Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc. v. Ottawa Plant Food, Inc. (283 F. Supp. 2d 1018, 2003)

United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa 2003-09-29

Citations

Full opinion text

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER REGARDING THE PARTIES’ CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND THE DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT

BENNETT, Chief Judge.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

J. INTRODUCTION.1022

A. Procedural Background.1022

B. Factual Background.1023

II.OTTAWA’S MOTION TO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT.1026

III. STANDARDS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.1029

IV. LEGAL ANALYSIS OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTIONS.1031

A. Issues Presented.1031

B. Liability Issues.1031

1. “First sale” or “patent exhaustion”.1031

a. Arguments of the parties.1031

b. Applicable law .1032

c. Analysis.1033

2. Restrictions in the “limited label license”.1035

a. Arguments of the parties.1035

b. Applicable law .1036

c. Analysis.1038

i. Interpretation of the restrictive language .1038

ii. Presence of the restriction on bags purchased by Ottawa-1040

iii.Ottawa’s notice.1040

3. Enforceability of the label restrictions.1042

a. Arguments of the parties.1042

b. Applicable law and analysis.1043

i. Permissible restrictions.1043

ii. Scope of the patent rights and anticompetitive effects.1044

iii. Contract principles.1046

C. Damages Issues.1049

1. Marking or notice of patent rights.1049

a. Arguments of the parties.1049

b. Applicable law .1050

c. Analysis.1051

i. Notice by “marking.”.1051

ii. Actual notice.1051

2. Damages for infringement.1052

a. Arguments of the parties.1052

b. Applicable law .1052

c. Analysis.1053

3. Full compensation from prior sale.1053

a. Arguments of the parties.1053

b. Applicable law .1054

c. Analysis.1054

4. Increased damages for “willful” infringement.1054

а. Arguments of the parties.1055

б. Applicable law .1056

c. Analysis.1056

V. CONCLUSION.1057

This action, which involves a claim of alleged infringement of patents for hybrid and inbred seed corn by an unlicensed reseller, comes before the court pursuant to the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment or partial summary judgment (docket nos. 174 & 175). Also before the court is the defendant’s motion to strike certain paragraphs of an affidavit offered by the plaintiff as part of the summary judgment record (docket no. 187). The court heard oral arguments on the motions on September 18, 2003. At those oral arguments, plaintiff Pioneer Hi-Bred International was represented by Edmund J. Sease, Christine Lebrón-Dykeman, and R. Scott Johnson of McKee, Voorhees & Sease, P.L.C., in Des Moines, Iowa, and Daniel J. Cosgrove of Pioneer, also in Des Moines, Iowa. Defendant Ottawa Plant Food, Inc., was represented by Keith D. Parr of Lord, Bissell & Brook in Chicago, Illinois, Mark R. Sargis of Bellande, Cheely, O’Flaherty, Sargis & Ayres in Chicago, Illinois, and James W. Redmond of Heid-man, Redmond, Fredregill, Patterson, Plaza, Dykstra & Prahl in Sioux City, Iowa. The motions are now fully submitted and some expedition in the disposition of the motions is required, as this matter is set for trial to begin on November 3, 2003.

I. INTRODUCTION

A. Procedural Background

Plaintiff Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc., commenced this patent infringement action on February 20, 1998, against eight defendants not including the present defendant, Ottawa Plant Food, Inc., alleging that each of the defendants, none of whom were authorized Pioneer Sales Representatives, had illegally sold or offered for sale Pioneer® brand seed corn. See Complaint. Ottawa was added as a defendant when Pioneer filed an Amended Complaint on September 11, 1998 (docket no. 80), apparently after Pioneer learned, through discovery, that Ottawa had acquired Pioneer ® brand seed corn from one of the original defendants, Farm Advantage, Ine. The claims against all other defendants have since been settled, so that this litigation is continuing only between Pioneer and Ottawa. Pioneer’s specific claim against Ottawa, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 271, is that Ottawa is not an authorized Pioneer Sales Representative, but that it has nevertheless, for some time past, and still is, infringing one or more of numerous patents-in-suit for Pioneer ® brand hybrid and inbred seed corn by making, using, selling, or offering for sale Pioneer ® brand seed corn, and will continue to do so unless enjoined by the court. See Amended Complaint, ¶ 16. Pioneer seeks injunctive relief, an accounting for damages, including damages for willful infringement, and assessments for interest and costs. Id. at Prayer. Ottawa answered the Amended Complaint on November 3, 1998 (docket no. 104), denying Pioneer’s claim and asserting affirmative defenses of patent exhaustion, laches, waiver, and estoppel.

Presently before the court are the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment or partial summary judgment filed July 22, 2003. More specifically, on July 22, 2003, Ottawa filed its Motions For Summary Judgment Of Noninfringement And No Damages (docket no. 174) on seven specific issues relating to liability and damages, which would be fully dispositive of this case if granted. Also on July 22, 2003, Pioneer filed its Motion For Partial Summary Judgment Re: Infringement And Enforceability Of Pioneer’s Limited Label License And Re: Ottawa’s Affirmative Defense Under The Doctrine Of Patent Exhaustion (docket no. 175), which would be dispositive of liability issues, if granted, but leave damages issues for trial. Pioneer resisted Ottawa’s motion for summary judgment on August 15, 2003 (docket no. 192), and Ottawa filed a reply on August 27, 2003 (docket no. 204). Ottawa resisted Pioneer’s motion for partial summary judgment on August 12, 2003 (docket no. 190), and Pioneer filed a reply in further support of its motion on August 26, 2003 (docket no. 201). In addition to these dispositive motions, the matters now before the court include Ottawa’s August 12, 2003, Motion To Strike Certain Paragraphs Of Bruce Hall’s Affidavit, which is offered by Pioneer as part of the summary judgment record (docket no. 187). Pioneer resisted the motion to strike on August 29, 2003 (docket no. 205), and Ottawa filed a reply on September 8, 2003 (docket no. 207).

B. Factual Background

Whether or not a party is entitled to summary judgment ordinarily turns on whether or not there are genuine issues of material fact for trial. See, e.g., Quick v. Donaldson Co., 90 F.3d 1372, 1376-77 (8th Cir.1996). Nevertheless, the court will not attempt here a comprehensive review of the undisputed and disputed facts in the record. Rather, the court will present here only sufficient factual background to put in context the parties’ arguments for and against the motions for summary judgment on Pioneer’s patent infringement claim. More attention will be given to specific factual disputes, where necessary, in the court’s legal analysis, below.

