Citations
- 318 F. Supp. 2d 606
Full opinion text
FINAL JUDGMENT IMPOSING SANCTIONS AGAINST ANTHONY PI-NELLI, ALAN R. BRUNELL AND EDWARD R. THEOBALD
NORGLE, District Judge.
This matter comes before the court upon the court’s Opinion and Order of March 29, 2004, which, inter alia, ordered Anthony Pinelli, Alan R. Brunell and Edward R. Theobald to submit detailed accountings of improperly obtained attorneys fees in order that a final sanction could be imposed.
I. INTRODUCTION
In an order dated October 2, 2003, the court advised and gave notice to attorneys Edward R. Theobald, Alan R. Brunell and Anthony Pinelli (collectively “counsel”) that the court intended to proceed on a Rule to Show Cause as to why sanctions should not issue. See Minute Order of October 2, 2003 [116-1]. In that order the court stated that a Rule to Show Cause would be issued expeditiously. On October 8, 2003, the court issued the Rule to Show Cause, detailing the allegedly sanctionable conduct of counsel, and allowed counsel 45 days to respond in writing. See Rule to Show Cause [117-1].
On November 24, 2003, counsel filed their responses to the Rule to Show Cause, as well as numerous motions to dismiss the Rule to Show Cause and a motion for recusal. On March 29, 2004, the court denied counsels’ motions to dismiss the Rule to Show Cause and the motion for recusal. See Schmude v. Sheahan, 312 F.Supp.2d 1047 (N.D.Ill.2004). In that order the court proceeded to find that counsels’ conduct was sanctionable, stating:
The court finds that attorneys Edward R. Theobald, Alan R. Brunell and Anthony Pinelli have disobeyed the orders of the United States District Court and acted improperly by seeking and obtaining numerous awards of attorney fees, as improperly appointed counsel, in the Circuit Court of Cook County, after the entire cause of action had been removed to the United States District Court. Further, counsel proceeded with that conduct after a motion to remand had been denied, while that issue of remand was on appeal in the Seventh Circuit and after the Seventh Circuit’s decision, after they were aware that the court was handling issues of appointments and awards of attorney fees pursuant to 55 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 5/3-9008 for other attorneys in the case, and despite the court’s repeated admonitions that further litigation in the state court would be in contravention of the federal court’s jurisdiction and improper. Additionally, the court finds that the statements and actions of each attorney violated their duty of candor to the court. The sanc-tionable conduct of each officer of the court was willful, intentional and repeated, and was an attempt to circumvent the United States District Court’s removal jurisdiction. Attorneys Edward R. Theobald, Alan R. Brunell and Anthony Pinelli are hereby sanctioned pursuant to the court’s inherent powers.
Id. at 639-40. The court sanctioned counsel, ordering disgorgement of all improperly acquired attorney fees and payment of a $5,000.00 fine. See id. at 640-41. In order to assess the exact amount of disgorgement, the court ordered that counsel file “a detailed accounting of all fees requested and received in the Circuit Court of Cook County which relate to this civil matter, including copies of all pleadings filed by counsel, orders entered by the Circuit Court of Cook County, and all fee petitions submitted to date” within 28 days of the court’s order. See id. (emphasis added). The court stated that “[o]nce counsel submit such accountings, the court will enter an order requiring counsel to disgorge those improperly acquired attorney fees in a specific dollar amount to the source of such funds by May 28, 2004.” See id.
On April 26, 2004, counsel submitted their accountings to the court. See Accounting of Fees, Expenses and Costs Requested and Received by Anthony Pinelli [168-1]; Accounting of Fees, Expenses and Costs Requested and Received by Alan R. Brunell [170-1]; Accounting of Fees, Expenses and Costs Requested and Received by Edward R. Theobald [169-1],
In order to fully understand the sanc-tionable conduct underlying this judgment and the protracted nature of this matter, with an abundance of caution, the court finds that a recitation of the facts underlying the Rule to Show Cause is again necessary.
II. BACKGROUND OF RULE TO SHOW CAUSE
This case arises out of the death of Louis Schmude. Schmude died on May 7, 2000, while in the custody of the Cook County Sheriffs Department. In the resultant lawsuit, Plaintiff (hereinafter “the Estate”) claimed that Defendants were liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and various state law theories for damages arising out of Schmude’s death. A detailed background concerning the procedural history of this case is necessary to place the Rule to Show Cause and the instant judgment in context.
A. The State Court Civil Action and Subsequent Removal to Federal Court
On June 20, 2000, the Estate filed its original complaint in the Circuit Court of Cook County, naming only one Defendant, Cook County Sheriff Michael Sheahan (hereinafter “the Sheriff’). On June 27, 2000, the Sheriff was served with process. The Cook County State’s Attorneys Office determined that a conflict of interest would exist if it represented the Sheriff, and so on July 6, 2000, Tyrone C. Fahner, Brian F. Hynes and Michael K. Forde of the law firm of Mayer, Brown & Platt were appointed to represent the Sheriff as Special State’s Attorneys in the Circuit Court of Cook County by the Honorable David R. Donnersberger, the judge before whom the case was pending.
On July 26, 2000, a Cook County Circuit Court judge granted the Estate leave to file an amended complaint, naming three individual Sheriffs Deputies, William Spatz, Patricia Pultz and Larry Koscian-ski, as additional Defendants. On that same day, the Estate had summonses issued for all three additional Defendants.
On July 27, 2000, one day after the Estate filed its amended complaint, the Sheriff filed a Notice of Removal in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. Attached to the Sheriffs Notice of Removal was a copy of the original complaint, which named only the Sheriff as Defendant. At the time of removal, the Sheriff was the only Defendant served with process. Several weeks after the removal, the Cook County Sheriffs Department served Koscianski and Pultz with notice of the state court proceeding and a copy of the amended complaint. Spatz was never formally served with process in this ease.
After removal, on December 22, 2000, attorneys Theobald and Brunell filed their personal appearances in the federal court, along with motions to be appointed as Special State’s Attorneys to represent Defendants Spatz and Koscianski. One week later, on December 27, 2000, attorney Michael Ficaro filed his personal appearance in the federal court, along with a motion to be appointed as a Special State’s Attorney to represent Defendant Pultz. In these motions, counsel indicated that the individual Defendants would ordinarily have been represented by the Cook County State’s Attorneys Office; however, due to a conflict of interest, the Cook County State’s Attorneys Office could not represent them. Counsel further indicated that an Illinois statute provided that the court in which a case is pending may appoint an attorney as a Special State’s Attorney for the limited purpose of representing a party in that case. On December 27, 2000, the court took these motions under advisement. The Rule to Show Cause had its roots in these motions.
