Hammond v. Gordon County (316 F. Supp. 2d 1262, 2002)

ORDER

MURPHY, District Judge.

This is a civil rights action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C.A. §' 1983. The case is before the Court on the Joint Motion by Defendants Gordon County, Christian, Trammel, Crider, Highfield, Gravitt, Bridwell, Jones, Roberts, and Davis to Disallow Plaintiffs’ Use of Expert Witness [31], Defendant Gordon County’s Motion for Summary Judgment [41], the Motion for Summary Judgment Filed by Defendants Crider, Gravitt, Johnson, Jones, Roberts, and Davis [43], Defendant Bridwell’s Motion for Summary Judgment [45], Defendant Highfield’s Motion for Summary Judgment [46], Defendant Trammel’s Motion for Summary Judgment [47], Defendant Christian’s Motion for Summary Judgment [48], and Defendants’ Objections to the Affidavit of David M. Bogard [63].

I. Motion to Disallow Plaintiffs’ Use of Expert Witness and Objections to the Affidavit of David M. Bogard

On November 1, 2001, Defendants filed a Motion to Disallow Plaintiffs’ Use of Expert Witness. Defendants argue that Plaintiffs failed to produce the expert report of David M. Bogard in a timely fashion, and that the report contains inadmissible legal conclusions. When Plaintiffs filed the Affidavit of David M. Bogard in response to Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment, Defendants objected to the Affidavit, citing the arguments that Defendants raised in their Motion to Disallow Plaintiffs’ Use of Expert Witness.

Plaintiffs did not formally disclose their plans to use Mr. Bogard as an expert witness until April 9, 2001, when Plaintiffs amended their responses to the mandatory disclosures to identify Mr. Bogard and to provide his expert report. By that time, the discovery period had almost concluded, leaving Defendants without sufficient time to depose Mr. Bogard and to retain their own expert. The Court finds that Plaintiffs’ delay in disclosing Mr. Bogard and in producing Mr. Bogard’s expert report violated Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2)(B) and Local Rule 26.3, and that this delay prejudiced Defendants. The Court therefore will not permit Plaintiffs to use Mr. Bogard’s Affidavit or expert testimony in connection with Defendants’ pending Motions for Summary Judgment. The Court may consider allowing Plaintiffs to use Mr. Bogard’s testimony at trial, conditioned upon a forty-five day extension of discovery to allow Defendants to depose Mr. Bogard and to retain their own expert.

II. Background

Keeping in mind that when deciding a motion for summary judgment, the Court “must view the evidence and all factual inferences in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion,” the Court provides the following statement of facts. Reynolds v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 989 F.2d 465, 469 (11th Cir.1993). This statement does not represent actual findings of fact; rather, it is intended simply to place the Court’s legal analysis within the context of a specific case or controversy. Swint v. City of Wadley, 51 F.3d 988, 992 (11th Cir.1995) (“[W]hat we state as ‘facts’ in this [order] for purpqses of reviewing the ruling[ ] on the summary judgment motion[ ] may not be the actual facts. They are, however, the facts for present purposes, and we set them out below.”).

A. The Parties

Plaintiff Hammond resides in Silver Creek, Georgia. (Dep. of Tiffany Hammond at 5.) During the time period relevant to this lawsuit, Plaintiff Hammond was an inmate residing in the Gordon County Jail (the “Jail”). (Comply 2.)

Plaintiff Trotter is a resident of Calhoun, Georgia. (Dep. of Jeannie Trotter at 6.) From late 1998 to April 13, 1999, Plaintiff Trotter was an inmate residing in the Jail. (Id. at 132.)

Plaintiff Crowder is a resident of Calhoun, Georgia. (Dep. of Tamatha Crowder Hayes at 4.) During the time period relevant to this action, Plaintiff Crowder was an inmate residing in the Jail. (Comply 3.)

Plaintiff Quarles resides in Calhoun, Georgia. (Dep. of Virginia Darlene Quarles at 4.) Plaintiff Quarles was an inmate residing in the Jail from February 1999 to August 1999. (Id. at 5.)

Defendant Gordon County, Georgia (“Defendant Gordon County”) is a political subdivision of the State of Georgia. (ComplJ7.) As part of its activities, Defendant Gordon County maintains the Jail.

Defendant Roberts resides in Calhoun, Georgia. (Dep. of William Sidney Roberts at 6.) During the time period relevant to this action, Defendant Roberts served as the sheriff of Defendant Gordon County. (Aff. of William Sidney Roberts ¶ 2; Roberts Dep. at 18.)

Defendant Davis currently serves as the sheriff of Defendant Gordon County. (Order of Mar. 22, 2001.) On March 22, 2001, the Court entered an Order substituting Defendant Davis, in his official capacity, for Defendant Roberts, in his official capacity. (Id.)

Defendant Crider is an employee of the Gordon County Sheriffs Office (“GCSO”). (Aff. of Brian Crider ¶ 2.) During the time period relevant to this action, Defendant Crider worked as a deputy jailer at the Jail. (Id.)

Defendant Gravitt is an employee of the GCSO. (Aff. of Mike Gravitt ¶ 2.) During the time period relevant to this action, Defendant Gravitt worked as a sergeant at the Jail. (Dep. of Robert Lee Johnson at 76-77.)

Defendant Jones was an employee of the GCSO. (Aff. of Michael Jones ¶2.) From January 1999 to October 2000, Defendant Jones served as the administrator for the Jail. (Dep. of Michael Jones at 7-8, 11-12.) Defendant Jones’ duties included ensuring the safety and security of inmates at the Jail. (Id. at 14.)

Defendant Johnson resides in Calhoun, Georgia, and is an employee of the GCSO. (Aff. of Robert Johnson ¶ 2; Dep. of Robert Lee Johnson at 6.) During the time period relevant to this action, Defendant Johnson worked as a deputy jailer at the Jail. (Johnson Dep. at 6.)

Defendant Bridwell resides in Calhoun, Georgia. (Dep. of Tricia Casey Bridwell at 6.) During the time period relevant to this action, Defendant Bridwell served as a deputy jailer at the Jail. (Id. at 19.)

Defendant Christian resides in Carters-ville, Georgia. (Dep. of Walter Z. Christian at 5.) Defendant Christian worked for the GCSO as a deputy jailer at the Jail from November 1998 to April 1999. (Id. at 8.)

Defendant Highfield resides in Cave Spring, Georgia. (Dep. of Mark Allen Highfield at 21.) During the time period relevant tot his action, Defendant High-field served as a deputy jailer at the Jail. (Id. at 45.)

Defendant Trammel is a resident of Calhoun, Georgia. (Dep. of Kenyon Trammel at 6.) During the time period relevant to this action, Defendant Trammel worked as a deputy jailer or as a sergeant at the Jail. (Id. at 17, 99.)

Defendant Duncan resides in Calhoun, Georgia. (ComplJ 16.) During the time period relevant to Plaintiffs Complaint, Defendant Duncan served as a deputy jailer at the Jail. (Id.)

Defendant Vaughn also is a resident of Calhoun, Georgia. (Comply 17.) Defendant Vaughn served as a deputy jailer at the Jail during the time period relevant to this action. (Id.)

