Full opinion text
MANION, Circuit Judge, joined by POSNER, BAUER, COFFEY, EASTERBROOK, and KANNE. An Illinois state court sentenced George Del Vecchio to death after convicting him of murdering a six-year-old boy. He filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the district court, claiming that the proceedings leading to his death sentence were constitutionally deficient. The district court denied all of Del Vecchio’s constitutional claims except one: the district court determined that Del Vecchio was entitled to an evidentiary hearing to test the voluntariness of a confession he had given for an earlier murder. Both Del Vecchio and Illinois appeal the district court’s decision. We affirm the portion of the district court’s decision denying the petition, but reverse the district court’s remand for an evidentiary hearing. I. Background This appeal involves George Del Vecehio’s 1979 murder conviction and death sentence. But this was his second murder. The first occurred in early February of 1965, while Del Vecchio and two young companions were on a two-day crime spree. On the second day, they happened upon Fred Christiansen, an elderly man, whom they decided to murder and rob. Del Vecchio shot Mr. Christiansen nine times, as his accomplices kicked the dying man to silence his cries for help. They recovered $11 from Mr. Christiansen’s wallet. The police arrested Del Vecchio, and he admitted to the murder. The crime received enormous publicity in the Chicago area. Del Vecchio claimed that he was looking for drug money when he killed Mr. Christiansen. In 1965 it was still front-page news when young men committed random acts of violence to gain drug money. The Cook County State’s Attorney handled the prosecution. Louis Garippo was the chief of the criminal division in that office. He assigned the case to his former trial partner, and generally supervised the prosecution. Del Vecchio provided the prosecutors with a written confession. According to Del Vecchio, he was not advised of his right to counsel in the manner prescribed in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), which was decided the following year. Del Vecchio was sixteen years old when he murdered Mr. Christiansen in early February of 1966. He was to turn seventeen on March 1, 1966. His lawyer considered it important that Del Vecchio be convicted and sentenced before his seventeenth birthday. That way, Del Vecchio would be sent to a youth correctional facility until his twenty-first birthday. Only then would he be given an adult sentence and sent to an adult prison. IU.Rev.Stat. Ch. 1963, 23 § 2523. By contrast, a person sentenced after his seventeenth birthday would immediately receive an adult sentence and be sent to an adult prison. Del Vecchio’s attorney met with Louis Garippo and told him that Del Vecchio would plead guilty and agree to immediate sentencing if the case could be wrapped up before March 1. Garippo agreed to expedite the indictment, welcoming such a quick resolution of the high-profile case. Del Vecchio was charged as an adult; he pleaded guilty and was sentenced before his seventeenth birthday. Because he was sentenced before turning seventeen, he was given over to the Illinois Youth Commission which placed him in a youth correctional facility. After he reached age twenty-one, Del Vecchio was sent back to court to receive an adult sentence. The presiding judge had broad discretion when sentencing the admitted murderer. He could have sentenced Del Vecchio to a minimum of fourteen years or a maximum of life in prison. The parties do not dispute that this is exactly the range of discretion a judge in 1966 would have had if Del Vecchio had been sentenced after his seventeenth birthday. During his stay at the youth facility, Del Vecchio had achieved a sterling record and the judge apparently took that into consideration. He sentenced Del Vecchio to the statutory minimum of fourteen years in an adult prison. He was credited with time served and since he continued to be a model inmate, he was paroled in April of 1973, only a few years after he had been sentenced. Unfortunately, Del Vecchio’s good behavior ended at the prison exit. In 1977, he struck again. This time his victim was six-year-old Tony Canzonieri. Early one morning, Del Vecchio broke into the apartment of Karen Canzonieri, Tony’s mother, apparently intending to rape her. Del Vecchio knew Karen. In fact, he had made a visit to the apartment the night before, where he and others had smoked marijuana. When he broke into the apartment the next morning, he came across young Tony on the first floor. Apparently Del Vecchio did not want Tony in the way when he was with Karen, so he killed him. He brutally slashed the boy’s throat, severing his trachea, carotid artery, jugular vein and vegus nerve, and fracturing his third and fourth vertebrae — a near decapitation. Del Vecchio then stuffed Tony’s body in a crawlspace and made his way upstairs to Karen’s bedroom, where he raped her. Karen was able to escape and call the police when Del Vecchio left her alone for a moment. When the police arrived they found Del Vecchio hiding on the roof. His first words on being captured were, “I didn’t kill nobody.” In 1979, the time of the Canzonieri murder trial, Louis Garippo had left his job with the State’s Attorney and had become a judge with the Cook County Criminal Division. He was randomly selected to preside over Del Vecchio’s trial for the murder of Tony Canzo-nieri. He neither recused himself from the ease, nor informed Del Vecchio’s attorneys about his involvement in the 1965 prosecution. Before the trial, Del Veechio’s attorneys made motions in limine to exclude evidence pertaining to the 1965 conviction and confession. They asserted three reasons to preclude the evidence: that the facts relating to the 1965 confession and conviction were irrelevant to the 1977 murder; that the 1965 confession had been involuntary and taken in violation of Miranda•; and that the law in 1965 which allowed juveniles to be charged as adults was unconstitutional. Judge Garip-po withheld ruling on these matters, but let the defense know that he would likely allow evidence about the 1965 case if the defense introduced evidence that Del Vecchio was insane at the time of the murder. Although the defense laid the groundwork to argue Del Veeehio’s insanity, they never presented the defense. So the state never attempted to introduce the evidence about the 1965 murder. Therefore, Judge Garippo never officially ruled during the guilt phase of the trial on the motions to preclude the evidence. The evidence presented against Del Vec-chio at the trial was overwhelming. Having abandoned the insanity defense, he really had no persuasive theory of defense. The jury convicted Del Vecchio for Tony’s murder. The case then proceeded to the sentencing phase, which involved testimony and other evidence about whether Del Vecchio should be put to death. The state sought to introduce evidence concerning the 1965 murder. Again, Del Vecchio’s attorneys challenged the evidence. Judge Garippo, believing that it was important for the jurors to consider Del Veeehio’s violent history when they made their sentencing decision, ruled that the evidence was admissible. Pursuant to that ruling, the government introduced Del Vecehio’s 1965 written confession, in which he discussed Mr. Christiansen’s killing and related events in great detail. Del Vec-chio had sought to preclude the 1965 confession on the basis that it