B. The State Court Criminal Action and Resultant Stay of Proceedings in Federal Court
One month before removal, on June 22, 2000, Spatz, Pultz and Koscianski were indicted and charged with first-degree murder in connection with the death of Louis Schmude. Thus, in addition to defending themselves against civil claims in the federal court, all three individual Defendants were defending themselves against criminal charges brought by the Cook County State’s Attorneys Office in the Circuit Court of Cook County. On December 29, 2000, the federal court stayed all proceedings in the civil case pending the outcome of the criminal prosecution.
On January 22, 2002, the criminal trial began. On March 12, 2002, in a bench trial before the Honorable Ronald A. Hi-mel, all three Sheriffs Deputies were acquitted of the charges against them.
C. The Stay of Proceedings in Federal Court Lifted
With the criminal trial concluded, the court returned to the civil matter. On March 18, 2002, after the conclusion of the criminal prosecution, attorney Theobald, on behalf of Spatz, filed a Renewed Motion to Remand to the Circuit Court of Cook County. At the March 22, 2002 hearing on the matter, the following exchange took place:
COURT:.
One of the issues the Court must deal with before deciding to lift the stay is who it is who will represent the defendants in this case, the individual defendants Spatz, Pultz and Koscianski.
Three attorneys have asked this Court to appoint them Special Assistant State’s Attorneys pursuant to some Illinois statute. And I have some doubts about the applicability of that statute to this situation.
But I am going to ask that the plaintiffs and all counsel brief this issue of the applicability of the Illinois statute, which counsel suggests applies here.
But beyond that, if the Court does have the obligation or the discretion to appoint counsel as Special Assistant State’s Attorneys, I will be candid with you and tell you that it is not likely that the Court would appoint any attorney who has previous experience with the State’s Attorneys office. And each of the movants here who are asking to be appointed attorneys, Special Assistant State’s Attorneys, in their curricula vita or résumé make a point of saying that they were in that office at some point in time or for some extended period of time.
And I will take this position initially, without ruling on it today, that it would be better to start, if at all, with attorneys who have not had experience in that office because of the particular relationship between the Sheriff and the State’s Attorney’s Office, given the background in this case, which involves the recent criminal prosecution.
So the first issue is whether that Illinois statute pertains.
There is no Sixth Amendment right to counsel in a civil matter. Each one of the defendants here has the right to employ his or her own attorney, if he or she chooses to do so.
But the motions are brought by individual attorneys who are asking to be appointed Special Assistant State’s Attorneys.
And so that’s the issue to brief.
The plaintiff certainly should be heard on this, the Sheriff should be heard, and each individual movant also should be heard.
And so you can submit simultaneous briefs on this issue within 21 days.
MR. THEOBALD:
Judge, I’d like to point out that that is not before the Court right now. The motion that I filed on behalf of William Spatz is to remand this case back to state court because—
COURT:
Well, you’re not in the case. You have filed an appearance, but along with that appearance you have filed a motion to be appointed a Special Assistant State’s Attorney to represent Spatz. And what I’m saying is that motion may not be granted.
MR. THEOBALD:
... But notwithstanding any ruling, my client wants me as his attorney, regardless of any appointment by the State’s Attorney’s Office or not. And I’m asking under the law that the case go back to state court, because it was clearly improperly removed.
COURT:
Well, if you are withdrawing — are you withdrawing your motion to be a Special Assistant State’s Attorney in this case?
MR. THEOBALD:
At this particular time, sure.
The motion I presented today was to remand back to state court. Not to be appointed anything.
COURT:
Are you making a motion to withdraw your motion to be appointed as Special Assistant State’s Attorney?
MR. THEOBALD:
Well, the motion I filed today, Judge,' is to remand it. So that’s — I don’t know how to respond to that.
COURT:
Well, I construe your answer is that you are not making a motion the [sic.] withdraw the motion.
MR. THEOBALD:
Well, I—
COURT:
So to deal with this, you have 21 days to submit simultaneous briefings on the issue that I have discussed. And we will take it one step at a time. And so—
MR. FICARO:
Judge, if I may speak on behalf of Miss Pultz. My name is Michael Fi'earo.
Before the Court was my petition. I would withdraw my petition to be appointed Special Assistant State’s Attorney by this Court and join in the motion for remand to state court.
COURT:
We will get to that in due course.
But if you are making a motion to withdraw your motion to be appointed a Special Assistant State’s Attorney, your motion is granted. And if you want your appearance to be as private counsel — for Pultz is it?
MR. FICARO:
Yes, your Honor.
COURT:
—certainly your appearance would be received.
So are you filing an appearance as her private attorney in this matter?
MR. FICARO:
I have not yet filed an appearance in the court.
I’m here on the remand, your Honor. And most respectfully, I don’t know if the Court has had the opportunity to review Mr. Theobald’s remand motion. It appears—
COURT:
So are you making a motion to withdraw your motion to be appointed a Special Assistant State’s Attorney?
MR. FICARO:
Yes.
MR. THEOBALD:
And on behalf of Mr. Spatz I will withdraw the motion — the petition that I filed, and in Mr. Brunell’s stead we will withdraw on Mr. Koscianski’s behalf. So that issue is no longer before the Court.
COURT:
All right. So very well.
Then there no longer is the issue of the appointment of Special Assistant State’s Attorneys.
Then what is before the Court is a motion to vacate the stay. That motion is granted and we will brief the issue of remand.
So the stay is granted only to the extent now to deal with the issue of remand.
Trans, of March 22, 2002 Hearing, pg. 3— 10.
At this hearing, counsel for the individual Defendants withdrew their motions to be appointed as Special State’s Attorneys. Attorney Brunell was not personally present, but attorney Theobald represented that he had the authority to appear in attorney Brunell’s stead and to withdraw the motion. Thus, attorneys Theobald, Fi-caro and Brunell appeared in this matter solely as private attorneys representing Defendants Spatz, Pultz and Koscianski, respectively.
D. Proceedings in Federal Court Subsequent to the Stay Being Lifted
With the matter of representations seemingly settled, the court and the parties then proceeded with Defendant Spatz’s March 18, 2002 Motion to Remand to the Circuit Court of Cook County. On April 22, 2002, the court issued an eight-page opinion denying Defendant Spatz’s Motion to Remand to the Circuit Court of Cook County. See Schmude v. Sheahan, 198 F.Supp.2d 964, 968 (N.D.Ill.2002). On April 24, 2002, Defendant Spatz filed a Motion to Reconsider the Court’s April 22, 2002 Ruling, which the court subsequently denied. Thereafter, on May 17, 2002, Defendant Spatz filed a Motion to Certify the Court’s April 22, 2002 Ruling Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), which the court granted. On June 14, 2002, the Seventh Circuit denied Defendant Spatz’s Petition for Leave to Appeal. Thus, these rulings conclusively stated that the court had jurisdiction over the entire matter.