Defendant Battle is a resident of Calhoun, Georgia. (Comply 19.) During the time period relevant to this action, Defendant Battle served as a deputy jailer at the Jail. (Id.)

B. The Events Giving Rise to this Lawsuit

1. “Flashing”

According to Plaintiffs, jailers refused to give female inmates toilet paper or feminine hygiene products, such as sanitary napkins or tampons. (Quarles Dep. at 11; Hammond Dep. at 40.) Some of the Plaintiffs have testified that certain Defendants, including Defendant Highfield, required female inmates to “flash,” or show their breasts, to obtain toilet paper or feminine hygiene products. (Crowder Dep. at 9; Hammond Dep. at 40.) Plaintiffs also have testified that jailers instructed, or asked, female inmates to “flash,” or show their breasts, in exchange for cigarettes. (Quarles Dep. at 13, 39.)

Plaintiff Hammond testified that Defendant Highfield asked Plaintiff Hammond to strip for cigarettes on two occasions. (Hammond Dep. at 72.) Plaintiff Hammond stripped for Defendant Highfield in exchange for cigarettes. (Id.)

Plaintiff Hammond also has testified that Defendant Johnson asked Plaintiff Hammond and other female inmates to strip in exchange for cigarettes. (Hammond Dep. at 119.) Plaintiff Hammond stripped for Defendant Johnson in exchange for cigarettes. (Id.)

On one occasion, Defendant Johnson asked Plaintiff Trotter to “flash” Defendant Johnson in exchange for cigarettes. (Trotter Dep. at 99,145.) Plaintiff Trotter refused to “flash” Defendant Johnson. (Id.)

Plaintiff Quarles “flashed” jailers “a couple of times” in exchange for cigarettes. (Quarles Dep. at 40.) Plaintiff Quarles, however, testified that she did not mind “flashing” for cigarettes because she is a smoker. (Id.)

Plaintiff Crowder “flashed” jailers between ten and twenty times in exchange for feminine hygiene products and toilet paper. (Crowder Dep. at 70-71, 122.) Plaintiff Crowder occasionally refused to “flash” jailers in exchange for those items. (Id. at 72, 122.) When Plaintiff Crowder refused to “flash” certain jailers, Plaintiff Crowder did not receive the items she requested. (Id. at 72.) According to Plaintiff Crowder, Defendants Highfield and Johnson requested that Plaintiff Crowder “flash” them. (Id. at 99, 104-06, 122.)

2. Sexual Relationships or Contact

a. Plaintiff Trotter

In late 1998, Defendant Christian made comments concerning his interest in Plaintiff Trotter to other inmates. (Trotter Dep. at 23.) In December 1998, Plaintiff Trotter and Defendant Christian began having conversations with one another. (Id. at 26-28.)

At some point in 1999, Defendant Christian entered Plaintiff Trotter’s cell while Plaintiff Trotter was sleeping. (Trotter Dep. at 28-29, 31-32.) Defendant Christian touched Plaintiff Trotter’s face and then left the room. (Id.)

On March 2, 1999, Defendant Christian again entered Plaintiff Trotter’s cell. (Trotter Dep. at 35-38; Hammond Dep. at 44.) According to Plaintiff Trotter, Defendant Christian touched Plaintiff Trotter’s “private part” and subsequently forced his penis into Plaintiff Trotter’s vagina. (Trotter Dep. at 35-38.) Defendant Christian did not use a condom. (Christian Dep. at 28.) Plaintiff Trotter contends that she told Defendant Christian to stop, but Defendant Christian continued his activities. (Trotter Dep. at 37.) On that occasion, Plaintiff Hammond apparently was present in the cell. (Hammond Dep. at 45.)

On March 15, 1999, Plaintiff Trotter and Defendant Christian again engaged in sex. (Hammond Dep. at 48; Trotter Dep. at 40 — 41, 46.) Once again, Defendant Christian did not use a condom. (Christian Dep. at 28.) According to Plaintiff Trotter, Plaintiff Trotter did not want to engage in sex with Defendant Christian; however, Plaintiff Trotter felt that she “owed it” to Defendant Christian to have sex with him because Defendant Christian had given her gifts. (Trotter Dep. at 40-41, 46.)

On March 20, 1999, Defendant Christian and Plaintiff Trotter engaged in sex in the cell shared by Plaintiffs Hammond and Trotter. (Trotter Dep. at 47-48, 75-76; Christian Dep. at 24; Hammond Dep. at 48, 50-51, 54-55.) Again, Defendant Christian did not use a condom. (Christian Dep. at 28.) Defendant Trammel and Plaintiff Hammond also engaged in sex in the cell, apparently at the same time. (Christian Dep. at 24; Hammond Dep. at 48, 50-51, 54-55; Trotter Dep. at 47-48, 75-76.)

On March 23, 1999, Plaintiff Trotter and Defendant Christian again engaged in sex. (Hammond Dep. at 56-58.) Plaintiff Trotter and Defendant Christian also kissed and talked on this occasion. (Id. at 56-58.) Defendant Christian, again, did not use a condom. (Christian Dep. at 28.)

On March 28, 1999, Plaintiff Trotter and Defendant Christian also had sex. (Hammond Dep. at 60.) Defendant Christian did not use a condom during this sexual contact. (Christian Dep. at 28.)

At one point, Defendant Christian asked Plaintiff Trotter to dance nude for him. (Trotter Dep. at 144-45.) Plaintiff Trotter complied with this request. (Id.)

Defendant Christian gave Plaintiff Trotter gifts while Plaintiff Trotter was incarcerated at the Jail. (Christian Dep. at 30.) Specifically, Defendant Christian gave Plaintiff Trotter a hair permanent and clothes, placed money in Plaintiff Trotter’s inmate account, sent Plaintiff Trotter a card, and gave Plaintiff Trotter a photograph of himself. (Christian Dep. at 30; Trotter Dep. at 20, 40-42.)

Defendant Christian wrote letters to Plaintiff Trotter, and told Plaintiff Trotter that Defendant Christian “loved” Plaintiff Trotter. (Trotter Dep. at 89-91.) Plaintiff Trotter wrote letters to Defendant Christian, and told Defendant Christian that she “loved him.” (Id. at 91-92, 120-23.) Plaintiff Trotter, however, testified that she was afraid of Defendant Christian, and that she wrote letters to Defendant Christian because Defendant Christian wanted Plaintiff Trotter to write letters to him. (Id. at 121-23.)

On one occasion, Defendant Christian pointed a gun at Plaintiff Trotter when he observed Plaintiff Trotter talking to a male inmate through the cell. (Hammond Dep. at 61; Trotter Dep. at 42-45, 127-29.) Plaintiff Hammond observed this incident. (Hammond Dep. at 61; Trotter Dep. at 42-45,127-29.)

b. Plaintiff Hammond

i. Contact With Defendant Crider

Plaintiff Hammond was incarcerated in the Jail in 1997. (Hammond Dep. at 66-68.) During her 1997 incarceration, Plaintiff Hammond engaged in sex with Defendant Crider on two occasions. (Id.) Plaintiff Hammond has testified that she voluntarily engaged in sex with Defendant Crider on those occasions. (Id.)

ii. Contact With Sherry Crowder Robinson

At some point during her 1999 incarceration in the Jail, Plaintiff Hammond recalls that Defendant Highfield and a male inmate, Nathaniel “Boogie” Clark, asked Plaintiff Hammond to engage in oral sex with another female inmate, Sherry Crow-der Robinson. (Hammond Dep. at 99, 130-35.) Defendant Highfield promised Plaintiff Hammond and Ms. Robinson cigarettes in exchange for this behavior. (Id. at 134.) Ms. Robinson then performed oral sex upon Plaintiff Hammond while Defendant Highfield and Mr. Clark observed this activity. (Id. at 134-35.) Afterward, Mr. Clark brought cigarettes to Plaintiff Hammond and Ms. Robinson. (Id.) According to Plaintiff Hammond, Defendant Highfield instructed Mr. Clark to provide Plaintiff Hammond and Ms. Robinson with cigarettes. (Id. at 135.)

