Full opinion text
TSOUCALAS, Judge: Defendants-appellants Nelson Luis Millet, Manuel E. Roman, Richard Morales, Hector Luis Rios, Maria Vidro, Johnny Zapata, Robert Burgos, Francisco Soto (“F.Soto”), Alexis Antuna, Luis Noel Cruz, Edgar Rodriguez (“E.Rodriguez”), Edward Calderon and Gilberto Rivera (“G.Rivera”), appeal from judgments entered, following jury trials or plea agreements, in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut (Alan H. Nevas, Judge), convicting and sentencing them for crimes in connection with their participation in a racketeering enterprise engaged in the distribution of narcotics. Nine defendants-appellants, excluding Burgos, Calderon, G. Rivera and E. Rodriguez, were convicted under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1988), for conducting the affairs of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity, and under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (1988) for racketeering conspiracy. Most defendants-appellants were convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(l)-(3), (6), (6) (1988) for aiding and abetting, conspiring to commit or committing murders or other violent crimes in aid of racketeering (“VICAR”): Antuna (three counts), Burgos (one count), Cruz (three counts), Morales (eight counts), Rios (one count), Roman (four counts), F. Soto (four counts), Vidro (six counts) and Zapata (six counts). All defendants-appellants except for Burgos were convicted under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846 (1988) for conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute heroin, marijuana, cocaine and cocaine base, and Morales was convicted under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A) (1988) for one count of possession with intent to distribute 50 or more grams of cocaine base. In addition, Burgos was convicted under 21 U.S.C. § 843(b) (1988) for one count of using a telephone in facilitating a drug transaction, Calderon was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 922(n) (1988) for one count of receiving a firearm while under a felony indictment, and Roman was convicted under 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2) (1988) for one count of firearm possession by a felon. The district court sentenced defendants-appellants to the following terms of imprisonment: Millet to one life term, plus two 20-year terms to be served concurrently with his life term, all to be served consecutively to a sentence imposed by the State of Connecticut; Roman to three life terms, plus five 10-year terms to be served concurrently with his life terms; Morales to six life terms, plus four 10-year terms and two 3-year terms, all to be served concurrently with his life terms; Rios to three life terms, plus one 20-year term to be served concurrently with his life terms; Vidro to seven life terms, plus two 10-year terms to be served concurrently with her life terms; Zapata to seven life terms, plus two 10-year terms to be served concurrently with his life terms; Burgos to one 20-year term, plus one 4-year term to be served consecutively to his 20-year term, and both to be served consecutively to a sentence imposed by the State of Connecticut and to be followed by a 3-year period of supervisory release; F. Soto to two 35-year terms, plus four 20-year terms and one 10-year term, all to be served concurrently with his two 35-year terms, to be followed by several periods of supervisory release totaling five years; Antuna to four life terms, plus one 10-year term and one 20-year term, both to be served concurrently with his life terms; Cruz to four life terms, plus one 10-year term and one 20-year term, both to be served concurrently with his life terms; E. Rodriguez to one 30-year term to be followed by a 5-year period of supervisory release; Calderon to one 78-month term, plus one 20-month term to run consecutively to his 78-month term, to be followed by two periods of supervisory release totaling five years; and G. Rivera to one 292-month term to be followed by a 5-year period of supervisory release. The district court imposed on each defendant-appellant a $50 special assessment for each count of conviction as required under 18 U.S.C. § 3013(a)(2)(A) (1988). The claims on appeal are fully outlined in the discussion that follows. For the reasons set forth therein, we affirm the judgments of the district court. BACKGROUND The present appeals arise out of the prosecution of the thirteen defendants-appellants and others for their participation in the activities of a street gang known as the “Latin Kings,” whose primary business was the distribution of narcotics by means of a racketeering enterprise conducted through a campaign of violent enforcement and retribution. At their respective trials, the government presented voluminous evidence that included, inter alia, testimony of cooperating Latin King members and officers, testimony of law enforcement officers, firearms and drugs recovered from search warrant seizures and undercover purchases, tape recorded calls between imprisoned Latin King leader Millet and Latin King officers in Connecticut, a tape recorded call between Rios and another imprisoned Latin King officer, wiretapped conversations between Latin King members and officers in Bridgeport and New Haven, Connecticut, and physical evidence corroborating testimony of violent acts in furtherance of the gang’s drug trafficking activities. Taken in the light most favorable to the government, the government’s evidence revealed the following facts. 1. Gang Formation, Structure and Operations The Latin Kings started out as a social organization for the advancement of the Hispanic community in the Chicago area in the 1940s. The organization spread nationally, and by the 1970s it came to be dominated by individuals engaged in criminal activity, in particular, narcotics trafficking. The Latin Kings involved in this appeal began in Connecticut in the late 1980s as a prison gang formed by Millet and Pedro Millan, who were both inmates at a Connecticut state prison. Millet and Millan drafted a charter and bylaws for the “Almighty Latin King Nation” based on principles taken from the national Latin King charter. Although Millet and Millan were moved to a federal prison in Lompoc, California, they continued to preside over the affairs of the enterprise that grew to include prison and city chapters throughout the state. In 1992, Millet began to distrust Millan and decided to form a faction of the Latin Kings in Connecticut, which he renamed the “Almighty Latin Charter Nation” (“Latin Kings”). Millet controlled the organization from his California prison by mail correspondence and telephone calls with important Latin King leaders in Connecticut. The Connecticut Board of Directors of the organization, known as the “Supreme Crown,” had authority over all Latin Kings within the state. Millet was the Supreme Crown President of the Latin Kings, the position of highest authority in the gang. Roman was Chairman of the Board, Morales served as Director of Security and Beatrice Codianni served as Director of Programs and Goals. The Latin Kings divided Connecticut into five regions. Each region was controlled by a Regional Commander. The Regional Commanders controlled each of the chapters within their region and answered to the Supreme Crown. Rios served as one of the Regional Commanders. Within each region, the Latin Kings had formed chapters in each city or town. Each chapter was controlled by a “Corona,” which consisted of