Full opinion text
ORDER MOODY, District Judge. This cause is before the Court on Petitioner Oba Chandler’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 and memorandum in support of thereof (Dkts. 1 and 16, respectively), Respondent’s response to the petition (Dkt.17), and Chandler’s reply to the response (Dkt.23). Chandler is a Florida prisoner under sentence of death challenging three convictions for first degree murder entered by the Sixth Judicial Circuit Court, Pinellas County, Florida. A review of the petition, the response, the reply, and the record in light of the applicable statutes and controlling case law demonstrates that Chandler’s petition for writ of habeas corpus must be DENIED. Facts and Procedural History On November 10, 1992, Chandler was arrested and charged by indictment with the 1989 murders of Joan Rogers and her two daughters, Michelle and Christe (Dkt. 19, App. A, Vol. 1 at 1). The indictment alleged that the murders occurred in Pi-nellas County and Hillsborough County, Florida. Id. Initially, the Sixth Judicial Circuit Public Defender was appointed to represent Chandler. Id. at 13. Citing an ethical conflict as cause, the public defender moved to withdraw on March 3, 1993. Id. at 84. The trial court granted the motion to withdraw, and on March 10, 1993, Attorney Thomas B. McCoun was appointed to represent Chandler. Id. at 85. Upon being selected to serve as a Federal magistrate judge for the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, Attorney McCoun moved for leave to withdraw once new counsel was appointed and the final transfer of various documents was accomplished (Dkt. 19, App. A, Vol. 6 at 691). The trial court granted Attorney McCoun’s motion on October 5, 1993, and appointed Attorney Fred Zinober (hereinafter “Zinober”) as lead counsel and Attorneys Robert Santa Lucia, Andrew Salzman, and Evan Berlin as co-counsel to assist Zinober. See id. at 796. Although initially Chandler elected to be tried in Hillsborough County, see Dkt. 19, App. A, Yol. 5 at 621-22, as discussed infra, the parties reached an agreement pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 910.03(1) (1993) to conduct the trial in Pinellas County where a jury picked from Orange County would be sequestered. Represented by Zinober, Chandler proceeded to a trial by jury on September 19, 1994. In its order affirming Chandler’s conviction and sentence on direct appeal, the Florida Supreme Court summarized the facts as follows: The record reflects that the body of Joan Rogers and those of her two daughters, Michelle and Christe, were discovered floating in Tampa Bay on June 4, 1989. Each body was nude from the waist down. Joan’s hands were tied behind her back, her ankles were tied together, and the yellow rope around her neck was attached to a concrete block. Christe’s hands and ankles were similarly tied, and she had duct tape on her face or head and a rope around her neck. Michelle’s left hand was free with only a loop of rope attached, her ankles were bound, she had duct tape on her face or head, and the rope around her neck was attached to a concrete block. The assistant medical examiner, Dr. Edward Corcoran, performed autopsies that same day. He determined that the cause of death for each victim was either asphyxiation due to strangulation from the ropes tied around their necks or drowning. The Rogers family was vacationing in Florida and had checked into a Days Inn in Tampa on June 1. One week later, housekeepers notified the general manager that the Rogers’ room had not been inhabited for several days. The general manager contacted the police, who secured the room and obtained the hotel’s records for the room. The police subsequently found the Rogers’ car parked at a boat ramp on the Courtney Campbell Causeway. Among the items recovered from the car was a handwritten note on Days Inn stationery and' a Clearwater Beach brochure. The note read, “Turn right. West W on 60, two and one-half miles before the bridge on the right side at light, blue w/wht.” FBI agent James Mathis determined that the handwriting was that of Joan Rogers. Theresa Stubbs from FDLE determined that some of the handwriting on the Clear-water Beach brochure was Chandler’s, while other writing may have been Joan Rogers’. Samuel McMullin, a fingerprint expert for the Hillsborough County Sheriffs Department, found Chandler’s palm print on the brochure. Rollins Cooper worked as a subcontractor for Chandler at the time of the murders. He testified at trial that on June 1, Chandler appeared to be in a big hurry after bringing Cooper some screen. When asked why, Chandler told Cooper that he had a date with three women. Cooper met Chandler the next morning at 7:05 a.m.; when asked why he looked grubby, Chandler replied that he had been out on his boat all night. Judy Blair and her friend, Barbara Mot-tram, both Canadian tourists, testified regarding Chandler’s rape of Blair several weeks prior to the Rogers’ murders. After meeting the women at a convenience store, Chandler, who identified himself as “Dave,” arranged to take them out on his boat the next day. The following morning, May 15, 1989, Mot-tram decided not to go out on Chandler’s boat, so Blair met Chandler alone. Blair testified that Chandler seemed disappointed when told Mottram would not be joining them. After boating for several hours, Blair and Chandler returned to the dock. Chandler asked Blair to get Mottram to join them for an after-dinner boat trip. Again, Blair could not convince Mottram to join them. Blair testified that Chandler seemed “ticked off’ when she told him Mottram would not be joining them. Subsequently, Chandler began making advances to Blair after the boat entered the Gulf of Mexico. Despite Blair’s refusals and attempts to resist him, Chandler raped her. Chandler and Blair then returned to shore. The next day, Blair told Mottram what happened and reported the rape to the police. At trial, she identified the clothing Chandler had been wearing that night. Mottram picked Chandler’s photograph out of a photo pack and identified him in a lineup and in court. Chandler visited his daughter, Kristal Mays, and her husband Rick in Cincinnati in November 1989. Kristal later testified that Chandler told her he could not go back to Florida because the police were looking for him for killing some women. While Chandler never admitted to the killings, Kristal testified that he likewise never claimed innocence. Similarly, Rick Mays thought Chandler had committed the murders from the way he described how the po- lice were looking for him as a murder suspect. During another visit to Cincinnati in October 1990, Chandler had Rick Mays set up a drug deal. Before absconding with some of the drug dealers’ money, Chandler put a gun to Rick’s head and said, “Family don’t mean s_to me.” After Chandler fled, Rick was badly beaten up and almost killed. The Mays’ house was also damaged by the drug dealers. This series of incidents forced Kristal Mays to drop out of nursing school. She was upset and told Rick to call the police and report that Chandler “put a gun on him.” After Chandler was arrested in September 1992, Kristal was contacted and cooperated with the police and she began to tape their conversations. She gave a sworn statement to the state attorney’s office on October 6, 1992. Kristal had been convicted