Plaintiff Hammond also recalls that, at some point during her 1999 incarceration, Defendant Johnson stated that he wanted to see Plaintiff Hammond and Ms. Robinson “eat pussy.” (Hammond Dep. at 132.) On the following day, Plaintiff Hammond engaged in oral sex with Ms. Robinson while Defendant Johnson watched. (Id. at 132-33.) Plaintiff Hammond claims that she received cigarettes in return for complying with Defendant Johnson’s request. (Id. at 133.)

iii. Contact With Corey Ricks

On at least three occasions during Plaintiff Hammond’s 1999 incarceration at the Jail, Plaintiff Hammond had sexual contact with inmate Corey Ricks. (Hammond Dep. at 38.) On one occasion, Mr. Ricks “rubbed on” Plaintiff Hammond’s privates. (Id. at 38.) Plaintiff Hammond did not report Mr. Ricks’ behavior at that time; however, Plaintiff Hammond has testified that Mr. Ricks’ behavior “kind of’ offended Plaintiff Hammond. (Id.) After Mr. Ricks “rubbed on” Plaintiff Hammond’s privates, Plaintiff Hammond received cigarettes. (Id. at 41.)

On another occasion, Plaintiff Hammond kissed Mr. Ricks in Plaintiff Hammond’s cell. (Hammond Dep. at 41-42.) According to Plaintiff Hammond, Defendant Brid-well had given Mr. Ricks access to Plaintiff Hammond’s cell to spray for bugs. (Id. at 42.)

On or about March 5, 1999, Defendant Christian allowed Mr. Ricks to enter Plaintiff Hammond’s cell. (Christian Dep. at 75; Hammond Dep. at 46.) While Mr. Ricks remained in Plaintiff Hammond’s cell, Plaintiff Hammond and Mr. Ricks engaged in sex. (Hammond Dep. at 45.) Plaintiff Hammond has stated that she did not object to having sex with Mr. Ricks. (Id. at 46.) Plaintiff Hammond testified that she received cigarettes, shampoo, candy bars, Cokes, and marijuana from Mr. Ricks in exchange for sex. (Id. at 100.)

iv. Contact With Defendant Trammel

According to Plaintiff Hammond, Defendant Trammel approached Plaintiff Hammond and promised Plaintiff Hammond that Defendant Trammel would give her anything she wanted in exchange for sex. (Hammond Dep. at 51-54.) On March 20, 1999, Plaintiff Hammond and Defendant Trammel engaged in sex in Plaintiff Hammond’s cell. (Id. at 48.) Defendant Christian and Plaintiff Trotter also were present in the cell, and apparently were also engaging in sex. (Id. at 49-50.) On that same day, Plaintiff Hammond received cigarettes, shampoo, Dr. Pepper, and candy, apparently from Defendant Trammel. (Id. at 50.)

On March 23, 1999, Plaintiff Hammond again had sex with Defendant Trammel. (Hammond Dep. at 56.) Apparently, Defendant Christian and Plaintiff Trotter also engaged in sex in the same cell. (Id.)

v. Contact With Nathaniel “Boogie” Clark

On March 21, 1999, Plaintiff Hammond kissed Mr. Clark. (Hammond Dep. at 54-55.) Plaintiff Hammond requested that Defendant Bridwell allow Plaintiff Hammond to engage in sex with inmates. (Hammond Dep. at 24-25.)

On March 27, 1999, Defendant Bridwell opened the door of Plaintiff Hammond’s cell to allow Mr. Clark to visit with Plaintiff Hammond. (Bridwell Dep. at 32, 65, 76; Highfield Dep. at 41-42; Hammond Dep. at 24-25, 59-60.) Plaintiff Hammond and Mr. Clark then engaged in sex. (Bridwell Dep. at 32; Hammond Dep. at 59-60.) Defendant Bridwell observed Plaintiff Hammond and Mr. Clark engaging in sex. (Bridwell Dep. at 32.) According to Plaintiff Hammond, Plaintiff Hammond received cigarettes from Mr. Clark in exchange for sex. (Hammond Dep. at 100.)

vi. Contact With Clifford “Beebe” Waller

At some point during her 1999 incarceration, Plaintiff Hammond also engaged in sex with an inmate named Clifford “Beebe” Waller. (Hammond Dep. at 61, 65.) According to Plaintiff Hammond, Mr. Waller informed Plaintiff Hammond that Plaintiff Hammond had to sleep with Mr. Waller if Plaintiff Hammond wanted cigarettes. (Id. at 61.) Plaintiff Hammond testified that she received Cokes, candy, and cigarettes from Mr. Waller in exchange for sex. (Id. at 100.)

vii.Contact With Defendant Johnson

Finally, at some point during Plaintiff Hammond’s 1999 incarceration, Defendant Johnson revealed his penis to Plaintiff Hammond and Ms. Robinson. (Hammond Dep. at 119-20.) At the time. Plaintiff Hammond and Ms. Robinson were talking to Defendant Johnson. (Id. at 120.) Plaintiff Hammond, however, has indicated that she and Ms. Robinson did not request Defendant Johnson to expose his penis to them. (Id.)

c. Plaintiff Crowder

i. 1996 Incarceration

In 1996, Plaintiff Crowder was incarcerated at the Jail. (Crowder Dep. at 12.) During her 1996 incarceration, Plaintiff Crowder had sexual contact with at least two jailers and another inmate.

aa. Contact With Defendant Duncan

In 1996, Plaintiff Crowder engaged in sexual relations with Defendant Duncan while incarcerated at the Jail. (Crowder Dep. at 13, 96.) Plaintiff Crowder has testified that she willingly engaged in sexual relations with Defendant Duncan. (Id. at 74.)

bb. Contact With Defendant Vaughn

In 1996, Plaintiff Crowder also had sexual contact with Defendant Vaughn. (Crowder Dep. at 13, 96.) Plaintiff Crow-der contends that her sexual contact with Defendant Vaughn in 1996 was not consensual. (Crowder Dep. at 14.) In particular, Plaintiff Crowder testified that Defendant Vaughn approached Plaintiff Crowder from behind and penetrated her vagina with his hands while Plaintiff Crowder spoke on a telephone inside the booking area. (Id. at 79-80.)

