Pollitt v. Roadway Express, Inc. (228 F. Supp. 2d 854, 2002)

DECISION AND ENTRY SUSTAINING IN PART AND OVERRULING IN PART DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DOC. # 10)

RICE, Chief Judge.

In the underlying case, Plaintiff Paul D. Pollitt claims that his employer, Defendant Roadway Express, Inc. (“Roadway”), discriminated against him on the basis of his age and disability. He pleads four claims for relief. In Count One, he alleges age discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq. (“ADEA”). In Count Two, he alleges disability discrimination in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq. (“ADA”). In Count Three, he alleges age and disability discrimination in violation of Ohio Rev. Code § 4112.01, et seq. Finally, in Count Four, he alleges retaliation in violation of the ADEA, the ADA, and Ohio Rev.Code § 4112.01, et seq. Contending that the facts do not support a finding of discrimination or retaliation on its part, Roadway now moves for summary judgment. {See Doc. # 10.)

I. Summary

In early January, 1999, after a nearly 17-year health-related hiatus from all work, Pollitt notified his employer, Roadway, that he was fit to return to work as of February 1 of that year. Having had very little contact with Pollitt over the course of the preceding 17 years, and in light of his previous health problems, Roadway expressed skepticism as to his fitness for employment. What ensued was a 17-month dispute over whether Pollitt had provided Roadway with sufficient medical evidence of his fitness for duty. Exacerbating the dispute was the fact that Roadway had removed Pollitt from its seniority list in the early 1990s, on the assumption that he was no longer employed with the company. On June 28, 2000, Pollitt was reinstated to his former position with his original seniority.

The question presented by his Complaint (Doc. # 1) is whether that 17-month “delay” was the product of age or disability-based animus, on the part of Roadway, or was, rather, merely the result of Roadway’s legitimate expectation that he provide a detailed accounting of his health, with particular regard for the specific injuries for which he had applied for workers’ compensation benefits during his extended period of unemployment.

For the reasons which follow, the Court finds that there are genuine issues of material fact, such that reasonable persons could disagree on whether Roadway discriminated against Pollitt on the basis of age and/or disability. Accordingly, Roadway’s Motion for Summary Judgment shall be OVERRULED as it relates to Pollitt’s discrimination claims. As it relates to Pol-litt’s retaliation claim, the Court finding no genuine issue of material fact with respect thereto, Roadway’s Motion shall be SUSTAINED.

II. Factual Background

Roadway is an international freight delivery company. (Blackert Depo. at 22.) Beginning in March of 1959, Pollitt was employed as a pickup and delivery driver (“P & D driver”) and dock worker at Roadway’s Dayton terminal. (Id. at 23; Pollitt Depo. at 27.) As a P & D driver, his job duties included picking up and delivering freight from and to customers in the Dayton area. (Blackert Depo. at 23-24.) Although Roadway as a whole employed its own interstate truck drivers (known as over-the-road carriers), its drivers working out of the Dayton terminal were exclusively local P & D drivers. (Id. at 22-23.)

At all relevant times, Robert Blackert was the manager of Roadway’s Dayton terminal (Id. at 7), and John Ferrone was a Roadway manager of labor relations, serving as a Roadway regional vice president of labor relations until around 1995, and thereafter as the vice president of labor relations for the entire Roadway organization. (Ferrone Depo. at 5.) Pollitt, as with all employees in his position, was a member of the Teamsters Union, and the terms of his employment were set forth in a collective bargaining agreement known as the National Master Freight Agreement and Central Region Local Cartage and Over-the-Road, Motor Freight Supplemental Agreement (“CBA”). (Pollitt Depo. at 27 — 28; Ferrone Depo. at 8 & Ex. 20.) Labor disputes arising under the CBA were to be decided by the Ohio Joint State Grievance Committee (“OJSGC”). Pension and unemployment welfare benefits were offered by the Teamsters through the union’s Central States Health and Welfare Plan (“Central States Fund”). (Pollitt Depo. at 141.)

While at Roadway, Pollitt suffered two serious industrial accidents. The first occurred in 1978 and resulted in his obtaining workers’ compensation benefits and missing work for about a year. (Id. at 132-33.) The second occurred in 1981, again resulting in his filing for workers’ compensation and having to miss work for about a year. (Id. at 134-36, 140.) Not long after his return to work in or around March of 1982, Pollitt’s physician instructed him to take off work indefinitely, which he did, until he began working for Roadway again in June of 2000. (Id. at 137.) He continued to receive workers’ compensation benefits until some time in 1986 or 1987. (Id. at 154-55.) At some point in the 1980s, Pollitt applied for and received disability benefits through the Central States Fund, and continued to receive such until around the time he returned to work for Roadway in June of 2000. (Id. at 141— 45, 372.) He also received Social Security disability benefits (“SSD”) (id. at 147), and continued to receive such for about nine months after his return to work. (Id. at 148, 372.) During his absence, he was considered totally and permanently disabled. (Id. at 371-72.)

Between 1982 and 1989, Pollitt, then living in Florida, did not work, and did not engage in any rigorous physical activity, on account of his physical condition. (Id. at 157-60.) On several occasions during that time, he contacted Blackert. (Id. at 41 & 44; Blackert Depo. at 5, 7-8.) These contacts concerned workers’ compensation issues, and Blackert told him to communicate exclusively with Roadway’s workers’ compensation department and the company’s attorneys. (Pollitt Depo. at 41-46, 173-74.) In June of 1986, Pollitt filed a claim for permanent and total disability benefits through the Ohio workers’ compensation system. (Id. at Ex. 16, at Bates-stamped doc. # s 02327-02329.) For reasons not explained to the Court, the Ohio Industrial Commission did not rule on this claim until 1994. (Id.) In 1991, at the suggestion of Roadway, Pollitt visited a Dr. Schneider, in St. Petersburg, Florida, who recommended that he try to rehabilitate himself. (Id. at 160-64.) Dr. Schneider identified 17 separate ailments of which Pollitt complained, and stated that it was his medical opinion that Pollitt was “permanently and totally impaired.” (Id. at Ex. 6, at Bates-stamped doc. # s 03043-03045.) However, Dr. Schneider opined that only 25% of Pollitt’s physical impairments was related to his two prior work-related industrial accidents, and that, therefore, he was not totally disabled on account of his work-related injuries. (Id.) On the basis of Dr. Schneider’s medical opinion and report, the Industrial Commission, in 1994, denied Pollitt’s 1986 benefits claim for permanent and total disability benefits. (Id. at Ex. 16, at Bates-stamped doc. # 02329.) Therefore, Pollitt did not undergo rehabilitation at that time. (Id. at 162 & 164.)