was involuntary. Judge Garippo did not grant Del Vecchio an evidentiary hearing to address the voluntariness of the confession; he simply allowed the confession into evidence, leaving Del Vecchio the opportunity to claim to the jury that the confession was not voluntary. The government also presented evidence that Del Vec-chio falsely claimed in 1965 that he killed because of drug use, and argued that Del Vecchio’s tendency to blame his crimes on drugs was part of a recurring pattern. After hearing this and all of the other evidence, the jury found that there were sufficient aggravating circumstances to warrant the death penalty, and no mitigating circumstances to prevent it. See Ill.Rev.Stat.1975, eh. 38, par. 9 — 1(b). The court imposed the sentence of death. That was fifteen years ago. Since then, Del Vecchio has been housed in Illinois prisons awaiting execution. His death penalty was stayed for a time as the Illinois Supreme Court considered his appeal; that court affirmed both Del Veechio’s conviction and death sentence. People v. Del Vecchio, 105 Ill.2d 414, 86 Ill.Dec. 461, 475 N.E.2d 840 (1985). The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari. 474 U.S. 883, 106 S.Ct. 204, 88 L.Ed.2d 173 (1985). Justices Marshall and Brennan dissented from that order. They took the position that Del Vecchio was entitled to an evidentiary hearing in the sentencing phase of the 1979 trial, to challenge the voluntariness of the 1965 confession. Id. In 1986, Del Vecchio discovered that Judge Garippo had been involved in his 1965 prosecution. Based on that and other legal theories, Del Vecchio petitioned for a new trial under the Illinois Post-Conviction Hearing Act, Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 38, paras. 122-1 et seq. The court dismissed that petition and the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. 129 Ill.2d 265, 135 Ill.Dec. 816, 544 N.E.2d 312 (1989). Once again, the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari. 494 U.S. 1062, 110 S.Ct. 1540, 108 L.Ed.2d 779 (1990). His direct appeals finally exhausted, Del Vecchio filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the district court. He made two primary arguments, along with a variety of others. First, he argued that he was denied a fair trial because Judge Garippo, who had been involved in prosecuting him for the 1965 murder, sat as presiding judge during the Canzonieri murder trial. Second, he argued that he was denied his constitutional right to an evidentiary hearing during the sentencing phase of the 1979 trial to test the voluntariness of the 1965 confession. Finally, Del Vecchio made several other claims: that the prosecutors misled the jury to believe that if he was not sentenced to death, he eventually would finesse state authorities into granting him parole; that the court should have ordered a hearing to determine whether one of the state’s witnesses committed perjury; that the court erred by allowing alleged hearsay statements made by three experts concerning drug use; that the 1965 confession should have been excluded from the jury’s consideration because it was taken in violation of Miranda; and that the death penalty jury instructions were confusing. The district court agreed with Del Vee-chio’s second argument, determining that Del Vecchio was entitled to an evidentiary hearing to challenge the voluntariness of the 1965 confession. The court remanded the case to state court, with instructions to conduct an evidentiary hearing, at which the state would have the burden to prove that the confession was voluntary. But the court otherwise denied the petition. 795 F.Supp. 1406. Del Vecchio appealed the district court’s order to the extent that it denied the petition. Illinois cross-appealed the district court’s decision to remand to the state court to conduct an evidentiary hearing on the voluntariness of the 1965 confession. A divided panel of this court agreed with the district court’s conclusion that Del Vec-chio was entitled to an evidentiary hearing to test the voluntariness of his confession, but reversed the district court’s decision that the proceedings were otherwise constitutional. 8 F.3d 509. The court held that Del Vecchio’s trial and sentencing were constitutionally flawed because Judge Garippo’s previous involvement with the 1965 prosecution necessarily rendered him biased in the Canzonieri trial. The full court vacated that opinion, and decided to rehear the case en banc. 8 F.3d 530. On rehearing, we first consider the legal questions addressed in the vacated opinion: 1) whether Del Vecchio was denied a fair trial because Judge Garippo presided as judge; and 2) whether Del Vecchio was entitled to an evidentiary hearing to test the voluntariness of his 1965 confession. We also address the other previously mentioned issues Del Vecchio raised on appeal, which were not addressed in the vacated opinion. II. Analysis A prisoner is entitled to a writ of habeas corpus if he is being held under a state court judgment obtained in violation of the Constitution. 28 U.S.C. § 2254; Williams v. Chrans, 945 F.2d 926, 931 (7th Cir.1991). Our habeas corpus jurisdiction, therefore, “is limited to questions of federal and constitutional custody. In other words, ‘federal courts can grant habeas relief only when there is a violation of federal statutory or constitutional law.’ ” Haas v. Abrahamson, 910 F.2d 384, 389 (7th Cir.1990), quoting Lee v. Flannigan, 884 F.2d 945, 952 (7th Cir.1989). In this case, the district court considered all of the alleged constitutional violations Del Vecchio raised in his petition, and determined that he was entitled to relief only on his claim that he had the right to an evidentiary hearing to address the voluntariness of his confession. We review de novo the district court’s legal conclusions. Drake v. Clark, 14 F.3d 351, 355 (7th Cir.1994). A Appearance of Bias Del Vecchio first argues that he was denied a fair trial because Judge Garippo’s participation in the 1979 trial created an appearance of bias. Under his theory, a showing of actual bias or prejudice would be unnecessary. He would only have to show that Judge Garippo had some temptation to be biased in order to demonstrate an appearance of bias. He finds this temptation in the intersection between the 1965 trial, in which Garippo supervised the prosecution, and the 1979 trial, where Garippo acted as judge. Del Vecchio claims that the confluence of those events raised a number of temptations for Judge Garippo, including the temptation to favor- the state in motions to introduce evidence concerning the 1965 proceedings, and the temptation to sabotage the capital sentencing hearing because of some personal responsibility Judge Garippo felt for Del Vecchio’s light sentence for the 1965 murder. As we will discuss later, it stretches the facts to suppose that Judge Garippo had any sort of temptation to be biased in 1979. Really, he was only tangentially involved in Del Vecchio’s 1965 prosecution. His decisions regarding the prosecution had little if anything to do with Del Vecchio being a free man in 1977, when he killed Tony Canzonieri. Judge Garippo had no real personal stake in the outcome of the motions to suppress evidence which were filed in the 1979 trial. Certainly, he had less personal stake than a judge who presides over a ease against a person he had sentenced in an earlier case— a common occurrence in our judicial system which does not prompt due process concerns. See Liteky v. United States, — U.S. -, -, 