of a crime involving dishonesty and appeared on the television show Hard Copy in 1994 to discuss her father’s alleged role in the murders in return for a $1000 fee. Robert Carlton testified that he bought a blue and white boat from Chandler in July or August 1989. Carlton recalled seeing concrete blocks at the Chandler house and that some of the concrete blocks had three holes and some had two. Arthur Wayne Stephenson shared a cell with Chandler for ten days in late October 1992. He testified at trial that after viewing television reports about the recovery of the victims’ bodies from Tampa Bay, Chandler said that he had met the three women and given them directions to a boat ramp on the Courtney Campbell Causeway. Chandler told Stephenson that one of the girls was very attractive. Blake Leslie, an inmate at the Pinellas County Jail with Chandler in the fall of 1992, testified that Chandler told him that he took a young lady from another country for a ride in his boat. Her friend did not want to go. Once he got out twenty to thirty miles, Chandler told her to have sex with him or swim for it. Chandler allegedly said that the only reason that woman was still around is because somebody was waiting for her at the boat dock. Leslie, who had been convicted of nine felonies, never heard Chandler speak of murders, only rapes. Several marine operators for GTE testified to collect calls made from a caller identifying himself as Oba, Obey, Obie, or no personal name and his boat as Gypsy or Gypsy One, from March 17 to June 2,1989. The calls were placed to a number registered to Debra Chandler, Chandler’s wife. One of the operators, Elizabeth Beiro, testified that she received three collect calls for Debra Chandler’s telephone number, at 1:12 and 1:30 a.m. on June 2, 1989. The caller did not give a first name, although he identified his boat as Gypsy One. Later that same morning, at 9:52 a.m., Frances Watkins received a collect call from Gypsy One; the caller identified himself as Obie. Chandler testified that he met Michelle Rogers when he stopped at a gas station. He testified that he had a very brief conversation with Michelle, giving her directions to the Days Inn on Highway 60. Chandler maintained that he never saw any of the Rogers family again after this short encounter and adamantly denied killing them. He also testified that he never told Rollins Cooper that he had a date with three women. Chandler claimed that he was out on his boat all night because his engine died after a hose burst, spilling all of his fuel. He testified that two men in a boat gave him a tow to Gandy Bridge Marina, where he put some fuel in his boat. In rebuttal, James Hensley, a certified boat mechanic, testified that Chandler’s fuel line was possibly still the original, was in good shape, and showed no signs of repair. Hensley stated that even if there had been a hole in the fuel line, it would not have leaked because of the anti-syphoning valve. When asked about details surrounding the rape of Judy Blair, Chandler invoked his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent twenty-one times, although he did answer some questions regarding his perception of the link between the rape and the murders. After the jury trial concluded, Chandler was found guilty of all three counts of murder on September 29, 1994. The jury reconvened for the penalty phase the next day. During the penalty phase, Chandler waived the presentation of any testimonial mitigating, evidence. However, he did present some documentary evidence, including records showing that he obtained his high school equivalency diploma and earned college credits while in prison. The State presented the judgments and sentences of Chandler’s prior armed robberies. The robbery victims also testified about the details of those crimes. Chandler v. State, 702 So.2d 186, 189-91 (Fla.1997) (footnotes omitted) (hereinafter Chandler I). Following the penalty phase of the trial, the jury recommended death for each murder by a vote of 12-0 (Dkt. 19, App. A, Vol. 66 at 11131-33). The trial court followed the jury’s recommendation and sentenced Chandler to death on November 4, 1994. The following seven issues were raised on direct appeal: (1) the trial court violated Chandler’s constitutional right to a fair trial by admitting evidence that he sexually battered Judy Blair; (2) the trial court erred in requiring Chandler to repeatedly invoke his right to remain silent when questioned regarding the facts of the prior sexual battery during cross-examination; (3) the trial court erred in allowing the State to present a prior consistent statement by Kristal Mays; (4) the prosecutor’s closing argument violated Chandler’s right to a fair trial; (5) the trial court erred in accepting Chandler’s waiver of his right to present mitigating testimony during the penalty phase; (6) the trial court erred in rejecting Chandler’s claim of childhood trauma as a mitigating circumstance; and (7) the standard jury instruction for the heinous, atrocious, or cruel aggravating circumstance is unconstitutionally vague (Dkt. 19, App. A, Vol. 103 at 70-73). The Florida Supreme Court affirmed Chandler’s judgments and sentences on December 11, 1997. See Chandler I, 702 So.2d at 186. The United States Supreme Court denied Chandler’s petition for certiorari review on April 20, 1998. See Chandler v. Florida, 523 U.S. 1083, 118 S.Ct. 1535, 140 L.Ed.2d 685 (1998). Chandler was originally represented in his efforts to secure collateral relief by the Office of Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Middle District of Florida. To toll the one-year limitation period applicable to petitions for federal habeas relief, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d), Chandler filed a “shell” motion to vacate in state court pursuant to Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.850 on June 17, 1998, setting forth 32 claims for relief (Dkt. 19, App. C, Vol. 1 at 1; Vol. 2 at 375). On May 30, 2000, following a substitution of counsel, see Dkt. 19, App. C, Vol. 2 at 357-58, Chandler filed an amended Rule 3.850 motion asserting only that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel during the guilt phase of his trial, citing Zinober’s failure to: (1) prevent the prosecutor from making improper, prejudicial comments to the jury during closing statements; (2) protect Chandler’s right to a fair and impartial jury by moving to prevent the selection of the jury from the Orange County venire pool; (3) protect Chandler from the effects of the evidence of a similar crime admitted pursuant to Fla. Stat. 90.404(2)(a) (hereinafter the “Williams Rule”); (4) prevent the prosecutor from cross-examining Chandler about the Madeira Beach case; (5) investigate and present available exculpatory evidence that would have supported Chandler’s contention that someone other than himself, to wit, John Rogers, committed the murders; (6) investigate and present an expert witness to rebut the State’s expert witness on boat fuel lines; and (7) prevent the prosecutor from eliciting testimony from a defense witness that Chandler was being investigated for crimes other than the Madeira Beach rape and the Rogers murders (Dkt. 19, App. C, Vol. 3 at 415-75). During a Huff hearing held on September 15, 2000, post-conviction counsel conceded that no evidentiary hearing was needed on claims one, five, and seven raised in Chandler’s Rule 3.850 motion and abandoned claim six regarding the fuel line expert, announcing that he had investigated the claim very carefully and could find no good faith basis therefor. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court entered an order denying the motion on June 27, 2001 (Dkt. 19, App. C, Vol. 11 at 2054). Chandler appealed the trial court’s decision to the Florida Supreme Court, raising the following claims: 1. Whether the lower court erred in denying Chandler’s request for an evidentiary hearing on his claim that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to seek a venue change from Orange County; 2. Whether counsel was ineffective for admitting that the State could prove Chandler’s guilt in the Madeira Beach case and in advising him to invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege regarding same; and 3. Whether counsel was ineffective in failing to object to statements made during the State’s closing arguments. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s decision on April 17, 2003. Rehearing was denied on June 24, 2003, and the mandate issued on July 24, 2003. See Chandler v. State, 848 So.2d 1031 (Fla. 2003) (hereinafter Chandler II). Chandler filed his § 2254 petition on June 26, 2003 (Dkt.l). In' his petition, Chandler asserts that his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel was violated when trial counsel: (1) failed to move for a change of venue for the jury selection; (2) conceded that the state could prove that Chandler was guilty in the Madeira Beach rape case; (3) advised Chandler to invoke his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination when questioned about the Madeira Beach rape; and (4) failed to object to statements made by the prosecutor during closing arguments. Each of these grounds was raised as either a claim or subclaim in Chandler’s Rule 3.850 motion. Respondent acknowledges that the claims are exhausted, but asserts that Chandler has failed to demonstrate that he is entitled to relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Standards of Review Because Chandler filed his petition after April 24, 1996, this case is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 2254, as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 792, 121 S.Ct. 1910, 150 L.Ed.2d 9 (2001); Henderson v. Campbell, 353 F.3d 880, 889-90 (11th Cir.2003). In order to “prevent federal habeas ‘retrials’ and to ensure that state-court convictions are given effect to the extent possible under law,” the AEDPA establishes a deferential standard of review of state habeas judgments. Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 693, 122 S.Ct. 1843, 152 L.Ed.2d 914 (2002); see also Woodford v. Visciotti 537 U.S. 19, 24, 123 S.Ct. 357, 154 L.Ed.2d 279 (2002): Pursuant to AEDPA, habeas relief may not be granted with respect to a claim adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the adjudication of the claim: (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application, of clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Price v. Vincent, 538 U.S. 634, 638-39, 123 S.Ct. 1848, 155 L.Ed.2d 877 (2003); Clark v. Crosby, 335 F.3d. 1303, 1308 (11th Cir.2003). “Clearly established Federal law” is the governing legal principle, not the dicta, set forth by the United States Supreme Court at the time the state court issues its decision. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71-72, 123 S.Ct. 1166, 155 L.Ed.2d 144 (2003). Where no Supreme Court precedent is on point, or the precedent is ambiguous, it cannot be said that the state court’s conclusion is contrary to clearly established governing federal law. Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 17, 124 S.Ct. 7, 157 L.Ed.2d 263 (2003); Clark v. Crosby, 335 F.3d at 1308-10. A state court decision is “contrary to” the Supreme Court’s clearly established precedent within the meaning of § 2254(d)(1) only if the state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law as set forth in Supreme Court case law, or if the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from those in a decision of the Supreme Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from Supreme Court precedent. Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. at 17, 124 S.Ct. 7 (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (hereinafter “Williams I”)). See also Price v. Vincent, 538 U.S. at 639, 123 S.Ct. 1848. A state court does not have to cite Supreme Court precedent, or even be aware of it, so long as neither its reasoning nor its result contradicts Supreme Court precedent. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8, 123 S.Ct. 362, 154 L.Ed.2d 263 (2002); Parker v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Corr., 331 F.3d 764, 775-76 (11th Cir.2003). “[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.” Williams I, 529 U.S. at 411, 120 S.Ct. 1495. The decision involves an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent if the state court identifies the correct governing legal rule from Supreme Court cases but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular inmate’s case; or if the state court either unreasonably extends a legal principle from Supreme Court precedent to a new context where it should not apply; or unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new context where it should apply. Bottoson v. Moore, 234 F.3d 526, 531 (11th Cir.2000). The “unreasonable application” inquiry requires the state court decision to be more than incorrect or erroneous; it must be objectively unreasonable. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. at 75-77, 123 S.Ct. 1166; Williams I, 529 U.S. at 409-10, 120 S.Ct. 1495. Whether a state court’s decision was unreasonable must be assessed in light of the record the court had before it. See Holland v. Jackson, 542 U.S. 649, 124 S.Ct. 2736, 2737-2738, 159 L.Ed.2d 683 (2004) (citing Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 124 S.Ct. 1, 157 L.Ed.2d 1 (2003)); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 348, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003); cf Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. at 697, n. 4, 122 S.Ct. 1843 (declining to consider evidence not presented to the state court in determining whether its decision was contrary to federal law). “[A] determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct. The applicant shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Henderson v. Campbell, 353 F.3d at 890-91. The statutory presumption of correctness applies only to findings of fact made by the state court, not to mixed determinations of law and fact. Parker v. Head, 244 F.3d 831, 836 (11th Cir.2001), cert denied, 534 U.S. 1046, 122 S.Ct. 627, 151 L.Ed.2d 548 (2001). Because of the deference due the state court’s findings of fact and con-elusions of law, the state court’s determination of each of Chandler’s claims largely governs review of those claims. Accordingly, in order to determine the reasonableness of the state court’s determinations, the review of each of Chandler’s grounds will necessarily include a recitation of the state court’s analysis. A petitioner who, through lack of diligence, “failed to develop” the factual basis for a claim while in state court is barred from doing so in federal court (subject to the very narrow exceptions set out in § 2254(e)(2)). Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 433-34, 120 S.Ct. 1479, 146 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000) (hereinafter ‘Williams II”). “[T]he state prisoner must give the state courts an opportunity to act on his claims before he presents those claims to a federal court in a habeas petition.” O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842, 119 S.Ct. 1728, 144 L.Ed.2d 1 (1999). See also Henderson v. Campbell, 353 F.3d at 891; Snoioden v. Singletary, 135 F.3d 732, 735 (11th Cir.1998). “The teeth of the exhaustion requirement comes from its handmaiden, the procedural default doctrine.” Smith v. Jones, 256 F.3d 1135, 1138 (11th Cir.2001). Under the procedural default doctrine, “[i]f the petitioner has failed to exhaust state remedies that are no longer available, that failure is a procedural default which will bar federal habeas relief, unless either the cause and prejudice or the fundamental miscarriage of justice exception is applicable.” Id. at 1138. A procedural default will only be excused in two narrow circumstances. First, a petitioner may obtain federal habeas review of a procedurally defaulted claim if he shows both “cause” for the default and actual “prejudice” resulting from the default. “Cause” ordinarily requires petitioner to demonstrate that some objective factor external to the defense impeded the effort to raise the claim properly in the state court. Henderson v. Campbell, 353 F.3d at 892; Marek v. Singletary, 62 F.3d 1295, 1302 (11th Cir.1995). To show “prejudice,” a petitioner must show “not merely that the errors at his trial created a possibility of prejudice, but that they worked to his factual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions.” Hollis v. Davis, 941 F.2d 1471, 1480 (11th Cir.1991) (quoting United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170, 102 S.Ct. 1584, 71 L.Ed.2d 816 (1982)). A petitioner must show that there is at least a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different. Henderson v. Campbell, 353 F.3d at 892. Second, a petitioner may obtain federal habeas review of a procedurally defaulted claim without a showing of cause or prejudice if such review is necessary to correct a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 451, 120 S.Ct. 1587, 146 L.Ed.2d 518 (2000); Henderson v. Campbell, 353 F.3d at 892. This exception is only available “in an extraordinary case, [sic] where a constitutional violation has resulted in the conviction of someone who is actually innocent.” Id. The fundamental miscarriage of justice exception concerns a petitioner’s “actual” innocence rather than his “legal” innocence. Johnson v. Alabama, 256 F.3d 1156, 1171 (11th Cir.2001) (citing Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 559, 118 S.Ct. 1489, 140 L.Ed.2d 728 (1998) and Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 495-96, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986)). To meet this standard, a petitioner must “show that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him” of the underlying offense. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327, 115 S.Ct. 851, 130 L.Ed.2d 808 (1995). The petitioner must show constitutional error coupled with “new reliable evidence—whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence—that was not presented at trial.” Id. at 324,115 S.Ct. 851. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), the Supreme Court established a two-part test for determining whether a convicted person is entitled to habeas relief on the ground that his or her counsel rendered ineffective assistance: (1) whether counsel’s representation “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness;” and (2) whether there was a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Id. at 687-88, 104 S.Ct. 2052. See also Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 534, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003). A court must “judge the reasonableness of counsel’s conduct on the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel’s conduct.” Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 477, 120 S.Ct. 1029, 145 L.Ed.2d 985 (2000) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S.Ct. 2052). This judicial scrutiny is “highly deferential.” Id. at 477, 120 S.Ct. 1029. A court must adhere to a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689-90, 104 S.Ct. 2052; Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. at 698, 122 S.Ct. 1843. Because the ultimate resolution of ineffective assistance of counsel claims is a mixed question of law and fact, the presumption of correctness contained in § 2254(e)(1) does not apply to this determination. Parker v. Head, 244 F.3d at 835-37. State court findings of historical facts made in the course of evaluating an ineffectiveness claim are, however, subject to § 2254(e)’s presumption of correctness. “[T]he issue is not what is possible or ‘what is prudent or appropriate, but only what is -constitutionally compelled.’ ” Grayson v. Thompson, 257 F.3d 1194, 1216 (11th Cir.2001) (en banc), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 964, 122 S.Ct. 2674, 153 L.Ed.2d 846 (2002) (quoting Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 107 S.Ct. 3114, 97 L.Ed.2d 638 (1987)). The inquiry into whether a lawyer has provided effective assistance is an objective one: a petitioner must establish that no objectively competent lawyer would have taken the action that his lawyer took. See Chandler v. United States, 218 F.3d 1305, 1315 (11th Cir.2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1204, 121 S.Ct. 1217, 149 L.Ed.2d 129 (2001). An ambiguous or silent record is not sufficient to disprove the strong and continuing presumption of effective representation. Where the record is incomplete or unclear about counsel’s actions, it will be presumed that he did what he should have done, and that he exercised reasonable professional judgment. Id. at 1314 n. 15. Evidentiary Hearing The provisions of the AEDPA governing evidentiary hearings in federal habeas corpus cases are found at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2): If the applicant has failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in state court proceedings, the court shall not hold an evidentiary hearing on the claim unless the applicant shows that— A. the claim relies on (i) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable; or (ii) a factual predicate that could not have been previously discovered through the exercise of due diligence; and B. the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense. 28 U.S.C. 2254(e)(2). Consistent with the AJEDPA goal of streamlining the habeas process, this provision “expressly limits the extent to which hearings are permissible, not merely the extent to which they are required.” Kelley v. Sec., Dep’t of Corr., 377 F.3d 1317, 1337 (11th Cir.2004), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 125 S.Ct. 2962, 162 L.Ed.2d 906 (2005). Under the AEDPA, if a petitioner failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in state court, the federal court must deny him an evidentiary hearing unless he meets one of the two narrow exceptions set forth in §§ 2254(e)(2)(A) and (B). See Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 376, 118 S.Ct. 1352, 140 L.Ed.2d 529 (1998). Even if a petitioner convinces the district court that he diligently sought to develop the factual basis of a claim for habeas relief but was denied the opportunity to do so by the state court, the petitioner must still persuade the district court that the facts supporting the claims for which the evi-dentiary hearing is requested “would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found [the petitioner] guilty of the underlying offense.