Meanwhile, also in the early 1990s, Roadway management was directed by its workers’ compensation department to remove Pollitt from its seniority list. (Blac-kert Depo. at 37-39.) Under Article 43 of the CBA, an employee’s seniority can be broken only by “discharge, voluntary quit, normal retirement, or more than a five (5) year layoff.” (Ferrone- Depo. at Ex. 20, at 168.) There is no dispute that Pollitt was never discharged or laid off, and Roadway has no documentation that he ever quit or retired. (Id. at 13-15; Blaekert Depo. at 74 & 76.) There is also no question that Roadway never notified Pollitt that his name had been removed from the seniority list. (Ferrone Depo. at 13-15; Pollitt Depo. at 178 & 182.) Roadway management simply “assumed” that its workers’ compensation department had a bona fide reason for directing it to remove him in such fashion. (Ferrone Depo. at 13.)

In 1995, another physician, Dr. Ronald Grove, recommended that Pollitt receive physical rehabilitation, but he was again denied workers’ compensation benefits. (Pollitt Depo. at 164-65.) In 1998, although he .did not receive workers’ compensation benefits to cover the cost, Pol-litt began rehabilitation treatment, which continued until the end of 1998, at which time Dr. Ronald Grove released him with a clean bill of health and permission to return to work beginning February 1, 1999. (Id at 165-70 & Ex. 5, at Bates-stamped doc. # 02012.)

Upon receiving his medical release, Pol-litt contacted his union representative, Doug Davis, who in turn told him to contact Blaekert. (Id at 174-75.) At Blae-kert’s request, Pollitt faxed him a copy of Dr. Ronald Grove’s release, but did not hear back from him before February 1. (Id at 176, 178.) Of his own volition, on January 26, 1999, Pollitt received and passed a physical evaluation from a medical group regularly utilized by Roadway for purposes of evaluating the fitness of its drivers and assuring they satisfy certain conditions imposed upon truck drivers by the Ohio Department of Transportation. (Id at 178-80; Blaekert Depo. at 59-60 & Ex. 3.) Then, on February 1, he reported to work at Roadway, where he was told by Blaekert that he had been taken off the seniority list and did not have a job. (Pol-litt Depo. at 181-82.) Prior to that point in time, Pollitt had never been notified that he had been removed from the seniority list. (Id at 178 & 182.) Blaekert told him that Roadway had not notified him of the fact because it did not know his whereabouts. (Id. at 183.) Around that same time, Blaekert told another employee that Pollitt would “never step foot” on Roadway property again. (Bolton Aff., attached to Doc. # 15, ¶ 3.)

Generally, when Roadway drivers take leave from work due to work-related injuries, they retain their seniority status. (Blaekert-Depo. at 27.) Upon an injured employee’s return to work, Roadway retains the right, under Article 47' of the CBA, to require an employee to undergo an evaluation by a physician of its choosing. (Id at 20; Ferrone Depo. at 22-23 & Ex. 20, at 179.) If he desires, the employee can obtain a second opinion from a physician of the union’s choosing. In the event of a disagreement between the two physicians, they are to select jointly a third physician to examine the employee, and his or her diagnosis of the employee’s fitness is final and binding on all parties. (Ferrone Depo. at Ex. 20, at 179.) Typically, Roadway either accepts the returning employee’s medical release, and reinstates him, or directs him to a physician of its own choosing if it thinks further evaluations are necessary. (Blaekert Depo. at 20.)

Interpreting Roadway’s stance with respect to his employment status as a violation of the CBA, Pollitt filed a grievance with the OJSGC on February 3, seeking reinstatement of his seniority status along with wages and benefits as of February 1, 1999. (Pollitt Depo. at Ex. 5, at Bates-stamped doc. # 02011.) In the same grievance, Pollitt charged Roadway with violating his rights under the ADA, also in violation of the CBA. (Id.)

At a hearing held on the grievance on February 18, 1999, the following statement was given by Ferrone, on behalf of Roadway (the emphasized portions are those which are cited by Pollitt in support of his argument against summary judgment):

