Full opinion text
OPINION JONES, Chief Judge. Petitioner Michael William Lenz, an inmate at a Virginia correctional facility, was convicted in state court of the capital murder of a fellow inmate and sentenced to death. After unsuccessfully challenging his conviction and the imposition of the death penalty both on direct appeal and in state collateral proceedings, Lenz now petitions for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254 (West 1994 & Supp.2004). For the reasons stated in this opinion, the respondent’s Motion to Dismiss must be granted. Table Of Contents I. Facts.453 II. Procedural History. cn co A. State Proceedings.. ^ cn co B. Federal Proceedings ^ or III. Procedurally Defaulted Claim.455 Claims on the Merits IV. cu Claim I — Presence of a Bible in the Jury Room. en Claim II — Counsel’s Failure to Object to the Verdict Forms ... m Claim III — Counsel’s Failure to Object to Use of the Stun Belt fT, Claim IV — Suppression of Evidence about the Victim’s Criminal History O Claim VI — Counsel’s Failure to Prepare for the Penalty Phase of Trial M O 1. Claim VI(A) — Counsel’s Failure to Seek Additional Time. O 2. Claim VI(B) — Evidence Regarding the Circumstances of the Offense -O 3. Claim VI(C) — Evidence Regarding Lenz’s Religion. <1 4. Claim VI(D) — Evidence Regarding Lenz’s Background. no 5. Claim VI(E) — Evidence Regarding Lenz’s Mental Illness. CO 6. Claim VI(F) — Failure to Obtain Independent Expert Assistance OO 7. Claim VI(G) — Cumulative Prejudice . QO Claim VII — Counsel’s Failures on Direct Appeal. CD Claim VIII — Constitutionality of the Death Penalty in Virginia. Cl Y. Conclusion.495 In affirming Lenz’s conviction and sentence on direct appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia summarized the facts as follows: During the early evening of January 16, 2000, the defendant, [Brent H.] Parker, Jeffrey Remington, and three other inmates attended a meeting of a group referred to as the Ironwood Kindred. The meeting occurred in Building J-5, which is a part of the Augusta Correctional Center. Earl Jones, a correctional officer, was assigned to Building J-5 that evening. Jones permitted the six inmates to enter a room where the meeting occurred. He closed the door, which contained windows, and “secured” the room. As Jones sat down at his post outside the meeting room and began to “sort through” inmate passes that he had collected, he “noticed a commotion.” Jones “got on” his radio and requested help from other correctional officers because he observed a fight. As Jones walked toward the room where the inmates were meeting, three of the inmates “ran out of the room,” and one of the inmates said, “[t]hey’re stabbing him.” Jones went to the door and saw “Remington and Lenz stabbing Parker.” Parker was lying “on his back; on the floor, between Remington and Lenz.” Parker “was making a feeble attempt to defend himself.... He had his hands up.” As Parker tried to use his hands to “block” the knives from piercing his body, the defendant and Remington “took their free hand[s]; pushed [Parker’s] hands aside and then stabbed him.” ' Jones opened the meeting room door and ordered the defendant and Remington to stop stabbing Parker. Jones testified, “[t]hey simply looked at me and went back to stabbing him.” Jones used his radio again to request help and asked his fellow correctional officers to hurry because Remington and the defendant “were trying to. kill this guy.” .Jones did not go into the room because Remington and the. defendant had knives, and Jones was unarmed. Edward V. Houching, a correctional officer, responded to Jones’ request for assistance. When Houching arrived at the meeting room, he saw the defendant and Remington stab Parker between 10 to 15 times as Parker was lying on the floor in a fetal position. Like Jones, Houching ordered the defendant and Remington to stop, but they continued to stab Parker. Parker was not “doing anything to defend himsélf,” and the defendant “was bent over, stabbing [Parker], over and over and over.” Within a few seconds after Houching arrived at the meeting room, two sergeants and correctional officer John Edward Simmons also responded. Simmons saw the defendant stab Parker six or seven times in an area that extended from Parker’s “underarm” to his waist as Parker was lying on his side on the floor. Simmons also saw Remington stab Parker in the shoulder and back. After a sufficient number of correctional officers arrived at the meeting room, the officers, some of whom were armed with mace, entered the room, and Simmons told the defendant and Remington “to drop” their knives. The defendant placed his knife on a table, and Remington eventually surrendered his knife. The officers placed handcuffs on the defendant .and Remington and escorted them from the area. Rita K. Dietz, a registered nurse employed at the Augusta Correctional Center, rendered emergency assistance to Parker. When she walked into the ■meeting room to assist him, he was “very pale” and “surrounded by blood.” As she approached him, she noticed that his shirt was soaked in blood. She ripped his shirt off. She testified that “[e]very time I encountered a couple of wounds, I encountered more wounds.” She described Parker’s medical condition as “[v]ery critical.” She placed bandages on his wounds until she “ran out.” She testified, at that point, the stretcher had arrived. So we took the sheet off the stretcher ... Parker was still alive, and he helped roll onto the sheet. And we lifted the sheet up, which the' one wound, out of the left side, just poured like water; like somebody had turned a faucet on, when we lifted him. And we got him on the stretcher. Parker was transported by ambulance to the Augusta Medical Center, where he died. Gregory Price Wanger, the Assistant Chief Medical Examiner for the Western District of Virginia, performed an autopsy on Parker’s body. Wanger testified that Parker had sustained 68 stab wounds and one cut wound, all of which were inflicted upon Parker when he yras alive. Dr. Wanger explained that a stab wound is “shorter on the surface than it is deep” and “implies a thrusting motion[,]” whereas a cut wound “is longer on the surface than it is deep” and “implies a slashing-like motion-.” The stab wounds penetrated Parker’s chest, abdomen, back, left arm, and right forearm. Dr. Wanger identified 40 stab wounds, “from the upper part of [Parker’s] chest down through the middle and center part of the chest, and into the abdomen.” These wounds all contributed to his death. Parker’s left lung and liver were stabbed seven times each and the wounds produced serious internal bleeding. The wounds to Parker’s lungs would have been fatal without the other wounds. Additionally, “the wounds to the liver; by themselves, would have been fatal without the other wounds to [his] body.” Lenz v. Commonwealth, 261 Va. 451, 544 S.E.2d 299, 301-02 (2001) {“Lenz I”). During the sentencing phase of the trial, the jury heard evidence from the Commonwealth regarding the defendant’s prior convictions for possession of a firearm after having been convicted of a felony, and breaking, and entering. Id. at 302. The jury also heard the following mitigation evidence from the defendant: Martin Rogozinski, a psychologist employed at the Augusta Correctional Center, testified that he spoke with the defendant soon after Parker was murdered and that it was