Full opinion text
AMENDED OPINION AND ORDER ON CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT LAPORTE, United States Magistrate Judge. TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION........................................................879 II. THE PARTIES..........................................................879 III. BACKGROUND..........................................................879 IV. STANDING .............................................................883 A. Standing Based on Procedural Injury ....................................883 1. Procedural injury...................................................884 2. Concrete interests...................................................884 3. Reasonable probability...............................................885 4. Causation and Redressability.........................................887 B. State Plaintiffs’ Standing Based on Substantive Injury......................888 1. Injury in fact.......................................................889 2. Causation and redressability..........................................889 C. Prudential Standing Requirements.......................................889 V. RIPENESS..............................................................890 VI. STANDARD OF REVIEW................................................892 VII. DISCUSSION............................................................893 A. National Environmental Policy Act.......................................893 1. The State Petitions Rule did not fit within the categorical exclusion invoked by the Forest Service ......................................894 2. The FEIS for the Roadless Rule did not satisfy the need for environmental analysis of the State Petitions Rule ...........................905 3. The prospect of future environmental analysis did not obviate the need to comply with NEPA at the time the State Petitions Rule was adopted..........................................................907 4. Conclusion.........................................................909 B. Endangered Species Act................................................909 C. Administrative Procedures Act..........................................912 VIII. REMEDY...............................................................913 IX. CONCLUSION ..........................................................919 In this environmental litigation, the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment are currently before the Court. For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiffs’ motions for summary judgment are granted and Defendants’ cross-motion is denied. The only revision contained in this amended opinion and order is the deletion of footnote nine. I. INTRODUCTION In these consolidated cases, Plaintiffs, four states and numerous environmental organizations, contend that Defendants violated the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370d, the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”), 16 U.S.C. § 1531-1544 and the Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706, by issuing the State Petitions for Inventoried Roadless Area Management Rule (“State Petitions Rule”) (70 Fed.Reg. 25,654 (May 13, 2005) (to be codified at 36 C.F.R. pt. 294)) without complying with the procedures required by those Acts. The State Petitions Rule replaced the Roadless Area Conservation Rule (“Roadless Rule”) (66 Fed.Reg. 3,244 (Jan. 12, 2001) (to be codified at 36 C.F.R. pt. 294)). Plaintiffs seek an Order vacating and setting aside the State Petitions Rule, reinstating the Roadless Rule and enjoining Defendants from taking any action in violation of the Roadless Rule until they undertake appropriate environmental analysis. II. THE PARTIES In California, et al. v. United States Dep’t of Agriculture, et al., C-05-3508 EDL, Plaintiffs are the States of California, Oregon, New Mexico and Washington. The State of Montana is amicus curiae in support of Plaintiffs. Defendants are the United States Department of Agriculture, Mike Johanns as Secretary of the United States Department of Agriculture, United States Forest Service, Dale Bosworth as Chief of the United States Forest Service, and Mark Rey as Undersecretary for Natural Resources and Environment of the United States Department of Agriculture (collectively, “Defendants” or “Forest Service”). The States of Alaska and Idaho are amici curiae in support of Defendants. The State of Wyoming filed a brief in opposition to the remedy sought by Plaintiffs in both cases. American Council of Snowmobile Associations, Blue Ribbon Coalition, California Association of 4 Wheel Drive Clubs, Silver Creek Timber Company and United Four Wheel Drive Associations are amici curiae with respect to