cc. Contact With Defendant Crider

Plaintiff Crowder contends that in 1996, Defendant Crider asked female inmates to kiss and touch each other in exchange for “things.” (Crowder Dep. at 14.) Defendant Crider allegedly asked Plaintiff Crowder to show him her breasts and to dance for him. (Id. at 15.) Defendant Cri-der also pulled out his penis and displayed it to female inmates. (Id. at 14.) Plaintiff Crowder also testified that Defendant Cri-der turned the power off on two occasions, and stated that he would turn the power back on if the female inmates touched each other and bared their body parts. (Id. at 80-81.)

dd. Contact With Faith Fogel

According to Plaintiff Crowder, in 1996, Defendant Crider showed Plaintiff Crow-der his penis and asked her to have sex with female inmate Faith Fogel. (Id. at 60, 78-79.) Plaintiff Crowder refused to have sex with Ms. Fogel, but she and Ms. Fogel touched each other’s breasts in front of Defendant Crider. (Id. at 78-79.)

ii. 1999 Incarceration

During her 1999 incarceration, Plaintiff Crowder did not engage in sexual activities at the Jail. (Crowder Dep. at 19.) Plaintiff Crowder, however, complains of unwanted sexual contact with Defendant Johnson following her hospitalization after a suicide attempt, and of one sexually-related comment by Defendant Trammel. (Id. at 24-25, 46-47, 96.)

aa. Contact With Defendant Johnson

According to Plaintiff Crowder, Defendant Johnson was assigned to guard Plaintiff Crowder during the third day of her hospital stay. (Id. at 28.) Defendant Johnson commented to Plaintiff Crowder that Plaintiff Crowder was attractive, and that Defendant Johnson would leave his wife for Plaintiff Crowder if 'Plaintiff Crowder was out of jail. (Id. at 29.) Plaintiff Crowder subsequently fell asleep. (Id. at 30.) Plaintiff Crowder awoke to find Defendant Johnson penetrating her vagina with his fingers. (Id. at 30-31, 53-56.) Plaintiff Crowder pushed Defendant Johnson’s hand away, and Defendant Johnson left the room. (Id.)

bb. Comments By Defendant Trammel

According to Plaintiff Crowder, Defendant Trammel asked Plaintiff Crowder why Plaintiff Crowder never talked to him. (Crowder Dep. at 46 — 47, 96.) Plaintiff Crowder responded by rolling her eyes. (Id.) Defendant Trammel commented that Plaintiff Crowder did not “go that way.” (Id.) Plaintiff Crowder believes that Defendant Trammel meant that Plaintiff Crow-der was not interested in Defendant Trammel because of his race. (Id. at 96.)

d. Plaintiff Quarles

According to Plaintiff Quarles, Plaintiff Quarles did not have sexual relations with any of the jailers employed at the Jail. (Quarles Dep. at 12.) Other than Defendant Christian, none of the jailers requested sex from Plaintiff Quarles, engaged in overt sexual acts toward Plaintiff Quarles, or touched Plaintiff Quarles. (Id.)

Plaintiff Quarles, however, complains that Defendant Christian made an improper comment to her in March or April 1999. (Quarles Dep. at 24.) According to Plaintiff Quarles, she was placed in a holding cell at the Jail. (Quarles Dep. at 24.) Jailers would not allow Plaintiff Quarles to leave the holding cell to go to the bathroom. (Id.)

According to Plaintiff Quarles, when Plaintiff Quarles requested permission to go to the bathroom, Defendant Christian responded, “Suck my dick and I’ll let you out to use the bathroom.” (Id. at 24, 35.) Plaintiff Quarles responded, “Bring it on in here.” (Id. at 24, 36, 44.) Defendant Christian laughed, and did not enter the cell or otherwise accept Plaintiff Quarles’ invitation. (Id. at 24, 26, 44.) Plaintiff Quarles believed that Defendant Christian was joking. (Id. at 44.) According to Plaintiff Quarles, Plaintiff Quarles was angry, and “would have bit it [Defendant Christian’s penis] off for him” if Defendant Christian had accepted her invitation. (Id. at 24, 44.) Plaintiff Quarles used the bathroom on herself. (Id. at 36.)

3. The Investigation and Related Events

In April 1999, Jail officials began investigating reports of sexual relationships between jailers and inmates. (Jones Dep. at 125, 168-69.) During that investigation, GCSO officers interviewed inmates and jailers. (Jones Dep. at 125.) The Georgia Bureau of Investigation (“GBI”) also participated in the investigation. (Id.)

On April 9, 1999, Defendant Christian’s employment with the GCSO was terminated as a result of the April 1999 investigation. (Christian Dep. at 8; Jones Dep. at 136; Roberts Dep. at 178.) Defendant Bridwell’s employment with the GCSO also was terminated as a result of the April 1999 investigation. (Jones Dep. at 127, 136.) Defendant Trammel’s employment with the GCSO also was terminated as a result of the April 1999 investigation. (Jones Dep. at 136; Roberts Dep. at 178.) Defendant Highfield resigned his employment with the GCSO as a result of the April 1999 investigation. (Highfield Dep. at 45; Jones Dep. at 126-27.)

On April 12 or 13, 1999, Plaintiff Trotter learned that she was pregnant as a result of her relationship with Defendant Christian. (Trotter Dep. at 54-55.) On April 13, 1999, Plaintiff Trotter was released from the Jail. (Id. at 132.)

In late April 1999, following Plaintiff Trotter’s release from jail, Defendant Christian took Plaintiff Trotter to have an abortion. (Christian Dep. at 35-36, 47; Trotter Dep. at 81.) Defendant Christian paid for the abortion. (Christian Dep. at 41; Trotter Dep. at 149.) According to Plaintiff Trotter, Defendant Christian “pressured” Plaintiff Trotter to have an abortion by informing Plaintiff Trotter that Defendant Christian already was paying child support, that Defendant Christian was in enough trouble already, and that Plaintiff Trotter and Defendant Christian needed to “take care of this.” (Trotter Dep. at 80-82.) Plaintiff Trotter claims that she did not want to have an abortion. (Id.)

At some point after Plaintiff Trotter’s release from jail, Defendant Christian and Plaintiff Trotter engaged in sex. (Trotter Dep. at 49.) At some point in late 1999, Defendant Christian tried to kick Plaintiff Trotter’s door down, tried to contact Plaintiff Trotter through relatives, and tracked Plaintiff Trotter when she moved. (Id. at 83-87.) Defendant Christian has not contacted Plaintiff Trotter since 1999. (Id. at 85.)

Defendant Christian subsequently pleaded guilty to charges of an improper relationship or improper touching of a female. (Christian Dep. at 25.) Defendant Trammel also pleaded guilty to charges of having sex with Plaintiff Hammond and of violating his oath of office. (Trammel Dep. at 104,107.)

C.History of Allegations of Sexual-Related Misconduct

In 1996, complaints surfaced concerning allegedly improper sexual relationships between Faith Ann Fogel, an inmate at the Jail, and three jailers. (Roberts Dep. Pis.’ Ex. 29; Dep. of Kevin Vaughn at 22-23; Roberts Dep. at 11, 14-15.) Ms. Fogel alleged that jailers had written her letters and given her cigarettes, that a jailer had exposed his genitals to female prisoners, and that a jailer had made an improper remark to her. (Roberts Dep. Pis.’ Ex. 29; Vaughn Dep. at 22-23.) Jail administrators conducted an internal investigation concerning those allegations. (Roberts Dep. Pis.’ Ex. 29; Vaughn Dep. at 22-23; Roberts Dep. at 14-15, 37.) According to Defendant Roberts, the GBI also assisted in the investigation. (Roberts Dep. at 14.) As a result of the deposition, two jailers pleaded guilty to criminal charges. (Id. at 12.)