Plaintiff Pioneer, an Iowa corporation with its principal place of business in Des Moines, Iowa, is the world’s largest producer of seed corn. Pioneer has developed and sells a wide range of hybrid and inbred seed corn varieties subject to one or more of the numerous patents-in-suit. Pioneer sells its seed through a “dual” distribution system, using licensed sales representatives — who never take title to the seed, and are licensed to sell it only to actual end users, ie., farmers, who plant the seed — and licensed dealers — who do take title to the seed, and are licensed to resell it only to other authorized dealers or end users. Defendant Ottawa, an Illinois corporation with its principal place of business in Ottawa, Illinois, is a seller and wholesaler of agricultural products, including seed corn. However, Ottawa is not now, and has never been, a licensed dealer or sales representative for Pioneer.

The parties agree that, from 1992 until 1998, Ottawa purchased and resold a number of bags of different varieties of Pioneer® brand seed com. Pioneer alleges that, during the time period in question, Ottawa sold 4,061 bags of Pioneer ® brand seed corn for a total of $315,110. The parties agree that Ottawa bought Pioneer ® brand seed corn from several different Pioneer Sales Representatives and licensed dealers and that Ottawa only bought Pioneer® brand seed corn in its original packaging, as sold by Pioneer. Ottawa never altered the Pioneer seed bags or their contents, removed any bag tags, or repackaged the seed. Rather, Ottawa resold the seed to farmers and other dealers, including some Pioneer dealers or representatives who were having trouble obtaining a supply of certain Pioneer® brand seed corn varieties. What the parties dispute is whether or not Ottawa’s “resale” of Pioneer ® brand seed corn infringed Pioneer’s patent rights in that seed corn.

Pioneer contends that, from at least 1986 onward, all of its seed corn was sold subject to a “limited label license,” which appeared on each bag and/or bag tag of Pioneer ® brand seed corn. That “limited label license” prohibited any purchaser from using the seed corn for any purpose other than production of forage or grain for feeding or processing. Thus, Pioneer contends that no purchaser was licensed to resell the seed corn unless granted a separate license to do so by Pioneer. The parties agree that, before or during the period of Ottawa’s alleged wrongdoing, Pioneer had turned down. Ottawa’s request for a license to resell Pioneer ® brand seed corn as a dealer or sales representative.

Although Pioneer admits that the language on the bag labels and bag tags changed somewhat over time, it contends that the essence of the limited license granted to buyers did not. Somewhat more specifically, Pioneer contends that, beginning in sales year 1986 and continuing through sales year 1995, the language on the label on the seed bags read, in pertinent part, as follows:

THE FOLLOWING PROVISIONS ARE PART OF THE TERMS OF SALE OF THIS PRODUCT

One or more of the parental lines used in producing this hybrid are the exclusive property of Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc. Buyer intends to purchase and seller intends to sell only hybrid seed. Buyer agrees that purchase of this bag of seed does not give any rights to use any such parental line seed which may be found herein, or any plant, pollen or seed produced from such parental line seed, for breeding, research or seed production purposes or for any purpose other than production of forage or grain for feeding or processing.

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By acceptance of the seed or other products the Buyer acknowledges that the foregoing terms are conditions of the sale and constitute the entire agreement between the parties regarding warranty or other liabilities and the remedy therefor.

Hall Affidavit, ¶ 16, Plaintiffs Appendix In Support Of Its Motion For Partial Summary Judgment at 3 (emphasis added). In 1995, a new version of the terms of the label license was developed and that language was used for sales years 1996 through 1998. The new version, in pertinent part, stated the following:

THE FOLLOWING PROVISIONS ARE PART OF THE TERMS OF SALE OF THIS PRODUCT

One or more of the parental lines used in producing this product are proprietary to Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc. (“Pioneer”). Parental lines are U.S. Protected Varieties and may be protected under the laws of other countries; export or transfer of possession is prohibited. Pioneer intends to supply only hybrid seed. Customer agrees that it is not acquiring the rights to use any parental line for any purpose other than production of forage or grain for feeding or processing. If the tag indicated this product is produced under one or more U.S. patents, customer is licensed thereunder only to produce forage or grain for feeding or processing. All uses outside the U.S. are prohibited to the extent they result in infringement of U.S. patents. For availability of other licenses, contact Pioneer.

H< Hs H* H* # H*

By acceptance of the seed or other products the Buyer acknowledges that the foregoing terms are conditions of the sale and constitute the entire agreement between the parties regarding warranty or other liabilities and the remedy therefor.

Hall Affidavit, ¶ 17, Plaintiffs Appendix In Support Of Its Motion For Partial Summary Judgment at 3-4 (emphasis added). For the 1999 sales season, the bag language for the first time included a specific prohibition on “resale” of the seed, but the parties agree that Ottawa ceased selling Pioneer® brand seed com in 1998 after the initiation of this lawsuit against Ottawa by Pioneer.

Pioneer also contends that, beginning in the 1996 sales season, it also included the U.S. patent numbers applicable to the seed in each bag on the corresponding bag tags of the hybrid seed corn sold commercially in order to comply with the patent marking statute, 35 U.S.C. § 287 (2003). Also in 1996, Pioneer contends that it amended the bag tag to include limited license language, as follows: “This product is for license only. PIONEER ® brand products are sold subject to the terms and conditions of sale which are part of the labeling and sale documents.” Hall Affidavit, ¶ 21, Plaintiffs Appendix In Support Of Its Motion For Partial Summary Judgment at 5. After identifying the patent numbers, the bag tag continued, as follows: “License is granted solely to produce grain and/or forage. For other licenses, contact Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc.... PIONEER® brand products are sold subject to the terms and conditions of sale which are part of the labeling and sale documents.” Id. at ¶22, Plaintiffs Appendix In Support Of Its Motion For Partial Summary Judgment at 5.

Ottawa contends that the “limited label licenses” used before the 1999 sales season restricted the “use” of the products, but did not restrict the “resale” of the products, which is a legal question, which will be addressed below. As to factual contentions, however, Ottawa also contends that Pioneer has failed to produce any evidence of what “limited label license” or bag tag appeared on any Pioneer® brand seed corn sold by Ottawa. Ottawa asserts that no such language appeared on some of the bag tags that it has retained. Ottawa also contends that, even if the “limited label license” language appeared on bags of Pioneer® brand seed corn that Ottawa acquired and resold, Ottawa’s employees did not read and had no reason to read the labels, beyond verification of the type, size, and maturity of the seed. The parties do agree that Ottawa does not produce grain or forage, but instead resold all of the Pioneer ® brand seed corn that it acquired, either to other dealers or to corn producers.

