Full opinion text
TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION...............................................................460 BACKGROUND................................................................460 March 19, 2004, Eavesdropping Warrant: 518-229-6128 ..........................460 April 21, 2004, Eavesdropping Warrant: 518-528-1148 and 518-376-3946 ...........463 McKinnon’s Cell Phone....................................................463 Howard’s Cell Phone......................................................465 Necessity — Alternative Investigative Techniques.............................465 May 20, 2004, Eavesdropping Warrant..........................................466 McKinnon’s and Cruz’s Cell Phones.........................................466 Sierra’s and Howard’s Cell Phones..........................................467 Howard’s and Castillo’s Cell Phones ........................................467 McKinnon’s and E & O’s Cell Phones.......................................468 Necessity — Alternative Investigative Techniques........:....................469 June 1, 2004 Search Warrant..................................................470 May 20, 2004 Vehicle Stop of Howard and Restifo................................470 STANDARDS ..................................................................470 Eavesdropping Warrants .....................................................470 Probable Cause..............................................................472 Severance...................................................................472 Dismissal of the Indictment and Inspection of Grand Jury Minutes................, 472 DISCUSSION..................................................................473 Defendant John E. Howard, III................................................473 Warrantless Vehicle Search................................................473 Evidence Obtained through Eavesdropping..................................473 Standing.............................................................473 Probable Cause.......................................................474 Traditional Investigative Techniques ....................................475 Severance...............................................................476 Defendant Redmond Andre McKinnon..........................................476 Dismissal of the Indictment................................................476 Eavesdropping Warrant...................................................476 Standing.............................................................476 Traditional Investigative Methods.......................................477 Probable Cause..............:........................................477 Search Warrant..........................................................479 Discovery...............................................................480 Supplemental Motion .....................................................480 Defendant Glenn Smith, Jr....................................................481 Severance...................................................................481 Wiretap Warrant.........................................................481 Discovery...............................................................482 Removal of Alias “Kabar” from Superseding Indictment.......................482 Defendant Kenneth Gibson............................ 482 Warrantless Search of Residence at 152 Maple Avenue 482 Eavesdropping Warrants.......................... 483 Severance ....................................... 483 Motion to Preclude Certain Testimony.............. 483 Defendant Christopher Restifo ........................ 484 Defendant Affis Cruz................................. 484 Sentencing Factors in the Superseding Indictment....... 485 Further Motions as Necessary......................... 485 CONCLUSION.......................... 485 MEMORANDUM-DECISION and ORDER HURD, District Judge. I. INTRODUCTION The defendants were charged with narcotics trafficking offenses in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 and 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), in a superseding indictment dated July 28, 2004. The grand jury also charged parallel forfeiture counts, and set forth conduct relevant to sentencing under the United States Sentencing Guidelines. Defendants John E. Howard III (“Howard”), Redmond Andre McKinnon (“McKinnon”), Glenn Smith, Jr. (“Smith”), Kenneth Gibson (“Gibson”), Christopher Restifo (“Resti-fo”), and Affis Cruz (“Cruz”) filed motions for omnibus relief. The Government opposed. Oral argument was heard on January 27, 2005, in Albany, New York. Decision was reserved. McKinnon filed a supplemental motion to suppress subsequent to oral argument, with permission. The Government responded in opposition. II. BACKGROUND A. March 19, 2004, Eavesdropping Warrant: 518-229-6128 On March 19, 2004, Terrence M. Kelly (“Kelly”), Assistant United States Attorney, Northern District of New York, applied for a warrant authorizing interception of communications on cellular telephone 518-229-6128 (“Gibson’s cell phone”). The warrant application was supported with the affidavit of Brian D. Cernak (“Cernak”), a Special Agent with the United States Drug Enforcement Administration. The communications of McKinnon and Gibson were expected to be intercepted as a result of the wiretap of Gibson’s cell phone. Further, the application indicated that narcotics trafficking by Smith, McKinnon, defendant Daniel Williams (“Williams”), and Gibson was being investigated. The following facts are set forth in Cernak’s affidavit. In April 2003, a confidential informant (“Cl # 1”) made a controlled purchase, observed by law enforcement personnel, of 54.9 grams of cocaine from one Richard Anderson (“Anderson”). Cl #1 paid $1,150 for the cocaine. Defendant Williams supplied cocaine to Anderson. After the transaction, law enforcement surveilled Williams to 429 Duane Avenue, Schenectady, New York. On May 30, 2003, a confidential informant (“Cl # 2”) called defendant Williams at 518-858-6057 (“Williams’ cell phone”) to arrange a purchase of $250 worth of cocaine. Cl #2 purchased 32.7 grams of cocaine at 429 Duane Avenue. A white Infinity registered to Williams was parked at this address while the transaction took place. On June 4, 2003, Cl #2 again called Williams on his cell phone to arrange to purchase cocaine for $250. Cl #2 purchased 33.7 grams of cocaine on this occasion. In September 2003 a confidential informant (“Cl #3”) was interviewed by law enforcement personnel. Cl #3 stated that in the late spring and early summer of 2003 he made many purchases of cocaine from a person he knew as “Kabar.” Cl # 3 would call Kabar at 518-378-5434 to arrange a purchase of cocaine. The transaction would take place at 202 Furman Street, Schenectady. Kabar told Cl #3 that his source was defendant McKinnon, who purchased his cocaine in kilogram quantities in New York City. Cl # 3 knew Kabar’s first name was Glenn, a vehicle registered to defendant Smith had been observed parked at 202 Furman Street, and Smith had been observed driving that car. New York State Department of Motor Vehicles records revealed that Smith resides at 202 Furman Street. Cl # 3 had plead guilty to state offenses relating to about 18 ounces of cocaine, and declined to cooperate further. On January 16, 2004, at 8:35 p.m. an individual was arrested in Schenectady in the possession of about 41 grams of cocaine. The individual admitted