Taylor v. Teledyne Technologies, Inc. (338 F. Supp. 2d 1323, 2004)

ORDER

CARNES, District Judge.

This case is presently before the Court on an Application by Teledyne Technologies Incorporated (hereinafter “Movant” or “Teledyne”) For Order To Show Cause Why Arthur Alan Wolk (hereinafter “Respondent” or ‘Wolk”) Should Not Be Held In Contempt [175]. On March 22, 2004[214], the Court denied Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss [185] and set down a hearing date on the Contempt Petition, thereby implicitly granting Movant’s Application for Order to Show Cause [175]. (See also April 20, 2004 Order [219] (set-» ting out basis for March 22, 2004 decision).) Accordingly, it is more precise to say that this case is presently before the Court on the issue of, whether Respondent is in contempt, as well as Movant’s alternative request that the Court vacate its previously issued protective order. The Court has reviewed the record and the arguments of the parties and, for the reasons set out below, does not hold Respondent in contempt. The Court does, however, GRANT, in part, and DENY, in part, Movant’s Alternative Request to Vacate the May 20, 2003 Protective Order [161].

Also pending in this case are the following motions: Motion for Limited Unsealing of Documents Relating to Arthur Alan Wolk [222]; Motion for Relief from Court’s April 28, 2004 Order Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) [229]; Motion for Sanctions Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11[232]; Emergency Motion to Compel Production of Documents [237]; AND Motion to Strike Teledyne’s Witnesses and Evidence Listed in Its Pre-Hearing Memorandum [246-1] Which were Requested in Discovery but not Provided on Basis of Improper Privilege Assertions [260]. The Court has reviewed the record and the arguments of the parties and, for the reasons set out below; concludes that all of the above motions should be DENIED as moot.

BACKGROUND

I. PRE-CONTEMPT APPLICATION PROCEEDINGS IN THIS COURT

The present contempt application has been filed by the defendant in a diversity case assigned to this Court. This diversity action arose out of an airplane crash in Georgia on June 29, 1999, that killed the only two persons on board. Their estates, represented by Herman Taylor and Anne Mauvais, filed a wrongful death action against Teledyne, alleging that the cause of the crash was a malfunction in the airplane’s right engine. Mr. Wolk, the respondent in this contempt application, was lead counsel for the plaintiffs.

The discovery process between the parties was extremely contentious, and the parties called on the Court on multiple occasions to referee the disputes; in addition, at the parties’ request, the Court reopened discovery and also extended discovery. Even after the Court’s direct intervention, the parties filed numerous additional discovery motions, which motions this Court resolved in a seventy-one (71) page Omnibus Discovery Order issued on September 30, 2002 (hereinafter, the “Omnibus Discovery Order”) [133],

In this Omnibus Discovery Order, the Court determined that plaintiffs’ counsel had intentionally disobeyed the orders and directives of the Court and the federal rules governing discovery, and the Court excluded certain expert testimony proffered by plaintiffs as a result of this violation. In support of these sanctions, the Court issued very critical comments about the conduct of plaintiffs’ counsel, Arthur Wolk, the respondent in this contempt application.

After the issuance of the Omnibus Discovery Order, plaintiffs filed, on October 15, 2002, a timely motion for reconsideration [135], expressing disagreement with the Court’s assessment of the discovery disputes. On the same date, Mr. Wolk filed his own motion for reconsideration as to the critical comments directed at him [136]. Although this motion reflected his disagreement, in large part, with the Court’s analysis of the discovery disputes and with the sanctions imposed, the focus of Wolk’s motion was his strenuous contention that the Court had unfairly singled him out by name in the Omnibus Discovery Order inasmuch as Wolk cast responsibility on an associate in his firm for the handling of discovery in the case and denied his own involvement in any discovery violations, should any violations have occurred.

The Court had reasonably understood Wolk to be the attorney responsible for any discovery violations because he had entered an appearance and was lead counsel in the case, because he was the named partner of the law firm handling the case, and, most significantly, because he was the only attorney for plaintiffs who spoke at the discovery conference that the Court had previously convened concerning the ongoing discovery disputes. During that conference, Wolk had indicated familiarity with the discovery disputes at issue. Nevertheless, given the intensity and seeming earnestness of Wolk’s assertions that he was not responsible for or aware of any discovery violations, this Court, three business days after the filing of his motion for reconsideration, sua sponte sealed the Omnibus Discovery Order until such time in the future as the Court deemed it appropriate to revisit the matter. (October 20, 2002 Order [141].)

Thereafter, the remaining discovery concluded uneventfully, with no need for further intervention by the Court, after which the parties attempted to mediate the case. In furtherance of this effort, on April 16, 2008, Wolk’s co-counsel, Richard Genter, sent a letter to the Court’s clerk indicating that all counsel believed that settlement might be possible, but “an impediment to settlement [was] the Court’s Order of September 30, 2002,” as well as the motions filed thereafter; accordingly, Genter requested a conference with the Court. (April 16, 2003 Letter to Court [154] at 1.) On May 2, 2003, the Court’s deputy clerk faxed a letter, dated May 1, 2003[152], setting down a telephone conference for May 8, 2003. On May 8, 2003, the Court convened this conference. (See Transcript, May 8, 2003 Telephone Conference, “Transcript” [156].) The conference focused on three primary matters: (1) the parties’ request that the Court vacate the Omnibus Discovery Order to facilitate what appeared to be an imminent settlement; (2) factors that created some hesitancy by the Court to vacate the Order; and (3) the Court’s inquiry as to how it could proceed on such a request, as the Court had learned since scheduling the conference that Wolk had filed a motion to recuse the Court.

Counsel and the Court discussed all matters at length. As to the second matter, the Court expressed concern that a settlement of the case for less than its value to plaintiffs not occur simply to allow Mr. Wolk to be rid of an order that was critical of him. As to this inquiry, plaintiffs’ counsel assured the Court that plaintiffs were aware generally of what was about to transpire and were in agreement; further, counsel indicated that plaintiffs would be receiving a large settlement with which they were apparently well satisfied. (Id. at 13-17, 26.)