On May 8, 2002, the court completely lifted the stay of proceedings in this matter. On that same day, Defendant Pultz filed a motion for leave to file the personal appearance of Anthony Pinelli as additional counsel, which the court routinely granted. Defendant Pultz had two private attorneys.
Again, at this time, the individual Defendants were represented by private counsel, as the motions to be appointed as Special State’s Attorneys had been withdrawn. On July 15, 2002, Defendants Spatz, Koscianski and Pultz filed a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 4(m), 12(b)(4), 12(b)(5) and 12(b)(6). On December 6, 2002, the court denied the Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). On April 23, 2003, the court denied the remaining grounds raised in the Motion to Dismiss. See Schmude v. Sheahan, 214 F.R.D. 487 (N.D.Ill.2003).
E. The Issue of Being Appointed as Special State’s Attorneys Arises Again
On May 20, 2003, attorney Ficaro filed a motion to withdraw as counsel for Defendant Pultz. On May 23, 2003, a hearing on the matter was held. At that time, the following exchange took place:
COURT:
Now who is moving to withdraw?
MR. THEOBALD:
Mr. Ficaro is moving to withdraw for Patricia Pultz.
COURT:
Where is Mr. Ficaro?
MR. THEOBALD:
He has a hearing in the Daley Center, Judge.
COURT:
Mr. Ficaro is not here.
MR. THEOBALD:
I’m standing in in his stead. He has got two hearings over there.
COURT:
If he withdraws, who is coming in?
MR. PINELLI:
Judge, I already have an appearance on file as co-counsel for Miss Pultz, and I will remain.
COURT:
You are her private attorney?
MR. PINELLI:
Yes.
No. Judge, I am appointed by the Circuit Court of Cook County.
COURT:
What makes you think so?
MR. PINELLI:
I’m sorry?
COURT:
What makes you think so?
MR. PINELLI:
I have an order from Judge Lott in Chancery Court appointing me.
COURT:
When did that occur?
MR. PINELLI:
Last May, Judge.
COURT:
In this case?
MR. PINELLI:
Yes. No, not in this case.
We filed a petition with the agreement of the Cook County State’s Attorney seeking to be appointed and seeking to represent Miss Pultz, and they agreed to that order.
COURT:
The order was entered on July 6, 2000, with respect to Special State’s Attorneys by Judge Donnersberger, or someone with that name.
MR. PINELLI:
With respect to the Sheriff, yes, your Honor not the individual defendants.
COURT:
Okay. But you are not appointed counsel in this case.
MR. THEOBALD:
Yes.
MR. PINELLI:
Yes, I am. Yes, Judge.
COURT:
Let me see a copy of the order.
MR. PINELLI:
Judge, I didn’t bring it with me today. I will have it here in half an hour.
COURT:
Once this case was removed, then no Judge in the state court could issue any orders in this case.
MR. PINELLI:
Judge, we didn’t file this case or indicate that we were seeking any order with respect to any matter before your Hon- or. We filed the petition in the Circuit Court of Cook County seeking to have counsel appointed.
COURT:
Not in this case.
MR. THEOBALD:
Yes.
MR. PINELLI:
On behalf of the defendants.
COURT:
After it was here? After it was here?
MR. THEOBALD:
Yes.
MR. PINELLI:
After this case was removed, yes, sir.
COURT:
Then you cannot do that.
MR. THEOBALD:
Judge—
COURT:
I’m talking to one attorney at a time.
MR. THEOBALD:
Well, I’m the same thing.
COURT:
Well, no you are not. You are not special attorneys appointed to this case. Once this case was removed, it was removed, and no attorney, once removed, could go before any state judge and file a motion. And any order that would be entered under those circumstances would be an improper order and unenforceable.
Once the case is removed, just this Court makes such decisions.
You are not an appointed attorney in this case, nor is Mr. Theobald. If you are here, it is because you are employed by individuals.
MR. PINELLI:
Judge, I have my appearance on file on behalf of Miss Pultz, and I intend to litigate this matter and I will consider what you have said.
COURT:
Are you telling me that once this case was removed to the federal court, notwithstanding removal that you went before a state judge and filed a motion?
MR. PINELLI:
Not a motion, a petition.
COURT:
A petition. A pleading.
MR. PINELLI:
A separate lawsuit by Miss Pultz seeking to have counsel appointed on her behalf.
MR. THEOBALD:
Could I explain, Judge?
COURT:
Not you.
MR. THEOBALD:
I am involved in this too.
COURT:
We will get to you, Mr. Theobald.
MR. THEOBALD:
All right.
COURT:
Any order that was entered by any state judge appointing an attorney to represent a party in this case, once this case was removed to the federal court, is void.
That applies — if that is what you did, if you, knowing of the removal, filed a petition or a motion before a state judge, that was improper conduct. And any order that a judge entered, once this case was removed to the federal court, was an improper order.
He or she acted without jurisdiction.
You did the same, Mr. Theobald?
MR. THEOBALD:
Yes, Judge.
A new independent action was filed, with the agreement of the Circuit Court, with the agreement of the State’s Attorney of Cook County.
I, Mr. Pinelli, Mr. Brunell and Mr. Fi-caro were appointed as Special State’s Attorneys under a State Statute to represent them here. And this has been going on for probably — well, I have been practicing for 29 years, and that’s been the procedure, to go before a state court judge.
The only time that a federal court judge appointed a Special State’s Attorney that I know of is when Judge Bua appointed me to represent the Sheriff 15 years ago.
COURT:
Once the case is remanded [sic.] to the federal court, the state court loses jurisdiction and cannot act with respect to that case any longer.
If you want to be here in this case, it is only as private counsel. As a matter of fact, several hearings back, when you filed a motion here with respect to being appointed a Special State’s Attorney, the Court made some comments, and you then withdrew the motion.
I don’t know if you then went to the state court. I don’t know if you did that.
But once the case is in the federal court, no state judge can enter any order in that case. The state court has lost its jurisdiction.
And so if you are — if you think that you are Special State’s Attorneys in this case, that is not the case.