officers such as a President, Vice President, Chief Enforcer and Chief of Philosophy. The chapter President and other chapter officers controlled the Latin King members within their respective chapter and answered to the Regional Commander and the Supreme Crown. Vidro, F. Soto and Zapata served as officers of the Latin King chapter in New Haven. Burgos and Calderon served as officers of the Latin King chapter in Bridgeport. Because of their Supreme Crown positions, Roman and Morales played leading roles in the activities of the Latin King chapter in Bridgeport where they resided. Members of the Latin Kings, often referred to as soldiers, were utilized by gang leaders to distribute and sell narcotics at Latin King drug blocks. In addition, soldiers were on occasion ordered by the Supreme Crown or their respective Coro1 na to conduct violent missions for the gang. The primary objectives of such missions were to physically assault, shoot or kill those who disrespected the Latin Kings, informed on its members or threatened its drug operations. Antuna and Cruz were Latin King soldiers in Bridgeport. II. The Prosecution On December 8, 1994, a federal grand jury sitting in New Haven returned a superseding indictment against thirty-three defendants alleged to be officers, members or associates of the Latin Kings, charging them with numerous offenses, including racketeering, racketeering conspiracy, VICAR and drug conspiracy. On April 7, 1995, the district court severed the trial of those defendants charged only with the drug conspiracy count (the “non-RICO defendants”) from the trial of the following twelve defendants (the “RICO defendants”) charged with RICO and RICO conspiracy in the superseding indictment: Millet, Roman, Morales, Rios, Vidro, Zapata, Burgos, Codianni, F. Soto, Antonio Rivera, Jr. (“A. Rivera”), Antuna and Cruz. These twelve RICO defendants were to be tried (“Millet Trial”) prior to the non-RICO defendants. On May 3, 1995, the grand jury returned a thirty-count, second superseding indictment charging the RICO defendants and others with various offenses, including the offenses enumerated above. A day later, RICO defendant A. Rivera pleaded guilty to the racketeering charge. Jury selection for the RICO defendants began on June 26, 1995. Shortly thereafter, Codianni pleaded guilty to the racketeering charge, leaving ten RICO defendants for the trial that began on July 5, 1995. After seven full days of trial, Bur-gos entered a plea of guilty on July 18, 1995, to a two count information, charging him with VICAR and with the use of a telephone to facilitate a drug transaction. On September 29, 1995, the jury returned guilty verdicts on all counts for the remaining nine RICO defendants, with the exception of Millet, who was acquitted on one VICAR count of assault with a dangerous weapon and on one predicate act of racketeering of the RICO count for conspiracy to murder. Following the trial and conviction of the RICO defendants, the court scheduled trials for the twenty-one non-RICO defendants, including defendants-appellants E. Rodriguez, Calderon and G. Rivera. On March 5, 1996, Calderon pleaded guilty to the second superseding indictment charging him with participating in the drug conspiracy and a one count information charging him with receiving a firearm while under indictment for a felony offense. Subsequently in 1996, E. Rodriguez and G. Rivera were both found guilty in separate trials of participating in the drug conspiracy- Defendants-appellants were sentenced as indicated above and these appeals followed. DISCUSSION Defendants-appellants jointly or individually make numerous arguments on appeal, including challenges to: (1) the government’s peremptory strikes during jury selection; (2) juror conduct; (3) the jury selection system; (4) admission of prior uncharged crimes and “bad acts” into evidence; (5) preclusion of testimonial and demonstrative evidence, including a murder victim’s prison records; (6) admission of co-conspirator statements; (7) sufficiency of the evidence; (8) jury instructions; (9) denial of severance motions; (10) denial of motion for a new trial; (11) denial of motion to suppress wiretap evidence; (12) denial of motion for Judge Nevas to recuse himself; (13) effectiveness of trial counsel; (14) voluntariness of a guilty plea; (15) denial of defense witness immunity; and (16) the district court’s sentencing calculations. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that none of the defendants-appellants’ challenges merit relief. I. Contentions with Respect to the Jury A. Batson Challenge Zapata argues he is entitled to a new trial because the government exercised three of its twelve peremptory strikes in a racially discriminatory manner. Specifically, he alleges that the district court erred in (1) considering only statistical evidence and not the totality of the circumstances in determining whether a prima facie case of discrimination existed under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986); and (2) finding that the government’s explanations for the peremptory strikes were not pretextual. We disagree. Batson established a three-step approach for determining whether a peremptory strike has been exercised in a racially discriminatory manner. When a Batson challenge is raised, the trial court must decide (1) whether the defendant has made a prima facie showing that the prosecution has exercised its peremptory strike on the basis of race, id. at 96,106 S.Ct. 1712, (2) if so, whether the government has satisfied its burden of coming forward with a race-neutral explanation for striking the juror in question, id. at 97, 106 S.Ct. 1712, and (3) if so, whether the defendant has carried his burden of persuasion of proving purposeful discrimination, id. at 98, 106 S.Ct. 1712; see Burkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 767, 115 S.Ct. 1769, 131 L.Ed.2d 834 (1995) (per curiam). To establish a prima facie case, a defendant must show that the circumstances raise an inference of racial discrimination. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 96, 106 S.Ct. 1712. Such an inference may stem from a pattern of strikes against minority jurors included in the particular venire or even from the manner of the prosecution’s questions and statements during voir dire examination. See id. at 97, 106 S.Ct. 1712. However, because of the elusive nature of the inquiry, a trial judge is not limited to just these two sources for discriminatory inferences. See United States v. Stavroulakis, 952 F.2d 686, 696 (2d Cir.1992). Rather, a trial judge has “broad latitude to consider the totality of the circumstances when determining whether a defendant has raised an inference of discrimination.” Id. (citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 97, 98 n. 21, 106 S.Ct. 1712). In- the present case, the jury was selected from a 48-person venire, consisting of eight African Americans and three Hispanics. Thus, 23 percent of the venire were members of minority groups, and 16 percent were African Americans. During jury selection, the government used three of its twelve peremptory strikes against African-American members of the venire and the remaining nine against Caucasian members. Zapata argued before the district court that a prima facie case under Batson had been established because the government used 25 percent of its peremptory strikes against African-American ve-nire persons. Therefore, he asserted that the government had to come forward with race-neutral