Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER DE MENT, Senior District Judge. I. INTRODUCTION This cause is before the court on Petitioner Timothy Charles Davis’ (“Davis”) petition for writ of habeas corpus, brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, for a decision on the merits. Davis, who was seventeen years old at the time of the offense, was convicted of murder by a jury in an Alabama state court and sentenced to death. The judgment of conviction and sentence of death were affirmed on direct review, and Davis’ petition was rejected by state collateral proceedings. In the present proceeding, timely brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, Davis challenges the constitutional validity of his judgment of conviction and sentence of death. In light of the Supreme Court of the United States’ decision in Roper v. Simmons, which held that the execution of individuals who were under the age of eighteen at the time of their capital crimes is prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth amendments, Davis is no longer eligible for the death penalty. See 543 U.S. 551, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005). Because Davis’ sentence of death is unconstitutional under Roper, as discussed herein, Davis is due habeas corpus relief with respect to his sentence of death to the extent that the court must grant Davis’ petition, unless the State of Alabama vacates or sets aside Davis’ death sentence and sentences Davis to life imprisonment without the possibility of par role. In his petition, Davis also raises guilt-phase claims challenging the validity of his judgment of conviction. After careful consideration of the arguments of counsel, the relevant law and the record as a whole, the court finds that, as to Davis’ guilt-phase claims, Davis’ writ is due to be denied pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) because the decisions of the Alabama courts were not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established, controlling Supreme Court precedent, and were not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. II. BACKGROUND A. Procedural History The following presents a synopsis of the procedural history of this case. Davis was tried before a jury in the Circuit Court of Coosa County, Alabama, on a charge of capital murder, namely, the intentional killing during a robbery of Mrs. Avis F. Alford (“Mrs.Alford”). On June 13, 1980, the jury returned a verdict of guilty against Davis for capital murder, and, pursuant to § 13-ll-2(a) of the Alabama Code, the predecessor to § 13A-5-40(a), fixed his punishment at death by electrocution. Pursuant to former Alabama Code §§ 13-11-3 and -4 (repealed and replaced by § 13A-5-45 and -47), after a separate sentencing hearing held on July 14, 1980, the Honorable Kenneth F. Ingram, who presided as the trial and sentencing judge, imposed a sentence of death consistent with the jury’s determination. See Davis v. State, 554 So.2d 1094, 1103 (Ala.Crim. App.1984). Davis’ judgment of conviction originally was reversed on appeal and remanded for a new trial on the authority of Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 100 S.Ct. 2382, 65 L.Ed.2d 392 (1980). See Davis v. State, 408 So.2d 532 (Ala.Crim.App.1981) (per curiam), cert. denied, 408 So.2d 533 (Ala.1982). The Supreme Court of the United States, however, granted the State’s petition for certiorari, vacated the judgment of the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals, above, and remanded the case for further consideration in light of Hopper v. Evans, 456 U.S. 605, 102 S.Ct. 2049, 72 L.Ed.2d 367 (1982). See Alabama v. Ritter, 457 U.S. 1114, 102 S.Ct. 2921, 73 L.Ed.2d 1326 (1982). Upon remand, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Davis’ judgment of conviction and the sentence of death. See Davis v. State, 554 So.2d 1094 (Ala.Crim.App.1984), op. extended and reh’rg denied, 554 So.2d at 1109. The judgment of the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Alabama. Ex parte Davis, 554 So.2d 1111 (Ala.1989). Davis’ application for rehearing was overruled on September 28, 1990. Davis v. State, 569 So.2d 738 (Ala.1990). The Supreme Court of the United States denied certiorari on February 25, 1991. Davis v. Alabama, 498 U.S. 1127, 111 S.Ct. 1091, 112 L.Ed.2d 1196 (1991). On February 12, 1992, Davis, through counsel, filed a petition for relief from the judgment of conviction and sentence of death pursuant to Rule 32 of the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure. An amended petition was filed on November 18, 1994, and an evidentiary hearing was conducted by the Circuit Court of Coosa County on September 1, 1995. On September 29, 1995, Davis filed a motion to amend the Rule 32 petition, to which the State filed a written objection on October 28, 1995. The Rule 32 trial court did not rule on whether the motion to amend was accepted or rejected. On February 3, 1997, the Rule 32 trial court denied Davis’ petition. The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the judgment of the Rule 32 trial court, denying Davis’ Rule 32 petition, Davis v. State, 720 So.2d 1006 (Ala. Crim.App.1998), and the Supreme Court of Alabama denied certiorari. Thereafter, on February 22, 1999, the Supreme Court of the United States denied certiorari. Davis v. Alabama, 525 U.S. 1149, 119 S.Ct. 1049, 143 L.Ed.2d 55 (1999). Davis’ extensive post-trial proceedings culminated in the filing of his timely habe-as petition in this court on April 28, 1999, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. During stage I of the proceedings, the court determined which of Davis’ claims could be heard on the merits. (See Doc. No. 68.) During these stage II proceedings, the court now decides the merits of the claims which are not procedurally barred. B. The Crime The crime of which Davis was convicted involves horrific instances of brutality, sodomy and murder. In Davis v. State, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals, in its decision affirming Davis’ judgment of conviction on direct appeal, succinctly summarized the facts which were adduced at trial. See 554 So.2d 1094, 1097-98 (Ala.Crim. App.1984). The court quotes from the Davis opinion: On July 20, 1978, between 4:30 p.m. and 5:30 p.m., at Alford’s Grocery in Coosa County, Alabama, 68-year-old Avis F. Alford was robbed, sodomized, and brutally murdered with a common steak knife. Her nude body was discovered at approximately 5:30 p.m. inside her store next to the cash drawer counter, where she had been assaulted and stabbed in the back 17 times. The cash drawer was found open. The drawer contained no paper currency, but it did contain a few coins. Other coins were “scattered about” on the floor behind the counter. An autopsy revealed that Mrs. Alford had, indeed, died from the combination of knife wounds in her back, wounds which punctured her lungs and lacerated her aorta. She had lost a large volume of type “A positive” blood. Further analysis of samples taken during the autopsy revealed the presence of human sperm in the victim’s rectum. Shortly after the murder, the appellant, accompanied by his wife and his mother, appeared at the murder scene and told the authorities that he had discovered Mrs. Alford’s body inside the store. He explained that when he realized she was dead, he “got scared and ran.” He later explained that in lifting the body he had “gotten blood all over” himself and that he had changed clothes at home before returning to report what he had seen. He also told the officers