Jewell v. Gonzales (420 F. Supp. 2d 406, 2006)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

McLAUGHLIN, District Judge.

In this Bivens action, a class of inmates at the Federal Correctional Institution (“Fci”) jn McKean, Pennsylvania challenges the constitutionality of a Program Statement issued by the U.S. Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”), as well as an “Institutional Supplement” issued by FCI-McKe-an, which prohibit the showing of unedited “R” rated movies to prisoners. Named as Defendants are Alberto Gonzales, in his official capacity as Attorney General of the United States, Harley G. Lappin, in his official capacity as Director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons, and Bernie D. Ellis, in his official capacity as the Warden of the FCI-McKean. We have subject matter jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Both Plaintiffs and Defendants have filed motions for summary judgment. On August 31, 2005, the United States Magistrate Judge to whom this case was referred recommended that the Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment be granted and the Defendants’ motion be denied. For the reasons that follow, we decline to adopt the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation and conclude, instead, that Defendants’ motion should be granted and the Plaintiffs’ motion denied.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under well established principles, summary judgment shall be granted if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). In considering a motion for summary judgment, this Court must examine the facts in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. International Raw Materials, Ltd. v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 898 F.2d 946, 949 (3d Cir.1990). The moving party bears the burden of demonstrating the absence of any genuine issues of material fact. United States ex rel. Quinn v. Omnicare, Inc., 382 F.3d 432, 436 (3d Cir.2004). Rule 56, however, mandates the entry of judgment against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In 1996, Congress passed the Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub.L. No. 104-134, § 611, 110 Stat. 1321 (April 26, 1996). Section 611 of that Act, commonly known as the Zimmer Amendment (after its sponsor, Representative Dick Zimmer) provided, in relevant part, that:

None of the funds made available in this Act shall be used to provide the following amenities or personal comforts in the Federal prison system' — •

sH * * * * *

(2) the viewing of R, X, and NC-17 rated movies, through whatever medium presented; ...

110 Stat. 1321-64 (April 26, 1996). Substantially identical versions of this amendment have been enacted in annual appropriations bills since that time.

At the time the Zimmer Amendment was proposed, the BOP already had in place a regulation prohibiting the showing of X-rated movies as well as a Program Statement, PS 5370.08 (June 13, 1994), which directed the Supervisor of Education or his/ her designee to “exercise good judgment” when selecting movie video rentals. PS 5370.08 § 7. With the Zim-mer Amendment’s enactment, the BOP updated its Program Statement, which now provides:

The Recreation Supervisor will exercise good judgment and follow statutory restrictions when selecting video movies rentals. No movies rated R, X, or NC-17 may be shown to inmates.

a. Institutions may show R and NC-17 movies that have been edited for general public viewing.

b. Spanish movies that are not rated may be shown if they do not include profanity, graphic violence, or nudity.

c. Not all edited movies may be appropriate for the correctional setting; each institution must use caution in selecting movies. (See Attachment A.)

PS 5370.10 (Feb. 23, 2000). FCI-McKean similarly updated its Institutional Supplement, which how provides: “Movies are shown each weekend. Only contracted movies rated PG-13, PG, G and airline edited will be shown.” See IS 5370.08 (Sept. 15,1997).

In December of 1997, three inmates at FCI-McKean commenced this action on behalf of themselves and all other current and future FCI-McKean inmates asserting that their First Amendment rights are abridged by the prison’s policy of categorically banning the showing of unedited R-rated movies. (See Complaint [Doc. # 1] at ¶¶ 30-36.) Plaintiffs seek a judgment declaring the policy unconstitutional and enjoining its future enforcement.

On April 14, 2000, following the resolution of various preliminary procedural issues, the Defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c). (See Def.s’ Mot. for Judg. on the Pleadings and Mem. in Supp. [Doc. # 34].) Defendants’ motion was premised upon their interpretation of Plaintiffs’ complaint as challenging both the Zimmer Amendment and the implementing policies issued by the BOP and FCI-McKean. (Id. at p. 7.)

Defendants began their Rule 12(c) analysis by acknowledging that restrictions on the First Amendment rights of prisoners are evaluated using the test set forth in Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987). That test involves consideration of four factors to determine whether the restriction in question is constitutional, to wit:

whether the regulation has a “ ‘valid, rational connection’ ” to a legitimate governmental interest; whether alternative means are open to inmates to exercise the asserted right; what impact an accommodation of the right would have on guards and inmates and prison resources; and whether there are “ready alternatives” to the regulation. 482 U.S. at 89-91,107 S.Ct. 2254.

Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 132, 123 S.Ct. 2162, 156 L.Ed.2d 162 (2003).

Applying this test, Defendants first asserted that deterrence, good order, discipline, and rehabilitation are among the penological interests rationally furthered by the Zimmer Amendment’s proscription of R-rated films. (See Mot. for Judg. on Pleadings, supra, at pp. 10-11.) The Defendants further argued: that the Plaintiffs had adequate alternative means by which to exercise their First Amendment rights inasmuch as a broad range of movies (including those rated G, PG or airline edited) remain available to them (id. at pp. 13-14); that the restricted category of movies could be potentially detrimental to the safety of guards and other inmates (id. at p. 15); and that Plaintiffs had failed to identify a ready alternative that would fully accommodate their rights at de minimis cost to the government’s valid penological interests (Id. at p. 15).

Defendants’ Rule 12(c) motion was initially reviewed by the United States Magistrate Judge. Like the Defendants, she assumed the Plaintiffs’ claims encompassed challenges to the Zimmer Amendment itself as well as the Policy Statement and Institutional Statement implementing the Amendment. The Magistrate Judge recommended that the Defendants’ motion be granted insofar as Plaintiffs were challenging the Zimmer Amendment on its face; as to this point, she reasoned that the statute facially invoked only Congress’ spending powers and therefore did not implicate any First Amendment issues because prisoners are not entitled to have the legislature fund their exercise of fundamental constitutional rights. (See Report and Recommendation (12/1/00 [Doc. # 37]) at pp. 8-10.) On the other hand, the Magistrate Judge recommended that the Rule 12(c) motion be denied insofar as the Plaintiffs were lodging a facial challenge to the administrative policies implementing the Zimmer Amendment. Recognizing that these restrictions do implicate First Amendment rights, as they facially impose an outright ban on the viewing of R-rated movies, the Magistrate Judge concluded that an evidentiary record would be required in order for the Court to perform a complete Turner analysis. The Magistrate Judge further recommended that a record be developed for purposes of assessing the Plaintiffs’ “as applied” challenges, since these would involve a fact-intensive analysis. (See id. at pp. 11-17.)