that he purchased the cocaine from defendant Gibson, and he had been obtaining cocaine from Gibson since late summer 2003. He would call Gibson’s cell phone when he wanted to make a purchase of cocaine. He paid $1,000 per ounce for the cocaine he purchased. Telephone records show that between December 26, 2003, and January 26, 2004, twenty-four calls took place between the arrested individual’s telephone and Gibson’s cell phone. One such call occurred at 6:56 p.m. on January 16, 2004 (about 1-1/2 hours prior to the individual’s arrest). Nextel business records indicate that defendant Gibson’s cell phone is listed to Noui Bouasay (“Bouasay-Gibson”), 152 Maple Avenue, Glenville, New York. Niagara Mohawk records show that it provides service to Noui Bouasay-Gibson at 152 Maple Avenue. A vehicle registered to Gibson was observed by law enforcement parked in the driveway at 152 Maple Avenue. On January 28, 2004, a confidential source told Cernak that defendants McKinnon and Gibson trafficked in kilogram quantities of cocaine. This source also stated that Gibson used his cell phone (518-229-6128) to conduct narcotics trafficking. Telephone pen registers and trap and trace information showed frequent contact amongst the telephones of defendants Gibson, McKinnon, Smith, Howard, and Williams. Between mid-December 2003 and mid-February 2004, the following calls were made, among others: 227 calls between 518-470-3799 (“Smith’s cell phone”) and two cellular telephones registered to Howard; 28 calls between Smith’s cell phone and Williams’ cell phone; 31 calls between 518-372-6983 (a telephone billed to 1010 Regent Street, McKinnon’s residence) and Williams’ cell phone; and 26 calls between the 1010 Regent Street telephone and Gibson’s cell phone. Between February 4, 2004, and March 18, 2004, 187 calls were made between Williams’ cell phone and two cellular telephones registered to Howard and 27 calls were made between Gibson’s cell phone and a number registered to Howard. Between December 15, 2003, and March 18, 2004, there were 214 calls between the McKinnon telephone at 1010 Regent Street and telephones billed to Howard at 516 Mumford Street. Additionally, physical surveillance by law enforcement established some locations and activities of the alleged conspirators. For example, law enforcement surv-eilled 1010 Regent Street, frequented by defendant McKinnon; 516 Mumford Street, frequented by McKinnon and defendant Howard; 202 Furman Street, frequented by defendant Smith; 454 Brandy-wine, frequented by defendant Williams; and 152 Maple Avenue, frequented by defendant Gibson. Agent Cernak noted that each of these locations with the exception of 152 Maple Avenue were residential, where a person sitting in a vehicle would be noticed. Maple Avenue is a high volume suburban street on which parking is not permitted. Further, the Regent Street, Mumford Street, and Brandywine locations were such that vehicles could pull into the driveway and out of view of any surveillance. Finally, Cernak stated that controlled purchases by informants had been surveilled by law enforcement. Agent Cernak opined that continued surveillance would be noticed, causing the targets of the investigation to be more cautious, to flee, to change their methods of operation including communications devices, and/or threaten the safety of informants. He also noted that continued surveillance would not establish the roles of the conspirators nor the scope of the alleged offenses. Agent Cernak went on to opine that grand jury testimony was unlikely to succeed, because the conspirators would be unlikely to cooperate and would invoke the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. Providing immunity for testimony would be unwise because it could foreclose prosecution of the most culpable people, and could not ensure truthful testimony. Finally, Cernak opined that service of grand jury subpoenas would alert the conspirators to the investigation. Agent Cernak next discussed the use of confidential informants and cooperating sources, opining that they would not yield evidence necessary to the investigation. These sources of information were on the fringe of the conspiracy, without direct contact to those mid— to high-level in the organization. Cl # 3 was to be incarcerated for many years and therefore would no longer be in a position to make controlled purchases of cocaine from defendant Smith. Cl # 1 and Cl # 2 stopped cooperating with law enforcement. Two other sources were incarcerated and declined to cooperate further. The source that told Cernak that defendants McKinnon and Gibson trafficked in kilogram quantities of cocaine and that Gibson used 518-229-6128 to conduct narcotics trafficking was willing to cooperate, but was unlikely to be able to infiltrate the organization. Agent Cernak stated that they had not been able to infiltrate the conspiracy with undercover officers. He opined that even if an undercover agent could infiltrate, it would not be in a position high enough in the organization to yield the evidence needed. Use of interviews of the subjects of the investigation or their associates also would be unlikely to successfully result in evidence necessary to the investigation. Cer-nak opined, based upon his extensive experience, that the response to attempts at such interviews could include untruths to divert the investigation; alert the conspirators to the investigation which would compromise the investigation because of possible destruction or concealment of documents and other evidence; and possible harm to cooperating sources. Agent Cernak stated that probable cause did not exist upon which a search warrant could be based. He noted that at this stage of the investigation, law enforcement did not know the location of the cocaine or of the monetary proceeds of the narcotics trafficking. Finally, Cernak outlined the useful information obtained by pen registers, telephone toll records, and telephone traps and traces. These investigatory methods verified frequent contact, but not the identity of the parties or the nature and substance of the conversations. Using these methods, law enforcement could not differentiate between legitimate calls and calls in furtherance of the criminal activity. Finally, these methods did not permit identification of the source of the controlled substances or establish proof that the conspiracy existed. Based upon the foregoing, Hon. Lawrence E. Kahn, United States District Judge, (“Judge Kahn”) found that there was probable cause to believe that particular wire communications of defendants Gibson, McKinnon, Williams, and others concerning cocaine distribution would be obtained through the interception of wire communications to and from Gibson’s cell phone, and that probable cause existed to believe that Gibson’s cell phone was used in the commission of narcotics trafficking offenses. Accordingly, he issued a warrant permitting eavesdropping of communications to and from Gibson’s cell phone. B. April 21, 2004, Eavesdropping Warrant: 518-528-1148 and 518-376-3946 On April 21, 2004, AUSA Kelly applied for a warrant authorizing continued interception of communications on defendant Gibson’s cell phone as well as interception of communications on cellular telephone 518-376-3946 (“Howard’s cell phone”) and cellular telephone 518-528-1148 (“McKin-non’s cell phone”). The warrant application was supported with the affidavit of Agent Cernak, and incorporated everything set forth in the March 19, 2004, warrant application. The communications of defendants McKinnon, Gibson, Williams, and Smith; and individuals Brian Last Name Unknown (“Brian”), Frank Dicipio (“Dicipio”), Jacob O’Donnell (“O’Donnell”), Bouasay-Gibson, and others were..expected to be intercepted as a result of the continued wiretap of Gibson’s cell phone and the wiretap of Howard’s and McKin-non’s cell phones. Further, the application indicated that narcotics trafficking by McKinnon, Gibson, Williams, Smith, Brian, Dicipio, O’Donnell, Bouasay-Gibson, and others was being investigated. Agent Cernak related some conversations intercepted pursuant to the March 19, 2004, wiretap warrant. He then expressed his opinion as to the meaning of the coded language used during some of the calls. For the sake of brevity, the coded language contained in the conversations is not set forth below. Rather, only Cernak’s opinion as to the actual meaning of the conversations is set forth. Further, although the times of each intercepted conversation are set forth by Cernak, only those times with apparent significance are set forth below. 