MR. THEOBALD:
But we — I would disagree — we have been appointed, we are here as private counsel, whatever, and we are — we are here.
COURT:
Well, you are here only if you choose to act as private attorneys. And if that’s what you want to do in this Court, you can be here as private attorneys.
But you are not special attorneys as far as this Court is concerned.
MR. THEOBALD:
We are just asking that Mr. Ficaro’s appearance be withdrawn and—
MR. PINELLI:
My appearance has been on file. You gave me leave to appear as Anthony Pinelli, Attorney at Law, sometime ago.
COURT:
You want to appear as a private attorney?
MR. PINELLI:
I want to continue in this matter. I will consider what your Honor has said today.
COURT:
It’s not consideration, it’s an order.
MR. PINELLI:
I understand it’s an order.
COURT:
Who is going to pay your bill?
MR. PINELLI:
I don’t know the answer to that as I stand here.
COURT:
But it will not be Cook County and it will not be the State’s Attorney.
Do you want to—
MR. PINELLI:
Judge, I understand your order. And with all due respect, I understand your order. And now I have to decide what to do about it.
COURT:
Do you want to decide now?
MR. PINELLI:
I don’t want to withdraw. I want to remain in the case.
COURT:
Well, you are here only as private counsel.
MR. PINELLI:
Your Honor, irrespective of my status, I filed an appearance and I would like to continue representing Miss Pultz. If what you are saying — your order is your order, and now I have to consider whether I need to have some sort of an appeal, whether I need to just remain in the case.
I have no intention of withdrawing at this point or asking to withdraw here.
COURT:
And if you are here, you are here as a private attorney.
That’s this Court’s position.
And to reemphasize this for the record, once the case was brought here, having been removed from the state court to the federal court, no state judge could enter an order regarding this case.
That’s this Court’s position.
MR. PINELLI:
Yes, sir.
Trans, of May 23, 2003 Hearing, pg. 5-13.
Thus, at this hearing, all counsel were reminded that any post-removal motions must be made in the federal court. As indicated by the court, any petition or motion to be appointed as Special State’s Attorney, made pursuant to 55 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 5/3-9008 or any other applicable law or rule of civil procedure, had to be brought in the federal court. In fact, after the above-excerpted discussion, the court proceeded to address the Sheriffs motion to amend the appointment of a Special State’s Attorney, brought pursuant to 55 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 5/3-9008. The court reiterated that litigating issues concerning the removed case in the state court would be “improper conduct.” As attorney Pi-nelli indicated, the court’s ruling on the issue of appointing a Special State’s Attorney was clear and counsel could have sought review by .filing the proper pleading in the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. However, attorney Pinelli did not file an appeal, nor did any other attorney. Rather, as discussed infra, counsel filed their petitions to be appointed as Special State’s Attorneys in the state court, a procedure that was in direct contradiction to this court’s ruling on the issue.
F. Other Attorneys Followed Proper Procedure to be Appointed as Special State’s Attorneys
The attorneys for the Sheriff understood this admonition and order. A recitation of the steps that they took in order to be appointed as Special State’s Attorneys, and obtain awards of attorney fees, will illustrate this point.
Prior to removal, on July 6, 2000, Tyrone C. Fahner, Brian F. Hynes and Michael K. Forde of the law firm of Mayer, Brown & Platt were appointed to represent the Sheriff as Special State’s Attorneys in the Circuit Court of Cook County by the Honorable David R. Donnersber-ger, the judge before whom the case was pending. In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1450, those appointments remained in effect when the case was removed to federal court.
After removal, on December 28, 2000, the Sheriff filed a motion in the federal court to amend the appointment to allow Tyrone C. Fahner, Brian F. Hynes, Robert H. King, Jr. and Michael D. Smith of the law firm of Greenberg Traurig, P.C. to represent the Sheriff as Special State’s Attorneys. This motion to amend the appointment was made as a result of one of the Sheriffs attorneys having changed law firms. The court granted that motion, and instructed the Sheriffs attorneys on how to seek attorney fee awards. On April 4, 2001, the Mayer, Brown & Platt attorneys filed a petition for attorney fees for work performed prior to removal, which the court granted. On November 12, 2002, the Greenberg Traurig attorneys also filed a petition for attorney fees, which the court granted. On May 19, 2003, due to another one of the Sheriffs attorneys having changed law firms, the Sheriff filed another motion to amend the appointment to allow Brian F. Hynes, John F. Kennedy and Steven J. Thompson of the law firm of Shefsky & Froelich Ltd. to represent the Sheriff as Special State’s Attorneys. The court granted that motion and again instructed the Sheriffs attorneys on how to seek attorney fee awards.
In their responses to the Rule to Show Cause, counsel indicated that another attorney for the Sheriff attempted to litigate the issue of appointments in the state court after removal. On November 3, 2000, attorney Hynes filed a motion in the Circuit Court of Cook County before the Honorable David R. Donnersberger seeking to amend his appointment as a Special State’s Attorney. That motion stated that it was seeking to amend the appointment as a result of attorney Hynes having changed law firms. By order dated November 6, 2000, the Honorable David R. Donnersberger denied that motion, recognizing the fact that jurisdiction in the state court had ceased upon removal to the federal court. Thereafter, on December 28, 2000, attorney Hynes, and other attorneys from the law firm to which he had moved, properly filed that motion in federal court. Counsel were given notice of that motion, and thereby given notice of the proper procedure to be appointed as Special State’s Attorneys.
Throughout this matter, the court reiterated that it had jurisdiction over all matters, including issues concerning representation and awards of attorney fees. On May 27, 2003, the court entered a Case Management order to that effect, instructing all attorneys appointed as Special State’s Attorneys by this court to submit periodic fee petitions at 28 day intervals. The attorneys appointed as Special State’s Attorneys have complied with that order, and the court has subsequently awarded additional attorney fee awards.
In contrast to the proper litigation conduct shown by the attorneys representing the Sheriff as Special State’s Attorneys, attorneys Theobald, Brunell and Pinelli chose another form of conduct. Following removal, the court’s denial of remand, an appeal of the denial of remand to the Seventh Circuit and repeated admonitions that further proceedings regarding this case in the state court would be improper, these attorneys repeatedly circumvented the federal court’s authority and jurisdiction by obtaining fees and expenses of approximately $400,000 to date in the state court.