On March 15, 2001, this Court entered a Memorandum Order granting Defendants’ Rule 12(c) motion in its entirety. (See Mem. Order (3/15/01 [Doc. # 41]).) Unlike the Magistrate Judge, this Court concluded that Plaintiffs’ facial challenge to the statute did implicate First Amendment rights, thus necessitating a Turner analysis. Nevertheless, we endorsed a “common sense” application of Turner relative to both the Zimmer Amendment and its implementing regulations, finding that the development of an evidentiary record was unnecessary in this case. We reasoned that such a “common sense” approach was consistent with the analysis undertaken by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in Amatel v. Reno, 156 F.3d 192 (D.C.Cir.1998) (addressing a challenge to the constitutionality of the Ensign Amendment), and the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Waterman v. Farmer, 183 F.3d 208 (3d Cir.1999) (upholding a New Jersey statute similar to Ensign Amendment). We concluded that “[a]pplying the Turner factors here, and for the reasons set forth in Amatel, 156 F.3d at 196-99, and Waterman, 183 F.3d at 214-18, ... the Ensign and Zimmer Amendments and their implementing regulations [are] neutral and reasonable, and rationally related to legitimate penological interests.” (Id. at p. 4.)

On direct appeal of our March 15, 2001 order, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. See Wolf v. Ashcroft, 297 F.3d 305 (3d Cir.2002). The court of appeals found that, in granting the Rule 12(c) motion, this Court did not conduct a proper, thorough Turner analysis in that we “did not articulate the relevant peno-logical interest or the prohibition’s relationship to it, and, further, [we] considered only Turner’s first prong.” Id. at 307. The appellate court explained that:

[i]n relation to the first factor, the [District] Court’s opinion was deficient in that it never stated or described the interest purportedly served by the prison policy, nor did it determine whether the interest was neutral and legitimate. The government offered several theories in general terms at different times, but the District Court opinion did not mention or discuss any such theories or interests. We cannot tell, for instance, whether the Court credited the government’s assertion that the movies posed security risks, or that the absence of such movies deterred people from committing crimes, or that denial of such movies fosters rehabilitation. Moreover, the District Court did not discuss how any of the particular interests offered by the government were “rationally connected to” the restrictions on movies rated R or NC-17.

Id. at 308.

The court of appeals concluded that a “common sense” approach may not always “fit” for purposes of analyzing Turner’s first prong, and “an evidentiary showing may be required in certain situations.” Id. In so concluding, the court declined to take any “categorical approaches” to a Turner analysis:

while the connection may be a mattef of common sense in certain instances, such that a ruling on this issue based only on the pleadings may be appropriate, there may be situations in which the connection is not so apparent and does require factual development. Whether the requisite connection may be found solely on the basis of “common sense” will depend on the nature of the right, the nature of the interest asserted, the nature of the prohibition, and the obviousness of its connection to the proffered interest. The showing required will vary depending on how close the court perceives the connection to be.... [T]he connection between the goal of rehabilitation and a ban on distributing sexually explicit magazines to “repetitive and compulsive” sexual offenders may well be, as we stated in Waterman, sufficiently obvious to be evaluated as a matter of common sense. But is it a matter of common sense, as was argued here, that prohibiting movies rated R or NC-17 deters the general public from committing crimes, lest they be sent to prison where they are not permitted to watch R-rated movies? We are not so sure____

Id. at 308-09. The appellate court directed us on remand to (1) describe the peno-logical interest served by the restriction; (2) consider whether the connection between the policy and the interest is obvious or attenuated — and, thus, the extent to which some foundation or evidentiary showing is necessary; and (3) in light of this determination, evaluate what the government has offered. Id. at 309.

Finally, the court of appeals directed that, even if the restriction at issue passed muster under the first Turner prong, we would need to consider the remaining prongs in order to fully evaluate the policy’s overall reasonableness. Id. at 310. As to the latter three Turner factors, the court of appeals noted that “we have historically viewed these inquiries as being fact-intensive,” requiring a “ ‘contextual, record-sensitive analysis.’ ” Id. (citation omitted).

Following the appellate court’s remand of this matter, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. (See Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss for Lack of Juris. [Doc. #49].) The Defendants’ motion was premised on the fact that, at some point during the appeal of our March 15, 2001 order, Plaintiffs abandoned their challenge to the Zim-mer Amendment itself, focusing their attack instead on the administrative policies implementing the Amendment. (See n. 9, supra; Wolf v. Ashcroft, 297 F.3d at 307.) Defendants argued that Plaintiffs’ claims now lacked redressability, their theory being that, even if we were to enjoin enforcement of the administrative ban on R-rated movies, the Zimmer Amendment would still stand as an independent prohibition. Thus, Defendants reasoned, Plaintiffs’ claims ultimately could afford them no relief and Plaintiffs therefore lacked standing to pursue them. (Def.s’ Mot. to Dismiss, supra, at pp. 6-8.)

On January 13, 2004, the Magistrate Judge issued a Report and Recommendation [Doc. # 52] in which she relied heavily on Amatel v. Reno, supra, in recommending that the Defendants’ motion be denied:

The reasoning advanced by Defendants necessarily assumes that the statute itself would be applied directly to the Plaintiffs to bar the viewing of R-rated movies in the absence of the implementing policy from which Plaintiffs seek relief. Such an assumption, however, was soundly rejected by the D.C. Circuit Court in Amatel, 156 F.3d at 194. In Amatel, federal prisoners brought a class action challenging the constitutionality of the Ensign Amendment and its implementing regulations. The D.C. district court directed its analysis primarily toward the statute in finding that the Ensign Amendment violated the First Amendment. On appeal, the D.C. Circuit Court rejected the district court’s analysis, stating, “[t]he district court seemed to assume that the statute has been and will be applied to these plaintiffs; ... [b]ut there is no suggestion that any warden does or will apply the statute directly; so far as appears, all enforcement is mediated through the regulations ... In the statutory borderland beyond the implementing regulations ... the prospect of enforcement appears completely insubstantial.” 156 F.3d at 194. Thus, the D.C. Circuit Court focused its analysis on “the substantive prohibitions of the regulations.” Id.

