Fleming v. Dowdell (434 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 2005)

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

IRA DeMENT, Senior District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

Before the court is a motion for summary judgment (Doc. No. 57) filed by Defendants Eddie Dowdell, Johnnie Johnson, Donald Parker, Gladys Riddle and Martha White. Accompanying said motion are a memorandum brief and an evidentiary submission. (Doc. Nos.58-59.) Plaintiff Herbert Fleming filed a brief in opposition and an evidentiary submission. (Doc. Nos.68-69.)

Also before the court is a motion for summary judgment (Doc. No. 52) filed by Defendant Beth Poe. Poe filed a brief in support of her motion and an evidentiary submission. (Doc. Nos.53-54.) A response, reply and surreply followed. (Doc. Nos.63, 66, 67.)

Fleming commenced this lawsuit, seeking money damages for deprivations of rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law when he was continued on parole and, ultimately, incarcerated on parole violations, despite the fact that Fleming’s writ of habeas corpus had been granted, and his underlying judgment of conviction vacated, by a federal court. Dowdell, Johnson, Parker, Riddle and White are employees of the Alabama Board of Pardons and Paroles who played a role in Fleming’s parole supervision and parole violation proceedings, and Poe is the assistant state attorney general who opposed Fleming’s writ of habeas corpus. There is no dispute that Fleming suffered a substantial deprivation of liberty in this case, as he remained under parole supervision and was incarcerated on parole violations for approximately five years longer than he was legally required. There also is no dispute that neither Fleming, Dowdell, Johnson, Parker, Riddle nor White was aware of the federal court’s order.

Although what happened to Fleming is grievous, having carefully considered the arguments of counsel, the relevant law and the record as a whole, the court finds the above Defendants cannot be held liable for the liberty deprivations under either § 1983 or state law. The court, therefore, finds that the motions for summary judgment are due to be granted.

II.JURISDICTION AND VENUE

The court exercises subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 for all claims arising under federal law. The court also has original jurisdiction over claims based upon violations of civil rights. See 28 U.S.C. § 1343. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367, the court has supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claim. The parties do not contest personal jurisdiction or venue.

III.STANDARD OF REVIEW

A court considering a motion for summary judgment must construe the evidence and make factual inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Cebtex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970). Summary judgment is entered only if it is shown “that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.CivJP. 56(c). At this juncture, the court does not “weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter,” but solely “determined whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (citations omitted). This determination involves applying substantive law to the substantive facts that have been developed. A dispute about a material fact is genuine if a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party, based on the applicable law in relation to the evidence developed. See id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505; Barfield v. Brierton, 883 F.2d 923, 933 (11th Cir.1989).

The moving party bears the initial burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. The burden then shifts to the non-moving party who “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Ebc. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). Summary judgment will not be entered unless the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party. See id. at 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348.

IV.BACKGROUND

In January 1991, Plaintiff Herbert Fleming was convicted upon a plea of guilty and sentenced in the Circuit Court of Etowah County, Alabama, on a reduced charge for receiving stolen property. (2nd Am. Compl. ¶ 7 (Doc. No. 23).) Because Fleming was a habitual offender, he was sentenced to life imprisonment and was committed to the custody of the Alabama Department of Corrections. (Id.)

While confined in a state penitentiary, Fleming filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama. (Id. ¶ 8.) He named as respondents “Warden Thomas” and the Attorney General of the State of Alabama and sought relief from the 1991 judgment and sentence of the Circuit Court of Etowah County. Defendant Beth Poe, an assistant attorney general, represented the respondents in the habeas corpus proceedings. (PI. Habeas Corpus Pet. (Doc. No. 65, Ex. 1); Resp’ts Answer to PI. Habeas Corpus Pet. (Doc. No. 65, Ex. 2).)

On January 26, 1998, during the pen-dency of his habeas corpus proceedings, Fleming was released to parole supervision, subject to certain conditions and restrictions. (Certifícate of Parole (Doc. No. 54, Ex. 4).) Defendant Eddie Dowdell, a parole officer employed by the Alabama Board of Pardons and Paroles (“BOPP”), supervised Fleming while he was on parole. (2nd Am.Compl.KH 2, 11.) The restrictions of Fleming’s parole included, in part, a requirement that Fleming “periodically meet with or otherwise report to” Dowdell. (Id.)

On May 5, 1998, while Fleming was serving his term of parole, the late Honorable Edwin L. Nelson, United States District Judge for the Northern District of Alabama, adopted the recommendation of the magistrate judge and entered a final judgment granting Fleming’s habeas corpus petition. (Id. ¶ 13; Final Judgment (Doc. No. 59, Ex. 4).) As grounds, the district court found that, because the offense to which Fleming pleaded guilty was not a lesser included offense of the original charge in the indictment, Fleming’s judgment of conviction was obtained without due process of law, in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth amendments. (Doc. No. 54, Ex. 5.) In the final judgment, the district court “ordered that any retrial of petitioner must commence within 120 days” of the date of entry of the final judgment. (2nd Am. Compl. ¶ 13; Final Judgment (Doc. No. 59, Ex. 4).)

The district court’s final judgment also contained a footnote indicating that a copy of the magistrate judge’s recommendation had been served on Fleming, but had been returned to the clerk of the court, marked “return to sender.” (Final Judgment (Doc. No. 59, Ex. 4).) In the same footnote, the district court stated that it independently had attempted to ascertain Fleming’s current mailing address through the Central Records Division of the Alabama Department of Corrections. (Id.) As further noted, the Central Records Division advised that Fleming had been paroled and that the only address in its records for Fleming was 1200 Kentucky Avenue, Gadsden, Alabama. The district court, thus, directed the clerk of the court to mail the final judgment, vacating Fleming’s conviction, to the Gadsden address. (Id.) The court records also reflect that copies of the May 5, 1998 final judgment were mailed to Poe and the Attorney General of the State of Alabama. (Id.)

Upon receipt of the magistrate judge’s recommendation, Poe discussed the case with her supervisor, after which Poe conducted research to determine whether to file an objection to the recommendation and, ultimately, whether to appeal any unfavorable judgment. (Poe Dep. at 31-34 (Doe. No. 65).) Poe also engaged in several communications, by telephone and letter, with the district attorney who prosecuted Fleming on the underlying criminal charges and provided him (the district attorney) a copy of the magistrate judge’s recommendation. (Id. at 41-42; Letters (Doc. No. 54, Exs.6, 8).) Poe advised the district attorney that, based on her research, she believed that the magistrate judge’s findings were correct and that, therefore, unless the district attorney proffered a reasonable argument, she would not file an objection to the recommendation. (Letter (Doc. No. 54, Ex. 6).) The district attorney advised Poe that the State of Alabama intended to retry Fleming on the original charges. (Poe Dep. at 42.) Poe, at that point, had no further involvement in Fleming’s case. (Id. at 51-53.)