In May 1994, Pioneer sent Ottawa a letter notifying Ottawa that it had come to Pioneer’s attention that Ottawa was reselling Pioneer® brand seed corn; asserting that Ottawa could only have obtained that seed corn from Pioneer Sales Representatives; advising Ottawa that sales of Pioneer ® brand seed corn by Pioneer’s Sales Representatives to anyone other than farmers were prohibited by the Sales Representatives’ contracts; and advising Ottawa that Ottawa’s purchase of seed corn from Pioneer Sales Representatives might have caused the Sales Representatives to breach their contracts with Pioneer, opening Ottawa up to liability for tortious interference with the contractual relations between Pioneer and its Sales Representatives. Pioneer contends that this letter placed Ottawa on notice that its acquisition and resale of Pioneer® brand seed corn was in derogation of Pioneer’s patent rights. Ottawa contends that this letter provided no such notice, but instead appeared to be a complaint about the conduct of Pioneer’s own sales force. Upon receiving the May 1994 letter, however, Ottawa contends that it contacted the Federal Trade Commission and the Illinois Attorney General’s Office, and was advised by both bodies that Ottawa was not violating any laws by reselling Pioneer seed. However, Ottawa did not receive a written opinion from either body on the matter. Ottawa contends that it received no notice that Pioneer was asserting “patent infringement” until this lawsuit was filed against it, at which time Ottawa ceased acquiring or reselling Pioneer ® brand seed corn. However, Pioneer points to testimony of Ottawa’s former controller, Lester Borden, to the effect that Ottawa’s managers and sales representatives simply did not care whether or not Pioneer objected to Ottawa’s acquisition or resale of Pioneer ® brand seed corn.

II. OTTAWA’S MOTION TO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT

In addition to the dispositive motions now before the court, the court must also consider Ottawa’s motion to strike certain paragraphs of the affidavit of Bruce Hall, which Pioneer has offered as part of the summary judgment record. Specifically, Ottawa challenges paragraphs 9,10,12, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, and 22 of Mr. Hall’s affidavit on the grounds that these paragraphs are not based on Mr. Hall’s personal knowledge and/or are different from or contradictory to his sworn deposition testimony. Pioneer’s general response is that each of the challenged paragraphs is, indeed, supported by Mr. Hall’s testimony, together with documentary evidence, and at most, his affidavit clarifies his prior deposition testimony.

As this court recently explained,

Rule 56(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that an affidavit in support of a motion for summary judgment “shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e). Because affidavits proffered in support of a motion for summary judgment must be based upon personal knowledge, an affidavit based upon “information and belief’ is insufficient as a matter of law. Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research, 339 U.S. 827, 831, 70 S.Ct. 894, 94 L.Ed. 1312 (1950) (affidavit in support of motion for summary judgment made on information and belief does not comport with Rule 56(e)); accord Sellers v. M.C. Floor Crafters, Inc., 842 F.2d 639 (2d Cir.1988); Tavery v. United States, 32 F.3d 1423, 1426 n. 4 (10th Cir.1994). Furthermore, the court may consider only that evidence that would be admissible at trial. Samuels v. Doctors Hosp., Inc., 588 F.2d 485, 486 n. 2 (5th Cir.1979). Hearsay statements which cannot be categorized as a hearsay exception, eonclusory allegations, legal arguments, and statements not based upon personal knowledge, may be stricken. See Sellers v. M.C. Floor Crafters, Inc., 842 F.2d 639, 643 (2d Cir.1988) (lack of personal knowledge); Kamen v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 791 F.2d 1006, 1011 (2d Cir.1986) (concluso-ry allegations and legal arguments).

With respect to [the requirements of Rule 56(e),] [c]ourts have recognized that “eonclusory allegations and self-serving affidavits, without support in the record, do not create a triable issue of fact.” Hall v. Bodine Elec. Co., 276 F.3d 345, 354 (7th Cir.2002) (citing Patterson v. Chicago Ass’n for Retarded Citizens, 150 F.3d 719, 724 (7th Cir.1998)); accord Albiero v. City of Kankakee, 246 F.3d 927, 933 (7th Cir.2001); see Drake v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 134 F.3d 878, 887 (7th Cir.1998); Murray v. City of Sapulpa, 45 F.3d 1417, 1422 (10th Cir.1995); Slowiak v. Land O’Lakes, Inc., 987 F.2d 1293, 1295 (7th Cir.1998).

Wells Dairy, Inc. v. Travelers Indemnity Co. of Illinois, 241 F.Supp.2d 945, 956-57 (N.D.Iowa 2003); see also Helm Fin. Corp. v. Iowa Northern Ry. Co., 214 F.Supp.2d 934, 952-54 (N.D.Iowa 2002) (stating similar standards).

This court has also considered the standards applicable to alleged contradiction of prior deposition testimony by an affidavit offered in resistance to summary judgment:

As to contradiction of prior testimony, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals recently reiterated the following principles:

It is well-settled that “[p]arties to a motion for summary judgment cannot create sham issues of fact in an effort to defeat summary judgment.” American Airlines, Inc. v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, Inc., 114 F.3d 108, 111 (8th Cir.1997). Consequently,

a party should not be allowed to create issues of credibility by contradicting his own earlier testimony. Ambiguities and even conflicts in a deponent’s testimony are generally matters for the jury to sort out, but a district court may grant summary judgment where a party’s sudden and unexplained revision of testimony creates an issue of fact where none existed before. Otherwise, any party could head off a summary judgment motion by supplanting previous depositions ad hoc with a new affidavit, and no case would ever be appropriate for summary judgment.

Wilson v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 838 F.2d 286, 289 (8th Cir.1988) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

Bass v. City of Sioux Falls, 232 F.3d 615, 619 (8th Cir.1999); accord Dotson v. Delta Consolidated Indus., Inc., 251 F.3d 780, 781 (8th Cir.2001) (“We have held many times that a party may not create a question of material fact, and thus forestall summary judgment, by submitting an affidavit contradicting his own sworn statements in a deposition. See, e.g., American Airlines, Inc. v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, Inc., 114 F.3d 108, 111 (8th Cir.1997), and Camfield Tires, Inc. v. Michelin Tire Corp., 719 F.2d 1361, 1364-65 (8th Cir.1983).”); Plymouth Foam Prods., Inc. v. City of Becker, 120 F.3d 153, 155 n. 3 (8th Cir.1997) (to the extent that the affiant’s affidavit conflicts with his earlier deposition testimony, his affidavit testimony should be disregarded); RSBI Aerospace, Inc. v. Affiliated FM Ins. Co., 49 F.3d 399, 402 (8th Cir.1995) (same). The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained that the rule that a party cannot create a “sham” issue of fact in an effort to defeat summary judgment by filing an affidavit directly contradicting prior deposition testimony “is a sound one,” because “if testimony under oath could be ‘abandoned many months later by the filing of an affidavit, probably no cases would be appropriate for summary judgment.’” Herring v. Canada Life Assur. Co., 207 F.3d 1026, 1030 (8th Cir.2000) (quoting Camfield Tires, Inc. v. Michelin Tire Corp., 719 F.2d 1361, 1366 (8th Cir.1983)).

However, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has also explained that, where the affidavit testimony seems consistent with the affiant’s prior deposition testimony, or simply adds more detailed information, the court may properly consider the affidavit on summary judgment. Bass, 232 F.3d at 619. Similarly, the court has recognized “that there are ‘narrow circumstances’ in which a subsequent affidavit is appropriate, such as to explain certain aspects of the deposition testimony or where the prior testimony reflects confusion on the part of the witness.” Herring, 207 F.3d at 1030-31 (citing Camfield Tires, Inc., 719 F.2d at 1364-65). In such circumstances, “it would be for the jury to resolve the discrepancy in the deposition testimony and the affidavit.” Id. at 1031.

Helm Fin. Corp., 214 F.Supp.2d at 954-55.

The court could, perhaps, engage in a paragraph-by-paragraph analysis of whether each of the challenged paragraphs of Mr. Hall’s affidavit meets or fails to meet the standards of Rule 56(e) or is contradictory to his deposition testimony. However, as a general matter, the court finds that any differences between Mr. Hall’s deposition testimony and his affidavit appear to be primarily clarifications and amplifications in his affidavit of issues addressed in his deposition or matters on which he professed lack of knowledge or memory at the time of his deposition. Thus, the subsequent affidavit does not offend the standards cited above. See Helm Fin. Corp., 214 F.Supp.2d at 955. Moreover, the court finds that this is a situation where any ambiguities or even conflicts between Mr. Hall’s deposition testimony and the challenged paragraphs of his affidavit should be left to the jury to sort out, if indeed a jury question is otherwise presented. Id.

More importantly, the court finds it unnecessary to consider separately whether each of the challenged paragraphs of Mr. Hall’s affidavit satisfies the applicable standards until and unless it is clear that whether or not there is a genuine issue of material fact on a pertinent issue hangs on his affidavit. The court’s disposition of the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment or partial summary judgment will necessarily moot Ottawa’s motion to strike. This is so, because either (1) the court’s analysis of the motion for summary judgment will necessarily determine whether any portions of Mr. Hall’s affidavit generate genuine issues of material fact on issues pertinent to the summary judgment motions, based on the requirements of Rule 56(e) and applicable case law, or (2) the summary judgment motions will be resolved without consideration of challenged portions of Mr. Hall’s affidavit, such that portions of the motion to strike will be mooted sub silentio. Therefore, the court will deny Ottawa’s motion to strike in its entirety as mooted by the court’s disposition of the cross-motions for summary judgment, below.

III. STANDARDS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals has explained its exclusive jurisdiction over certain appeals, as follows:

Our relevant jurisdictional authority is contained in 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (1994), which states that this court enjoys exclusive appellate jurisdiction over appeals “based, in whole or in part, on section 1338 [of Title 28].” Section 1338(a), in turn, provides that district courts have jurisdiction over suits “arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents.” 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1994). Thus, our jurisdiction turns upon whether the claims here arise (at least in part) under the patent laws.

^

... “In order to demonstrate that a case is one ‘arising under’ federal patent law, ‘the plaintiff must set up some right, title or interest under the patent laws, or at least make it appear that some right or privilege will be defeated by one construction, or sustained by the opposite construction of these laws.’ ” Christianson [v. Colt Industries Operating Corp.], 486 U.S. [800,] 807-08, 108 S.Ct. 2166, [100 L.Ed.2d 811 (1988)] (quoting Pratt v. Paris Gaslight & Coke Co., 168 U.S. 255, 259, 18 S.Ct. 62, 42 L.Ed. 458 (1897)). In other words, the scope of section 1338 extends to (1) claims where federal patent law creates the cause of action, or (2) claims where the plaintiffs right to relief necessarily depends upon resolution of a “substantial question of federal patent law.” Christianson, 486 U.S. at 809, 108 S.Ct. 2166, 100 L.Ed.2d 811.

Helfgott & Karas, P.C. v. Dickenson, 209 F.3d 1328, 1333-34 (Fed.Cir.2000). This lawsuit involves claims of patent infringement that involve causes of action created by federal patent law. Moreover, the present cross-motions for summary judgment necessarily involve “substantial question[s] of federal patent law,” such as Ottawa’s defense of “patent exhaustion,” and the availability of damages for patent infringement under certain provisions of the Patent Act. See id. Thus, this action and the present cross-motions for summary judgment fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals. Therefore, the court will consider here the standards for summary judgment in patent cases, as articulated by the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals.

Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which governs motions for summary judgment, states, in pertinent part, the following:

Rule 56. Summary Judgment

(a) For Claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in the party’s favor upon all or any part thereof.

(b) For Defending Party. A party against whom a claim ... is asserted ... may, at any time, move for summary judgment in the party’s favor as to all or any part thereof.

(c) Motions and Proceedings Thereon.... The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(b)-(c) (emphasis added). As the plain language of the rule indicates, the appropriateness of summary judgment ordinarily turns on whether or not there are genuine issues of material fact that must be resolved by the trier of fact. On the other hand, questions of law are particularly amenable to summary judgment precisely because they do not turn on factual disputes. See, e.g., Varilease Technology Group, Inc. v. U.S., 289 F.3d 795, 798 (Fed.Cir.2002) (contract interpretation, as a question of law, is amenable to summary judgment); Gentex Corp. v. Donnelly Corp., 69 F.3d 527, 530 (Fed.Cir.1995) (patent claim interpretation, as a question of law, is amenable to summary judgment). The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals has recognized the general proposition that “[sjummary judgment is appropriate in a patent case, as in other cases.” Nike, Inc. v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc., 43 F.3d 644, 646 (Fed.Cir.1994); Conroy v. Reebok Int'l Ltd., 14 F.3d 1570, 1575 (Fed.Cir.1994) (“The grant of summary judgment [in a patent case] is appropriate where the standards set forth in Rule 56(c) are satisfied.”).

Taking a closer look at the meaning of the standards for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56, “[a] genuine issue exists if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could find for the nonmoving party.” Eli Lilly & Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 251 F.3d 955, 962 (Fed.Cir.2001) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1109, 122 S.Ct. 913, 151 L.Ed.2d 879 (2002). “A disputed fact is material if it might affect the outcome of the suit such that a finding of that fact is necessary and relevant to the proceedings.” Id. (again citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505). “While the burden rests on the party moving for summary judgment to show ‘that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party’s case,’ the nonmov-ing party must affirmatively demonstrate by specific factual allegations that a genuine issue of material fact exists for trial.” Id. at 971 (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)). In reviewing the record, the court must view all the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and give that party the benefit of all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the facts. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).

The court will apply these standards to the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment or partial summary judgment in this patent infringement action.

IV. LEGAL ANALYSIS OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTIONS

A, Issues Presented

Ottawa’s motion for summary judgment involves seven issues pertaining to liability and damages, while Pioneer’s motion for partial summary judgment is essentially the “mirror image” of Ottawa’s as to the first three issues. The cross-motions, therefore, present the following issues: (1) whether Ottawa’s purchase and resale of Pioneer® brand seed corn is immunized from liability for patent infringement under the “first sale” or “patent exhaustion” doctrine; (2) whether Ottawa had notice of and was bound by Pioneer’s restrictions in its “limited label license”; (8) whether Pioneer’s “limited label license” restrictions are enforceable or are instead unenforceable as against public policy owing to their anticompetitive effect or unenforceable under applicable contract principles; (4) whether Pioneer has any evidence of notice to Ottawa of the patents-in-suit and alleged infringement supporting Pioneer’s claim for compensatory damages under 35 U.S.C. § 287; (5) whether Pioneer has any evidence that any of the seed tags or seed bags purchased and resold by Ottawa contained any language prohibiting resale supporting Pioneer’s claim for damages under 35 U.S.C. § 284; (6) whether Pioneer has already recovered its full profits in connection with the first sale of any seed, so that it is not entitled to any compensatory damages; and (7) whether Pioneer has any evidence supporting its claim for increased damages based on “willful” infringement. Issues (1) through (3) — the issues on which there are cross-motions for summary judgment — thus go to “liability,” while issues (4) through (7)— which are the subject only of Ottawa’s motion for summary judgment — go to “damages” or the prerequisites for any damages. The court will consider these issues in turn, subdividing its discussion into “liability” issues, on which, coincidentally, there are cross-motions for summary judgment, and “damages” issues, which are raised only in Ottawa’s motion for summary judgment.

B. Liability Issues

1. “First sale” or “patent exhaustion”

In its motion for summary judgment, Ottawa contends, first, that Pioneer’s patent infringement claims are barred by the “first sale” or “patent exhaustion” doctrine. However, in its motion for summary judgment, Pioneer contends that it, not Ottawa, is entitled to summary judgment on Ottawa’s “patent exhaustion” defense.

a. Arguments of the parties

In its own motion for summary judgment, Ottawa argues that, while the patent laws grant a patent holder the exclusive right to make, use, and sell a patented invention, once the patentee sells the patented item, he effectively surrenders or “exhausts” this monopoly and forfeits the ability to control use of the invention by the buyer. In this case, Ottawa contends that Pioneer’s patent rights were “exhausted” by a “first sale” when Pioneer or a Pioneer dealer first sold the seed corn that Ottawa bought. Ottawa contends, further, that it is presumed that, in pricing for the “first sale,” Pioneer was fully compensated for the value of its invention and can no longer assert any control over the patented product or obtain any “damages” for its resale. More importantly, Ottawa argues that the “first sale” immunizes Ottawa’s subsequent resale from any claim of patent infringement.

In response to Ottawa’s motion for summary judgment and in support of its own motion for summary judgment on Ottawa’s “patent exhaustion” defense, Pioneer contends that Ottawa cannot establish the prerequisite for application of the “first sale” or “patent exhaustion” rule, which is an unconditional sale of the patented product. Here, Pioneer contends that any prior sale of the seed corn at issue before Ottawa’s resale was specifically conditioned by the terms of the “limited label license,” which grants only a right to use the seed corn to produce grain or forage. Pioneer also contends that distribution of Pioneer ® brand seed corn to Pioneer authorized Sales Representatives or dealers does not constitute an unconditional “first sale.” Rather, Pioneer argues that such sales were conditioned by the terms of the representatives’ or dealers’ limited licenses to resell the patented products, which prohibited sales representatives from selling to individuals or groups for resale, and permitted dealers to resell only to other licensed dealers or persons who would use the seed to produce grain or forage. Pioneer argues, further, that any price it received for transfers of the seed corn prior to the resale by Ottawa reflected only the value of the limited license to use the seed corn to produce grain or forage, not the full value of the patented invention or the retained patent rights. Pioneer points out that Ottawa admits that it was never granted a license to resell Pioneer ® brand seed corn, so that Ottawa never acquired that “stick” from Pioneer’s “bundle” of patent rights.

In its reply in further support of its own motion for summary judgment, Ottawa contends that Pioneer’s “limited label license” simply does not restrict or prohibit Ottawa’s right to “resell” Pioneer ® brand seed corn. Ottawa argues that the “limited label license” restricts only certain “uses,” but is silent as to “resale,” so that the “first sale” exhausted any patent rights with regard to “resale.” Ottawa did not, however, directly address that part of Pioneer’s motion for partial summary judgment seeking summary judgment on Ottawa’s “patent exhaustion” defense in its resistance to Pioneer’s motion for partial summary judgment.

b. Applicable law

As the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals recently reiterated, “when a patented product has been sold the purchaser acquires ‘the right to use and sell it, and ... the authorized sale of an article which is capable of use only in practicing the patent is a relinquishment of the patent monopoly with respect to the article sold.’ ” Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 302 F.3d 1291, 1298 (Fed.Cir.2002) (quoting United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 249, 62 S.Ct. 1088, 86 L.Ed. 1408 (1942)). It is not any sale that invokes this “first sale” or “patent exhaustion” rule, however. Rather,

The unrestricted sale of a patented article, by or with the authority of the pat-entee, “exhausts” the patentee’s right to control further sale and use of that article by enforcing the patent under which it was first sold. In United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 278, 62 S.Ct. 1070, 86 L.Ed. 1461 (1942), the Court explained that exhaustion of the patent right depends on “whether or not there has been such a disposition of the article that it may fairly be said that the patentee has received his reward for the use of the article. ” See, e.g., Intel Corp. v. ULSI Sys. Tech., Inc., 995 F.2d 1566, 1568, 27 USPQ2d 1136, 1138 (Fed.Cir.1993) (“The law is well settled that an authorized sale of a patented product places that product beyond the reach of the patent.”) Thus when a patented device has been lawfully sold in the United States, subsequent purchasers inherit the same immunity under the doctrine of patent exhaustion.