explanations. Before the district court decided if there was a prima facie showing, the government offered to put its reasons on record for striking the three African Americans and the court accepted this offer. The government explained that it challenged these venire persons because: the first was a member of the clergy who was occasionally called upon to attend at funerals and who indicated that this circumstance would affect his ability to concentrate on the case; the second was a bus supervisor in Stamford, Connecticut, who had knowledge of the Latin Kings in the area, believed that they were a good influence in the community and thought favorably of gang members for assisting bus drivers with security problems on buses; and the third was a court liaison officer who assessed criminals for alternative incarceration programs and who stated that she had experience with the Latin Kings in the past and had worked with two of the defense attorneys in this case. After hearing the government's explanations, the district court quoted United States v. Alvarado, 923 F.2d 253, 255 (2d Cir.1991), and found that there was no statistical inference of racial discrimination because the government's 25 percent rate of minority strikes was not significantly higher than the 23 percent minority population of the venire. See id. ("[I]f the minority percentage of the venire was 50, it could be expected that a prosecutor, acting without discriminatory intent, would use 50 percent of his challenges against minorities."). Further, the court noted that the 44 percent minority composition of the 16 member jury (five African Americans, two Hispanics and nine Caucasians), which exceeded the 16 percent minority population in the relevant area in Connecticut from which the jury was selected, dispels Zapata's claim that there was a pattern of discrimination by the government in exercising its peremptory strikes. The court concluded that, far from making a prima fade showing of a statistical imbalance, the statistics clearly indicated there was no inference of discrimination with the government's peremptory strikes. The court also found that, in assessing all of the circumstances in the case and the government's three explanations, there was no discriminatory intent involved. On appeal, Zapata claims that the court erred because it only looked at statistics to determine whether a prima fa-cie case was established under Batson,. We disagree. First, although the court noted that there was no statistical inference of discrimination, it explicitly stated that it considered the totality of the circumstances in the case iii finding no inference of discrimination. As to the allegation of statistical disparity, we have recognized that "[o]nly a rate of minority challenges significantly higher than the minority percentage of the venire would support a statistical inference of discrimination." Alvarado, 923 F.2d at 255. Here, no significantly higher percentage was demonstrated. Moreover, we find that the minority composition of 44 percent on the final jury as compared to the minority composition of 16 percent in the relevant area of Connecticut also undermines Zapata's claim that the government's peremptory strikes raise an inference of discrimination. See id. at 255-56 (noting that where the minority percentage of the venire is unknown, a trial court may accept as a surrogate for that figure the minority percentage of the population of the judicial district from which the ye-nire is drawn). Zapata further claims that the answers given by the excused African-American jurors during voir dire were similar to those of the Caucasian jurors who were not challenged and, therefore, that there is an inference that the government's peremptory strikes were based solely on race. This argument has no merit. The record reflects that the answers given by these excused jurors differed in substance from those provided by other members of the venire. Although the non-challenged members expressed hardships with work and reservations about being on the jury, such concerns were not equivalent to the clergyman's inability to concentrate on the case that might result from his attendance at funerals, the bus supervisor's favorable impression of the Latin Kings or the court employee's working relationship with the Latin Kings and defense counsel. The disparity between answers of the excused African-American members of the venire and the non-challenged members belies any inference that the government's peremptory strikes were applied in a racially discriminatory manner. Accordingly, we find that the district court correctly ruled that there was no inference of discrimination to establish a prima facie case and, therefore, we need not reach Zapata’s remaining claims under the second and third prongs of Batson. B. Sleeping Juror Defendants-appellants, including Zapata, asserted during trial that one of the jurors had slept during most of the presentation of the testimony. Therefore, defendants-appellants moved for the juror to be excused and for a mistrial. The district court denied the motion. On appeal, Zapata does not argue that the alleged sleeping juror should have been excused. Rather, he claims that his due process rights to a fair trial before an impartial and competent jury were violated because the district court failed to implement any procedure to investigate and cure the problem once it was brought to its attention. This contention is without merit. “Because of his continuous observation of the jury in court, a trial judge’s handling of alleged juror misconduct ... is only reviewable for abuse of discretion.” United States v. Panebianco, 543 F.2d 447, 457 (2d Cir.1976). Here, we find no abuse of discretion. Contrary to Zapata’s assertions, Judge' Nevas, from the moment the sleeping juror allegation was raised, investigated the matter and carefully observed the juror in question throughout the trial. Judge Nevas concluded that although the juror had his eyes downcast and perhaps had slept for a very brief moment, he was generally alert and attentive to the evidence. Accordingly, we find that Judge Nevas did not abuse his discretion in handling the alleged juror misconduct. C. Jury Selection System E. Rodriguez argues that the district court erroneously denied his pre-trial motion to stay his trial for three months to ensure that his jury was selected from a “new Qualified [Jury] Wheel which relied upon revised voter and motor vehicle records.” In particular, E. Rodriguez contends that because the pool from which his jury was selected was based on the old qualified jury wheel of the Bridgeport Division of the District of Connecticut, which he alleges unfairly underrepresented Hispanics, he was denied his right to have a jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the community, in violation of the Sixth Amendment and the Jury Selection' and Service Act of 1968, 28 U.S.C. § 1861 et seq. (1994). This Court has already rejected the same argument in United States v. Barnes, 158 F.3d 662, 674 (2d Cir.1998) (citing United States v. Rioux, 97 F.3d 648 (2d Cir.1996), and United States v. Fields, 113 F.3d 313 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 118 S.Ct. 434, 139 L.Ed.2d 334 (1997)). Therefore, we affirm the district court’s denial of E. Rodriguez’s motion to stay his trial. II. Challenges to Evidentiary Rulings Defendants-appellants argue that the district court erred by (1) admitting evidence of “other crimes” in violation of Rules 404(b) and 403 