the issues going to the merits and intervenors with respect to the issue of remedy in support of Defendants in both cases. The American Forest Resource Council is ami-cus curiae in support of Defendants in both cases. In Wilderness Society, et al. v. United States Forest Service, et al., C-05-4038 EDL, a number of private environmental groups sue the same Defendants. Specifically, Plaintiffs are The Wilderness Society, California Wilderness Coalition, Forests Forever Foundation, Northcoast Environmental Center, Oregon Natural Resources Council Fund, Sitka Conservation Society, Siskiyou Regional Education Project, Biodiversity Conservation Alliance, Sierra Club, National Audubon Society, Greater Yellowstone Coalition, Center for Biological Diversity, Environmental Protection Information Center, Klamath-Siskiyou Wildlands Center, Defenders of Wildlife, Pacific Rivers Council, Idaho Conservation League, Humane Society of the United States, Conservation NW and Greenpeace. III.BACKGROUND In 2001, the Forest Service enacted the Roadless Rule, which essentially prohibited road construction and reconstruction and timber harvesting, subject to certain limited exceptions, in inventoried roadless areas (“IRAs”) on a uniform nationwide basis. The Roadless Rule was the culmination of a lengthy process regarding the impact of road construction and reconstruction in roadless areas starting in early 1999 with the Interim Roads Rule (64 Fed. Reg. 7,290 (Feb. 12,1999) (to be codified at 36 C.F.R. pt. 212)), and followed by over one year of rulemaking in response to President Clinton’s order to the Forest Service “to initiate a nationwide plan to protect inventoried and uninventoried roadless areas within our treasured national forests.” Kootenai Tribe v. Veneman, 313 F.3d 1094, 1105 (9th Cir.2002). In adopting the Roadless Rule, the Forest Service conducted an environmental analysis under NEPA and prepared a biological evaluation under ESA, resulting in a Final Environmental Impact Statement (“FEIS”) that included letters of concurrence from the Fish & Wildlife Service and the National Marine Fisheries Service that the rule would not likely adversely affect threatened or endangered species. Prior to the Roadless Rule, individual forest plans governed the use of roadless areas and permitted road construction in 34.3 million acres of the nation’s 58.5 million acres of roadless areas. See Roadless Rule, 66 Fed.Reg. at 3,246. The Roadless Rule and the interim protections leading up to it replaced forest-by-forest decision-making with uniform national protections that the agency determined were necessary to protect the diminishing areas of relatively unspoiled national forest from further fragmentation by the steady accretion of local decisions allowing encroachment. Forest Service Roadless Area Conservation Final Environmental Impact Statement (“FEIS”), vol. 1 at 1-15 (Nov. 2000); see also Kootenai Tribe, 313 F.3d at 1117 n. 20. The Roadless Rule was scheduled to take effect on March 13, 2001. The incoming President issued a moratorium on all regulations from the prior administration that had not yet been implemented. Just as the moratorium was to expire, the Idaho district court preliminarily enjoined implementation of the Roadless Rule in May 2001. Kootenai Tribe v. Veneman, 142 F.Supp.2d 1231 (D.Idaho 2001). The Forest Service exercised its discretion not to appeal the injunction (28 C.F.R. § 0.20(b) (discretion to appeal adverse rulings); United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 161, 104 S.Ct. 568, 78 L.Ed.2d 379 (1984)), informing the district court that it planned to “ ‘initiate an additional public process that [would] ... examine possible modifications to the Rule.’ ” Kootenai Tribe, 313 F.3d at 1106 (“Although the Forest Service would let the Roadless Rule go into effect, the Forest Service told the district court that it would also ‘develop[] proposed amendments to the Rule that will seek to maintain the protections embodied in the current rule.’ In particular, the Forest Service planned to amend the Rule to allow ‘limited activities to prevent the negative effects of unnaturally severe wildfires, insect infestation and disease.’ ”). Environmental groups who had intervened at the district court appealed the Idaho injunction. In December 2002, the Ninth Circuit reversed the injunction. Kootenai Tribe, 313 F.3d at 1126. While the Court of Appeal reviewed the validity of the Roadless Rule in the context of a preliminary injunction, it explained in eon-siderable detail its conclusion on that record that the Forest Service had provided adequate notice and opportunity to comment and properly considered a reasonable range of alternatives under NEPA. When the court’s mandate issued in April 2003, the Roadless Rule went into effect. In July 2003, the Wyoming district court issued a nationwide permanent injunction against the Roadless Rule. Wyoming v. United States Department of Agriculture, 277 F.Supp.2d 1197 (D.Wyo.2003). The Wyoming court acknowledged the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Kootenai Tribe, but declined to follow that precedent. Wyoming, 277 F.Supp.2d at 1202 n. 1 (“... this Court finds the Kootenai Tribe opinion to be of limited persuasive value. Moreover, because this Court is unable to discern what NEPA opinions Kootenai Tribe overruled, this Court will refrain from relying on any Ninth Circuit NEPA opinions as persuasive authority.”). Again, the Forest Service declined to appeal the ruling. Wyoming v. United States Department of Agriculture, 414 F.3d 1207, 1211 (10th Cir.2005). Again, environmental groups appealed. Id. On May 5, 2005, one day after the Tenth Circuit heard oral argument on the appeal, the Forest Service adopted the State Petitions Rule. The State Petitions Rule was adopted without environmental analysis under NEPA or consultation under ESA about potentially affected endangered or threatened species. The State Petitions Rule eliminated the uniform national protections of roadless areas from road construction and reconstruction and timber harvesting, reverting to the prior regime of forest-by-forest plans, but adding an optional state-by-state petitioning process to alter the level of protection of roadless areas within individual state borders from that afforded by the forest plans. If a state’s petition were accepted, rulemaking on management of roadless areas within that state would begin, although individual forest plans would guide forest management starting immediately upon the rule’s promulgation until changed in a state by rule-making. For those states which did not petition, forest plans would continue to govern roadless areas. For states that did choose to petition, petitions were not due until November 2006, with no process to expedite consideration of petitions seeking restoration of the Roadless Rule’s protections. Based on the State Petitions Rule, the Forest Service asked the Tenth Circuit to dismiss the appeal in Wyoming as moot because ... the 2001 Rule at issue in this case has now been wholly superceded by the United States Department of Agriculture .... While the Intervenor-Appel-lants seek to have the district court’s decision invalidating the 2001 Rule overturned any such decision is without legal consequence as the 2001 Rule has been replaced by the Forest Service. Thus, even apart from the district court’s ruling, the 2001 Rule can no longer govern management of roadless areas. Defs.’ Reply in Support of Defs.’ Cross-Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. 2 at 2-4. In July 2005, the Tenth Circuit agreed that adoption of the State Petitions Rule had mooted the appeal because “[t]he portions of the Roadless Rule that were substantively challenged by Wyoming no longer exist.” Wyoming, 414 F.3d at 1212. The court observed that “it appears that the replacement of the Roadless Rule was not triggered by the district court’s judgment, but merely reflects the government’s discontent with the rule itself.” Id. The court then granted the request by the appellant environmental groups to vacate the district court decision, finding no reason to depart from the general practice of vacatur of the judgment below when a case becomes moot pending appeal through circumstances beyond the control of the party seeking vacatur. Wyoming, 414 F.3d at 1213 (“ ‘[a] party who seeks review of the merits of an adverse ruling, but is frustrated by the vagaries of circumstance, ought not in fairness be forced to acquiesce in the judgment.’ ”) (citing U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership, 513 U.S. 18, 25, 115 S.Ct. 386, 130 L.Ed.2d 233 (1994)). These consolidated cases followed. Plaintiffs’ primary arguments are that the State Petitions Rule effected a substantive repeal of the nationwide protections of the Roadless Rule, replacing the Roadless Rule with a less environmentally protective, more localized approach, thereby triggering the requirement for environmental analysis under NEPA and consultation under the ESA. Plaintiffs argue that the Forest Service was required to engage in a programmatic NEPA analysis and ESA consultation to validly promulgate the State Petitions Rule, and cannot postpone that analysis for the two to three years or more that it has and will take for some states to petition and, if their petitions are accepted, go through the process of rule-making. Further, Plaintiffs point out that the forest plans will continue to govern in lieu of the