Jazz Photo Corp. v. International Trade Comm’n, 264 F.3d 1094, 1105 (Fed.Cir.2001) (emphasis added), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 950, 122 S.Ct. 2644, 153 L.Ed.2d 823 (2002); accord Anton/Bauer, Inc. v. PAG, Ltd., 329 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed.Cir.2003) (“The exhaustion doctrine is based upon the proposition that ‘[t]he unrestricted sale of a patented article, by or with the authority of the patentee, “exhausts” the pat-entee’s right to control further sale and use of that article by enforcing the patent under which it was first sold.’ Jazz Photo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 264 F.3d 1094, 1105, 59 USPQ2d 1907, 1914 (Fed.Cir.2001).”). In Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700 (Fed.Cir.1992), the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals noted that the Supreme Court had “considered and affirmed the basic principles that unconditional sale of a patented device exhausts the patentee’s right to control the purchaser’s use of the device,” but that “the sale of patented goods, like other goods, can be conditioned.” Mallinckrodt, Inc., 976 F.2d at 706 (emphasis added). Furthermore, the court explained that “[t]he principle of exhaustion of the patent right d[oes] not turn a conditional sale into an unconditional one.” Id.; accord B. Braun Med., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 124 F.3d 1419, 1426 (Fed.Cir.1997) (noting that, in Mallinckrodt, the court “canvassed precedent concerning the legality of restrictions placed upon the post-sale use of patented goods” and concluded that, as a general matter, “an unconditional sale of a patented device exhausts the patentee’s right to control the purchaser’s use of the device thereafter”). Thus, where something less than all of the rights in the patent have been “sold” to a buyer, “[t]he price paid by the purchaser ‘reflects only the value of the “use” rights conferred by the patentee.’ ” Monsanto Co., 302 F.3d at 1299 (quoting B. Braun Medical, Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 124 F.3d 1419, 1426 (Fed.Cir.1997)), and the “first sale” or “patent exhaustion” rule does not apply. Id.; B. Braun Med., Inc., 124 F.3d at 1426 (“This exhaustion doctrine, however, does not apply to an expressly conditional sale or license.”).

c. Analysis

The court concludes that it is Pioneer, not Ottawa, that is entitled to summary judgment on Ottawa’s “patent exhaustion” defense. Ottawa has failed to generate a genuine issue of material fact that the sale of Pioneer ® brand seed corn was not always conditional, so that, in the face of undisputed evidence that the sales were conditional, the “patent exhaustion” defense is simply inapplicable as a matter of law. See Anton/Bauer, Inc., 329 F.3d at 1349 (the “exhaustion” doctrine is based upon the proposition that there was an “unrestricted” sale); Monsanto Co., 302 F.3d at 1299 (where something less than all of the patent rights have been conveyed, the “first sale” rule is inapplicable); Jazz Photo Corp., 264 F.3d at 1105 (the “first sale” or “patent exhaustion” doctrine only applies where the first sale was “unrestricted”); B. Braun Med., Inc., 124 F.3d at 1426 (“This exhaustion doctrine, however, does not apply to an expressly conditional sale or license.”); Mallinckrodt, Inc., 976 F.2d at 706 (“[UJnconditional sale of a patented device exhausts the patentee’s right to control the purchaser’s use of the device.”) (emphasis added). Treating the winning party on this issue as the movant and the losing party as the party charged with adequately resisting the motion, the court finds that Pioneer has met its initial burden, see Eli Lilly & Co., 251 F.3d at 971 (the party moving for summary judgment bears the burden “to show ‘that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party’s ease” ’), by pointing to evidence that, from 1986 on, its bag label restricted the uses for which the seed corn was sold to production of grain or forage. Even giving Ottawa the benefit of all reasonable inferences, id., Ottawa’s attempts to generate a genuine issue of material fact on its “patent exhaustion” defense are unavailing.

Ottawa attempts to generate a genuine issue of material fact by asserting that certain bag tags from bags it resold did not include any restrictions on use of the seed corn. However, the bag tags to which Ottawa points are dated 1992 and 1993, see Defendant’s Appendix In Support Of Its Motion For Summary Judgment at 70, 76 & 79, which means that they antedate the sales season in which Pioneer represents that it first included the restrictions on the bag tags, which was 1996. Ottawa has pointed to nothing suggesting that the bag labels did not always carry restrictions on use. Ottawa also points to evidence that the purchase orders and invoices for the Pioneer® brand seed corn that it bought from Pioneer Sales Representatives or dealers did not contain any limitations on the sale of the seed corn, but the bag labels and bag tags on the seed com itself expressly stated that the terms thereon are terms and conditions of the sale. Although Ottawa argues that it is Pioneer’s burden to show that the sale was conditional, the burdens at summary judgment require Ottawa to point to evidence that it bought bags of seed with no limitations, see Eli Lilly & Co., 251 F.3d at 971 (the party moving for summary judgment bears the burden “to show ‘that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party’s case” ’), and Ottawa has not done so, nor has Ottawa denied that the bags it sold carried the label license. Because “[t]he principle of exhaustion of the patent right did not turn a conditional sale into an unconditional one,” Mallinckrodt, Inc., 976 F.2d at 706, there was no unconditional sale in this case upon which “patent exhaustion” could be founded.

Finally, the court is unpersuaded by Ottawa’s arguments, in its reply in further support of its own motion for summary judgment, that Pioneer’s “limited label license” simply does not restrict or prohibit Ottawa’s right to “resell” Pioneer ® brand seed corn, even if it restricts other “uses.” While this argument is relevant to the nature of the conditions on the first sale of the patented seed corn by Pioneer — a matter that the court must address below — it is not responsive to the pertinent issue at this point in the analysis, which is whether or not there ever was an unconditional sale of the seed corn. See Anton/Bauer, Inc., 329 F.3d at 1349 (the “exhaustion” doctrine is based upon the proposition that there was an “unrestricted” sale); Monsanto Co., 302 F.3d at 1299 (where something less than all of the patent rights have been conveyed, the “first sale” rule is inapplicable); Jazz Photo Corp., 264 F.3d at 1105 (the “first sale” or “patent exhaustion” doctrine only applies where the first sale was “unrestricted”); B. Braun Med., Inc., 124 F.3d at 1426 (“This exhaustion doctrine, however, does not apply to an expressly conditional sale or license.”); Mallinckrodt, Inc., 976 F.2d at 706 (“[UJn-conditional sale of a patented device exhausts the patentee’s right to control the purchaser’s use of the device.”) (emphasis added); see also Eli Lilly & Co., 251 F.3d at 962 (“A disputed fact is material if it might affect the outcome of the suit such that a finding of that fact is necessary and relevant to the proceedings.”). Thus, Ottawa has failed to generate a genuine issue of material fact as to the applicability of the “first sale” or “patent exhaustion” defense in this case. See Eli Lilly & Co., 251 F.3d at 971 (“[T]he nonmoving party must affirmatively demonstrate by specific factual allegations that a genuine issue of material fact exists for trial.”).