1. McKinnon’s Cell Phone On March 19, 2004, defendant Gibson called defendant McKinnon. Gibson told McKinnon that he had obtained some marijuana, and McKinnon should stop by. On March 26, 2004, McKinnon called Gibson, asking if Gibson could stop by on his way to work. Agent Cernak opined that McKinnon wanted to increase the amount of cocaine he provided to Gibson for distribution: Gibson asked if he was talking about a whole kilogram. McKinnon responded that the amount was what they had previously discussed. On March 27, 2004, at 2:30 p.m., defendant Gibson called Dicipio, and the two agreed to meet later. At 2:10 p.m. and 3:09 p.m. Gibson left messages on defendant McKinnon’s cell phone, saying to call him. At 3:16 p.m. Gibson called McKinnon. In Cernak’s opinion, Dicipio ordered a quantity of cocaine from Gibson, then Gibson attempted to call McKinnon to arrange to pick up the cocaine. On March 30, 2004, an unidentified male called Gibson. Cernak opined that in this conversation, the male was attempting to obtain cocaine from Gibson. On April 2, 2004, Gibson called Brian. According to Cernak, Brian expressed his desire to purchase both cocaine and marijuana. Gibson replied that he only had one available. On April 4, 2004, McKinnon called Gibson. In Cernak’s opinion, the conversation centered around two searches of Derrick Miles (“Miles”) by the Drug Enforcement Administration during which marijuana was seized. Cernak stated that facts demonstrated that Miles was Gibson’s marijuana supplier. On April 5, 2004, Gibson called Dicipio. According to Cernak, Dicipio was ordering a quantity of cocaine, and told Gibson that he had the money. A pen register/trap and trace device on defendant McKinnon’s cell phone showed that at 1:13 p.m. on April 6, 2004, a call was placed from that phone to 518-878-1610 (“ — 1610”), another cellular telephone used by defendant Gibson. At 1:15 p.m. Gibson left his residence at 152 Maple Avenue. At 1:26 p.m. he arrived at 1010 Regent Street. At 1:48 p.m. Gibson exited the residence at 1010 Regent Street with a backpack. McKinnon’s vehicle was parked at 1010 Regent Street during the time Gibson was inside. At 2:57 p.m. a call was made from -1610 to McKinnon’s cell phone. Cernak opined that McKinnon called Gibson to arrange for Gibson to pick up cocaine. Gibson then went to McKin-non’s residence and picked up the cocaine. On April 6, 2004, at 11:57 a.m. Gibson called a male at 518-221-6128 (billed to Jacob O’Donnell). Cernak opined that the conversation was Gibson arranging distribution of the cocaine he was to receive from McKinnon. At about the same time Gibson called a male at 518-377-8049. Cernak opined that this conversation was also to arrange delivery of cocaine. On April 7, 2004, at 11:46 a.m. defendant Gibson called a male, probably O’Donnell. At about the same time Gibson left his residence at 152 Maple Avenue carrying a yellow plastic bag. While he was driving, he removed a backpack from the back seat. At about 12:05 a male exited a pickup truck and sat in Gibson’s vehicle. After a few minutes the male returned to his truck. Cernak opined that the telephone call was to arrange a purchase of cocaine, which law enforcement surveillance observed. On April 7, 2004, Bouasay-Gibson called Gibson on his cell phone. Cernak opined that they discussed Gibson having cocaine secreted in the basement of their residence. On April 8, Gibson called a male at 518-506-1693. According to Cernak, this conversation regarded arranging a sale of cocaine. On April 9, at 12:05 p.m. a call from - 1610 was placed to defendant McKinnon’s cell phone. According to a pen register, the call lasted 35 seconds. At 12:14 p.m. defendant Gibson was observed by law enforcement exiting 152 Maple Avenue with a green knapsack. He entered his vehicle and drove. He arrived at 25 James Street, Schenectady, at about 12:33 p.m. At 12:35 p.m. a male exited from 25 James Street and sat in Gibson’s vehicle. The male exited Gibson’s vehicle at 12:37 p.m. Gibson then drove to 516 Mumford and entered the residence. Earlier on April 8, 2004, McKinnon’s vehicle had been observed in the driveway at 516 Mumford. At 12:40 p.m. another call was placed from -1610 to McKinnon’s cell phone. This call lasted 16 seconds. ■' On April 9, 2004, a male called Gibson’s cell phone. Cernak opined that the male was telling Gibson that he had the money proceeds from cocaine previously distributed. Trap and trace equipment demonstrated that there was frequent contact between McKinnon’s cell phone, defendant Williams, and defendant Smith. From March 8, 2004, to April 19, 2004, fifty-two calls were made between Smith’s cell phone and McKinnon’s cell phone. From March 13, 2004, to April 19, 2004, forty-four calls were made between Williams’ cell phone and McKinnon’s cell phone. Nextel business records show that McKinnon’s cell phone is billed to defendant Howard at 516 Mumford Street, as is Howard’s cell phone. Both McKinnon’s and Howard’s cell phones are on the same account. 2. Howard’s Cell Phone A pen register and trap and trace device on defendant Smith’s cell phone showed 110 calls to or from defendant Howard’s cell phone between January 14, 2004 and April 19, 2004. A pen register and trap and trace device on defendant Williams’ cell phone registered 134 calls to or from Howard’s cell phone between February 6, 2004, and April 19, 2004. Agent Cernak related a series of telephone call interceptions obtained pursuant to an eavesdropping warrant issued by an Onondaga County Court Judge. He also related facts regarding vehicle interdictions following some of these telephone calls during which, pursuant to search warrants, large amounts of cocaine were recovered. Cernak opined that these facts demonstrate that two brothers (whose telephone was the subject of the County Court eavesdropping warrant) and defendant Julio Sierra (“Sierra”), also known as “P,” were cocaine traffickers. Cernak further related one conversation during which a male using the brothers’ telephone called defendant Howard’s cell phone asking for “PR’s number.” In a second call to Howard’s cell phone, the caller was given a telephone number. Later, the male called the number previously given and spoke to Sierra. Cernak opined that the male obtained Sierra’s number so that he could contact Sierra to make a purchase of cocaine. 