G. Counsel Circumvented the Federal Court’s Authority and Jurisdiction by Initiating a State Court Proceeding to be Appointed as Special State’s Attorneys
Approximately one month after the March 22 hearing, and one week after the April 22 order denying the motion to remand, on April 29, 2002, attorney Theobald initiated a cause of action in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Chancery Division captioned In re Special State’s Attorneys, case number 02 CH 08323. On April 30, 2002, a motion styled “Petitioner’s Motion for Appointment of Special State’s Attorney” was filed in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Chancery Division. That motion sought to have attorneys Theobald, Bru-nell, Ficaro and Pinelli appointed to represent Defendants Spatz, Koscianski and Pultz in the matter pending in the federal court. On the face of that motion, two attorneys, Ficaro and Pinelli, sought to represent Pultz. That motion stated:
Petitioners are defendants in the case of ESTATE OF LOUIS SCHMUDE, et al., plaintiffs v. MICHAEL SHEAHAN, Cook County Sheriff, WILLIAM SPATZ, Cook County Deputy Sheriff, PATRICIA PULTZ, Cook County Deputy Sheriff, and LARRY KOSCIANSKI, Cook County Deputy Sheriff, defendants, 00 L 6557 later removed to federal court and renumbered as 00 C 4580.
The prayer for relief in that motion stated:
Petitioners pray this Honorable Court to enter an order appointing Edward R. Theobald as a Special State’s Attorney to represent WILLIAM SPATZ, Alan R. Brunell as a Special State’s Attorney to represent LARRY KOSCIANSKI, and Michael A. Ficaro and Anthony Pi-nelli as Special State’s Attorneys to represent PATRICIA PULTZ and to retain jurisdiction over the appointments for the purpose of awarding counsel attorney’s fees and expenses.
From that motion, it appears that notice was given to Patrick T. Driscoll, Jr. and Thomas M. Burnham of the Cook County State’s Attorneys Office. That motion was ultimately granted by the Honorable Gay-Lloyd Lott, apparently presiding in the Chancery Court, on May 3, 2002.
After having been ostensibly appointed as Special State’s Attorneys in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Chancery Division, counsel also filed numerous motions for awards of attorney fees in that court. Based on counsels’ court-ordered account-ings and the state court record, the total amount of attorney fees awarded by those orders was approximately $400,000 to date. In short, counsel repeatedly proceeded to litigate issues regarding this case in the state court following removal, the court’s denial of remand, an appeal of the denial of remand to the Seventh Circuit and repeated admonitions that further proceedings regarding this case in the state court would be improper. Counsel used the other side of our federalism structure to litigate issues that should have been addressed in this court, with the federal court having jurisdiction over the entire matter.
H. Rule to Show Cause and the Court’s Opinion and Order of March 29, 2004
In light of these events, the court issued a Rule to Show Cause alleging that counsel had disobeyed the court’s orders and acted improperly by seeking to become court-appointed counsel and obtaining numerous awards of attorney fees in the state court after the case had been removed to federal court. Further, the Rule to Show Cause alleged that counsels’ conduct exhibited a lack of candor toward the court. The court then issued the Rule, giving counsel 45 days to respond in writing.
Approximately two weeks after the court issued the Rule to Show Cause, the parties pursuant to settlement, executed a Stipulation to Dismiss the underlying action, which the court entered. On November 24, 2003, counsel filed their answers to the Rule to Show Cause, as well as numerous motions to dismiss the Rule and a Motion for Recusal. On March 29, 2004, the court entered an opinion and order, finding that disgorgement of improperly obtained attorney fees and additional sanctions were warranted. See Schmude v. Sheahan, 312 F.Supp.2d 1047 (N.D.Ill.2004). With an abundance of caution, and for purposes of clarity, the court will now quote the entirety of the court’s findings in the March 29, 2004 Opinion and Order as related to the Rule to Show Cause:
IV. DISPOSITION ON THE RULE TO SHOW CAUSE
A. The Court’s Inherent Powers to Sanction Attorney Conduct
The federal courts possess certain inherent powers, “‘which cannot be dispensed with in a Court, because they are necessary to the exercise of all others.’ ” Chambers, 501 U.S. at 43, 111 S.Ct. 2123 (quoting United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Crunch) 32, 34, 3 L.Ed. 259 (1812)); see also Dale M. ex rel. Alice M. v. Board of Education, 282 F.3d 984, 985-86 (7th Cir.2002) (“Courts have a broad power, deemed ‘inherent’ in the sense that its existence does not depend on an explicit grant of power in a statute or other formal enactment, to regulate the conduct of the lawyers who practice before them.”). The federal courts “ ‘are universally acknowledged to be vested, by their very creation, with power to impose silence, respect, and decorum, in their presence, and submission to their lawful mandates.’ ” Id. (quoting Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) 204, 227, 5 L.Ed. 242 (1821)). A federal court also “ ‘has the power to control admission to its bar and to discipline attorneys who appear before it.’ ” Id. (citing Ex parte Burr, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 529, 531, 6 L.Ed. 152 (1824)).
As part of the power to control the conduct of attorneys appearing before it, “ ‘a federal court has the inherent power to sanction for conduct which abuses the judicial process,’ ” U.S. v. Johnson, 327 F.3d 554, 560 (7th Cir.2003) (quoting Barnhill v. United States, 11 F.3d 1360, 1367 (7th Cir.1993)), and to “ ‘prevent unprofessional conduct by those attorneys who are practicing before them ..., including conduct that involves the exaction of illegal fees.’ ” Dale M., 282 F.3d at 986 (quoting Jackson v. United States, 881 F.2d 707, 710 (9th Cir.1989)). Further, as the inherent powers are “rooted [in] considerations of institutional self-defense,” United States v. Giannattasio, 979 F.2d 98, 101 (7th Cir.1992), resort to such powers is appropriate where the conduct at issue, as in the present case, is counterproductive to the removal jurisdiction of the federal courts.
The Seventh Circuit “has recognized the need to be cautious when resorting to inherent powers to justify an action, particularly when the matter is governed by other procedural rules, lest (even in the absence of a direct conflict) the restrictions in those rules become meaningless.” Kovilic Constr. Co., Inc. v. Missbrenner, 106 F.3d 768, 772-73 (7th Cir.1997) (citing G. Heileman Brewing Co., Inc. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 871 F.2d 648, 652 (7th Cir.1989) (en banc)). “So long as the inherent powers are exercised in harmony with applicable statutory or constitutional alternatives, then the latter need not displace the former.” Johnson, 327 F.3d at 561 (citing G. Heileman Brewing Co., Inc. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 871 F.2d 648, 652 (7th Cir.1989) (en banc)). “Sanctions authorized only by the inherent power of the court are therefore available only when no direct conflict with laws or national rules of procedure would arise.” Missbrenner, 106 F.3d at 773. In accordance with this rationale, the Supreme Court in Chambers stated that courts should ordinarily rely on the Rules rather than their inherent power, “[b]ut if in the informed discretion of the court, neither the statute nor the Rules are up to the task, the court may safely rely on its inherent powers.” Chambers, 501 U.S. at 50, 111 S.Ct. 2123. “At the very least, the inherent power must continue to exist to fill in the interstices.” Id. at 46, 111 S.Ct. 2123.