Therefore, unless the court determines that the conditions Pioneer placed on its initial sale of the seed corn are unenforceable, Ottawa’s “patent exhaustion” defense must fail as a matter of law, because there was no “first” unconditional sale.

2. Restrictions in the “limited label license”

Ottawa next contends that it is entitled to summary judgment on Pioneer’s patent infringement claim on the grounds that (1) Pioneer has failed to produce any evidence sufficient to prove that there was a contractual provision prohibiting resale appearing on any seed bags or bag tags purchased and resold by Ottawa, and (2) Pioneer has failed to produce any evidence sufficient to prove that Ottawa had actual notice of any such restrictions on resale. Pioneer contends, in resistance to Ottawa’s motion and in support of its own motion for partial summary judgment, that there is no genuine issue of material fact that the “limited label license” prohibits resale of the seed corn and that Ottawa was adequately notified of that fact.

a. Arguments of the parties

Although Ottawa acknowledges that private parties are free to place express conditions on the sale of patented products, Ottawa contends that such express conditions are subject to basic contract principles. Therefore, Ottawa contends that Pioneer must establish not only that it intended to convey only restricted rights, not including a right to resell, but that Ottawa had notice that the limited rights that it obtained did not include the right to resell the seed corn. Ottawa contends that Pioneer has offered no evidence that the so-called “limited label license” even appeared on any of the bags of seed corn purchased and resold by Ottawa or that Ottawa had actual knowledge of such restrictions before purchasing the com.

In response to Ottawa’s motion for summary judgment, and in support of its own motion for summary judgment, Pioneer contends that Ottawa cannot dispute the existence of the bag label or bag tag licenses or that Ottawa’s employees were aware of and looked at the bag labels and bag tags. Pioneer contends that Ottawa’s argument that its employees never read the limitations on the bag labels and bag tags simply is not credible. On the other hand, Pioneer contends that attachment of a label to a product is an acceptable means of communicating license terms to a purchaser, and that, at all times since 1986, it has used language on all or substantially all of its bag labels prohibiting the use of the seed for any purpose other than to produce forage or grain, and since 1996, it has used bag tags using comparable restrictive language or pointing out that restrictions on the conditions of sale were to be found on the bag label. Pioneer contends that, under the circumstances, Ottawa must be deemed to have had notice of the conditions of sale for the seed corn.

In its reply in further support of its own motion for summary judgment, and in resistance to Pioneer’s motion for partial summary judgment on this issue, Ottawa argues that Pioneer’s “use” restriction does not prohibit “resale,” because the rights to use and sell a patented product are separate rights. Although Ottawa agrees that Pioneer has shown that it restricted purchasers’ “use” of the seed corn, Pioneer has not shown that it restricted purchasers’ rights to “sell” or “resell” the seed corn. Ottawa contends that, at best, Pioneer’s language restricting certain “uses” of the seed corn is ambiguous as to its impact on “selling” or “reselling.” Ottawa also argues that Pioneer has not established that Ottawa had notice of any resale prohibition or that such a restriction was, in fact, placed on any of the bags of seed corn purchased and resold by Ottawa. Ottawa points out that Pioneer has not produced a single bag from a sale to Ottawa. Ottawa also asserts that Pioneer is required to show that Ottawa had actual notice of the restrictions, not simply that the restrictions appeared somewhere on the bag or bag tag. In its resistance to Pioneer’s motion for partial summary judgment, Ottawa argues that Pioneer failed to take reasonable steps to ensure that buyers had notice of the restrictions that Pioneer was attempting to impose, because there are no express restrictions on resale on any labels or sales documents from the time period during which Ottawa was reselling Pioneer® brand seed com, nor did Pioneer require all buyers to execute a written license agreement.

b. Applicable law

Section 154 of Title 35, a key provision of the Patent Act, provides that “every patent shall contain ... a grant to the patentee ... of the right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout the United States.” 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1). Similarly, 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) provides that, “[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this title, whoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States or imports into the United States any patented invention during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent.” 35 U.S.C. § 271(a). In Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700 (Fed.Cir.1992), the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals noted that “the sale of patented goods, like other goods, can be conditioned.” Mallinckrodt, Inc., 976 F.2d at 706. In other words, some or all of the rights granted by § 154 can be reserved to the patent holder or those rights can be waived in whole or in part. See id. at 703 (“The enforceability of restrictions on use of patented goods derives from the patent grant, which is in classical terms of property: the right to exclude [and][t]his right to exclude may be waived in whole or in part.”).

At least in the first instance, the conditions of a waiver of patent rights— i.e., the terms of a grant of a license to make, use, or sell the patented item — are subject to contract considerations. Id. The court reviews the interpretation of contractual language, including license agreements, as a question of law. See Ethicon, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 135 F.3d 1456, 1466 (Fed.Cir.1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 923, 119 S.Ct. 278, 142 L.Ed.2d 229 (1998). “State law controls in matters of contract interpretation.” Id.

This court recently summarized the Iowa rules of contract interpretation and construction as follows:

This court has recognized that Iowa law distinguishes between “interpretation” and “construction” of a contract. See Kaydon Acquisition Corp. v. America Central Indus., Inc., 179 F.Supp.2d 1022, 1037 (N.D.Iowa 2001). When the dispute concerns the meaning of certain contract terms, the court must engage in the process of interpretation, rather than construction. See id. (citing Walsh v. Nelson, 622 N.W.2d 499, 503 (Iowa 2001); Fausel v. JRJ Enters., Inc., 603 N.W.2d 612, 618 (Iowa 1999), which notes that interpretation is “a process for determining the meaning of words in a contract” while construction is “a process of determining the legal effect of such words”; and Fashion Fabrics of Iowa v. Retail Investors Corp., 266 N.W.2d 22, 25 (Iowa 1978), which states, “Interpretation involves ascertaining the meaning of contractual words; construction refers to deciding their legal effect.”). As this court has noted,

The Iowa Supreme Court has explained that:

The primary goal of contract interpretation is to determine the parties’ intentions at the time they executed the contract. See Hartig Drug Co. [v. Hartig], 602 N.W.2d [794,] 797 [ (Iowa 1999) ]. Interpretation involves a two-step process. First, from the words chosen, a court must determine “what meanings are reasonably possible.” Restatement ( Second) of Contracts § 202 cmt. a, at 87 (1981). In so doing, the court determines whether a disputed term is ambiguous. A term is not ambiguous merely because the parties disagree about its meaning. Hartig Drug Co., 602 N.W.2d at 797. A term is ambiguous if, “after all pertinent rules of interpretation have been considered,” “a genuine uncertainty exists concerning which of two reasonable interpretations is proper.” Id.