3. Necessity — Alternative Investigative Techniques Agent Cernak outlined the alternative investigative techniques used, including physical surveillance of 1010 Regent Street, 516 Mumford Street (both frequented by McKinnon), Furman Street (frequented by Smith), 454 Brandywine Avenue (frequented by Williams), and 152 Maple Avenue (frequented by Gibson). Cernak pointed out that the physical surveillance included controlled purchases as set forth in his previous affidavit. Agent Cernak also cited problems and limitations with physical surveillance to the same extent as set forth above with regard to the March 19, 2004, warrant application. Similarly, he discussed the potential use and problems associated with the use of grand jury subpoenas, confidential informants, confidential sources, undercover agents, interviews, search warrants, and pen register and trap and trace devices. Finally, he set forth the prior electronic surveillance that has been authorized. Based upon the foregoing, Judge Kahn found that there was probable cause to believe that particular wire communications of defendants Gibson, Smith, McKin-non, and Williams; and individuals Brian, Dicipio, O’Donnell, Bouasay-Gibson, Miles, and others concerning cocaine distribution would be obtained through the interception of wire communications to and from Gibson’s, Howard’s, and McKinnon’s cell phones, and that probable cause existed to believe that these cellular telephones were used in the commission of narcotics trafficking offenses. Accordingly, he issued a warrant permitting eavesdropping of communications to and from Gibson’s, Howard’s, and McKinnon’s cell phones. C. May 20, 2004, Eavesdropping Warrant On May 20, 2004, AUSA Kelly applied for a warrant authorizing continued interception of communications on McKinnon’s and Howard’s cell phones as well as interception of communications on cellular telephone 646-260-8578 (“E & O’s ■ cell phone”), cellular telephones 646-852-5838 (“Castillo’s cell phone”), 619-789-3080 (“Sierra’s cell phone”), and 646-260-0942 (“Cruz’s cell phone”). The warrant application was supported with the affidavit of Agent Cernak dated May 20, 2004, and incorporated everything set forth in the March 19, 2004, and April 22, 2004, warrant applications. The communications of defendants Smith, McKinnon, Gibson, Williams, Howard, Roland Riggins (“Rig-gins”), William Pendelton (“Pendelton”), and Sierra; and individual Tim Knight (“Knight”) and others were expected to be intercepted ■ as a result of the continued wiretap of Howard’s and McKinnon’s cell phones and the wiretap of E & O’s, Castillo’s, Sierra’s, and Cruz’s cell phones. Further, the application indicated that narcotics trafficking by Smith, McKinnon, Gibson, Williams, Howard, Riggins, Pen-delton, Sierra, Knight, and others was being investigated. The following facts are set forth in Cer-nak’s affidavit. Cernak set forth some conversations intercepted pursuant to the April 21, 2004, eavesdropping warrant. Again, the coded language is not set forth (as it was in the affidavit). Rather, only Cernak’s opinion as to the meaning of a conversation is set forth. 1. McKinnon’s and Cruz’s Cell Phones On April 23, 2004, defendant McKinnon made a call from his cell phone to a male on defendant Cruz’s cell phone. Cernak opined that they were discussing a potential purchase of cocaine from the male, which McKinnon would make as soon as he had the money together. They also discussed that defendant Williams was McKinnon’s customer, but he gave Williams the man’s number so they could deal directly. Also on April 23, 2004, Williams used his cell phone to call McKinnon. Cernak opined that Williams told McKinnon about 3 kilograms of high quality cocaine he had obtained. He also opined that based upon information from a pen register and trap and trace on Williams’ cell phone during this time period that Williams had obtained the cocaine from the man using Cruz’s cell phone to whom McKinnon spoke. On April 24, 2004, McKinnon made a call to Cruz’s cell phone. According to Cer-nak, this conversation centered on arrangements to have a secret compartment put in McKinnon’s Toyota Camry, so that he could hide the contraband when he was transporting it from New York City to Schenectady. A male using Cruz’s cell phone called McKinnon on May 6, 2004. Cernak opined that the male was asking McKinnon when he was coming to New York to get cocaine. McKinnon responded that he did not want to travel to purchase it — that is why he gave Williams the man’s phone number so they could deal directly. They also discussed if McKinnon was going to bring his Camry to New York to have the concealed compartment installed. 2. Sierra’s and Howard’s Cell Phones On April 25, 2004, calls were made from defendant Howard using his cell phone to defendant Sierra’s cell phone at 12:41 p.m., 3:17 p.m., and 3:21 p.m. In Cernak’s opinion, Howard and the male using Sierra’s cell phone were arranging for Howard to travel from Schenectady to New York City to purchase cocaine. The male said he had four kilograms for sale. Howard inquired if the price per kilogram remained the same as the last transaction. The male replied that he was trying to get a price break. Howard noted that if the quality was not good, he would not make the purchase. The male stated that the price was $24,500 per kilogram. On May 7, 2004, at 7:41 p.m. Howard again called Sierra. At 7:44 p.m. Sierra called Howard. Cernak opined that Howard was complaining that the kilograms of cocaine he had obtained from Sierra weighed less than 1000 grams; one kilogram weighed 43 grams less than 1000 grams. A pen register and trap and trace device on Sierra’s cell phone registered several calls between that cell phone and 518-986-0425, used by an unidentified male. Cer-nak interpreted these calls as making arrangements for the male to come to New York City to meet Sierra at his block to purchase cocaine. 3. Howard’s and Castillo’s Cell Phones On April 24, 2004, defendant Howard used his cell phone to call defendant Castillo’s cell phone. Cernak opined that a message was left asking about the availability of cocaine. On May 4, 2004, Howard used his cell phone to call Castillo’s cell phone. During that call, according to Cernak, Howard arranged travel from Schenectady to New York City to purchase cocaine. The male told Howard that he was giving him a good price because of past problems. On May 6, 2004, a male used Castillo’s cell phone to call Howard on his cell phone. According to Cernak, the male was asking Howard to meet him at a shopping complex north of New York City, and to bring the money for cocaine previously delivered to Howard. Howard replied that he was waiting for the money from Smith. On May 13, 2004, defendant Williams used his cell phone to call Howard. Cer-nak opined that the conversation was about defendant Riggins discarding 600 grams of cocaine he had received from McKinnon. They also discussed attempting to get information from inside the Schenectady police department so they could find out what the police knew about their conspiracy. About an hour later on May 13, 2004, the male who ordinarily used Castillo’s cell phone used 973-482-3077 to call Howard. Cernak opined that Howard related that he needed to see him to get cocaine, but first he had to correct a problem with his driver’s license before driving with cocaine in the car. Howard stated that he wanted to buy a car, and the male said that the concealed compartment in which contraband could be hidden was still being built into the car. A pen register and trap and trace device on Howard’s cell phone registered 87 calls between that phone and Castillo’s cell phone between April 30, 2004, and May 8, 2004. A similar device on McKinnon’s cell phone registered 14 calls to or from Castillo’s phone between April 3, 2004, and March 2, 2004. On May 11, 2004, a similar device registered two calls between Castillo’s cell phone and 518-221-4825, which was billed to Knight, 162 Putnam Road, Schenectady. Law enforcement spoke to an informant who had purchased cocaine from someone who had purchased it from Knight. 