114 S.Ct. 1147, 1155, 127 L.Ed.2d 474 (1994) (“[a]lso not subject to deprecatory characterization as ‘bias’ or ‘prejudice’ are opinions held by judges as a result of what they learned in earlier proceedings. It has long been regarded as normal and proper for a judge to sit in the same case upon its remand, and to sit in successive trials regarding the same defendant.”). But this is a death penalty case, and our court is closely divided. Thus we will examine Del Vecchio’s seemingly remote claim that Garippo’s participation in the 1965 prosecution tempted him to undermine the 1979 case. Therefore, we first address when the possibility of temptation alone — without a showing of actual influence or bias — is enough to demonstrate a due process violation. Certainly, the appearance of justice is important in our system and the due process clause sometimes requires a judge to recuse himself without a showing of actual bias, where a sufficient motive to be biased exists. A long line of Supreme Court cases compel these general conclusions. In Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532, 47 S.Ct. 437, 444, 71 L.Ed. 749 (1927), the Court stated that “[e]very procedure which would offer a possible temptation to the average man as a judge ... not to hold the balance nice, clear, and true between the state and the accused denies the latter due process of law.” Where such temptations exist, the due process clause “may sometimes bar trial by judges who have no actual bias and who would do their very best to weigh the scales of justice equally between contending parties.... [T]o perform its high function in the best way, ‘justice must satisfy the appearance of justice.’ ” In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136, 75 S.Ct. 623, 625, 99 L.Ed. 942 (1955); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 825, 106 S.Ct. 1580, 1587, 89 L.Ed.2d 823 (1986). Despite the Supreme Court’s broad pronouncements about “the appearance of justice,” we cannot answer the due process question simply by concluding that it may have looked bad for Judge Garippo to preside at trial. If the question truly is whether a defendant received a fair trial, bad appearances alone should not require disqualification to prevent an unfair trial. What may appear bad to an observer, especially in hindsight, may not have influenced — or, more importantly, may not have had any real possibility to influence — the judge in his decision-making process. Consider the following hypothetical. Suppose a judge does not know a close relative has a financial interest in a case he tries. To the outside observer aware of the interest but unaware of the judge’s lack of knowledge, it would look bad for the judge to try that case. But if the judge does not even know about the relative’s financial interest, how could he be tempted to undermine the case? And if no actual incentive exists for the judge to be biased — if the judge does not have reason to be partial— how could the judge’s presiding over the trial deprive a party of his right to a fair trial before an impartial judge? See Bradshaw v. McCotter, 796 F.2d 100, 101-03 (5th Cir.1986) (Gee, J., concurring.). The dissents treat the Supreme Court’s “appearance of justice” language from Murchison and Aetna as holding that the due process clause requires judges to recuse themselves based solely on appearances. But those eases present no such holding; the Supreme Court’s mention of “appearance of justice” certainly does not compel reversal on due process grounds if a federal judge decides — based on a personal view of judicial protocol — that it looked bad for a state judge to try a case. Such a pure appearance approach would be hard to reconcile with the bevy of Supreme Court precedents on the issue of recusal which do not address the “appearance of justice.” See, e.g., Liteky, — U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 1147. Appearances are usually for the eyes of the beholder. Years after whatever appearance there was has disappeared, a reviewing judge is left not with appearance but with hindsight speculation. That will not suffice as a basis for overturning a conviction. The Supreme Court has never rested the vaunted principle of due process on something as subjective and transitory as appearance. Instead, the Supreme Court simply uses the “appearance of justice” language to make the point that judges sometimes must recuse themselves when they face possible temptations to be biased, even when they exhibit no actual bias against a party or a cause. In short, bad appearances alone do not require disqualification. Reality controls over uninformed perception. Del Vecchio cites no case in which the Supreme Court has overturned a verdict on due process grounds based on a mere appearance of bias. Our court was correct in holding that “a litigant is not denied due process by either the ‘appearance’ of partiality or by circumstances which might lead one to speculate as to a judge’s impartiality.” Margoles v. Johns, 660 F.2d 291, 296 (7th Cir.1981). When the Supreme Court talks about the “appearance of justice,” it is not saying that bad appearances alone require disqualification; rather, it is saying that when a judge is faced with circumstances that present “some [actual] incentive to find one way or the other” or “a real possibility of bias,” a court need not examine whether the judge actually was biased. Id. at 297 (quoting Howell v. Jones, 516 F.2d 53, 57-58 (5th Cir.1975)); Bradshaw, 796 F.2d at 102 (Gee, J., concurring). Absent the incentive for bias, however, disqualification is not required despite bad appearance. Moreover, even if Judge Garippo faced some “possible temptation” to be biased against Del Vecchio, not every “possible temptation” to be biased presents a sufficient possibility of bias to require disqualification. This is evident from other language in the same cases in which the Court talks about “possible temptations.” Thus, in Aetna and Tumey, the Court noted that “ ‘[n]ot all questions of judicial qualification ... involve constitutional validity.... [M]atters of kinship, personal bias, state policy, remoteness of interest, would generally be matters of legislative discretion’” — even though any of these matters, particularly kinship and personal bias, could offer a “possible temptation” to be biased. Aetna, 475 U.S. at 820, 106 S.Ct. at 1584; Tumey, 273 U.S. at 523, 47 S.Ct. at 441. At some point, a “ ‘biasing influence ... will be too remote and insubstantial to violate the constitutional constraints.’ ” Aetna, 475 U.S. at 826, 106 S.Ct. at 1588 (quoting Marshall v. Jerrico, 446 U.S. 238, 243, 100 S.Ct. 1610, 64 L.Ed.2d 182 (1980)). This merely recognizes, at least implicitly, that in the real world, “possible temptations” to be biased abound. Judges are human; like all humans, their outlooks are shaped by their lives’ experiences. It would be unrealistic to suppose that judges do not bring to the bench those experiences and the attendant biases they may create. A person could find something in the background of most judges which in many cases would lead that person to conclude that the judge has a “possible temptation” to be biased. But not all temptations are created equal. We expect — even demand — that judges rise above these potential biasing influences, and in most cases we presume judges do. See Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47, 95 S.Ct. 1456, 1464, 43 L.Ed.2d 712 (1975) (the contention that the combination of investigative and adjudicatory functions necessarily disqualifies an administrative adjudicator “must overcome a presumption of honesty and integrity in those serving as adjudicators.”). The common law recognized this reality. At the time the American court system was established, the common law of disqualification “was clear and simple: a judge was disqualified for direct pecuniary interest and for nothing else.” John P. Frank, Disqualification of Judges, 56 Yale L.J. 605, 609 (1947). No other interest would suffice to require, or even permit, a judge to disqualify himself, including evidence of bias against a litigant. Id. at 611-12; see also Aetna, 475 U.S. at 820, 106 S.Ct. at 1584. As Blackstone put it, “the law will not suppose a possibility of bias or favour in a judge, who is already sworn to administer impartial justice, and whose authority greatly depends upon that presumption and idea.” 3 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *361 (quoted in Aetna, 475 U.S. at 820, 106 S.Ct. at 1584). As the common law recognized, and as experience teaches, the lure of lucre is a particularly strong motivation, and therefore judges ought to be prohibited from presiding over cases in whose outcomes they have a direct financial interest. Of course, the Supreme Court has held the due process clause requires disqualification for interests besides pecuniary interests. But the constitutional standard the Supreme Court has applied in determining when disqualification is necessary recognizes the same reality the common law recognized: judges are subject to a myriad of biasing influences; judges for the most part are presumptively capable of overcoming those influences and rendering evenhanded justice; and only a strong, direct interest in the outcome of a ease is sufficient to overcome that presumption of evenhandedness. The Supreme Court’s disqualification eases illustrate this point. The cases requiring disqualification all involved “direct, personal [and] substantial” influences on the judges involved. Aetna, 475 U.S. at 822, 106 S.Ct. at 1585. In each of these cases, it is fair to say that the influences involved struck at the heart of human motivation, that an average man would find it difficult, if not impossible, to set the influence aside. In both Tumey and Aetna, for example, judges were faced with “direct, personal, substantial, pecuniary interest[s].” See Aetna, 475 U.S. at 824, 106 S.Ct. at 1586. In Tumey, the judge in a criminal case was paid only if the defendant was convicted. 273 U.S. at 520, 47 S.Ct. at 440. In Aetna, Justice Embry of the Alabama Supreme Court cast the deciding vote and wrote the majority opinion in a case establishing a legal proposition that “had the clear and immediate effect of enhancing both the legal status and settlement value” of two pending cases Justice Embry had filed as a plaintiff. 475 U.S. at 822-24, 106 S.Ct. at 1585-86. The judge in Ward v. City of Monroeville, Ohio, 409 U.S. 57, 93 S.Ct. 80, 34 L.Ed.2d 267 (1972), faced a temptation similar to those faced by the judges in Tumey and Aetna. In Ward, the Court held that the mayor of Monroeville could not sit as a judge in traffic court. The mayor was responsible for the town’s finances and revenue production; Monroeville derived a “major part” of its income from fines and other costs imposed in that court. The Court sensibly held that the mayor’s responsibility for town finances “may make him partisan to maintain the high level of contribution from the may- or’s court.” Id. at 60, 93 S.Ct. at 83. That interest, like the judge’s personal financial interest in Tumey, provided the mayor sufficient incentive to find against the defendant that the mayor could not, consistently with the due process clause, sit as judge. See id. The Court has also required disqualification in the face of a litigant’s direct personal insults to a judge. In Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 91 S.Ct. 499, 27 L.Ed.2d 532 (1971), the defendant during the course of his trial called the judge, among other epithets, a “dirty [S.O.B.],” a “dirty tyrannical old dog,” a “stumbling dog,” and a “fool,” had charged the judge "with running a “Spanish Inquisition,” and had told the judge to “Go to hell.” Id. at 466, 91 S.Ct. at 505. The Court held that the judge could not subsequently try the litigant for contempt in the face of this abuse. The litigant’s insults were “apt to strike ‘at the most vulnerable and human qualities of a judge’s temperament.’ ” Id. (quoting Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 204, 88 S.Ct. 1477, 1483, 20 L.Ed.2d 522 (1968)). See also Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488, 94 S.Ct. 2697, 41 L.Ed.2d 897 (1974) (judge who had become embroiled in a “running controversy” with an attorney that resulted in “marked personal feelings ... on both sides,” and during which the judge had displayed an “unfavorable personal attitude” toward the attorney, could not try the attorney for contempt). In Murchison, the Court held that the judge’s combination of prosecutorial and adjudicatory functions in the same case violated due process. In that case, a state court judge acted as a “one-man grand jury” investigating police corruption. Two witnesses before the judge in his role as grand juror answered questions in such a way as to convince the judge that those witnesses had committed contempt. The judge charged the two witnesses with contempt and subsequently tried and convicted them. 349 U.S. at 134-35, 75 S.Ct. at 624. The Supreme Court held that the trial before the same judge who brought the contempt charges violated the defendants’ right to due process. “Having been part of [the accusatory process] a judge cannot be, in the very nature of things, wholly disinterested in the conviction or acquittal of those accused.” Id. at 137, 75 S.Ct. at 626. A comparison of the situations in which the Court required disqualification with situations in which the Court did not find disqualification was required makes it clear that not all “possible temptations” toward bias require a judge to disqualify himself. For example, in Aetna, the Court held that Justice Embry’s general antipathy toward and frustration with insurance companies did not require him to disqualify himself. 475 U.S. at 820-21, 106 S.Ct. at 1585. “[OJnly in the most extreme of cases” would the Constitution require disqualification for this type of general bias. Id. at 821, 106 S.Ct. at 1585. Likewise, not all contemptuous conduct by a person prevents a judge from trying the person for contempt. The Court refused to hold a judge disqualified from trying a witness for contempt in Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 84 S.Ct. 841, 11 L.Ed.2d 921 (1964), despite the witness’ continued criticism of the judge, disobedience to his orders during trial, and “disruptive, recalcitrant and disagreeable commentary.” Id. at 584, 84 S.Ct. at 847. One might suppose this disobedience and criticism offered a “possible temptation” to be biased against the defendant. But the judge had not become “personally embroiled” with the litigant, and the Court refused to “assume that judges are so irascible that they cannot fairly deal with resistance to their authority or with highly charged arguments about the soundness of their decisions.” Id. The line between interests that require disqualification and those that do not is not always clear. Consider the contrast between Murchison and Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 95 S.Ct. 1456, 43 L.Ed.2d 712 (1975), a case involving similar circumstances. In Withrow, the Wisconsin Medical Examining Board commenced an investigation to determine whether a doctor had committed certain illegal acts. The Board subsequently decided to hold a hearing to determine whether the doctor had committed the alleged illegal acts and whether to suspend the doctor’s license temporarily. 