Roadless Rule’s protections for those states which choose not to petition, so there will never be any programmatic analysis under NEPA or ESA of the impact in some states of the shift from the protections of the Roadless Rule and the moratorium on road construction and timber harvesting which preceded it, to individual forest plans. Plaintiffs contend that because some states seek to restore those protections while others do not, as shown by the opposing positions of states involved in this litigation, the outcome of the lengthy petitioning process will be a more fragmented, less protective regime for roadless areas than the nationwide approach in the Roadless Rule. Plaintiffs also argue that the Forest Service failed to provide a reasoned explanation for revoking the old rule in favor of the new one as required under the APA. Defendants counter that Plaintiffs lack standing and that the issues are not ripe for decision. On the merits, Defendants argue that the State Petitions Rule did not repeal the Roadless Rule but only replaced it “on paper,” because at the time the State Petitions Rule issued, the former rule was enjoined by the Wyoming court, while the new rule by itself is strictly procedural in nature. Defs.’ Cross-Mot. for Summ. J. at 39:22-24 (“The Forest Service correctly concluded that the State Petitions Rule ‘would replace the 2001 Roadless Rule [only] on paper’ because the Roadless Rule was ‘permanently enjoined by a federal district court order in July 2003.’ ”) (quoting Determination for Threatened, Endangered and Proposed Species, and Designated and Proposed Critical Habitat for the Final State Petitions for Inventoried Roadless Area Management Rule (April 18, 2005) at Administrative Record (“AR”) SPR084). Thus, according to Defendants, the new rule has no “on the ground” effect on the environment or species, and was properly categorically excluded from the need to do an environmental analysis and did not require consultation. Defendants argue alternatively that the “no action alternative” considered and rejected in the FEIS for the Roadless Rule suffices for programmatic analysis of the State Petitions Rule, and future environmental analysis and endangered species consultations will occur on state petitions which result in rules as well as specific projects in roadless areas. On February 24, 2006, Plaintiffs filed their motions for summary judgment. Defendants filed an opposition and cross-motion on April 7, 2006. Plaintiffs filed reply-briefs on May 5, 2006 and Defendants filed a reply brief on June 2, 2006. The Court heard extensive oral argument on August 1, 2006. At the Court’s request, the parties filed supplemental briefs on September 1, 2006. The Court has carefully considered the arguments on both sides in the context of the lengthy regulatory and litigation history of the Roadless Rule and the State Petitions Rule that replaced it. The question for the Court is not, of course, which rule is preferable; that is for the Executive Branch. Nor is there any doubt that the Forest Service has the authority to change policies from a uniform national approach strongly protecting roadless areas from human encroachment to a more localized approach permitting more roads and logging, provided that it follows the proper procedures. Rather, the question is whether the Forest Service complied with the procedures mandated by Congress for consideration of potential environmental impacts prior to changing course, or was exempt from doing so. The resolution of this question turns on whether the State Petitions Rule is merely procedural, or instead constitutes a substantive repeal of the Roadless Rule in favor of a different scheme for managing roadless areas that raises substantial questions whether the change will significantly impact the environment or may affect endangez*ed or threatened species. For the reasons set forth below, including the significant guidance that the court of appeals provided in Kootenai Tribe, this Court concludes that the Forest Service failed adequately to consider the environmental and species impacts when it issued the State Petitions Rule, in violation of NEPA and ESA. IV. STANDING Under Article III, constitutional standing requires: (1) an injuz-y in fact, which is both concrete and particularized, and actual or imminent, not merely conjectural or hypothetical; (2) a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of; and (3) a likelihood that the injury can be redressed by a favorable decision. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). In opposition to a summary judgment motion based on standing, a plaintiff must “ ‘set forth’ by affidavit or other evidence ‘specific facts’ ” showing constitutional standing. Id. at 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130; Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 56(e). A. Standing Based on Procedural Injury Both Environmental Plaintiffs and State Plaintiffs allege that they have sustained a procedural injury that satisfies the injury in fact prong of the standing analysis. “ ‘[A] plaintiff asserting a procedural injury must show that the procedures in question are designed to protect some threatened concrete interest of his that is the ultimate basis of his standing.’ ” Public Citizen v. Dep’t of Transp., 316 F.3d 1002, 1015 (9th Cir.2003) (quoting Cantrell v. City of Long Beach, 241 F.3d 674, 679 (9th Cir.2001)). A plaintiff alleging a procedural injury must also establish “ ‘the “reasonable probability” of the challenged action’s threat to [his or her] concrete interest.’ ” Hall v. Norton, 266 F.3d 969, 977 (9th Cir.2001) (quoting Churchill County v. Babbitt, 150 F.3d 1072, 1078 (9th Cir.1998)). Specifically, a plaintiff asserting a proeeduz*al injury must adduce sufficient facts to show that: (1) that the defendant violated certain procedural rules; (2) that the rules protect the plaintiffs concrete interests; and (3) it is reasonably probable that the challenged action will threaten the plaintiffs concrete intez-ests. Citizens for Better Forestry v. U.S. Dep’t of Agriculture, 341 F.3d 961, 969-70 (9th Cir.2003). 1. Procedural injury Plaintiffs allege that Defendants violated procedural rules requiring environmental analysis under NEPA and consultation with federal wildlife experts under ESA before implementing the State Petitions Rule. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (requiring a detailed Environmental Impact Statement under NEPA for “major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment....”); 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (requiring consultation under ESA under certain circumstances). These claims involve the same type of procedural injury held to be sufficient for standing in Citizens for Better Forestry. There, the plaintiffs alleged that, contrary to NEPA implementing regulations, they were denied the opportunity to comment on the Environmental Analysis and Finding of No Significant Impact made pursuant to NEPA for a new programmatic national forest management plan called the 2000 Plan Development Rule, which replaced the 1982 Plan Development Rule. The court stated that plan development rules constitute the “highest tier of regulatory oversight of the forest management system and govern the development and revision of the regional and local plans.” Citizens for Better Forestry, 341 F.3d at 965. The plaintiffs also alleged that the defendants in that case failed to comply with the biological assessment requirements of ESA during the rulemaking process. Id. at 971. The court concluded that the “wholesale neglect of the regulations’ mandatory inclusion of the public in the process results in a procedural injury” which supported standing, and stated that this type of procedural injury was tied to a substantive harm to the environment, that is, the “ ‘added risk to the environment that takes place when governmental deci-sionmakers make up their minds without having before them an analysis (with public comment) of the likely effects of their decision on the environment.’ ” Id. at 970-71 (quoting Sierra Club v. Marsh, 872 F.2d 497, 500 (1st Cir.1989)). Citizens for Better Forestry is closely analogous to, if not controlling of, this case, which raises at least as strong a claim of a procedural violation. Here, Plaintiffs allege that the Forest Service erred in failing to conduct any environmental analysis under NEPA or consultation under the ESA, much less provide an opportunity for public comment on the results of that environmental review. If Plaintiffs were deprived of the opportunity to participate in a mandated NEPA or ESA process for the State Petitions Rule, they sustained a procedural injury. As Citizens for Better Forestry recognized, the failure to include the public in rule-making procedures “... undermines the very purpose of NEPA, which is to ‘ensure! ] that federal agencies are informed of environmental consequences before making decisions and that the information is available to the public.’ ” Citizens for Better Forestry, 341 F.3d at 970-71 (quoting Okanogan Highlands Alliance v. Williams, 236 F.3d 468, 473 (9th Cir.2000)); see also West v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Transp., 206 F.3d 920, 930 n. 14 (9th Cir.2000) (an environmental plaintiff was “surely ... harmed [when agency action] precluded the kind of public comment and participation NEPA requires in the EIS process.”). Similar reasoning applies to suits to compel compliance with ESA requirements. See Environmental Prot. Info. Ctr. v. Simpson Timber Co., 255 F.3d 1073, 1079 (9th Cir.2001). 