Ultimately, for reasons not in the record, the State of Alabama did not retry Fleming. (2nd ArmCompl^ 15.) At the latest then, after the expiration of the 120-day time frame for retrial, Fleming was released from all attendants of his state court judgment of conviction based on the district court’s final judgment granting ha-beas relief to Fleming.

On January 12, 2000, some two years and eight months after the district court in the Northern District of Alabama entered its final judgment in Fleming’s habeas corpus lawsuit, Dowdell arrested Fleming for parole violations based on a positive drug test for marijuana and a failure to pay restitution. (Dowdell Dep. at 21, 28 (Doc. No. 59, Ex. 7); Report of Parole Violation (Doc. No. 46, Ex. 4).) It is undisputed that Dowdell, like Fleming, did not know that Fleming’s judgment of conviction from which the parole violations stemmed had been set aside. (Dowdell Dep. at 37-38 (Ex. to Doc. No. 59); 2nd Am. Compl. ¶ 16.)

Defendant Donald Parker (“Parker”), now retired, formerly served as the executive director of the BOPP. (Parker Aff. at 1 (Ex. to Doc. No. 37).) After reviewing Dowdell’s report charging Fleming with violating conditions of his parole, Parker determined that the charges were supported by “reasonable cause.” (Id.) Parker, thus, “authorizfed]” the Department of Corrections to issue a fugitive warrant for the retaking and detaining of Fleming. (Id.); see Ala.Code § 15-22-31(a) (1975). Fleming, thus, was held in custody on the fugitive warrant issued by the Department of Corrections at the behest of Parker. Parker also was unaware that Fleming’s judgment of conviction had been set aside. (2nd Am. Compl. ¶ 16; Parker Aff. at 2 (Ex. to Doc. No. 37).)

Thereafter, on January 26, 2000, Defendant Martha White, acting as a parole court hearing officer, see AIa.Code § 15-22-32 (1975), conducted a fact-finding hearing on the parole violation charges. (See form titled, “Action of the Board Subsequent to Parole Court” (Doc. No. 59, Ex. 10); White Dep. at 77-79, 89-90 (Ex. to Doc. No. 59).) Based on Fleming’s admission of guilt on the charges, (see form titled “Finding of Guilt Upon Guilty Plea” (Doc. No. 46, Ex. 9)), White found that Fleming was guilty of violating his parole. (Id.) White recommended to the Board that Fleming’s parole be revoked. (Id.; see also Doc. No. 59, Ex. 10.) Acting on White’s recommendation, Defendants Gladys Riddle and Johnnie Johnson Jr., members of the BOPP, revoked Fleming’s parole on March 8, 2000.(M) Fleming was returned to prison for a minimum term of two years. (Report of Parole Violation (Doc. No. 46, Ex. 4); 2nd Am. Compl. ¶ 19.)

It is undisputed that Johnson, Riddle and White did not know that a federal court had vacated Fleming’s judgment of conviction. (2nd Am. Compl. ¶ 16; White Dep. at 33-35, 79 (Ex. to Doc. No. 59).) It also is undisputed that neither Johnson, Riddle nor White independently inquired into the validity of the underlying judgment of conviction. (White Dep. at 90 (Ex. to Doc. No. 59).) White says, though, that had Fleming informed her that he had filed a habeas corpus writ challenging the validity of the underlying judgment of conviction, she would have checked on the status of that case. (White Dep. at 34-35 (Doc. No. 54, Ex. 13); Riddle Dep. at 45 (Doc. No. 54, Ex. 14).) White says, however, that she is unaware of any procedure in place requiring the BOPP to verify the validity of a facially-valid judgment of conviction. (White Dep. at 90 (Ex. to Doc. No. 59).)

More than three years passed, and, finally, on July 27, 2003, while incarcerated on the parole violations, Fleming wrote the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, inquiring about the status of his habeas corpus petition. (PI. Letter (Ex. 9 to Doc. No. 54); 2nd Am. Compl. ¶22.) In response to Fleming’s letter, on August 12, 2003, the district court entered an order, directing that Fleming “be RELEASED FORTHWITH from incarceration.” (2nd Am. Compl. ¶ 24; Aug. 12, 2003 Order at 1 (Ex. to Compl.).) The order provided that “[t]he State of Alabama may not re-try [Fleming] on the vacated conviction, nor may the vacated conviction be used to incarcerate [Fleming] in the future or enhance the penalty for any subsequent conviction [Fleming] may receive.” (Aug. 12, 2003 Order at 1 (Ex. to Compl.).) Fleming was released on August 13, 2003, after serving “3 years, 7 months and [1] day” in the state prison system on parole violations which stemmed from a vacated judgment of conviction. (2nd Am. Compl. ¶ 21.)

Seeking monetary damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law for injuries resulting from the foregoing events, Fleming commenced this lawsuit on November 24, 2003, alleging § 1983 constitutional claims under the Eighth and Fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution. The Second Amended Complaint contains four counts. In Count 1, Fleming alleges that he was deprived of “liberty without due process of law,” in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, and was subjected to cruel and unusual punishment, in contravention of the Eighth Amendment. (Id. ¶26.) In this count, he sues, among others, Dowdell, Johnson, Parker, Poe, Riddle and White.

In Count 2, Fleming asserts that Dow-dell, Johnson, Parker, Poe, Riddle and White are liable to him for false imprisonment as defined by state law. (Id. ¶¶ 27-30.) As grounds, Fleming avers that, during the time frame he was under parole supervision after which his underlying judgment of conviction had been vacated, and from January 12, 2000, to August 13, 2003 (i.e., the time period during which Fleming was incarcerated on parole violations), each Defendant “unlawfully and without authority exerted compulsory control over and interfered with [ ] Fleming’s movements and liberty.” (Id. ¶ 28.)

Count 3 is lodged only against Johnson and Riddle. Fleming alleges that, in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth amendments, these two Defendants unlawfully revoked Fleming’s parole and “without proper authority ordered and directed that [ ] Fleming be arrested and confined at a state penitentiary pursuant to his invalidated conviction and sentence.” (Id. ¶¶ 31-34.)