The Court also expressed its concern that if the discovery violation underlying the Laposata expert testimony, which appeared to have also occurred in a Texas case handled by plaintiffs’ counsel, were to repeat itself a third time, a vacated order would not be available to serve as a record of the prior conduct. Genter agreed, stating that “if the Order is vacated, it’s my understanding that it’s void ab initio and it could not and should not be used in any other litigation in any other context.” (Id. at 17-18.) Wolk then interjected that the attorney responsible for this discovery matter had lost her job because of the Order. The Court also indicated its uncertainty about how vacating the Order would impact the case procedurally if a settlement did not occur, because, in that event, the same discovery disputes that triggered the Omnibus Discovery Order would remain to be addressed again by the Court. (Id. at 12-13.) It was agreed that if a settlement did not occur, these matters would have to be readdressed by the Court, although plaintiffs’ counsel emphasized the likelihood that a settlement would occur. (Id.) Finally, counsel for defendants had indicated their consent to the order requested by Wolk and Genter. (Id. at 11-12.)

After a discussion of the above matter, the Court indicated its general willingness to proceed in the manner requested by plaintiffs’ counsel (id. at 32), but the Court also expressed its unwillingness to enter an order vacating the Omnibus Discovery Order while a motion to recuse was pending, as the Court believed a motion to recuse deprived it of the ability to enter a substantive order prior to resolving the recusal motion. (Id. at 6-7, 23-24, 27-28, 30-32.) Both Genter and Wolk appeared to indicate that they would withdraw the motion to recuse, after which the Court would vacate the Omnibus Discovery Order and would hold in abeyance any future ruling on these old discovery disputes for the purpose of allowing settlement discussions to continue. (Id.) It was agreed that after notifying the Court that the motion to recuse had been withdrawn, counsel would then submit a proposed order to vacate the Omnibus Discovery Order. (Id. at 30-32.)

Finally, the Court indicated that it had reviewed the discovery matters and was prepared to indicate to counsel the matters on which the Court might be inclined to reconsider. Although counsel indicated that they did not require this information for their settlement negotiations, the Court disclosed its thinking to allow counsel, particularly plaintiffs’ counsel, a general understanding of the Court’s leanings in order that they could fairly negotiate a settlement. Accordingly, the Court indicated that, upon rehearing, the Court might be inclined, as to the “testing” matter, to order a lesser sanction than preclusion of this evidence. (Id. at 16-17.) As to Wolk’s allegation that the Court had incorrectly identified him as the attorney responsible for discovery in the case — and therefore had incorrectly faulted him for any discovery violations — the Court indicated its conclusion that a hearing at which Wolk would be pointing fingers at a now-terminated associate would be an “unseemly” event; instead, to the extent that the Court identified discovery violations in a future order, it would simply identify the attorney as “plaintiffs’ counsel,” and mention no attorney by name. (Id. at 19-20.)

Given the representations of Genter and Wolk, the Court expected to hear from plaintiffs’ counsel, following this conference, that they had withdrawn the motion to recuse, after which the Court would enter an order vacating the Omnibus Discovery Order. If the parties indeed settled, as they indicated they would likely do, the Omnibus Discovery Order would be permanently vacated; if the parties did not settle, the Court would then again issue an order resolving the discovery disputes that had been the subject of the earlier Order. The above was the Court’s expectation. It was not what happened.

Instead, even though he had initiated the conference to request the Court to vacate the Order, Wolk reversed course the next day in a letter, dated May 9, 2003, faxed to the Court. (May 9, 2003 Letter to Court [155].) In essence, Wolk indicated his belief that withdrawal of the motion to recuse and mandamus petition might imply his acknowledgment that he or his firm had committed discovery violations. He now indicated that he wanted an order vacating the Omnibus Discovery Order to be issued first, after which he would withdraw the pending motions, including the motion to recuse, as moot. (Id. at 3.) Wolk closed by asking the Court to convene another telephone conference immediately “to make [the Court’s] position known....” (Id.)

The Court did not convene a conference immediately, as requested by Wolk, but instead, on May 12, 2003, caused a letter to be sent to counsel indicating that the Court intended to issue an order responsive to the letter on May 13, 2003. On May 13, 2003, the Court issued a lengthy order setting out the events that had occurred. At bottom, the Court indicated that it did not believe it proper to grant a motion to vacate a previous order while a motion to recuse was pending and further that the Court would not negotiate with counsel regarding this matter. (May 13, 2003 Order [157] at 15.) The Order concluded by directing plaintiffs’ counsel to indicate by May 16, 2003 whether counsel wished to proceed as they, themselves, had suggested during the May 8th conference or whether they instead wished to litigate the motion to recuse and motions for reconsideration. If the latter, the Court indicated that it would issue a scheduling order setting down a briefing schedule for the motion to recuse and a hearing schedule thereafter for the motion to reconsider. (Id. at 22-23.)

The next day, May 14, 2003, Wolk faxed a letter to the Court’s court reporter implying that the Court might alter the record of the proceedings and requesting that the reporter preserve “any media” used to record any proceedings before the Court and also requesting that no such media be “altered, destroyed or in any manner changed or discarded without an order from at least the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.” (May 14, 2003 Letter to Court Reporter [165].) Wolk also indicated that he would want “the opportunity for a court reporter of [his] choice to examine the original for purposes of determining the accuracy of the transcription,” as the “imbalance of power is frightening.” (Id.)

On that same date, Wolk also faxed another letter to the Court. (May 14, 2003 Letter to Court [166].) It is difficult to adequately capture the substance and tone of this letter with a paraphrase. The letter begins with Wolk indicating that he would like to proceed with the motion to recuse and would like that motion to be transferred out of the Northern District of Georgia to the Eleventh Circuit. (Id. at 1.) Thereafter, Wolk indicates that he is “not unmindful of the Court’s considerable political power in Georgia and the King and Spalding connection” and opines that he will need to go to Washington to get justice. (Id.) The letter is very scattered and touches on a variety of topics on the mind of Wolk, including his explanation of the reason a federal district court in Texas had ruled against him in a similar discovery dispute in other litigation, cited by the Court in the Omnibus Discovery Order:

So rather than the Fifth Circuit case, that held the trial judge to have abused his discretion, being another example of the way we do business, it is none of that. It stands for a very simple proposition in my opinion — two Jewish families from New York who lost their lives need not sue a Southern Baptist in the Federal Court in Texas, regardless of his causal negligence, where there has already been a large settlement and the defense lawyer is a bud of the Judge.

(Id. at 4.) Wolk concluded this six-page letter by suggesting that “Let’s both take a deep breath and fix this.” (Id. at 6.) The “fix” that he envisioned was for the Court to immediately sign an order vacating the Omnibus Discovery Order. (Id.)