Consistent with the D.C. Circuit Court’s decision in Amatel, Plaintiffs have focused their constitutional challenge on the Zimmer Amendment’s implementing policy, P.S. 5370.10, rather than the statute itself. This policy specifically prohibits inmates from viewing R, X, and NC-17 movies and is directly applicable to them. Although it is true that the Zimmer Amendment would remain in effect if Plaintiffs are successful in having the policy struck down as unconstitutional, the statute does not, by its terms, have any direct application to federal prisoners. Instead, the Zimmer Amendment prohibits the BOP from using appropriated federal funds to provide federal prisoners with the means to view R, X, or NC-17 movies. In Ama-tel, the D.C. Circuit Court held “[ijnso-far as plaintiffs attack the proscriptions of the statute not embodied in the regulations, they effectively pursue a pre-enforcement challenge. Even in the First Amendment context, such a challenge presents a justiciable controversy only if the probability of enforcement is real and substantial.” 156 F.3d at 194....

In this case, there is no evidence of record to suggest that the Zimmer Amendment has been or will be applied directly to Plaintiffs to prohibit them from viewing R-rated movies in the same manner as P.S. 5370.10. Thus, a challenge to the constitutionality of the Zimmer Amendment by the Plaintiffs would be an impermissible pre-enforcement challenge. For standing purposes, a challenge to the BOP’s implementing policy embodied in P.S. 5370.10 is the only means currently available to Plaintiffs to seek redress from the constitutional injuries they claim to have suffered. [] As a result, Defendants’ motion to dismiss based on their assertion that Plaintiffs lack Article III standing to challenge only the constitutionality of P.S. 5370.10 should be denied.

(Id. at pp. 6-8 (internal footnote omitted).)

By order dated October 8, 2004, this Court adopted Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation and denied the Defendants’ motion to dismiss on jurisdictional grounds. (See Order dated 10/8/04 [Doc. # 60].) Thereafter, a case management schedule was established and the parties conducted their discovery.

Defendants filed their motion for summary judgment on July 1, 2005 and Plaintiffs filed their cross-motion for summary judgment on August 1, 2005. On August 31, 2005 the Magistrate Judge entered a Report and Recommendation concluding that the Plaintiffs’ motion should be granted and the Defendants’ motion should be denied. Defendants’ objections to the Report and Recommendation have been briefed and the matter is ripe for review.

III. DISCUSSION

In support of their motion for summary judgment, Defendants assert two arguments. First, they have renewed their jurisdictional challenge, claiming that the Plaintiffs lack standing to pursue this lawsuit because the litigation cannot provide any redress for their injuries. Second, and assuming this Court has jurisdiction to address Plaintiffs’ claims, Defendants argue that the policies being challenged pass constitutional muster under Turner. We will address each argument in order.

A. Defendants’ Jurisdictional Challenge

Our jurisdiction is limited by Article III of the Constitution to adjudicating “Cases” or “Controversies.” See U.S. Const, art. III, § 2; Khodara Environmental, Inc. v. Blakey, 376 F.3d 187,193 (3d Cir.2004). A plaintiff possesses constitutional standing to pursue a claim only if he can establish: (1) an injury-in-fact, which is an invasion of a legally protected interest that is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of; and (3) a likelihood, as opposed to mere speculation, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. Danvers Motor Co., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 432 F.3d 286, 290-91 (3d Cir.2005) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992); Khodara Environmental, Inc. supra, at 193 (collecting cases)). These requirements “ensure that plaintiffs have a ‘personal stake’ or ‘interest’ in the outcome of the proceedings, ‘sufficient to warrant ... [their] invocation of federal-court jurisdiction and to justify exercise of the court’s remedial powers on ... [their]) behalf.’ ” Khodara, 376 F.3d at 193 (alterations in the original) (citation omitted). A plaintiff bears the burden of proving standing. Danvers Motor Co. at 291 (citation omitted).

Defendants challenge only the redressability element of standing. Their argument is straightforward and goes as follows:

There are two independent prohibitions on prisoners viewing R-rated movies: (1) the Zimmer Amendment; and (2) the BOP Policy that implements the Zimmer Amendment. Currently, plaintiffs are only challenging the BOP Policy and, therefore, even if this Court were to enjoin the BOP Policy, BOP still could not show R-rated movies because the Zimmer Amendment, which this Court previously found constitutional, independently prohibits BOP employees from using federal funds to show prisoners R-rated movies. Hence, there is no longer a case or controversy because plaintiffs alleged injury is not redressable.... In short, there is no possible outcome on remand that can give plaintiffs the ultimate relief they seek — an order that permits BOP to show R-rated movies....

(Def.s’ Mot. for Summ. Judg. [Doc. # 69] at pp. 8-9.) Defendants’ theory thus rests on several assumptions: first, that there are two separate and legally independent proscriptions on the viewing of R-rated movies by prisoners; second, that the constitutional validity of the Zimmer Amendment has already been established for purposes of this litigation; and third, that the BOP would be required to enforce the Zimmer Amendment’s proscription on R-rated movies regardless of the outcome of this litigation.

We find that the foregoing assumptions are unwarranted on this record. First— notwithstanding the reasoning which we originally adopted in our October 8, 2004 order declining to dismiss this case on jurisdictional grounds — we conclude, upon further considered reflection, that it makes little sense in the context of this case to view the Zimmer Amendment and the BOP’s implementing policies as separate and distinct legal proscriptions on the viewing of R-rated movies. All parties agree that the administrative “policy” of banning such films, which Plaintiffs expressly challenged in their complaint, has its genesis in the Zimmer Amendment. As Defendants have consistently acknowledged throughout this litigation, the challenged prison policy does not reflect independent rule-making on the part of the BOP or FCI-McKean, but derives completely from the Zimmer Amendment and is, in effect, simply a restatement of the statute’s proscription. Thus, the prison policy at issue is nothing more than an attempt by the Defendants to implement what Defendants view as a Congressionally mandated ban on R-rated films. It necessarily follows — for reasons that will become more clear in our discussion applying the Turner factors — that our analysis of the challenged prison policy requires an analysis of the constitutionality vel non of the Amendment itself. Practically speaking, irrespective of whether the Plaintiffs have directly challenged the constitutionality of the Zimmer Amendment, analysis of that statute is inherent in, and necessary to, our analysis of the derivative ■ prison policy.