4. McKinnon’s and E & O’s Cell Phones On April 28, 2004, at 1:50 p.m. a male using E & O’s cell phone called defendant McKinnon’s cell phone. A conversation ensued during which it was established that McKinnon was at 1010 Regent Street. Thereafter, law enforcement observed two males arrive at 1010 Regent Street, park in the back, and open the trunk. At 3:25 p.m. two males used E & O’s cell phone to call McKinnon’s cell phone. The two males told McKinnon that they had detected police surveillance of their earlier meeting with him. Cernak opined that at the meeting the two males delivered cocaine to McKinnon. At 7:53 that evening, McKinnon used his cell phone to call defendant Williams on his cell phone. They had a discussion and then McKinnon told Williams about the police surveillance at 1010 Regent Street earlier that day. According to Cernak, the discussion centered on the asking price for cocaine. McKinnon asked Williams if he still got cocaine for $25,000 per kilogram. McKinnon said that his brother (Howard) gets cocaine for $24,800 per kilogram. On May 6, 2004, a male using E & O’s cell phone called McKinnon. Cernak opined that McKinnon was telling the male that the cocaine defendants Pendelton and Smith had was not of the same quality as what he had received. The male acknowledged the difference. McKinnon asked if they got poorer quality because they purchased a smaller amount. The male said no, that he thought Pendelton lost some weight when he made crack from the powder cocaine. On May 5, 2004, at 4:32 p.m. defendant McKinnon used his cell phone to call defendant Riggins at 518-378-5188. They had a discussion. At 4:49 p.m. McKinnon called Riggins again, saying he was “up top” (that is, at 1010 Regent Street). Law enforcement surveillance observed a 1997 Oldsmobile Bravada arrive at 1008 Regent Street at 5:14 p.m. At 5:32 p.m. a brown van parked in the driveway of 1010 Regent Street. A male exited the vehicle and entered 1010 Regent Street. At 5:35 p.m. McKinnon and another male arrived in a Jeep and they also entered the building. At 5:40 p.m. the driver of the Bravada exited the vehicle and went into 1010 Regent Street. He was not carrying anything. At 5:46 p.m. the driver of the Bra-vada exited 1010 Regent Street carrying a white plastic bag, which he put on the passenger side in his vehicle. The driver then went back to the porch at 1010 Regent Street and conversed with McKinnon. At 5:56 p.m. the driver and McKinnon entered the Bravada. At 5:59 p.m. McKin-non exited the Bravada. Shortly thereafter the Bravada left. Surveillance was not continued. Department of Motor Vehicles business records indicate that the Bravada was registered to Riggins, 829 Salina Street, Schenectady. At 6:25 p.m. McKinnon used his cell phone to call Riggins. Cernak opined that a cocaine transaction occurred between the driver of the Bravada and McKinnon. McKinnon called Riggins later to ask him to check the weight that he had received, because there may have been a mistake. On May 6, 2004, at 10:42 a.m. McKinnon used his cell phone to call Riggins. According to Cernak, Riggins related to McKinnon that the cocaine he received weighed less than it was supposed to weigh, using “five percenter” language code for the numbers. On May 10, 2004, McKinnon called Rig-gins. Cernak opined that Riggins told McKinnon that he wanted to purchase one kilogram of cocaine. McKinnon replied that the price would be $26,000 if he could wait, but if he had to obtain it now it would cost $27,000. On May 12, 2004, at 2:25 p.m. McKinnon again called Riggins, telling him to come to Mumford Street. Law enforcement surveillance observed Riggins exiting 146 Mumford Street at 4:05 p.m. carrying a bag. Riggins drove away in the Bravada, followed by law enforcement. A uniformed member of the Schenectady police department stopped the Bravada. However, Riggins fled in the vehicle and threw the bag out the window. The bag, containing 600 grams of powder and crack cocaine, was recovered by law enforcement personnel. Riggins eventually crashed the Bra-vada. Cernak noted that intercepted conversations reveal that the co-conspirators do not know that the bag of cocaine was recovered. On May 8, 2004, defendant Pendelton called defendant McKinnon’s cell phone. Cernak opined that they were discussing the contact they had with the users of E & O’s cell phone, and the fact that Pendelton lost weight when he turned powder cocaine into crack. McKinnon asked Pendelton if he was satisfied with the cocaine he received from McKinnon the night before. A pen register and trap and trace device on defendant Smith’s cell phone registered 160 calls to or from E & O’s cell phone between December 14, 2003 and May 8, 2004. 5. Necessity — Alternative Investigative Techniques Agent Cernak again outlined the physical surveillance at Regent Street, Mumford Street, Furman Street, Brandywine, and Maple Avenue, as well as during controlled purchases, and the limitations of physical surveillance. He further discussed grand jury subpoenas, confidential informants, confidential sources, undercover infiltration, interviews, search warrants, and pen register and trap and trace devices. He discussed details about the use and limited success of these traditional investigative techniques and reasons why their future use would not be successful in meeting the goals of the investigation, essentially the same as set forth in the March 19, 2004, eavesdropping warrant application. Based upon the foregoing, on May 20, 2004, Hon. Gary L. Sharpe, United States District Judge (“Judge Sharpe”), found that there was probable cause to believe that particular wire communications of defendants Smith, McKinnon, Gibson, Williams, Howard, Riggins, Pendelton, and Sierra; and individual Knight and others concerning cocaine distribution would be obtained through the interception of wire communications to and from Howard’s, McKinnon’s, E & O’s, Castillo’s, Sierra’s, and Cruz’s cell phones, and that probable cause existed to believe that these cellular telephones were used in the commission of narcotics trafficking offenses. Accordingly, he issued a warrant permitting eavesdropping of communications to and from Howard’s, McKinnon’s, E & O’s, Castillo’s, Sierra’s, and Cruz’s cell phones. D. June 1, 2004 Search Warrant On June 1, 2004, Agent Cernak applied for and obtained warrants to search 1010 Regent Street (McKinnon’s residence); 516 Mumford Street; 514 Paige Street (Howard’s residence); 56A West Street, Ballston Spa, New York (Pendelton’s residence); 201 Jackson Avenue, Schenectady (Smith’s residence); and a grey Ford Taurus N.Y. CPH 6666. He also applied for and obtained warrants to search the persons of Howard, McKinnon, Smith, and Pendelton. E. May 20, 2004 Vehicle Stop of Howard and Restifo On May 20, 2004, a New York State Police investigator observed defendant Howard obtain a knapsack-style bag from a Lexus SUV