The Court did not respond to Wolk’s May 14th letter. Apparently because the Court did not get back to him immediately, Wolk attempted to prod the former by faxing another letter on May 16th, which attached a revised order vacating the Omnibus Discovery Order for the Court’s signature. (May 16, 2003 Letter to Court [167].) Wolk concluded his letter with the following paragraph:

Your Honor, I am anxiously awaiting your response so that I can try to get this matter concluded. I would really like to keep up the momentum toward settlement, if that is possible. Can I please hear from you?

(Id.)

Wolk did not hear from the Court. The next communication from him was a letter dated May 19, 2003, in which he reflected his apparent change of mind as to his requests to litigate the motion to recuse, and thereafter the motions to reconsider. (May 19, 2003 Letter to Court [168].) In that letter, Wolk indicated that he was enclosing a copy of a Notice of Withdrawal of Plaintiffs’ Motion to Recuse Without Prejudice. He further indicated that he looked forward to receiving a signed copy of the parties’ agreed order (vacating the Omnibus Discovery Order and directing that it not be disclosed or publicized), after which he would be able to report a settlement of the case. Respondent concluded this letter by stating “I trust this is received by you as evidence of my bona fides towards a peaceful resolution.” (Id.)

On May 20, 2003, the Court convened another telephone conference in the case. (Transcript, May 20, 2003 Telephone Conference [160].) The Court explained a couple of changes that had been made in the parties’ proposed Order, which are not directly pertinent to the present Contempt Application, and counsel agreed to these changes. (Id. at 3-5.) The Court then indicated that it would sign the proposed order, as revised, that afternoon. (Id. at 6.) The Court further instructed the parties to indicate in a joint letter whether the case had settled, and, if the case had not settled, the litigation would proceed as previously outlined. (Id. at 8.) Finally, the Court directed that, other than the above joint letter, no further letters be sent to the Court. (Id. at 8-9.)

The Court entered the above Order vacating the Omnibus Discovery Order (Order [161].) The Order reads as follows:

The Court does hereby revoke and vacate its Order of September 30, 2002.

The Order of September 30, 2002, shall be marked not for publication nunc pro tunc, sealed, and shall not be disclosed without further order of this Court.

All proceedings, including transcripts of telephone conversations, court orders, and correspondence in connection with the Order of September 30, 2002, or relating thereto, are sealed, at the request of counsel, and shall not be disclosed without further order of this Court.

The parties, their representatives, successors, insurers, and all others are directed not to publicize the Order of September 30, 2002, to destroy all copies, and to obtain the return or destruction of all copies of the said Order.

Should the Order of September 30, 2002, in violation of this Order, be provided to any other court, a copy of this Order shall be sufficient to indicate to that court that it be disregarded in its entirety.

(May 20, 2003 Order [161], “May 20th Order” or “Protective Order,” (emphasis added).)

In short, the above Order, which was submitted by plaintiffs’ counsel, directed that no one should “publicize” the now-vacated Omnibus Discovery Order nor should the latter Order be “disclosed” without prior approval of this Court. Further, all counsel and involved parties agreed to destroy any copy of this Order that they might possess. Finally, the Order directed that the proceedings and pleadings in connection with this Order would remain sealed, absent further order of this Court.

Thereafter, on the next day, May 21, 2003, Wolk faxed a letter indicating that the case had settled and expressing appreciation to the Court, on behalf of all concerned, for its help in resolving the case. (May 21, 2003 Letter to Court [163].)

II. WOLK’S NEW LITIGATION IN PENNSYLVANIA

As noted above, Wolk had requested that this Court issue an order that not only vacated the Omnibus Discovery Order, but that also directed that this order not be publicized and that maintained the order under seal. The Court understood that Wolk wanted the Omnibus Discovery Order to remain sealed because of the critical comments directed at him and because of his desire that these comments not be aired publicly. As the Order had been vacated, the litigation was about to be settled, and the defendants agreed, the request appeared reasonable, and the Court accommodated Mr. Wolk in his request. In short, the Court concluded that the litigation had achieved the finality that Mr. Genter had indicated was the goal when he and Wolk put into motion the proceedings that led to the Court’s vacating of the Order. See discussion supra at 1327 n. 4, 1328 and infra at 1339-40, 1356-57.

Finality did not occur, however. Instead, even though he had sought the sealing of the vacated Omnibus Discovery Order because it had contained criticisms of his professional conduct, Wolk filed a defamation action based on this Order against Movant and Intervenors in a state court of Pennsylvania, less than four months after this Court issued the Protective Order vacating and sealing the Omnibus Discovery Order. In that action, Wolk essentially repeated these same criticisms made by the Court in a purported paraphrase of the Order. This state defamation action was removed by the defendants to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania on or about October 14, 2003. The Court learned of Wolk’s Pennsylvania litigation when the Movant filed the pending Application for Contempt on November 18, 2002.

Movant has provided a copy of Wolk’s defamation complaint, which is, in fact, a Fifth Amended Complaint to a preexisting state action against different defendants based on events occurring prior to or independently of this action. The Complaint alleges conspiratorial conduct against Wolk, predating the Taylor action and involving defendants other than the defendants in the Taylor action, and indicates that it was decided in the “highest circles” of the aviation defense bar, along with insurance companies, that the best way to prevail against Wolk was to attack him in the media and in pretrial motions, in order “to hold the plaintiff up to false light, to destroy his credibility with the courts, to extort settlements in cases that should go to trial, to interfere with his relations with clients, to prevent his getting new clients, and to avoid, at all costs, a decision on the merits of eases the plaintiff brought.” (Am. Compl., attach, as Ex. 3 to Application for Order to Show Cause Why Arthur Alan Wolk Should Not Be Held in Contempt [175], at ¶ 38, 40.)

As to Movant in this case, Wolk accuses it, and the attorneys who represented Tel-edyne in this Court, of deliberately procuring an order from this Court that falsely faulted Wolk for discovery-violations and then sending that order to fellow aviation defense attorneys. (Id. at ¶¶ 73, 79, 93-94, 99, 100, 101.) In his allegations, Wolk discusses at length the Omnibus Discovery Order sealed by this Court, paraphrasing the critical comments that the Court made. He also purports to characterize this Court’s reasoning behind the vacating and sealing of the Order, indicating that the Court’s actions in sealing and later vacating the Order suggested a recognition that the Court had made a “grievous error,” evidenced by the fact that the Court ultimately withdrew the Order. (Id. at ¶ 81; see also ¶ ¶ 82, 86-87; see generally ¶¶ 69-99,162,175.)