of the Fed.R.Evid.; (2) admitting the government’s redirect examination of Margaret Soto (“M.Soto”) without a limiting instruction; (3) precluding the testimony of Mike Soto; (4) excluding photographs of a murder scene; (5) refusing to admit prison records of a murder victim; and (6) admitting certain co-conspirator statements. None of these contentions has merit; only the following warrant discussion. A. Admission of “Bad Act” Evidence At the Millet Trial, the government introduced evidence of prior uncharged crimes and other bad acts that were committed by defendants-appellants and government witnesses. Such evidence included: testimony concerning Morales’ drug trafficking, stockpiling of weapons to protect the gang’s drug trade, and his related acts of violence; testimony that Roman ordered Latin King members to assault individuals selling drugs within his drug block; testimony that Antuna used a gun to rob someone, where such gun was later found to have been used in the murder of Latin King member Arosmo Diaz (“ADiaz”); and testimony of cooperating Latin King members about drug sales and acts of violence they committed on behalf of the gang. The district court admitted this evidence, finding that it was relevant because it tended to prove the existence, organization and nature of the RICO enterprise, and a pattern of racketeering activity by each defendant-appellant. See United States v. DiNome, 954 F.2d 839, 843-44 (2d Cir.1992). Defendants-appellants of the Millet Trial assert that the district court violated Fed. R.Evid. 404(b) by admitting these bad acts as “background evidence” to show that the defendants-appellants constituted a RICO enterprise. They contend that since most of them had conceded to being associated with the Latin Kings enterprise, there was no need for such bad acts evidence. Defendants-appellants also claim that this evidence was irrelevant under Fed.R.Evid. 401 and was unfairly prejudicial under Fed.R.Evid. 403 because it only served to depict them as violent drug dealers. They therefore assert that these evidentiary admissions require a reversal of their convictions. We disagree. First, such an evidentiary ruling is reviewable only for an abuse of discretion, see United States v. Wong, 40 F.3d 1347, 1378 (2d Cir.1994) (citing United States v. Brady, 26 F.3d 282, 286 (2d Cir.1994)), and we find no abuse here. Fed. R.Evid. 404(b) bars the admission of “Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts” to prove the defendant’s propensity to commit the crime charged. However, this rule is not controlling here, for “[a]n act that is alleged to have been done in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy ... is not an ‘other’ act within the meaning of Rule 404(b); rather, it is part of the very act charged.” United States v. Concepcion, 983 F.2d 369, 392 (2d Cir.1992). Where, as in this case, “the indictment contains a conspiracy charge, ‘uncharged acts may be admissible as direct evidence of the conspiracy itself.’ ” United States v. Miller, 116 F.3d 641, 682 (2d Cir.1997) (quoting United States v. Thai 29 F.3d 785, 812 (2d Cir.1994)), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 118 S.Ct. 2063, 141 L.Ed.2d 140 (1998). Moreover, as we stated in United States v. Rosa, 11 F.3d 315 (2d Cir.1993), “it is within the [trial] court’s discretion to admit evidence of prior acts to inform the jury of the background of the conspiracy charged, in order to help explain how the illegal relationship between participants in the crime developed, or to explain the mutual trust that existed between coconspira-tors.” Id. at 334; see United States v. Pipola, 83 F.3d 556, 566 (2d Cir.1996). In this case, for example, testimony of Morales’ drug dealing for Burgos was admitted because it informed the jury how the Latin Kings’ racketeering and drug conspiracies evolved, and how illegal relationships and mutual trust developed between co-conspirators. With respect to Rule 403, we also find that the district court acted well within its discretion in finding that the evidence was not unduly prejudicial. Although defendants-appellants conceded that they were associated with the Latin Kings, several issues still remained in dispute, including the existence, nature and operations of the RICO enterprise, and the related racketeering and drug conspiracies. Since the evidence had significant probative value as to these disputed matters, its admission was not “substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” Fed.R.Evid. 403. B. Government’s Redirect Examination of M. Soto During the Millet Trial, defendants-appellants asked M. Soto on cross-examination whether the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) had paid her to testify, travel or take a vacation. In response, M. Soto testified that one of these payments was made to enable her to go to South Bend, Indiana, for her “own protection.” The government’s redirect examination probed the purpose of such payments. Judge Nevas overruled an objection by Roman and allowed M. Soto to testify that she received money from the FBI so that she could leave Bridgeport because she was scared that Roman would find out about her cooperation. Roman asserts that M. Soto’s fear could not be attributed to any of his actions and, therefore, the district court erred in admitting this highly prejudicial, inflammatory testimony into evidence. This argument is without merit. The scope of redirect examination is a matter entrusted to a trial judge’s broad discretion. See United States v. Wiley, 846 F.2d 150, 156 (2d Cir.1988). Such redirect may be “used to rebut false impressions arising from cross-examination” and the trial judge is in the best position to determine whether such a false impression was created. United States v. Bilzerian, 926 F.2d 1285, 1296 (2d Cir.1991) (citing United States v. Mang Sun Wong, 884 F.2d 1537, 1544 (2d Cir.1989)). Here, we find that defendants-appellants opened the door for the government’s redirect by creating an impression that M. Soto was being paid for her testimony and that the government was subsidizing her alleged “vacation” in South Bend. Under these circumstances, we conclude that Judge Nevas correctly allowed M. Soto to testify about the funds she received from the government to rebut the impressions created by defendants-appellants. C. Exclusion of Roman’s Evidence 1. Preclusion of Mike Soto’s Testimony M. Soto began to cooperate with the government two days after her brother Angel Soto (“A. Soto”) was murdered, a crime she suspected Roman had committed. During the Millet trial, M. Soto was a key witness against Roman. She testified that he participated in the murder of Charles Robinson, a young drug dealer, and conspired to murder Victor Mojica, a drug dealer who had threatened Latin King Gregg Cyr, Jr.’s drug operations in Bridgeport. Roman attempted to refute M. Soto’s testimony by calling a cooperating government witness, Mike Soto, as a defense witness, but the district court precluded Mike Soto from testifying on Roman’s behalf. On appeal, Roman contends that Mike Soto would have testified that his brother, A. Soto, told him that he and Luis Rodriguez (“L.Rodriguez”) murdered Javier Le-Bron, a crime not charged in this case. From this testimony, Roman asserts that M. Soto, as sister of A. Soto, must also have known that A. Soto or L. Rodriguez killed LeBron and, therefore, she lied when she testified that she did not know who killed LeBron. Roman asserts that M. Soto lied about the LeBron murder