Well you see, Mr. Pollitt went off on some sort of an injury and we haven’t heard from him in about 18 years. And, so in 1987, I guess it was, he filed for 'permanent disability and then again in 1991 or 1992, somewhere along those lines, and never, ever talked to us about anything other than the fact that all the information that we got that said that he was permanently, totally disabled and could never, ever return to work and ive removed his name from the seniority list. Haven’t heard from him. Called us one day and said I’ll be back to work on such and such day, give me a starting time. So we did remove his name from the seniority list. We feel he has no seniority at Roadway Express. I believe 1991 and have no contact with him whatsoever. Didn’t tell us that he was on any type of therapy or anything of this nature and just shows up one day and says here I am, after 18 years. I’m totally rehabilitated, on some miracle drug and ready to go back to work. It’s our opinion that if this individual was on some type of therapy or was going through some type of program and had any intentions of going to work that he had an obligation to notify us, which he did not do. We’re in a situation right now where we’ve got fifteen people on layoff status, really doesn’t make any difference to this particular case, but this guy in my opinion has got no seniority with Roadway Express. We told him that, said you have no job here. Fine. After we haven’t heard from him he just shows up one day. So I have no idea. No information. He’s got no information. When he showed up for work that day wanting to know when his starting time, with no ... [ellipses in original] this guy’s had extensive physicals, he’s got a lot of degenerative parts of his body. Matter of fact the release that he showed up with that he gave us was the same doctor that seven or eight years before had said he’s 100% disabled. Would never, ever return to work. Couldn’t lift over 10 pounds over his head. No that’s from us going back reviewing the reports that he’s had through Worker’s Comp. But he just simply shows up with a physical from the same guy and says he’s under years of rehabilitation. We asked him what he’d been doing in rehabilitation, rehabilitating in Florida for 18 years or so, right? And now after all these years he decides to go to physical therapy. So, I don’t know. If he had this release now he may have had this release seven, eight or nine years ago and what do you do, you just get lost for 10 years and all of a sudden show up one day when you’re 62 years old? I thought as you got older your body deteriorated. This guy, as he got older he turned into a piece of steel, evidently. From what we’ve got. It’s our opinion that if anything, he’s doing nothing but playing some sort of a game. He’s looking for something that he’s not entitled to. If he was entitled to something along these lines, he would have been entitled to it fifteen years ago. He had plenty of time to rehabilitate. He had plenty of time to take physical therapy. We have no release from this guy stating that all of these x’s that he’s got on his body that they’ve healed completely. And if he’s as bad as his doctor’s [sic] have said he’s been over the years, the same doctor that said he’s ok, there’s no doubt in our mind that what’s going to happen to this guy on his first day out he’s going to crash and we’re going to be subject with another problem. So yes, yes, we told • him he had no seniority with Roadway. We don’t believe he has any seniority with Roadway. And that’s by his own doing. So after years and years, in 1992 or something, I believe it was 1992, after he filed for permanent disability, again, and was denied, when he was denied that, and he was, by his own records stating that he was 100% disabled, when we got that word, on that day, we removed him from our seniority list. Took him off the seniority list. Have not heard from him since that time up ‘til today, when he found all these miracle dmgs or whatever he’s got. Whatever he’s taking to heal his body I’d like to have some, if he could let us all know, we could live to be 1,000’. It’s our position that this guy has no seniority. You cannot go someplace for an extended period of time with not notifying the Company or the Union. We have not heard anything from the Union, telling us that this guy was coming back or was in rehabilitation, until the same time he called us. So evidently he wasn’t in contact with them either. And we don’t think that the contract or any job provides for someone to simply take a seven or eight year vacation, and then decide after all this period of time, now I think I’ll go to physical therapy for two months and then get well and then come back and then pick up everything that he had, five weeks vacation, and these other goodies and the top dollar for nothing. And we don’t think that any contract or any job provides for that. If this individual had an ongoing problem and notified us as to what his problem was so we could track it and be part of it, that was one thing. That did not happen. That did not happen. We have the same manager who had been there all these years. So it isn’t like he didn’t know who he was doing business with. Gentlemen, it’s our position that this is nothing more than a sham and if he could have got physical therapy, if he could have got rehabilitated, he could have done this ten years ago or twelve years ago. And he has no seniority with Roadway. He is not an employee who should be working on that facility. He’s not somebody that we should be putting on that dock, taking a job away from somebody whose worked very, very hai'd. That’s our case in a nutshell. We have no documentation from this individual other than what you’ve read that the same doctor who said he was 100% disabled back in 1987 and again in 1992 is now saying he’s a fine specimen of health and he can not only lift 10 pounds over his head, he can lift 100 pounds over his head. That the situation. That’s what happened in the case and that’s all we know about it, because we asked Mm for full documentation, everything along these lines which he has provided us with nothing. All he said was, I’m rehabilitated, I’ve been rehabilitated and have been to physical therapy and now I’m here and I’m ready to go back to work. That’s our position gentlemen. We don’t think this guy has anything, any seniority at the Dayton facility.

(Id. at Ex. 1, at 5-9.)

Ferrone added, in reference to Dr. Schneider’s 1991 report, the following comments:

1991 he said he was going to go into rehab. He decided to do that in 1998. Gentleman [sic], I don’t believe that this contract or any other contract or anything that we do business with every day allows an individual to totally get lost for the period of time that he had been. Now lets [sic] just go back to his last evaluation, I guess, before the Industrial Commission, and that was in 1992.1992-1998. Seven years and he brings a doctor’s release in from the same doctor that says that he was totally, 100% disabled and got all this medical equipment from the stair stepper in his room, or whatever he got, that he could work on in his house. If he could done this when he was, he’s in his sixties I think he’s the same, close to the same age as I am, sixty one or sixty two, if he could have done tMs, he could have done this a hell of lot easier when at the age of 54. He elected not to do that. Now all of a sudden, after all of his positions, going back before the Industrial Commission, has said over and over again, that he’s 100% disabled, he just shows up one day and says I want to go back to work and where is my starting time and that’s the only explanation. Now, I just read to you seventeen things that he reported wrong with him. Now, we are a self-insured carrier, this doctor’s release that he brought to us is if [sic] course totally unacceptable. We don’t feel that he has done anything to rehabilitate himself and we don’t feel that it is proper that any company for any reason should have to carry an individual like this on a seniority list where he could just simply come back eight or nine years later, or in this particular case, eighteen years later, and go right to the top of the seniority list and knock somebody out of a job when he did absolutely nothing, nothing to correct his problem that he had. If he could have corrected the problem in 1998, he could have corrected the problem at least in 1992, after he went before the Ohio State Commission. And they said that he was, that he wanted to be rehabilitated. Now, that’s our case. No, no, did we send him a letter removing his name from the seniority list? The answer to that is no we did not. We never said we did. We removed his name from the seniority list because all of the information we got back from the doctors and him being on pension, said that he would never, ever be back to work. Never, ever, ever be back to work. And he went back before this Commission on several occasions. We were not there. This manager was not there. This is the same guy that he worked for. This guys [sic] been at Dayton for, I’ve been with Roadway for twenty years, he’s the guy that picked me up from the airport and took me to Cincinnati, showed me where my office was. So, that’s how long he’s been there. He’s not a stranger to Mr. Pol-litt. He’s not a stranger to Mr. Wei-nert, who was there at that time, working in Dayton. Doug was not, but the bottom line is this, he had no conversation with this local union because they would have called us. Had no discussion about ADA. Had no discussion about he wanted special consideration from Roadway to look into his problems. None whatsoever. All he did, all he did, was, for some reason, he decided to rehabilitate himself and come back to work. And I think, in my opinion, before is the same as it is now, if he could have done it in 1998, he could have done it back in 1987 or whatever the case may be. I don’t feel that this guys [sic] got any seniority. I don’t feel he deserves any seniority. None whatsoever. I don’t feel that he has a right to replace the last guy we’ve got on our seniority list at Dayton, Ohio or any other facility. And that’s the Company’s position and that’s our position.

(Id. at Ex. 1, at 39-41.)