In 1998, female inmates at the Jail filed complaints or grievances concerning allegedly improper behavior by jailers and inmates. (Roberts Dep. Pis.’ Ex. 29; Vaughn Dep. at 30; Roberts Dep. at 41.) In particular, the female inmates complained that Sergeant Tippens, Deputy Reynolds, Deputy Bennett, and Deputy Poarch allowed inmates to bring tobacco into the Jail, and that Deputy Poarch and Deputy McCain sold tobacco to inmates. (Roberts Dep. Pis.’ Ex. 29.) The female inmates also complained that Deputies Reynolds, Poarch, Parrott, and Tippens watched female inmates strip and engage in oral sex. (Id.) The female inmates further alleged that Deputy Reynolds allowed male inmates to watch female inmates engage in oral sex, and allowed the male inmates to masturbate while viewing those occurrences. (Id.) Additionally, the female inmates complained that Sergeant Tippens grabbed his penis and shook it at female inmates. (Id.) Finally, the female inmates alleged that a trusty or deputy brought certain female inmates cigarettes, marijuana, and cocaine. (Id.) Jail administrators conducted an internal investigation concerning those allegations. (Id.)

D. Hiring of Jail Personnel

Defendant Roberts delegated responsibility for hiring jailers to the staff sergeant. (Roberts Dep. at 48-49.) Defendant Jones testified that jailers were hired based on applications and interviews, and that applicants were required to submit to a polygraph examination and a background check. (Jones Dep. at 96.) Defendants Bridwell, Highfield, and Christian, however, testified that they never took polygraph examinations. (Bridwell Dep. at 16; Christian Dep. at 11, 17; Highfield Dep. at 14.) Applicants were not required to undergo psychological examinations prior to hiring. (Bridwell Dep. at 16,11,17; High-field Dep. at 14; Jones Dep. at 97.)

E. Training Provided to Jail Personnel

Defendant Roberts has testified that new jailers received hands-on training by being assigned to work under the supervision of an experienced employee. (Roberts Dep. at 19-30, 145-46.) Some of the Defendants also attended a two-week jail school — often after having been employed at the Jail for six months. (Bridwell Dep. at 21-22; Johnson Dep. at 6-7, 27-28.) The topics covered at the jail school included proper contact between males and females in a jail situation. (Bridwell Dep. at 21-22.)

Certain jail personnel attended a county-wide sexual harassment training seminar provided by Defendant Gordon County. (Vaughn Dep. at 33; Jones Dep. at 103; Roberts Dep. at 145-46.) That training seminar addressed sexual harassment of co-workers, and did not purport to address sexual harassment of inmates. (Jones Dep. at 103.) At least one of the Defendants testified that she did not attend the county-wide sexual harassment seminar. (Bridwell Dep. at 36.)

Jailers did not receive other training concerning sexual harassment or interaction with female inmates. (Christian Dep. at 22, 45; Vaughn Dep. at 19-20; High-field Dep. at 19; Trammel Dep. at 107; Jones Dep. at 92, 104.) Jailers also did not receive training concerning improper sexual contact with inmates, or training concerning preventing sexual contact between inmates. (Christian Dep. at 66, 74; Highfield Dep. at 19; Trammel Dep. at 63; Jones Dep. at 92.)

Other Defendants have testified that they received no training concerning dealing with inmates with psychological problems or inmates with disabilities. (Brid-well Dep. at 74.) Some Defendants also testified that jailers received no formal training concerning conducting body cavity searches, conducting strip searches, handling prisoner grievances, or dealing with suicide attempts. (Highfield Dep. at 20; Bridwell Dep. at 74-75; Christian Dep. at 45; Trammel Dep. at 114.) Finally, some Defendants have testified that they received no training concerning AIDS or AIDS prevention. (Bridwell Dep. at 46.)

At least some of the Defendants received formal training in certain areas, including: (1) the proper use of pepper spray; (Highfield Dep. at 25; Bridwell Dep. at 80; Johnson Dep. at 26; Christian Dep. at 20; Trammel Dep. at 15); (2) civil rights (Johnson Dep. at 27); and (3) training concerning privacy and security with respect to the Georgia Crime Information Center (“GCIC”) computer system (Johnson Dep. at 27; Trammel Dep. at 16.)

F. Supervision Provided to Jail Personnel

Defendant Bridwell testified that the jailers did not receive supervision. (Brid-well Dep. at 27.) According to Defendant Bridwell, jailers did “whatever they wanted.” (Id.)

Defendant Jones testified that jailers were to receive performance evaluations every six months, and that the sergeants on duty were to conduct those evaluations. (Jones Dep. at 101.) Some Defendants, however, have testified that they did not receive written evaluations or performance reviews. (Bridwell Dep. at 48-49; Christian Dep. at 19-20.)

Defendant Jones, in his capacity as Jail Administrator, toured the Jail every two to four weeks. (Jones Dep. at 89-90.) Defendant Jones’ office was in the booking area of the Jail. (Id. at 90.) Defendant Jones saw the Jail staff every day, and scheduled a formal meeting every four or fiye months. (Id. at 98.)

Defendant Roberts toured the Jail approximately once every three months. (Jones Dep. at 89.) Defendant Jones testified that he talked to Defendant Roberts four or five times each week. (Jones Dep. at 132.) Defendant Roberts testified that he met with all the jailers approximately two times each year to discuss things such as budgets. (Roberts Dep. at 85.)

G. Policies of the Jail

The Jail did not establish policies concerning sexual harassment of inmates. (Johnson Dep. at 44; Jones Dep. at 169.) Defendant Jones and Defendant Roberts, however, testified that the Jail has an unwritten policy that prohibits male jailers from performing searches of female inmates. (Jones Dep. at 22-26, 34; Roberts Dep. at 102.) If a female jailer is not available, females on duty in the dispatch center or in the road division perform the searches of female inmates. (Jones Dep. at 23-24, 26, 33-35; Roberts Dep. at 102-03.)

According to Defendant Jones, the Jail has a policy prohibiting male inmates from entering the cells of female inmates. (Jones Dep. at 51-52.) The Jail, however, does not have a policy prohibiting sexual activities between inmates. (Id. at 51.)

The Jail also has a policy requiring jailers to guard inmates who have been placed in a hospital for treatment. (Jones Dep. at 56.) The jailer assigned to guard an inmate should watch the inmate at all times. (Id. at 62.) When a physician examines the inmate, the jailer assigned to guard the inmate should stand outside the door. (Id. at 63.) The door, however, should remain open while the examination occurs. (Id.)

The Jail provides each female inmate with two rolls of toilet paper each week. (Dep. of Jeremy Battle at 25; Jones Dep. at 134, 152.) If female inmates require additional toilet paper, the Jail requires those inmates to purchase additional toilet paper from the Jail store. (Battle Dep. at 25-26; Jones Dep. at 134, 152.) If female inmates do not have sufficient funds to purchase additional toilet paper, jailers can provide the female inmates with additional toilet paper. (Battle Dep. at 24.)