Once an ambiguity is identified, the court must then “choos[e] among possible meanings.” Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 202 cmt. a, at 87. If the resolution of ambiguous language involves extrinsic evidence, a question of interpretation arises which is reserved for the trier of fact. Fausel, 608 N.W.2d at 618.

Walsh, 622 N.W.2d at 503.

Kaydon Acquisition Corp., 179 F.Supp.2d at 1037-38. As to “pertinent rules of interpretation,” the Iowa Supreme Court has explained that “We ... do not interpret [any] contractual term apart from the context of the agreement as a whole.... The parties’ intent as evidenced by all of the terms of the contract controls our conclusion.” Koenigs v. Mitchell County Bd. of Supervisors, 659 N.W.2d 589, 594 (Iowa 2003). “Interpretation” is “a question of law for the court unless the meaning of disputed terms turns on extrinsic facts or choices among reasonable inferences.” Grinnell Select Ins. Co. v. Continental Western Ins. Co., 639 N.W.2d 31, 33 (Iowa 2002).

On the other hand, where the dispute centers on determining the legal effect of contractual terms, the court engages in the process of construction, rather than interpretation. See Fausel, 603 N.W.2d at 618; Fashion Fabrics of Iowa, 266 N.W.2d at 25. “In the construction of written contracts, the cardinal principle is that the intent of the parties must control; and except in cases of ambiguity, this is determined by what the contract itself says.” IOWA R. APP. P. 6.14(6)(n). The Iowa Supreme Court has explained that “construction” is “always a question of law.” See Grinnell Select Ins. Co., 639 N.W.2d at 33.

Central States Indus. Supply, Inc. v. McCullough, 279 F.Supp.2d 1005, 1031-33, 2003 WL 22048226, *20-*21 (N.D.Iowa Sept.3, 2003).

Illinois rules of interpretation and construction are similar. As the Illinois Court of Appeals recently explained, under Illinois law,

When the language of a contract is clear and unambiguous, construction of the contract is a matter of law that is subject to de novo review. A court must construe the meaning of a contract by examining the language and may not interpret the contract in a way contrary to the plain and obvious meaning of its terms. Unless the contract clearly defines its terms, the court must give the contractual language its common and generally accepted meaning. Furthermore, the court must place the meanings of words within the context of the contract as a whole. A contract term is ambiguous when it may reasonably be interpreted in more than one way. The mere fact that the parties disagree on some term, however, does not render the term ambiguous. J.M. Beals Enterprises, Inc. v. Industrial Hard Chrome, Ltd., 194 Ill.App.3d 744, 748, 141 Ill.Dec. 847, 551 N.E.2d 840 (1990). “A court will neither add language or matters to a contract about which the instrument itself is silent, nor add words or terms to an agreement to change the plain meaning of the parties as expressed in the agreement.” Sheehy v. Sheehy, 299 Ill.App.3d 996, 1001, 234 Ill.Dec. 34, 702 N.E.2d 200 (1998).

If the language of the contract is facially unambiguous, then the “four corners” rule requires the trial court to interpret the contract as a matter of law without the use of parol evidence. If, however, the language of the contract is susceptible to more than one meaning, then an ambiguity is present and parol evidence may be admitted to aid the trier of fact in resolving the ambiguity. Air Safety, Inc. v. Teachers Realty Corp., 185 Ill.2d 457, 462-63, 236 Ill.Dec. 8, 706 N.E.2d 882 (1999).

Dean Mgmt., Inc. v. TBS Constr., Inc., 339 Ill.App.3d 263, 274 Ill.Dec. 161, 790 N.E.2d 934, 939-40 (Ill.Ct.App.2003). Because Iowa and Illinois rules of interpretation are similar, the court finds it unnecessary to decide which state’s law applies to interpretation of the license language here.

c. Analysis

i. Interpretation of the restrictive language. Although each of the “exclusive” rights identified in § 154 may be in some sense “distinct,” the court is not convinced that each category of right must be separately and expressly reserved, as Ottawa appears to contend by arguing that Pioneer’s “limited label license” prior to 1999 failed to include any express restriction on “resale” of the patented seed corn. Ottawa’s strained readings of various cases involving restrictions on “use” as showing that restrictions on “resale” are distinct and separate, and thus must be separately and expressly stated, are simply unavailing, at least in the face of language in a license unambiguously granting a buyer only very limited rights. To put it another way, where, as here, the “limited label license” expressly grants only some of the rights identified in § 154, it follows that the only reasonably possible meaning of the language is that all other rights are reserved. See Central States Indus. Supply, Inc., 279 F.Supp.2d at 1032-33, 2003 WL 22048226 at *21 (under Iowa law, interpretation requires the court to determine what meanings are reasonably possible); Dean Mgmt., Inc., 274 Ill.Dec. 161, 790 N.E.2d at 939 (under Illinois law, a contract is not ambiguous unless there is more than one reasonable interpretation). This might be described as an application of the contract principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, that is, expression of one thing is the exclusion of another. It is also the plain meaning of what the “limited label license” says in this case. See id. at 1031-33, 2003 WL 22048226 at *20-*21 (under Iowa law, construction and interpretation are controlled by what the contract says, in the absence of ambiguity); Dean Mgmt., Inc., 274 Ill.Dec. 161, 790 N.E.2d at 939-40 (under Illinois law, “[u]n-less the contract clearly defines its terms, the court must give the contractual language its common and generally accepted meaning,” and, in the absence of ambiguity, the meaning of contract language is determined by examining the language and such language must not be interpreted in a way contrary to the plain and obvious meaning of the terms); see also Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d at 703 (the rights granted to the patentee can be waived in whole or in part). Ottawa’s disagreement with this interpretation does not create an ambiguity. See id.; Dean Mgmt., Inc., 274 Ill.De