Defendants assume that the constitutionality of the Zimmer Amendment has been definitively ruled on for purposes of this case, but we find that this assumption, too, is flawed. It is true that our order of March 15, 2001 upheld both the Zimmer Amendment and its implementing regulations as constitutionally valid under Turner. Nevertheless, while the Plaintiffs abandoned any formal challenge to the statute on direct appeal, the Third Circuit’s opinion in Wolf v. Ashcroft, supra, leaves no doubt that the appellate court found our analysis (which we applied without any distinction as between the statute and the implementing policy) to be deficient, thereby implicitly — if not expressly-undermining the integrity of our prior ruling.

Finally, unlike the Defendants, we are not convinced that the outcome of this litigation will be immaterial to the Plaintiffs’ requests for relief. Defendants have professed an intention to continue to apply the Amendment’s proscription on R-rated movies, regardless of how this Court may ultimately rule on the constitutionality of the challenged prison policy. However, as we have already suggested — and as our analysis below demonstrates — application of the Turner factors in the context of this case makes sense only to the extent that the Amendment itself and its implementing policy are examined in lock-step with one another, as effectively one proscription. At the end of the day, this Court’s ruling on the prison policy banning R-rated movies must necessarily reflect our view as to the constitutionality vel non of the statute itself. In short, if this Court should enter a judgment favorable to the Plaintiffs, it would be difficult to conceive of any theory whereby the Zimmer Amendment could, consistent with our judgment, continue to be enforced against the Plaintiffs.

Defendants acknowledge that Plaintiffs need only show a “substantial likelihood” that the relief they request will remedy the alleged injury. See Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 771, 120 S.Ct. 1858, 146 L.Ed.2d 836 (2000) (quoted in Def.s’ Mot. for Summ. Judg. at p. 9.) Because we consider it likely that a judgment in their favor would ipso facto cast doubt on the constitutionality of the Zimmer Amendment itself, and because we assume that Defendants would abide by such a ruling, we conclude that Plaintiffs’ claims are redressable for Article III purposes and we proceed now to address the merits of those claims.

B. Defendants’ Argument Under Turner

As we have previously recognized, the test for evaluating restrictions on the First Amendment rights of prisoners is set forth in Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987). In Turner, “the Supreme Court recognized an enduring tension between two conflicting principles in operation whenever a prisoner brings a constitutional challenge to a law or regulation affecting prison policy.” Ramirez v. Pugh, 379 F.3d 122, 125-26 (3d Cir.2004). That is, the principle that “[pjrison walls do not form a barrier separating prison inmates from the protections of the Constitution” must be balanced against the competing principle, rooted in practical reality, that “the judicial branch is ill-suited for running the country’s prisons, a task committed to the particular expertise of the legislative and executive branches.” Id. at 126 (citing Tuner, 482 U.S. at'84-85, 107 S.Ct. 2254) (alterations in the original).

To accommodate these competing interests, the Supreme Court in Turner held that prison regulations implicating an inmate’s constitutional rights are valid so long as they are “reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” 482 U.S. at 89, 107 S.Ct. 2254. The Court established a four-part test for assessing the overall reasonableness of a challenged regulation, which our circuit court of appeals has summarized thus:

As a threshold inquiry, “there must be a Valid, rational connection’ between the prison regulation and the legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify it.” ... Courts must then determine “whether there are alternative means of exercising the right that remain open” to prisoners, and “[what] impact accommodation of the asserted constitutional right will have on guards and other inmates, and on the allocation of prison resources generally.” ... Finally, a regulation’s reasonableness may be evidenced by “the absence of ready alternatives” that would fully accommodate the constitutional right “at de minimis cost to valid penological interests.” ...

Ramirez, 379 F.3d at 126 (internal citations omitted) (alteration in the original).

While the Tuner factors “serve as guides to a single reasonableness standard,” the first factor “ ‘looms especially large’ because it ‘tends to encompass the remaining factors, and some of its criteria are apparently necessary conditions.’ ” Id. (quoting Waterman v. Farmer, 183 F.3d 208, 213-14 (3d Cir.1999)). If the connection between a prison policy and the government’s asserted interests is too tenuous, the policy is “arbitrary or irrational” and “fails irrespective of whether the other factors tilt in its favor.” Wolf, 297 F.3d at 309-10. Accord Ashker v. Califonia Dept. of Corrections, 350 F.3d 917, 923 (9th Cir.2003) (holding that, if a policy fails the first Tuner prong, the court need not address the other factors). The Supreme Court has made clear that the burden “is not on the State to prove the validity of prison regulations but on the prisoner to disprove it.” Overton, 539 U.S. at 132, 123 S.Ct. 2162. See also Williams v. Morton, 343 F.3d 212, 217 (3d Cir.2003) (“[T]he burden is not on the state to prove the validity of the challenged prison regulation but instead is on the inmate to disprove it.”). .

Here, Defendants have articulated numerous penological interests in support of the challenged policy, to wit: punishment, deterrence, prison security and institutional order, rehabilitation, the preservation of a safe and non-hostile work environment for BOP employees, and the promotion of efficiency and uniformity among federal prisons. In support of their position, Defendants have submitted the Declarations of Dennis Flatt, Supervisor of Education at FCI-McKean, and John M. Vanyur, Ph.D., a psychologist and Assistant Director of the Correctional Programs Division for the BOP.

Mr. Flatt’s Declaration establishes that FCI-McKean is a medium security institution which currently houses approximately 1600 inmates. {See Declaration of Dennis Flatt [Doc. # 69, Attachment 1] at ¶ 4.) The general population is a diverse group comprised of individuals convicted of a wide range of offenses. More than 200 inmates are currently serving sentences in excess of 20 years, including 16 individuals serving life sentences for such crimes as murder, armed bank robbery, assault with the intent to kill, mayhem while armed, rape and drug possession and distribution offenses. (Id.) Some 100 inmates have been classified as sex offenders, while another 200 have mental health issues for which they receive treatment. (Id.) Inmates assigned to the general population housing units at FCI-McKean are not segregated into any particular housing unit based on the nature of their criminal offenses, “as to do so could affect their personal safety and security by identifying to other inmates this sometimes sensitive information.” (Id. at ¶ 6.)