The Jail store also sold feminine hygiene products. (Battle Dep. at 24.) Female inmates who possessed sufficient funds to purchase female hygiene products were required to purchase those products from the Jail store. (Id. at 25-26.) Jailers could provide female hygiene products to female inmates who did not possess sufficient funds to purchase those products. (Id. at 25.)

The Jail had a policy prohibiting the use of tobacco products or the possession of such products. (Battle Dep. at 28; Roberts Dep. at 39.) Inmates, however, obtained tobacco products and smoked. (Battle Dep. at 28.)

H. Procedural History

On December 29, 2000, Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit. Plaintiffs asserted claims for deliberate indifference under the Eighth Amendment, filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. (Compl.lffl 73-77.) Plaintiff Trotter asserted a claim for wrongful coercion of medical treatment and wrongful death arising under Georgia law. (Id. ¶¶ 78-81.) Plaintiffs also asserted claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and assault and battery arising under Georgia law. (Id. ¶¶ 82-88.)

On January 22, 2001, Defendants Christian and Trammel filed a Motion to Strike with respect to certain allegations contained in Plaintiffs’ Complaint. On February 22, 2001, the Court denied that Motion. (Order of Feb. 22, 2001.)

On March 22, 2001, the parties moved to substitute Defendant Davis in his official capacity for Defendant Roberts in his official capacity. (Order of Mar. 22, 2001.) On that same day, the Court entered an Order adding Defendant Davis, in his official capacity, as a party to this action, and dismissing Defendant Roberts, in his official capacity, as a party to this action. (Id.)

On January 15, 2002, Defendant Gordon County filed its Motion for Summary Judgment. On that same day, Defendants Crider, Gravitt, Johnson, Jones, Roberts, and Davis filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. On that same day, Defendants Bridwell, Highfield, Trammel, and Christian all filed separate Motions for Summary Judgment. All of the Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have failed to create a genuine dispute with respect to any of their claims. The Court first sets forth the general standard governing a motion for summary judgment, and then addresses Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment in turn.

III. Summary Judgment Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) authorizes summary judgment when all “pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c). In short, everything in the record must demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Herzog v. Castle Rock Entertainment, 193 F.3d 1241, 1246 (11th Cir.1999).

The party seeking summary judgment bears the burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine dispute as to any material fact. Herzog, 193 F.3d at 1246 (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970)). The party requesting summary judgment “ ‘always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis of its motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.’ ” Graham v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 193 F.3d 1274, 1281 (11th Cir.1999) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The movant[] can meet this burden by presenting evidence showing that there is no dispute of material fact, or by showing that the nonmoving party has failed to present evidence in support of some element of its case on which it bears the ultimate burden of proof.” Id. at 1281-82. “There is no requirement, however, ‘that the moving party support its motion with affidavits or other similar materials negating the opponent’s claim.’ ” Id. at 1282 (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548).

Once the moving party has supported its motion adequately, the non-movant has the burden of showing summary judgment is improper by coming forward with specific facts that demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue for trial. Graham, 193 F.3d at 1282; Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). The non-moving party “need not present evidence in a form necessary for admission at trial; however, he may not merely rest on his pleadings.” Graham, 193 F.3d at 1282.

After the non-moving party properly has responded to a proper motion for summary judgment, the Court may grant the motion for summary judgment if the Court concludes that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. St. Charles Foods, Inc. v. America’s Favorite Chicken Co., 198 F.3d 815, 819 (11th Cir.1999). When making this determination, the Court must view the evidence and all factual inferences in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Hinson v. Edmond, 192 F.3d 1342, 1348 (11th Cir.1999); St. Charles Foods, Inc., 198 F.3d at 819. The Court also must “ ‘resolve all reasonable doubts about the facts in favor of the non-mov-ant.’ ” St. Charles Foods, Inc., 198 F.3d at 819 (quoting United of Omaha Life Ins. v. Sun Life Ins. Co., 894 F.2d 1555 (11th Cir.1990)). Additionally, ‘“[i]f reasonable minds might differ on the inferences arising from undisputed facts, then the court should deny summary judgment.’ ” Id. (quoting Warrior Tombigbee Transp. Co. v. M/V Nan Fung, 695 F.2d 1294, 1296-97 (11th Cir.1983)) (alteration in original). Moreover, “credibility determinations, the weighing of evidence, and the drawing of inferences from the facts are the function of the jury.” Graham, 193 F.3d at 1282. Finally, “[i]f the record presents factual issues, the court must not decide them; it must deny the motion and proceed to trial.” Herzog, 193 F.3d at 1246.

When considering motions for summary judgment, the Court does not make decisions as to the merits of disputed factual issues. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Ryder Int’l Corp. v. First Am. Nat’l Bank, 943 F.2d 1521, 1523 (11th Cir.1991). Rather, the Court only determines whether genuine issues of material fact exist to be tried. Graham, 193 F.3d at 1282. Applicable substantive law identifies those facts that are material and those that are irrelevant. Id. Disputed facts that do not resolve or affect the outcome of a suit properly will not preclude the entry of summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

In addition to materiality, the Court also must consider the genuineness of the alleged dispute. Graham, 193 F.3d at 1282. A dispute is genuine if “ ‘the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.’ ” Id. (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505). The non-movant “ ‘must do more than show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.’ ” Id. (quoting Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348). “Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’ ” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348 (quoting First Nat’l Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 289, 88 S.Ct. 1575, 20 L.Ed.2d 569 (1968)). The standard for summary judgment thus mirrors the “standard necessary to direct a verdict: ‘whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.’ ” Graham, 193 F.3d at 1283 (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-52, 106 S.Ct. 2505).

IV. Defendant Gordon County’s Motion for Summary Judgment

Defendant Gordon County has filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. Defendant Gordon County argues that the individual Defendants are not agents of Defendant Gordon County for purposes of § 1983 liability, that Plaintiffs Trotter and Crowder failed to provide an ante-litem notice with respect to their state law claims, as required by O.C.G.A. § 36-11-1, and that sovereign immunity bars Plaintiffs Trotter and Crowder’s state law claims against Defendant Gordon County.

A. § 1983 Claims

“A county may be liable under § 1983 for the actions of its sheriff if the sheriffs actions ‘constitute county policy.’ ” Fletcher v. Screven County, 92 F.Supp.2d 1377, 1378 (S.D.Ga.2000) (quoting McMillian v. Monroe County, 520 U.S. 781, 783, 117 S.Ct. 1734,138 L.Ed.2d 1 (1997)). The parties do not dispute that Defendant Roberts is the policymaker concerning issues pertaining to the Jail. Therefore, to determine whether Defendant Gordon County can be held liable for the actions of Defendant Roberts and his jailers under § 1983, the Court must determine whether Defendant Roberts makes policy for Defendant Gordon County. Id. at 1379.