Although the Complaint alleges that the Movant disseminated the Omnibus Discovery Order to other individuals not involvéd in the Taylor litigation (see, e.g., ¶¶ 94-95), the Court does not read the Complaint to aver that Movant or Intervenors ever violated the Court’s sealing order, issued in October 2002, or the Court’s ultimate Protective Order, issued in May 2003, which sealed the vacated-Omnibus Discovery Order and directed that it not be publicized or disclosed. In addition, nothing that has occurred in this contempt proceeding has suggested that-Movant or Intervenors ever disseminated the Order once it was sealed, which occurred some two plus weeks after it was issued. In short, the Pennsylvania complaint bases its claims of defamation against the Movant (1) on pleadings filed before issuance of the Omnibus Discovery Order that alleged discovery violations by plaintiffs’ counsel and (2) on Movant’s mailing of this Omnibus Discovery Order to selected aviation defense counsel, prior to the Order being sealed or vacated.

III. PRESENT CONTEMPT APPLICATION

As a result of Wolk’s discussion of the substance of the Omnibus Discovery Order in his defamation action, Movant filed a contempt application in this Court on November 18, 2003, asking the Court for an order to show cause why Wolk should not be held in contempt [175]. Movant argued that Wolk’s action was in violation of the Protective Order in the Teledyne action, directing that no party or representative publicize or disclose the Omnibus Discovery Order. Movant further noted that Wolk describes in the Complaint matters in documents and proceedings under seal. Finally, Movant alleged that, given a reading of the Amended Complaint, it is apparent that, contrary to the Protective Order, Wolk has maintained a copy of the Omnibus Discovery Order.

As a remedy for these alleged violations of the May 20th Order, Movant asked that this Court hold Respondent Wolk in contempt and sought an order enjoining the case pending in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania or, in the alternative, an order vacating and unsealing prior orders [133,141,161] of this Court so that Movant could use the Omnibus Discovery Order in its defense of the Pennsylvania action. Movant also sought attorney’s fees.

Respondent filed a timely response to Movant’s contempt application on December 3, 2003[178]. On December 22, 2003, Respondent also filed a motion to dismiss the contempt application [185]. On February 2, 2004, Respondent filed a motion for transfer of the contempt action to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, and, in the alternative, a motion for recusal [199]. The Court denied both motions in a brief order issued on March 22, 2004[214], in which Order the Court indicated that it would indicate its reasoning for the rulings in an order to be released in the future. In the meantime, the Court set the hearing date on the Contempt Application for June 3, 2004 and directed the parties to complete by May 14, 2004 whatever discovery was needed for the hearing or for the preservation of the testimony of witnesses beyond the Court’s subpoena power. (March 22, 2004 Order [241] at 31.)

On April 28, 2004, the Court issued an order setting out the reasoning for its denial of Respondent’s two pending motions. (April 28, 2004 Order [219].) With regard to Respondent’s motion to dismiss, the Court’s reasoning is discussed at length in the Court’s Order of April 28, 2004 and touched on infra. With regard to the motion to transfer, Respondent had contended that the contempt application should be transferred from the Northern District of Georgia to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania because he could not receive a fair trial before any judge on this court. His basis for this contention was as follows:

21. Based on all of these facts, it is my (Wolk’s) reasonable belief that no justice can be obtained for a Jewish lawyer from Philadelphia anywhere in the Northern District of Georgia.

22. Based on all the aforementioned facts and information known to the undersigned, it is my belief that the “good oV boy” network in Georgia would prevent any justice being obtained in this case because of the considerable political influence it can, has been and will be exercised by Judge Julie Carnes, including political influence on the court by 1) her father; 2) her husband; 3) Lord Bissell & Brook; 4) her politically obligated colleagues on the bench; 5) the defendant’s insurance carrier.

(Wolk Aff., attach, as Ex. D to Wolk’s Venue and Recusal Mem., at ¶¶ 21, 22 (emphasis added).) Wolk also suggested that judges who had reviewed an earlier mandamus petition in the underlying litigation — i.e., Eleventh Circuit judges — may have formed a bias against him. (Wolk’s Venue and Recusal Mem. at 10.) This Court found no basis for such allegations and denied Respondent’s Motion to Transfer. (See April 28, 2004 Order [219] at 36-37.)

Respondent had moved for recusal of this Court only if this Court denied the motion to transfer the case out of the district. Turning to the former motion, Respondent cited several bases for his motion. First, he argued that the Court’s critical comments in the Omnibus Discovery Order, which the Court had ultimately vacated in anticipation of settlement at the parties’ request, necessitated recusal. He also argued that his initiation of “confidential proceedings” against this Court prior to entry of the Protective Order on May 20, 2003 required recusal. The Court denied Respondent’s motion for recusal on these grounds. (See April 28, 2004 Order [219] at 42-55. See also Supplemental Order Concerning Respondent’s Motion to Vacate Order of April 28, 2004 and For Recusal [223], which Order is issued this same date.)

Respondent then contended that the Court should recuse because the spouse of the Court is a partner at King and Spald-ing, which is “one of the most politically influential law firms in the State of Georgia, and perhaps in the country,” because Respondent believed King and Spalding to regularly represent Movant’s insurance carrier in the underlying litigation, and because an associate in the law firm that actually represented Movant, Lord Bissell and Brook, had once worked as an associate at King and Spalding. (Wolk Aff., attach, as Ex. D to Wolk’s Venue and Recusal Mem., at ¶¶ 16-18.) The Court found these grounds insufficient to warrant recusal. (April 28, 2004 Order [219] at 39-42.)

As with the motion to transfer, Respondent also contended that this Court should recuse because of his perception of antiSemitism on the bench of the Northern District of Georgia (Wolk Aff., attach, as Ex. D to Wolk’s Venue and Recusal Mem., at ¶ 21) (“it is my reasonable belief that no justice can be obtained for a Jewish lawyer from Philadelphia anywhere in the Northern District of Georgia”) and because of some undefined political power that Respondent perceived this Court to have in that the Court is “from an extremely influential judicial family in the State of Georgia” (Wolk Aff., attach, as Ex. D to Wolk’s Venue and Recusal Mem., at ¶ 20) and therefore again:

Based on all the aforementioned facts and information known to the undersigned, it is [Respondent’s] belief that the “good of boy” network in Georgia would prevent any justice being obtained in this case because of the considerable political influence it can, has been and will be exercised by Judge Julie Carnes, including political influence on the court by 1) her father; 2) her husband....”