At the conclusion of the hearing, the OJSGC ruled that the dispute was exclusively over the issue of seniority, and governed by Article 43 of the CBA (Ferrone Depo. at Ex. 20, at 168), and that there was no ADA issue to consider. Despite this ruling, nowhere in its decision did it expressly rule on the seniority issue. Indeed, its sole ruling was that Pollitt should provide Roadway with a detailed medical release. (Id. at Ex. 1, at 53-54.) Following the February 18 hearing, Pollitt provided Roadway with another medical release form from Dr. Jeffrey Grove, Dr. Ronald Grove’s son, but a dispute soon arose as to whether said medical release satisfied the conditions of the OJSGC’s February 18 decision. (Pollitt Depo. at Ex. 6, at Bates-stamped doc. # 03049; id. at Ex. 2.) In particular, Roadway objected to the fact that the release provided by Dr. Jeffrey Grove did not address the 17 ailments of which he had complained to Dr. Schneider in 1991, as addressed in the Industrial Commission’s 1994 ruling on Pollitt’s 1986 application for workers’ compensation benefits. (Id. at Ex. 2, at 5-9.) A third favorable medical evaluation, provided by a Dr. Long, of Dayton (Id. at 230-35 & Ex. 6, at Bates-stamped doc. # 03050), also failed to assuage Roadway of its misgivings, because again, it did not address the 17 ailments dating back to 1991. (Id. at 240; Ferrone Depo. at 55-56.) It made this objection even though the OJSGC made no mention of Dr. Schneider’s 1991 report in its decision. Indeed, at the time Pollitt presented Roadway with his third medical release, from Dr. Long, dated March 10, 1999, Roadway was aware that Pollitt did not even have a copy of Dr. Schneider’s 1991 report enumerating the 17 ailments of which he had then complained. (Pollitt Depo. at Ex. 7; Blaekert Depo. at 101.)

In early April, 1999, Roadway wrote to the OJSGC, stating that Pollitt was refusing to comply with the terms of the February 18 decision. (Blaekert Depo. at Ex. 7.) In response, Pollitt renewed his grievance with the OJSGC, which then heard additional arguments on the matter on April 15. At the conclusion of the April 15 hearing, the OJSGC ruled in favor of Roadway that Pollitt was obligated to provide a medical release giving Roadway the “authority to converse with his doctors relative to all 17 items listed in the Workmen’s Compensation report made a part of the previous record.” (Pollitt Depo. at Ex. 2, at 24-25.)

Following the April 15 hearing, Pollitt drafted his own release of information form, authorizing Dr. Long to discuss the 17 specific ailments addressed in Dr. Schneider’s 1991 report with a single physician from the medical group regularly used by Roadway (and from where Pollitt had received his physical on January 26, 1999).' (Id. at 243 & Ex. 8, at Bates-stamped doc. # 01908.) In addition, Dr. Long wrote to Roadway that he had reviewed Dr. Schneider’s 1991 report, and that, in his medical opinion, none of the 17 ailments of which Pollitt had then complained would prevent him (Pollitt) from returning to work for Roadway. (Id. at Ex. 8, at Bates-stamped doc. # 01909; Blaekert Depo. at 97-98.) Again, Roadway rejected the release, this time because it limited its ability to obtain medical information from Dr. Ronald Grove and his son Dr. Jeffrey Grove, and from Dr. Schneider. (Ferrone Depo. at 68; Pollitt Depo. at Ex. 10.) Furthermore, Roadway did not believe that Dr. Long’s correspondence addressed the 17 ailments in sufficient detail. (Ferrone Depo. at 71-72.) The parties therefore went back before the OJSGC, on May 21,. 1999, at which time Pollitt signed a release authorizing Roadway’s physician to discuss his medical history with Drs. Ronald and Jeffrey Grove, and Schneider. (Pollitt Depo. at 260-63 & Exs. 3 & 10.)

The dispute expanded after May 21 to the question of whether Roadway was entitled to physical records. (Id. at 268.) Pol-litt had not authorized the physical release of any medical records. (Id. at 268, 273 & Ex. 12.) Thus, on July 15, 1999, the parties returned to the OJSGC to have it determine whether Pollitt was required to do so per the terms of the preceding decisions. (Id. at Ex. 4.) At that time, adding frustration to Pollitt’s cause, Roadway produced a letter, dated July 1, 1999, from a Dr. Howard, a physician utilized by Roadway, in which Dr. Howard reported to Roadway that he had conversed with Dr. Jeffrey Grove and Dr. Long, and that he had been informed by Dr. Long that he had been unaware that Pollitt’s duties at Roadway would include heavy lifting, -and that he had not taken such into account in authorizing Pollitt to return to work. (Id. at Ex. 4, at 15-16; id. at Ex. 13.) Dr. Howard also noted that Dr. Jeffrey Grove had not actually examined Pollitt, but that he, too, upon an examination of Dr. Ronald Grove’s chart on Pollitt, had opined that Pollitt could not perform heavy work for prolonged periods. (Id. at Ex. 13.) Therefore, Dr. Howard expressed his opinion to Roadway that there was a “strong probability” that Polhtt would suffer further injury if allowed to return to work, and that he should undergo “thorough examination and testing” before Roadway allowed any such return. (Id.) Pollitt, not having been shown a copy of Dr. Howard’s letter prior to the July 15 hearing, and caught off guard by the production of same, withdrew his grievance. (Id. at Ex. 4, at 18.)

Throughout the several proceedings, the OJSGC never made express findings of fact. Furthermore, at each stage of the grievance prior to its withdrawal on July 15, 1999, the OJSGC stated that the dispute remained open and unresolved. (Id. at Ex. 1, at 54; id. at Ex. 2, at 24; id. at Ex. 3, at Bates-stamped doc. # 03069.)

Following Polhtt’s withdrawal of his grievance, Roadway was of the belief that it owed no duty to Pollitt to facilitate further his return to work. (Ferrone Depo. at 88-91; Blackert Depo. at 116.) Furthermore, regardless of what Pollitt intended to do, Roadway maintained its position that until he provided a statement from one of his physicians addressing the 17 ailments enumerated in Dr. Schneider’s 1991 report, and finding him fit to perform all of the functions of his job at Roadway, it would not allow him to return to work. (Ferrone Depo. at 87-92.) For his part, Pollitt attempted to verify the assertions in Dr. Howard’s letter. Although Pollitt could not verify whether Dr. Jeffrey Grove' stated those opinions ascribed to him by Dr. Howard (Pollitt Depo. at 275-78), he recalled that those opinions ascribed to Dr. Long had been distorted by Dr. Howard. (Id. at 278.) Indeed, Dr. Long memorialized in a writing the fact that at no time did he tell Dr. Howard that Pollitt was not fit to return to work (id. at -Ex. 14), and Pollitt delivered a copy of this writing to Roadway (id. at 278), which offered no response. (Ferrone Depo. at 93; Blackert Depo. at 117-18.)