Defendant Gordon County argues that, under Georgia law, sheriffs are agents of the state, rather than the county. Consequently, Defendant Gordon County contends that Defendant Roberts cannot establish policy for Defendant Gordon County for purposes of § 1983, and that Defendant Gordon County therefore cannot be held liable under § 1983 for any of the actions taken by Defendant Roberts and the individual Defendants.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit recently addressed the issue of whether a Georgia sheriff is an agent of the county for purposes of Eleventh Amendment immunity. Manders v. Lee, 2002 WL 397221, at *5, 285 F.3d 983, 993 (11th Cir.2002). In Manders, the Eleventh Circuit noted that it was bound by prior panel precedent to treat a Georgia sheriff as an agent of the county, rather than the state, for purposes of Eleventh Amendment immunity. 285 F.3d at 993. The Eleventh Circuit, however, proceeded to question the correctness of its prior panel precedent on this issue, and concluded that “Georgia sheriffs are agents of the state, not counties, when performing their law enforcement duties as to use of force.” 285 F.3d at 993.

In concluding that Georgia sheriffs and their jailers are not agents of the counties, the Eleventh Circuit stated:

Although sheriffs are designated “county officers,” the Georgia Constitution and Code afford counties no authority, role, or control over (a) sheriffs qualifications, minimum salary, law enforcement powers and duties, (b) the investigation and suspension of sheriffs, or (c) the training, supervision, and discipline of his deputies at the jail. Sheriffs are independent and separate from county boards to such a degree that Georgia courts have held that counties are not liable under state law for the actions of the sheriff or his deputy jailers. Indeed, the state has mandated that sheriffs alone hire and fire their own deputies and jailers.

We recognize that counties set the total amount of sheriffs’ budgets and pay sheriffs’ salaries, but counties cannot reduce the sheriffs’ minimum salaries and cannot dictate how that budget is spent. Counties may waive the sheriffs’ sovereign immunity for motor-vehicle claims by purchasing insurance, but Eleventh Amendment precedent now makes clear that insurance or indemnification provided by a third party, such as the county, is not material to whether there is a risk of an adverse judgment or potential legal liability. Counties construct and maintain the county jails and must provide inmates certain necessities, but counties have no authority, role or control over the sheriffs’ use-of-force policies at the jail. Thus, on balance, we believe sheriffs are not agents of counties when performing their law enforcement duties as to use of force.

285 F.3d at 1008.

Although the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion in Manders did not purport to address the issue of whether a Georgia sheriff and his jailers are agents of the county or policymakers for the county for purposes of § 1983 liability, the Court believes that the reasoning of Manders clearly indicates that the Eleventh Circuit would conclude that Georgia sheriffs and their jailers are not agents of the counties or policymakers of the counties for purposes of § 1983 liability. Cf. Fletcher, 92 F.Supp.2d at 1380 (analyzing provisions of Georgia Constitution and Georgia statutes to determine that Georgia sheriffs conduct in area of law enforcement did not constitute county policy for purposes of § 1983 liability).

Given this authority, the Court concludes that Defendant Roberts is not an agent of Defendant Gordon County for purposes of § 1983 liability and that Defendant Roberts consequently does not establish policy for Defendant Gordon County with respect to the Jail. Defendant Gordon County thus cannot be held liable under § 1983 for the actions of Defendant Roberts or the other Defendants. The Court therefore grants Defendant Gordon County’s Motion for Summary Judgment with respect to Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims.

B. State Law Claims

Plaintiffs have failed to respond to Defendant Gordon County’s arguments with respect to Plaintiffs’ state law claims. Plaintiffs therefore have abandoned those claims, and Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on those claims. Bute v. Schuller Int’l, Inc., 998 F.Supp. 1473, 1477 (N.D.Ga.1998) (“Because plaintiff has failed to respond to this argument or otherwise address this claim, the Court deems it abandoned.”); Welch v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 978 F.Supp. 1133, 1137 (N.D.Ga.1997) (“Plaintiffs failure to respond to Defendant’s argument alone entitles Defendant to summary judgment on these claims.”).

C. Summary

In sum, the Court concludes that the individual Defendants are not agents of Defendant Gordon County for purposes of § 1983 liability. Defendant Gordon County consequently is entitled to summary judgment with respect to Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims asserted against it. The Court also grants summary judgment to Defendant Gordon County with respect to Plaintiffs’ state law claims, because Plaintiffs have failed to respond to Defendant Gordon County’s arguments with respect to those claims.

V. Motion for Summary Judgment Filed by Defendants Roberts, Cri-der, Gravitt, Johnson, Jones, and Davis

Defendants Roberts, Crider, Gravitt, Johnson, Jones, and Davis have filed a Motion for Summary Judgment with respect to Plaintiffs’ claims asserted against them in their individual and official capacities. The Motion filed by those Defendants also requests summary judgment with respect to Plaintiffs’ claims asserted against all the other individual Defendants in their official capacities.

A. § 1983 Claims: Individual Capacity

1. Defendant Crider

a. Plaintiff Trotter

Plaintiff Trotter has produced no evidence in support of any § 1983 claims that Plaintiff Trotter may have intended to assert against Defendant Crider. Defendant Crider therefore is entitled to summary judgment with respect to any § 1983 claims that Plaintiff Trotter may have alleged against Defendant Crider.

b. Plaintiff Hammond

Plaintiff Hammond testified that she had sex with Defendant Crider during her 1997 incarceration. A two-year statute of limitations, however, applies to § 1983 claims. Williams v. City of Atlanta, 794 F.2d 624, 626 (11th Cir.1986) (noting that Georgia’s two-year statute of limitations governing personal injury claims applies to § 1983 actions that originate in Georgia). Because Plaintiff Hammond did not file this lawsuit until December 27, 2000 — more than two years after allegedly engaging in sex with Defendant Crider in 1997, this claim is time-barred.

c. Plaintiff Crowder

Plaintiff Crowder has testified that in 1996, Defendant Crider displayed his penis to Plaintiff Crowder, asked Plaintiff Crow-der to show him her breasts and dance for him, and asked Plaintiff Crowder to engage in sex with Ms. Fogel. Any § 1983 claims that Plaintiff Crowder may have arising from those activities, however, are barred by the two-year statute of limitations. Williams, 794 F.2d at 626.

d. Plaintiff Quarles

Plaintiff Quarles has produced no evidence in support of any § 1983 claims that Plaintiff Quarles may have intended to assert against Defendant Crider. Defendants therefore are entitled to summary judgment with respect to any § 1983 claims that Plaintiff Quarles may have alleged against Defendant Crider.

e. Summary

In sum, the Court finds that the § 1983 claims asserted by Plaintiffs Hammond and Crowder against Defendant Crider are barred by the statute of limitations, and that Plaintiffs have failed to produce evidence in support of their remaining claims against Defendant Crider. The Court therefore grants summary judgment to Defendants with respect to all of the § 1983 claims asserted against Defendant Crider in his individual capacity.

2. Defendant Gravitt

Plaintiffs have presented no evidence in support of any § 1983 claims that Plaintiffs may have intended to assert against Defendant Gravitt. Further, to the extent that Plaintiffs intended to assert an Eighth Amendment claim against Defendant Gravitt based on an alleged failure to protect Plaintiffs from a known risk of harm, summary judgment would be appropriate for that claim for the reasons stated infra Part IV.A.5. The Court therefore grants summary judgment to Defendants with respect to any § 1983 claims that Plaintiffs may have asserted against Defendant Gravitt in his individual capacity.