(Id. at ¶ 22 (emphasis added).) Again, the Court found these contentions to be insufficient to justify recusal. (April 28, 2004 Order [219] at 56-58).

Finally, in support of his recusal motion, Respondent chose to announce that he had been pursuing his own investigation of the Court, through the Freedom of Information Act, by requesting from the Federal Bureau of Investigation and United States Senate Judiciary Committee files compiled during these groups’ background investigations of the undersigned during the judicial nomination process. (Id. at 53, 55-56.) As this Court would not have known this information, absent Respondent’s decision to disclose it, the Court inferred that Respondent was “at best.. .attempting to create a ground for recusal with this disclosure [and] at worst, he would appear to be trying to intimidate this Court.” (Id. at 55.) Citing caselaw that disfavored rewarding such behavior by litigants, the Court also found this new disclosure to be an insufficient basis for recusal. (Id. at 55-56.)

On April 29, 2004, the day after release of the above Order, the Court issued an order directing the parties to file pre-hear-ing memoranda by May 21, 2004, in anticipation of the June 3, 2004 Hearing. (April 29, 2004 Order [220].) To insure a “focused and orderly” proceeding (id. at 1), the Court set out its preliminary analysis based on the pleadings already filed and requested briefing on particular matters. Specifically, the Court indicated its difficulty discerning a persuasive argument that Respondent’s summary of the Court’s vacated Order in a publicly-filed complaint had not publicized and disclosed the substance of that Order, both as a linguistic matter and because Respondent’s co-counsel had given assurances to the Court and Movant that indicated that the vacating of the order would effectively end all other litigation. (Id. at 2.) Accordingly, the Court indicated that while it would continue to entertain arguments by Respondent on this point, the Court wished the parties to focus on the appropriate relief should the Court ultimately conclude that a violation had occurred. (Id. at 2-3.) To that end, the Court noted that, although Respondent had offered little legal analysis on this point, it shared Respondent’s concerns as to the propriety of injunctive relief that effectively halted litigation in another court. (Id. at 3-4.) The Court sought more helpful briefing from both parties on this matter. (Id. at 4.)

The Court further indicated that even were some sort of injunctive relief authorized, the Court was uncertain that it would wish to exercise its discretion in this manner. (Id.) The Court noted that it would have been prudent for Respondent to have sought a modification of the Protective Order before disclosing and publicizing the vacated Omnibus Discovery Order, as he had arguably done in the Pennsylvania Complaint. (Id. at 4-5.) As Respondent unfortunately had not done so, the Court suggested that he might wish to purge himself of any potential contempt by requesting such a modification. (Id. at 5.) The Court indicated that it would review any such request under a good cause standard. The Court further envisioned that any evidence at the upcoming hearing pertinent to a need to modify the Protective Order would focus on (1) Respondent’s apparent position that the non-disclosure provisions of the Protective Order had been purportedly intended for his benefit and his assertion that Movant had been aware that he intended to sue for defamation, notwithstanding the entry of the Protective Order and (2) Movant’s apparent position that Movant had fairly relied on the terms of the Protective Order as effectively ending the litigation between the parties. (Id.)

The Court points out that it was the Court that explicitly suggested to Respondent an exit strategy — that would avoid a contempt citation — for the predicament in which he had gotten himself. The Court takes pains to emphasize this point because Respondent has continued to argue quite vehemently that this Court is biased against him and is determined to hold him in contempt. Indeed, shortly after the release of these Orders, on May 10, 2004, Respondent filed a Motion to Vacate the Order of April 28, 2004 and for Recusal of Judge [223] and a Motion For Limited Unsealing of Documents [222]. In these pleadings, Respondent further escalated the rhetoric found in his earlier motion to transfer and motion to recuse. Much of the pleadings are just a rehash of Respondent’s previous contentions, with more talk about “Yankees” and “home-towning,” and a point-by-point recitation of his disagreement with the April 28, 2004 Order.

In the Motion For Limited Unsealing of Documents, however, Respondent made new statements concerning the Court that cannot be viewed as anything other than a further attempt to bully and intimidate the Court. Specifically, Respondent informed the Court that he had drafted and circulated within Congress a legislative bill that he had named the “Carnes Bill”, which bill would purportedly broaden the ability of Congress to impeach and discipline federal judges. (Mot. for Limited Unsealing [222] at ¶ 7; Decl. of Arthur Alan Wolk in Support of Mot. to Vacate, Mot. to Recuse, and Mot. for Limited Unsealing, “Deck,” [224] at ¶ 66.) In that same vein, Respondent announced that he was requesting an impeachment investigation of this Court. (Mot. For Limited Unsealing [222] at ¶ 11; Deck [224] at ¶ 67.) Respondent further chose to disclose that he was writing a book called “The Judge,” “a true story about corruption and despotism in the federal judiciary” that will profile this Court. (Deck [224] at ¶ 68.) Respondent additionally fleshed out his reasons for seeking review of the FBI’s background investigation of the undersigned because his “thinking was that perhaps the FBI investigation is cursory and doesn’t disclose things like quid pro quos demanded or given for judicial appointments.... ” (Id. at ¶ 64.) Respondent also disclosed his intention to file a Federal Tort Claims Act suit against this Court in the future. (Mot. for Limited Unsealing [222] at ¶ 13.) Finally, Respondent indicated that he had retained an unnamed psychiatrist to analyze this Court; “I then thought that perhaps Judge Julie E. Carnes is not evil, corrupt or both, but sick deserving of my compassion. I contacted a psychiatrist in Atlanta for purposes of reviewing Judge Julie E. Carnes opinions to see of(sic) there is a pattern that shows some psychological pathology. That is on going.” (Deck [224] at ¶ 69; Mot. for Limited Unsealing [222] at ¶ 12.)

The Court did not respond to these motions, but does rule on them this date. Two days after filing the above two motions, Respondent filed a motion for summary judgment [283], which motion is worthy of mention because, unlike many of the other pleadings filed by Respondent, this motion was lawyerly, analytic, and contained a discussion of the issues that was actually helpful to the Court in grappling with the anomalous facts and legal questions involved in this contempt application. Indeed, the Court has incorporated some of the reasoning in this motion in its final disposition of this matter.