Furthermore, “[b]ecause the inherent powers are so broad in scope, they are to be narrowly tailored in their application.” Johnson, 327 F.3d at 562 (citing Chambers, 501 U.S. at 44-45, 111 S.Ct. 2123). As such, the Seventh Circuit has stated that “[c]areful, case-specific consideration is owed therefore not only to the character of the sanctionable conduct, but also to the nature and purpose of the sanctions.” Id. A court has discretion in “fashioning] an appropriate sanction for conduct which abuses the judicial process,” Chambers, 501 U.S. at 45, 111 S.Ct. 2123, but the sanction must be proportional to the wrongful conduct at issue. See Diettrich v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 168 F.3d 961, 964 (7th Cir.1999) (indicating that, when exercising inherent powers to sanction, “the punishment must fit the crime”). However, “[generally, the harshest of sanctions have been upheld only in situations involving bad faith, contumacy, or egregious misconduct.” Johnson, 327 F.3d at 563. “The district court may find willfulness, or bad faith, in the manner in which the attorney conducts the litigation.” Magnus Elec., Inc. v. Masco Corp., 871 F.2d 626, 632 (7th Cir.1989).
Thus, with this understanding of the court’s inherent powers to impose sanctions, the court will now turn to the allegedly sanctionable conduct of counsel and determine whether the imposition of sanctions is warranted, and if so, what type of sanction is appropriate.
B. Allegedly Sanctionable Conduct Delineated in the Rule to Show Cause
In sum, the Rule to Show Cause alleged that counsel had willfully disobeyed established statutory and case law authority and the court’s orders by improperly seeking to become court-appointed counsel and obtaining numerous awards of attorney fees in the Circuit Court of Cook County after the cause of action had been removed to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, and where it remains pending. Further, the Rule to Show Cause alleged that counsels’ conduct exhibited a lack of candor toward the court. The allegedly sanctionable conduct involved one simple matter — circumventing the federal court’s removal jurisdiction.
In the Rule, the court reiterated the procedural history of the case, detailing the allegedly sanctionable conduct of counsel. In section IV of the Rule, styled “Grounds Underlying Possible Impropriety by Attorneys Appearing Before the Court,” the court framed the issues for counsel to address. First, the court discussed the well-settled law regarding removal of a case from state court to federal court, stating that after removal any further orders of the state court are considered coram non judice, or without jurisdiction. Second, the court discussed the court’s authority and jurisdiction in regard to awards of attorney fees in cases that are pending before it, stating that this court was best suited to determine the issue of attorney appointments and fees and that such review was justified by the court’s inherent right to supervise the members of its bar. Lastly, the court stated that attorneys practicing before the court owed a duty to act with candor toward the court, indicating that counsels’ conduct fell short of that requirement. The Rule alleged discrete, readily ascertainable acts. The court then issued the Rule, giving counsel 45 days to respond in writing.
C. Counsels’ Responses to the Rule to Show Cause
Counsel have timely submitted written responses to the Rule. Attorneys Theobald and Pinelli filed a joint response to the Rule, including numerous exhibits, and attorney Pinelli has also filed a supplemental response. Attorney Brunell filed his own response to the Rule, but additionally adopted the response and exhibits submitted by attorneys Theobald and Pinelli. In each of their responses, counsel also raise numerous matters characterized as affirmative defenses. The matters characterized as affirmative defenses are also repetitive of the numerous motions to dismiss the Rule, which counsel have filed separately, and which are largely irrelevant and immaterial to the matters raised in the Rule to Show Cause. Additionally, the matters raised as affirmative defenses and in the motions to dismiss the Rule are also largely undeveloped or underdeveloped and lacking appropriate citations to controlling authorities.
Counsels’ arguments can be described by what the Seventh Circuit has referred to as the “ ‘everything but the kitchen sink’ philosophy” of litigation. In re Maurice, 21 F.3d 767, 770 (7th Cir.1994). In response to the singularly simple allegation that counsel circumvented the court’s federal removal jurisdiction, counsel have responded with a total of 19 affirmative defenses and 7 separately filed motions to dismiss the Rule. In order to highlight the irrelevancy and immateriality of counsels’ arguments, the court will list all of the matters raised in the affirmative defenses and reiterated in the numerous motions to dismiss the Rule:
1. The court must give preclusive effect to the In re Special State’s Attorneys proceeding based on the Full Faith & Credit Clause of Article IV, section 1 of the United States Constitution, as well as the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
2. Article III of the United States Constitution limits the court from assuming jurisdiction not granted by Congress.
3. The Illinois Circuit Courts have exclusive jurisdiction to appoint Special State’s Attorneys.
4. The court cannot assume jurisdiction to appoint Special State’s Attorneys pursuant to an Illinois statute, because the Illinois Constitution vests such power solely in the Illinois Circuit Courts.
5. The court cannot assume jurisdiction over decisions to be made by the State’s Attorneys Office of Cook County, because the Illinois Tort Immunity Act authorizes the State’s Attorneys Offices to appear and defend their interests.
6. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes the court from reviewing or reversing orders entered in the In re Special State’s Attorneys proceeding.
7. The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution bars the court from assuming jurisdiction over decisions made by the State’s Attorneys Office of Cook County to consent to counsels’ appointments in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Chancery Division.
8. The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution bars the court from assuming jurisdiction over claims against counsel because they are Special State’s Attorneys, which are considered Illinois Constitutional officers.
9. The court cannot assume jurisdiction over counsel, as Special State’s Attorneys, because they are entitled to absolute immunity.
10. The court cannot assume jurisdiction over counsel, as Special State’s Attorneys, because they are entitled to qualified immunity.
11. The Rule to Show Cause is barred by the doctrine of laches because Illinois Circuit Courts have appointed Special State’s Attorneys for over twenty years.
12. According to Saldana v. Kmart Corp., 260 F.3d 228 (3rd Cir.2001), the court cannot invoke jurisdiction over a matter under its inherent powers unless the conduct complained of occurred in the presence of the court and affected the orderly disposition of cases before the court.