According to Mr. Flatt, the Movie Program at FCI McKean consists of showing movies over an internal television system to the common areas in each of the four units housing the general population of inmates. (Flatt Decl. at ¶ 7.) Each weekend, from approximately 5:00 pm on Friday to 12:00 noon on Sunday, two movies are shown to the inmate population. The movies are selected from a list or catalog provided by a local video store and consist of films rated G, PG, PG-13, and airline edited. (Id.) The prison does not exclude any particular class of inmates from the viewing of any particular movie because, according to Mr. Flatt, “[t]he inherent security risks referenced above, the composition of the inmate population at FCI McKean, the method of showing movies at this institution, and the staff time such an intensive screening would require do not make this option a viable one.” (Id. at ¶ 8.)

Dr. Vanyur notes in his declaration that the federal prison population is very different from that of the general public, as it contains a higher concentration of persons who have anti-social personalities, are violent, have mental health problems, and/or are sex offenders. (See Declaration of John M. Vanyur, Ph.D. [Doc. # 69, attachment 2] at ¶2.) Many of these inmates have trouble controlling their impulses. (Id.) Dr. Vanyur opines that R-rated movies tend to feed into certain “criminogenic risk factors” by exposing inmates to depictions of graphic violence, substance abuse, criminal behavior, victimization of others, violation of societal norms, and other themes which reinforce pro-criminal value systems and anti-social behaviors and beliefs. (Id. at ¶¶8-10.) Mr. Flatt and Dr. Vanyur collectively opine that the uniform banning of unedited R-rated movies in federal prisons furthers the various pe-nological interests set forth above.

For the most part, Plaintiffs do not dispute that the government has a legitimate interest in advancing its stated penological goals. (See Pl.s’ Br. in Opp. to Def.s’ Mot. for Summ. Judg. [Doc. # 71] at pp. 13-14 (citing DeHart v. Horn, 227 F.3d 47, 50 (3d Cir.2000); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 412, 94 S.Ct. 1800, 40 L.Ed.2d 224 (1974)).) Instead, they argue that the link between these stated interests and the R-rated movie ban is so attenuated as to render the general ban arbitrary and irrational under Turner.

The Magistrate Judge agreed with the Plaintiffs and found the first Turner prong dispositive of the matter. The “primary difficulty” with the R-rated movie ban, as she saw it, was “its use of the movie rating system established by the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) as the benchmark for determining what films may or may not be viewed by inmates.” (See Report and Recommendation (8/31/05) [Doc. # 76] at p. 9). Based upon an article by Jack Valenti, President of the MPAA, entitled “MPAA Rating History and How it Works,” the Magistrate Judge found that:

[t]wo major points are evident ... :(i) the MPAA ratings system is designed solely to guide parents’ decisions regarding the type of movies their children should be allowed to see; and (ii) ratings decisions are wholly subjective and merely represent estimates of what “most parents” would consider to be appropriate. Neither of these points provides any logical basis for the BOP’s imposition of a blanket ban on the showing of R-rated movies to adult inmates. As noted above, the ratings have no meaning for anyone over the age of 18. Thus, the rational relationship between a movie’s rating and the penological interests sought to be served by Defendants is tenuous at best. This is particularly true given the “ratings creep” that has occurred during the past several years, which blurs the line of distinction between the content of R-rated movies released over a decade ago and the content of PG-13 movies released today.

{Id. at p. 11 (discussing Jack Valenti, “MPAA Rating History and How it Works” (last revised in December 2000), published at Http://www.filmratings.com, at pp. 3-4).) The Magistrate Judge therefore concluded that the Defendants’ reliance on the MPAA rating system was not rationally connected to the advancement of any of its proffered penological interests. She further concluded that, even if a logical connection could be established between the ratings system and the government’s asserted penological goals, an absolute ban on all R-rated movies would run afoul of Turner because it constitutes an exaggerated response to the government’s stated interests. Accordingly, she recommended that the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment be denied and the Plaintiffs’ motion be granted.

Defendants fault the Magistrate Judge’s analysis in three principal respects. First, they dispute her conclusion that the MPAA ratings system lacks definable standards and is an inappropriate tool for determining the propriety of certain films in a prison setting. They characterize the Magistrate Judge’s focus on the MPAA rating system as “misguided,” since the “BOP Policy in this case merely implemented a prohibition that was contained in a statute, specifically, the Zimmer Amendment.” (Def.’s Objections to Mag. Judge’s R & R [Doc. # 77] at p. 4.) Defendants protest that “it was Congress, not the BOP, who determined that R-rated movies should not be shown in prison.” {Id.)

Second, Defendants contend that the Magistrate Judge improperly shifted the burden of proof onto them, contrary to the Supreme Court’s mandate in Overton v. Bazzetta, supra. Defendants object that the Magistrate Judge did not credit evidence proffered by their two prison officials regarding the penological interests served by the R-rated movie ban. At the same time, they claim, the Magistrate Judge failed to cite any evidence provided by Plaintiffs to prove that the restriction is not reasonably related to the stated peno-logical interests.

Finally, ’ the Defendants object to the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that the R-rated movie ban constitutes an “exaggerated response” to the asserted penological interests. According to Defendants, that inquiry is properly undertaken in conjunction with the fourth Turner prong rather than the first prong, which was the focus of the Magistrate Judge’s analysis. Moreover, Defendants argue, the Plaintiffs have not pointed to “an alternative that fully accommodates the prisoners’ rights at de minimis cost to valid penological interests”, as the law requires. Defendants reason that the ban cannot be an “exaggerated response” if there are no obvious easy alternatives.

We turn then to an examination of the relevant Turner factors, applying de novo review of the Magistrate Judge’s conclusions and recommendations and giving due regard to the Defendants’ objections.