because she was trying to protect her then-boyfriend, L. Rodriguez, from prosecution for the Robinson murder and for the conspiracy to murder Mojica. Roman claims that Mike Soto’s testimony would have exculpated him by permitting the jury to draw the inference that L. Rodriguez killed Robinson and attempted to kill Mojica. Roman therefore argues that the district court erred by not permitting him to call Mike Soto. We disagree. The district court decided to exclude Mike Soto’s testimony because it found it was irrelevant under Fed.R.Evid. 401 and 402. The court determined that testimony that L. Rodriguez killed LeBron did not make it more or less probable that L. Rodriguez, not Roman, murdered Robinson and conspired to kill Mojica. We will not reverse the district court’s determinations of admissibility of evidence unless it abused its discretion, see United States v. Malpeso, 115 F.3d 155, 162 (2d Cir.1997) (citing Rioux, 97 F.3d at 660), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 118 S.Ct. 2366, 141 L.Ed.2d 735 (1998), and “[w]e will not overturn a trial judge’s evidentiary rulings unless the judge acted arbitrarily or irrationally.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, we find no abuse of discretion. First, the fact that Mike Soto may have known who killed LeBron does not support the claim that M. Soto knew and lied about it at trial. Moreover, another witness testified that he heard that L. Rodriguez and A. Soto killed Lebrón. Finally, Roman’s defense counsel on summation had the opportunity to argue that M. Soto was allegedly covering up for L. Rodriguez, and the district court gave careful instructions to the jury on examining a witness’ credibility where there is a grant of immunity. Accordingly, we find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding Mike Soto’s testimony. 2. Exclusion of 1995 Photographs of Robinson Murder Scene Taken in the light most favorable to the government, the evidence demonstrated the following facts. In November 1992, Roman was operating a drug block on East Main Street in Bridgeport. At this time, Roman kept seeing an adolescent, Robinson, riding a bike and selling crack cocaine on his drug block. Roman asked Robinson to leave, but he refused to do so. Roman therefore decided to kill Robinson for selling drugs on his drug block. On November 30, 1992, Roman ordered three Latin King soldiers to kill Robinson, provided them with guns, and instructed them on how to kill the adolescent. As a result, the three shot and murdered Robinson as he rode his bicycle on Booth Street, near the heart of Roman’s drug block. As part of his defense to the Robinson murder, Roman claims that M. Soto lied when she testified that while she was living with Roman on a third floor apartment on East Main Street, she observed the “flashes” from the guns used to kill Robinson on Booth Street. Roman attacked M. Soto’s credibility by introducing a photograph showing large buildings directly across the street from Roman’s apartment that would have blocked her view of the flashes. However, the owner of the largest building across the street, testified on cross-examination that his building suffered a fire prior to 1991, and that because of its gutted condition, it was possible to see right through the second and third floors of the building all the way over to Booth Street, that is, the site of Robinson’s murder. In addition, Roman sought to introduce two other photographs, taken by his private investigator in 1995. The first showed a view from Roman’s apartment window looking toward the Robinson murder scene and the second showed a view from the crime scene looking back towards Roman’s apartment. Roman also attempted to introduce a third photograph, a computer generated combination of these two photographs. The district court excluded these three photographs, but admitted a government exhibit of the same area not showing the buildings that allegedly obstructed M. Soto’s view. Roman argues that the court abused its discretion by excluding his photographs while admitting the government’s exhibit. We disagree. First, the record reflects that the private investigator could not testify that the photographs he had taken in 1995 were fair and accurate depictions of the Robinson murder scene on November 30, 1992. Likewise, Roman was unable to offer foundation testimony for the computer generated photograph and, consequently, it also was properly excluded because it was based in part on one of the 1995 photographs that was found inadmissible. In view of the foregoing, we believe that there was a sufficient basis for the exclusion of the photographs and, therefore, conclude that the district court properly exercised its discretion in denying Roman’s request to receive the photographs into evidence. Moreover, we find no error in the admission of the government exhibit because it was admitted through the testimony of M. Soto, who unlike Roman’s private investigator, was able to testify that this was a fair and accurate depiction of the area as it existed in November 1992. Indeed, Roman had no objection to this exhibit after he elicited testimony from M. Soto during voir dire that there were tall buildings right across the street from her apartment that were not depicted in the exhibit. Further, the government exhibit was countered by (1) Roman’s admitted photograph that clearly showed the buildings he claimed blocked M. Soto’s view as they existed in 1992; and (2) the testimony of Roman’s private investigator, who testified that the third floor window from which M. Soto stated she saw the gun flashes was 28 feet from the ground, and that the large building that existed at the time of the Robinson murder was 36 feet high. 3. Exclusion of Robinson’s Prison Records Roman argues that the district court erred by excluding prison records showing that murder victim Robinson had assaulted a person while in prison. Roman contends this evidence would have given the jury the opportunity to consider whether the assaulted person in jail might have been involved in Robinson’s murder approximately a year later when Robinson was released. We disagree. This was creative conjecturing and the court properly exercised its discretion in excluding such speculative evidence. D. Admission of Statements Co-Conspirator Cruz and Morales argue that certain out-of-court statements made after the double homicide were improperly admitted as declarations of co-conspirators under Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(E). In particular, Cruz challenges the admission of statements made by Antuna in which he describes the double homicide discussed at trial by David Soto (“D.Soto”), a Latin King who cooperated with the government. Morales challenges the admission of telephone conversations between himself and Latin King Julio Vasquez and between himself and Antuna. In addition, G. Rivera argues that certain statements made to Cyr and “Carmello,” a G. Rivera lieutenant, were also erroneously admitted as co-conspirator statements. These arguments are without merit. Fed.R.Evid. 801(c) defines hearsay as “a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” Rule 801(d)(2)(E) provides that, notwithstanding Rule 801(c), “[a] statement is not hearsay if ... [it] is offered against a party and is ... a statement by a cocon-spirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy.” In order to admit an extra-judicial statement by a co-conspirator under Rule 801(d)(2)(E), the district court must find by a preponderance