Rogozinski’s opinion that the defendant had murdered Parker based “solely on a religious conviction.” The defendant testified during the penalty phase. He stated that he was a practicing member of the “Asatru” religion. According to the defendant, several inmates had approached him and asked him to “construct” an Asatru group, but his efforts to do so were “thwarted” by Parker. The defendant testified that on the evening of the murder, he planned to perform an Asatru ceremony in the meeting room. The defendant recited poetic literature and then asked Parker to approach an altar. The defendant testified that I called [Parker] up to the altar and I asked — and I said to him, “It’s been a long, hard path between us.” And [Parker] said, “Yes, it is.” And I pulled the knife out of my pocket. And I said, “Are you trying to take it to the next step?” And he said, “Yes, I am.” And so I stabbed him. The defendant admitted that he did not like Parker, that he had planned to kill Parker that day, and that he had threatened others in the meeting room with the knife. The defendant presented the testimony of Gary Lee Bass, the Chief of Operations at the Virginia Department of Corrections and Jerry Wayne Armentr-out, the Assistant Warden of Operations at the Red Onion State Prison. Bass and Armentrout testified about “prison life” and the security conditions that the defendant would encounter at a Virginia maximum security correctional facility if he were sentenced to life imprisonment. Two officers assigned to the Augusta Correctional Center testified that the defendant had never given them any problems while he was under their supervision. Patricia Daley Lenz, the defendant’s mother, testified about his childhood and family interaction. She stated that the defendant’s biological father was absent during much of the defendant’s early childhood and that the defendant’s adoptive father was very strict and favored his biological child. Id. at 302-03. I.Facts. II.PROCEDURAL HISTORY. A. State PROCEEDINGS. Lenz, an inmate at the Augusta Correctional Center, was indicted in Augusta County for the January 16, 2000, capital murder of Brent H. Parker. The Circuit Court of Augusta County appointed him counsel. Following a two-day trial, July 26-27, 2000, the jury found Lenz guilty of capital murder and, on July 28, 2000, fixed his punishment at death. The trial court entered a final order on October 20, 2000, sentencing Lenz to death in accordance with the jury’s verdict. Still represented by trial counsel, Lenz appealed his conviction and death sentence on eighteen grounds. The Supreme Court of Virginia unanimously affirmed the conviction and the sentence on April 20, 2001. See Lenz I, 544 S.E.2d at 311. Thereafter, Lenz sought a writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court of the United States, which was denied on October 29, 2001. See Lenz v. Virginia, 534 U.S. 1003, 122 S.Ct. 481, 151 L.Ed.2d 395 (2001). Lenz filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus with the Supreme Court of Virginia on December 28, 2001, and the court appointed new counsel. After being granted leave to file an amended petition on or before January 11, 2002, Lenz filed a petition asserting ten claims. On June 17, 2002, the Virginia Supreme Court ordered the Circuit Court of Augusta County to conduct an evidentiary hearing on Claims I and II and took the remaining claims under advisement. In Claim I, Lenz alleged that the bailiff provided ex parte responses to juror questions regarding the sentencing instructions, violating several of his constitutional and statutory rights. In Claim II, Lenz alleged that jurors read from and relied upon passages in the Bible when determining whether to sentence him to life or death, violating his rights under the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. The evidentiary hearing was held on August 9, 2002, and in an October 7, 2002 report, the state trial judge made findings of fact and recommended conclusions of law to the Virginia Supreme Court. Lenz filed his objections on November 8, 2002, and the court heard oral argument on Claims I and II. The Supreme Court of Virginia issued an opinion on April 17, 2003, granting the petition as to Claim IV, in which Lenz alleged that trial counsel were ineffective for failing to object to use of the statutory sentencing verdict form, refusing to consider claims relating to his prior sentencing hearing, and denying the petition as to all other claims. Lenz v. Warden of the Sussex I State Prison, 265 Va. 373, 579 S.E.2d 194 (2003) {“Lenz II”). The court then remanded Lenz’s case to the circuit court for a new sentencing hearing. The Warden filed a petition for rehearing, which was granted on June 6, 2003. Following additional briefing and argument both on the issues raised in the Warden’s petition and on the remaining issues, the court denied Lenz’s petition on March 5, 2004. Lenz v. Warden of the Sussex I State Prison, 267 Va. 318, 593 S.E.2d 292 (2004) (“Lenz III ”). Lenz filed a petition for rehearing, which was denied on April 30, 2004. The Circuit Court of Augusta County scheduled Lenz’s execution for July 1, 2004. B. Fedeeal Proceedings. On June 30, 2004, Lenz filed a motion in this court to stay his scheduled execution, a notice of intent to file for a writ of habeas corpus, and a motion to appoint counsel. This court stayed Lenz’s execution pending consideration of his federal habeas petition and appointed counsel. In his petition, Lenz sets forth the following eight grounds for federal habeas relief: I. Lenz was denied his rights under the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments where jurors were exposed to improper extraneous material during their sentencing phase deliberations; II. Lenz’s right to the effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution was violated when his trial attorneys failed to object to flawed and incomplete verdict forms that did not comport with the jury instructions or the law; III. Trial counsel’s failure to object to the Department of Corrections’ unilateral decision to place a stun belt on Lenz throughout his trial, without any showing of need, denied Lenz his rights to be tried without restraint, to effective assistance of counsel, and to a fair trial; IV. Lenz’s right to confront the witnesses against him and to due process of law were violated when the court suppressed evidence about the victim’s murder conviction; V. Lenz was denied his right to counsel at a critical stage of the proceedings due to the trial court’s refusal to order that Lenz be transported to a location where he could have reasonable access to his attorneys until a week before his capital trial commenced, and due to the conditions under which the Commonwealth forced trial counsel to consult with Lenz during the months prior to his trial; VI. Counsel rendered ineffective assistance during the sentencing phase; VII. Lenz was denied the effective assistance’ of counsel on direct appeal because counsel failed to preserve, raise and cogently argue meritorious issues; [and] VIII. The death penalty in Virginia is unconstitutional. (Pet. at 28-126.) On November 22, 2004, respondent filed a Rule 5 Answer and Motion to Dismiss. Lenz filed a Response to the Motion to Dismiss on December 23, 2004, the Warden filed a Reply on January 24, 2005, and oral argument was heard on February 10, 