that on his way home after discovering the body he had seen two black men walking down the highway away from Alford’s store. However, when asked for a description of the two black men, the appellant “hemmed and hawed,” and could only state that one was tall and one was short. Mrs. Alford was last seen alive inside the store at 4:30 p.m. A young white male on a motorcycle was seen riding into the parking lot at Alford’s Grocery at 5:05 p.m. The description of the motorcycle rider and the motorcycle generally matched the appearance of the appellant and his motorcycle on the day of the murder. Curtis Smith identified the appellant in court. He testified that on the day of the murder, at approximately 5:30 p.m., he saw the appellant riding his motorcycle at the Covered Bridge a few miles from Alford’s store. He saw the appellant ride past the bridge, and he heard the motorcycle stop and “quiet down” for several minutes before the appellant returned to the bridge. The appellant stopped and told Smith that he, the appellant, had “taken a spill” on his motorcycle. The appellant was wearing a brown T-shirt and blue jeans and had blood on his right hand and arm and on his jogging shoes. He was bleeding from underneath one of his fingernails. He “pulled down to the rocks” beside the creek, washed off the blood, and rode away. During the investigation immediately following the murder, Mrs. Alford’s wallet, which had been taken during the robbery-murder, was found in the woods a short distance past the Covered Bridge where Smith had seen the appellant. The investigating officers testified that, after talking with Smith, they drove slowly down the road and found, at the entrance to an old logging road, a disturbance in the dirt of the type a motorcycle would make “spinning out.” They searched the area and found the wallet. Using metal detectors, the investigating officers also found, in the field across the highway from Alford’s Grocery, the murder weapon, a steak knife covered with type “A” human blood. Similar knives were seen in the kitchen of appellant’s residence. The results of physical examinations and chemical analyses of the clothes the appellant was wearing at the time Mrs. Aford was murdered, including his motorcycle helmet, were particularly incriminating. Splattered blood was found on his motorcycle helmet and smeared and splattered blood was found on his blue jeans and shoes. Blood was smeared on and around the button and the button hole used to fasten the jeans at the waist. Blood stains were found on the outside and on the inside of the jeans in the waist area. Bloodstains were also found in the area of the right knee and the lower leg. All of the stains of sufficient size to permit typing were type “A” human blood, whereas appellant’s blood type is type “0.” A small bloodstain was found on the inside of appellant’s undershorts. On the outside of his undershorts in the area of the crotch there was a large yellowish-brown stain. This stain was a combination of human sperm mixed with fecal matter and human tissue of the type found inside the rectum. In addition to this overwhelming circumstantial evidence against the appellant, the state presented evidence of an alleged confession by the appellant to Tracy Bignault, a fellow inmate of the appellant during appellant’s incarceration prior to trial. Bignault testified that the appellant admitted robbing and killing Mrs. Alford. Bignault related to the jury a detailed account of the crime as it was, allegedly, confessed to him by the appellant. Bignault’s testimony was consistent with the state’s circumstantial evidence. On cross-examination, however, Bignault admitted that in his original statement to the authorities he had left out many of the details. He explained that he did not tell the authorities the whole truth at that time because he was scared. Appellant’s apparent motive for the crime was presented through the testimony of Steve Colvin. Colvin had sold the appellant the motorcycle the appellant was riding on the day of the murder, but the appellant had not made timely payments for it. At work on the morning of the murder, Colvin told the appellant that he, Colvin, needed some of the money the next day. The appellant presented a defense in the nature of an alibi. On the day of the murder he was living in his grandmother’s home with his wife, his mother, and his grandmother. He had been living there for approximately five weeks. His mother testified that the appellant came home from work at 4:00 p.m. and ate supper with the family as usual. James Richardson, a young black boy in the neighborhood, borrowed appellant’s motorcycle shortly after the appellant came home from work and did not return it until 5:15 p.m. The appellant, then, took Richardson home and returned at 5:17 p.m. The appellant left again and returned at 5:40 p.m. He told his mother to call the police because he had found a dead woman inside Alford’s Grocery. After she had changed clothes, she immediately drove the appellant back to the store, where the appellant told the authorities what he had seen. On cross-examination appellant’s mother admitted that she had never told the authorities about James Richardson, and she could not remember the appellant saying anything about going down to the Covered Bridge before returning home from Alford’s Grocery. She also admitted that the family had some knives similar in appearance to the murder weapon, but stated that their knives were not the same size. Some were larger and some were smaller than the murder weapon. Appellant’s theory in defense was that someone else robbed and killed Mrs. Alford, that he got blood on himself when he found her body, and that Big-nault was lying and had fabricated appellant’s alleged confession in order to “make a deal” with the authorities. Id. III. FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS STANDARD OF REVIEW Because Davis is in state custody, his application for habeas review is controlled by 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The amendments to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), which were enacted in 1996 as part of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), govern the court’s review of the claims in Davis’ petition for writ of habeas corpus. See Nelson v. Alabama, 292 F.3d 1291, 1294 (11th Cir.2002) (a petition for habeas corpus filed after the effective date of the AEDPA is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)). The AEDPA sets forth a “ ‘highly deferential standard for reviewing state court judgments.’ ” Jamerson v. Sec’y for Dep’t of Corrs., 410 F.3d 682, 687 (11th Cir.2005) (quoting Parker v. Sec’y for Dep’t of Com., 331 F.3d 764, 768 (11th Cir.2003)). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), the court may grant habeas relief to a person in state custody, such as Davis, only if that person demonstrates that a claim “adjudicated on the merits” by the state court (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The purposes behind § 2254(d)’s limited parameters of review of state court judgments are twofold, the first being “to prevent ‘retrials’ on federal ha-beas,” and the second being “to give effect to state convictions to the extent possible under law.