2. Concrete interests The concrete interest test requires “ ‘a geographic nexus between the individual asserting the claim and the location suffering an environmental impact.’ ” Citizens for Better Forestry, 341 F.3d at 971 (quoting Public Citizen, 316 F.3d at 1015 (quoting Cantrell, 241 F.3d at 679)). “That is, environmental plaintiffs must allege that they will suffer harm by virtue of their geographic proximity to and use of areas that will be affected by the [agency’s] policy.” Citizens for Better Forestry, 341 F.3d at 971. An environmental plaintiff need not assert that any specific injury will occur in any specific national forest; rather, “ ‘the “asserted injury is that environmental consequences might be overlooked” as a result of deficiencies in the government’s analysis under environmental statutes.’ ” Citizens for Better Forestry, 341 F.3d at 971-72 (quoting Salmon River Concerned Citizens v. Robertson, 32 F.3d 1346, 1355 (9th Cir.1994)). “ ‘Were we to agree with the district court that a NEPA plaintiffs standing depends on “proof’ that the challenged federal project will have particular environmental effects, we would in essence be requiring that the plaintiff conduct the same environmental investigation that he seeks in his suit to compel the agency to undertake.’ ” Citizens for Better Forestry, 341 F.3d at 972 (quoting City of Davis v. Coleman, 521 F.2d 661, 670-71 (9th Cir.1975)); see also Kootenai Tribe, 313 F.3d at 1109 (intervenor conservation groups established injury in fact for purposes of standing where they “hunt, hike, fish and camp in roadless areas.”). Plaintiffs have satisfied this standard here. Both the Environmental Plaintiffs and the State Plaintiffs have shown their concrete interest by submitting numerous declarations from organizational members and State officials regarding their geographic proximity to areas that will be affected by changed roadless area policies. See, e.g., Declaration of Jonathan Oppenheimer ¶ 19 (“Specifically, during the summer of 2006, I intend to visit the Mallard-Larkins Roadless Area....”); Declaration of Erik Molvar ¶ 11 (“This coming summer I and my children plan to visit the Snowy Ridge and Libby Flats Roadless Areas as well as Roadless Areas in Colorado and Washington.”); Declaration of Marv Hoyt in Supp. of State Pis.’ Mot. for Summ. J. ¶ 9 (“I intend to hunt elk (if I draw the required permit) in the fall of 2006 in the Gannet Spring Creek roadless areas, to celebrate the 4th of July by hiking and climbing with friends to the top of Meade Park in the Meade Park roadless area, to fish for Bonneville cutthroat trout in the Mt. Naomi and Station Creek roadless areas, and to hunt forest grouse in the fall of 2006 in the Bear Creek, Pole Creek, and Poker Peak roadless areas.”); Declaration of David Simon in Supp. of State Pis.’ Mot. for Summ. J. ¶ 2 (New Mexico owns Oliver Lee Memorial State Park, which is adjacent to an IRA in Lincoln National Forest, which is not protected under the current forest management plan from road construction, but would have been protected under the Roadless Rule); Declaration of Tod Stevenson in Supp. of State Pis.’ Mot. for Summ. J. ¶ 7 (New Mexico owns properties in proximity to IRAs in which the state has proprietary interest in protecting wildlife). S. Reasonable probability Plaintiffs need not demonstrate that their interests will be immediately harmed, but “• ‘need only establish “the reasonable probability of the challenged action’s threat to [their] concrete interest.” ’ ” Citizens for Better Forestry, 341 F.3d at 972 (quoting Hall, 266 F.3d at 975 (quoting Churchill County, 150 F.3d at 1078)). Defendants argue that the effects of the State Petitions Rule are indirect only and therefore, not sufficient to establish the reasonable probability prong of the standing analysis. The Ninth Circuit has squarely rejected this distinction between direct and indirect effects because “... such line drawing seems inherently arbitrary.” Citizens for Better Forestry, 341 F.3d at 975. In Citizens for Better Forestry, the court determined that the plaintiffs satisfied the reasonable probability test because the 2000 Plan Development Rule in that case “decreases substantive environmental requirements (thus injuring [plaintiffs’] concrete interest in enjoying the national forests) as compared to the 1982 Plan Development Rule.” Id. at 972. For example, the 2000 Rule in Citizens for Better Forestry decreased the species viability requirement “from one in which the USDA must ‘insure’ that forest conditions support the viability of existing species, to one in which the USDA must only