in the parking log of a large shopping center north of New York City and place it into the trunk of his Acura automobile. Thereafter, defendant Resti-fo, who was driving, and Howard were on the New York State Thruway. An officer pulled over the Acura. The officer told Howard and Restifo that an elderly woman had phoned the police stating that her car had been run off the road by a vehicle described as the Acura. The officer then took Howard and Restifo to the police station ostensibly so that the woman could make a positive identification. They left their locked car where it was. Meanwhile, the New York State police searched the Acura (without a search warrant) and discovered the bag in the trunk. The bag contained 1300 grams of cocaine and $20,100. The purported woman who made the complaint never showed up at the police station, and the police returned Howard and Restifo to their car. No traffic tickets were issued. III. STANDARDS The following standards are applicable to more than one defendant. Where a standard applies to only one defendant, it is set forth in the section regarding that defendant’s motion. A. Eavesdropping Warrants The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, as amended, governs the interception of wire, oral, and electronic communication. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-22. Certain designated federal officials are authorized to apply to a Federal judge for an eavesdropping warrant. Id. § 2516(1). Such an order may be granted in conformity with Section 2518, which sets forth the procedure for the interception of wire, oral, and electronic communication. Id. The principal prosecuting attorney of any State or political subdivision of a State, if authorized by State Statute to apply to a State court judge of competent jurisdiction for an eavesdropping warrant, may apply to a State judge for such a warrant, which may be granted in conformity with Section 2518. Id. § 2516(2). The identity of the investigator making the application and the officer authorizing the application must be set forth. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(l)(a) (2000). A full and complete statement of the facts and circumstances upon which the applicant based the justification for such an order is required. Id. § 2518(l)(b). The statement must include details about the offense, a particular description of where the interception is to be made, a particular description of the type of communications to be intercepted, and the identity of the person committing the offense and whose communications will be intercepted. Id. § 2518(l)(b)(i)-(iii). In addition to the factual basis justifying the warrant, the application must include “a full and complete statement as. to whether or not other investigative procedures have been tried and failed or. why they reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous.” Id. § 2518(l)(c). The time period for which the interception must be maintained and information regarding all previous applications involving the same persons, facilities, or places must be included. Id. § 2518(l)(d)-(e). An application for an extension of a previous order must include the results so far obtained or a reasonable explanation for why such results have not been obtained. Id. § 2518(l)(f). The court may require additional material or testimony. Id. § 2518(2). The court may issue an ex parte eavesdropping warrant upon a finding that there is probable cause to believe a person is committing, has committed, or is about to commit an enumerated offense; there is probable cause to believe that particular communications regarding that offense will be intercepted; “normal investigative procedures have been tried and have failed or reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous;” and there is probable cause to believe that the facilities or place where the interception will occur “are being used, or are about to be used in connection with the commission of such offense, or are leased to, listed in the name of, or commonly used by such person.” Id. § 2518(3). Probable cause with regard to a wiretap warrant is determined by the same standard as that regarding a regular search warranty-totality of. the circumstances. United States v. Diaz, 176 F.3d 52, 110 (2d Cir.1999); see United States v. Rowell, 903 F.2d 899, 901 (2d Cir.1990) (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230-32, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2328, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983)). The totality of the circumstances standard applies even where “the underlying investigation leading to prosecution was conducted solely by state officials.” Rowell, 903 F.2d at 902; United States v. Pforzheimer, 826 F.2d 200, 204 (2d Cir.1987). The order must set forth the identity of the person whose, communications will be intercepted if it is known; the nature and location of the facility or place where the interception will occur; a “particular description of the type of communication sought'to be intercepted, and a statement of the particular offense to which it relates;” the agency authorized to perform the interception and the person who authorized the application; and the time period during which such interceptions are authorized. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(4). An order may not authorize interceptions for longer than is necessary to achieve the objective, and in any event no longer than thirty days. Id. § 2518(5). Progress reports may be required by the court. Id. § 2518(6). An aggrieved person may move to suppress the contents of any intercepted oral or wire communication, along with the fruits of such interception. Id. § 2518(10)(a). An “aggrieved person” is “a person who was a party to any intercepted wire, oral, or electronic communication or a person against whom the interception was directed.” 18 U.S.C. § 2510(11). A motion to suppress may be based upon the grounds that “(i) the communication was unlawfully intercepted; (ii) the order of authorization or approval under which it was intercepted is insufficient on its face; or (iii) the interception was not made in conformity with the order of authorization or approval.” Id. These are the only nonconstitutional bases on which such evidence may be suppressed. Id. § 2518(10)(c). B.Probable Cause As noted above, the same probable cause standard applies to both a wiretap warrant and a regular search warrant. Diaz, 176 F.3d at 110. Probable cause exists where “the ‘totality-of-the-eireum-stances’ indicate a probability of criminal activity.” Id. (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. at 230-32, 103 S.Ct. at 2328); Rowell, 903 F.2d at 902. The determination of probable cause turns on “the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts,” as it is a “fluid concept ... not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.” Rowell, 903 F.2d at 902. The issuing judge must “make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the ‘veracity’ and ‘basis of knowledge’ of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. at 238, 103 S.Ct. at 2332. If the issuing judge had a “ ‘substantial basis for ... concluding]’ that a search would uncover evidence of wrongdoing” then the probable cause determination comports with the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 236, 103 S.Ct. at 2331 (quoting Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 271, 80 S.Ct. 725, 736, 4 L.Ed.2d 697 (I960)). On review, it is