The Court denied without prejudice this motion for summary judgment (May 17, 2004 Order [239]), but directed Respondent to incorporate these arguments into his pre-hearing memorandum and directed Movant to respond to this motion in its own memorandum, as the Court “wishes to review all these matters in one consolidated pleading by each party.” (Id. at 2.) The Court did, however, use some of the reasoning in Respondent’s summary judgment motion as a springboard to explain, in great detail, the Court’s preliminary analysis, as well as those legal and factual matters for which the Court did not yet have an answer. (Id. at 6-13.) The Court requested that the evidence introduced, as well as the pre-hearing memoranda, help the Court fill in these factual and legal gaps. (Id.) Again, it must be noted that the Court set out, at length, a roadmap of the evidence and analysis that would be pertinent to the Court in determining whether to modify the Protective Order and indicated that “[flrom the partial facts presently known to the Court, it may be that Respondent can make such a showing.” (Id. at 10.) This guidance to Respondent and the Court’s indication of its receptivity to a persuasive motion to modify hardly meshes with Respondent’s continuing characterizations of this Court as being determined to hold him in contempt.

In addition, the Court largely removed, as a matter to be addressed by a contempt citation, the allegation that Respondent had retained a copy of the vacated Omnibus Discovery Order. The Court noted that as it was proceeding in a civil contempt application, any remedies that it provided would be prospective. (Id. at 6.) Whether or not Respondent had retained a copy of the Order in the past, which he apparently denied, he was apparently also going to testify that he did not presently possess such a copy. (Id.) Moreover, the Court, by separate order, had indicated that it would provide Respondent and Movant with a copy of this Order. Accordingly, the allegation that Respondent had improperly retained a copy of this Order no longer appeared to warrant consideration as part of a civil contempt citation, although the Court gave the Movant an opportunity to persuade the Court to the contrary. (Id.)

Finally, the Court issued two further directives that have become at issue. First, the Court directed that since “Respondent is the subject of the contempt proceeding, he should be represented by counsel at [the pre-hearing telephone conference] and at any hearing or other proceeding that is held.” (Id. at 13.) Indeed, local counsel had appeared with Respondent throughout the entire litigation and a lawyer in his firm had entered an appearance in March 2004. See discussion infra at 1369-74. Notwithstanding this dí-rective, in an exhibit buried within the voluminous materials filed by Respondent as part of his Pre-Hearing Memorandum on May 24, Respondent filed a declaration of his local counsel indicating that the latter probably would not be attending the upcoming hearing because of vacation plans. (Decl. of Jason T. Schneider, attach. as Ex. 213 to Respondent Arthur Alan Wolk’s Consolidated Pre-Hearing Memorandum [244], at ¶ 7.) Moreover, even in this buried document, local counsel did not even request this Court’s permission for this leave of absence; instead, he simply announced that he would probably not be present. As a result, the Court had to expend more of its time to issue an Order directing local counsel to be present. (See June 1, 2004 Order [254] at 2.)

Second, in this May 17 Order, the Court noted the drain on its resources that Respondent’s repetitive and piecemeal filings had caused. The Court indicated that it wished to consider all arguments in one consolidated pleading, whose contents the Court described in great detail and, to that end, the Court directed that “there be no further filings of any dispositive-type motions excepts as incorporated in this pre-hearing memorandum nor any filing of any duplicative motion.... ” (May 17, 2004 Order [239] at 2-3 (emphasis in original).)

The parties timely filed their pre-hear-ing memoranda. (See Docket Numbers 244, 245, 246.)

IV. THE CONTEMPT HEARING AND POST-HEARING FILINGS

As scheduled, the Court held a hearing on June 3, 2004, which continued to Juné 4, 2004. Respondent testified throughout the first day. The only other live witness was Jonathan Friedman, a former associate at Lord Bissell & Brook, who was called by Movant and who negotiated the language of the release documents with Richard Genter following the settlement of the case. The parties also played video portions of depositions, and submitted page designations of testimony from these depositions.

The parties timely filed their post-hearing memoranda. (See Docket Numbers 267, 268, 269.) They also later filed their joint exhibit list [264]. On July 16, 2004, notwithstanding the Court’s directive that there be no more motions, Respondent nevertheless filed a motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60, in which motion he acknowledged his awareness that he was not in compliance with the Court’s directive. (See Motion [270].) The Court struck this motion, admonished Wolk, and instructed Movant not to respond. (July 19, 2004 Order [271].)

DISCUSSION

I. DID RESPONDENT PUBLICIZE OR DISCLOSE THIS COURT’S OMNIBUS DISCOVERY ORDER?

A. The May 20th Order

As noted, on May 20, 2003, this Court issued the Protective Order at issue in this contempt proceeding. This Order had been drafted by Respondent and it was largely though his entreaties that the Order was signed by the Court. Respondent and Movant indicated that entry of this order would facilitate the imminent settlement of the case. In this Order, the Court revoked and vacated the Omnibus Discovery Order and ordered that it remain sealed. (May 20, 2003 Order [161], supra at 1331.) As provided for in the proposed order, the Court also sealed all proceedings relating to the Omnibus Discovery Order. (Id.) This Protective Order further provided that the Omnibus Discovery Order “shall not be disclosed without further order of this Court” and barred the parties, “their representatives” “and all others” from publicizing the Omnibus Discovery Order, as well as from retaining copies of that Order. {Id. (emphasis added).)

In his efforts to gain the Court’s approval of the Order, Respondent, though his co-counsel, made certain statements to the Court, which statements provide the context in which Respondent advocated that the Court sign this Order. Specifically, in response to the Court’s inquiry about future use of the Omnibus Discovery Order, were it vacated, Genter responded: “[I]f the Order is vacated, it’s my understanding that it’s void ab initio and it could not and should not be used in any other litigation in any other context.” (Transcript [156] at 18.) In further advocating the Court to adopt Respondent’s proposed order, Mr. Genter informed the Court that:

[T]he Defendant, through Ms. Holahan (the insurer), has not yet made their best final offer because it’s my understanding through discussions that there is some monetary value towards closure of the entire litigation and all the ancillary motions and possible ancillary litigation.

(Id. at 11 (emphasis added).) Respondent, Mr. Wolk, was on the telephone line with Genter and never disputed the above remarks.