2005. Accordingly, the Motion to Dismiss is now ripe for decision. III. PROCEDURALLY DEFAULTED CLAIM. One claim presented by Lenz in his federal habeas petition was procedurally defaulted during the state court proceedings. A claim is defaulted if: (1) a state court expressly relied on an adequate and independent state procedural rule to deny relief on that claim, Fisher v. Angelone, 163 F.3d 835, 844 (4th Cir.1998); or (2) the petitioner failed to present a claim to the state court and that claim may not now be presented, Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 161-62, 116 S.Ct. 2074, 135 L.Ed.2d 457 (1996); Bassette v. Thompson, 915 F.2d 932, 936 (4th Cir.1990). The Supreme Court of Virginia, in ruling on Lenz’s state habeas petition, found that Claim V was procedurally defaulted under the rule in Slayton v. Parrigan, 215 Va. 27, 205 S.E.2d 680 (1974). Slayton prohibits state habeas review of claims that were available to the petitioner at trial or on direct appeal but were not raised at that time. Id. at 682. The Supreme Court of Virginia’s application of the Slayton procedural default rule provides an adequate and independent state law ground upon which to deny relief and bars consideration of these claims on federal habeas review, absent cause and actual prejudice or a miscarriage of justice. See Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 533, 106 S.Ct. 2661, 91 L.Ed.2d 434 (1986); Burket v. Angelone, 208 F.3d 172, 188-89 (4th Cir.2000). To show cause, a petitioner must demonstrate that “objective factors” external to his defense impeded him from raising his claim at an earlier stage. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986). To demonstrate prejudice, a petitioner must show that the alleged constitutional violation worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional magnitude. Id. at 492, 106 S.Ct. 2639. In Claim V, Lenz asserts that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel when the trial court refused to order his transfer to a location where he could have reasonable access to his attorneys until a week before his capital trial commenced. In addition, he claims that the conditions under which the Commonwealth forced trial counsel to consult with him during the months prior to his trial denied him his right to counsel. On direct appeal, Lenz raised a claim arising from the same set of facts as his current habeas claim. He argued that he was “denied effective assistance of [cjounsel in that the Department of Corrections housed [him] hours away from the site of the trial and of the offices of his appointed attorneys. Because of these great distances the defendant could only meet with his attorneys for a short period of time. The time the defendant spent with his attorneys was much less than the travel time to and from the location.” Lenz II, 579 S.E.2d at 198 (quoting Lenz I, 544 S.E.2d at 304) (alterations in original). The Supreme Court of Virginia refused to consider this claim on direct appeal “because in the Commonwealth, ‘[c]laims raising ineffective assistance of counsel must be asserted in á habeas corpus proceeding and are not cognizable on direct appeal.’ ” Id. (quoting Lenz I, 544 S.E.2d at 304) (alteration in original). In his state habeas petition, Lenz first asserted the claim now before this court, that he “was denied his right to counsel at a critical stage of the proceedings due to the trial court’s refusal to order that Lenz be transported to a location where he could have reasonable access to his attorneys until a week before his capital trial commenced, and due to the conditions under which the Commonwealth forced trial counsel to consult with Lenz during the months prior to his trial.” Id. In its initial habeas opinion, the Supreme Court of Virginia ruled that this claim had been procedurally defaulted “because it could have been raised at trial and on direct appeal,” but was not. Lenz II, 579 S.E.2d at 198 (citing Slayton, 205 S.E.2d at 682). The court distinguished between Lenz’s direct appeal and habeas claims: [I]n petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus, he does not allege that his counsel were ineffective for this reason. Rather, he asserts that he was denied his rights to counsel at a critical stage of the proceedings, which is different from a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. Lenz claims there was no state court adjudication of this claim because after issuing its initial opinion, the court “set aside the judgment entered” and “[i]n its subsequent March 5, 2004, opinion ... did not address this claim.” (Pet. at 78.) In its reconsideration opinion, the court unequivocally said, “Petitioner raised ten claims in his petition.... In our original opinion we specifically declined to address petitioner’s claims relating to his prior sentencing hearing and dismissed all his claims except the claim involving the verdict form.” Lenz III, 593 S.E.2d at 296 n. 2 (emphasis added). The court thus intended its rehearing opinion to supplement, not vacate, its prior holding. This is further clarified by the opening sentence of the opinion, which explains, “we granted a rehearing to ... consider whether trial counsel was ineffective because they did not object to the verdict form.” Id. at 295. The court was not required to discuss and dismiss Lenz’s right to counsel claim a second time. Having found that the state court did adjudicate Claim V, I now turn to Lenz’s justification for default. Lenz does not argue that cause and prejudice excuse his procedural default, nor does he claim a miscarriage of justice. See Smith, 477 U.S. at 533, 106 S.Ct. 2661 (outlining the exceptions to procedural default). Rather, Lenz argues that “[t]he state court incorrectly defaulted this claim based on the clearly erroneous finding that Lenz ‘d[id] not allege that his counsel were ineffective.’ ” (Pet. at 79 (quoting Lenz II, 579 S.E.2d at 198) (alteration in original).) He asserts that he did, in fact, raise an ineffective assistance of counsel claim in his state habeas petition. In addition, Lenz argues that Slayton does not provide an independent and adequate state bar because it is not “firmly established and regularly followed.’” (Pet.’s Resp. at 19 (quoting Ford v. Georgia, 498 U.S. 411, 423-24, 111 S.Ct. 850, 112 L.Ed.2d 935 (1991).)) As previously explained, a federal court may not review a constitutional claim when a state court has declined to consider its merits on the basis of an adequate and independent state procedural rule. Mu’min v. Pruett, 125 F.3d 192, 196 (4th Cir.1997) (citing Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 262, 109 S.Ct. 1038, 103 L.Ed.2d 308 (1989)). In this case, the Supreme Court of Virginia explicitly relied upon the procedural default rule in Slayton. The Fourth Circuit has “held on numerous occasions” that Slayton constitutes an adequate and independent state law ground for decision. Id. (citations omitted). After determining that a state court relied on an adequate and independent state law ground for its decision, the federal courts “ ‘may only inquire into whether cause and prejudice exist to excuse [a state procedural] default, not into whether the state court properly applied its own law.’ ” Fisher v. Angelone, 163 F.3d 835, 844 (4th Cir.1998) (quoting Barnes v. Thompson, 58 F.3d 971, 974 n. 2 (4th Cir.1995)). The Fourth Circuit has applied this rule to a claim almost identical to Lenz’s. In Wright v. Angelone, 151 F.3d 151 (4th Cir.1998), the Supreme Court of Virginia held on state habeas review that the petitioner’s claim had been defaulted under Slayton because it had not been raised on direct appeal. Wright, 151 F.3d at 159. The petitioner argued that his claim had, in fact, been raised and ruled upon on direct appeal. Id. The Fourth Circuit refused to review this claim, explaining “we are not at liberty to question a state court’s application of a state procedural rule because a state court’s finding of procedural default is not renewable if the finding is based upon an adequate and independent state ground.” Id. (quoting Williams v. French, 146 F.3d 203, 208-09 (4th Cir.1998)). Because the Supreme Court of Virginia relied upon an adequate and independent state law ground for its decision that Lenz’s claim was procedurally defaulted, that decision is not reviewable in this court. Furthermore, because Lenz challenges only the application of the rule in Slayton, and offers no argument as to why cause and prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of justice might excuse his procedural default, I do not consider whether those exist. Accordingly, I find that Claim V is not subject to federal habeas review. IV- Claims on the MeRits. Lenz raises five claims which the state court adjudicated on the merits. When reviewing such claims, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) states that a federal court may grant habeas relief only if the state court’s adjudication resulted in a decision that was: (1) “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” or (2) “based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d)(1), (2) (West 1994 & Supp.2004). A state court adjudication is “contrary to” clearly established federal law only if “the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the Supreme] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000). A state court decision involves an “unreasonable application” of clearly established federal law if the court identifies the governing legal principle, but “unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413, 120 S.Ct. 1495. “It is not enough that a federal habeas court, in its ‘independent review of the legal question’ is left with a ‘firm conviction’ that the state court was ‘erroneous’.... Rather, that application must be objectively unreasonable.” Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75-76, 123 S.Ct. 1166, 155 L.Ed.2d 144 (2003) (quoting Andrade v. Attorney Gen. of Cal., 270 F.3d 743, 753 (9th Cir.2001), overruled on other grounds, Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 123 S.Ct. 1166, 155 L.Ed.2d 144 (2003)). A state court decision is entitled to a “presumption of correctness.” 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(e)(1) (West 1994 & Supp.2004). That presumption is rebutted only by “clear and convincing” evidence that the state court decision was “based on [an] unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding.” Id.; Wiggins v. Smith, 589 U.S. 510, 528, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003). The presumption applies equally to the factual findings of state courts that conducted postconviction proceedings. Howard v. Moore, 131 F.3d 399, 422 (4th Cir.1997) (citing Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 104 S.Ct. 453, 78 L.Ed.2d 267 (1983) (per curiam); Johnson v. Maryland, 915 F.2d 892, 896 (4th Cir.1990)). Even if a writ of habeas corpus is authorized under § 2254(d), a petitioner still is not entitled to relief unless he can show “that any constitutional errors committed ‘had substantial and injurious effect or influence on the verdict’ rendered by the jury.” Wilson v. Ozmint, 352 F.3d 847, 855 (4th Cir.2003) (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993); Fullwood v. Lee, 290 F.3d 663, 679 (4th Cir.2002) (applying Brecht after enactment of the AED-PA)). A. Claim I — Peesence of a Bible in the Juey Room. Lenz claims that he was denied his rights under the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments because jurors were exposed to improper extraneous material, the Bible, during their sentencing phase deliberations. The Supreme Court of Virginia addressed this claim in its state habeas rehearing opinion after reviewing the report of the circuit court judge who conducted an evidentiary hearing on the matter. See Lenz III, 593 S.E.2d at 298-300. The court applied the standard for evaluating a claim of extraneous jury contact set forth in Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 229, 74 S.Ct. 450, 98 L.Ed. 654 (1954). Under Remmer, a petitioner is entitled to a presumption of prejudice upon a showing of two elements: (1) that an extraneous contact with or by a member of the jury took place, and (2) that the contact was “about the matter pending before the jury.” Id. The Supreme Court of Virginia held that while Lenz had established the first element under Remmer, he had failed to establish the second — that the extraneous contact was relevant to the pending matter. Lenz III, 593 S.E.2d at 298-99. The court adopted the circuit court’s findings that one juror had a Bible, and perhaps a “Woman’s Devotional” with her in the jury room, and that several jurors read from it. Id. at 299. However, there was no evidence of which Bible passages were read. Id. Therefore, the Supreme Court of Virginia held, there was no evidence that any passages jurors read were related to the sentencing decision, as Remmer requires. Id. Lenz argues that the state court’s decision on this claim was contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, and that it was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the state court record. Upon review of the record and applicable law, I find that the Supreme Court of Virginia’s adjudication was reasonable and deny relief. First, Lenz argues that the state court unreasonably applied Remmer when it required him to establish which passages of the Bible jurors read, rather than merely requiring him to demonstrate “that jurors were exposed to external material that had some relevance to the matter before them.” (Pet. at 37.) A state court adjudication constitutes an “unreasonable application” of clearly established federal law if the court identifies the governing legal principle, but “unreasonably applies- that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 413, 120 S.Ct. 1495. Lenz compares the Supreme Court of Virginia’s application of Remmer to the Fifth Circuit’s application of United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984), in Burdine v. Johnson, 262 F.3d 336 (5th Cir.2001) (en banc). In Cronic, the Supreme Court suggested in dicta that in some circumstances the performance of counsel might be so deficient that prejudice may be presumed to have resulted therefrom. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 658-60, 104 S.Ct. 2039. In Burdine, the defendant' successfully argued that his counsel’s performance was so deficient that the court should presume prejudice. Burdine, 262 F.3d at 355-56. Burdine’s counsel had slept through portions of the trial, but he could not prove which portions. Id. Burdine is not parallel to this case. The Burdine court held that all events occurring during “the taking of evidence against [the defendant]” occur at a “critical phase.” Therefore, the demonstration that counsel slept at any time the State was presenting its evidence was sufficient to show that he slept during a “critical stage” of the trial— the showing required for the presumption of prejudice. Id. at 355. By analogy, it would have to be true that all passages of the Bible read during sentencing deliberations are relevant to the sentencing decision. Therefore, the demonstration that the jurors read anything from the Bible during deliberations would be sufficient to show that those passages were relevant to their deliberations. Such a reading would effectively eliminate the relevance prong of Remmer. Without a showing of which passages were read, it is impossible to know whether the jurors’ search for relevant passages was even successful. I find that the Supreme Court of Virginia did not unreasonably apply Remmer when it required Lenz to demonstrate which passages were read. Furthermore, even if I accepted Lenz’s contention that several of the jurors read passages regarding the appropriate punishment for murder, it is impossible to know how that might have affected the sentencing decision without a showing of which passages or books of the Bible were read. The Remmer requirement that an extraneous contact be “about the matter pending before the jury” is a prerequisite for a finding of prejudice. Remmer, 347 U.S. at 229, 74 S.Ct. 450. Knowing only that “a book” of the Bible was named does not raise any inference of prejudice to the defendant. While passages in some books of the Bible seem to state that the death penalty is the appropriate punishment for murder, those in other books appear to counsel against the death penalty. Compare Genesis 9:6 (‘Whoso sheddeth man’s blood, by man shall his blood be shed....”), and Exodus 21:23-25 (“And if any mischief follow, then thou shalt give life for life, [e]ye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot, [b]urning for burning, wound for wound, stripe for stripe.”), and Leviticus 24:21 (“[H]e that killeth a man, he shall be put to death.”), with Exodus 20:13 (“Thou shalt not kill.”), and Matthew 5:39 (“[Wjhosoever shall smite thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the other also.”), and Romans 12:17, 19 (“Recompense to no man evil for evil.... [A]venge not yourselves, but rather give place unto wrath: for it is written, Vengeance is mine; I will repay, saith the Lord.”). See also Jill Jones, Comment, The Christian Executioner: Reconciling “An Eye for an Eye” with “Turn the Other Cheek, ” 27 Pepp. L.Rev. 127 (1999) (comparing Old and New Testament positions on the death penalty). Even those faiths that use the Bible as their primary text disagree about the Holy Scriptures’ teachings on capital punishment. See Michigan State University Communication Technology Laboratory and Death Penalty Information Center, Death Penalty Curricula for High School: Current Issues and Topics: Religion and the Death Penalty (Nov. 1, 2001), at http://teacher. deathpenaltyi nfo. msu.edu/c/about/ history/history-8, htm (explaining that “Fundamentalist and Pentecostal churches, as well as the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints” support the death penalty, while the Roman Catholic Church and certain Protestant denominations oppose it). For these reasons, I find the Supreme Court of Virginia’s application of Remmer reasonable. Next, Lenz argues that the Supreme Court of Virginia’s decision was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the state court record. Specifically, Lenz asserts that the court erred by finding first, that the extraneous material was not about the matter pending before the jury, and second, that juror affidavits regarding the reading of that material were not credible. Lenz first contends that the Supreme Court of Virginia’s adjudication was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts because the court incorrectly determined that the extraneous contact, that is, the reading of the Bible, was not about the matter pending before the jury. Lenz argues that this determination is “absurd” because “[t]he state court based this determination on an inference; the state court alleged that implicit in the circuit court’s finding that there was no evidence of which chapter and verse was read is the determination that ‘no evidence showed that jurors read Bible passages relating to the sentencing decision.’” (Pet. at 40 (quoting Lenz III, 593 S.E.2d at 299).) Lenz admits “it is true that no juror could identify a specific chapter or verse that was read from the Bible during deliberations,” but argues there was clear evidence that several of the jurors read passages regarding the appropriate punishment for murder. (Id. at 41.) I must presume the state court’s findings of fact to' be correct unless the petitioner makes a clear and convincing showing to the contrary. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 528, 123 S.Ct. 2527; § 2254(e)(1). In addition, I must presume correct “inferences fairly deductible from these facts.” Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 36, 113 S.Ct. 517, 121 L.Ed.2d 391 (1992) (quoting Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 432, 103 S.Ct. 843, 74 L.Ed.2d 646 (1983)). There was testimony at the circuit court’s evidentiary hearing that at least two jurors asked juror Durrett, who had her Bible with her, whether the Bible indicated the appropriate punishment for murder. (App.521-23.) Another juror answered that the Bible did provide an answer to the question and identified a book of the Bible, but not a chapter or verse, that, discusses the issue. (App.522-23.) However, there was no evidence of the specific book of the Bible to which the juror was referring, and there was no evidence that any juror ever stated or read any answer that the Bible provides. (See App. 521-26, 532.) These facts distinguish this case from those in which jurors’ use of the Bible justified the Remmer presumption of prejudice. Cf. Burch v. Corcoran, 273 F.3d 577, 590 (4th Cir.2001) (“[T]he juror ‘quoted (from memory and, on occasion by reading) from the Bible’ ”); McNair v. Campbell, 315 F.Supp.2d 1179, 1183 (M.D.Ala.2004) (The “foreperson ... brought a Bible into the jury room, read aloud from it, led the other jurors in prayer, and relied on the Bible to reach his decision”); People v. Harlan, 109 P.3d 616, 622 (Colo.2005) (Finding prejudice under state law corollary to Remmer where “[sjeveral jurors studied Bibles” during a recess and one took the “Bible in the jury room to share with other jurors the written Leviticus and Romans texts during deliberations”). The Supreme Court of Virginia’s conclusion, albeit an inference, that “no evidence showed that jurors read Bible passages relating to the sentencing decision,” Lenz III, 593 S.E.2d at 299, is fairly supported by the record and is not unreasonable. I will not deviate from the presumption that that determination is correct. Lenz also contends that the state court’s adjudication was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts because the court incorrectly found that juror affidavits regarding the reading of the Bible in the jury room were not credible. In its report from the evidentiary hearing, the circuit court indicated that its findings were based on the testimony of the jurors, and not on their prior affidavits. (App.713.) The circuit