of the evidence “(1) that there was a conspiracy, (2) that its members included the declarant and the party against whom the statement is offered, and (8) that the statement was made both (a) during the course of and (b) in furtherance of the conspiracy.” United States v. Tracy, 12 F.3d 1186, 1196 (2d Cir.1993) (citing Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 175, 107 S.Ct. 2775, 97 L.Ed.2d 144 (1987)). In making a preliminary factual determination of these prerequisites, the court may consider the hearsay statements themselves. See Bourjaily, 483 U.S. at 181, 107 S.Ct. 2775. “However, these hearsay statements are presumptively unreliable, and, for such statements to be admissible, there must be some independent corroborating evidence of the defendant’s participation in the conspiracy.” United States v. Tellier, 83 F.3d 578, 580 (2d Cir.1996) (citation omitted). When an objection is made to the admission of alleged hearsay statements, we review a district court’s factual findings for “clear error.” United States v. Orena, 32 F.3d 704, 711 (2d Cir.1994) (citing Bourjaily, 483 U.S. at 181, 107 S.Ct. 2775). “Further, the improper admission of such testimony is subject to harmless error analysis.” Id. (citing United States v. Rivera, 22 F.3d 430, 436 (2d Cir.1994)). When no objection is raised at trial, however, we will only review the district court’s factual findings if there was plain error, that is, if there was “(1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affects substantial rights. If all three conditions are met, an appellate court may then exercise its discretion to notice a forfeited error, but only if (4) the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” United States v. Gore, 154 F.3d 34, 42 (2d Cir.1998) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted) (quoting Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 467, 117 S.Ct. 1544, 137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997) (quoting, in turn, United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993))). 1. Cruz Taken in the light most favorable to the government, the evidence showed that during the fall of 1993 and spring of 1994, Vasquez was operating a drug spot in New Haven. The spot employed several Latin King street sellers. At the time, Vasquez and Morales became partners and Morales supplied Vasquez with crack. In addition, Vasquez supplied cocaine to A. Diaz who sold it within the same area. In the spring of 1994, Vasquez had several conversations with Morales about problems with A. Diaz, including rumors that A. Diaz was an informant on the Latin Kings’ drug activities. On April 29, 1994, after an extensive investigation, police raided the New Haven drug spot and arrested Vasquez and several other Latin King drug dealers. A. Diaz was not one of those arrested. Police seized from Vasquez’s residence crack and cash proceeds from crack sales, which was provided to Vasquez by Morales. From jail, Vasquez called Morales and cryptically told him that A. Diaz was an informant on Latin King drug dealers in New Haven and Bridgeport, and thus, was responsible for Morales’ and Vasquez’s loss of crack to the police. Shortly thereafter, Morales ordered the murder of A. Diaz. On May 14, 1994, Antuna and Cruz, Latin King members acting on the orders of Morales, shot and killed A. Diaz and his friend Tyler White in Bridgeport. White was killed because he happened to be with A. Diaz at the time of the murder. Cruz argues that the district court improperly admitted the testimony of D. Soto concerning hearsay statements by Antuna directly implicating Cruz in the A. Diaz and White double murder. D. Soto testified (1) that a couple of days after the murders, Antuna told him that Cruz shot and killed White instantly from the backseat of a car with a .45 caliber gun; (2) that Antuna shot A. Diaz in the car with a 9mm gun, and then chased and killed him; (3) that they killed A. Diaz because he was an informant; and (4) that they were going to kill Adam Cintron, who was an associate of A. Diaz and with him the night of the murder, but they could not find him. Over defense counsel’s hearsay objections, the district court admitted Antuna’s statements to D. Soto as co-conspirator statements under Rule 801(d)(2)(E). Cruz asserts that this ruling was clearly erroneous and violated his confrontation rights because there was no corroborating evidence, independent of Antuna’s statements, that Cruz was a member of the conspiracy, that Cruz and Antuna were co-conspirators or that Antuna’s confession about the double murder to D. Soto was made in furtherance of a conspiracy between Antuna and Cruz. In addition, Cruz contends that Antuna’s out-of-court statements were not offered pursuant to a “firmly rooted” exception to the hearsay rule and lacked particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. We find Cruz’s protestations unpersuasive. First, there was ample independent evidence corroborating that Cruz was a member and participant in the racketeering and drug conspiracies of the Latin Kings, as well as the conspiracy to murder A. Diaz. With respect to the murder conspiracy, the record clearly reflects that (1) Cruz was a Latin King member; (2) Cruz was a close associate of Antuna’s; (3) Cruz frequented the backroom of an establishment where influential Latin Kings congregated and where Antuna received word that A. Diaz was to be killed; (4) Cruz accompanied Antuna to an apartment the night of the murder to retrieve the guns used for the murders; (5) Cruz and Antuna were with the victims minutes before the murder; (6) forensic evidence established they were in the exact location where the murders were committed; (7) Cruz and Antuna matched the physical descriptions of the gunmen given by eyewitnesses; (8) Cruz’s and Antuna’s fingerprints were found on the door handles of the car where the murders occurred; and (9) Cruz and Antuna were seen together minutes after the murders at D. Soto’s apartment. In addition to evidence corroborating Cruz’s participation in the murder, we find that there was additional independent evidence that corroborated other aspects of Antuna’s statements to D. Soto. For example, Antuna’s statements to D. Soto that he used a 9mm gun to kill A. Diaz and that Cruz used a .45 caliber gun to kill White were confirmed by ballistic evidence showing that the murder victims were killed by such firearms. Further, Antuna’s statement to D. Soto that A. Diaz was killed because he was informing on the gang’s drug operations was corroborated by the testimony of Cyr and Vasquez, and by intercepted phone conversations between Morales and Antuna, that established the motive for the murder of A. Diaz. Moreover, Antuna's remark to D. Soto that he had sold the 9mm murder weapon to a Latin King from Hartford was corroborated by Ray Perez, a Latin King from Hartford, who was arrested with a 9mm gun in July 1994 and who testified that he bought the gun from a group of Latin Kings in Bridgeport in May 1994. Therefore, we conclude that the evidence amply corroborated Antuna's statements that he and Cruz committed the double murders. Next, Cruz argues that even if he participated in the double murders, there was no independent evidence that he participated in the charged racketeering and drug conspiracies. Cruz relies on Tellier, 83 F.3d at 580-81, for the proposition that proof of participation in a RICO conspiracy cannot come solely from proof of predicate acts of racketeering based on challenged