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)(B). Chandler acknowledges that an eviden-tiary hearing was held in state court on three of the four claims presented in the petition, but asserts that his claim that Zinober was ineffective for failing to file a second request for a change of venue cannot be adequately adjudicated without an evidentiary hearing to determine if the Orange County venire pool was partial (Dkt. 16 at 12). In support of his request for an evidentiary hearing, Chandler cites Breedlove v. Moore, 279 F.3d 952 (11th Cir.2002), arguing that he, like Breedlove, was precluded from developing relevant facts in support of this claim and denied the opportunity to present evidence related thereto at each stage of his state court proceedings (Dkt. 16 at 14). First, the state trial court’s failure to hold an evidentiary hearing on a collateral claim does not state a federal constitutional violation and is therefore not a basis for federal habeas corpus relief. See, e.g., Spradley v. Dugger, 825 F.2d 1566, 1568 (11th Cir.1987) (where a claim goes to issues unrelated to the cause of the petitioner’s detention, the claim does not state a basis for habeas relief). Secondly, Chandler’s argument that he was prevented from developing the factual basis for this claim despite diligent efforts to raise the claim at every stage of the state court proceedings is refuted by the record. A review of Chandler’s appellate brief confirms that “[o]n direct appeal, Chandler did not challenge any members of the Orange County jury as being unfair or unable to be impartial.” Chandler II, 848 So.2d at 1035. The state courts determined that to the extent that Chandler argues that the jury was somehow unfair or biased, his claim is proeedurally barred. Id. Under Florida law, issues which either were or could have been litigated at trial and upon direct appeal are not cognizable through collateral attack. See Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.850 (“This rule does not authorize relief based on grounds that could have or should have been raised at trial and, if properly preserved, on direct appeal of the judgment and sentence.”); Harvey v. Dugger, 656 So.2d 1253, 1256 (Fla.1995). It is a state’s prerogative to fix the contours of its procedural rules, and this circuit has long recognized this aspect of Florida law. Sullivan v. Wainwright, 695 F.2d 1306, 1310 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 922, 104 S.Ct. 290, 78 L.Ed.2d 266 (1983) (claims that could have been or should have been reserved at trial and then raised on direct appeal and were not are proeedurally barred). In Breedlove, the Florida Supreme Court reached the merits of Breed-love’s Brady claim even though it was procedurally barred under state law and rejected it. Breedlove v. Moore, 279 F.3d at 959. It is well-settled law that a federal claim is not barred on federal habeas review if the state courts actually address the claim on the merits. Thus, in Breed-love, since the highest state court to review his claim addressed it on the merits, the federal habeas court entertained the claim without regard to whether there was a procedural bar to the claim under state law. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801, 111 S.Ct. 2590, 115 L.Ed.2d 706 (1991) (holding that a state procedural bar will be removed if the last state court to be presented with a particular federal claim reaches the merits of the claim). Other than Breedlove, which is in-apposite, Chandler does not point to any case law to support his assertion that this claim should be heard on the merits despite the procedural bar. When, as in the instant case, a state court has declined to address federal claims because the defendant failed to meet a state procedural requirement, the independent and adequate state grounds doctrine applies to bar federal habeas review. Thus, this Court is precluded from addressing the merits of Chandler’s assertion that the Orange County venire pool was partial unless Chandler can demonstrate “cause and prejudice” for his procedural default or that he is “actually innocent” of the charged offense. See Johnson v. Singletary, 938 F.2d 1166, 1174-75 (11th Cir.1991). See also Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 97 S.Ct. 2497, 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977). In his reply to Respondent’s response, Chandler has advanced no explanation whatever for his failure to raise this claim on direct appeal. Chandler focuses instead on his “diligence” in attempting to raise the issue of presumed prejudice in his Rule 3.850 proceedings. Notably, Chandler has never presented a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal. Chandler has not demonstrated valid cause to excuse his procedural default or alleged facts to support a colorable showing of actual innocence. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 90-91, 97 S.Ct. 2497. The Court will not conduct an evidentiary hearing to consider a claim which is procedurally defaulted. Discussion Each of the four grounds presented in the Petition challenge Zinober’s performance during the guilt phase of Chandler’s trial. According to Chandler, he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel when Zinober: 1. Failed to seek a second change of venue; 2: Conceded that the state could prove Chandler’s guilt for the sexual battery in the Madeira Beach case; 3. Failed to protect Chandler from cross-examination regarding the Madeira Beach case; and 4. Failed to protect Chandler by objecting to improper comments made by the prosecutor during closing argument. Dkt. 1. Each claim was raised and rejected in Chandler’s Rule 3.850 proceedings. A review of the decisions rejecting these' claims confirms that the state courts set forth the correct standard of review for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, as enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052. See Chandler II, 848 So.2d at 1035; Dkt. 19, App. C, Vol. 11 at 2056. Thus, to be entitled to relief under § 2254, Chandler must establish that the state courts’ application of the Strickland standard in reaching the determination that the claims raised in his Rule 3.850 motion lack merit was objectively unreasonable or that the decision “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Ground One In Ground One of the petition, Chandler contends that Zinober rendered ineffective assistance in failing to seek a second change of venue due to extensive pretrial publicity that allegedly tainted the Orange County venire pool. Chandler’s principal argument is that the pretrial publicity in his case was so intense that the trial court would have found, had Zinober brought the publicity to the court’s attention, that he met the presumed prejudice standard, and therefore would have granted a