(i)

The first Turner prong requires us to consider whether the restriction at issue bears a valid, rational connection to the “legitimate and neutral” governmental interest put forward to justify it. Fraise v. Terhune, 283 F.3d 506, 513 (3d Cir.2002) (citing Turner, at 91, 107 S.Ct. 2254). A prison restriction “fails to satisfy this prong if [it] promotes an interest that is illegitimate or not neutral, or if the [restriction] bears no ‘valid, rational connection’ to the asserted interest.” Waterman, 183 F.3d at 214 (citing Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-90, 107 S.Ct. 2254). “Neutrality” in this sense simply means that “the regulation or practice in question must further an important or substantial governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of expression.” Amatel v. Reno, 156 F.3d 192, 197 (D.C.Cir.1998) (quoting Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 415, 109 S.Ct. 1874, 104 L.Ed.2d 459 (1989)).

In the context of this case, there does not appear to be any dispute about the “neutrality” of the challenged policy. All of the justifications proffered in support of the ban are unrelated to the suppression of ideas or expression. In addition, the Plaintiffs have conceded that punishment, deterrence, rehabilitation, and the preservation of security and institutional order are legitimate penological interests. As we have noted above, the dispute in this case centers on whether the policy of banning unedited R-rated movies rationally furthers the foregoing penological interests.

a. Punishment/Deterrence/Efficient Resource Allocation

We begin by recognizing, as Defendants have consistently asserted, that the “policy” of uniformly banning unedited R-rated movies at FCI-McKean was the direct result of, and merely an attempt to enforce, a Congressional mandate set forth in the Zimmer Amendment. Enacted as a budgetary rider, the Amendment provided that:

[n]one of the funds made available in this Act shall be used to provide the following amenities or personal comforts in the Federal prison system—

(1) in-cell television viewing except for prisoners who are segregated from the general population for their own safety;

(2) the viewing of R, X and NC-17 rated movies, through whatever medium presented;

(3) any instruction (live or through broadcasts) or training equipment for boxing, wrestling, judo, karate, or other martial art, or any bodybuilding or weightlifting equipment of any sort;

(4) possession of in-cell coffee pots, hot plates, or heating elements; or

(5) the use or possession of any electric or electronic musical instrument.

See Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub.L. No. 104-134, § 611, 110 Stat. 1321 (April 26, 1996).

That the Amendment was primarily aimed at reducing or eliminating public funding for perceived “prison frills” is supported by the legislative history, which consists of a statement made by Representative Dick Zimmer, the sponsor of the Amendment, on the floor of the House of Representatives:

[T]his amendment deals with prison amenities. Prison perks are bad public policy and a waste of taxpayer dollars. My amendment is designed to start eliminating them from Federal Prisons.

In some prisons, inmate amenities are better than what law-abiding Americans have. Prisons should be places of detention and punishment; prison perks undermine the concept of jails as a deterrence. They also waste taxpayer money....

[M]y amendment would help end this taxpayer abuse by prohibiting funds from being spent in Federal prisons on luxuries such as martial arts instruction, weight rooms, in-cell televisions, sexually explicit or violent movies, and expensive electronic musical instruments. We must make sure we are spending public funds wisely, not using them on amenities that have little or no bearing on institutional security and that far exceed basic standards of human dignity....

[M]y amendment has won the support of the Law Enforcement Alliance of America, the Nation’s largest coalition of law enforcement officers, crime victims, and concerned citizens. This is a reasonable amendment. It does not provide for a return of the chain gang. It does provide for a return to common sense....

* * * * * *

Earlier this year during consideration of the anti-crime component of the Contract with America, this House accepted a no-frills prison amendment I offered that requires the Attorney General to set specific standards governing conditions in the Federal prison system that provide the least amount of amenities and personal comforts consistent with constitutional requirements and good order and discipline in the Federal prison system.

That amendment also requires the Bureau of Prisons to submit an annual audit to Congress listing exactly how much is spent at each Federal prison for basics and how much is spent on extras, perks, and amenities.

This requirement will allow Congress to get a handle on whether we are spending taxpayers money on reasonable items to maintain and secure prisoners, or whether money is being wasted on luxuries that many law-abiding Americans cannot afford.

We must make sure we are spending public funds wisely-not using them on amenities that have little bearing on institutional security.

141 Cong. Rec. H7751-01 (quoted in Kimberlin v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 150 F.Supp.2d 36, 39-40 (D.D.C.2001), aff'd 318 F.3d 228 (D.C.Cir.2003), reh’g en banc denied, 351 F.3d 1165 and 1166 (D.C.Cir.2003)). The record contains numerous press releases published by Representative Zimmer’s office in connection with the Amendment’s enactment, all of which further demonstrate that the law was designed to reduce expenditures of public monies on perceived prison luxuries.

Because the Amendment’s mandate did not admit of any discretion on the part of the BOP, the BOP did not promulgate any regulations relative to the Zimmer Amendment. See Kimberlin, 150 F.Supp.2d at 40 (citing remarks by the BOP’s Rules Administrator that, “[bjecause the provisions of the Zimmer Amendment do not allow the BOP any discretion in the provisioning of specific amenities, there is not need to initiate rulemaking under the [APA].”). Instead, the BOP updated Program Statement 5370.10 and issued internal memo-randa to comply with the Amendment, while FCI-McKean updated Institutional Supplement 5370.08.

Both the Program Statement and the Institutional Supplement interpret and implement the Zimmer Amendment as a functional ban on various amenities, including unedited R-rated movies. The parties agree that this is a reasonable interpretation of the Amendment. See Am-atel, 156 F.3d at 194 n. 1 (In prison, “[w]here the government absolutely monopolizes the means of speech or controls a bottleneck, ... a refusal to fund functions the same as an outright ban.”); Kimberlin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 318 F.3d 228, 232 (D.C.Cir.2003) (BOP’s interpretation of Zimmer Amendment as imposing an outright ban of electrical instruments was reasonable; the restriction on using appropriated funds for the “use or possession” of electric and electronic instruments may reasonably be construed to prohibit paying for costs incidental to such use or possession, including costs incurred for storage, supervision and electricity), reh’g en banc denied, 351 F.3d 1165 and 1166 (D.C.Cir.2003). See also Environmental Defense Ctr. v. Babbitt, 73 F.3d 867, 871-72 (9th Cir.1995) (holding that “[t]he use of any government resources — ■ whether salaries, employees, paper, or buildings — to accomplish a final listing [of a species as endangered] would entail government expenditure” and thereby run afoul of statutory moratorium on spending for such purpose; “The government cannot make expenditures, and therefore cannot act, other than by appropriation.”).