necessary only to insure that the issuing judge had a substantial basis for finding probable cause. Id. at 238-39, 103 S.Ct. at 2332. C. Severance “[Severance, pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 14, should only be granted if there is a serious risk that a joint trial would either compromise a specific trial right of one of the defendants or prevent the jury from making a reliable judgment about guilt or innocence,” if the defendants were properly joined pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 8. United States v. Walker, 142 F.3d 103, 110 (2d Cir.1998). “A defendant seeking severance must show that the prejudice to him from joinder is sufficiently severe to outweigh the judicial economy that would be realized by avoiding multiple lengthy trials.” Id. D. Dismissal of the Indictment and Inspection of Grand Jury Minutes An indictment is valid on its face where it sufficiently “traek[s] the language of the statute and state[s] the time and place (in approximate terms) of the alleged crime.” United States v. Pirro, 212 F.3d 86, 92 (2d Cir.2000). “[A] defendant who objects to the indictment before trial, is entitled to a more exacting review of the indictment than one who waits until after trial to object.” Id. An invalid indictment must be dismissed. See id. at 94. Because “[gjrand jury proceedings carry a presumption of regularity,” review of the grand jury minutes is “rarely permitted without specific factual allegations of government misconduct.” United States v. Torres, 901 F.2d 205, 232-33 (2d Cir.1990). “Without specific, credible reasons to doubt the integrity of the prosecutor’s conduct, the Court will not permit [defendant to review the grand jury minutes, nor take it upon itself to do so.” United States v. Bocio, 103 F.Supp.2d 531, 533 (N.D.N.Y. 2000), aff'd, 8 Fed.Appx. 85 (2d Cir.2001). IV. DISCUSSION A. Defendant John E. Howard, III 1. Warrantless Vehicle Search Howard first moves to suppress the cocaine found in the bag in the trunk of his Acura automobile on May 20, 2004. He contends that the warrantless search of his automobile, without his consent, violated the Fourth Amendment. The Government does not argue that, although there was no search warrant, the search was permissible because the officers had probable cause to believe that it contained contraband. “ ‘Under the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement, police may conduct a warrant-less search of a readily mobile motor vehicle if probable cause exists to believe the vehicle contains contraband or other evidence of a crime.’ ” United States v. Gagnon, 373 F.3d 230, 235 (2d Cir.2004) (internal quotations omitted). Moreover, where such probable cause exists, containers and packages within the vehicle may be searched. Id. Thus, the question becomes whether probable cause existed for the officers to search the Acura. The Government does not set forth facts to support a finding of probable cause. Rather, it asserts that a hearing is required to determine the issue. Accordingly, an evidentiary hearing will be held to determine if probable cause existed to search the Acura. Decision on Howard’s motion to suppress is therefore reserved pending the evidentiary hearing. 2. Evidence Obtained through Eavesdropping Second, Howard moves to suppress the evidence obtained through interceptions of communications that were authorized by the three wiretap warrants. He contends that he has standing as an “aggrieved person” to challenge all three warrants. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10)(a). The Government argues that Howard has standing to contest only the conversations intercepted over the Howard, Castillo, and Sierra cell phones. a. Standing Interceptions of conversations pursuant to the March 19, 2004, warrant regarding Gibson’s cell phone were not directed toward Howard. Further Howard was not a party to any of the intercepted communications obtained pursuant to the March 19, 2004, warrant. Accordingly, he lacks standing to move to suppress with regard to the March 19, 2004, warrant. The April 21, 2004, and May 20, 2004, warrants were directed, in part, toward Howard. Accordingly, he has standing to bring a motion to suppress with regard to those warrants. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10)(a). b. Probable Cause Howard next argues that the warrant applications failed to set forth facts sufficient to establish probable cause. In support of the April 21, 2004, warrant, the Cernak affidavit set forth multiple conversations among the alleged conspirators indicating that a narcotics trafficking operation was ongoing. Three controlled purchases of cocaine were made in April, May, and June, 2003. During the first defendant Williams provided the cocaine to the seller, who sold it to a confidential informant. The second and third involved calling Williams’ cell phone to arrange the purchase, and later observing the purchase. A confidential informant stated that his supplier (defendant Smith) of cocaine was supplied by defendant McKinnon. The hearsay reliability was bolstered by the fact that the transactions took place at 202 Furman Street, where Smith resides. Smith told the informant that his supplier, McKinnon, obtained kilogram quantities of cocaine in New York City. Another individual, in possession of 41 grams of cocaine, stated that he obtained the cocaine from defendant Gibson, and had made multiple purchases from Gibson by calling Gibson’s cell phone to arrange the transaction. Telephone records established that twenty-four calls between the individual’s cell phone and Gibson’s cell phone were made between December 26, 2003, and January 26, 2004, including one about 1-1/2 hours prior to the individual’s arrest. Other sources also told law enforcement officials that McKinnon and Gibson trafficked in kilograms quantities of cocaine and that Gibson used his cell phone to conduct narcotics trafficking. Pen register and trap and trace devices showed an unusually high frequency of calls among the telephones of defendants Gibson, McKin-non, Smith, Howard, and Williams. For example 227 calls in two months were made between Smith’s cell phone and two cellular telephones registered and billed to Howard. During an approximately six-week period 187 calls were made between Williams’ cell phone and the two telephones registered to Howard, and 27 calls between Gibson’s cell phone and a number registered to Howard. Further, 214 calls in three months were made between McKinnon’s telephone and telephones billed to Howard at 516 Mumford Street. Physical surveillance established, inter alia, that both McKinnon and Howard frequented 516 Mumford Street. Sufficient facts were presented in the application for the April 21, 2004, eavesdropping warrant to provide Judge Kahn with a substantial basis for finding that probable cause existed that the targets of the warrant, defendants McKinnon, Gibson, Williams, and Smith; and individuals Brian, Dicipio, O’Donnell, and Bouasay-Gibson were participating in narcotics trafficking activity. With regard to the May 20, 2004, warrant application, again multiple conversations were set forth indicating illegal drug transactions were being carried out. Specifically with regard to Howard, On April 24, 2004, Howard called defendant Castillo asking about the availability of cocaine. On April 25, 2004, Howard made calls to defendant Sierra to arrange a purchase of kilogram quantities of cocaine in New York City. On May 4, 2004, Howard