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 386 & 404, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000); see also Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 693, 122 S.Ct. 1843, 152 L.Ed.2d 914 (2002). The deferential review, recited in § 2254(d), applies even where the state court summarily rejects a federal claim.' See Herring v. Sec’y for Dep’t of Com., 397 F.3d 1338, 1347 (11th Cir.2005) (“even a summary, unexplieated rejection of a federal claim qualifies as an adjudication entitled to deference under § 2254(d)”). By its express terms, § 2254(d)(1) confines the source of “clearly established Federal law” to decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 381-82 & 412, 120 S.Ct. 1495. In Williams, the Supreme Court interpreted § 2254(d)(l)’s limitation as to the source of authority as encompassing “the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme Court’s] decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court decision.” Id. at 412, 120 S.Ct. 1495; see also Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 542, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003). Section 2254(d)(1), however, does not “ ‘limit the federal courts’ independent interpretive authority with respect to federal questions.’ ” Williams, 529 U.S. at 412, 120 S.Ct. 1495 (quoting Lindh v. Murphy, 96 F.3d 856, 869 (7th Cir.1996)), and “rules of law may be sufficiently clear for habeas purposes even when they are expressed in terms of a generalized standard rather than as a bright-line rule.” Id. at 382, 120 S.Ct. 1495. Decisions emanating from claims adjudicated by state courts are deemed in aberration of “clearly established Federal law” only if one of two conditions is satisfied: The decision is (1) “contrary to” or (2) “involved an unreasonable application of’ the “clearly established Federal law.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); Williams, 529 U.S. at 404, 120 S.Ct. 1495. These two phrases— “contrary to” and “unreasonable application” — have “independent meaning.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 404, 120 S.Ct. 1495. A state court decision is contrary to “clearly established federal law” when the state court “applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases” or “confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of th[e] [Supreme Court],” but nonetheless reaches a different result. Id. at 405-06, 120 S.Ct. 1495. With respect to the “unreasonable application” scenario, the standard is one of objective unreasonableness. See id. at 409, 120 S.Ct. 1495. “[W]hen a state-court decision unreasonably applies the law of [the Supreme Court] to the facts of a prisoner’s case, a federal court applying § 2254(d)(1) may conclude that the state-court decision falls within that provision’s ‘unreasonable application’ clause.” Id. Additionally, a state court decision involves an unreasonable application of controlling law where, “under clearly established federal law, the State court was unreasonable in refusing to extend the governing legal principle to a context in which the principle should have controlled.” Ramdass v. Angelone, 530 U.S. 156, 164, 120 S.Ct. 2113, 147 L.Ed.2d 125 (2000); see also Williams, 529 U.S. at 408, 120 S.Ct. 1495 At the same time, the Williams Court recognized that “[t]he term ‘unreasonable’ is no doubt difficult to define.” 529 U.S. at 410, 120 S.Ct. 1495. “[T]he most important point,” for purposes of the ruling in Williams, is that “unreasonable” differs from an incorrect or erroneous application of Supreme Court jurisprudence. Id. Under the unreasonable application prong, the “habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.” Id. at 411, 120 S.Ct. 1495; see also Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75, 123 S.Ct. 1166, 155 L.Ed.2d 144 (2003) (“The ‘unreasonable application’ clause requires the state court decision to be more than incorrect or erroneous. The state court’s application of clearly established law must be objectively unreasonable.”) (citation omitted). As stated, the AEDPA also permits a court to grant a writ if the court concludes that the state court’s adjudication of the claim “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the [s]tate court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). Relevant to § 2254(d)(2)’s analysis is the restriction delineated in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e): “A state court’s determinations of fact shall be ‘presumed to be correct,’ and the habeas petitioner ‘shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.’ ” Parker v. Head, 244 F.3d 831, 835-36 (11th Cir.2001) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1)). As pronounced in Miller-El v. Cockrell, [flactual determinations by state courts are presumed correct absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, § 2254(e)(1), and a decision adjudicated on the merits in a state court and based on a factual determination will not be overturned on factual grounds unless objectively unreasonable in light of the evidence presented in the state-court proceeding, § 2254(d)(2). 537 U.S. 322, 340, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003); see also Lenz v. Washington, 444 F.3d 295, 300 (4th Cir.2006) (discussing interrelatedness between 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) and 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) as “indicated” by Supreme Court precedent). The presumption “applies equally to factual determinations made by the state trial and appellate courts.” Bui v. Haley, 321 F.3d 1304, 1312 (11th Cir.2003). On the other hand, “the statutory presumption of correctness applies only to findings of fact made by the state court, not to mixed determinations of law and fact.” Parker, 244 F.3d at 836. In addition to the foregoing law governing the standard of review, one other legal premise is noteworthy. The federal habeas writ is not available to correct violations of state law. “[A] habeas petition grounded on issues of state law provides no basis for habeas relief’ pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Branan v. Booth, 861 F.2d 1507, 1508 (11th Cir.1988). The federal writ is available only if the violation of state law “raises federal constitutional problems.” Wilcox v. Ford, 813 F.2d 1140, 1145 n.7 (11th Cir.1987). Thus, whether or not the state court erred under Alabama law in its rulings at Davis’ trial is “largely beside the point” in the court’s analysis. Jammed v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 920 (9th Cir.1991). IV. DISCUSSION Davis seeks habeas corpus relief as to his sentence of death based upon the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Roper, supra, and the court addresses this claim first. Davis also has raised and briefed six constitutional guilt-phase claims attacking the validity of his judgment of conviction which the court will address in the order in which the claims are asserted by Davis. See Clisby v. Jones, 960 F.2d 925, 936 (11th Cir.1992) (holding that district court must resolve all claims for relief premised on alleged constitutional violations which are raised in a petition for writ of habeas corpus whether habeas relief is granted or denied). A. Davis’Sentence of Death This case no longer involves implication of the death penalty. During the pen-dency of the present action, the Supreme Court of the United States granted certio-rari to consider “whether it is permissible under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States to execute a juvenile offender who was older than 15 but younger than 18 when he committed a capital crime.” Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 555-56, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005); Roper v. Simmons, 540 U.S. 1160, 124 S.Ct. 1171, 157 L.Ed.2d 1204 (2004) (granting petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Missouri). Based on the Supreme Court’s decision to decide this issue and the fact that the Court’s ultimate decision would likely inform the merits of the issues pertaining to Davis’ sentence of death, the court stayed consideration of the instant petition pending the Supreme Court’s ruling. (See Doc. No. 89.) On March 1, 2005, the Supreme Court issued its opinion, holding that “[t]he Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments forbid imposition of the death penalty on offenders who were under the age of 18 when their crimes were committed.” Roper, 543 U.S. at 579, 125 S.Ct. 1183. The bright-line holding in Roper abrogated the Supreme Court’s earlier decision in Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 109 S.Ct. 2969, 106 L.Ed.2d 306 (1989), wherein the Court held that the Constitution did not bar the imposition of the death penalty for offenders who were older than the age of sixteen. By order filed on March 4, 2005, this court directed the parties to file briefs addressing all issues remaining for review on the merits and discussing the effect of the Supreme Court’s decision in Roper on Davis’ death penalty claims, including his claim that the execution of offenders who were under the age of eighteen at the time their crimes were committed is unconstitutional. (Doc. No. 90 at 16-17.) On June 2, 2005, the State filed a supplemental brief conceding, albeit reluctantly, that the death penalty could not be imposed against Davis because he was under the age of eighteen when Mrs. Alford was robbed, murdered and sexually assaulted, crimes for which Davis has been convicted. (Id. at 17.) The parties do not dispute that Davis was seventeen years old when Mrs. Alford was murdered, and the record amply supports this uncontested fact. Davis’ certifí-cate of birth shows that Davis was born on March 18, 1961. (See Doc. No. 92, Ex. 1.) Mrs. Alford was murdered seventeen years later on July 20, 1978. The decisions of the state courts also contain references to Davis’ age at the time of the offense. See, e.g., Ex parte Davis, 554 So.2d 1111, 1113-14 (Ala.1989) (acknowledging Davis’ age in context of considering his claim that Eighth Amendment barred his execution); id. at 1110 (“In its finding of facts, the trial court found as mitigating circumstances the fact that the appellant had no significant history of any prior criminal activity and was 17 years old at the time of the offense.”); Davis v. State, 554 So.2d 1094, 1107 (Ala.Cr.App.1984) (accepting “stipulations oí the State and defendant that the defendant was 17 years of age ... at the time the offense was committed”). Applying the Supreme Court’s decision in Roper to the undisputed fact that Davis was seventeen years old at the time the murder was committed, the court finds that Davis’ sentence of death is unconstitutional. Pursuant to an Alabama statute, an individual convicted of a capital offense must be sentenced to death or life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. See Ala.Code § 13A-5-39(l) (defining “capital offense” as “[a]n offense for which a[ ] defendant shall be punished by a sentence of death or life imprisonment without parole according to the provisions of this article”); id. § 13A-5-40(a) (listing and defining Alabama’s capital offenses). Because the sentence of death is no longer constitutionally valid, the only sentencing alternative is life without parole. See Adams v. State, — So.2d-, 2006 WL 1216740, *1 (Ala.Cr.App. April 28, 2006) (holding unconstitutional defendant’s sentence of death based upon the holding in Roper, supra, and “remand[ing] for the Montgomery Circuit Court to set aside [the defendant’s] death sentence and to sentence him to the only other sentence available — life in the penitentiary without the possibility of parole”). Davis’ petition, therefore, is due to be granted as to his sentence of death to the extent that the court must grant the petition, unless the State of Alabama sets aside Davis’ death sentence and imposes a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Consequently, the court finds, and Davis concedes (see Doc. No. 92 at 2, 7), that the remaining claims regarding the penalty phase of Davis’ trial now are moot. See LeCroy v. Secretary, Florida D.O.C., 421 F.3d 1237, 1239-40 (11th Cir.2005) (dismissing as moot defendant’s § 2254 petition, challenging his death sentence, where his death sentence was vacated pursuant to Roper v. Simmons because the defendant was seventeen years old at the time of his offenses). The court, thus, need only address Davis’ claims pertaining to his guilt and the validity of the judgment of conviction. B. Claims B and C: Davis’ Claims that He Was Denied His Fourth Amendment Right to a Fair and an Impartial Judge 1. Arguments of Counsel In Claims B and C, Davis contends that, in the proceedings in his case in juvenile court, including the hearings governing detention, probable cause and juvenile transfer, he was denied due process, as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, because the presiding judge, Robert Teel, Jr. (“Judge Teel”), and the prosecutor, Frank Teel, are brothers. (Doc. No. 92 at 7.) Frank Teel was the assistant district attorney who participated in all stages of Davis’ prosecution. Because Davis was a juvenile when arrested, the initial proceedings were held in juvenile court. Judge Teel presided over the hearings in juvenile court, including two detention hearings held on July 25, 1978, and September 26, 1978, and a juvenile transfer hearing held on November 17, 1978, after which Davis’ case was transferred by Judge Teel to adult court. Davis asserts that the state court “upheld the participation of the Teel brothers in this case” based solely on the application of Alabama law, but that the decision is “contrary to and an unreasonable application of’ Davis’ clearly established federal rights to “due process,” “a fair and impartial judge,” and “proceedings free from the appearance of impartiality.” (Doc. No. 95 at 7); (see also Doc. No. 92 at 8-9 (same).) In support of his argument, Davis relies on four United States Supreme Court opinions which he says clearly establish that the “appearance of impartiality” violates due process rights under the United States Constitution. (Doc. No. 29 at 9, citing Turney v. Ohio, 278 U.S. 510, 47 S.Ct. 437, 71 L.Ed. 749 (1927); Offutt v. U.S., 348 U.S. 11, 75 S.Ct. 11, 99 L.Ed. 11 (1954); In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 75 S.Ct. 623, 99 L.Ed. 942 (1955); and Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 93 S.Ct. 80, 34 L.Ed.2d 267 (1972)); (see also Doe. No. 95 at 6.) Based on these four Supreme Court decisions, Davis contends that, even where evidence of actual bias is lacking, the “appearance of impartiality” violates the Due Process Clause of the United States. The State, on the other hand, contends that Davis’ claim does not rise to the level of a due process violation because there was no evidence of actual or inherent bias presented during the state court proceedings. It points out that, on direct appeal, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals’ independent scrutiny of the record uncovered no such evidence of bias. (Doc. No. 94 at 18-19, citing Davis v. State, 554 So.2d 1094, 1099 (Ala.Crim.App.1984).) Moreover, the State asserts that, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), in order for Davis to demonstrate that the state court’s decision is “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” Davis must cite precedent which is “identical at a high degree of specificity.” (Id. at 19-20.) The State says, however, that none of the Supreme Court decisions cited by Davis “supports his claim” with the requisite degree of factual specificity “that a judge must under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment disqualify himself from adjudicating a preliminary hearing and juvenile transfer hearing in which the judge’s brother is the assistant district attorney.” (Id. at 22.) Relatedly, the State contends that the Supreme Court opinions cited “are off point as ‘clearly established precedent.’ ” (Id.) Accordingly, the State contends that 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) forecloses habeas relief on this claim. 2. The State Court Decision The state court rejected Davis’ argument that Judge Teel, who presided over the preliminary proceedings in Davis’ case, including the hearing concerning Davis’ certification as an adult, should have sua sponte recused himself because he was the brother of Frank Teel, the assistant district attorney who appeared in some of the same proceedings against Davis. See Davis, 554 So.2d at 1098. The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals held that Judge Teel did not have to disqualify himself pursuant to the Canons of Judicial Ethics, state statute, or state common law. It reasoned that Judge Teel’s brother did not have an interest that could have been affected by the outcome of the proceedings, as required for disqualification under the Canons of Judicial Ethics, and he was not a “party” within the state statute governing disqualification of judges. See id. at 1098-99. The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals also observed that the assistant district attorney’s salary “was not dependent upon the result of the litigation” and that the district attorney “had no interest other than his ‘pride in the successful outcome’ of the proceedings.” Id. at 1099. The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals also rejected Davis’ argument that his rights were violated based on the alleged “inherent bias” of Judge Teel. Id. It emphasized that Davis did not challenge Judge Teel’s qualifications until more than two years after Judge Teel’s final action in the case and that Davis had presented “no evidence of actual bias.” Id. The court held that Davis failed to overcome the “presumption that a judge is qualified and unbiased.” Id. Notwithstanding Davis’ failure to submit evidence of actual bias, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals reviewed the record of both the preliminary and juvenile transfer hearings. See id. It, however, “found no evidence, whatsoever, of any bias against [Davis].” Id. To the contrary, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals observed that “the preliminary hearing resulted in an order ‘releasing the appellant from detention,’ a ruling favorable to [Davis].” Id. Furthermore, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals found that the facts adduced at the juvenile transfer hearing “well supported” Judge Teel’s discretionary decision to deny Davis’ motion for treatment as a youthful offender. Id. The court concluded that Judge Teel’s decision was not arbitrary, but was based upon a consideration of many factors, including the horrendous nature of the crime, the evidence that Davis absconded from the state after being released from detention following the preliminary hearing to be returned only through extradition proceedings, and the evidence that Davis confessed to a fellow inmate that he had murdered Mrs. Alford. See id. Moreover, during the post-conviction proceedings, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals similarly rejected Davis’ ineffective assistance of counsel claim predicated on his trial attorneys’ failure to move to recuse Judge Teel based on his kinship to the assistant district attorney. The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals observed that Davis “still has not presented any evidence of actual bias on the part of the district judge.” Davis, 720 So.2d at 1015. S. Analysis a.) Threshold Issues Pertaining to the Standard of Review Before discussing the merits, the court addresses two arguments raised by the parties pertaining to the standard of review. First, the court agrees with Davis’ position set forth in his reply brief (Doc. No. 95) that the fact-specific standard cited by the State applies only to the “contrary to,” and not to the “unreasonable application,” prong of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). As discussed in Section III of this Memorandum Opinion and Order, supra, § 2254(d)(l)’s guideposts have independent meaning and require separate analysis. Accordingly, the court finds that the standard argued by the State does not apply to Davis’ claims which Davis bases on the “unreasonable application” prong of § 2254(d)(1). Second, Davis is correct that the decision of the state courts discussed neither federal constitutional principles nor decisions from the Supreme Court of the United States. It is not fatal, however, that state law governed the state courts’ analysis so long as the decision does not violate the proscriptions of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). See Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 16, 124 S.Ct. 7, 157 L.Ed.2d 263 (2003) (“A state court’s decision is not ‘contrary to ... clearly established Federal law simply because the court did not cite our opinions .... We have held that a state court need not even be aware of our precedents, ‘so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision contradicts them.’ ”) (citation omitted). The Supreme Court reiterated this premise in Bell v. Cone, when it observed that “[federal courts are not free to presume that a State court did not comply with constitutional dictates on the basis of nothing more than lack of citation.” 543 U.S. 447, 455, 125 S.Ct. 847, 160 L.Ed.2d 881 (2005) (per curiam). b.) The Merits Those threshold matters having been addressed, the court turns to the merits of Davis’ claim. As stated, Davis contends that the proceedings before Judge Teel violated his rights to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution because Judge Teel was impartial given his kinship to the prosecutor. The right to a trial before an impartial judge is a paramount concept of due process of law. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees Davis a right to a fair and an impartial judge who is neutral, detached and free from “actual bias.” In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136, 75 S.Ct. 623, 99 L.Ed. 942 (1955); see also Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 905-06, 117 S.Ct. 1793, 138 L.Ed.2d 97 (1997) (“[T]he floor established by the Due Process Clause clearly requires a ‘fair trial in a fair tribunal,’ ... before a judge with no actual bias against the defendant or interest in the outcome of his particular case.”); Ward, 409 U.S. at 59-63, 93 S.Ct. 80; Tumey, 273 U.S. at 532, 47 S.Ct. 437. The court carefully has reviewed the four Supreme Court opinions relied upon Davis, i.e., Murchison, Tumey, Offutt and Ward. (Doc. No. 29 at 9); (Doc. No. 95 at 6.) A summary of the facts and holdings of these opinions will aid the court’s discussion. In Murchison, which involved a judge who acted as a “one-man judge-grand jury,” 349 U.S. at 135, 75 S.Ct. 623, the Supreme Court held that a judge cannot “act as a grand jury” and then preside over the trial of the individuals accused