13. The Rule to Show Cause fails to refer to “one written, unequivocal, clear and unambiguous order entered on the docket sheet of the ‘record’ allegedly not followed by [counsel],” and thus dismissal is warranted according to In re La-Marre, 494 F.2d 753, 758 (6th Cir.1974).
14. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 is inapplicable to the Rule to Show Cause because counsel filed no improper pleading with the court.
15. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 is inapplicable to the Rule to Show Cause because counsels’ conduct did not delay the proceedings in Schmude v. Sheah-an.
16. Comity prohibits the court from exercising jurisdiction to appoint Special State’s Attorneys based on the Supreme Court’s decision in Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 728, 116 S.Ct. 1712, 135 L.Ed.2d 1 (1996).
17. The court lacks jurisdiction because the case was improperly removed.
18. The Honorable Charles R. Norgle must recuse himself.
19. Counsel demand an evidentiary hearing.
As indicated, some of the matters raised in counsels’ affirmative defenses and motions to dismiss the Rule are so patently meritless that the court need not address them, while others are underdeveloped and lack appropriate citations to controlling authorities. Some of the matters raised in counsels’ affirmative defenses and motions to dismiss the Rule may even be independently sanc-tionable under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. As an initial example, counsel argue that the court lacks jurisdiction because the case was improperly removed. However, the court denied a motion to remand, denied a motion to reconsider the order denying remand, and the Seventh Circuit denied leave to appeal the issue of remand after the court certified the issue for appellate review. It is the law of the case that the court properly has federal removal jurisdiction over this case, and it is untenable to argue the contrary when two courts have decided that this court has jurisdiction over the ease. As another example, counsel argue that 28 U.S.C. § 1927 is inapplicable to the Rule to Show Cause because counsels’ conduct did not delay the proceedings in this case. However, the court did not cite that authority as a basis for the Rule to Show Cause, and did not even intimate that counsels’ conduct delayed the proceedings. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 prohibits the filing of pleadings which “insistí ] upon a position after it is no longer tenable” or which are brought for an improper purpose. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 11 and Advisory Committee’s Notes. With that admonition, the court will not press the point, and will proceed to the Rule to Show cause as framed.
Those remaining matters that warrant consideration will be addressed by the court. However, some of these matters raised as affirmative defenses and in the numerous motions to dismiss the Rule are repetitive of the arguments raised in response to the issues as framed in the Rule to Show Cause, and will be best addressed alongside counsels’ answers to the Rule.
In furtherance of counsels’ “ ‘everything but the kitchen sink’ philosophy” to litigation, they have also denied every allegation raised in the Rule to Show Cause. For the most part, counsel simply deny the allegations in a conclusory fashion with no argument or supporting authority. Additionally, certain allegations are denied despite counsels’ admissions concerning the grounds of the underlying impropriety as alleged in the Rule. For example, counsel do not dispute that they filed the In re Special State’s Attorneys proceeding in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Chancery Division in order to be appointed as Special State’s Attorneys in the matter pending in the federal court, nor that they obtained awards of attorney fees from that court. In fact, counsel admitted that they had filed pleadings in the state court after removal and the court’s denial of remand, and counsel have also attached certain orders from that proceeding in the exhibits submitted in response to the Rule.
Viewing counsels’ affirmative defenses, motions to dismiss the Rule and responses to the Rule together, it appears that some of the arguments are without merit and do not directly address the issues as framed by this court in the Rule to Show Cause; therefore, the court will consolidate these arguments and address those that are most substantive to the issues presented. Counsels’ arguments can be summarized as follows: (1) counsel did not willfully disobey the court’s orders, because there was no written order that was disobeyed; (2) the court does not have jurisdiction to appoint Special State’s Attorneys because Illinois circuit courts have exclusive jurisdiction to appoint Special State’s Attorneys pursuant to 55 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 5/3-9008; and (3) counsels’ conduct did not evidence a lack of candor. The court will now address the arguments raised in response to the Rule.
D. Substantive Issues to be Determined
1. Whether Counsel Willfully Disobeyed this Court’s Orders
Counsel first argue that the Rule should be dismissed because “[it] does not identify one written, unequivocal, clear and unambiguous order entered on the docket sheet of the ‘record’ allegedly not followed by [counsel].” Theobald & Pinelli Answer at 6 (citing In re LaMarre, 494 F.2d 753, 758 (6th Cir.1974)). However, this argument may be quickly dispatched, as the court entered an order on April 22, 2002 [docket entry 44-1] denying Defendant Spatz’ Motion to Remand. This order unequivocally held that the court has proper jurisdiction over the removed case. Defendant Spatz filed a motion to reconsider that order, which the court denied on May 8, 2002 [docket entry 50-1]. Thereafter, Defendant Spatz filed a motion to certify the April 22, 2002 order for appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292, which the court granted on May 21, 2002 [docket entry 54-1]. The Seventh Circuit denied the petition on June 14, 2002 [docket entry 56-1]. Thus, the court twice held that removal was proper and that it had jurisdiction over the entire case, and the Seventh Circuit denied the petition seeking to reverse the court’s order. It is disingenuous to argue that counsel did not violate a written order when two courts considered the issue and decided that the court had jurisdiction over the case.
The orders holding that the court had jurisdiction over the case carried with them the law surrounding the issue of federal removal jurisdiction. Once a removal petition is filed and proper notice is given to adverse parties in state court, the federal district court has exclusive jurisdiction over the case. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(d); see also Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780, 797 n. 27, 86 S.Ct. 1783, 16 L.Ed.2d 925 (1966). The function of the removal statutes, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441-1452, is to provide a simple means, uniformly applied irrespective of state rules, for defendants entitled to do so to remove actions from state to federal court. See Grubbs v. General Electric Credit Corp., 405 U.S. 699, 705, 92 S.Ct. 1344, 31 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972). The United States Code is clear on the point that after a case is removed from the state court in which it was initially filed, “the State court shall proceed no further unless and until the case is remanded.” 28 U.S.C. § 1446(d). Thus, after removal, any further proceedings in the state court are considered coram non judice, as the state court would have acted without jurisdiction. See Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller and Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure: Jurisdiction and Related Matters, § 3737; see also Kern v. Huidekoper, 103 U.S. 485, 491, 26 L.Ed. 354 (1880) (indicating that any orders entered post-removal by a court from which a case has been removed are comm non judice and may be vacated by the district court); Fox Valley AMC/ Jeep, Inc. v. AM Credit Corp., 886 F.2d 366, 367 (7th Cir.1988) (stating that any motion presented to the state court, made after removal to a federal district court, comes too late because the state court has lost its jurisdiction). Removal to federal court divests the state court of jurisdiction over the ease.