Given the context in which the challenged policy came into existence — i.e., without any input, rule-making, or discretion on the part of the BOP — we conclude that the most sensible way of performing a Turner analysis is to first consider the Congressional directive which gave rise to the policy. As we have seen, the most obvious rationale underlying the Zimmer Amendment’s de facto ban on R-rated movies is the government’s interests in reducing public expenditures on allegedly excessive amenities and personal comforts for federal prisoners. By reducing these expenditures, Congress sought to enhance the punitive aspect of federal prisons, thereby furthering the goal of deterrence by making prison a less desirable place, while at the same time promoting a more efficient allocation of federal prison resources. We consider these interests in turn.

(i) Punishment/Detemnce

“[P]unishment and deterrence are unquestionably among the fundamental ‘goals of the penal function in the criminal justice system.’ ” Kimberlin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 318 F.3d at 239 (Tatel, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 352, 101 S.Ct. 2392, 69 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981)). See also Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822, 94 S.Ct. 2800, 41 L.Ed.2d 495 (1974) (“An important function of the corrections system is the deterrence of crime. The premise is that by confining criminal offenders in a facility where they are isolated from the rest of society, a condition that most people presumably find undesirable, they and others will be deterred from committing additional criminal offenses.”). Though conceptually distinct, these goals are also closely related; in theory, any condition which makes prison life less desirable, and therefore inflicts greater punishment on the criminal, ought to discourage the criminal and other like-minded individuals from engaging in conduct which would result in future imprisonment.

Plaintiffs insist that it is “absurd” to believe there is any meaningful punitive or deterrent value to be derived from the policy of uniformly banning R-rated films. They point out that FCI-McKean’s current recreational program allows inmates to watch other categories of movies as well as a variety of cable TV programming, such that the punitive value of the R-rated movie ban is substantially watered down. In addition, Plaintiffs argue, the punitive aspect of prison derives oveiwhelmingly from the loss of freedom and personal liberties that inmates must endure consistent with their status as prisoners, not the least of which are the loss of contact with family and friends outside the institution and confinement in a cell.

Defendants counter, however, that the Plaintiffs are viewing the issue out of context to the extent they ask whether the lack of R-rated films in and of itself inflicts punishment or deters crime. Defendants suggest that, instead, we should consider the deterrent value of the Zimmer Amendment as a whole. They conclude “it is not irrational to believe that banning a broad spectrum of amenities and thereby making prison harsher and less desirable may produce a deterrent effect.” (Def.’s Reply in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. Judg. [Doc. # 74] at p. 6.)

At first blush, Defendants’ argument has some appeal. In Kimberlin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra, the district court addressed the BOP’s policy of banning electronic musical instruments in federal prisons, a restriction also rooted in the Zimmer Amendment. In upholding the ban, the district court noted that, “Congress took away several amenities that, in the aggregate, it perceived would make prisons more of a deterrent. While banning musical instruments, by itself, may not actually deter anyone, it is possible that BOP (and Congress) thought the ban would indicate to society that prison is a harsh place where one does not want to be.” 150 F.Supp.2d at 45. “The supposition that exclusion of electric instruments will have much of an impact on this perception may be optimistic,” the court wrote, “but it is not irrational,” especially when the ban on other amenities (including, among other things, R, X, and NC-17 rated movies, weightlifting equipment, martial arts training, in-cell coffee pots and in-cell televisions) is considered. Id. In a per curiam opinion, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s ruling on different grounds, see Kimberlin, 318 F.3d at 233-34 (holding that for purposes of Turner’s first prong, the BOP’s ban rationally furthered the government’s legitimate interest in conserving correctional departmental funds), but one circuit judge on the panel would have upheld the ban for the reasons articulated by the district court — i.e., that the ban is reasonably related to the asserted goal of deterrence through punishment. See id. at 234-35 (Henderson, J., concurring).

This theory, however, becomes problematic when taken to its logical conclusion. The concern was cogently explained by Judge Tatel, the dissenting circuit judge in Kimberlin: 318 F.3d at 239-40 (Tatel, J., dissenting in part) (internal citation omitted). As Judge Tatel succinctly observed, “regulations that deprive prisoners of their constitutional rights will ahoays be rationally related to the goal of making prison more miserable.” Id. at 240.

... Does the goal of enhancing the punitive and deterrent value of prison by making prison conditions more onerous justify limiting prisoners’ constitutional rights? As long as [Turner v.] Safley is the law — that is, as long as prisoners generally retain their constitutional rights — the answer must be no, for there is no discernable limit to the government’s ability to invoke punishment or deterrence as reasons for adopting regulations that restrict constitutional rights. The BOP’s rationale for banning electric guitars could also justify banning all musical instruments, or all music, or even all books, including the Bible and the Koran, on the ground that denying these “perks” will make prison more onerous and “more of a place of deterrence and punishment.” ... Under this theory, the government could, subject only to whatever limitations the Eighth Amendment imposes, reduce prisons to places of virtually silent, solitary confinement, where prisoners may not read, write, or engage in any other expressive activity.

Moreover, Turner’s deferential standard of review is rooted in a judicial aversion to meddling in fundamental matters of prison administration such as “the preservation of internal order or discipline, the maintenance of institutional security against escape or unauthorized entry, and the rehabilitation of the prisoners,” — all matters peculiarly within the expertise of prison officials. Id. at 240 (quoting Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 412, 94 S.Ct. 1800, 40 L.Ed.2d 224 (1974)). These operational, security, and management concerns have little to do with measures that would restrict First Amendment rights in the interest of punishment for its own sake. Id. Perhaps that is why, as the district court noted in Kimberlin, “the government has never defended a [First Amendment] restriction solely on deterrence or punishment grounds,” despite Congress’ well-recognized and legitimate interest in those goals. See 150 F.Supp.2d at 44 (“This appears to be the first instance where the government asserts only deterrence and/or punishment as a legitimate reason for limiting a prisoner’s First Amendment rights. The government usually asserts internal order, security, and/or rehabilitation as the legitimate objective.”) (citations omitted). It is debatable, therefore, whether punishment and/or deterrence are legitimate governmental interests in and of themselves for purposes of a Turner analysis. See Kimberlin, 318 F.3d at 240 (Tatel, J., dissenting) {“[Turner v.] Safley does not contemplate punishment as one of the interests that justifies restriction on prisoners’ constitutional rights.”)