In November, 1999, Pollitt filed an EEOC complaint. (Compl. at Ex. A; Fer-rone Depo. at 102; Blackert Depo. at 129-30.) Around the same time, Pollitt retained legal counsel, which, upon contacting Roadway, was informed that Pollitt could^return to work only if he could demonstrate his fitness for duty. (Jenkins Aff., attached to Doc. # 15, ¶ 9.) In March, 2000, Pollitt underwent a thorough physical evaluation by Dr. Michael Pedoto, and presented Dr. Pedoto’s report to Roadway. (Blackert Depo. at 130 & Ex. 19.) After several months went by without it hearing from Roadway, counsel for Polhtt learned, in June of 2000, that Roadway had directed Pollitt to undergo a more extensive physical evaluation at the Cleveland Clinic. (Jenkins Aff. ¶¶ 10 & 11; id. at Exs. H, I & J; Blackert Depo. at 130; Ferrone Depo. at 105.) The Cleveland Clinic examination was completed as of June 15, and Pollitt returned to work on June 28. (Jenkins Aff ¶ 12.)

Shortly after his return to work, Blac-kert told another employee that Pollitt would not be back “for long.” (Bolton Aff. ¶ 4.) Furthermore, for several months following his return, Pollitt experienced a hostile work environment. (Pollitt Depo. at 52-120.) Blackert retired in December, 2000, and since that time Pollitt has gotten along favorably with Blackert’s replacement, Marty Pond. (Id. at 70-71.)

III. Position of the Parties

Pollitt claims that Roadway discriminated against him on the basis of his age and perceived disability, in violation of the ADEA and ADA, respectively, by not reinstating him to his former position until June 28, 2000, nearly 17 months after he first sought reinstatement. Pollitt’s allegations that he was the subject of discrimination are not limited to a single point in time, and include: Roadway’s refusal to reinstate him on February 1, 1999, even though he had provided it with a medical release from Dr. Ronald Grove; Roadway’s repeated refusal to reinstate him after he provided follow-up medical releases from Dr. Jeffrey Grove and Dr. Long; Roadway’s submission of the allegedly misleading statements of Dr. Howard to the OJSGC; Roadway’s refusal to have him examined by a physician of its- own choosing until it received what it considered to be a sufficient medical release from one of his physicians; Roadway’s insistence that any such medical release specifically address each of the 17 ailments of which he complained to Dr. Schneider in 1991; Roadway’s delay in scheduling his physical at the Cleveland Clinic even after it was finally satisfied that his earlier ailments had been addressed in sufficient fashion by Dr. Pedoto; and Roadway’s two-week delay in reinstating him even after he successfully completed his physical at the Cleveland Clinic. He also claims that he was subject to harassment upon his return to work in retaliation for his having filed the EEOC complaint.

Roadway contends that it refused to reinstate Pollitt initially because of the fact that he had been removed from the seniority list around 1991, and therefore was not considered an employee, and, furthermore, because it did not consider the medical release signed by Dr. Ronald Grove to address sufficiently his past ailments. Conceding that on the basis of the OJSGC decision of February 18, 1999, it could no longer maintain its argument that it had removed Pollitt from the seniority list in a proper manner, it argues that thereafter it refused to reinstate him, because he failed to provide sufficient medical documentation of his health. It contends that it reinstated him after he finally complied with the letter of the OJSGC decision, and that it did so in a timely fashion. It argues further Pollitt has not adduced any evidence of actionable retaliation.

IV. Standards Governing Motions for Summary Judgment

Summary judgment must be entered “against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Of course, the moving party:

always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,” which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.

Id. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548; see also Boretti v. Wiscomb, 930 F.2d 1150, 1156 (6th Cir.1991) (The moving party has the “burden of showing that the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions and affidavits in the record, construed favorably to the nonmoving party, do not raise a genuine issue of material fact for trial.”)(quoting Gutierrez v. Lynch, 826 F.2d 1534, 1536 (6th Cir.1987)). The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party who “must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)(quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)). Thus, “[o]nce the moving party has met its initial burden, the nonmoving party must present evidence that creates a genuine issue of material fact making it necessary to resolve the difference at trial.” Talley v. Bravo Pitino Restaurant, Ltd., 61 F.3d 1241, 1245 (6th Cir.1995). Read together, Liberty Lobby and Celotex stand for the proposition that a party may move for summary judgment by demonstrating that the opposing party will not be able to produce sufficient evidence at trial to withstand a directed verdict motion (now known as a motion for judgment as a matter of law, Fed.R.Civ.P. 50). Street v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1478 (6th Cir.1989).

Once the burden of production has so shifted, the party opposing summary judgment cannot rest on its pleadings or merely reassert its previous allegations. It is not sufficient to “simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); see also Michigan Protection and Advocacy Serv., Inc. v. Babin, 18 F.3d 337, 341 (6th Cir.1994)(“The plaintiff must present more than a scintilla of evidence in support of his position; the evidence must be such that a jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.”). Rather, Rule 56(e) “requires the nonmoving party to go beyond the [unverified] pleadings” and present some type of evidentiary material in support of its position. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548. Summary judgment “shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and tfiat the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Summary judgment shall be denied “[i]f there are ... ‘genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.’ ” Hancock v. Dodson, 958 F.2d 1367, 1374 (6th Cir.1992) (citation omitted). Of course, in determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, a court must assume as true the evidence of the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505. If the parties present conflicting evidence, a court may not decide which evidence to believe, by determining which parties’ affiants are more credible; rather, credibility determinations must be left to the fact-finder. 10A Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 2726. In ruling on a motion for summary judgment (in other words, in determining whether there is a genuine issue of material fact), “[a] district court is not ... obligated to wade through and search the entire record for some specific facts that might support the nonmoving party’s claim.” InterRoyal Corp. v. Sponseller, 889 F.2d 108, 111 (6th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1091, 110 S.Ct. 1839, 108 L.Ed.2d 967 (1990); see also L.S. Heath & Son, Inc. v. AT & T Information Sys., Inc., 9 F.3d 561 (7th Cir.1993); Skotak v. Tenneco Resins, Inc., 953 F.2d 909, 915 n. 7 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 832, 113 S.Ct. 98, 121 L.Ed.2d 59 (1992)(“Rule 56 does not impose upon the district court a duty to sift through the record in search of evidence to support a party’s opposition to summary judgment....”). Thus, a court is entitled to rely, in determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists on a particular issue, only upon those portions of the verified pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with any affidavits submitted, specifically called to its attention by the parties.