The law in Illinois on this point is also clear. The Illinois Supreme Court has stated: “It is universally held that when a petition for removal has been filed in Federal district court and the other acts specified by section 1446[] have been performed, the State court loses jurisdiction to proceed further until the case is remanded ... [and], no action taken by the State court in the interim can stand.” Eastern v. Canty, 75 Ill.2d 566, 27 Ill.Dec. 752, 389 N.E.2d 1160, 1162 (1979); see also Hartlein v. Illinois Power Co., 151 Ill.2d 142, 176 Ill.Dec. 22, 601 N.E.2d 720, 726 (1992) (holding that “when a case is removed from State to Federal court, the entire action, including all of the parties and their claims, is transferred to the Federal court”).
The coram non judice effect given to state court orders entered after removal to federal court is strengthened by the Anti-Injunction Act, which provides: “A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments.” 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (emphasis added). As an exception to the general prohibition of the Anti-Injunction Act, § 2283 permits a federal court to enjoin further state judicial proceedings concerning the removed case in certain situations. One of the long recognized statutory exceptions to the prohibition of the Anti-Injunction Act is the language in 28 U.S.C. § 1446(d), stating that upon removal from state court to federal court “the State court shall proceed no further unless and until the case is remanded.” See, e.g., Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 234-37, 92 S.Ct. 2151, 32 L.Ed.2d 705 (1972) (reiterating that removal to federal court is a situation where there is an express authorization to enjoin state court proceedings). Further, the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651, can also be used to enjoin further state judicial proceedings concerning the removed case or attempts to evade removal. See United States v. New York Telephone Co., 434 U.S. 159, 172, 98 S.Ct. 364, 54 L.Ed.2d 376 (1977) (stating that a federal court has the power “to issue such commands under the All Writs Act as may be necessary or appropriate to effectuate and prevent the frustration' of orders it has previously issued in its exercise of [its] jurisdiction”). Where later filed state court proceedings are an attempt to subvert federal removal jurisdiction, a federal court may enjoin state court proceedings in order to effectuate the federal court’s jurisdiction. Thus, statutory and case law authority make it perfectly clear that upon removal to federal court, only the federal court has jurisdiction to deal with matters concerning the removed proceeding.
Despite this perfectly clear statutory and case law authority, counsel chose to willfully disregard it. On July 27, 2000, this case was removed from state court to the federal court. At this point in time, the federal court had exclusive jurisdiction over the entire case. On April 22, 2002, the court denied Defendant Spatz’ motion to remand the case back to state court. If any doubts had existed as to the propriety of removal, this order dispelled those doubts, and indicated that this court would exercise exclusive jurisdiction over the entire matter. However, on April 29, 2002, counsel proceeded to litigate issues concerning the removed case in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Chancery Division by filing the In re Special State’s Attorneys proceeding. Thus, within 5 court days from when the court denied the motion to remand, counsel disregarded that order and in effect attempted to relitigate the issue of federal removal jurisdiction in the state court. Counsel personally proceeded to the state court, and have continued to proceed in that court numerous times, while the federal court was dealing with the case. This evidences counsel’s willful disregard of the court’s orders, the ruling of the Seventh Circuit, and the clear statutory and ease law authority regarding federal removal jurisdiction.
2. Whether Counsel Surreptitiously Gained Appointments and Attorney Fees in order to Circumvent this Court’s Jurisdiction and Authority
Counsel have not disputed the existence of the In re Special State’s Attorneys proceeding, and have not disputed that the proceeding dealt with their attempts to be appointed Special State’s Attorneys in the matter pending in the federal court. Counsels’ only argument in response to this indisputable fact is that the federal court did not have jurisdiction to appoint them as Special State’s Attorneys.
In support of this contention, counsel raise a number of arguments. First, counsel argue that Illinois Circuit Courts have exclusive jurisdiction to appoint Special State’s Attorneys pursuant to 55 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 5/3-9008. In support of this argument counsel argue that such power is solely vested in the Illinois Circuit Court by the Illinois Constitution. Second, counsel argue that the established practice in the various State’s Attorneys Offices is to either appoint, or agreed to Illinois Circuit Court appointments of, Special State’s Attorneys in matters pending in federal court, without petitioning the United States District Courts for such appointments. Lastly, counsel argue that the law on this issue is not clear, because other district court judges in the Northern District of Illinois have denied motions brought by attorneys seeking to be appointed as Special State’s Attorneys.
Counsels’ arguments present an untenable legal position in response to the Rule to Show Cause. The court does not dispute the jurisdiction of Illinois Circuit Courts to appoint Special State’s Attorneys in matters that are pending before them pursuant to 55 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 5/3-9008. Nor does the court dispute the authority of the State’s Attorneys Offices to appoint Special State’s Attorneys, without judicial involvement, in cases pending in either state or federal court. What is disputed is the issue of whether counsel can personally seek an Illinois Circuit Court to make such appointments for a matter pending in federal court, where the federal court has specifically been dealing with the issue of appointment with respect to other attorneys in the case and the procedure for obtaining attorney fees.
Counsels’ arguments become even more untenable when viewed in light of their conduct and their knowledge in the present situation. As a preliminary matter, counsels’ arguments are belied by their conduct. On December 22, 2000, attorneys Theobald and Brunell filed motions seeking to have the federal court to appoint them as Special State’s Attorneys. If federal courts do not have the authority to appoint Special State’s Attorneys, then why did counsel file such motions with the court? Counsels’ arguments are also belied by the statements of attorney Theobald. At the status hearing on his motion seeking to be appointed as a Special State’s Attorney, the court discussed the issue of which court had jurisdiction to entertain such a motion after removal. The court stated: “Once the case is removed — once the case is removed there is no basis that I am aware of that would permit a state judge to enter an order.” Schedule of Exhibits, Ex. 8 (December 22, 2000— Transcript of Proceedings before the Honorable Charles [Rjonald Norgle, Sr.). In response, Theobald stated: “So we are seeking it [appointment] here, because the Illinois Statute says we should go before where the case is pending.” Id. (emphasis added).
Furthermore, counsel were aware that the court amended the appointment of other attorneys as Special State’s Attorneys to represent the Sheriff and entered orders awarding attorney fees. Other counsel of record were initially appointed as Special State’s Attorneys for the Sheriff by the state court while the matter was pending there prior to removal. After removal, the court adopted those appointments pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1450, and from that point forward dealt with matters concerning appointments and awards of attorney fee