421 U.S. at 39-41, 95 S.Ct. at 1460-61. The Supreme Court held that the Board could adjudicate the same charges it had investigated and decided to prosecute without violating the doctor’s due process rights. See id. at 47-55, 95 S.Ct. at 1464-68. One may wonder why the Court found a due process violation in Murchison but not Withrow. In both cases, the same person (or body) had served as both prosecutor and adjudicator. In both cases, the adjudicators seemed to have had a “possible temptation ... not to hold the balance nice, clear, and true....” But the Court distinguished Withrow from Murchison; the procedure in Murchison violated due process “not only because the judge in effect became part of the prosecution and assumed an adversary position, but also because as a judge, passing on guilt or innocence, he very likely relied on ‘his own personal knowledge and impression of what had occurred in the grand jury room’ an impression that ‘could not be tested by adequate cross-examination.’” 421 U.S. at 53, 95 S.Ct. at 1467 (quoting Murchison, 349 U.S. at 138, 75 S.Ct. at 626). Not even all financial interests are disqualifying. In Aetna, for instance, six other judges were members of the plaintiff class in the two suits Justice Embry had filed. Although those six justices conceivably had a “slight pecuniary interest” in the outcome — and, therefore, a “possible temptation” to be biased — the Court held that their disqualification was not required. 475 U.S. at 825-26, 106 S.Ct. at 1587-88. The justices’ interests, though pecuniary, were not “direct, personal, and substantial_” Id. Any gain to these justices from a favorable decision in Aetna was “speculative and contingent;” the class had not yet been certified, and no class relief had been awarded. Id. Therefore, the Court’s eases require that we go beyond generalizations about “possible temptations” in deciding whether Judge Garippo was required to disqualify himself. The question is not whether some possible temptation to be biased exists; instead, the question is, when does a biasing influence require disqualification? Consistent with the common law, we begin in answering this question by presuming “the honesty and integrity of those serving as adjudicators.” Withrow, 421 U.S. at 47, 95 S.Ct. at 1464; Dyas v. Lockhart, 705 F.2d 993, 997 (8th Cir.1983). Disqualification is required only when the biasing influence is strong enough to overcome that presumption, that is, when the influence is so strong that we may presume actual bias. See Dyas, 705 F.2d at 996-97. This occurs in “situations ... in which experience teaches that the possibility of actual bias is too high to be constitutionally tolerable.” Withrow, 421 U.S. at 47, 95 S.Ct. at 1464. A court must be convinced that a particular influence, “under a realistic appraisal of psychological tendencies and human weakness,” poses “such a risk of actual bias or prejudgment that the practice must be forbidden if the guarantee of due process is to be adequately implemented.” Id. Judged by this standard, Judge Gar-ippo was not required to disqualify himself. Judge Garippo faced none of the biasing influences involved in the cases in which the Supreme Court required disqualification. Judge Garippo had no financial interest— direct or indirect — in the outcome of Del Vecchio’s trial. He had never been subject to any personally insulting, abusive, or even disrespectful remarks by Del Vecchio or his attorneys. He did not serve the dual role of prosecutor and judge in the Canzonieri trial. Judge Garippo had been involved in some aspects of Del Vecchio’s prosecution for murder in 1965 — fourteen years before the Can-zonieri trial. But as both the Fifth and Sixth Circuits have held, no per se rule disqualifies a judge because he has prosecuted a defendant in the past. Corbett v. Bordenkircher, 615 F.2d 722, 723-24 (6th Cir.1980); Murphy v. Beto, 416 F.2d 98, 100 (5th Cir.1969). This rule is consistent with the Supreme Court’s cases. Prosecuting a defendant in one case is not the kind of action from which we can presume bias or prejudgment in a future case. So, what personal motive could Judge Gar-ippo possibly have had to undermine the 1979 trial? Del Vecchio identifies two theories. First, he contends that prosecutor Garippo was closely involved in gathering evidence concerning the 1965 murder. He argues, therefore, that Judge Garippo had a personal stake in affirming the validity of that evidence. It follows, from Del Vecchio’s viewpoint, that in 1979 Judge Garippo could not fairly comply with the applicable rules of evidence when ruling on the admissibility of the 1965 evidence. Instead, he disregarded the rules and simply admitted the evidence. Second, Del Vecchio contends that prosecutor Garippo’s decision in 1965 to expedite the indictment resulted in Del Vecchio being initially sentenced as a juvenile. The theory is that prosecutor Garippo cut Del Vecchio a break in 1965, leading to his early release from prison, which allowed him to kill Tony in 1977. Under this theory, Judge Garippo felt personal responsibility for Tony’s murder, and could not fairly conduct the 1979 trial. We shall consider each theory in turn. Del Vecchio did file motions to exclude use of his 1965 confession and conviction in the Canzonieri trial, and Judge Garip-po did have to rule on these motions, at least in the trial’s sentencing phase. But as the Court in Murchison stated, the interest necessary to disqualify a judge “cannot be defined with precision. Circumstances and relationships must be considered”. 349 U.S. at 136, 75 S.Ct. at 625. The circumstances in this case — the actual contents of the motions and the issues they raised — do not warrant a finding that Judge Garippo was so likely to have prejudged the motions’ merits that we can presume he could not impartially decide the motions. In the first motion, Del Vecchio challenged the use of evidence about the 1965 conviction, claiming that the conviction was irrelevant to the issues at the 1979 trial. In the second motion, Del Vecchio alleged that his 1965 conviction was illegal because the statute that allowed juveniles to be charged as adults violated due process in two ways: the statute did not require a hearing to determine if a juvenile should be charged as an adult; and the statute left the decision to charge a juvenile as an adult to the “absolute and totally standardless discretion” of the State’s Attorney and circuit court judge. Finally, in the third motion, Del Vecchio challenged the use of his 1965 confession in the 1979 trial, claiming that the confession was involuntary and obtained in violation of Miranda. Judge Garippo never ruled on these motions during the guilt phase of the trial. He did not have to; the prosecution never attempted to introduce the evidence. But he did allow evidence from the 1965 proceedings at the sentencing phase. Is it possible to presume, or even to infer, that he did so because he had a personal stake in the outcome? To answer this, we must examine Judge Garippo’s personal stake in each motion. First, Del Vecchio sought to preclude evidence about the 1965 