hearsay. However, unlike Tellier where the challenged hearsay statement was the only evidence of the defendant's participation in the conspiracy, and thus, the hearsay statement was held inadmissible, we find here that Antuna's statements against Cruz are admissible because there is, as noted above, ample, independent evidence corroborating his statements. Moreover, the Supreme Court noted in Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 118 S.Ct. 469, 139 L.Ed.2d 352 (1997), that proof of participation in a RICO conspiracy is possible when a conspirator intends "to further an endeavor which, if completed, would satisfy all the elements of a substantive criminal offense, but it suffices that he adopt the goal of furthering or facilitating the criminal endeavor." Id. 118 S.Ct. at 477. Since Cruz's membership in the Latin Kings and participation in the double murder demonstrated that he adopted the goal of furthering the criminal endeavors of the gang, we conclude that the district court correctly found that he was a participant in the racketeering conspiracy. Likewise, the evidence supports the court's finding that Cruz had joined and acted on behalf of the drug conspiracy. Cruz further argues that the district court clearly erred in concluding that Antuna's statements to D. Soto about the double murder were made "in furtherance" of the racketeering conspiracy. Cruz asserts that Antuna's statements to D. Soto were in reality a confession, and at best "idle chatter" that did not further the goals of the racketeering conspiracy. We disagree. We have held that the term "in furtherance of the conspiracy" implies that "the statements must in some way have been designed to promote or facilitate achievement of the goals of the ongoing conspiracy, as by, for example ... seeking to induce a coconspirator's assistance, serving to foster trust' and cohesiveness, or informing coconspirators as to the progress or status of the conspiracy." Tracy, 12 F.3d at 1196 (citations omitted). This "in furtherance" requirement is not met by a narrative conversation that amounts to mere "idle chatter." See United States v. Paone, 782 F.2d 386, 390 (2d Cir.1986). However, in this case, Antuna's statements to D. Soto were not idle chatter for they clearly promoted the goals of the racketeering and drug conspiracies. For example, Antuna told D. Soto (1) to bring him clothes when he was on the run; (2) that he and Cruz committed the murders; and (3) that he sold his 9mm gun after the murders. These statements showed that Antuna attempted to apprise D. Soto of the progress or status of the conspiracy, to facilitate and encourage his assistance, and to foster the cohesiveness of the conspiracy. As a result, we find that Antuna's statements satisfy the "in furtherance" requirement. Nevertheless, Cruz argues that even if Antuna's statements to D. Soto could be considered "in furtherance of the conspiracy,” this is an expansion of the co-conspirator hearsay rule because such statements fall outside of the “firmly rooted” exception and, therefore, this requires particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. In particular, Cruz contends that a recent proliferation of RICO cases has expanded the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule to include some narrative statements about past events on the theory that they serve to foster trust and cohesiveness among group members or inform each other as to the progress or status of the RICO conspiracy. Cruz maintains that because these developments are far too recent to be considered “firmly rooted,” a narrative account under such a theory should be presumed unreliable and inadmissible without particularized guarantees of trustworthiness of a co-conspirator’s hearsay statements. Since no such guarantees were set forth, Cruz claims that the admission of Antuna’s statements violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. We find that this argument is without merit. In Bourjaily, the Supreme Court clarified that “[b]ecause hearsay rules and the Confrontation Clause are generally designed to protect similar values ... no independent inquiry into reliability is required when the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception ... [such as] the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule.” 483 U.S. at 182-83, 107 S.Ct. 2775 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Accordingly, the Court held that the “Confrontation Clause does not require a court to embark on an independent inquiry into the reliability of statements that satisfy the requirements of Rule 801(d)(2)(E).” Id. at 183-84, 107 S.Ct. 2775. Since we found that Antuna’s statements meet the requirements of Rule 801(d)(2)(E), that is, the statements were not merely idle chatter, but were made during the course of and in furtherance of the conspiracy, we reject Cruz’s assertion that the admission of these statements violated his constitutional rights under the Confrontation Clause. 2. Morales Morales challenges the admission of a recorded telephone conversation between himself and Antuna that occurred after the night of the A. Diaz and White murders in which they discussed the double homicide and the ensuing police investigation. Pri- or to trial, Morales moved to dismiss count 24 of the first superseding indictment, a VICAR conspiracy count that alleged that he conspired to murder A. Diaz in violation of Conn. Gen.Stat. Ann. §§ 53a-48, 53a-54a, and 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(5). One of the overt acts in count 24 that the government alleged in furtherance of Morales’ conspiracy to murder A. Diaz is the challenged, recorded telephone conversation between himself and Antuna. Morales argued that this overt act was legally insufficient because, under Connecticut law, once a conspiracy to commit murder culminates with the murder of the victim, the conspiracy ends, and thus, subsequent declarations are not “in furtherance of the conspiracy” and may be held inadmissible. Although Morales recognized that state pleading, procedural and evidentiary rules are not incorporated into § 1961 under the RICO statute, he argues that § 1959 of the VICAR statute is different and should be read to incorporate Connecticut’s eviden-tiary rule regarding admissibility of evidence after a conspiracy to murder ends. The district court dismissed his motion, holding that § 1959 does not incorporate state substantive law. See United States v. Morales, 881 F.Supp. 769, 772 (D.Conn.1995). On appeal, Morales argues that the court erred by denying his motion, and even if Connecticut’s evidentiary law is not binding, he asserts his conversation with Antuna was not in furtherance of the conspiracy to murder A. Diaz for the conspiracy ended with the murder. We disagree. First, in Paone, we held that the language of 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(A), which defines racketeering activity as any act or threat involving murder which is chargeable under State law and punishable by imprisonment for more than one year, was “not intended] to incorporate the various states’ procedural and evidentiary rules into the RICO statute.” 