V. Analysis

Under the ADA, an employer cannot discriminate against a “qualified individual with a disability” because of that disability. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). A “qualified individual with a disability” means “an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires.” Id. § 12111(8). “Disability” means:

(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual;

(B) a record of such an impairment; or

(C) being regarded as having such an impairment.

Id. § 12102(2). Under the ADEA, an employer cannot discriminate against an employee on the basis of age if the employee is at least 40 years of age. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 623(a) & 631(a).

In this case, there is no question that Pollitt was above the age of 40 when the alleged discrimination transpired. Regarding his alleged disability, he does not contend that he is actually disabled. Rather, his claim of disability is raised under 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8)(B) & (C), on the basis that he has a known record of being disabled, and that Roadway regarded him as disabled. (See Doc. # 15 at 25-26.)

With regard to burdens of proof, the Sixth Circuit has stated:

An employee may prove discrimination based on his or her disability in two ways. The first is by putting forward direct evidence that the defendant had a discriminatory motive in carrying out its employment decision. See Robinson v. Runyon, 149 F.3d 507, 512-14 (6th Cir. 1998) (discussing the difference between direct versus circumstantial proof in a Title VII case). Such evidence would take the form, for example, of an employer telling an employee, “I fired you because you are disabled.” Because “rarely will there be direct evidence from the lips of the 'defendant proclaiming his or her ... animus,” id., employees have a second method to prove discrimination: the indirect burden-shifting approach first articulated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-03, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973).

Smith v. Chrysler Corp., 155 F.3d 799, 805 (6th Cir.1998). The same approach applies to claims brought under the ADEA. See Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers Int’l Union v. RMI Titanium Co., 199 F.3d 881, 889-90 (6th Cir.2000).

Where a plaintiff creates a genuine issue of material fact as to the existence of “direct evidence” of discrimination, summary judgment may not be granted. See, e.g., Johnson v. University of Cincinnati, 215 F.3d 561, 577 (6th Cir.) (holding that direct evidence of race discrimination presented a genuine issue of fact for the trier of fact to decide), cert. denied 531 U.S. 1052, 121 S.Ct. 657, 148 L.Ed.2d 560 (2000). Alternatively, where the plaintiff must prove her ease with “indirect evidence” of discrimination, under the McDonnell Douglas approach, she must first make a prima facie showing of discrimination. If she can do this, she “in effect creates a presumption that the employer unlawfully discriminated against the employee.” St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993) (citation omitted). In that case, the burden of producing evi dence of a non-discriminatory reason for the adverse decision falls on the defendant employer. See id. at 506-07, 113 S.Ct. 2742. This is merely a production burden, not a persuasion burden. See id. at 507, 113 S.Ct. 2742. In the event the defendant fails to meet its burden of production, the presumption created by the plaintiffs prima facie case requires a finding for the plaintiff. See id. at 506, 113 S.Ct. 2742. If, however, the defendant proffers such a justification, while an inference of discrimination may still be drawn from the plaintiffs prima facie evidence, the mandatory presumption of discrimination drops from the case. See Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255 n. 10, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981). It then falls on the plaintiff to rebut the defendant’s proffered justification by showing that it is mere pretext. Generally, the plaintiff can meet this burden in one of three ways. To raise a genuine issue of material fact about the credibility of his employer’s explanation (i.e., to show pretext), the plaintiff must show by a preponderance of the evidence either (1) that the proffered reasons had no basis in fact, (2) that the proffered reasons did not actually motivate the employer to take the adverse action, or (3) that the proffered reasons were insufficient to motivate the taking of the adverse action. See Manzer v. Diamond Shamrock Chemicals Co., 29 F.3d 1078, 1084 (6th Cir.1994).

Both of the parties herein place significant emphasis on the proceedings before the OJSGC. Pollitt reiterates time and time again that Ferrone’s comments about his age and health, made during the hearing on February 18,1999, should be under1 stood as direct evidence of age and disability discrimination. He also argues that the OJSGC ruled that Roadway erroneously removed him from -its seniority list, and that this, too, is direct evidence of discrimination. See supra note 8. Roadway, for its part, contends that the OJSGC repeatedly ruled that Pollitt had failed to provide Roadway with access to his medical records, such that its refusal to allow him to return to work until he complied with the decisions was perfectly legitimate, and supports its overarching argument that it had legitimate grounds for doubting Pol-litt’s fitness, even though he ultimately proved to be healthy.

Although the Court may treat statements made during the OJSGC proceedings as prior admissions of party opponents, see Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2), the actual decisions of that body are of limited relevance. The OJSGC was utilized, as required by the CBA, to settle a labor contract dispute. The question before the OJSGC was whether Roadway violated the CBA by removing Pollitt from its seniority list in the early 1990s. While it is true that in the course of those proceedings, the OJSGC proceeded to consider a secondary issue of whether Pollitt had provided Roadway with sufficient documentation of his good health, it never invoked the ADA or the ADEA as a basis for any of its decisions, and it certainly did not have in front of it all of the facts that are now before this Court. Indeed, Article 37 of the CBA even states that “whether the Employer has complied with the ADA’s statutory requirements shall not be subject to the grievance procedure.” (Ferrone Depo. at Ex. 20, at 140.) In any event, the contractual issue therein, i.e., the question of seniority, is not at issue before this Court. The case at bar is in no manner an appeal of any decision issued by the OJSGC, and there is no reason for this Court to defer to any decisions or rulings of that body, which related exclusively to Pollitt’s rights under the CBA. At most, the Court may consider statements made by Roadway during those proceedings, by Ferrone in particular, for their probative value vis-a-vis the Claims at issue herein.