Finally, Count 4 asserts a state law claim for false imprisonment against Johnson and Riddle predicated on allegations that, “in excess of their lawful authority,” they “revoked the parole granted [ ] Fleming from the sentence imposed pursuant to his invalidated conviction and sentence and directed that [he] be arrested and confined at a state penitentiary pursuant to his invalidated conviction and sentence.” (Id. ¶ 37.) On each count in the Second Amended Complaint, Fleming seeks $5,000,000 in compensatory damages and $5,000,000 in punitive damages. (Id. at 7, 9.)

V. DISCUSSION

Defendants move for summary judgment, asserting that they are entitled to absolute and qualified immunities on the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims and State-agent immunity on the state law claims for false imprisonment. Moreover, Defendants contend that the statute of limitations has run on the § 1983 claims. Fleming opposes each ground for summary judgment.

First, the court addresses the motion for summary judgment filed by the employees of the BOPP, i.e., Dowdell, Johnson, Parker, Riddle and White. Second, the court examines Poe’s motion for summary judgment.

A. Dowdell, Johnson, Parker, Riddle and White

1. 12 U.S.C. § 1983 constitutional claims

Dowdell, Johnson, Parker, Riddle and White contend that, in their individual capacities, they are absolutely immune from liability in damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on the. basis of quasi-judicial immunity. Alternatively, Dowdell contends that he is protected from individual liability under the doctrine of qualified immunity.

Before proceeding to the immunity anal-yses, the court addresses two preliminary issues. First, it is important to ascertain what constitutional rights Fleming deems these Defendants to have violated, particularly given that Fleming’s Second Amended Complaint and his pleadings filed in response to the summary judgment motion are not wholly congruous as to the constitutional theories of liability. See Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271, 114 S.Ct. 807, 127 L.Ed.2d 114 (1994) (“The first step in any [§ 1983] claim is to identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed.”); see also Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 140, 99 S.Ct. 2689, 61 L.Ed.2d 433 (1979). Second, the court examines the threshold question of whether a constitutional violation has occurred in the first place because the absence of a constitutional violation obviates the need to analyze the immunity defense. Cf. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201,121 S.Ct. 2151,150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001) (“The initial inquiry is whether a constitutional right would have been violated on the facts alleged, for if no right would have been violated, there is no need for further inquiry into [qualified] immunity.”).

(a) Identifying the Specific Constitutional Right Allegedly Infringed

In the Second Amended Complaint, Fleming alleges that Dowdell, Johnson, Parker, Riddle and White deprived him of liberty without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment “and/ or” violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. (2nd Am. Compl. ¶ 26 (Doc. No. 23).) Fleming, however, has abandoned the Eighth Amendment claim as to all of the BOPP Defendants, except Parker. As to Johnson, Riddle and White, Fleming states: “The legal basis for the § 1983 claim against these defendants is that by their actions in revoking the parole from a non-existent and invalidated conviction and sentence, these defendants unlawfully deprived Fleming of his Fourth and/or Fourteenth Amendment rights by causing his detention within a penal institution of the State of Alabama without any lawful authority to do so.” (Doc. No. 30 at 2-3.) Also abandoning reliance on the Eighth Amendment, Fleming states that “[t]he legal basis for the § 1983 claim against [Dowdell] is the violation of the Fourth and/or Fourteenth Amendment[s] by Dow-dell that occurred when Dowdell unlawfully and without authority seized and arrested [Fleming] and took him into custody, restrained and interfered with his liberty without any lawful authority to do so.” (Doc. No. 19 at 2.)

Moreover, responding to the BOPP Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, Fleming proposes a new basis for holding Johnson and Riddle liable under § 1983 for a Fourteenth Amendment violation. Fleming contends that, not only are they liable for their personal participation, but Johnson and Riddle, as policymakers (Doc. No. 68 at 5 & n. 2, citing Johnson Dep. at 17-18), are liable for “their failure ... to establish reasonable policies and procedures to help ensure that the [BOPP] did not unlawfully imprison or interfere with the liberty of those over whom the [BOPP] had no authority to exercise any such authority.” (Id. at 5.) Fleming submits that “a state agency which operates without a policy that so requires is being deliberately indifferent to the rights of the state’s citizens.” (Id. at 7.)

(b) Ascertaining Whether a Constitutional Violation Has Occurred

(i) Fourteenth Amendment due process claim predicated on Dowdell, Johnson, Parker, Riddle and White’s personal participation in the alleged violation

There is no dispute that, for more than five years, Fleming was held in state custody without any lawful authority. Dowdell, Johnson, Parker, Riddle and White, though, assert that their lack of knowledge that Fleming’s underlying judgment of conviction had been vacated negates their liability under the Fourteenth Amendment. For the reasons to follow, the court agrees with Defendants and finds that their lack of knowledge of the federal court’s order demonstrates that they did not act with deliberate indifference as is required to state a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment for their personal participation.

Fleming correctly cites Cannon v. Macon County, for the proposition that prisoners have a “constitutional right to be free from continued detention after it was or should have been known that the detainee was entitled to release.” 1 F.3d 1558, 1563 (11th Cir.1993). In Cannon, where the § 1983 plaintiff was arrested and incarcerated due to a misidentification, the Eleventh Circuit cited cases from the Fifth and Seventh circuits which also expressly recognized this constitutional right. Id. (citing Sivard v. Pulaski County, 959 F.2d 662 (7th Cir.1992) (continued detention where sheriff knew it was wrongful states claim under § 1983 for due process violation), modification on rehearing on other grounds, 15 F.3d 1022 (11th Cir. 1994) (per curiam); Sanders v. English, 950 F.2d 1152 (5th Cir.1992) (failure to release after officer knew or should have known that plaintiff had been misidentified gives rise to cause of action under § 1983)).

Fleming’s § 1983 claim predicated on allegations that Dowdell, Johnson, Parker, Riddle and White caused him to be unlawfully incarcerated on parole violations, by virtue of the fact that there no longer existed a valid underlying judgment of conviction, properly is analyzed under the Fourteenth Amendment, not the Fourth Amendment. See id. Such a claim, as in Cannon, basically is one of “false imprisonment rising to the level of a liberty deprivation,” in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s substantive due process guarantee. Id. at 1561-62; see also Ortega v. Christian, 85 F.3d 1521, 1526 (11th Cir.1996) (arresting officer liable in § 1983 lawsuit under Fourteenth Amendment for subsequent false imprisonment of plaintiff); Douthit v. Jones, 619 F.2d 527, 532 (5th Cir.1980) (finding claim based on continued confinement without valid judicial order was cognizable under § 1983 as a deprivation of due process). Summary judgment, therefore, is due to be entered in favor of the BOPP Defendants on a Fourth Amendment claim premised on the unlawful detention.

For the reasons to follow, the court finds that the evidence against Dowdell, Parker, Johnson, Riddle, and White is insufficient as a matter of law to establish a transgression of the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process guarantee because none of the Defendants possessed the requisite culpable state of mind. In Cannon, the court observed:

The defendant’s state of mind is ... relevant to a § 1983 claim for substantive due process violations. The Supreme Court has stated that negligent conduct does not give rise to § 1983 liability for resulting unintended loss of or injury to life, liberty, or property. Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 347, 106 S.Ct. 668, 88 L.Ed.2d 677 (1986); Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328, 106 S.Ct. 677, 88 L.Ed.2d 662 (1986). Neither the Davidson nor the Daniels decision, however, articulated the precise level of culpability necessary to give rise to § 1983 liability for deprivations of due process rights.

This court has, in cases dealing with prisoners and other persons in state custody, held that a showing of deliberate indifference is required to establish a violation of substantive due process rights protected by the fourteenth amendment. The deliberate indifference requirement was adopted based on analogies to eighth amendment situations where the defendant’s state of mind was relevant to the issue of whether a constitutional violation has occurred in the first place. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976) (deliberate indifference to prisoner’s serious illness or injury violates eighth amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment); Edwards v. Gilbert, 867 F.2d 1271 (11th Cir.1989) (deliberate indifference showing necessary in prisoner suicide case alleging § 1983 cause of action for violation of substantive rights protected by eighth and fourteenth amendments); Taylor v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791 (11th Cir.1987) ... (child abused by foster care parent must show deliberate indifference or gross negligence to establish § 1983 liability in action brought against state officials for violation of substantive due process rights protected by fourteenth amendment). See also Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 140 n. 1, 99 S.Ct. 2689, 61 L.Ed.2d 433 (1979) (discussing state of mind necessary to establish certain constitutional violations as separate and distinct from the state of mind sometimes necessary to establish § 1983 liability).

Id. at 1563.

Pursuant to Cannon, the court finds that “deliberate indifference” is the standard which must guide the court. “[D]e-liberate indifference entails something more than mere negligence, ... [but] is satisfied by something less than acts or omissions for the very purpose of causing harm or with knowledge that harm will result.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994).

As stated, it is undisputed that the BOPP Defendants did not have actual knowledge that a federal court had vacated Fleming’s underlying judgment of conviction. The BOPP Defendants also were not parties to the habeas corpus litigation so as to be charged with constructive knowledge of the federal court’s orders. See Salahuddin v. Coughlin, 781 F.2d 24, 27 (2d Cir.1986) (parties to lawsuit are charged with constructive knowledge of court orders).

Moreover, there is no evidence that the BOPP Defendants obtained information casting doubt on the validity of the underlying judgment of conviction which should have prompted them to investigate or rectify the situation. For example, this is not a case where the BOPP Defendants ignored repeated protests by Fleming that the arrest and parole revocation proceedings were not supported by a valid judgment of conviction. Indeed, Fleming himself had no knowledge that his judgment of conviction had been vacated. See Cannon, 1 F.3d 1558 (noting that “continued detention in the face of repeated protests will deprive the accused of liberty without due process”); Alexander v. Perrill, 916 F.2d 1392, 1398 (9th Cir.1990) (holding that prison officials cannot “stand by idly after an inmate has raised the prospect that he is being unlawfully incarcerated and has provided documentary evidence in support of his claim”). There also is no evidence that Fleming apprized any of the BOPP Defendants that he had filed a post-conviction lawsuit or that the BOPP Defendants otherwise were aware of the existence of Fleming’s post-conviction proceedings. There is, thus, no evidence which could support an inference that the BOPP Defendants acted with deliberate, reckless indifference, by turning a blind eye to facts before them. Cf. Jones v. City of Chicago, 856 F.2d 985, 992-93 (7th Cir.1988) (in order to be personally liable under § 1983, a defendant supervisor must “act either knowingly or with deliberate, reckless indifference,” the latter of which includes “turn[ing] a blind eye for fear of what [he] might see”).

Undisputedly, the BOPP Defendants were mistaken in their belief that Fleming was a parolee, but, under the facts of this case, their mistaken belief does not rise to the level of deliberate indifference, absent evidence of actual or constructive knowledge of the federal court’s judgment or of other facts triggering a duty to investigate. At most, the BOPP Defendants acted with negligence, resulting in an unintended loss of liberty to Fleming.

Because there is no evidence that either Dowdell, Johnson, Parker, Riddle or White intended to deprive Fleming of his constitutional rights under the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of due process of law, the court finds that Fleming cannot establish that these Defendants deprived him of a constitutionally protected liberty interest. The Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claim, therefore, fails.

(ii) Fourteenth Amendment due process claim predicated on Johnson and Riddle’s alleged liability as policymakers

Fleming is correct that “liability may be imposed ... from the absence of a policy,” Rivas v. Freeman, 940 F.2d 1491, 1495 (11th Cir.1991), when a constitutional injury occurs and when the failure to adopt a policy rises to the level of deliberate indifference to the need for such policy. See City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388-89, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989) (municipal liability); Armstrong v. Squadrito, 152 F.3d 564, 581 (7th Cir.1998) (observing that, “if the supervisor personally devised a deliberately indifferent policy that caused a constitutional injury, then individual liability might flow from that act”).

The record establishes that the BOPP does not have a policy in place which requires it to independently investigate the validity of underlying judgments of conviction of state parolees, at least where the BOPP has not been informed of facts which call into doubt the facial validity of said judgments. The evidence further suggests that the BOPP relies on the Department of Corrections for information pertaining to a parolee’s release date, including the issuance of court orders directing a parolee’s release. (Parker Aff. at 2 (Ex. to Doc. No. 37).) Fleming contends that Johnson and Riddle are policymakers for the BOPP (Doc. No. 68 at 5 & n. 2, citing Johnson Dep. at 17-18), and that, as such, they are liable for “their failure ... to establish reasonable policies and procedures to help ensure that the [BOPP] did not unlawfully imprison or interfere with the liberty of those over whom the [BOPP] had no authority to exercise any such authority.” (Id. at 5.)

The court, though, finds that this new claim of § 1983 supervisory liability is not properly before the court. Fleming raises it for the first time in his response to the pending motion for summary judgment, see supra footnote 9, and Johnson and Riddle have not had an opportunity to address this claim. The allegations in the Second Amended Complaint do not put Riddle and Johnson on notice that they may be subject to § 1983 Fourteenth Amendment liability because they failed to implement a policy which resulted in the deliberate indifference to Fleming’s right not to be unlawfully detained. Fleming has not pleaded, by either direct or inferential allegations, that there was an absence of policy under circumstances that allegedly required one, that the absence of policy was the moving force behind the violation, or that Johnson and Riddle had final policymaking authority to implement such a policy, but failed to do so. Rather, Fleming’s claims focus solely on the personal participation of the individual BOPP Defendants in revoking Fleming’s parole, not on the presence or absence of policies which allegedly resulted in Fleming’s deprivation of liberty.

The court finds that requiring Fleming to identify the policy which he contends should have been implemented by a policy-making official and to plead that the absence of the policy was the moving force behind the alleged constitutional violation is in no way inconsistent with notice pleading. See Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352, 1362 & n. 7 (11th Cir.2003) (complaint did not allege the requisite “causal connection” to state a claim for § 1983 supervisory liability where, among other deficiencies, plaintiff did not allege that a policy formulated by a policymaking defendant caused a role in detainee’s death); Cannon, 1 F.3d at 1565 (upholding dismissal where plaintiff failed to allege “any facts whatsoever to indicate that the alleged violation was a result of a County policy or practice”). The court, therefore, finds that Fleming has failed to set forth a “short and plain statement” as required by Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

In any event, it does not appear that a § 1983 policymaking claim against Johnson and Riddle would be viable. ■Whether a government official is a policymaker is a question of state law, see City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 123, 108 S.Ct. 915, 99 L.Ed.2d 107 (1988), and the court “may not assume that final policymaking authority lies in some entity other than that in which state law places it.” McMillian v. Johnson, 88 F.3d 1573, 1578 (1996). By state statute, the warden of the prison from which the prisoner was paroled, not the BOPP, retains legal custody of the prisoner while the prisoner serves his or her term of parole. See Ala.Code § 15-22-26 (1975); see also Williams v. City of Birmingham, 41 Ala. App. 208, 133 So.2d 713, 715 (1961) (“a State convict on parole is yet, under the provisions of our pardon and parole statute, in the legal custody of the warden of the prison until the expiration of the term specified in his sentence, and is in effect serving his sentence outside of prison walls”); cf Ex parte Powell, 73 Ala. 517 (Ala.1883) (holding that delivery of pardon to warden (who failed to deliver pardon to his prisoner being held in a county jail) was the same as delivery to the prisoner; “[t]he prisoner was not, it is true, confined in the walls of the penitentiary, but he was in the constructive custody of the warden”); (see also Doc. No. 70 at 14.) In the cases cited in the margin, the individual or entity with legal custody of the detainee was the one ultimately held to be accountable under § 1983 for failing to establish policies and procedures adequate to prevent detainees from being held without reason. Neither party has cited any different authority.

Alabama law establishes that Johnson and Riddle, as members of the BOPP, did not have legal custody over Fleming, and there is no evidence that Johnson and Riddle have any control or authority over a warden who is employed by the Department of Corrections. Fleming has not pointed to any state statute or other law, nor has the court found any, which would make Johnson and Riddle answerable for the legality of the custody of a warden’s prisoners so as vest policymaking authority in them pertaining to such matters.

(iii) Fourth Amendment claim predicated on Dowdell’s false arrest of Fleming for a parole violation

Fleming also alleges an unlawful arrest claim against Dowdell. (Doc. No. 19 at 1-2.) Unlawful arrest claims are analyzed under the Fourth Amendment. See Berg v. County of Allegheny, 219 F.3d 261, 269 (3rd Cir.2000) (“the constitutionality of arrests by state officials is governed by the Fourth Amendment rather than due process analysis”).

Fleming’s unlawful arrest claim is based on the fact that a federal court invalidated the underlying judgment of conviction from which the alleged parole violations arose, thereby divesting Dowdell of legal jurisdiction to arrest Fleming for a supposed parole violation. (Id.) Again, though, there is no evidence that, when he secured an arrest warrant for Fleming on chai’ges of parole violations, Dowdell had either actual or constructive knowledge that Fleming’s underlying judgment of conviction had been invalidated by a federal court on a writ of habeas corpus. (2nd Am.ComplJ 16.)

The issue is whether a Fourth Amendment claim can lie for actions which are neither knowing nor deliberate, but, at best, border on negligent. Whether negligence can establish a Fourth Amendment violation was addressed in Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978), albeit in the context of a motion to suppress. There, the criminal defendant challenged the veracity of statements police officers made in the affidavit in support of a search warrant. The Supreme Court held that a criminal defendant could challenge a search warrant under the Fourth Amendment if he or she could prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the affiant had included a material false statement in the warrant application knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard of the truth. See id. at 155-56, 98 S.Ct. 2674. The court emphasized, though, that only allegations of deliberate falsehood or of reckless disregard for the truth could support a challenge to the validity of a facially valid warrant: Allegations of “negligence or innocent mistake” would be insufficient to mount a successful Fourth Amendment attack on the warrant and subsequent search. Id. at 171, 98 S.Ct. 2674.

Although the Fourth Amendment issue in Franks was decided in the context of a criminal suppression hearing, the Eleventh Circuit has extended the Franks holding to § 1983 damages claims. See Maughon v. Bibb County, 160 F.3d 658 (11th Cir. 1998). In Maughon, ruling that officers did not violate the Fourth Amendment in executing a search warrant, the Eleventh Circuit held that “[njegligent or innocent mistakes do not violate the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 660 (citing Franks, 438 U.S. at 171, 98 S.Ct. 2674). “To invalidate a warrant based on incorrect information provided in a supporting affidavit one must show that officers intentionally or recklessly included false information or omitted necessary true information.” Id. (citing Franks, 438 U.S. at 171, 98 S.Ct. 2674); see also Kelly v. Curtis, 21 F.3d 1544, 1554 (11th Cir.1994) (recognizing that the holding in Franks “does not apply to negligent misrepresentations or omissions”); Ansley v. Heinrich, 925 F.2d 1339, 1344 (11th Cir.1991) (holding that negligence, alone, absent any intentional government conduct, cannot form the basis of a claim under § 1983 premised on the Fourth Amendment).

It follows from the foregoing cases that some showing of deliberate or intentional misconduct is required to state a Fourth Amendment claim against a parole officer who wrongfully, without jurisdiction, secures a parole violation warrant and arrests a citizen who is no longer a parolee. For the same reasons discussed in the preceding section, there is no evidence from which the court can imply any deliberate misconduct on the part of Dowdell. It is undisputed that Dowdell did not know that Fleming was no longer a parolee by virtue of the vacated judgment of conviction. There is no evidence that Dowdell received information that the validity of the facially-valid judgment of conviction was in doubt. The court finds that Dow-dell’s lack of knowledge precludes a finding that he acted deliberately or intentionally. Fleming, therefore, cannot prevail as a matter of law on his § 1983 Fourth Amendment false arrest claim against Dowdell.

(c) Quasi-Judicial Immunity

Because Fleming has failed to establish the existence of a constitutional violation under either the Fourth or Fourteenth amendments, the court need not examine the immunity defenses raised by the BOPP Defendants. Nonetheless, to clarify some of Fleming’s misconceptions, the court does so. For the reasons to follow, even assuming that a Fourth Amendment or Fourteenth Amendment claim could be extracted from the evidence, the court finds that Johnson, Parker, Riddle and White would be entitled to quasi-judicial immunity. Because the analyses are slightly different, the court discusses the application of quasi-judicial immunity, first, as to Johnson, Riddle and White and, second, as to Parker.

(i) Johnson, Riddle and Wfiiite

In suits brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, “[i]t is well-established that judges are immune from liability for damages for acts committed within their judicial jurisdiction.” Stewart v. Baldwin County Bd. of Educ., 908 F.2d 1499, 1507 (11th Cir.1990) (citing Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 199, 106 S.Ct. 496, 88 L.Ed.2d 507 (1985), and Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (1967)). The Supreme Court of the United States has extended judicial immunity to certain executive and administrative personnel whose duties are “classically adjudicatory.” Id. (quoting Cleavinger, 474 U.S. at 201-04, 106 S.Ct. 496).

To determine whether Johnson, Riddle and WTiite are entitled to quasi-judicial immunity, the court turns to the principles delineated in Stump v. Spark-man, 435 U.S. 349, 98 S.Ct. 1099, 55 L.Ed.2d 331 (1978), the seminal case regarding the scope of judicial immunity as to lawsuits under § 1983. See id. at 360, 98 S.Ct. 1099. Because judicial immunity is an immunity from suit, not just immunity from damages liability, “[a] judge will not be deprived of immunity because the action he [or she] took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his [or her] authority.” Id. at 356-57, 98 S.Ct. 1099 (citation and internal quotations omitted); see also Pierson, 386 U.S. at 554, 87 S.Ct. 1213 (“[I]mmunity applies even when the judge is accused of acting maliciously and corruptly.”). Rather, a judge will be deprived of judicial immunity in only two scenarios. First, a judge loses immunity for actions not taken in the judge’s judicial capacity. See Stump, 435 U.S. at 360-63, 98 S.Ct. 1099. Second, a judge is not immune, even when he or she performs judicial actions, if he or she “has acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.” Id. at 356-57, 98 S.Ct. 1099.

Fleming does not dispute that Johnson, Riddle and White acted in a quasi-judicial, adjudicatory capacity when they made factual and legal findings that he engaged in the conduct for which he was charged, and for good reason. Rather, Fleming focuses on the fact that, in revoking Fleming’s parole, they acted on an underlying judgment which had been vacated. Because the underlying judgment had been invalidated, Fleming asserts that Johnson, Riddle and White acted “without lawful authority” (Doc. No. 30 at 6; Doc. No. 68 at 3), and, thus, “in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.” Stump, 435 U.S. at 356-67, 98 S.Ct. 1099.

Johnson, Riddle and White, on the other hand, disagree with Fleming’s interpretation of the phrase “in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.” They do not dispute that they lacked personal jurisdiction over Fleming to revoke his parole once the federal district court granted Fleming’s writ of habeas corpus and vacated Fleming’s underlying judgment of conviction. Johnson, Riddle and White, though, assert that, because they were unaware of the facts divesting them of personal jurisdiction and, further, because they otherwise acted within their subject matter jurisdiction, they did not act “in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.” (Doc. No. 57 at 8-9.) For the reasons to follow, the court agrees with Johnson, Riddle and White.

For purposes of judicial immunity, there is a distinction between an “excess of jurisdiction” and a “clear absence of all jurisdiction.” There also is a distinction between the clear absence of personal jurisdiction and the clear absence of subject matter jurisdiction. Only judicial acts performed in the clear absence of all jurisdiction over the subject matter are not protected by judicial immunity. Stump, supra, and Dykes v. Hosemann, 776 F.2d 942, 943-45 (11th Cir.1985), illustrate the distinctions.

Stump considered the immunity defense raised by Harold D. Stump, a circuit court judge in the state of Indiana. Judge Stump ordered a “somewhat retarded” child to undergo a tubal ligation at the request of her mother. 435 U.S. at 351, 98 S.Ct. 1099. The court of appeals’ held that Judge Stump “did not have jurisdiction over the petition authorizing [the child’s] sterilization,” and, thus, acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction. Id. at 357, 98 S.Ct. 1099. The Supreme Court reversed. It stated, though, that the court of appeals “correctly” identified the issue as “whether at the time he [Judge Stump] took the challenged action he had jurisdiction over the subject matter before him.” Id. at 357, 98 S.Ct. 1099. The Supreme Court held that, even though Judge Stump’s ruling may have been contrary to the common law of the state and in violation of due process, the judge had not exceeded the general jurisdiction of the court. “A judge is absolutely immune from liability for his judicial acts even if his exercise of authority is flawed by the commission of grave procedural errors.” Id. at 359, 98 S.Ct. 1099. Quoting precedent, the Court reiterated:

“Where there is clearly no jurisdiction over the subject-matter any authority exercised is a usurped authority, and for the exercise of such authority, when the want of jurisdiction is known to the judge, no excuse is permissible. But where jurisdiction over the subject-matter is invested by law in the judge, or in the court which he holds, the manner and extent in which the jurisdiction shall be exercised are generally as much questions for his determination as any other questions involved in the case, although upon the correctness of his determination in these particulars the validity of his judgments may depend.”

Stump, 435 U.S. at 356 n. 6, 98 S.Ct. 1099 (quoting Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 351, 20 L.Ed. 646 (1871)).

Borrowing examples from Bradley, the court explained that a probate judge who presides over a criminal trial acts in the clear absence of' all jurisdiction, but a judge of a criminal court who convicts a defendant for a non-existent crime acts only in excess of jurisdiction and is protected by judicial immunity. See Stump, 435 U.S. at 357 n. 7, 98 S.Ct. 1099 (citing Bradley, 80 U.S. at 352); see also Duty v. City of Springdale, 42 F.3d 460, 462 (8th Cir.1994) (quotations omitted) (“a judge acts in excess of jurisdiction if the act complained of is within his general power of jurisdiction but is not authorized because of certain circumstances,” whereas there “is a clear absence of jurisdiction when a court of limited jurisdiction attempts to adjudicate a case outside of its jurisdiction”).

Moreover, in Dykes, a mother alleged that her ex-husband and two Florida state court judges conspired to deprive her of custody of her child without due process. See 776 F.2d at 943^5. One of the judges, Judge Hosemann, signed a petition which falsely declared the child to be a “dependent child.” Judge Hosemann then awarded the father with temporary custody of the child. The plaintiff-mother did not receive notice of the dependency and temporary custody proceedings, as required by statute. See id. at 943-44 & 948 n. 19.

After rejecting the plaintiff-mother’s argument that the judge acted in the clear absence of all subject matter jurisdiction, see id. at 947, the court turned to the plaintiff-mother’s assertion that Judge Ho-semann “acted in ‘the clear absence of all jurisdiction’ because he lacked ... jurisdiction over [her] personf].” Id. at 946. The Eleventh Circuit disagreed, concluding that Stump’s and Bradley’s references to a “clear absence of all jurisdiction” only pertained to the clear absence of subject matter jurisdiction:

Although the [Stump ] Court referred to jurisdiction in general terms, the context of the statement indicates that the Court was referring to a complete absence of subject matter jurisdiction. The passage itself cited to a footnote in which the Court presented an example of a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. More importantly, the language in Bradley from which Stump quotes, more fully reads “clear absence of all jurisdiction over the subject matter.” Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 351 (emphasis added).

Dykes, 776 F.2d at 947-48 (citing Stump, 435 U.S. at 356-57, 98 S.Ct. 1099) (internal footnote omitted).

The en bane court in Dykes then held that, where a judge does not clearly lack subject matter jurisdiction, the absence of personal jurisdiction over the complaining party does not deprive the judge of immunity. See id. at 948-49. “[T]o require a judge to defend a charge that he knowingly entered an order adversely affecting a party over whom the court had not acquired personal jurisdiction would be to ignore the still valid policy considerations articulated by the Supreme Court in Bradley v. Fisher, ” supra. Id. at 950; see also Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir.1986) (judicial immunity may not be pierced for lack of personal jurisdiction).

Applying these principles, the court finds that Johnson, Riddle and White acted within their general subject matter jurisdiction. They are statutorily vested with the authority to conduct parole revocation hearings and to revoke parole. See Ala.Code § 15-22-24(a) (1975) (BOPP’s duties, among others, include “determining whether violation of parole ... conditions exist in specific cases, deciding, in the case of parolees, what action should be taken with reference thereto.”); see also Ala. Code § 15-22-32(a) (1975) (authorizing a single member of BOPP to conduct a parole violation hearing “to determine guilt or innocence of the charges” to “recommend to the board revocation ... of parole”).

It is true that at the time Johnson, Riddle and White acted Fleming was no longer a parolee based on the grant of his habeas corpus writ. The court finds that the fact Fleming’s judgment had been vacated meant that these Defendants did not have authority over Fleming’s person when they acted. In other words, Johnson, Riddle and White were divested of personal jurisdiction over Fleming. Under Dykes, supra, the absence of personal jurisdiction, however, does not preclude the application of judicial immunity.

The court’s analysis is not complete, though. Alternatively, to the extent that an argument could be made that Johnson, Riddle and White committed more than a “purely procedural” error in revoking Fleming’s parole when, in fact, Fleming was no longer a parolee, so as to categorize their actions as depriving them of subject matter jurisdiction, Dykes, 776 F.2d at 947 n. 17, the court finds that they nonetheless would be entitled to absolute judicial immunity.

To explain, in a portion of the panel decision in Dykes which remains undisturbed by the en banc court, the Eleventh Circuit held that to deprive a judicial officer of absolute immunity, he or she must know facts which place him or her on notice of the clear absence of subject matter jurisdiction: “[Ijimmunity for judicial acts in the clear absence of jurisdiction is lost only if the judge knows that he lacks jurisdiction.” Dykes v. Hosemann, 743 F.2d 1488, 1497 (11th Cir.1984); see also Bradley, 80 U.S. at 351 (“Where there is clearly no jurisdiction over the subject-matter any authority exercised is a usurped authority, and for the exercise of such authority, when the want of jurisdiction is known to the judge, no excuse is permissible.”) (emphasis added); Tucker v. Outwater, 118 F.3d 930, 934 (2d Cir.1997) (“A judge will be denied immunity for damages wrhere he (i) acts in the clear absence of all jurisdiction; and (ii) knew or must have known that he was acting in such a manner.”) (quoting Maestri v. Jutkofsky, 860 F.2d 50, 53 (2d Cir.1988)).

Neither Johnson, Riddle nor White was enlightened to the fact that Fleming’s conviction had been invalidated. They had no knowledge, either actual or constructive, and had received no information placing on them a duty to investigate the judgment’s validity. They acted unknowingly. Thus, whether the absence of jurisdiction is categorized as a clear lack of personal jurisdiction or a clear lack of subject matter jurisdiction, Johnson, Riddle and White are entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity and, therefore, are not liable to Fleming on the § 1983 constitutional claims.

(ii) Parker

As stated, Parker also invokes quasi-judicial immunity. (Doc. No. 37 ¶ 2; Doc. No. 57 at 7.) Although Parker’s role in Fleming’s revocation proceedings differs from that of Johnson, Riddle and White, the court finds that Parker is protected by the same quasi-judicial immunity. Namely, for the reasons to follow, the court finds that Parker’s involvement in Fleming’s parole revocation was “classically adjudicatory” in nature, Stewart, 908 F.2d at 1507, and that Parker did not act “in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.” Stump, 435 U.S. at 356-57, 98 S.Ct. 1099.

First, the court finds that Parker’s determination that there existed reasonable cause to believe that Fleming violated the conditions of his parole so as to support the issuance of a warrant places Parker in a position akin to a judicial or magisterial role. See, e.g., Fed.R.Crim.P. 41(b)(1) & (d)(1) (authorizing a magistrate judge to issue a search warrant “for search of property or for a person within the district” where probable cause exists). A magistrate judge performs a judicial act when he or she makes decisions pertaining to issuing search warrants. See Pressly v. Gregory, 831 F.2d 514, 517 (4th Cir.1987) (“As judicial officers, magistrates are entitled to absolute immunity for acts performed in their judicial capacity.”); Vail-lancourt v. Bentsen, 1994 WL 243489, *1 (D.Ariz.1994) (finding that a magistrate judge’s issuance of search warrant was a judicial act for which magistrate judge was immune from suit under doctrine of absolute judicial immunity) (citing Stump, 435 U.S. at 349, 98 S.Ct. 1099). The court finds that Parker engaged in a similar judicial act when he exercised his statutory duty and determined that there was “reasonable cause to believe” that Fleming had violated the conditions of his parole. See Ala.Code § 15-22-31(a) (1975) (“If ... any member of the [BOPP] shall have reasonable cause to believe that such prisoner ... has violated the conditions of his parole in an important respect, such ... board member shall report such fact to the Department of Corrections, which shall thereupon issue a warrant for the retaking of such prisoner....”).

This court is not the first to analogize the job of a non-judicial officer’s role in assessing legal grounds for the issuance of a warrant to that of a judicial officer for purposes of determining the applicability of absolute quasi-judicial immunity. In Nesmith v. Alford, 318 F.2d 110, 127 (5th Cir.1963), cited by Parker (Doc. No. 70 at 11), the Fifth Circuit held that the role of a police desk captain in reviewing an experienced police officer’s affidavit to determine whether legal grounds existed to issue an arrest warrant was comparable to that of a magistrate: “Captain Eiland was acting in the role of a Magistrate” because “[h]is function was to determine whether legal grounds existed for an arrest and prosecution.” Id. As such, the police desk captain was entitled to quasi-judicial immunity. Id. Similarly, because Parker made an assessment of “reasonable cause,” a role analogous to the job of a magistrate, the court finds that Parker engaged in a judicial function.

Second, because Parker is statutorily authorized to make “reasonable cause” determinations concerning violations of parole, Ala.Code § 15-22-31 (1975)(a), the court finds that Parker acted within his general subject matter jurisdiction. Finally, for the reasons discussed in the preceding section, the court finds that Parker’s undisputed lack of either actual or constructive knowledge that Fleming’s underlying judgment of conviction had been vacated mandates a finding that Parker did not act “in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.” Stump, 435 U.S. at 356-57, 98 S.Ct. 1099. Parker, therefore, having satisfied the Stump requirements, is entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity on the § 1983 claims against him.

(d) Qualified Immunity: Dowdell

Dowdell asserts that quasi-judicial immunity and qualified immunity protect him from individual liability as to Fleming’s § 1983 constitutional claims. For the reasons to follow, the court finds that summary judgment is appropriate, not only on the merits as discussed, supra, but also on the basis of qualified immunity.

Government officials may raise qualified immunity as an affirmative defense to a § 1983 individual-capacity lawsuit. See Wilson v. Strong, 156 F.3d 1131, 1135 (11th Cir.1998); see also Hill v. Dekalb Regional Youth Detention Ctr., 40 F.3d 1176, 1184 n. 16 (11th Cir.1994). Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, “government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established ... constitutional rights of which a reasonable person should have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982); see also Rich v. Dollar, 841 F.2d 1558, 1563 (11th Cir. 1988).

The test for whether a governmental defendant is entitled to qualified immunity involves a two-step analysis. The first inquiry concerns whether the government official was engaged in a “discretionary function.” Madiwale, 117 F.3d at 1324. It is undisputed, and in fact alleged by Fleming, that Dowdell at all relevant times was acting within the scope of his employment as a state parole officer. Accordingly, the court finds that Dowdell “was acting within the scope of his discretionary authority” when the alleged unconstitutional acts occurred. Zeigler v. Jackson, 716 F.2d 847, 849 (11th Cir.1983).

Under the second inquiry, the burden shifts to Fleming. First, as a “threshold question,” the court asks, “[t]aken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show [the government official’s] conduct violated a constitutional right?” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001). Second, if under Fleming’s version of the facts, his constitutional rights would have been violated, the court must determine whether those rights were “clearly established.” Id. This inquiry focuses on whether the “state of the law” at the time of the alleged violation provided the government officials with “fair warning that their alleged treatment of the [plaintiff] was unconstitutional.” Hope v. Pel-zer, 536 U.S. 730, 741, 122 S.Ct. 2508, 153 L.Ed.2d 666 (2002).

As stated, Fleming cannot demonstrate that Dowdell violated Fleming’s Fourth Amendment or Fourteenth Amendment rights because Dowdell did not possess the requisite state of mind to impose liability. In short, Dowdell did not have actual or constructive knowledge that Fleming’s underlying judgment of conviction had been vacated. Nor was Dowdell apprized of facts giving rise to a duty to investigate the validity of Fleming’s judgment. Dow-dell, therefore, did not act knowingly, intentionally or with deliberate indifference so as to impose liability under either the Fourth or Fourteenth amendments. At this point, the court observes that, in each case it found where summary judgment was denied to state officials who retained inmates in spite of court orders mandating their release, the offending state official knew of the court order, yet refused to comply with it. These decisions, cited in the margin, further demonstrate that Dow-dell did not violate the Constitution and that his unknowing mistake that he lacked jurisdiction over Fleming entitles him to qualified immunity. In other words, because Fleming’s parole conditions and incarceration were not wrongly extended based on a knowing and deliberate refusal to obey a court order, Dowdell is qualifiedly immune from a damages suit in his individual capacity.

Assuming, though, the existence of a constitutional violation, the court finds that the parameters of the law were not sufficiently defined during the relevant time period so as to provide “fair warning” to Dowdell that he had an obligation to verify the validity of Fleming’s underlying judgment of conviction where he was unaware of the federal court’s order or that Fleming had even challenged the validity of the judgment of conviction in a habeas corpus proceeding. Hope, 536 U.S. at 741, 122 S.Ct. 2508; cf. Kelly, 21 F.3d at 1551 (holding that there was no law clearly establishing that