motion for change of venue. Although the claim that the jury was partial is procedurally barred as a substantive claim, see discussion supra, because the ultimate resolution of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is a mixed question of law and fact, see Thompson v. Haley, 255 F.3d 1292, 1292 (11th Cir.2001), the Court finds that a discussion of Chandler’s assertion that the Orange County venire pool was tainted by pretrial publicity is in order. In rejecting this claim, the Florida Supreme Court stated: The indictment in this case alleged that the murders occurred in either Pinellas County or Hillsborough County, Florida. Pursuant to section 910.03(1), Florida Statutes (1993), Chandler initially elected to be tried in Hillsborough County. Subsequently, Chandler’s trial counsel filed a motion for change of venue, alleging that Chandler could not get a fair and impartial trial anywhere in the Tampa Bay area. Prior to hearing the motion, the trial court contacted defense counsel and the State to determine if the parties could reach an agreement to conduct the trial in Pinellas County. Pursuant to a new law, the trial court had the option of picking a jury from another county and bringing the jurors to Pinellas County for the trial. See § 910.03(3), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1994). Before hearing Chandler’s change of venue motion, the trial court informed the parties that if a stipulation could be entered wherein Chandler would elect Pinellas County over Hillsborough County, the court would agree to select the jury in Orange County and return the jurors to Pinellas County, where they would be sequestered during trial. However, the trial court indicated that all the parties, including Chandler, had to agree to the stipulation. A hearing was held on the motion for change of venue, at which the court explained the stipulation to Chandler in great detail. After the hearing, the trial court entered an order explaining the stipulation and stating that the parties and Chandler had agreed to the stipulation.™ The order also indicated that in the event any portion of the stipulation was rescinded, the entire stipulation would be rescinded. ™The order stated, in relevant part, that: (1) Chandler rescinded his election to be tried in Hillsborough County and elected to be tried in Pinellas County; (2) the jury would be sequestered; and (3) the jury would be selected from Orange County because a fair and impartial jury could not be impaneled in Pinellas County. In the order denying Chandler’s current postconviction motion, the trial court stated that a subsequent motion to change venue objecting to the jury being picked in Orange County would have caused her to consider the previous stipulation void. The trial court also stated that if the stipulation had been voided, any change of venue motion that Chandler filed would have been held in abey-anee while the court attempted to pick an impartial jury in Hillsborough County, the county of original venue. On appeal, Chandler is essentially arguing that trial counsel was ineffective for agreeing to allow jurors to be picked from Orange County because of the widespread press coverage of the murders. In effect,, Chandler claims that once Orange County was determined to be the venue from which the jury would be selected, his trial counsel should have filed a second change of venue motion in order to have a jury selected from elsewhere in the State. In denying Chandler relief on this claim, the trial court first determined that the underlying issue was procedurally barred. We agree. On direct appeal, Chandler did not challenge any members of the Orange County jury as being unfair or unable to be impartial. Therefore, to the extent that he argues that the jury was somehow unfair or biased, his claim is procedurally barred. See, e.g., Harvey v. Dugger, 656 So.2d 1253, 1256 (Fla.1995) (holding that claims that could have been brought in direct appeal were procedurally barred from being brought in postconviction proceedings); Swafford v. Dugger, 569 So.2d 1264, 1267 (Fla.1990) (stating that “[pjostcon-viction proceedings cannot be used as a second appeal”). Furthermore, Chandler has not established either element of the test for establishing ineffective assistance of counsel. In order to prove an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a defendant must establish two elements:' First, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Unless a defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction or death sentence resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); see also Wike v. State, 813 So.2d 12, 17 (Fla.2002); Rutherford v. State, 727 So.2d 216, 219-20 (Fla.1998); Rose v. State, 675 So.2d 567, 569 (Fla.1996). To establish prejudice, “[t]he defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674. Ineffective assistance of counsel claims present a mixed question of law and fact subject to plenary review based on the Strickland test. See Stephens v. State, 748 So.2d 1028, 1033 (Fla.1999). This requires an independent review of the trial court’s legal conclusions, while giving deference to the trial court’s factual findings. See id. Generally, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel regarding change of venue are brought where counsel either did not file a change of venue motion, see, e.g., Buford v. State, 492 So.2d 355 (Fla.1986), or where counsel failed to obtain a change of venue, see, e.g., Rolling v. State, 695 So.2d 278 (Fla.1997). Chandler, by way of comparison, was given an initial selection between Pinel-las or Hillsborough counties based on the indictment, and was given the additional option of stipulating to have his jury selected from Orange County. Hence, the question before us is whether Chandler’s trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a second motion for change of venue because of pretrial publicity. With regard to when a change of venue is necessary to protect a defendant’s rights, we have provided the following test: The test for determining a change of venue is whether the general state of mind of the inhabitants of a community is so infected by knowledge of the incident and accompanying prejudice, bias, and pre-conceived opinions that jurors could not possibly put these matters out of their minds and try the case solely on the evidence presented in the courtroom. The trial court in its discretion must determine whether a defendant has raised such a presumption of prejudice under this standard.... In exercising its discretion, a trial court must make a two-pronged analysis, evaluating: (1) the extent and nature of any pretrial publicity; and (2) the difficulty encountered in actually selecting a jury. Rolling, 695 So.2d at 284-285 (citations omitted) (quoting McCaskill v. State, 344 So.2d 1276, 1278 (Fla.1977)). Furthermore, the existence of pretrial publicity in a case does not necessarily lead to an inference of partiality or require a change of venue: [Pjretrial publicity must be examined in the context of numerous circumstances, including; (1) when it occurred in relation to the time of the crime and the trial; (2) whether the publicity was made up of factual or inflammatory stories; (3) whether the publicity favored the prosecution’s side of the story; (4) the size of the community; and (5) whether the