In moving for summary judgment, Roadway contends, simply, that there is no evidence of discrimination or retaliation. In opposing Roadway’s Motion, Pollitt contends that there is direct evidence that Roadway discriminated against him on the basis of age and disability. He relies upon three pieces of evidence in making this argument. First, he recounts his own auditory observation that during the February 18, 1999, OJSGC hearing, Ferrone stated “the reason we don’t want him [Pol-litt] back is that he is an old man and he will fall apart.” (Pollitt Depo. at 337.) Second, he cites excerpted portions of the statements given by Ferrone at the same hearing, as documented in the transcript of that hearing and set forth and highlighted earlier in this Decision and Entry. Third, he cites Roadway’s Motion, wherein it states:

Plaintiff will no doubt argue that he was treated differently than other employees. He is right. Roadway will certainly treat an employee totally disabled for 17 consecutive years as the result of numerous conditions differently than an employee who returns to work following a much shorter absence based on a single medical condition. (See Blaekert Depo. at 20-22.) Such differences clearly do not show discrimination. They reflect only common sense.

(Doc. # 10 at 13 (emphasis in original).)

The Court will address his various claims in turn.

A. Age Discrimination Under the ADD A (Count One)

The Court agrees that the first piece of evidence relied upon by Pollitt is direct evidence of age discrimination which creates a genuine issue of material fact and precludes summary judgment. Construing the facts in a light most favorable to Pollitt, the Court must accept as true the allegation that Ferrone stated that Roadway did not reinstate him upon his return because it felt that he would “fall apart” on account of his being an “old man.” Because this statement fits neatly next to the example of direct evidence provided by the Sixth Circuit in Smith, 155 F.3d at 805, and assuming for the sake of ruling on summary judgment that a jury might believe Pollitt’s allegation, it is plain that summary judgment would not be proper.

Clearly, there are competing inferences which could be made in Roadway’s favor. For example, it may be that its initial reluctance to reinstate Pollitt was due to the fact that it had removed him from his seniority list in 1991, and therefore no longer regarded him as someone who rightly could claim a job. This is a perfectly legitimate argument to raise in its defense, because the legality of Roadway’s action of removing Pollitt from the seniority list in 1991, which was the purported focus of his OJSGC grievance, is not itself an issue herein. It may also be that Roadway simply did not like Pollitt, and that it was trying to put up roadblocks to his reinstatement on that basis. Indeed, it is perfectly reasonable to think that management might have been concerned about what effect Pollitt’s reinstatement with full seniority after his lengthy absence would have on other employees’, particularly if another employee would have to be laid off as a result. Because discrimination based on personal animus, as opposed to age-based animus, is not illegal under the ADEA, this, too, is a legitimate argument to raise as a defense. It may also be that Roadway’s refusal to accept the medical release Pollitt submitted from Dr. Ronald Grove was based on its genuine, good faith belief that the release simply was not sufficient, and that Roadway’s continued reluctance to accept Pollitt’s follow-up releases provided after the February 18, 1999, OJSGC hearing owed itself to its strict adherence to what it believed to be the letter of the OJSGC’s decision. Again, acting upon this basis would not be related to age or disability, and would therefore be legitimate and perfectly legal. A trier of fact might also agree that Pollitt’s long absence posed a special concern to Roadway, and/or simply refuse to believe that Ferrone ever made the statement ascribed to him by Pollitt, perhaps finding credence to Roadway’s argument that it is unlikely Ferrone would make derogatory comments about Pollitt’s age, given the fact that he is older than Pollitt.

However many reasonable inferences could be drawn in Roadway’s favor, they all are, of course, irrelevant to the Court in ruling on its Motion for Summary Judgment. It may be that a jury could find that Roadway had considerable and legitimate misgivings about Pollitt’s ability to handle the rigors of a job he had not occupied for almost 18 years, but then it might also find that Roadway had the obligation to have him evaluated more promptly to determine if he could satisfy the requisite level of fitness. The essence of the ADEA is that “[t]he employer cannot rely on age as a proxy for an employee’s remaining characteristics, such as productivity, but must instead focus on those factors directly.” Hazen Paper Co. v. Big- gins, 507 U.S. 604, 611, 113 S.Ct. 1701, 123 L.Ed.2d 338 (1993). Accordingly, to the extent it relates to Pollitt’s claim of age discrimination under the ADEA (Count One), Roadway’s Motion for Summary Judgment is OVERRULED.

B. Disability Discrimination Under the ADA (Count Two)

With regard to Pollitt’s ADA claim, the Court disagrees with Pollitt that Ferrone’s statements at the February 18, 1999, OJSGC hearing directly demonstrate that Roadway denied him reinstatement prior to June 28, 2000, because of his perceived disability. Having set forth earlier in this Decision and Entry the full text of the pertinent statements made by Ferrone, and having highlighted therein the excerpted portions of same upon which Pollitt relies, it is apparent, when said excerpts are placed back in their true context, that Ferrone’s statements were not discriminatory. As noted, the issue before the OJSGC was whether Roadway had acted properly under the CBA in removing Pollitt from its seniority list in the early 1990s, and it was that issue which Ferrone was addressing. His comments were made in defense of Roadway’s decision to do just that, and further in defense of its position that Pollitt’s return on February 1, 1999, did nothing to change the company’s opinion that he was not entitled to reinstatement. His comments regarding Pollitt’s history of physical impairments were just that, comments about a record of health problems which Roadway believed, as of the early 1990s, foreclosed the possibility of his returning to work. Again, whether Roadway was correct in removing Pollitt from its seniority list is a CBA issue which is not the concern of this Court. It would be inappropriate for the Court to misconstrue Ferrone’s explanation of the company’s position on that issue as evidence of its feelings toward Pollitt upon his return to work in 1999.