conviction, contending that it was irrelevant to the 1979 proceedings. Judge Garippo allowed the evidence at the sentencing phase, determining it to be relevant for the jury to consider when deliberating the fate of the twice-convicted killer. Del Vecchio asks us to infer that Judge Garippo’s decision on that motion was not a careful appraisal on the issue of relevance; rather, that it was an unscrupulous effort to impose the death sentence. But that is not a reasonable, much less permissible inference. There is no cause to think — let alone presume — that Judge Garippo could not impartially consider the relevance of the 1965 conviction. The question of relevance in no way required Judge Garippo to judge any decision he had made in 1965. It was not Judge Garippo who killed Mr. Christiansen, confessed to the murder and pleaded guilty. The 1965 conviction existed independently of anything prosecutor Garippo is alleged to have done. Judge Garippo simply had no personal stake in determining the 1965 conviction to be relevant. In the second motion, Del Vecchio sought to preclude evidence of the 1965 conviction because it was obtained under a law allowing juveniles to be charged as adults, which he contended was unconstitutional. Judge Gar-ippo permitted this evidence, determining that the law was constitutional. It is true that Judge Garippo participated in the decision to charge Del Vecchio as an adult (a decision that Judge Garippo in his 1989 deposition described as a “no-brainer” — 16-year-olds accused of murder were almost always charged as adults). But Del Vecchio’s motion did not focus on Judge Garippo’s decision; it focused on the statute under which he made that decision. The motion did not allege that Judge Garippo himself violated the Constitution except to the extent that he followed the allegedly unconstitutional statute. There is no reason to presume that a judge in Judge Garippo’s position could not impartially decide Del Vecehio’s motion, unless perhaps he had some professional or intellectual stake in the statute’s constitutionality. But the record reveals no such stake. There is no indication, for example, that Judge Garippo had anything to do with drafting or passing the statute, or that he had ever defended the statute’s constitutionality. The motion in no way required Judge Garip-po to judge his own decision as a prosecutor. In the third and final motion, Del Vecchio attempted to preclude his 1965 confession, contending that it was involuntary. But Judge Garippo allowed the jury to review the confession during the sentencing phase. Again, there is no possible inference that Judge Garippo had a personal stake in the confession. As a prosecutor, Garippo was at best only tangentially involved in the circumstances surrounding Del Veechio’s confession. Del Vecchio gave two confessions, one to police and one to Assistant State’s Attorney Patrick Tuite, prosecutor Garippo’s subordinate. Prosecutor Garippo read Tuite’s report about the confession. But Garippo himself took no confession from Del Vecchio. In fact, Judge Garippo’s deposition indicates that he first read about the crime in the newspaper and did not even know of the ease when the police and Tuite took Del Vecchio’s confessions. The motion does not allege, nor does the record indicate, that prosecutor Garippo improperly trained his subordinates, or that he required or allowed subordinates to extract involuntary confessions from suspects, either systematically or in this case. Again, any personal stake Judge Garippo would have had in upholding the confession was minimal. There is no reason to presume that Judge Garippo could not impartially evaluate the work of the police or his former subordinate. Our decision in Barry v. United States, 528 F.2d 1094 (7th Cir.1976), is instructive on whether Del Vecchio’s pretrial motions required Judge Garippo to disqualify himself. In Barry, the defendant was indicted under a then-novel (but subsequently upheld) construction of the Hobbs Act. Barry’s trial judge had been a United States Attorney. As United States Attorney, he had personally decided to use the Hobbs Act to prosecute activity such as that in which Barry was involved. Id. at 1097. One of the questions the judge had to decide at trial was whether the Hobbs Act applied to Barry’s activities. Id. at 1100. The judge in Barry had at least as much professional and intellectual stake in the outcome of the Hobbs Act question as Judge Garippo had in the outcomes of Del Vecchio’s motions to exclude his 1965 conviction and confession. He had made the decision to apply the Hobbs Act the way it was applied in Barry’s case. But after examining Supreme Court precedent and the practices of Supreme Court justices in deciding whether to disqualify themselves, this court held that the judge’s interest was insufficient to require disqualification under the due process clause. See id. at 1099-1100 & 1100 n. 19. The second theory Del Vecchio presents in arguing that Judge Garippo was personally motivated to undermine the 1979 trial centers on prosecutor Garippo’s 1965 decision to expedite the indictment. Del Vecchio contends that this decision began a chain reaction which eventually led to his early release from prison, allowing him to kill again. Under Del Vecchio’s theory, Judge Garippo felt personal responsibility for the 1977 murder, and could not have been unbiased during the trial because he held a grudge against Del Vecchio. In order to accept this theory, we must first conclude that the record allows the inference on which it is based: that prosecutor Garippo cut Del Vecchio a break in 1965 which led to his being free to kill again in 1977. But the record does not permit this inference. All prosecutor Garippo did, really, was agree to expedite the indictment. As it turned out, this only postponed the date of Del Vecchio’s sentencing as an adult; whereas he otherwise would have been sentenced as an adult immediately, instead he was sentenced as an adult a few years later when he turned twenty-one. There is no allegation or evidence that the judge who ultimately sentenced Del Veechio as an adult had any less discretion than a judge in 1965 would have had. Indeed, Del Vecchio faced a minimum of fourteen years and a maximum of life in prison both in 1965, and in 1971, when he was finally sentenced as an adult. It just so happened that the judge in 1971 decided to be lenient. In retrospect, there is no telling whether a judge asked to sentence Del Vec-ehio as an adult in 1965 would have been lenient. If we cannot know in retrospect, prosecutor Garippo could not have predicted as much when he made the decision to expedite the indictment. Once he did that, the punishment was out of his hands and it was left to the wisdom of the judges to sentence Del Veechio. Granted, Del Veechio ultimately received a light sentence for murdering Mr. Christiansen in 1965, but this light treatment was not because of prosecutor Garippo. It was because of the judge who sentenced Del Vecchio. The only break Del Vecchio received because of the quick indictment was that he was allowed to spend the first four years of his sentence in a youth correctional facility, rather than in an adult prison. This break had no foreseeable connection to the 1977 murder. Therefore, any possible biasing influence stemming from the decision to expedite the indictment is far too remote to have required Judge Garippo’s disqualification. Even if one perceived some obscure causal link between the expedited