defendant exhausted all of his peremptory challenges. Foster v. State, 778 So.2d 906, 913 (Fla.2000); see Rolling, 695 So.2d at 285. In the postconviction context where a defendant is claiming that counsel was ineffective with regard to a venue issue: [T]he defendant must, at a minimum “bring forth evidence demonstrating that there is a reasonable probability that the trial court would have, or at least should have, granted a motion for change of venue if [defense] counsel had presented such a motion to the court.” Meeks v. Moore, 216 F.3d 951, 961 (11th Cir.2000); see also Provenzano v. Dugger, 561 So.2d 541, 545 (Fla.1990) (concluding that counsel was not ineffective for failing to renew the motion for change of venue because it was a tactical decision and because “it is most unlikely that a change of venue would have been granted because there were no undue difficulties in selecting an impartial jury”). Wike, 813 So.2d at 18. Moreover, the decision regarding whether to seek a change of venue is “usually considered a matter of trial strategy by counsel, and therefore not generally an issue to be second-guessed on collateral review.” Rolling v. State, 825 So.2d 293, 298 (Fla.2002). Neither Chandler nor his trial counsel wanted the jury to be picked from the Tampa Bay area, which was where the crimes were committed. The trial judge in her order denying Chandler postcon-viction relief stated that both Chandler and his trial counsel knew that she would try to pick the jury from Hillsbor-ough County before granting a change of venue.FN6 Her revelation that she would have tried to pick a jury before granting the motion was appropriate. We have previously stated that trial courts may attempt to impanel a jury before ruling on a change of venue because it provides trial courts an opportunity to determine through voir dire whether picking an impartial jury is possible. See Foster v. State, 778 So.2d 906, 913 (Fla.2000); Henyard v. State, 689 So.2d 239, 245 (Fla.1996); Davis v. State, 461 So.2d 67, 69 n. 1 (Fla.1984); Manning v. State, 378 So.2d 274, 276 (Fla.1979). Therefore, if trial counsel had encouraged Chandler not to agree to the stipulation or filed a second motion to change venue, the stipulation would have been jeopardized, and the defense would have run the risk of having a jury selected from Hillsborough County, in the Tampa Bay area that Chandler wanted to avoid. Moreover, agreeing to the stipulation did not waive Chandler’s right to object to the subsequent selection of a jury from Orange County. Trial counsel testified at the evidentiary hearing that if he had not been able to select a jury in Orange County, he would have moved for a change of venue at that point.™7 ™6At the evidentiary hearing, trial counsel agreed that the judge was “absolutely correct” after she explained the nature of the stipulation: What I wanted to make sure is clear on this record is [the stipulation] was a package. If Mr. Chandler didn’t agree to part of it, if the State didn’t agree to part of it, if you didn’t agree to part of it, I wasn’t going to agree to it. We were going to go to Hillsborough County where I believed we could pick a jury and get the case done. ™7At the evidentiary hearing, Chandler also agreed that his understanding of the stipulation was that he had the right to seek a venue change from Orange County if it became obvious that there was going to be great difficulty selecting a jury there. Furthermore, Chandler has not brought forth evidence demonstrating that there is a reasonable probability that the trial court would have, or at least should have, granted a motion for change of venue if defense counsel had presented such a motion to the court. See Proven-zano v. Dugger, 561 So.2d 541, 545 (Fla.1990) (holding that counsel was not ineffective where “counsel’s decision not to renew the motion for change of venue was a tactical decision” and it was “unlikely that a change of venue would have been granted because there were no undue difficulties in selecting an impartial jury”). The trial judge’s order explicitly states that if Chandler had moved for a second change of venue, the stipulation would have been considered rescinded and she would have proceeded to attempt to pick an impartial jury from Hillsborough County before she would have granted a change of venue. Even if trial counsel’s actions were somehow deficient, Chandler cannot meet the prejudice prong of Strickland, in part because he cannot show prejudice under the test we enunciated in Rolling, which requires the trial court to consider (1) the extent of the pretrial publicity and (2) the difficulty encountered in seating the jury. See Rolling, 695 So.2d at 285.™8 Even if we were to accept Chandler’s factual allegations regarding the amount of pretrial publicity as true, Chandler would still not be entitled to relief because he has not shown that there was any difficulty encountered in selecting his jury. In denying the claim, the trial court referred to three facts in particular: ™8The trial court only granted an evi-dentiary hearing on this claim “as to defendant’s waiver” and did not allow evidence regarding the amount of pretrial publicity. Because the trial court did not hold an evidentiary hearing on the amount of pretrial publicity, the only information in this record regarding the extent and nature of pretrial publicity comes in the way of the supplemental record, which includes the report prepared by Chandler’s media expert. This Court has summarized the applicable standard when reviewing a summary denial of a postconviction motion: [A] defendant is entitled to an evi-dentiary hearing on a postconviction relief motion unless (1) the motion, files, and records in the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief, or (2) the motion or a particular claim is legally insufficient. The defendant bears the burden of establishing a prima facie case based upon a legally valid claim. Mere conclusory allegations are not sufficient to meet this burden. However, in cases where there has been no evidentiary hearing, we must accept the factual allegations made by the defendant to the extent that they are not refuted by the record. We must examine each claim to determine if it is legally sufficient, and, if so, determine whether or not the claim is refuted by the record. Freeman v. State, 761 So.2d 1055, 1061 (Fla.2000) (citations omitted). Because we find that Chandler’s claim is refuted by the record, we agree that there was no need for an eviden-tiary hearing on the amount of pretrial publicity in the case. 1) Only 4 of the 12 jurors who served knew anything about this case. None of them had formed any opinion about the guilt or innocence of the defendant. 