That debate is further fueled by the fact that the remaining Turner factors make little sense in the context of a regulation for which punishment and deterrence are the only asserted justifications. Id. Turner’s second, third, and fourth inquiries “are designed to ensure that legitimate management and security considerations do not unnecessarily limit prisoners’ constitutional rights.” Id. However,

if the government’s very purpose is to make prison more onerous, then why ask whether there are alternative means of expression available or less costly ways to accommodate the constitutional rights at issue? After all, the greater the deprivation, the stronger the connection between the restriction and the government’s goal of punishment and deterrence.

Id.

In expressing our concern about upholding the challenged movie ban based on the government’s interest in punishment and deterrence, we do not suggest that these interests are generally invalid or can never support the reduction of prison amenities. Nor do we mean to imply that prisons should be places of luxury. On the contrary, a regulation which, consistent with the Eighth Amendment, reduces purely physical or recreational comforts unrelated to free speech might easily pass muster as a reasonable restriction that rationally furthers the government’s legitimate interests in punishment and deterrence. See Kim-berlin, supra, at 239 (Tatel, J., dissenting) (“I have no doubt that the government may enhance prison’s punitive and deterrent value by eliminating weightlifting equipment, in-cell coffee pots, and other ‘perks’ not protected by the First Amendment.”). Moreover, Turner does not necessarily preclude the executive or legislative branches from restricting prisoners’ constitutional rights as a means of addressing misconduct that occurs within the correctional institution. In such instances, a restriction on prisoners’ constitutional rights may well be undertaken to inflict punishment on the wayward inmate and deter future misconduct, but it will not be for the sake of punishment or deterrence alone; rather, the loss of privileges will almost inevitably be designed to serve the broader and more obvious penological interests of preserving institutional order and discipline, maintaining institutional security, and rehabilitating prisoners — all of which are fundamentally tied to the effective administration of prisons and which lie at the heart of Turner’s deferential standard of review. See Kimberlin, 318 F.3d at 240 (Tatel, J., dissenting in part). Whether the restriction passes muster will, of course, depend on its connection to these valid penological interests.

Our point is simply that, to justify a regulation which restricts the First Amendment rights of prisoners on the basis that it rationally advances punishment and deterrence for their own sake is to espouse a principle with potentially no boundaries and one which could conceivably lead to the complete evisceration of many, if not most, constitutional rights. Thus, the ban on unedited R-rated films cannot be upheld under the theory that it is reasonably related to the goal of furthering punishment and deterrence.

(ii) Efficient Allocation of Prison Resources

As we have seen, however, Representative Zimmer expressed another rationale for banning R-rated movies and other prison “perks”: a desire to re-direct the public funding of prisons in a more efficient manner. As articulated by Representative Zimmer, his Amendment was aimed at ensuring that taxpayers’ money is spent on “reasonable measures” to maintain and secure prisoners rather than unnecessary “luxuries.”

Promoting the efficient allocation of prison resources has been recognized as a legitimate governmental interest. See, e.g., Williams v. Morton, 343 F.3d 212 (3d Cir.2003) (prison’s policy of providing Muslim inmates vegetarian meals, rather than Halal meals with meat in conformance with the Muslim inmates’ religious beliefs, was rationally related to legitimate peno-logical interests in, among other things, simplified food service and staying within the prison’s budget). See also Orafan v. Goord, 411 F.Supp.2d 153 (N.D.N.Y.2006) (recognizing prison’s legitimate penological interest in efficient and economical operations in the context of an alleged Establishment Clause violation); Breakiron v. Neal, 166 F.Supp.2d 1110 (N.D.Tex.2001) (County’s act of deducting payments from prisoner’s inmate trust account for medical services rendered was rationally related to county’s legitimate interest in the efficient use of prison resources for purposes of Equal Protection Claim). Thus, the question becomes whether that interest is rationally furthered by the ban on unedited R-rated movies.

In Kimberlin, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia upheld the Zim-mer Amendment’s ban on electrical instruments on the theory that it bears a reasonable relationship to the legitimate governmental interest of conserving correctional departmental funds. 318 F.3d at 233. In finding a rational connection, the court observed: “[c]ommon sense tells us ... that a prisoner’s possession and use of an electric guitar costs correctional institutions money for electricity, upkeep, storage and supervision.” Id.

Such a rationale is not so easily transposed to the facts of this case, however, where the Amendment and implementing policy do not ban films in their entirety, but ban only a broad category of films. Whatever institutional costs might otherwise have been incurred by FCI-McKean as an incident of showing of R-rated movies (e.g., electricity, gas money to obtain the films, the expense of maintaining VCR equipment, etc.) must nevertheless be incurred, in any event, given the fact that G, PG, PG-13, and airline edited movies continue to be shown at the Institution. Thus, in one respect, the banning of R-rated movies does not rationally advance the Amendment’s apparent goal of saving tax-payer dollars by curbing spending on prison “luxuries” — unless one accepts the proposition that unedited R-rated movies are somehow a distinct “luxury” in and of themselves simply by virtue of their rating. We are not prepared to accept that proposition, as there is no apparent basis from which to rationally conclude, on this record, that R-rated movies constitutes more of a “luxury” than, e.g., movies with a G, PG or PG-13 rating.

Importantly, however, Defendants have argued that the challenged policy helps conserve BOP resources in other respects. Dr. Vanyur states in his declaration that the R-rated movie ban “benefits the administration of the federal prisons” in that “[s]taff no longer pre-screen R-rated movie titles and contents, nor view videos sent by mail; tasks which were time-consuming and staff intensive.” (Vanyur Decl. at ¶ 15.) Mr. Flatt adds in his declaration that:

[pjrior to the Zimmer Amendment, when select R-rated movies were still permitted to be shown, the decision