indictment and the light sentence, it is highly unlikely that Judge Garippo would have felt sufficiently guilty about a decision with which he had so little to do that he could not have put this guilt aside at Del Vecchio’s trial. The due process standard for disqualification requires an influence or interest that we can conclusively presume would cause the average judge to be biased. All prosecutor Garippo did was agree to expedite the indictment. By chance, this decision eventually placed Del Vecchio before a judge who decided to be lenient. Because prosecutor Garippo could not have foreseen such easy treatment, he was not likely to have felt responsible for it fourteen years later. It would be unreasonable to presume that Judge Garippo would have weighed the scales against Del Veechio under these circumstances. But even if prosecutor Garippo had undoubtedly given Del Vecchio a clear break — for example, if prosecutor Garippo had agreed to imposition of the minimum sentence in exchange for a guilty plea — the risk of bias would still be insufficient to hold that Judge Garippo was required to disqualify himself. Compare a prosecutor to a sentencing judge. In a system of indeterminate sentencing, such as the federal system before the Sentencing Guidelines, judges make thousands of decisions on sentence length, based in large part on the judges’ personal evaluations of the defendants before them. Any one of those decisions could turn out to be wrong. But does a judge’s incorrect decision to give a defendant a sentencing break in one case necessarily prevent the judge from presiding at that defendant’s trial in a case fourteen years later? Would the Circuit Court judge who actually gave Del Vecchio the minimum sentence have been required to disqualify himself from the 1979 trial? Can we presume that the average judge in this situation would violate his oath to be impartial? Most trial judges would rightly reject that suggestion; so does the Supreme Court. See Liteky, — U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 1155. To suggest partiality in such situations is inconsistent with the “presumption of honesty and integrity of those serving as adjudicators.” Withrow, 421 U.S. at 47, 95 S.Ct. at 1464. This presumption should guide our decision; we should be careful before we engage in “unseemly excursions into [judges’] psyches.” Cummings, J. dissent at 66. The Constitution empowers this court to intrude in the state process of convicting and sentencing only if we find a constitutional violation. We should not exaggerate propriety in order to find such a violation. Illinois’ treatment of George Del Vecchio is anything but “tragic.” Cf. Cummings, J. dissent at 1398. It exhibits a civilized attempt to deal with an unrepentant and twice-convicted murderer. Illinois caught, tried, convicted and heard all of the appeals of a murderer; it will now give that murderer a sentence the people of Illinois deem appropriate. As federal judges assigned to ensure due process under the Constitution, we must not create obstacles when the state of Illinois has fulfilled its constitutional obligations. B. Actual Bias If Judge Garippo exhibited some actual bias in conducting the trial, Del Vecchio would have had a valid Fourteenth Amendment claim. “Fairness of course requires the absence of actual bias in the trial of a case.” Murchison, 349 U.S. at 136, 75 S.Ct. at 625. But, as Del Vecchio concedes in his brief, “[i]n practice, actual bias is difficult if not impossible to prove.” Probably because of this, Del Vecchio never really argues that Judge Garippo exhibited actual bias. He argues simply that “[d]ue process requires a judge to recuse himself in any situation in which there is a fair potential that an average person might be tempted to tilt one way or the other; a showing of actual influence or bias is not required.” Because of Del Vecchio’s method of presentation, there is some question whether he waives the actual bias argument. He really confines his presentation to arguing that Judge Garippo had an appearance of bias. But because Del Vecchio seems to contend that Judge Garippo’s supposed appearance of bias in some way portended his hidden actual bias, we shall consider whether the evidence in this case is sufficient to make a showing of actual bias. The preceding section of this opinion — on the appearance of bias — resolves much of this question. Because none of the evidence discussed previously supports the inference that Judge Garippo had an actual substantial incentive to be biased, neither does it support the inference that he was actually biased. But Del Vecchio presents other circumstantial evidence adduced in the habeas corpus proceedings, which is meant to prove Judge Garippo’s bias. We shall consider whether this evidence possibly supports the inference of actual bias. Judge Garippo gave a deposition in these proceedings, in which he admitted that he personally feels betrayed by defendants who commit crimes after he has been lenient when sentencing them. Del Vecchio recounts this statement to argue that Judge Garippo felt similar antipathy towards him. But most sentencing judges probably feel this sense of betrayal; it is a natural emotion, though hardly a disqualifying interest. Taken to its logical conclusion, this “predisposition” theory would prevent a trial judge from trying and sentencing someone a second time — a common occurrence in our courts which, as the Supreme Court recently noted, does not raise concerns about bias. See Liteky, — U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 1155. Judge Garippo’s general antipathy toward defendants who abuse his lenience is akin to Justice Embry’s general antipathy toward insurance companies that the Supreme Court found to be insufficient to disqualify the justice in Aetna. Del Vecchio next points to two other pieces of circumstantial evidence he obtained in discovery for the purposes of this petition. He notes that Judge Garippo’s courtroom clerk had checked out the Christiansen case files before the Canzonieri trial started. The implication is that Judge Garippo took an unusual interest in Del Vecchio’s case, and that this unusual interest points to bias. But this is like saying that an appellate judge who cheeks out a record before oral argument is taking an unusual interest in that case. In fact, the judge has a very good reason to examine the record — that reason is called preparation. Trial preparation does not start at the beginning of trial. In any event, this “evidence” shows not so much bias as inquisitiveness; and being inquisitive about an earlier case is not sufficient reason for us to presume — or even infer — bias on the part of the average judge (especially when such investigation is warranted by the demands of trial preparation). Finally, Del Vecchio notes Judge Garippo’s statement that “Del Vecchio was more deserving of the death penalty than John Wayne Gacy.” Apparently, Judge Garippo made this off-the-record comment to Del Veechio’s attorney comparing three death penalty cases before him, including Del Vec-chio’s and Gacy’s. Del Vecchio argues that this statement evidences Judge Garippo’s bias against him. But according to Judge Garippo, the statement was directed not at which of the three defendants was most worthy of death, but rather at which defendant was a more likely “candidate” for the death sentence. Based on Judge Garippo’s limited knowledge of the facts of the cases, he was speculating on which defendant was most vulnerable to a death sentence by a jury. Judge Garippo’s explanation makes sense; if Judge Garippo was trying to railroad Del Vecchio, why would he tell Del Vecchio’s lawyer? In any event, Del Vecchio has not presented any evidence inconsistent with Judge Garippo’s testimony. In an affidavit, Del Vecehio’s trial attorney stated only that Judge Garippo “indicated his ranking of the cases with respect to their relative merits as death cases.... Garippo indicated that of the three defendants, Del Vecchio in his view was the most appropriate candidate for imposition of the death penalty. He referred to Gacy as a ‘distant third.’ ” The affidavit does not state that Judge Garippo said Del Vec-chio was more “deserving” of the death penalty than Gacy. In context, then, Judge Garippo’s statement about Gacy provides no evidence of any predisposition on Judge Gar-ippo’s part. In sum, the record presents no facts indicating either actual bias, or a possible temptation so severe that we might presume an actual, substantial incentive to be biased. Therefore, Del Vecchio cannot prevail on his claim that he was denied due process because Judge Garippo presided at his trial. III. The next constitutional issue Del Vecchio raises concerns the confessions he gave in 1965. He claims that the confessions were coerced, and he demands at least the opportunity to challenge the voluntariness of the confessions in an evidentiary hearing. The district court granted the writ of habeas corpus on this issue, remanding the cause to state court to conduct such a hearing. The district court determined that Del Vecchio was entitled to a hearing under the Supreme Court’s decision in Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908 (1964). Illinois filed its cross-appeal to challenge that ruling. The Illinois Supreme Court addressed this issue in Del Vecchio’s direct appeal. It determined that, under Illinois law, Del Veechio’s guilty plea in 1965 waived his challenge to the voluntariness of the confessions. Del Vecchio, 86 Ill.Dec. at 470, 475 N.E.2d at 849. A federal court is required to avoid collateral review of an issue in a habeas corpus case if the last state court which considered the issue resolved it on independent and adequate state law grounds. Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 109 S.Ct. 1038, 103 L.Ed.2d 308 (1989); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991). Here, there is no question that the Illinois Supreme Court resolved the confession issue on independent state law grounds. The court determined that, as a matter of Illinois law, the guilty plea waived any subsequent challenge to the voluntariness of the confessions; this proposition finds a measure of support in Illinois law. See, e.g., People v. Brown, 41 Ill.2d 503, 244 N.E.2d 159, 160 (1969) (“A constitutional right, like any other right of an accused, may be waived, and a voluntary plea of guilty waives all errors or irregularities that are not jurisdictional.”). See also People v. Phelps, 51 Ill.2d 35, 280 N.E.2d 203, 204 (1972); People v. Stanley, 50 Ill.2d 320, 278 N.E.2d 792, 794 (1972); People v. Jackson, 47 Ill.2d 344, 265 N.E.2d 622, 624-25 (1970); People v. Stice, 160 Ill.App.3d 132, 112 Ill.Dec. 49, 53, 513 N.E.2d 463, 467 (1987); People v. Owens, 131 Ill.App.3d 381, 86 Ill.Dec. 435, 436, 475 N.E.2d 649, 650 (1985); People v. Patterson, 3 Ill.App.3d 824, 279 N.E.2d 169, 170 (1972); People v. Goodwin, 5 Ill.App.3d 1091, 284 N.E.2d 430, 431 (1972). See also Healey v. Cannon, 553 F.2d 1052, 1057-58 (7th Cir.1977). But there is a question whether this independent state law ground was adequate. “[Ojnly a ‘firmly established and regularly followed state practice’ may be interposed by a State to prevent subsequent review ... of a federal constitutional claim.” Ford v. Georgia, 498 U.S. 411, 423, 424, 111 S.Ct. 850, 857, 857, 112 L.Ed.2d 935 (1991), quoting James v. Kentucky, 466 U.S. 341, 348-51, 104 S.Ct. 1830, 1835-36, 80 L.Ed.2d 346 (1984). Ah Illinois Supreme Court cases before Del Vecchio’s on this subject involved constitutional challenges made in the same case where the defendant made his gmlty plea. The Illinois Supreme Court never before spe-cificaUy faced the question whether a gufity plea cuts off all chaUenges to matters preceding the plea — even chaUenges made in a different case. Because it never faced the question, the IUinois Supreme Court’s resolution in Del Vecchio’s case was novel. See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 457-58, 78 S.Ct. 1163, 1169, 2 L.Ed.2d 1488 (1958). (“Novelty in procedural requirements cannot be permitted to thwart review in this court apphed for by those who, in justified reUance upon prior decisions, seek vindication in state courts of their federal constitutional rights.”). Not only that, the IUinois Supreme Court’s decision in Del Vecchio’s case departs somewhat from the appellate court’s decision in People v. McLain, 32 Ill.App.3d 998, 337 N.E.2d 82 (4th Dist.1975). McLain involved the same sequence as Del Vecehio’s: confession, gmlty plea, and a second prosecution at which the prosecutor introduced the confession. The appeUate court held that the defendant was entitled to a hearing on the voluntariness of the confession, despite the earUer guüty plea. Id. 337 N.E.2d at 84. Given the apparent flux in IUinois law, coupled with the novelty of the Illinois Supreme Court’s decision, we cannot say that the state apphed a “firmly established and regularly followed” rule in Del Vecchio’s case. Therefore, we wül not apply a procedural bar to avoid review of the IUinois Supreme Court’s decision. We proceed to the merits of the involuntary confession issue. A criminal defendant has the “right to be free of a conviction based upon a coerced confession” guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Jackson, 378 U.S. at 377, 84 S.Ct. at 1781. It protects both the accused and the criminal justice system to discard any confession that has the taint of coercion. Therefore, the Supreme Court allows the criminal defendant facing prosecution for an offense to which he confessed, to challenge the voluntariness of the confession at an evidentiary hearing. Jackson, 378 U.S. at 392-93, 84 S.Ct. at 1789. This extra procedural safeguard is meant to assure the rehabiUty of the confession, which is always a highly persuasive piece of evidence in the prosecutor’s arsenal. The question here is whether Jackson required the IUinois trial court to interrupt the 1979 sentencing proceedings, in order to provide Del Vecchio with an evidentiary hearing to address the voluntariness of the 1965 confessions. Del Vecchio argues that Jackson estabhshed the right to such an evidentiary hearing wherever and whenever he chose to fight, even if it was at the sentencing phase of another trial for a different murder taking place fourteen years after the confessions. We do not read Jackson as broadly. Jackson established the principle that a person should be able to recount the circumstances of his confession to a court, so that an improperly obtained confession will not be used to gain a conviction for the crime described in the confession. In such circumstances, the confession is such a conclusive indication of guilt that the Supreme Court counsels an extra step in the process of determining admissibility — an evidentiary hearing — to assure that the confession is reliable. In this case, Del Vecchio was not facing prosecution based on an allegedly coerced confession. By the time the 1965 confessions