by the grand jury because “[hjaving been a part of that process a judge cannot be, in the very nature of things, wholly disinterested in the conviction or acquittal of those accused.” Id. at 135, 137, 75 S.Ct. 623. The Supreme Court concluded that the judge’s actions offended the basic notion of due process that an accused receive “[a] fair trial in a fair tribunal.” Id. at 136, 75 S.Ct. 623. Citing, Tumey, supra, and Offutt, supra, the Supreme Court elaborated as follows: Fairness of course requires an absence of actual bias in the trial of cases. But our system of law has always endeavored to prevent even the probability of unfairness. To this end no man can be a judge in his own case and no man is permitted to try cases where he has an interest in the outcome. That interest cannot be defined with precision. Circumstances and relationships must be considered. This Court has said, however, that “Every procedure which would offer a possible temptation to the average man as a judge ... not to hold the balance nice, clear, and true between the State and the accused denies the latter due process of law.” Tumey v. State of Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532, 47 S.Ct. 437, 71 L.Ed. 749 ... Such a stringent rule may sometimes bar trial by judges who have no actual bias and who would do their very best to weigh the scales of justice equally between contending parties. But to perform its high function in the best way “justice must satisfy the appearance of justice.” Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14, 75 S.Ct. 11, 99 L.Ed. 11. Id. Tumey and Ward, in turn, arose out of criminal trials in mayors’ courts in Ohio where the mayors also served as judges. In Tumey, after a trial without a jury in “Liquor Court,” as the court was “popularly called,” 273 U.S. at 521, 47 S.Ct. 437, the mayor of North College Hill convicted the defendant of possessing liquor, in violation of the state’s prohibition act. Id. at 514-16, 47 S.Ct. 437. By ordinance, part of the funds from Liquor Court was used to pay the mayor “his costs in each case in addition to his regular salary, as compensation for hearing such cases,” but only if the defendant was convicted. Id. at 520, 47 S.Ct. 437. Over the course of several months in 1923, the mayor collected $696.35 as costs from Liquor Court cases, in addition to his regular salary. See id. at 521-22, 47 S.Ct. 437. The Supreme Court held that the mayor should have been “disqualified” as the judge: [I]t certainly violates the Fourteenth Amendment and deprives a defendant in a criminal case of due process of law to subject his liberty or property to the judgment of a court, the judge of which has a direct, personal substantial pecuniary interest in reaching a conclusion against him in his case. Id. at 523, 47 S.Ct. 437; see also id. at 535, 47 S.Ct. 437. Apart from the mayor’s pecuniary interest in the outcome of the proceedings, due process also was violated given the may- or’s responsibilities for the fiscal-well being of his village. The Court opined: “With his interest as mayor in the financial condition of the village and his responsibility therefor might not a defendant with reason say that he feared he could not get a fair trial or a fair sentence from one who would have so strong a motive to help his village by conviction and a heavy fine?” Id. at 533-34, 47 S.Ct. 437. The Court held that the mayor, “by reason of his interest, both as an individual and as chief executive of the village, is disqualified to exercise it in the trial of the defendant.” Id. at 535, 47 S.Ct. 437. Similarly, in Ward, pursuant to a state statute, mayors were authorized to sit as traffic court judges. Exercising that statutory authority, the mayor in Ward convicted and fined the defendant for two traffic offenses. See 409 U.S. at 57, 93 S.Ct. 80. The mayor’s town realized a “major part” of its revenue from traffic fines levied by the mayor in traffic court. Id. at 58, 93 S.Ct. 80. Relying on Tumey, the Supreme Court held that, because the judge exercised significant financial control over the town’s finances and the fines collected in traffic court, the defendant was denied a trial before an “impartial,” “neutral and detached” judge, in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 59, 62, 93 S.Ct. 80. Finally, in Ojfutt, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of conviction because the trial judge, who invoked the use of summary contempt power post-trial, had become “personally embroiled” with the lawyer whom he held in contempt. See 348 U.S. at 17, 75 S.Ct. 11. Citing the axiom that “justice must satisfy the appearance of justice,” the Court held that a trial judge whose “personal feeling[s]” about the lawyer are “entangled” with the “contempt charged” cannot summarily punish the lawyer for contempt after the completion of the trial, but instead must recuse himself or herself and permit another judge to adjudicate the contempt. See id. at 14, 17, 75 S.Ct. 11. Davis contends that each of the foregoing Supreme Court decisions clearly establishes that due process “requires a judge to satisfy an ‘appearance of impartiality’ ” and that a judge’s sibling relationship to the prosecutor clearly offends the due process requirement of impartiality. (Doc. No. 95 at 6.) He cites language from those opinions, quoted above, including the phrases “justice must satisfy the appearance of justice” and due process does not allow any “procedure” that “might lead [the] judge to hold the balance nice, clear and true between the state and the accused.” (Doc. No. 95 at 6-7 (quoting Tumey, 273 U.S. at 532, 47 S.Ct. 437 and Murchison, 349 U.S. at 136, 75 S.Ct. 623).) Unquestionably, Murchison, supra, Tu-rney, supra, Ward, supra, and Ojfutt, supra, demonstrate that “[t]he requirement of [tribunal] neutrality has been jealously guarded by th[e] [Supreme] Court.” Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242-43, 100 S.Ct. 1610, 64 L.Ed.2d 182 (1980) (citing Murchison, Tumey, Ward and Ofutt). The court, though, disagrees with Davis that the holdings in these opinions yield a violation of due process when applied to the facts of this case. The court finds instructive and persuasive the Third Circuit’s opinion in Johnson v. Carroll, 369 F.3d 253 (3rd Cir.2004), and the Seventh Circuit’s opinion in Del Vecchio v. Illinois Department of Corrections, 31 F.3d 1363 (7th Cir.1994), as to the application of Supreme Court precedent under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) to claims of judicial bias. In Johnson, the defendant brought a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). See 369 F.3d at 255. Charged with kidnaping his estranged daughter, the- defendant argued that the judge should have sw sponte recused himself based upon an ex parte conversation the judge had with a former state prosecutor at a social gathering. See id. at 255-56. In that conversation, the former state prosecutor remarked that the defendant was a “bad guy,” had “threatened” the state prosecutor, and that he hoped “justice was done” in the defendant’s pending criminal case. Id. at 255. The defendant argued that there was an “appearance of bias” on the part of the judge, given the occurrence of the out-of-court conversation, and he asserted that the failure of the judge to recuse himself violated his due process rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. The federal district court agreed with the defendant that “the trial judge’s failure to recuse himself sua sponte gave rise to an appearance of bias and that the