court determined that the juror affidavits were hearsay not falling under any exception to that rule. (Id.) Noting several problems with the reliability of the affidavits, the court considered them only as they affected the witnesses’ credibility. (Id.) The Supreme Court of Virginia found the circuit court’s use of the juror affidavits to be an appropriate exercise of that court’s discretion. Lenz III, 593 S.E.2d at 297. Lenz attacks the circuit court’s rationale for limiting the use of the affidavits, disputing that they “were ‘all hearsay’ ” and that their value should be discounted because they were taken almost a year and a half after the trial. (Pet. at 45-46.) Lenz phrases this argument as an attack on the reasonableness of the state court’s factual determinations, not on the circuit court’s legal analysis of the hearsay rule and its exception. To the extent that Lenz’s argument attacks the court’s determination that the juror affidavits were not credible, it is rejected. The credibility of juror testimony is an issue that the trial judge is “uniquely qualified to decide.” Hunt v. Woodson, 800 F.2d 416, 420 (4th Cir.1986) (citing Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1038, 104 S.Ct. 2885, 81 L.Ed.2d 847 (1984)). This rule applies equally to credibility determinations of affidavits. See United States v. Tindle, 860 F.2d 125, 128 (4th Cir.1988) (explaining, about an affidavit, “[i]n these matters the trial judge determines issues of credibility”). The circuit court’s determination was well-reasoned and supported by the record. The Supreme Court of Virginia was justified in accepting that determination and Lenz has not made the required showing to justify departure from the presumption that the state court’s factual findings are correct. B. Claim II — Counsel’s FailuRE to OBJECT to the VERDICT Forms. The trial judge presented Lenz’s jury with forms containing alternate verdicts and instructed it to select the one reflecting its verdict. (See App. 153-54 (verdict forms similar to those used at Lenz’s sentencing).) Lenz claims that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance .of counsel because counsel failed to object to the verdict forms on the grounds that they did not comply with the law and were not consistent with the jury instructions. The Supreme Court of Virginia first addressed this claim sua sponte on direct appeal. Although neither party raised the issue, the court “asked the litigants to address the verdict form[s] utilized during the penalty phase of the defendant’s trial in view of our decision in Atkins v. Commonwealth, 257 Va.160, 510 S.E.2d 445, 457 (1999).” Lenz I, 544 S.E.2d at 311. In Atkins, the court found a set of verdict forms improper for failing to provide the jury with the option of sentencing the defendant only to a life sentence if it found neither of the two alleged aggravating factors. Atkins, 510 S.E.2d at 456. After considering the parties’ briefs, the record, and oral argument in this case, the court concluded that any questions related to the verdict forms had been procedurally defaulted because Lenz had neither raised the issue before the circuit court, nor assigned error to the forms on direct appeal. Lenz I, 544 S.E.2d at 311. In his state habeas petition, Lenz claimed, “counsel were ineffective for failing to object to verdict forms which did not comport with the trial court’s instructions, Virginia law and federal constitutional requirements.” (App.180.) In its initial ha-beas opinion, the Supreme Court of Virginia agreed. The court observed that the “life imprisonment” verdict, form used in the sentencing phase of Lenz’s trial was “almost identical” to the language then required by Virginia Code section 19.2-264.4(D). Lenz II, 579 S.E.2d at 197. Nevertheless, the court held that the form did not satisfy the requirements of Atkins because it failed to inform the jury that if it found no aggravating factors, it could sentence Lenz to life in prison, or life in prison plus a fine. Id. The court rejected the Warden’s argument that Lenz’s counsel could not have been ineffective for failing to object to verdict forms mandated by statute and repeatedly held proper. It pointed out that Lenz’s jury had been instructed one and a half years after the Atkins decision. The court also noted that in Powell v. Commonwealth, 261 Va. 512, 552 S.E.2d 344 (2001), which was decided after Lenz’s trial, it applied Atkins to a set of verdict forms identical to those used in Lenz’s trial and found those forms improper. Lenz II, 579 S.E.2d at 197 (citing Powell, 552 S.E.2d at 363). Finally, the court found that the improper verdict forms had prejudiced Lenz, and remanded the case for a new sentencing hearing. Id. Before a new sentencing hearing could be held, the Warden filed a petition for rehearing with the Supreme Court of Virginia. The court granted the petition to again consider Lenz’s verdict form claim. The Warden argued that the verdict forms were proper under Atkins, that Lenz’s counsel could not have anticipated the court’s ruling in Powell and that counsel, therefore, could not have been ineffective for failing to object to the forms. Lenz III, 593 S.E.2d at 295. This time, the court agreed. Id. The court emphasized the difference between the forms used in Atkins and at Lenz’s trial. The Atkins forms failed to provide the option of sentencing the defendant to life when no aggravating factor was found; Lenz’s forms failed to provide the option of sentencing Lenz to life when one or both aggravating factors were found. Id. Had Lenz’s forms been used at Atkins’ trial, the court reasoned, the outcome of Atkins would have been different. Id. The court further explained that Powell, decided after Lenz’s trial, was its first opportunity to address the issue Lenz raised. Accordingly, the court held that Lenz’s counsel was not ineffective for failing to anticipate a future court ruling. Id. Lenz now asserts two separate ineffective assistance of counsel claims related to the verdict forms: first, that trial counsel failed to object and assign error to the forms on the ground that they did not include the option of sentencing Lenz to life plus a fíne of not more than $100,000 (Claim 11(A)); and second, that trial counsel failed to object to the forms on the ground that they did not allow the jury to find one or both of the alleged aggravating factors, but still sentence Lenz to life imprisonment or life plus a fine (Claim 11(B)). Lenz argues that he raised, but the state court failed to address, Claim 11(A), allowing this court to review that claim de novo. Lenz also argues that the state court’s decision on Claim 11(B) was contrary to and involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. Upon review of the record and applicable law, I disagree. The Supreme Court of Virginia did adjudicate both Claims 11(A) and 11(B) on the merits, and its adjudication was reasonable. First, Lenz contends that he raised Claim 11(A) before the Supreme Court of Virginia, arguing that trial counsel were ineffective for failing to object and assign error to the verdict forms on the ground that they did not include the option of sentencing Lenz to life plus a fine of not more than $100,000. However, he asserts, the court failed to address the claim. The respondent disagrees, arguing that Lenz’s state habeas Claim IV encompassed both arguments now designated as Claims 11(A) and 11(B), and that the state court adjudicated both of those on the merits when it decided state habeas Claim IV. Whether or not this claim was “adjudicated on the merits” is a critical question. Absent a decision by the state court resulting from such adjudication, I must review the merits of Claim 11(A) de novo. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d); Weeks v. Angelone, 176 F.3d 249, 258 (4th Cir.1999). In its initial habeas' opinion, the Supreme Court of Virginia held that Lenz’s verdict forms failed to satisfy the requirements of Atkins because “the form[s] failed to inform the jury that it could impose a sentence of life imprisonment or a sentence of life imprisonment and afine if the jury found that neither of the aggravating factors had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Lenz II, 579 S.E.2d at 197 (emphasis added). In the rehearing opinion, the majority framed the issue as “whether the verdict form[s] must specifically provide the option of imposing a sentence of life when the Commonwealth has established one or both aggravating factors.” Lenz III, 593 S.E.2d at 295 (emphasis omitted). However, three justices specifically discussed Claim 11(A) in dissent. They argued that the jury in Lenz’s case was not given a verdict form that specifically reflected the jury’s option of imposing a life sentence, or a life sentence a/nd a fine of not more than $100,000, even if the jury found that the Commonwealth had proven beyond a reasonable doubt one or both of the aggravating factors necessary for imposing a sentence of death. The trial court was required to provide the jury with a verdict form expressly providing this sentencing option, and we expressly so held in Powell .... Id. at 306 (emphasis added). The dissent concluded any reasonably effective counsel would have recognized after Atkins that a [set of] jury form[s] that did not specifically reflect the jury’s option of imposing a life sentence, or a life sentence and a fine of not more than $100,000, even if the jury found .. one or both aggravating factors ..., would not comport with the correct statement of law given to the jury by the trial court in its sentencing instructions. Id. Section 2254 does not specify the extent to which a state court must discuss a claim in order for that claim to have been adjudicated on the merits. Indeed, even a summary dismissal of a habeas petition is an “adjudication on the merits” qualifying for § 2254’s deferential standard of review. Bell v. Jarvis, 236 F.3d 149, 163 (4th Cir.2000) (en banc). The state court is not required to offer any rationale for its determination. Sellan v. Kuhlman, 261 F.3d 303, 312 (2nd Cir.2001) (citing Bell v. Jarvis, 236 F.3d 149 (4th Cir.2000)); Weeks, 176 F.3d at 259 (stating, “[wjhere ... the state supreme court has adjudicated a claim on the merits but has given no indication of how it reached its decision, a federal habeas court must still apply the AEDPA standards of review”). Any failure by the majority to offer an independent rationale for its decision on what is now Claim 11(A) does not mean that the Supreme Court of Virginia did not “adjudicate” that claim. The state court’s decision on the verdict form issue encompassed both federal Claims 11(A) and 11(B). This is especially apparent in the rehearing opinion dissent, which specifically mentions the effect the failure to include life plus a fine as a sentencing option had — the verdict forms did not “comport with the ... sentencing instructions.” Lenz III, 593 S.E.2d at 305. Moreover, the court’s decision to reject Lenz’s entire verdict form claim was made for substantive, not procedural reasons, that is, “on the merits.” See Semtek Int’l, Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 497-98, 121 S.Ct. 1021, 149 L.Ed.2d 32 (2001) (noting that the original definition of an “on the merits” adjudication is “one that actually ‘pass[es] directly on the substance of [a particular] claim before the court’ ”) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 19, cmt. a, 161 (1980)). The court did not need to distinguish between the two claims Lenz now presents separately. Accordingly, I find that the Supreme Court of Virginia’s adjudication of state habeas Claim IV did adjudicate on the merits both federal habeas Claim 11(A) and 11(B) and, therefore, the AEDPA standards of review control. Next, Lenz argues that if this court finds that Claim 11(A) was adjudicated on the merits, as it has, then the state court’s adjudication was contrary to and an unreasonable application of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). He makes the same argument as to Claim 11(B), as well. Specifically, Lenz contends that the Supreme Court of Virginia failed to identify Strickland as the controlling legal authority for both Claims 11(A) and 11(B), and failed to apply the rule of Strickland when resolving those claims. Upon review of the record and applicable law, I find that the Supreme Court of Virginia’s adjudication of this claim was reasonable and deny relief. Strickland adopted a two-part standard for evaluating claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, requiring the defendant to show: (1) that “counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,” and (2) that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Lenz alleges, “[i]n this case, the Supreme Court of Virginia neither cited to Strickland nor identified the two-prong test ... [of] Strickland as the correct test.” (Pet. at 58 (citing Lenz III, 593 S.E.2d at 295-96).) The Supreme Court of Virginia did cite Strickland in its first habeas opinion, stating, “[o]ur above-stated holding in Atkins requires a finding of prejudice because had counsel assigned error to the verdict form[s] during the direct appeal of the judgment, petitioner would have received a new sentencing proceeding.” Lenz II, 579 S.E.2d at 197 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052). It is true that the court did not cite Strickland in connection with the verdict form claim in its reconsideration opinion. Instead, the court cited Kornahrens v. Evatt, 66 F.3d 1350 (4th Cir.1995), for the proposition that trial counsel is not ineffective for failing to anticipate a subsequent court decision. Lenz III, 593 S.E.2d at 295 (citing Komahrens, 66 F.3d at 1360). Komahrens, in turn, expressly applied Strickland. 66 F.3d at 1360. Citing Komahrens adequately identified the constitutional claim at issue. See Green v. French, 143 F.3d 865, 885 n. 4 (4th Cir.1998) (holding that a state court has adjudicated a claim on the merits when it relies upon precedent that, in turn, cites to and relies upon the federal precedent at issue), abrogated on other grounds, Williams, 529 U.S. at 374, 120 S.Ct. 1495. The Supreme Court of Virginia’s failure to cite Strickland does not mean that the court failed to apply the Strickland standard. Lenz also alleges that, if the Supreme Court of Virginia applied Strickland, it did so unreasonably. A state court decision constitutes an “unreasonable application” of clearly established federal law if the court identifies the governing legal principle, but “unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 413, 120 S.Ct. 1495. Lenz first argues that the court was required to “determine whether trial counsel’s' performance was ‘reasonable considering all the circumstances’ ” and suggests the “proper test” would have been “whether trial counsel was ‘reasonably effective’ under the law that existed at the time of Lenz’s trial.” (Pet. at 59.) The performance prong of Stricklan-dasks whether “counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness..” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Although the Supreme Court of Virginia did not specifically mention the phrases Lenz suggests— “reasonable considering all the circumstances” and “reasonably effective” — it did conduct the proper inquiry. It is clear from the court’s reconsideration opinion that the court considered all the circumstances surrounding counsel’s failure to object to the verdict forms, particularly the fact that Atkins had not yet been applied to a case like Lenz’s, and that the court weighed that failure against an objective standard of reasonableness. See Lenz III, 593 S.E.2d at 295. Finally, Lenz argues that the court incorrectly relied upon Komahrens in its Strickland analysis because Komahrens addresses counsel’s failure to anticipate a “new rule of law,” while Lenz’s case involved a new application of an existing rule. Although the facts in Komahrens did involve a new rule of law, the Fourth Circuit opinion also discusses “clear precedent” applicable to Lenz’s situation. Kornahrens, 66 F.3d at 1360 (citing Honeycutt v. Mahoney, 698 F.2d 213, 216-17 (4th Cir.1983) (deciding that trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to longstanding North Carolina law even though Supreme Court and First Circuit precedent arguably “foreshadowed” the subsequent overruling of that law)). Lenz’s verdict forms complied with statutory requirements. Furthermore, even if Atkins did foreshadow Powell, Strickland does not require counsel to raise “every single conceivable argument.” Ruff v. Armontrout, 77 F.3d 265, 268 (8th Cir.1996); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (instructing courts reviewing ineffective assistance of counsel claims to “eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time”). Finally, the Powell decision was not a foregone conclusion, as Lenz’s counsel implies. See Powell, 552 S.E.2d at 361-63. The Supreme Court of Virginia recognized that Powell presented this issue for the “first time,” Lenz III, 593 S.E.2d at 295, and in the Powell decision itself, the court explained, “this issue is not controlled by Atkins.” Powell, 552 S.E.2d at 363; cf. Emmett v. Warden of Sussex I State Prison, 269 Va. 164, 609 S.E.2d 602, 605 (2005) (finding counsel’s performance ineffective for failing to object to a verdict form prior to Poivell when that form had “the same omission as the verdict form at issue in Atkins ”) (emphasis added). I find that the Supreme Court of Virginia reasonably applied Strickland to the facts of Lenz’s case and reasonably relied upon Komahrens in its analysis. C. Claim III — Counsel’s FailuRE to Objeot to Use of the Stun Belt. Lenz claims that he was denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel because counsel failed to object to the Department of Corrections’ decision to place a stun belt on Lenz throughout his trial without any showing of need, and in violation of his rights to be tried without restraint, to the effective assistance of counsel and to a fair trial. The Supreme Court of Virginia first addressed this claim in its initial habeas opinion. The court held that Lenz had failed to establish either the performance or prejudice prongs of Strickland. Lenz II, 579 S.E.2d at 198. As to the performance prong, the court held that “[e]ven habeas counsel do not dispute that petitioner was a risk to the public if he were able to escape.” Id. As to the prejudice prong, the court concluded Lenz could not “show that there is a ‘reasonable probability’ that, but for counsel’s [allegedly] unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different,” especially considering the fact that the jury could not see the belt. Id. Lenz claims there was no “adjudication on the merits” of this claim because after issuing its initial opinion, the court “set aside the judgment entered” and “[i]n its subsequent March 5, 2004, opinion ... did not address this claim.” (Pet. at 67.) As I did in Claim V, I reject this argument because the state court intended its rehearing opinion to supplement, not vacate, its prior holding. The court was not required to discuss and dismiss Lenz’s stun belt claim a second time. Having found that the state court did adjudicate Claim III on its merits, I now turn to Lenz’s arguments that the adjudication was contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, and that it was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the state court record. Upon review of the record and applicable law, I find that the Supreme Court of Virginia’s adjudication was reasonable and deny relief. First, Lenz argues the state court holding that his stun belt claim failed to satisfy either prong of Strickland was contrary to the Supreme Court’s holdings in Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 112 S.Ct. 1810, 118 L.Ed.2d 479 (1992), and Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 106 S.Ct. 1340, 89 L.Ed.2d 525 (1986). In Riggins, the Court held that the forced administration of antipsychotic drugs violated a defendant’s rights under the Fourteenth Amendment when the defendant was competent to stand trial without the drug. 504 U.S. at 134, 112 S.Ct. 1810. Lenz argues that a stun belt can affect a defendant’s demeanor and “cognitive processes” just as an antipsychotic drug does. (Pet. at 65.) Therefore, he claims, use of the stun belt prejudiced him and the state court’s contrary determination was an unreasonable application of Riggins. In Holbrook, the Court applied the rule that the State must demonstrate a compelling interest before engaging in “inherently prejudicial practice^],” like restraining a defendant during his own trial. 475 U.S. at 568-69, 106 S.Ct. 1340 (holding that the deployment of additional courtroom security personnel was not such an “inherently prejudicial practice”). Because the state court failed to address this argument, Lenz asserts that its adjudication of his stun belt claim was contrary to Holbrook. A state court adjudication is considered “contrary to” clearly established federal law if “the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the Supreme] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13, 120 S.Ct. 1495. Neither Riggins nor Holbrook involved facts “materially indistinguishable” . from those in this case. As already explained, the defendant in Riggins was forced to take antipsychotic drugs. 504 U.S. at 134, 112 S.Ct. 1810. Holbrook involved the deployment of courtroom security officers. 475 U.S. at 568, 106 S.Ct. 1340. While there may be parallels between these situations and the use of a stun belt, as Lenz argues, there are also many differences. Holbrook did observe that “shackling and prison clothes ... unmistakably] separate a defendant from the community at large,” making it necessary for the state to justify their use. Id. at 569, 106 S.Ct. 1340. Again, the use of a stun, belt at Lenz’s trial is distinguishable — jurors could not see the stun belt, as they could have seen shackles or additional security guards, had they been used. There is no clear precedent for Lenz’s proposition that the State must justify the use of any