2) In this case that was to last four weeks, with jurors having to come to Pinellas County from Orange County and be sequestered for the entire time, it only took 1 \ days to pick a jury. 3) Neither side exercised all its preemptory [sic] challenges, with Chandler choosing to exercise only A of his 10 challenges. Our examination of the jury selection process in this case supports the trial court’s observation that an impartial jury was seated with relative ease. Most of the prospective jurors who were questioned indicated that they had not heard about the case.PN9 Thus, under these circumstances, we affirm the trial court’s denial of this claim. PN9The trial court noted that it only took a day and a half to pick the jury, which is substantially less time than other high-profile cases that this court has reviewed where media attention to the case was an issue. See, e.g., Rolling, 695 So.2d at 287 (stating that jury selection “spanned a three-week period”). Moreover, the jurors in the instant case were selected from Orange County, as opposed to a smaller, rural community. This Court has stated that in determining the prejudicial impact of intense publicity the size of the community is a factor to be considered. See, e.g., Copeland v. State, 457 So.2d 1012, 1017 (Fla.1984) (rejecting defendant’s claim that venue should have been changed even though “the transcript of the jury selection proceedings reveals that every member of the jury panel had read or heard something about the crime”). Chandler II, 848 So.2d at 1035-38. Chandler contends that the Florida Supreme Court’s determination that he failed to satisfy either prong of the Strickland test is objectively unreasonable when considered in light of clearly established Federal law, citing Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 81 S.Ct. 1639, 6 L.Ed.2d 751 (1961), and Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 86 S.Ct. 1507, 16 L.Ed.2d 600 (1966). The United States Supreme Court has established two standards to guide courts when considering whether pretrial publicity necessitates a change of venue to ensure an-impartial jury—the “actual prejudice” standard and the “presumed prejudice” standard. Chandler does not address any particular seated juror’s voir dire and fails to assert, much less provide, clear and convincing evidence, that the jurors empaneled could not be impartial. He does not attempt to show “actual prejudice,” focusing instead on the “presumed prejudice” standard and pretrial publicity. If successful, Chandler’s argument that prejudicial and inflammatory pretrial publicity saturated Orange County such that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to be tried by “a panel of impartial, ‘indifferent’ jurors,” Coleman v. Kemp, 778 F.2d 1487, 1489 (11th Cir.1985), would afford him the relief he seeks without requiring him to prove that local prejudice actually entered the jury box. See Pamplin v. Mason, 364 F.2d 1, 6-7 (5th Cir.1966). See also Mayola v. Alabama, 623 F.2d 992, 997 (5th Cir.1980) (“[Wjhere a petitioner adduces evidence of inflammatory, prejudicial pretrial publicity that so pervades or saturates the community as to render virtually impossible a fair trial by an impartial jury drawn from that community, ‘(jury) prejudice is presumed and there is no further duty to establish bias’”) (quoting United States v. Capo, 595 F.2d 1086, 1090 (5th Cir.1979)) (additional citations omitted), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 913, 101 S.Ct. 1986, 68 L.Ed.2d 303 (1981). Chandler would thus avoid the procedural default which prevents him from raising a claim of juror partiality. Under the “presumed prejudice” standard, extensive adverse pretrial publicity can create such a presumption of prejudice in a community that jurors’ assurances of their impartiality should not be believed. Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1031, 104 S.Ct. 2885, 81 L.Ed.2d 847 (1984); Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 799, 95 S.Ct. 2031, 44 L.Ed.2d 589 (1975). The cases in which the Supreme Court has presumed prejudice in the face of juror attestation to the contrary demonstrate that this finding is reserved for an “extreme situation.” Meeks v. Moore, 216 F.3d 951, 961 (11th Cir.2000). See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. at 363, 86 S.Ct. 1507; Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 726, 83 S.Ct. 1417, 10 L.Ed.2d 663 (1963); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. at 728, 81 S.Ct. 1639. In those cases where “presumed prejudice” was found, the influence of the news media, either in the community at large or the courtroom itself, “pervade[d] or saturate[d] the community as to render virtually impossible a fair trial by an impartial jury drawn from the community.” Meeks v. Moore, 216 F.3d at 961. “[Extensive knowledge in the community of either the crimes or the putative criminal is not sufficient by itself’ to create such a presumption. Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 303, 97 S.Ct. 2290, 53 L.Ed.2d 344 (1977). Deficient Performance Under Florida law, as enunciated by the Florida Supreme Court in Rolling, in exercising its discretion to grant a change of venue, the trial court must consider: (1) the extent of the pretrial publicity and (2) the difficulty encountered in seating the jury. Rolling v. State, 695 So.2d 278, 285 (Fla.1997). This is consistent with federal law. If the trial court is unable to seat an impartial jury because of prejudicial pretrial publicity or an inflamed community atmosphere, due process requires that the trial court grant a defendant’s motion for a change of venue, see Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. at 726, 83 S.Ct. 1417, or consider granting a motion for continuance, see Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. at 362-63, 86 S.Ct. 1507. Chandler wanted to avoid a continuance (Dkt. 19, App. C, Vol. 10 at 1862-63). A. Pretrial Publicity The Rogers murders occurred on Florida’s west coast in the Tampa Bay area. Orange County, Florida, is located in central Florida, approximately 90 miles northeast of the Tampa Bay area. According to estimates by the Census Bureau, when the Rogers murders occurred in 1989, Orange County had a population of 677,491. When Chandler was indicted in 1992, Orange County’s population had risen to 725, 347. Its population had grown to 764,593 by 1994 when Chandler went to trial. See Fla. Intercensal Population Estimates by County, Census Bureau, U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, available at http:/www.census. gov/popest/archives/1990s/co-99-ll/crhfl 94.txt, viewed on June 15, 2005. In support of Chandler’s claim that Zi-nober was ineffective for failing to move for a change of venue from Orange County, post-conviction counsel proffered two reports prepared by media consultant Paul Wilson (Dkt.19, App. C, Vol.13). The May 23, 2000 Media Analysis (“Wilson I”) deals primarily with the sources of media coverage in the Tampa Bay area and Orange County in general terms, whereas the December 7, 2000 Media Research and Analysis (“Wilson II”) presents estimates of the nature and extent of pretrial publicity in Orange County related to the Rogers murders and Chandler’s arrest and trial (Dkt. 19, App. C., Vols. 13 and 14). 1. Newspapers There were four “major” newspapers printed and circulated daily in the Orlando area when Wilson prepared his reports: the Orlando Sentinel, the Daytona Beach News Journal, the Lakeland Ledger, and the Winterhaven News Chief. According to Wilson, 117,000 copies of the Orlando Sentinel’s daily edition were placed in circulation in Orange County “every weekday, as audited by Scarborough in 1999” (Dkt. 19, App. C, Vol. 13 at 133). Although Wilson asserts that the coverage of the Rogers murders “in the Orlando Sentinel was substantial,” he does not provide any information regarding the circulation of the newspaper during the period 1989-1994, stating instead that “covera