3. Defendant Johnson

a. Plaintiff Trotter

Plaintiff Trotter has produced evidence indicating that Defendant Johnson asked Plaintiff Trotter to “flash” him in exchange for cigarettes. (Trotter Dep. at 99, 145.) The Court first determines whether this allegation states a constitutional claim, and next addresses whether Defendant Johnson is entitled to qualified immunity for this claim.

i. Whether Plaintiff Trotter’s Allegations State a Constitutional Claim

Plaintiff Trotter appears to assert a claim pursuant to the Eighth Amendment. The Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction of cruel and unusual punishments. Taylor v. Adams, 221 F,3d 1254, 1257 (11th Cir.2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1077, 121 S.Ct. 774, 148 L.Ed.2d 673 (2001). Actions that “impose the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment.” Carrigan v. Davis, 70 F.Supp.2d 448, 452 (D.D.C.1999). Under certain circumstances, sexual harassment or sexual abuse of a prisoner may violate the Eighth Amendment. Freitas v. Ault, 109 F.3d 1335, 1338 (8th Cir.1997); Boddie v. Schnieder, 105 F.3d 857, 860 (2d Cir.1997).

To establish an Eighth Amendment claim, a plaintiff must satisfy two requirements. First, the plaintiff must show that the defendant’s conduct is objectively serious or caused an objectively serious injury to the plaintiff. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994). Second, the plaintiff must show that the prison official acted with a “ ‘sufficien[tly] culpable state of mind,’ ” or with deliberate indifference to or reckless disregard for the plaintiffs constitutional rights, health, or safety. Id. at 834, 847, 114 S.Ct. 1970.

“The first element of the deliberate indifference standard is an objective element.” Carrigan, 70 F.Supp.2d at 452. “A prison official’s conduct is ‘objectively serious’ under the Eighth Amendment if it is incompatible with ‘contemporary standards of decency.’ ” Id. (quoting Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 32, 113 S.Ct. 2475, 125 L.Ed.2d 22 (1993)).

“The second element of the deliberate indifference standard is a subjective element.” Carrigan, 70 F.Supp.2d at 452. To satisfy this element, a prison official must act with “ ‘a sufficiently culpable state of mind’ ”, or with deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 825, 114 S.Ct. 1970 (quoting Wilson v. Setter, 501 U.S. 294, 297, 111 S.Ct. 2321, 115 L.Ed.2d 271 (1991)); Barney v. Pulsipher, 143 F.3d 1299, 1310 (10th Cir.1998). A prison official acts with a sufficiently culpable state of mind where the prison official “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837, 114 S.Ct. 1970. If no legitimate law enforcement purpose or pe-nalogical purpose can be inferred from the officer’s conduct, the conduct itself can be sufficient evidence of a culpable mind. Carrigan, 70 F.Supp.2d at 454.

Here, Plaintiff Trotter has presented evidence indicating that Defendant Johnson asked Plaintiff Trotter, on one occasion, to “flash” him in exchange for cigarettes. This allegation amounts merely to a claim of verbal harassment, and does not state an Eighth Amendment claim for sexual harassment. Barney, 143 F.3d at 1311 n. 11 (noting “acts of verbal harassment alone are not sufficient to state a claim under the Eighth Amendment”); Adkins v. Rodriguez, 59 F.3d 1034, 1037 (10th Cir.1995) (same). Plaintiff Trotter’s allegations against Defendant Johnson thus do not present a constitutional claim.

ii. Whether Defendant Johnson Is Entitled to Qualified Immunity

Defendant Johnson also has asserted the defense of qualified immunity with respect to Plaintiff Trotter’s claim asserted against him. The Court first sets forth the general standard governing qualified immunity in the Eleventh Circuit, and then applies that standard to Plaintiff Trotter’s claim.

aa. General Standard Governing Qualified Immunity

The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials performing discretionary functions from suits for damages brought against them in their individual capacities. Stanley v. City of Dalton, 219 F.3d 1280, 1285 (11th Cir.2000); see also Santamorena v. Georgia Military Coll, 147 F.3d 1337, 1339 (11th Cir.1998) (“ ‘[qjualified immunity protects government officials performing discretionary functions from civil trials ... and from liability’ ”) (quoting Lassiter v. Alabama A & M Univ., 28 F.3d 1146, 1149 (11th Cir.1994) (en banc)).

The Eleventh Circuit applies a two-part analysis to determine whether a government official is entitled to qualified immunity. Maggio v. Sipple, 211 F.3d 1346, 1350 (11th Cir.2000); see also Harbert Int’l, Inc. v. James, 157 F.3d 1271, 1281 (11th Cir.1998). First, the governmental official must prove that the allegedly unconstitutional conduct occurred while the official was acting with the scope of his discretionary authority. Maggio, 211 F.3d at 1350. A government actor’s discretionary authority encompasses all actions that: (1) were undertaken pursuant to the performance of his duties; and (2) were within the scope of the actor’s authority. Har-bert Int’l, Inc., 157 F.3d at 1281. The government official may not satisfy this burden merely by making “ ‘[a] bald assertion that the acts were taken pursuant to the performance of duties and within the scope of duties.’ ” Id. (quoting Espanola Way Corp. v. Meyerson, 690 F.2d 827, 830 (11th Cir.1982)). Instead, the government official must make “ ‘a showing by competent summary judgment materials of objective circumstances that would compel that conclusion.’ ” Id. (quoting Barker v. Norman, 651 F.2d 1107, 1124-25 (5th Cir.1981)).

The showing, however, is not a difficult one to make “because of the level of generality at which this requirement must be interpreted.” Sweatt v. Bailey, 876 F.Supp. 1571, 1576 (M.D.Ala.1995). For example, the inquiry focuses on whether a police officer’s act of subduing an arrestee falls within the scope of the officer’s authority, not whether the officer’s alleged use of excessive force while subduing the arrestee falls within the scope of the officer’s authority. Id.; see also Harbert Int’l, 157 F.3d at 1282 (noting that the discretionary authority inquiry “is not whether it was within the defendant’s authority to commit the allegedly illegal act”). Instead, the Court must ask “ ‘whether the act complained of, if done for a proper purpose, would be within, or reasonably related to, the outer perimeter of an official’s discretionary duties.’ ” Maggio, 211 F.3d at 1351 (quoting Harbert Int’l, 157 F.3d at 1282) (internal quotation marks omitted). The alleged unconstitutional conduct is “more properly considered in the second step of the [qualified immunity] test[,] where the court examines the actual conduct of the officer to see if the specific situation is governed by clearly established law.” Sweatt, 876 F.Supp. at 1576.

Once the defendant shows that he acted within his discretionary authority, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate that the defendant violated “clearly established law.” Maggio, 211 F.3d at 1350. To discharge this burden, the plaintiff must establish that (1) “ ‘the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of a constitutional right’ and (2) at the time of the alleged violation, that right was “clearly established,” that is, that a reasonable government official would have been aware of the right. Stanley, 219 F.3d at 1285 (quoting Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609, 119 S.Ct. 1692, 143 L.Ed.2d 818 (1999)) (internal quotation marks omitted). If the plaintiff fails to make either of those showings, then the defendant is entitled to qualified immunity. Taylor v. Adams, 221 F.3d 1254, 1257 (11th Cir.2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1077, 121 S.Ct. 774, 148 L.Ed.2d 673 (2001); see also Stanley, 219 F.3d at 1285 (“ ‘If a plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged