United States v. Elashi (440 F. Supp. 2d 536, 2006)

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

LINDSAY, District Judge.

Before the court are the following post-verdict motions: (1) Rule 29(c) Renewal of Motion of Judgment of Acquittal, filed by Defendant Ghassan Elashi on April 19, 2005; (2) Motion for Judgment of Acquittal Pursuant to Rule 29, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, filed by Defendant Basman Elashi on April 19, 2005; (3) Defendant Basman Elashi’s Motion for New Trial Pursuant to Rule 33, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, filed on April 19, 2005; and (4) Defendants’ Motion Reurg-ing Motion for Judgment of Acquittal Pursuant to Rule 29, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and Motion Adopting Other Defendants’ Motions, filed by Defendants Bayan Elashi and Infocom Corporation on May 13, 2005 (collectively referred to as “postverdict motions”). On February 1, 2006, the court conducted a hearing concerning the post-verdict motions. Upon careful consideration of the motions, the record, and applicable law, for the reasons herein stated, the court denies Defendant Ghassan Elashi’s Rule 29(c) Renewal of Motion of Judgment of Acquittal; denies Defendant Basman Elashi’s Motion for Judgment of Acquittal Pursuant to Rule 29, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure; denies Defendant Basman Elashi’s Motion for New Trial Pursuant to Rule 33, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure; and denies Defendants’ Motion Reurging Motion for Judgment of Acquittal Pursuant to Rule 29, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and Motion Adopting Other Defendants’ Motions, filed by Defendants Bayan Elashi and Infocom Corporation.

1. Procedural and Factual Background

This opinion addresses postverdict motions filed by the above-named Defendants in response to the jury verdict, returned April 13, 2005, regarding renumbered Counts 1 through 21 of the Revised Superseding Indictment (“revised superseding indictment”), filed April 14, 2005. Defendants Bayan Elashi (“Bayan”), Ghassan Elashi (“Ghassan”), and Basman Elashi (“Basman”), are employees of Infocom Corporation (“Infocom”), and are brothers. Bayan is the President; Ghassan is Vice-President of Marketing; and Basman is the Logistics and Credit Manager. The Elashi family owns 100% of Infocom’s stock.

Renumbered Counts 1 through 21 center upon alleged violations of law relating to financial transactions between Infocom and Nadia Elashi (“Nadia”), a cousin of Defendants. Nadia is married to Mousa Abu Marzook (“Marzook”), who is a leader in the Islamic Resistance Movement (“Ha-mas”). At trial, the Government contended that Defendants entered into an alleged scheme whereby they executed a contractual agreement with Nadia in order to conceal approximately $250,000 that Mar-zook had invested in Infocom, thereby creating the appearance that Nadia actually invested these monies. Further, it contended that Defendants conspired to deal, and dealt, in the property of Marzook after he received a terrorist designation; and that Defendants conspired to launder money, and laundered money, by using Info-com to make payments to Nadia during the years after the contractual agreement was executed, knowing that these monies represented the proceeds of unlawful activity, and structuring the payments to conceal the interest Marzook retained in the monies paid.

On March 22, 1993, Infocom and Nadia executed a “Murabaha Agreement,” a contractual agreement, whereby Nadia agreed to pay $250,000 to Infocom “to be used in computer and trade business.... ” Govt’s Ex. 18 at 2. By its terms, the Murabaha Agreement was “valid for 12 months and renewable upon the agreement of the two parties.” Id. Defendant Bayan Elashi signed the agreement on behalf of Info-com; Nadia signed the agreement; and Marzook signed as a “Second Witness.” Id. at 3.

On January 23, 1995, under the authority of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 (the “IEEPA”), President William J. Clinton issued Executive Order 12947. Executive Order 12947 specifies that, “notwithstanding any contract entered into ... prior to the effective date,” all property and interests in property of specially designated persons “that are in the United States ... or that hereafter come within the possession or control of United States persons, are blocked.... ” Exec. Order 12947 § l(a)(iii), 60 Fed.Reg. 5079 (Jan. 23, 1995). The Order further states that “any transaction or dealing by United States persons or within the United States in property or interests in property of the persons designated in or pursuant to this order is prohibited, including the making or receiving of any contribution of funds, goods, or services to or for the benefit of such persons.” Id. § 1(b). The IEEPA, the enforcement mechanism for Executive Order 12947, provides, “[w]hoever willfully violates ... any license, order, or regulation issued under this chapter [shall be guilty of an offense.]” 50 U.S.C. § 1705(b).

As a result of Executive Order 12947, the Secretary of the Treasury promulgated regulations. One regulation provides:

Except as authorized by [law], no property or interests in property of a specially designated terrorist, that are in the United States ... or hereafter come within the possession or control of [United States] persons ... may be transferred, paid, exported, withdrawn or otherwise dealt in.

31 C.F.R. § 595.201(a). Another regulation sets forth prohibited conduct:

Any transaction for the purpose of, or which has the effect of, evading or avoiding, or which facilitates the evasion or avoidance of, any of the prohibitions set forth in this part, is hereby prohibited. Any attempt to violate the prohibitions set forth in this part is hereby prohibited. Any conspiracy formed for the purpose of engaging in a transaction prohibited by this part is hereby prohibited.

31 C.F.R. § 595.205. The regulations further provide, “[w]hoever willfully violates any license, order, or regulation issued under the Act [commits an offense against the United States.]” 31 C.F.R. § 595.701(a)(2).

On January 25, 1995, the Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”), designated Hamas as a Specially Designated Terrorist Organization. On August 29,1995, OFAC designated Marzook as a Specially Designated Terrorist pursuant to Executive Order 12947 and the IEEPA. According to the Government, this designation blocked as a matter of law any property in which Mar-zook held any interest that is subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. See Rev. Supers. Indict. ¶ 11. It alleged that, upon designation, any United States person or entity who possessed any funds in which Marzook held any interest should have reported such interest to the proper United States authorities. Id. The Government contended that Defendants’ dealings in the $250,000 forming the basis of the Murabaha Agreement, and the proceeds therefrom, after Marzook received a terrorist designation, as well as their attempts to avoid acknowledgment of such monies, violated Executive Order 12947 and the IEEPA.

On July 25, 1995, Marzook was arrested at John F. Kennedy International Airport in Queens County, New York. The Eastern District of New York issued a subpoena to the Custodian of Records of Infocom on July 28, 1995. On July 31, 1995, FBI Special Agent Brian Harkins, among other agents, served the subpoena upon Infocom. On September 5, 2001, OFAC issued a Blocking Notice upon Bayan Elashi, as President of Infocom Corporation. Federal agents searched Infocom, pursuant to an executed search warrant, on September 5 through 7, 2001, collecting materials in both hard copy and electronic form. On September 24, 2001, Mr. Arch McColl, In-focom’s then attorney, submitted a letter containing various attachments in response to OFAC’s Blocking Notice. Federal authorities arrested Defendants Bayan and Ghassan Elashi on December 18, 2002, and arrested Defendant Basman Elashi on December 19, 2002.

After the conclusion of trial for counts 1 through 25, Defendants were tried under the 21-count revised superseding indictment. The charges included conspiracy to deal in the property of a Specially Designated Terrorist, 18 U.S.C. § 371, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706, and 31 C.F.R. §§ 595 et seq. (Count 1); dealing in the property of a Specially Designated Terrorist, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706,. 31 C.F.R. §§ 595 et seq., and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (Count 2); substantive counts of dealing in the property of a Specially Designated Terrorist, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706, 31 C.F.R. §§ 595 et seq., and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (Counts 3 through 11); conspiracy to commit money laundering, 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h) (Count 12); and substantive counts of money laundering, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(a)(1)(B)®, 2 (Counts 13 through 21).

On April 13, 2005, the jury returned its verdict, convicting Defendants Bayan Ela-shi, Ghassan Elashi, and Infocom on all counts, and convicting Defendant Basman Elashi on Counts 1, 2, and 12. The Defendants moved jointly for judgments of acquittal at the close of the Government’s case-in-chief, and reurged the motions postverdict. The Government filed its Consolidated Response to Defendants’ Motions for Judgment of Acquittal and New Trial on May 27, 2005. On February 1, 2006, the court held a hearing concerning the postverdict motions.

The parties acknowledge, as is evident, that this is a circumstantial evidence case. The Government contends that it presented evidence at trial which, when reviewed in the light most favorable to it, with all reasonable inferences drawn in support of the verdict, was sufficient for a reasonable jury to conclude that all of the essential elements of each crime were established beyond a reasonable doubt. Under the Government’s theory of the case, Defendants executed the Murabaha Agreement as a prop or cover designed to document on paper that Nadia, and not Marzook, had invested the $250,000. It argued that Defendants continued them scheme by making false representations consistent therewith (a) during the response to the July 1995 subpoena, and (b) through the September 24, 2001 letter submitted by Arch McColl. Although each Defendant raises specific issues, all argue that the evidence presented is insufficient as a matter of law to support a guilty verdict on the respective counts of conviction.

II. Standards of Review

A. Motion for Judgment of Acquittal

A motion for judgment of acquittal “challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to convict.” United States v. Medina, 161 F.3d 867, 872 (5th Cir.1998) (citing Fed.R.Crim.P. 29(a)), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1043, 119 S.Ct. 1344, 143 L.Ed.2d 507 (1999). The standard of review for a motion for judgment of acquittal is whether, “reviewed in the light most favorable to the government, drawing all reasonable inferences in support of the verdict,” “a reasonable jury could find that the evidence establishes the guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Pennington, 20 F.3d 593, 597 (5th Cir.1994). In other words, “[t]he only question is whether a rational jury could have found each essential element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. The court does not assess the credibility of witnesses or weigh the evidence, since the jury “retains the sole authority to weigh any conflicting evidence and to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses.” United States v. Loe, 262 F.3d 427, 432 (5th Cir.2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1134, 122 S.Ct. 1078, 151 L.Ed.2d 979 (2002); see also United States v. Molinar-Apodaca, 889 F.2d 1417, 1423 (5th Cir.1989). If the evidence “viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution gives equal or nearly equal circumstantial support to a theory of guilt and a theory of innocence,” then reversal is required. Pennington, 20 F.3d at 597. The jury “is free to choose among all reasonable constructions of the evidence,” and “it is not necessary that the evidence exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence or be wholly inconsistent with every conclusion except that of guilt.” United States v. Williams, 264 F.3d 561, 576 (5th Cir.2001) (quotations and citations omitted).

B. Motion for New Trial

A district court may grant motion for new trial if it is required in the interests of justice. FecLR.Crim.P. 33. A motion for new trial is at “the discretion of the court, which should be exercised with caution, and the power to grant a new trial ... should be invoked only in exceptional eases in which the evidence preponderates heavily against the verdict.” United States v. Robertson, 110 F.3d 1113, 1120 n. 11 (5th Cir.1997) (citation and quotation omitted). During consideration of a motion for new trial, the court may weigh the evidence and assess the credibility of witnesses. Id. at 1117 (citing Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 37-38, 102 S.Ct. 2211, 72 L.Ed.2d 652 (1982)). The court may not, however, “reweigh the evidence and set aside the verdict simply because it feels some other result would be more reasonable”; instead, for a motion for new trial to be granted, “[t]he evidence must preponderate heavily against the verdict, such that it would be a miscarriage of justice to let the verdict stand.” Id. at 1118 (citations omitted).

III. Applicable Law Controlling the Offenses of Conviction

A. Conspiracy

Count 1 of the revised superseding indictment alleged a single object conspiracy. To establish conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 371, “the government must show (1) an agreement between two or more persons to pursue an unlawful objective; (2) the defendant’s knowledge of the unlawful objective and voluntary agreement to join the conspiracy; and (3) an overt act by one or more of the members of the conspiracy in furtherance of the objective of the conspiracy.” United States v. Peterson, 244 F.3d 385, 389 (5th Cir.2001). “Conspiracy may be proved through circumstantial evidence, and the agreement need not be formal or spoken.” United States v. Tencer, 107 F.3d 1120, 1132 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 960, 118 S.Ct. 390, 139 L.Ed.2d 305 (1997). Proof of conspiracy “may be inferred from concert of action.” Williams, 264 F.3d at 577. The object of the conspiracy, as specified in Count 1, was dealing in property in which Marzook, a Specially Designated Terrorist, had an interest.

B. Dealing in the Property of a Specially Designated Terrorist

Counts 2 through 11 charged the offense of dealing in the property of a Specially Designated Terrorist. Count 2 alleged that Defendants, aided and abetted by each other, and by others, knowingly and willfully dealt in the property of Marzook, a Specially Designated Terrorist, by entering into and annually renewing the Murab-aha Agreement, which related to monies in which Marzook had an interest. Counts 3 through 11 alleged that Defendants, aided and abetted by each other, and by others, knowingly and willfully dealt in the property of Marzook, a Specially Designated Terrorist, by issuing, and causing to be issued, certain enumerated checks and wire transfers, involving property in which Marzook retained an interest, from the bank accounts of Infocom into bank accounts held under Nadia’s name.

C. Conspiracy to Commit Money Laundering

Count 12 charged the offense of conspiracy to commit money laundering. It a crime for anyone to conspire to commit the offense of money laundering, as defined in Section 1956 of Title 18, United States Code. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h). The Government must “prove beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1) there was an agreement between two or more persons to launder money; (2) the defendant voluntarily agreed to join the conspiracy; and (3) one of the persons committed an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy.” United States v. Wilson, 249 F.3d 366, 379 (5th Cir.2001) (citing United States v. Pettigrew, 77 F.3d 1500, 1519 (5th Cir.1996)).

D. Money Laundering

The money laundering counts, Counts 13 through 21, alleged violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(a)(l)(B)(i), 2. Section 1956(a)(l)(B)(i) makes it a crime for anyone to knowingly use the proceeds of certain illegal activity to conceal or disguise the nature, location, source, ownership, or control of such proceeds. To establish the offense of money laundering under section 1956(a)(l)(B)(i), the “government must prove that the defendant: (1) conducted or attempted to conduct a financial transaction, (2) which the defendant knew involved the proceeds of unlawful activity, and (3) which the defendant knew was designed to conceal or disguise the nature, location, source, ownership, or control of the proceeds of the unlawful activity.” United States v. Burns, 162 F.3d 840, 847 (5th Cir.1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1076, 119 S.Ct. 1477, 143 L.Ed.2d 560 (1999). Section 1956 requires that the financial transaction, in fact, involve funds derived from unlawful activity. Tencer, 107 F.3d at 1130. The specified unlawful activity in this case, as alleged in the revised superseding indictment, is dealing in the property of a Specially Designated Terrorist, as set forth in Count 2. See Rev. Supers. Indict, at 15; 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7)(D). The indictment alleged that each Defendant committed money laundering by issuing, or aiding and abetting the issuance of, checks and wire transfers from Infocom to Nadia, after Marzook received a terrorist designation, made pursuant to the conditions of the Murabaha Agreement, knowing that the property underlying the financial transactions represented the proceeds of monies in which Marzook had an interest, and also knowing that the transactions were designed in whole or in part to conceal the nature, source, ownership, or control of the proceeds. See Rev. Supers. Indict, at 15. “[T]he government must prove that the specific transactions in question were designed, at least in part, to launder money.” United States v. Powers, 168 F.3d 741, 747-48 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 945, 120 S.Ct. 360, 145 L.Ed.2d 282 (1999). It must show “that the defendant desired to create the appearance of legitimate wealth or otherwise to conceal the nature of funds so that the money could enter the economy as legitimate funds.” Id. at 748 (citations omitted). A “scheme that conceals only the source of the funds falls within the purview” of section 1956(a)(l)(B)(i). Id.

IV. Analysis

A. Ghassan Elashi’s Motion for Judgment of Acquittal

Ghassan contends that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to satisfy the Government’s burden of proof as to each count, and asserts that, at best, its case is one of mere guilt by association. While Ghassan makes a number of assertions regarding the insufficiency of the evidence, he does not always state with specificity the reasons that the evidence was insufficient on the counts for which he was convicted. Instead, Ghassan globally contends that the Government presented no evidence, or insufficient evidence that: (1) he knew whether the $250,000 Infocom received by way of the Murabaha Agreement, purportedly from Nadia, were monies that Marzook had previously invested in Infocom or any predecessor; (2) Mar-zook had any interest in the payments Infocom sent to Nadia after Marzook was designated as a Specially Designated Terrorist on August 29, 1995; (3) he was involved in the accounting or financial matters of Infocom, other than participating in the execution of the Murabaha Agreement; (4) he participated in, or knew of, any financial decisions regarding whether Mar-zook retained any interest in payments Infocom made to Nadia subsequent to the Murabaha Agreement; (5) he committed any conduct, on or after August 29, 1995, evidencing that he knew Marzook retained any interest in such payments; and (6) he made, or knowingly participated in making, any false or misleading statement to any person, including any government official, as well as Arch MeColl, concerning the nature or extent of Marzook’s financial transactions with Infocom.

1. Dealing in the Property of a Specially Designated Terrorist

The court first turns to Counts 2 through 11, dealing in the property of a Specially Designated Terrorist. The pivotal question is whether Ghassan “willfully” violated Executive Order 12947 and the IEEPA. “As a general matter, when used in the criminal context, a ‘willful’ act is one undertaken with a ‘bad purpose.’ ” Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 191, 118 S.Ct. 1939, 141 L.Ed.2d 197 (1998) (citations omitted). In order to establish a willful violation of a statute, “the Government must prove that the defendant acted with knowledge that his conduct was unlawful.” Id. at 192, 118 S.Ct. 1939 (quoting Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 137, 114 S.Ct. 655, 126 L.Ed.2d 615 (1994)). The issue of “willfulness” in relation to Executive Order 12947, as enforced under the IEEPA, is new to Fifth Circuit jurisprudence. To establish a conviction under the IEEPA for a willful violation of Executive Order 12947, the government must show that the defendant acted with specific intent, that is, acted with knowledge that the conduct was unlawful and therefore disregarded a known legal obligation. The pivotal inquiry is whether Ghassan knew Marzook had any interest in the $250,000 related to the Murabaha Agreement after it was executed, and specifically, on or after August 29, 1995, when Mar-zook received a terrorist designation, yet willfully dealt in such property or property interest knowing such dealing was unlawful.

Ghassan contends that the evidence presented during trial does not support a reasonable inference that he willfully dealt in the property of a Specially Designated Terrorist. He asserts that the Government presented insufficient evidence to establish that he knew the $250,000 invested in Infocom pursuant to the Murabaha Agreement was Marzook’s money, or that Marzook retained any interest in the payments made by Infocom to Nadia in the years after the Murabaha Agreement was executed, including those payments made on or after August 29, 1995. Ghassan contends that he believed, at the time the Murabaha Agreement was executed, and afterward, that the $250,000 invested was Nadia’s money.

Ghassan claims it would be unreasonable to infer that he knew the Murabaha Agreement involved Marzook’s money, or that Marzook had any interest in the $250,000 or its proceeds after its execution, since such inference assumes, without a sufficient evidentiary basis, that: (1) he knew Marzook previously invested money in Infocom or any predecessor; (2) he participated in the financial operations of Infocom, including recordkeeping or check writing; (3) he was aware of, or participated in making, any of the financial documents produced by the Government at trial; (4) he knew Marzook’s name was dropped from Infocom’s books and records after the Murabaha Agreement was executed; (5) he participated in renewing annually the Murabaha Agreement; and (6) he was present when Bay an made alleged misrepresentations in response to the July 1995 subpoena, and therefore adopted the alleged misrepresentations as his own.

In addition, Ghassan argues that the language of the Murabaha Agreement suggests that even if Marzook had invested in Infocom and any predecessor, he did not any retain interest in such monies after execution, since the Agreement assigned Marzook’s interest in the $250,000 to Nadia, or memorialized an assignment that had already occurred. He contends that, even if the Murabaha Agreement did not effect an assignment, the Government presented no evidence indicating that an assignment did not occur before the Agreement was executed that fully divested Marzook’s interest in Infocom.

Finally, Ghassan contends that the consistency of Defendants’ conduct from 1993 through 2001, namely, Infocom’s annual renewal of the Murabaha Agreement and continued payments to Nadia, even after Marzook’s August 29, 1995 designation as a terrorist, manifests strong evidence that he, as well as the other Defendants, did not know they were violating the law, and therefore did not willfully deal in the property of a Specially Designated Terrorist. He argues that such evidence leads to the alternative inference that he, and the other Defendants, genuinely believed that Nadia had invested the $250,000, and that the subsequent payments Infocom made to her were legal.

The Government counters that the totality of evidence presented at trial provided the jury a sufficient basis to reasonably conclude that the $250,000 investment made pursuant to the Murabaha Agreement was Marzook’s money; that Ghassan knew Marzook retained an interest in this money after the Agreement was executed, and also knew Marzook was designated as a Specially Designated Terrorist; that Ghassan was aware of Executive Order 12947 and its prohibitions, as enforced through the IEEPA, and also understood it was unlawful to deal in property in which Marzook retained any interest; and that Ghassan’s post-designation dealings in such property constituted a willful violation of the law. It contends that the Mu-rabaha Agreement was a prop or cover that documented Nadia as investing the $250,000 in an attempt to conceal Mar-zook’s investments in Infocom, and that the Agreement did not operate as an assignment or divestiture of Marzook’s interest.

After careful consideration of the evidence considered at trial, the court concludes that the Government presented sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Ghassan willfully dealt in the property of a Specially Designated Terrorist. First, the Government presented sufficient evidence to reasonably infer that the Murabaha Agreement was a prop or cover to conceal Marzook’s investments in Infocom by creating the appearance that Nadia invested the $250,000. It presented evidence of the three transactions representing the basis of the $250,000 invested pursuant to the Murabaha Agreement, including an Info-com bank deposit ticket dated March 25, 1993 indicating a total deposit of $50,000, and containing writing stating, “Mousa AbuMarzook ch. 3023,” see Govt’s Ex. 7B-6, and also a wire transfer receipt indicating that Marzook invested $150,000 into an Infocom corporate account on July 24, 1992, see Govt’s Ex. 7B4, which is verified by a Daily Transaction Log, see Govt’s Ex. 11 A-4. Although the wire transfer receipt shows that Marzook transferred $150,000 into Infocom’s account on July 24, 1992, an Infocom Aging Report reflects a $150,000 investment by Nadia on March 20, 1993. See Govt’s Ex. 17B. The Government also introduced a 1993 Income Tax Return for Marzook and Nadia, who filed jointly, which stated Nadia’s occupation was a “homemaker.” Govt’s Ex. 16Q at 3. Finally, the Government presented evidence connecting Ghassan to the Murabaha Agreement, as his name appears on the cover letter, along with a statement saying, “[a]s per our telephone Conversation, Please find the Agreement as we discussed.” Govt’s Ex. 18 at 1. In light of this evidence and Ghassan’s position at Infocom, a jury could reasonably infer that Ghassan was involved in Infocom’s financial affairs, knew about Marzook’s investments, and helped orchestrate the execution of the Murabaha Agreement.

Moreover, FBI Special Agent Robert Miranda testified at trial that during the September 2001 search of Infocom, agents found a letter addressed to Ghassan, which had been faxed on February 14,1995, from Ismail Elbarrasse, whom Miranda described as an associate of Marzook who shared two bank accounts with him. See Govt’s Ex. 24. The agents found the letter in a safe contained in Bayan Elashi’s office. Special Agent Miranda testified that two checks paid to Nadia, representing payments made in response to the letter, were forwarded to a Fairfax, Virginia post office box serving as a mailing address for an Elbarrasse/Marzook joint bank account, and that the forwarding occurred after the Murabaha Agreement was executed. At minimum, a reasonable jury could infer from the letter that Ghassan was involved in the financial affairs of Infocom, since the letter was addressed to him. Although the Government did not present direct evidence showing that Ghassan knew the connection between Elbarrasse and Marzook, this is a reasonable inference the jury could make.

To the extent that Ghassan and the other Defendants argued to the jury that the Murabaha Agreement operated as a legal assignment to Nadia of Marzook’s interest in the $250,000, a determination by a jury that the Agreement did not operate as an assignment is supported by sufficient evidence. As the Agreement states Nadia “will pay” $250,000 in the future, see Govt’s Ex. 18 at 2, does not reference Marzook’s preexisting investments, and contains no language of an express transfer from Marzook to Nadia indicative of an intent to assign, sufficient evidence exists for a jury to infer that the monies did not change character, and that the document effected a concealment instead of an assignment or a divestiture.

The court concludes that sufficient evidence was presented for a reasonable jury to find the element of willfulness. Special Agent Miranda testified at trial that, during the September 2001 search of Infocom, agents recovered a paper copy of Executive Order 12947 (Govt’s Ex. 20A) from Ghassan’s office. As a hard copy of the law Defendants allegedly violated was found on the premises during the 2001 search, a jury could reasonably infer, from such evidence, that Ghassan was apprised of the law and knew dealing in property in which Marzook had any interest, post-designation, was unlawful. In addition, a jury could infer from evidence of certain Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (“FISA”) cuts, see Govt’s Ex. 26A-D, which were admitted only as to Ghassan, as well as other electronic intercepts played during trial, that Ghassan knew about Marzook’s interests in Infocom, that Marzook and Nadia relied upon Ghassan for routine management of these interests even after Marzook’s designation, and that he communicated with Nadia to manage these interests. For example, evidence was introduced of a call between Ghassan and Nadia on March 21, 1996, after Mar-zook’s designation, in which Ghassan questioned Nadia about contact she had with a Dallas Morning News reporter, and inquired whether she discussed the topics of “money and computers.” See Govt’s Ex. 25A. There was evidence of another call between Nadia and Marzook dated September 27, 1996, also post-designation, in which Nadia informed Marzook that she told Ghassan to have money transferred to her. See Govt’s Ex. 25E. The Government also presented evidence of a call dated December 19, 1997, involving several persons, including Marzook, Nadia, and Tariq, their son, in which the following conversation transpired:

Tariq: And, Dad, Ghassan hasn’t sent the money yet. I tried to call him....

Marzook: Son, if I call him from here I will lose $200 just to tell him to send them.

Govt’s Ex. 38B at 4. The court determines that a reasonable inference could be drawn, from this piece of evidence, that Ghassan knew Marzook retained interest in the payments Infocom sent to Nadia.

Finally, Robert McBrien, chief of OF AC’s International Programs Division, testified at trial that Ghassan attended a meeting at OFAC in Washington, DC, and that the meeting took place in February 1995. According to McBrien, the meeting occurred in response to Executive Order 12947, which issued on January 23, 1995. He testified that, although he could not recall the details of the conversation, the purpose of the meeting was to discuss the Executive Order with representatives of various Arab American charitable associations, and to tell them how the executive order operated. He further stated that the issue of to whom they could send funds would have been a logical discussion topic. Ghassan’s name appears on a list of attendees at the meeting, along with a corresponding reference to “Holy Land Foundation.” Defs’ Ex. 174. He contends that the meeting regarded charitable funding issues relating to the Holy Land Foundation instead of whether Infocom could continue making payments to Nadia. Sufficient evidence exists, however, for a jury to infer that even if Ghassan attended the meeting in his capacity as representative of the Holy Land Foundation, he was nevertheless apprised of Executive Order 12947 and its operation, and used the knowledge for other purposes. Likewise, although Marzook had not received a terrorist designation as of the time of the meeting, a jury could reasonably infer that Ghassan, having been placed on notice about Executive Order 12947, and later learning of Marzook’s designation, knew he could not deal with property in which Marzook had any interest.

The court concludes that ample evidence exists in the record from which a jury could reasonably infer that Ghassan dealt in the property of a Specially Designated Terrorist. Accordingly, Ghassan’s motion with respect to a request for judgment of acquittal on Counts 2 through 11 should be denied.

2. Conspiracy to Deal in the Property of a Specially Designated Terrorist

In a conspiracy case, “an agreement may be inferred from concert of action, voluntary participation may be inferred from a collocation of circumstances, and knowledge may be inferred from surrounding circumstances.” United States v. Bieganowski, 313 F.3d 264, 277 (5th Cir.2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 1014, 123 S.Ct. 1956, 155 L.Ed.2d 851 (2003). Upon reviewing the evidence, the court determines that sufficient evidence was presented during trial for a reasonable jury to have found the essential elements of conspiracy to deal in the property of a Specially Designated Terrorist, as alleged in Count l.

During trial, the Government presented two main pieces of evidence against all Defendants in support of its contention that Defendants, including Ghassan, conspired to deal in the property of a Specially Designated Terrorist. First, it presented testimony from Special Agent Harkins in support of its assertion that Bayan made patently false statements to FBI agents in response to the July 1995 subpoena which the other Defendants voluntarily adopted. Second, it presented evidence of the September 24, 2001 letter written by Arch McColl in response to OFAC’s Blocking Notice. The Government contends that the letter reinforced the position that Bayan provided the FBI agents, adopted by the other Defendants, in response to the July 1995 subpoena.

The court first turns to the July 1995 subpoena. The subpoena, which Harkins served upon Infocom on July 31, 1995, mandated Infocom’s “custodian of records” to produce “forthwith” the following:

Any and all records pertaining to any closed or open accounts for Nadia Mohammed Elashi, including without limitation, the following:

1. agreements

2. murabaha agreements

3. contracts

4. statements

5. wire transfers

6. cancelled checks

7. correspondence

8. credit checks

9. any of the above pertaining to Mousa Mohamed Abu Marzook.

Govt’s Ex. 30A. Harkins testified at trial that on July 31, 1995, the same day the subpoena was served, Bayan signed an FBI Form FD-597 inventory list (Govt’s Ex. 30B) prepared in response to the subpoena. He further testified that Bayan assured the agents that the documents produced included everything that complied with the subpoena. According to Harkins, Bayan stated that there were no other agreements, contracts, or transactions with Marzook or Nadia prior to the Murabaha Agreement, other than those provided in response to the subpoena. Harkins also testified that Bayan advised him that the 13 monthly bank statements listed on the Form FD-597 were the only bank statements reflecting an instance when Infocom issued a check to Marzook or Nadia.

Harkins further testified at trial that all Defendants were present when Bayan produced the documents in response to the subpoena, and that Ghassan and Basman said nothing. In addition, he testified that he had some interaction with each Defendant on July 31, 1995, and that he interviewed Bayan and Basman. Moreover, he testified that he spoke with Ghassan when he first arrived at Infocom to serve the subpoena, that Ghassan was “in and out” during the subpoena response, but that he was in the same room when his brothers spoke with the agents.

According to the Government, the jury could, and did, infer that Bayan’s statements in response to the subpoena requests, adopted by the other Defendants, falsely represented the totality of Info-com’s dealings with Marzook, as shown when contrasted with documents recovered from Mohammad Azad, Infocom’s former accountant, and documents taken from Infocom during the September 2001 search. It contends that Ghassan and Basman’s failure to clarify, or in any way correct or alter, Bayan’s statements evidenced an agreement or scheme by Defendants to use the Murabaha Agreement as a prop or cover to conceal Marzook’s investments in Infocom; and that the statements served as knowingly false representations consistent with their scheme. Ghassan contends that such inference cannot be imputed to him, since he was “in and out” of any discussions that Bayan and Basman may have had with the agents. Harkins’s testimony, however, would allow a reasonable jury to conclude that the Defendants, including Ghassan, knowingly agreed not to comply fully with the subpoena in order to prevent the disclosure of documents linking Infocom with Marzook.

The court now turns to the September 24, 2001 letter submitted to OFAC by Infocom’s then attorney in response to OFAC’s Blocking Notice. Although the letter does not state specifically the Defendants to which it applies, the letter appears to be written on behalf of Infocom, and begins by stating, “[w]e are sending you.... ” Govt’s Ex. 34 at 5. The letter contains itemized responses to the numbered requests for information appearing in the Blocking Notice. It states, among other things, that “All of Infocom’s contacts were with Nadia Elashi,” see id., and that “[t]he total and complete extent of the financial relationship between Nadia Ela-shi and Infocom is defined in the Murab-aha Agreement of 1993 attached hereto. Infocom has never handled any other money received from either Nadia Elashi or Mr. Marzook.” Id. at 6.

The Government contends that since the letter was written in the form of the collective “we,” it is evidence of a conspiracy attributable to all Defendants, including Ghassan. It asserts that a jury could reasonably infer that the letter reiterates the same position taken by Defendants in response to the July 1995 subpoena, and therefore evidences conduct in furtherance of a conspiracy. The court determines that a reasonable jury could make such inference.

As discussed above, the Government presented sufficient evidence for a jury to reasonably infer that the Murabaha Agreement was a prop or cover to conceal Mar-zook’s investments in Infocom by creating the appearance that Nadia invested the $250,000. In addition, a reasonable jury could interpret Ghassan’s name on the cover page of the Murabaha Agreement, and Bayan’s signature the actual contract, to be evidence showing an agreement to conceal, the continuation of which would later become illegal. Likewise, it could reasonably deduce that the presence of Elbar-rasse’s letter in Bayan’s safe, which was addressed to Ghassan, evidences that Defendants shared documents and discussed company affairs with each other.

In addition, the close relationship of the Elashi family, and particularly, Infocom’s status as a family-owned and operated business, can be part of the circumstantial evidence from which a reasonable jury may infer that each Defendant agreed, or joined in an agreement, to deal in property in which Marzook retained an interest, knowing such dealing was unlawful. See United States v. Investment Enters., Inc., 10 F.3d 263, 267 n. 4 (5th Cir.1993) (“Close relationships can be a part of the circumstantial evidence from which a jury may infer that the defendant knew of a conspiracy.”) (citation omitted). A reasonable jury could infer from the totality of the evidence presented, including evidence that Infocom is family-run; that Marzook is the husband of Nadia, who is a cousin of Ghassan, Bayan, and Basman; that Mar-zook was a leader in Hamas; that Marzook had been designated as a Specially Designated Terrorist; and evidence showing the financial history between Marzook and In-focom and any predecessor, that Defendants conspired to deal in the property of a Specially Designated Terrorist. Cf. Soape, 169 F.3d at 265 (explaining that intent to conspire may be inferred “from the combination” of a defendant’s “own actions” and a “close relationship” with the other defendants). Accordingly, the court concludes, reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government and drawing all reasonable inferences in support of the verdict, that a reasonable jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Ghassan was guilty of conspiracy to deal in the property of a Specially Designated Terrorist.

3. Money Laundering

Ghassan’s money laundering convictions, like Bayan and Infocom’s, are based upon the jury’s finding that he committed the financial transactions listed as overt acts in Counts 13 through 21, involving the underlying specified activity of dealing in the property of a Specially Designated Terrorist, as set forth in Count 2. Essentially, the Government asserts that money laundering is a natural and actual consequence of dealing in the property of a Specially Designated Terrorist, and contends that a conviction for a substantive count charging dealing in the property of a Specially Designated Terrorist triggers liability for the corresponding money laundering count. The Government’s position, however, ignores the court’s jury instructions, which directed the jury to perform an independent analysis of the money laundering charges based upon well-established law concerning the offense of money laundering pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1956. The court will not rubberstamp the money laundering convictions merely because the jury convicted Ghassan, Bayan, and Info-com of Count 2, as well as Counts 3 through 11; instead, it will analyze under the essential elements of money laundering. See Ct’s Instr. to Jury at 23-25.

Upon review, the court determines that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient for a reasonable jury to have found each essential element of money laundering beyond a reasonable doubt, and therefore convict Ghassan on Counts 13 through 21. It is clear from the evidence that Infocom continued making payments to Nadia after Marzook received a terrorist designation, and that a jury could reasonably infer that Ghassan, through the routine management of Marzook and Nadia’s interests, knowingly conducted these financial transactions, or at least aided and abetted others in making them. For the reasons stated previously, a jury could also reasonably infer from the evidence that Ghassan willfully dealt in the property of a Specially Designated Terrorist, as alleged in Counts 2 through 11. As the offense of dealing in such property is enforced under section 206 of the IEEPA, the offense is a “specified unlawful activity” for purposes of money laundering. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7)(D). For the reasons stated in its discussion regarding Counts 2 through 11, the court is satisfied that sufficient evidence existed for a reasonable jury to infer that Ghassan knew that Marzook retained an interest in the monies transacted, and this same inference establishes knowledge under section 1956(a)(l)(B)(i). Ghassan acknowledged that he knew Mar-zook was designated as a Specially Designated Terrorist, and the evidence supports an inference that he was apprised of Executive Order 12947 and its prohibitions. To the extent Ghassan argues that the jury could have concluded, from the evidence presented, that he genuinely believed Mar-zook had no interest in the transactions at issue, and therefore the transactions involved legitimate funds, he ignores that the jury was free to discredit any explanation suggested or argued on his behalf, in favor of the Government’s. See United States v. Rodriguez, 278 F.3d 486, 491 (5th Cir.) (explaining that the jury heard evidence from both sides as to the source of the money, but concluded that the defendant laundered the money), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 913, 122 S.Ct. 2376, 153 L.Ed.2d 195 (2002).

The court now turns to the “designed to conceal” element. A “particular transaction must be viewed in context when determining whether it was designed to conceal.” Burns, 162 F.3d at 848; see also United States v. Pipkin, 114 F.3d 528, 534 (5th Cir.1997) (“[Concealment can be established by showing that the transaction is part of a larger scheme designed to conceal illegal proceeds.”) (citations and quotation omitted). Sufficient evidence exists for a reasonable jury to infer that the payments from Infocom to Nadia, made pursuant to the Murabaha Agreement, were attempts to conceal Marzook’s interest in the monies he invested, as well as the proceeds from such monies, and that although such attempts to conceal were not illegal before Marzook’s designation, the payments became illegal post-designation, since these same transactions, made post-designation, became attempts to conceal blocked monies. Evidence of the transaction history presented to the jury, beginning with Marzook’s alleged pre-Mu-rabaha Agreement investments, then the execution of the Agreement, then payments to Nadia continuing post-designation, provides the basis for an inference that the payments were made with an intent to conceal, and such concealment, albeit not illegal when it began, became illegal upon Marzook’s designation as a Specially Designated Terrorist. Moreover, sufficient evidence exists for a reasonable jury to conclude that Infocom’s payments to Nadia made after Marzook’s designation were a continuation of an attempt to disguise Marzook’s interest by use of a third party. Cf. Pipkin, 114 F.3d at 534 (“In determining whether there is a larger scheme to conceal proceeds, the defendant’s use of a third party ... usually constitutes sufficient proof of a design to conceal.”) (citation and quotation omitted). A jury could thus view the post-designation transactions as steps in a scheme designed to distance Infocom from Marzook by concealing his investments. Accordingly, the court concludes that sufficient evidence exists for a reasonable jury to convict Defendant Ghassan Elashi on counts 13 through 21.

4. Conspiracy to Commit Money Laundering

The court determines that there was sufficient evidence presented during trial to satisfy the Government’s burden of proof as to Count 12. As discussed above, the conclusion that Ghassan laundered money is supported by sufficient evidence. A rational jury could also conclude that the evidence taken as a whole established the essential elements of conspiracy to commit money laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h), beyond a reasonable doubt. It is well-settled that a conspiracy may be proved by circumstantial evidence, and “the agreement need not be formal or spoken.” Tencer, 107 F.3d at 1132. The court is convinced that the jury made a conclusion based upon the evidence presented and the credibility of the witnesses.

5. Conclusion regarding Ghassan’s Motion

Contrary to Ghassan’s assertions, upon reviewing the evidence presented in the light most favorable to the Government and drawing all reasonable inferences in support of the verdict, the court determines that a rational jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the Government established the essential elements of (1) conspiracy to deal in the property of a Specially Designated Terrorist; (2) dealing in the property of a Specially Designated Terrorist; (3) conspiracy to commit money laundering; and (4) money laundering. Accordingly, Defendant Ghassan Elashi’s Rule 29(c) Renewal of Motion of Judgment of Acquittal should be denied.

B. Basman Elashi’s Motion for Judgment of Acquittal

Defendant Basman Elashi contends that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to satisfy the Government’s burden of proof on Counts 1, 2, and 12, and therefore requests the court to enter a judgment of acquittal on these counts. He asserts that the evidence presented cannot support a finding that he entered in an agreement to deal in the property of a Specially Designated Terrorist (Count 1), or that he dealt directly or indirectly in the property of a Specially Designated Terrorist (Counts 1 and 2). As to Count 12, conspiracy to commit money laundering, Basman contends that his conviction is unwarranted because the jury acquitted him of all nine substantive counts charging him with dealing in the property of a Specially Designated Terrorist, as well as all nine substantive counts charging him with money laundering. The court disagrees.

1. Dealing in the property of a Specially Designated Terrorist

Basman challenges the determination that he “willfully” dealt in the property of a Specially Designated Terrorist, and contends that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient for a reasonable jury to conclude that he knew Marzook was designated as a Specially Designated Terrorist or that he knowingly sought to violate the law by dealing in property in which Mar-zook retained an interest. Basman asserts that the only evidence the Government offered in support of his conviction on Count 2 was a handwritten computation and an address book, both found in his office during the September 2001 search of Infocom. He contends such evidence is insufficient to support a conviction because no handwriting expert or other evidence was offered linking these exhibits to him. He also contends that all other circumstantial evidence linking him to the offense is equally consistent with innocent activity and therefore legally and factually insufficient to support a conviction. In support of his contention that the evidence, at best, presents a tie, Basman points out that the Jury acquitted him of Counts 3 through 11, the substantive counts charging him with dealing in the property of a Specially Designated Terrorist, even though the court provided the jury a Pinkerton charge in its jury instructions.

Upon review of the evidence, the court determines that sufficient evidence was presented during trial for a rational jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Basman willfully dealt in the property of a designated terrorist. Contrary to Basman’s assertion, the court determines that the handwritten computation and the address book are pieces of circumstantial evidence upon which a rational jury could infer that Basman knew Marzook made the $250,000 investment, and that Basman was involved in the financial operations of Infocom. One entry on the handwritten computation states, “Musa = 250,”. Govt’s Ex. 31A. The notation was written on the reverse side of a Vendor Voucher dated “1/26/94.” Id. In addition, the address book contains an entry for Marzook spelled “Musa AbuMarzook.” Govt’s Ex. 45 at 3. Although the court agrees with Basman that the Government did not specifically prove that he made the entries, there is sufficient evidence for a rational jury to infer that he did. Moreover, even if a jury were to conclude that Basman did not write either entry, since the handwritten computation and the address book were both found in Basman’s office, and in light of other evidence relating to Basman, it could still reasonably infer that Basman knew about Marzook’s investments in Infocom.

Turning to Basman’s contention that there was insufficient evidence upon which to conclude that he knew Marzook was designated as a Specially Designated Terrorist, evidence was presented during trial that Basman was present during the July 1995 subpoena response, and a rational jury could infer that this would have placed Basman on notice to track Mar-zook’s status. In addition, a rational jury could reasonably infer Basman’s knowledge because of his apparent inconsistent position regarding whether Marzook had invested in Infocom. FBI Special Agent James Lewis testified at trial that, when he interviewed Basman at his residence on the morning of September 5, 2001, Basman stated that he did not know the source of the $250,000 investment. A rational jury could contrast this statement, made post-designation, with the handwritten computation, presumably written pre-designation, to infer that Basman attempted to conceal Marzook’s investment to Special Agent Lewis because he knew Marzook was designated as a Specially Designated Terrorist.