appearance of bias violated his due process rights.” Id. at 258. The defendant and the district court relied, in part, on the Supreme Court’s decision in Murchison, supra. The Third Circuit reversed. For purposes of its analysis, the Third Circuit “assume[d] that there was an appearance of bias” and framed the issue as “whether the Supreme Court has ever held in any of its decisions existing at the time of the District Court’s judgment ... that an appearance of bias on the part of a state court judge, without more, violates the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution.” Id. at 259. After summarizing the facts and holding in Murchison, supra, the Third Circuit recited the following language from the Murchison opinion: The Court commented that although fairness certainly required “an absence of actual bias,” “our system of law has always endeavored to prevent even the probability of unfairness.” Id. The Court acknowledged that its “stringent rule may sometimes bar trial by judges who have no actual bias and who would do their very best to weigh the scales of justice equally between contending parties.” Id. However, “to perform its high function in the best way justice must satisfy the appearance of justice.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Id. at 259-60 (quoting Murchison, 349 U.S. at 136, 75 S.Ct. 623). The Third Circuit rejected the conclusion, reached by the district court, that the foregoing language clearly established that any “appearance of bias” contravened the Due Process Clause. Id. The court explained: In re Murchison does not stand for that broad conclusion. Instead, its holding, as opposed to dicta, is confined to the basic constitutional principle of prohibiting a judge from adjudicating a case where he was also an investigator for the government. The rest of the language quoted in the preceding paragraph merely explains the holding. Even a generalized reading of the holding, that a judge cannot adjudicate a case where he has an interest in the outcome, does not stand for the conclusion, drawn by the District Court and [the defendant], that a judge with an appearance of bias, without more, is required to recuse himself sua sponte under the Due Process Clause. [The defendant] has not alleged, and there is no evidence, that the trial judge here had a personal interest in the outcome of the sentence. Id. at 260 (brackets added). The Johnson court held that the fact that the judge had been exposed to disparaging remarks about the defendant through a third-party conversation with a former prosecutor did not fit within the parameters of the holding of Murchison and that the alleged bias of the judge arising from that conversation was insufficient, in and of itself, to rise to a constitutional level. In Del Vecchio, involving a 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) petition, the Seventh Circuit, on rehearing en banc, was presented with the issue of whether a state trial judge, who as a former state attorney had supervised the prosecution of the defendant for a murder fourteen years earlier, should have disqualified himself in a second murder trial in which the defendant was convicted and the judge imposed the death sentence. See 31 F.3d at 1367-1369. The defendant contended that the trial judge’s prior involvement in the defendant’s first murder case “created an appearance of bias.” Id. at 1370. He argued that “a showing of actual bias or prejudice” was not a prerequisite to establishing a Fourteenth Amendment violation, but rather that he merely had to demonstrate that the “trial judge had some temptation to be biased in order to demonstrate an appearance of bias.” Id. The Seventh Circuit concluded that equating the Supreme Court’s “appearance of justice” language, such as found in Murchison, with a holding that due process mandates a judge’s recusal “based solely on appearances” is an impermissible extension of the holdings from the Supreme Court. Id. at 1371. “Despite the Supreme Court’s broad pronouncements about the ‘appearance of justice,’ we cannot answer the due process question simply by concluding that it may have looked bad for [the trial judge] to preside at trial.” Id. “The Supreme Court has never rested the vaunted principle of due process on something as subjective and transitory as appearance.” Id. at 1372. Rather, [wjhen the Supreme Court talks about the “appearance of justice,” it is not saying that bad appearances alone require disqualification; rather, it is saying that when a judge is faced with circumstances that present “some [actual] incentive to find one way or the other” or “a real possibility of bias,” a court need not examine whether the judge actually was biased. Id. (citations omitted). The Seventh Circuit’s conclusion was based on a careful examination of Supreme Court precedent. After analyzing the Su-pi-eme Court’s opinions in Turney, Ward, and Murchison, among others, see id. at 1373-74, the Seventh Circuit observed that the “presumption of evenhandedness” was overcome only in those eases where the judges were subject to a “strong, direct interest in the outcome of a case.” Id. at 1373. In none of the opinions reviewed by the Seventh Circuit was disqualification based solely on the appearance of bias, and the decisions make clear that “not all ‘possible temptations’ toward bias require a judge to disqualify himself.” Id. at 1374. The Seventh Circuit concluded that, under Supreme Court precedent, to demonstrate a Fourteenth Amendment due process violation, & defendant must show either “actual bias” or “an' influence or interest [the court] can conclusively presume would cause the average judge to be biased.” Id. at 1378, 1379. Neither was present in the defendant’s case. See id. at 1375-80; Murchison, 349 U.S. at 136, 75 S.Ct. 623 (“Fairness of course requires the absence of actual bias in the trial of cases.”). Other courts have applied the foregoing standard to judicial bias cases. See Harris v. State of Mo., 960 F.2d 738, 740 (8th Cir.1992) (“Although Harris contends the trial judge’s refusal to disqualify himself ‘infected’ the trial, Harris has failed to show either actual or presumed bias by the trial judge rising to the level of a constitutional violation.”) (citing Dyas v. Lockhart, 705 F.2d 993, 996-97 (8th Cir.1983)); Bell v. Haley, Civ. A. No. 95-T-913-N, 2000 WL 33682804 (M.D.Ala.2000) (Thompson, J.) (citing opinions which demonstrate that “[f]ederal cases have elaborated that judicial bias or prejudice rising to a level that violates due process must stem from a predisposition against the defendant that is actual ... or that is readily presumed from a judge’s conduct or comments, or connection to one of the participants”); cf. U.S. v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123, 133, 57 S.Ct. 177, 81 L.Ed. 78 (1936) (“[t]he bias of a prospective juror may be actual or implied; that is, it may be bias in fact or bias conclusively presumed as [a] matter of law”). To the extent that Davis claims that any appearance of bias is tantamount to a due process violation, the court finds that clearly established Supreme Court precedent is not so far reaching. The court is persuaded by the well-reasoned circuit court opinions of Johnson, supra, and Del Vecchio, supra, regarding their interpretation and application of Supreme Court precedent, that the mere “appearance of bias” on the part of the judge, without a showing of either actual bias or a personal, strong direct interest in the proceedings from which bias can be presumed, is insufficient to rise