Citations
- 316 F. Supp. 2d 84
Full opinion text
RULINGS ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT
DORSEY, District Judge.
Defendants International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers (“IAM”) and Sherry Cooper move for summary judgment on Counts Three through Six. For the reasons set forth herein, defendants’ motion is granted and plaintiffs motions for entry of default and default judgment against defendant TWA are granted.
I. FACTS
Plaintiff was employed by Trans World Airlines, Inc. (“TWA”) for twenty-one years. Since March, 1997, she was a member of defendant IAM. From August, 1997 to July, 2002, defendant Cooper served as the General Chair of IAM District Lodge 142, plaintiffs local union representative.
Plaintiff and TWA were subject to a collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) initially negotiated by IFFA and which took effect September 22, 1994. The CBA provided for a medical leave of absence, retirement benefits, including disability retirement for those eligible, and a grievance procedure. Article 21 of the CBA governs retirement, providing that “[ejxcept as specifically amended hereunder, all provisions of the Retirement Plan for Flight Attendants ... shall remain in full force and effect.” The CBA, Article 21(B)(7), refers to disability retirement for those with over ten years of service. Article 21(B) further provides that “[t]he Summary of your Plan and your Rights as a Plan Participant as required by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 appears in the TWA booklet entitled Tour TWA Retirement Plan for Flight Attendants.’ ” The Retirement Plan for Flight Attendants of Trans World Airlines, Inc., Article 8.1, restates the ten-year service requirement and further requires that eligible employees “may retire on the first of the month which is not less than 30 nor more than 90 days next following receipt by the Benefits Administrator of his written application for a benefit.”
On November 14, 1994, plaintiff sustained injuries from a fall and sought a medical leave of absence. Plaintiff thereafter was placed on an extended medical leave of absence. During the leave of absence, plaintiff was required to undergo a series of independent medical examinations and attend neutral medical examinations pursuant to the CBA. On April 25, 1997, Dr. Alan H. Goodman evaluated plaintiff, concluded she had reached maximum medical improvement and recommended she return to work as a flight attendant. Dr. Rosly Einbinder, plaintiffs treating physician, disputed Goodman’s findings, stating that return to duty was not appropriate at the time. As a result of the difference of opinions, and in accordance with provisions of the CBA, plaintiff submitted to a neutral medical evaluation by Dr. Melville Roberts. Roberts concluded that plaintiff was not ready to return to work as a cabin attendant and recommended that she be retrained for a more sedentary job.
As a result of Roberts’s evaluation, TWA determined that plaintiff was permanently unable to perform the duties as flight attendant. On September 18, 1997, plaintiff was administratively dismissed.
IAM was required, pursuant to the terms of the CBA, to file a grievance not later than October 31, 1997. No grievance was filed contesting the dismissal. By letter dated April 20, 1998, plaintiff sought details as to whether a grievance was filed, whether such grievance was filed within thirty days of her discharge and if further proceedings were conducted on the grievance. Cooper did not respond to the letter nor did she respond to Maurer’s telephone calls. Plaintiff testified that she spoke with Cooper “months” after an October 6, 1999 letter and was told that “It’s over. Forget it. There’s no disability retirement for you.” Plaintiff applied for disability retirement on February 14, 2000. By letter dated March 1, 2000, the application was denied. On March 28, 2000, the denial was appealed. On August 16, 2000, the appeal was denied.
Plaintiff filed the present complaint on September 15, 2000. Plaintiffs amended complaint alleges violations of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), by defendant TWA’s breach of a fiduciary duty, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1104,1132 (“Count One”), and failure to pay benefits due, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (“Count Two”), violation of the Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947 (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. § 185, and the Railway Labor Act (“RLA”), 45 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. by TWA and IAM (“Count Three”), breach of a common law fiduciary duty by Cooper (“Count Four”), misrepresentation by IAM and Cooper (“Count Five”) and negligent infliction of emotional distress by IAM and Cooper (“Count Six”).
II. DISCUSSION
Defendants move for summary judgment on Counts Three through Six. Plaintiff opposes the motion only as to Count Three.
A. Standard
A party moving for summary judgment must establish that there are no genuine issues of material fact in dispute and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). In determining whether a genuine issue has been raised, all ambiguities are resolved and all reasonable inferences are drawn against the moving party. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655, 82 S.Ct. 993, 8 L.Ed.2d 176 (1962); Quinn v. Syracuse Model Neighborhood Corp., 613 F.2d 438, 445 (2d Cir.1980). Summary judgment is proper when reasonable minds could not differ as to the import of evidence. Bryant v. Maffucci, 923 F.2d 979, 982 (2d Cir.1991). Determinations as to the weight to accord evidence or credibility assessments of witnesses are improper on a motion for summary judgment as such are within the sole province of the jury. Hayes v. N.Y. City Dep’t of Corr., 84 F.3d 614, 619 (2d Cir.1996).
B. Count Three: RLA Claim
Defendants argue that plaintiffs RLA claim must fail having been brought outside the six-month statute of limitations. Plaintiff responds that she exhausted administrative remedies only four weeks pri- or to filing the present complaint and the present complaint is thus timely filed.
A claimed breach of the duty of fair representation is subject to a six-month statute of limitations. See DelCos- tello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 169-71, 103 S.Ct. 2281, 2293-94, 76 L.Ed.2d 476 (1983); Gvozdenovic v. United Air Lines, Inc., 933 F.2d 1100, 1106 (2d Cir.1991). The limitations period commences “no later than the time when plaintiffs knew or reasonably should have known that such a breach [of the duty of fair representation] had occurred, even if some possibility of nonjudicial enforcement remained.” Cohen v. Flushing Hosp. and Medical Center, 68 F.3d 64, 67 (2d Cir.1995) (internal quotation marks omitted).