spoke to Castillo and arranged to travel from Schenectady to New York City to purchase cocaine. On May 6, 2004, Howard again spoke to Castillo, arranging to meet at a shopping complex north of New York City. During this conversation, Howard was told to bring the money for cocaine previously delivered to him. Howard replied that he was waiting for the money from Smith. On May 7, 2004, Howard spoke with Sierra complaining that the kilograms of cocaine he had purchased weighed less than 1000 grams. On May 13, 2004, Howard spoke with defendant Williams about defendant Riggins discarding 600 grams of cocaine he had obtained from McKinnon. They also talked about how to obtain inside information about the Schenectady Police Department. On the same day, Howard received a call during which he indicated that he wanted to purchase cocaine, but first he had to correct a problem with his drivers license. They discussed Howard purchasing a car with a concealed compartment built into it. Further, a pen register and trap and trace device on Howard’s cell phone showed 87 calls between his phone and Castillo’s cell phone in an eight-day period. Again, sufficient facts were presented in the application for the May 20, 2004, eavesdropping warrant to provide Judge Sharpe with a substantial basis for finding that probable cause existed that the targets of the warrant, defendants McKinnon, Gibson, Williams, and Smith; and individuals Brian, Dicipio, O’Donnell, and Boua-say-Gibson, were participating in narcotics trafficking activity. c. Traditional Investigative Techniques Howard’s next argument is that the affidavits in support of the warrants were insufficient as to alternative investigative techniques. An eavesdropping warrant application must include “a full and complete statement as to whether or not other investigative procedures have been tried and failed or why they reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous.” 18 U.S.C. § 2518(l)(c). Both warrant applications at issue set forth the traditional investigative techniques used and explanations of why they were of limited success or would be unlikely to successfully achieve the goals of the investigation. Detailed analyses of pen register and trap and trace devices were presented. The limitations of those devices were noted. For example, the callers could not be identified and the substance of the conversation could not be determined. Law enforcement officers also used physical surveillance of Regent Street, Mumford Street, Furman Street, Brandy-wine Avenue, and Maple Avenue. However, physical surveillance was of limited usefulness because of the location of the places frequented by the alleged conspirators, the possibility of detection, and the deleterious effects detection would have on the investigation. Further, physical surveillance could not reveal the roles of the conspirators, the scope of the alleged offenses, or the location of contraband and proceeds. Three confidential informants had been used, two of whom made controlled purchases of cocaine. These informants were disinclined to cooperate further. Attempts were made to obtain information from confidential sources, with limited success. Further use of confidential informants and sources was possible, but unlikely to be successful to the goals of the investigation because one would not be able to penetrate beyond outskirts of the conspiracy. Also set forth were the difficulties of using grand jury testimony and interviews of the subjects of the investigation or their associates. A sufficient showing was made of the traditional techniques of investigation that had been used and the results obtained, as well as an explanation of why alternative investigative techniques would not have been successful if tried. This statutory requirement was fulfilled with regard to all of the warrant applications. 3. Severance Howard moves for severance under Bru-ton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968), due to an incriminating statement of co-defendant Pendelton. In light of Pendelton’s change of plea to guilty, severance under Bruton is moot. B. Defendant Redmond Andre McKinnon 1. Dismissal of the Indictment McKinnon first moves to dismiss the indictment arguing that insufficient facts are set forth to form the basis of a conspiracy charge against him, specifically that there is no factual showing of a conspiratorial agreement between him and the other alleged conspirators. He also contends that insufficient facts appear in the indictment from which he can determine the role he allegedly played in the conspiracy. A defendant “ ‘who deals in large quantities of narcotics may be presumed to know that he is a part of a venture which extends beyond his individual participation.’ ” United States v. Valencia, 226 F.Supp.2d 503, 510 (S.D.N.Y.2002), aff'd, 100 Fed.Appx. 17 (2d Cir.2004) (quoting United States v. Murray, 618 F.2d 892, 901 (2d Cir.1980) (internal quotation omitted)). Further, “a defendant can be guilty of conspiracy without knowing the identities of the co-conspirators.” Id. The superseding indictment alleges that the conspirators obtained large quantities of cocaine in New York City and had them transported to Schenectady and Ballston Spa in “bulk quantity.” (Super. Indictment ¶ 1.) It also alleges that the conspirators broke down the drugs into smaller quantities for redistribution. Id. ¶ 2. Because of the alleged large quantities of narcotics alleged, McKinnon may be presumed to know that the drug distribution network of which he was a part extended beyond himself. See Valencia, 226 F.Supp.2d at 510. Moreover, even if the superseding indictment did not name his alleged co-conspirators it would provide sufficient notice of the conspiracy. See id. Thus, the superseding indictment sufficiently alleges a conspiratorial agreement as well as notice of McKinnon’s alleged role. 2. Eavesdropping Warrant a. Standing McKinnon moves to suppress the fruits of all three eavesdropping warrants. The Government argues that he has standing only to contest the conversations intercepted over the Gibson, McKinnon, Howard, E & O, and Cruz cell phones. As the Government concedes, McKinnon has standing to challenge the March 19, 2004, eavesdropping warrant, as he was a party to calls intercepted on Gibson’s cell phone. With regard to the April 22, 2004, and May 20, 2004, eavesdropping warrants, clearly McKinnon was a party to communications intercepted pursuant to those warrants. Therefore, McKinnon has standing to challenge the issuance of ah three eavesdropping warrants. b. Traditional Investigative Methods McKinnon contends that the warrant applications fail to adequately show that eavesdropping was necessary due to the failure or futility of traditional investigative methods. He argues that traditional techniques used, including physical surveillance, confidential informants and cooperating sources, and controlled purchases of narcotics, had proven successful and would have been if continued. He further argues that the applications make the conclusory assertion that only with wiretapping would the goals of the investigation be achievable. In the March 19, 2004, warrant application, Agent Cernak set forth detailed information about the use of three confidential informants and controlled purchases made by them. He also noted that these informants declined to cooperate further with law enforcement. Other sources of information also were discussed, including two sources who stated that