to the level of a constitutional violation. The court, thus, turns to a review of Davis’ allegations of bias in light of the foregoing teachings. i.) Actual Bias On Davis’ direct appeal, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals observed that Davis had not argued actual bias and that its independent review of the record of the hearings handled by Judge Teel demonstrated that there was “no evidence, whatsoever, of any bias” against Davis. Davis, 554 So.2d at 1099. Also, upon review of the state trial court’s decision denying post-conviction relief to Davis, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals observed that Davis “still has not presented any evidence of actual bias on the part of the district judge.” Davis, 720 So.2d at 1015. In this proceeding, Davis has not refuted the findings of the state court that there was no evidence of actual bias on the part of Judge Teel. Davis also has not cited any part of the record which reveals any actual bias on the part of Judge Teel, and the court is aware of no such evidence. Accordingly, the court finds that the decision of the Alabama court that Davis failed to show actual bias was not contrary to clearly established federal law, as articulated by the United States Supreme Court, or based on an unreasonable application of established principles. ii.) Presumed Bias In the state courts and now in this proceeding, Davis focuses on an alleged “inherent bias” flowing from the fact that a “pivotal decision” in his case, i.e., whether Davis would be tried as an adult, was decided by Judge Teel based upon the arguments of the prosecutor, who happened to be Judge Teel’s brother. (Doc. No. 95 at 5.) The issue then is whether there is any other evidence revealing that the relationship between Judge Teel and the prosecutor presented the type of personal, strong direct interest from which Judge Teel’s bias can be presumed. The Supreme Court opinions cited by Davis present scenarios of substantial biased appearances, but the court finds that the facts here neither mirror, nor are comparable to, those in Murchison, Tumey, Ward and Offutt. There is no evidence that Judge Teel had a financial interest in Davis’ proceedings, and none is alleged by Davis; thus, Turney’s holding, followed in Ward, that a state court decision should be set aside where there is “the slightest pecuniary interest” on the part of the judge is inapplicable here. Nor do the facts present a merger of prosecutorial and judicial functions by Judge Teel. This case, therefore, is distinguishable from Murchison. Moreover, Davis did not personally attack Judge Teel through insulting, abusive, or contemptuous remarks from which it could be inferred that Judge Teel harbored personal animosity toward Davis. This case, therefore, is unlike Of-futt. In short, the court finds that Judge Teel faced none of the biasing influences involved in the cases in which the Supreme Court required disqualification. Consequently, given this court’s conclusion that Supreme Court precedent in this area has not expressly dealt with the issue presented in this case, the court finds that the Supreme Court’s prior decisions have not involved facts which are “materially indistinguishable” from the facts of this case. It follows then that the state court ruling here was not contrary to federal law as articulated by decisions of the Supreme Court. See Washington v. Crosby, 324 F.3d 1263, 1265 (11th Cir.2003) (stating that, where no Supreme Court precedent is on point, the state court’s conclusion is not contrary to clearly established Federal law as determined by the Supreme Court). Nonetheless, Davis essentially asks this court to find that Judge Teel’s “close relationship” to the prosecutor, Frank Teel, automatically establishes a presumption of bias based on the more general principles espoused by the Supreme Court, in opinions such as Tumey, and, therefore, to find that the state court decision constituted an “unreasonable application” of Supreme Court precedent. The court, however, finds that Davis’ contention is undercut by language in Tumey. In Tumey, and later repeated in Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 820, 106 S.Ct. 1580, 89 L.Ed.2d 823 (1986), the Supreme Court pronounced that “[a]ll questions of judicial qualification may not involve constitutional validity”; therefore, “matters of kinship, personal bias, state policy, remoteness of interest would seem generally to be matters merely of legislative discretion.” Tumey, 273 U.S. at 523, 47 S.Ct. 437 (emphasis added). Indeed, the Supreme Court has pointed out on more than one occasion that “most matters relating to judicial disqualification [do] not rise to a constitutional level.” FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683, 702, 68 S.Ct. 793, 92 L.Ed. 1010 (1948) (citation omitted); see also Bracy, 520 U.S. at 904-05, 117 S.Ct. 1793 (discussing elements of a judicial-bias claim and stating that, “[o]f course, most questions concerning a judge’s qualifications to hear a case are not constitutional ones, because the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment establishes a constitutional floor, not a uniform standard”; rather, “these questions are, in most cases, answered by common law, statute, or the professional standards of the bench and bar”) (citing Aetna, 475 U.S. at 820-21, 828, 106 S.Ct. 1580); see, e.g., Dyas, 705 F.2d at 998 (“We conclude that Judge Steele’s relationship to the Prosecuting Attorneys was, standing alone, insufficient to raise the conclusive presumption of his actual bias.”). Davis, however, cites two federal circuit court opinions in support of his position that “[i]t is well established that a judge should not preside over proceedings in which a close relative is involved.” (Doc. No. 92 at 8) (citing Potashnick v. Port City Constr. Co., 609 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir.1980), and SCA Serv., Inc. v. Morgan, 557 F.2d 110 (7th Cir.1977)). The court, however, finds that the holdings in those opinions are not applicable because they involved interpretations of the recusal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), which mandates disqualification of federal judges in specified circumstances. As recognized by several circuit courts, “section 455 and the Due Process Clause are not coterminous.” U.S. v. Couch, 896 F.2d 78, 81 (5th Cir.1990). “[S]ection 455 establishes a statutory disqualification standard more demanding than that required by the Due Process Clause.” Id.; see also Johnson, 369 F.3d at 262 (28 U.S.C. § 455(a)’s “appearance of impropriety standard” is not “ ‘mandated by the Due Process Clause.’ ”) (quoting Hardy v. U.S., 878 F.2d 94, 97 (2d Cir.1989)); U.S. v. Sypolt, 346 F.3d 838, 840 (8th Cir.2003) (observing that, “[i]n contrast to the due process clause, the recusal statute [i.e., 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) ] is concerned largely with insuring that the federal judiciary appears to be impartial, in addition to actually being impartial[;][i]t thus reaches farther than the due process clause, which is concerned primarily with the individual rights of parties.”) (internal citation omitted) (brackets supplied). Accordingly, the court finds that the state court decisions did not constitute an “unreasonable application” of the principles espoused by the Supreme Court, in opinions such as Tumey, discussed above, which emphasize the importance of impartiality. Davis simply has not presented, and the court has not uncovered, any Supreme Court precedent which w