782 F.2d at 393; see United States v. Friedman, 854 F.2d 535, 565 (2d Cir.1988). Rather, “[t]he statute is meant to define, in a more generic sense, the wrongful conduct that constitutes the predicates for a federal racketeering charge.” Paone, 782 F.2d at 393; see United States v. Coonan, 938 F.2d 1553, 1563-65 (2d Cir.1991). Similarly, in our view, the gravamen of § 1959 is a violation of federal law and, therefore, reference to “violation of any laws of any State” in the statute merely defines the unlawful conduct constituting the predicate offense. Thus, the statute does not incorporate the substantive requirements of state law. Consequently we conclude that the court correctly ruled that a state’s evidentiary rule underlying a conspiracy to murder offense is not incorporated into a VICAR prosecution. Second, Morales’ and Antuna’s statements are admissible under Rule 801(d)(2)(E) because the record reflects that they were made in furtherance of the racketeering conspiracy, irrespective of whether or not the conspiracy to murder A. Diaz was completed. Accordingly, we conclude that the court properly admitted the recorded telephone conversation between Morales and Antuna. 3. G. Rivera Cyr testified at trial, without objection, that other drug dealing co-conspirators told him that G. Rivera supplied cocaine for their drug operation. G. Rivera argues that the district court improperly admitted these co-conspirator statements because they were not made during the course, or in furtherance, of the drug conspiracy as required by Rule 801(d)(2)(E). G. Rivera contends such admission constitutes plain error. We disagree. First, the government amply demonstrated that all of the challenged statements were made during the time of the charged conspiracy and while the co-conspirators were engaged in drug trafficking. Second, each of the challenged statements were in furtherance of the conspiracy. For instance, the record reflects that each statement was made by a co-conspirator to Cyr while he was acting as an integral member of the Latin King’s drug conspiracy. Further, the evidence demonstrates that the co-conspirator statements made to Cyr served (1) to inform the co-conspirators as to the progress or status of the conspiracy; (2) to facilitate and protect their drug dealing activities; (3) to identify other co-conspirators; (4) to inform Cyr about the persons with whom he would be working; and (5) to prepare him for the role he would play in the drug conspiracy. See Rivera, 22 F.3d at 436; Tracy, 12 F.3d at 1196; United States v. Maldonado-Rivera, 922 F.2d 934, 959 (2d Cir.1990); United States v. Rahme, 813 F.2d 31, 35-36 (2d Cir.1987). In addition, there was wiretap evidence that independently corroborated Cyr’s testimony concerning the co-conspirator statements, and, in turn, such wiretap evidence was corroborated by law enforcement surveillance. Finally, given the extent of the evidence against G. Rivera concerning his role as a major supplier of drugs to leading Latin King dealers from 1991 through 1994, we conclude that even if there were any error in the admission of some of the challenged co-conspirator statements about his drug dealing activities, it was harmless and would certainly not constitute plain error. E. Admission of D. Soto’s and Cin-tron’s Out-of-Court Statements Cruz challenges certain out-of-court statements made by D. Soto and Cintron, who both implicated Cruz in the double homicide of A. Diaz and White. First, during his direct testimony, D. Soto was asked by the prosecution what Antuna told him about the double homicide. D. Soto answered that Antuna confessed he and Cruz lolled them. The prosecution further questioned D. Soto about Antuna’s statements, but he could not recall certain minor details. After D. Soto testified that he had been interviewed by the FBI concerning Antuna’s statements, the prosecution showed him a single paragraph of the FBI report of the interview to refresh his recollection of these details, but D. Soto replied he still could not remember. The direct examination then proceeded to more substantive questions about what Antuna told D. Soto. Cruz asserts that D. Soto’s subsequent testimony regarding what An-tuna mentioned about the murders was not based on D. Soto’s present recollection, but from reviewing his prior statement in the FBI interview report. Therefore, Cruz argues D. Soto used his prior out-of-court statement, that is, inadmissible hearsay, as a substitute for actual memory to testify about Antuna’s statements. We disagree. There is no evidence in the record to support Cruz’s claim that the government’s failed attempt to refresh D. Soto’s recollection about certain minor details was, in fact, a pretext for allowing D. Soto to testify from his prior out-of-court statement in the FBI interview report. Indeed, the record shows that there were no further references to this report after the government was unable to refresh D. Soto’s memory from the one paragraph, and that subsequent testimony was from actual memory. Further, Cruz did not object to the prosecutor’s questions during the contested portion of D. Soto’s testimony. Accordingly, we find that the admission of D. Soto’s statement was not plain error. Next, Cruz contests Cintron’s out-of-court statement made the day after the murder to Elizabeth Wynne, who was A. Diaz’s girlfriend. On direct examination, the government asked Cintron about an argument he had with Wynne where she demanded that he give her a gold necklace that had belonged to A. Diaz. Cintron testified that he refused to give her the necklace because he bought it from A. Diaz. Cintron also explained to her that she could not have it back for he felt just as bad as she did and that he was also A. Diaz’s close friend. The government further asked Cintron whether he told Wynne during this argument that “at least you didn’t have to watch him die.” Cintron denied making such a statement; rather, he testified that he told her “I’m the one that had to identify his body, I feel just as bad as you do.” Over defense counsel’s objection, the district court admitted Cin-tron’s testimony of this out-of-court statement. The government explained that it sought the admission of this statement because it wanted to limit the impact of the impeachment of Cintron’s credibility on cross-examination regarding the statement. Indeed, on cross-examination of Cintron, Cruz’s counsel inquired about Cintron’s argument with Wynne. Moreover, during Cruz’s defense, his counsel called Wynne as a witness and she testified that Cintron said during their argument that “you didn’t have to watch him die.” Cruz also contests Cintron’s out-of-court statement related by Alexza Berrios during her direct testimony, concerning what happened the morning after the A. Diaz and White murders when Cintron arrived at her apartment. The prosecutor asked Berrios what Cintron told her that morning, and when she began to reply, defense counsel objected on hearsay grounds. The government argued that her testimony about Cintron’s statements was not offered for the truth, but merely to explain Berr-ios’ subsequent actions. The district court allowed Berrios to testify that Cintron told her that “he had left them down there and that he had left New Haven and that he was worried about [A. Diaz].” She then explained how she and Cintron looked for A. Diaz and then went to the police station and discovered that he was dead. On cross-examination, defense counsel elicited testimony from Berrios regarding a number of statements Cintron made to her that morning. Relying on Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 156-57, 115 S.Ct. 696, 130 L.Ed.2d 574 (1995) (discussing Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(1)(B)), Cruz argues that Cintron’s out-of-court statements to Wynne and Berrios were inadmissible hearsay because they were (1)