As noted, in his Pennsylvania Complaint, Respondent mentioned and paraphrased the above Omnibus Discovery Order in some detail, indicating that this Court had issued critical comments directed at Respondent consistent with the described statements in the Complaint. Moreover, this Order, which Respondent had expended so much energy getting sealed, purportedly to avoid future embarrassment, was now the centerpiece of the defamation litigation filed by Respondent against the Movant. The first question before the Court is whether the prohibitions against publicizing and disclosure contained in the Protective Order applied to both Movant (and Intervenors) and Respondent, or whether these prohibitions did not apply to Respondent, as he has argued at various points in this litigation. If these prohibitions did apply to both parties, then the second question becomes whether the summary of the essence of the Court’s Omnibus Discovery Order, through a detailed paraphrasing of its critical comments in a publicly filed legal complaint, constitutes a disclosure or publicizing of the vacated Omnibus Discovery Order. Moreover, to avoid any need to come back to this Court for continuing interpretations of the Order, should the Pennsylvania litigation proceed forward, the Court must also consider whether that litigation, proceeding in its predictable course, would likely trigger disclosure or publication of the Order by either party.

The Court has previously indicated its preliminary conclusion that the answer to the above questions is an affirmative one. (See April 29, 2004 Order [220] at 2-3; April 28, 2004 Order [219] at 28-31; May 17, 2004 Order [239] at 7-9.) As the Court has noted, clearly, the Protective Order applied to Respondent, as well as to the Movant. By its terms, the May 20th Order applies directly to the parties and their representatives, as well as to “all others.” No language of the May 20th Order exempts Respondent from the terms of the Order, either generally or for a specific purpose. Presumably, Respondent knew this fact, as it was he who drafted and presented the order to the Court. (Respondent’s Legal Mem., attach, as Tab E to Consolidated Pre-Hearing Mem., “Respondent’s Legal Mem.,” [244] at E-l, E-14.)

Also problematic for the Court has been Respondent’s contention that the summarizing and paraphrasing of the Order in publicly-filed litigation did not constitute a publicizing and disclosure of the Order, as Respondent disclosed to the world the substance of the Omnibus Discovery Order. Moreover, Respondent’s position is particularly difficult to accept because he has taken the position that, had Movant summarized the vacated order in litigation, as Respondent did, Respondent would consider Movant to be in violation of the Protective Order and would sue Movant. (May 17, 2004 Order [239] at 8; Wolk Dep. at 82-83.) Yet, if a particular act, when taken by Movant, would constitute a “disclosure” or “publicizing” in violation of the Protective Order, the Court knows of no rule of construction that would call for a different interpretation of these words when it is Respondent who is committing the act. Words do not change their meaning depending on who the speaker or actor is.

Nevertheless, throughout this contempt litigation, Respondent has raised a variety of defenses to any contention that he has violated the terms of the Protective Order. The Court will address these arguments made by Respondent.

B. Validity of Defenses Raised by Respondent

1. Respondent cannot control the interpretation of the Protective Order, merely because he drafted it for his own protection

Respondent has sometimes argued that he drafted the May 20th Order to provide him with protections against disclosure by others of the Omnibus Discovery Order, but that he intended to confer no restrictions on his own ability to disclose this Order, through a suit against Movant. (Respondent’s Legal Mem. at E-14-15; June 3, 2004 Hearing Tr., “Hrg. Tr.,” [265] at 31, 45-46, 61-62, 111.) His apparent position, at times, has been that, because he drafted the Order and because its terms were intended for his benefit, this authorship has conferred on him the right to interpret the terms of the Order as he sees fit. Specifically, during his deposition, the following exchange occurred:

Chiate: I take it, then, you believe the Order meant what it said?

Wolk: No. / believed the Order meant what I said.

(Wolk Dep. 56-57 (emphasis added).) Movant played this part of the deposition at the hearing, and Respondent’ tone was emphatic, leaving no room for doubt as to his meaning. In a further exchange:

Chiate: You’re interpreting the third paragraph words “shall not be disclosed” to be limited to preventing the filing of the actual document as opposed to disclosing the content of it; is that right? Wolk: No.... I wrote this.

Chiate: Yeah. You’ve said that several times.

Wolk: No. No. But, see, here’s what you don’t understand. You’re not asking me what I meant. You’re asking me what you think it means. I’m telling you what I meant, what I wrote....

(Id. at 126. See also, e.g., Wolk Dep. at 52 (“I know exactly what the judge ordered because I drafted this document”); at 63-64 (the same); Hrg. Tr. at 131 (Order was for his protection); at 45 (the same).)

Although Respondent now appears to have backed off this assertion somewhat, should he resurrect this argument in the future, the Court notes its conclusion that such an argument is without merit. A court’s order does not mean what a litigant, even a drafting litigant, subjectively and privately hopes it to mean; rather, the interpretation of a court’s order triggers an objective examination. Moreover, the Court is aware of no authority that would suggest that the drafter of an order is not held to the terms of the order just as is any other party subject to that order.

Respondent’s own testimony in this litigation has been inconsistent with an argument that he did not believe himself to be held to the terms of the Protective Order. Specifically, Respondent has indicated that he destroyed his copy of the Omnibus Discovery Order, as the Protective Order required. (Respondent’s Br. in Supp. of Dismissal [268] at 4; Hrg. Tr. [265] at 42-44.) This conduct by Respondent suggests a recognition that the provisions of the Protective Order apply to him. Indeed, there is no language in the Protective Order indicating that Respondent is bound by some, but not all, of the Order’s provisions.

In addition, Respondent has also testified that he always intended to apply to have the Pennsylvania Complaint placed under seal — which sealing Respondent contends would prevent the disclosure or publicizing of its contents — but he simply had not had the time to do so in the seven month period of time between his filing of the Complaint, on September 12, 2003, and the filing of his motion to seal, on April 13, 2004. (See, e.g., Hrg. Tr. [265] at 149 (Wolk could not find the time to file a motion to seal because he had a lot of other motions to respond to and other clients to attend to) and at 47 (similar testimony).)

While it is difficult to accept Respondent’s assertion that he lacked the necessary time to have the complaint sealed, particularly given his demonstrated ability to file numerous pleadings in a short period of time, his acknowledgment that he had always intended to seal the Complaint suggests a recognition that the terms of the Protective Order — -and, in particular, the non-disclosure terms — -applied to him.