Finally, the September 24, 2001 letter, as well as its attachments, and the above-described evidence provide sufficient evidence upon which a jury could reasonably infer that Basman willfully dealt in the property of a Specially Designated Terrorist. Evidence was presented at trial that the September 24, 2001 letter contained attachments that were faxed by Basman. The fax cover sheets (Govt’s Ex. 34 at 12-13) which were included in the attached materials, state “FROM: Basman,” and were sent on an Infocom fax stationery. At trial, the Government presented evidence that one of the faxed pages, a Vendor Voucher (Govt’s Ex. 34 at 14), purported to show that Nadia made the three payments comprising the $250,000 invested into Infocom pursuant the Murabaha Agreement. Basman contends that he faxed the documents in his capacity as Infocom’s logistics and credit manager, and, as faxing was part of his job duties, he did not compile the financial records that were faxed. The court notes, however, that the name “Basman” appears at the bottom of the Vendor Voucher at issue, see id., which provides evidence for an inference that Basman prepared, or assisted in preparing, the documents. The court determines that sufficient evidence exists for a rational jury to infer that Basman knew the contents and import of the documents he faxed, and therefore knowingly faxed documents containing misrepresentations to Arch MeColl, Infocom’s then attorney, with the intent for MeColl to forward them to OFAC. In light of the totality of the evidence presented, the court determines that a reasonable jury could conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Basman willfully dealt in the property of a Specially Designated Terrorist.

2. Conspiracy to deal in the property of a Specially Designated Terrorist

Basman challenges his conviction on Count 1 by contending that the Government presented insufficient evidence to support a finding that he entered into an agreement to deal in the property of a Specially Designated Terrorist. The court disagrees. As the court held with respect to Ghassan, it determines that Special Agent Harkins’s testimony would allow a reasonable jury to conclude that Defendants, including Basman, knowingly agreed not to fully comply with the July 1995 subpoena, in an effort to prevent the disclosure of documents linking Infocom with Marzook. Moreover, the court determines that a jury could reasonably infer that the September 24, 2001 letter reiterates the statements made by Bayan in response to the subpoena request, which were made in Basman’s presence, and therefore evidences conduct in furtherance of or part of a conspiracy. Finally, it would be reasonable to infer that Basman’s act of faxing the documents to MeColl was part of the Defendants’ concert of action, and signified his knowing participation in an agreement designed to conceal or otherwise misrepresent Marzook’s investment history in Infocom. The court therefore concludes, reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government and drawing all reasonable inferences in support of the verdict, that a reasonable jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Basman was guilty of conspiracy to deal in the property of a Specially Designated Terrorist.

3. Conspiracy to Commit Money Laundering

Basman asserts that he could not be convicted of Count 12, conspiring to commit money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h), because the Government failed to present sufficient evidence to establish Count 2, dealing in the property of a Specially Designated Terrorist, which is the specified underlying offense that would support a conviction for money laundering. As discussed above, sufficient evidence was presented during trial to support Basman’s conviction on Count 2, and the court therefore rejects Basman’s assertion. Moreover, the court agrees with the Government that the jury was free to acquit Basman of Counts 13 through 21, the substantive money laundering charges, and therefore reject the Government’s Pinkerton theory of liability as to Basman, but nevertheless convict Basman of Count 12, conspiracy to commit money laundering. This is because the jury was permitted to find that Basman knowingly entered into an agreement with Bayan and Ghassan to launder money, or voluntarily agreed to join a preexisting agreement, without finding, at least beyond a reasonable doubt, that Basman conducted, or aided and abetted the conducting of, the financial transactions comprising the basis of the substantive money laundering counts.

As “[a] conspiracy does not merge with the substantive offense,” United States v. Nims, 524 F.2d 123, 126 (5th Cir.1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 934, 96 S.Ct. 2646, 49 L.Ed.2d 385 (1976), “conspiring to commit a crime is an offense wholly separate from the crime which is the object of the conspiracy.” United States v. Threadgill, 172 F.3d 357, 367 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 871, 120 S.Ct. 172, 145 L.Ed.2d 146 (1999). In this same vein, conspiracy to commit money laundering is wholly separate and distinct from the offense of money laundering, since prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h) does not require proof of the elements of the substantive offense of money laundering under 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1). See Threadgill, 172 F.3d at 367.

The court is satisfied, based upon the evidence presented during trial, that a reasonable jury could conclude that the totality of the evidence established the essential elements of conspiracy to commit money laundering as to Basman beyond a reasonable doubt. Sufficient evidence exists for the conclusion that Basman knowingly agreed with Bayan and Ghassan to launder money, or voluntarily agreed to join a preexisting agreement to launder money, and that the Defendants committed at least one overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy. See Wilson, 249 F.3d at 379. Basman’s motion with respect to Count 12 should therefore be denied.

4. Conclusion regarding Basman’s Motion

Upon reviewing the evidence presented in the light most favorable to the Government and drawing all reasonable inferences in support of the verdict, the court determines that a rational jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the Government established the essential elements of (1) conspiracy to deal in the property of a Specially Designated Terrorist; (2) dealing in the property of a Specially Designated Terrorist; and (3) conspiracy to commit money laundering. Accordingly, Defendant Basman Elashi’s Motion for Judgment of Acquittal Pursuant to Rule 29, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure should be denied.

C. Basman Elashi’s Motion for New Trial

Basman also timely filed a motion for new trial pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 33. He requests the court to grant a new trial as to Count 12 of the revised superseding indictment, which charged conspiracy to commit money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h). According to Basman, the court should grant a new trial because the jury verdict is inconsistent. The jury convicted Basman of Count 12, but acquitted him of Counts 3 through 11, the substantive counts charging him with dealing in the property of a Specially Designated Terrorist, as well as Counts 13 through 21, the substantive counts charging him with money laundering. He argues that the jury cannot convict him of Count 12, but acquit him of Counts 3 through 11, and 13 through 21. Put another way, he contends that a conviction on Count 2, dealing in the property of