The statement made by Roadway on page 13 of its Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. # 10), in which it acknowledges that it treated Pollitt differently from other employees returning from disability leave on account of his 17-year absence and history of disability, poses a closer question. It is certainly an acknowledgment that he was treated differently on account of his long history of being disabled, but whether “different” treatment and “discriminatory” treatment mean the same thing is a different question. Under the ADA and related regulations, an employer has a right to inquire into “the ability of an employee to perform job-related functions.” See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(B); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(c). As an additional matter, as a trucking company, Roadway has to be concerned about whether its drivers are fit under rules imposed by the Ohio Department of Transportation. (Ferrone Depo. at 24.) Indeed, Pollitt himself stated that driving a truck is “one of the most hazardous jobs there are besides a police officer.” (Pollitt Depo. at 35.) On the other hand, a 17-year disability absence means nothing when taken by itself, anymore than a seven-year absence or a seven-month absence. The question is whether the employee is fit for duty, and it seems to this Court that an employer’s subjective perception that a 17-year disability absence provides grounds for treating an employee differently than an absence of fewer years is exactly the sort of stereotypical thinking which the ADA seeks to prohibit. It may have been, as Roadway argues, “common sense” for it to treat Pollitt differently, but that could only been determined after it had shown, by an objective evaluation of his health, that his 17-year absence actually had the deleterious effect which it surmised it had. This Court disagrees that the length of an employee’s leave of absence is relevant to the procedures utilized by the employer to evaluate his fitness upon his return. Indeed, the fact that Pollitt proved to be fit emphasizes the central tenet of the ADA: arbitrary perceptions of one’s physical ability to perform a job are not to guide an employer’s decision making.

Even if the statement at page 13 of Roadway’s Motion could not be construed as “direct evidence” of discrimination, the Court finds that Pollitt has created a genuine issue of material fact under the McDonnell Douglas rubric. To make out a prima facie case of disability discrimination under the ADEA, the plaintiff must be able to point to, in opposing a motion for summary judgment, facts as would be admissible at trial that, when taken as true, give rise to genuine issue whether (1) he is a member of a protected group, (2) he was subject to an adverse employment decision, (3) he was qualified for the position at which he faced the adverse employment decision, and (4) he was treated differently than similarly situated individuals outside of the protected class. See Policastro v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 297 F.3d 535, 539 (6th Cir.2002). The facts to which Pollitt directs the Court’s attention easily raise a genuine issue as to each of these prima facie factors.

If nothing else, Ferrone’s statements at the February 18, 1999, OJSGC hearing, along with the acknowledgment in Roadway’s Motion that Pollitt was treated differently because of its perception that his lengthy history of being disabled made him a special case, satisfy prongs (1) and (4). Through these statements, Roadway expressly acknowledges Pollitt’s history of being disabled and its perception that he was disabled, which places him within the class of individuals protected by the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8)(B) & (C), and that he was treated differently than other similarly situated employees outside the protected class (i.e., those who returned to work after disability leave whom Roadway did not continue to perceive as being disabled).

With respect to prong (2), whether a genuine issue exists as to whether Pollitt suffered an adverse employment action, which the Sixth Circuit has defined as a “materially adverse change in the terms or conditions of ... employment,” id. (citation omitted), Roadway does not argue in its Motion that an almost 17-month delay in reinstatement would not generally be considered adverse, or even that a shorter delay in scheduling a physical with a Roadway-appointed physician, or a delay in reinstating an employee after he has proven to be fit, would not be considered adverse. Certainly, if an employee is denied the right to perform his job, and thus receive compensation and benefits, for no legitimate reason, said denial constitutes a material change in the terms and conditions of employment, whether that right is denied over the course of one week, one month, or 17 months. Accordingly, the Court believes that if the facts were to demonstrate that Roadway acted unlawfully in causing Pollitt’s delayed reinstatement, then the inherent evil of the disparate treatment, along with his loss of income and benefits over that time, be it for the full 17 months, or even the shorter time periods between his physical with Dr. Pedoto and his reinstatement or his physical at the Cleveland Clinic and his reinstatement, would constitute an adverse employment action.

Finally, there is no doubt that Pollitt was qualified for the P & D driver’s job, in satisfaction of prong (3). Even if upon greater scrutiny of the facts Roadway’s initial concerns about Pollitt’s perceived disability appear well taken, at the prima facie stage of the analysis, the focus is merely on whether he met the objective qualifications for the job. Because Pollitt disputes the fact that Roadway had a legitimate basis for questioning his fitness for the job, the Court will not inquire, at the prima facie stage of the McDonnell Douglas analysis, into the factual truth of Roadway’s facially non-discriminatory justifications for not immediately reinstating him. To do so would require the Court to consider at this initial juncture Pollitt’s rebuttal argument, thus defeating the role of the tripartite analysis engendered by McDonnell Douglas. The prima facie inquiry is not so searching, and the Sixth Circuit has frequently repeated that a prima facie showing of a plaintiffs qualifications for a job need only be enough to demonstrate that the plaintiff meets the legitimate, objective criteria established by the employer. See Hoskins v. Oakland County Sheriff’s Dept., 227 F.3d 719, 731-32 (6th Cir.2000) (“ ‘[WJhen assessing whether a plaintiff has met her employer’s legitimate expectations at the prima facie stage of a termination case, a court must examine plaintiffs evidence independent of the nondiscriminatory reason “produced” by the defense as its reason for terminating plaintiff.’ ”) (quoting Cline v. Catholic Diocese of Toledo, 206 F.3d 651, 660-61 (6th Cir.2000)); Cline, supra (quoted in Hoskins, supra; stating that any consideration of the employer’s stated non-discriminatory reason for taking the adverse action against the plaintiff is “required” by McDonnell Douglas to be considered at the rebuttal stage); Gafford v. General Elec. Co., 997 F.2d 150, 167 n. 9 (6th Cir.1993) (rejecting the proposal to require a plaintiff to show, at the prima facie stage, that he was “as qualified” as other candidates or employees); Brown v. Tennessee, 693 F.2d 600, 603 n. 5 (6th Cir.1982) (plaintiffs proof must only support “the conclusion that the plaintiff was qualified according to the legitimate criteria disseminated by the company or as found by the district court”). The fact that Pol-litt had previously held the job, and ultimately proved fit for reinstatement in 2000, creates a genuine issue as to whether he was qualified for the job at any time between February 1, 1999, and June 28, 2000.

Because the Court finds' that the facts in the record give rise to a genuine issue as to each prong of Pollitt’s prima facie case of disability discrimination, it must consider Roadway’s facially non-discriminatory justifications for delaying Pol-litt’s reinstatement. Roadway easily satisfies its burden of production. First, it contends that it was justified in not reinstating Pollitt'upon his return on February 1, 1999, because, as far as its records indicated, Pollitt was no longer an employee with any seniority. Furthermore, it argues it had a bona fide reason to be concerned about Pollitt’s