Finally, Respondent’s hearing testimony concerning the painstaking process that he purportedly underwent in drafting a complaint that would not run afoul of the provisions prohibiting disclosure and publicizing of the Omnibus Discovery Order ends any further argument by him that he did not believe himself to be subject to the confidentiality provisions of the Protective Order. (See, e.g., id. at 158 (Wolk felt “really in a jam” trying to write a complaint that would not run afoul of the Protective Order); at 161 (he, Wolk, had “a difficult line to walk” in trying to draft a complaint that was compliant with the Protective Order); at 163-64 (Wolk found himself between “a rock and a hard place” and was walking “a fine line” in this endeavor).) See also discussion infra at 1354-56.

Indeed, Respondent acknowledged at the hearing that he had actually drafted the Pennsylvania Complaint prior to drafting the Protective Order to insure that he could mesh the provisions of the two documents in a way that would arguably allow him to base a lawsuit on the very vacated Order that he had urged never be disclosed or publicized again. (Hrg. Tr. [265] at 111; Wolk Dep. at 223.) In fact, Respondent indicated that he worked with a dictionary to accomplish what he admitted to be this difficult feat. (Hrg. Tr. [265] at 111-12, 133.) Accordingly, Respondent has always been aware that he was subject to the provisions of the Order because he so drafted the Order. Moreover, the terms of the Protective Order make clear that Respondent, like Movant, is subject to all provisions of the Order.

In short, this Court concludes that, just like Movant, Respondent was not permitted to publicize or disclose the Omnibus Discovery Order under the terms of the Protective Order. The next question then is whether Respondent contravened that provision of the Protective Order through the filing of his Pennsylvania Complaint.

2. Respondent’s detailed summary and paraphrase of the Court’s findings in his Pennsylvania Complaint constitutes a disclosure and publicizing of this Court’s Omnibus Discovery Order

Respondent has contended that he did not disclose the Omnibus Discovery Order in his Pennsylvania Complaint (1) because the Complaint did not attach a copy of the Omnibus Discovery Order or otherwise contain a verbatim disclosure of its terms and (2) because the defendants named in the Pennsylvania complaint already knew the contents of the disclosure order and because one “can’t make known something to somebody who already knows about it.” (Hrg. Tr. [265] at 111; see also id. at 133.) As to the second contention, as was made clear at the hearing, multiple persons besides the Movant and Intervenors necessarily became aware of Respondent’s complaint when he filed it. Specifically, Respondent named persons other than Movant and Intervenors in his Complaint. Further, the Pennsylvania state and federal courts and their staffs, as well as their Clerk’s Offices, became privy to the filed documents. Thus, this explanation by Respondent is not persuasive.

With regard to Respondent’s contention that he did not disclose the Omnibus Discovery Order because he did not attach a copy of it to the Complaint nor directly quote it, the Court concludes that disclosure can occur without such actions, and did occur here. In his Pennsylvania Complaint, Respondent set out, in ten paragraphs, a detailed paraphrase of the allegations of discovery abuse made by Movant in its pleadings before this Court in the Taylor litigation. (Am. Compl., attach. as Ex. 3 to Application for Order to Show Cause Why Arthur Alan Wolk Should Not Be Held in Contempt [175] at ¶74.) Respondent has argued that, as this recitation related to allegations made by Movant, it did not constitute a disclosure of the Court’s Order. Had Respondent stopped with this paragraph, he would be correct. Instead, however, Respondent went on to indicate that this Court had “completely adopted” the above “false allegations” by Movant and issued an order containing numerous “scathing comments” regarding Respondent. (Id at ¶ 79.) Moreover, Paragraph 84 summarized the characterizations of Respondent’s conduct that the Court derived based on the above statements that the Court had adopted. (Id. at ¶ 84; see also id. at ¶¶ 98, 162, 175.) The Court concludes that, in these paragraphs, Respondent disclosed the findings of discovery violations and the criticisms that the Court directed at Respondent.

Moreover, given his ultimate acknowledgment that he was subject to the provisions of the Protective Order, just as was Movant, Respondent has made admissions that effectively concede that the public filing of this Complaint constituted a disclosure of the Omnibus Discovery Order. Specifically, in his deposition, counsel for Movant inquired whether Respondent would consider Movant to be in violation of the Protective Order had it summarized the Omnibus Discovery Order to the same extent that Respondent had in his Complaint:

Chiate: Do you believe it (the Pennsylvania Complaint) violated the intent or spirit of the May 20 Order of Judge Carnes?

Wolk: Of course not.

Chiate: Then would it be your opinion, sir that Teledyne could file in any court •that it chose an Affidavit setting forth what Judge Carnes ordered in her September 30 Order as long as they simply summarized or paraphrased it as you have...

Wolk: No.

Chiate: .. .without violating Judge Carnes’ Order?

Wolk: No. I’d think they’d be in violation of her Order and I can tell you they’d get sued.

(Wolk Dep. at 82-83.)

At the hearing, Respondent acknowledged that a summary of the critical comments in the Omnibus Discovery Order risked injury to his reputation just as did a verbatim recitation, although the risk might be less with the former; this was why he wanted to seal the Pennsylvania Complaint. (Hrg. Tr. [265] at 129; accord id. at 131.) He further reiterated that had Movant summarized the Order in any fashion, Movant would have been in violation of the Order:

I mean my view of it is that since the Order was in place for my protection, Teledyne’s use of the Order or summary of the Order in any manner would have been, in my opinion, a violation of that Order.

(Id. at 132. See also id. at 139.)

In short, if Movant would be in violation of the Protective Order, had Movant filed a pleading that summarized the Omnibus Discovery Order to the same extent that Respondent summarized this document in his own Pennsylvania Complaint, then as a logical matter, Respondent has likewise violated the Order through the allegations in his Complaint.

Moreover, Respondent’s continuing argument that Movant should have been on notice that Respondent might sue Movant, even with the existence of the non-disclosure provisions of the Protective Order, is an argument that has no place in a determination of whether Respondent violated the Protective Order. This Order was an order of a court, and it should have been treated by Respondent with the appropriate respect. Respondent implored this Court to use its good offices to issue this Order. At that point, the drafted proposal became a Court Order, and whatever noises Respondent may or may not have been making outside the courtroom about his intention to sue anyway, did not give him the right to unilaterally disregard provisions of this Order that he later found inconvenient. Moreover, as discussed infra, Respondent sat silently by while his co-counsel indicated to the Court that