guarantee a ‘high likelihood’ of supporting then* viability.” Id. Further, the 2000 Rule eliminated many of the “minimum specific management requirements,” such as specific limits on clear cutting of trees, that were included in the 1982 Rule, and eliminated the post-decision appeal process and replaced it with a pre-decision objection process. Id. The environmental impact of the 2000 Plan Development Rule was arguably indirect and lay in the future, but was nonetheless sufficient for standing: “because the Rule controls the development of LRMPs [Land Resource Management Plans or forest plans] and site-specific plans, it is through these that it poses an actual, physical effect on the environment in national forests and grasslands.” Id. at 973. The court concluded: “[W]e reaffirm, as we have repeatedly done in the face of USDA arguments to the contrary, that environmental plaintiffs have standing to challenge not only site-specific plans, but also higher-level, programmatic rules that impose or remove requirements on site-specific plans. ” Id. at 975 (emphasis added); see also Idaho Conservation League v. Mumma, 956 F.2d 1508, 1516 (9th Cir.1992) (“More importantly perhaps, if the agency action only could be challenged at the site-specific development stage, the underlying programmatic authorization would forever escape review. To the extent that the plan pre-determines the future, it represents a concrete injury that plaintiffs must, at some point, have standing to challenge.”). Finally, the Citizens for Better Forestry court refused to apply a heightened standing scrutiny to challenges of broad rulemaking as opposed to site-specific governmental action. Citizens for Better Forestry, 341 F.3d at 974 (rejecting Florida Audubon Society v. Bentsen, 94 F.3d 658, 667 (D.C.Cir.1996)). Like the Plan Development Rule in Citizens for Better Forestry, the State Petitions Rule is a programmatic rule that replaced substantive nationwide protections for the IRAs that had been in place under the Roadless Rule, and which the Forest Service had previously determined were necessary. See Roadless Rule, 66 Fed.Reg. at 3,246 (“Local land management planning efforts may not always recognize the national significance of inventoried roadless areas and the values they represent in an increasingly developed landscape. If management decisions for these areas were made on a case-by-case basis at a forest or regional level, inventoried roadless areas and their ecological characteristics and social values could be incrementally reduced through road construction and certain forms of timber harvest. Added together, the nation-wide results of these reductions could be a substantial loss of quality and quantity of roadless area values and characteristics over time.”). The State Petitions Rule constitutes a “higher-level, programmatic rule[ ] that ... remove[s] requirements” that governed site-specific plans in national forests. Citizens for Better Forestry, 341 F.3d at 975. Moreover, as a practical matter, the new rule removed substantive protections of roadless areas in all states for at least two years if not longer, from the pre-petition and petition stage through any subsequent rulemaking, and substituted the less protective local forest plans for this period. These effects are at least as direct as those in Citizens for Better Forest'ry. Therefore, Plaintiffs have shown that there is a reasonable probability of harm to their environmental interests from the State Petitions Rule. See Kootenai Tribe, 313 F.3d at 1110 (“Whatever protections of the involved environmental interests remain in the absence of the Roadless Rule, there can be no doubt that the 58.5 million acres subject to the Roadless Rule, if implemented, would have greater protection if the Roadless Rule stands.”). Moreover, the State Plaintiffs have made an additional showing of reasonable probability. A state’s proprietary interest in its natural resources may be affected by actions on adjacent land. See Douglas County v. Babbitt, 48 F.3d 1495, 1501 (9th Cir.1995); see also Kootenai Tribe, 313 F.3d at 1112 (“As adjacent landowners, the Idaho plaintiffs have a ‘sufficient geographic nexus to the site of the challenged project that [they] may be expected to suffer whatever environmental consequences’ may result from implementation of the Roadless Rule.”); California v. Block, 690 F.2d 753, 776 (9th Cir.1982) (a governmental entity challenging an EIS satisfies the injury standing requirement if it is in geographical proximity to the proposed action’s site). In Oregon, for example, the Mike’s Gulch salvage logging project, which was auctioned in June 2006 and is currently underway, represents a reasonable probability of harm (if not actual harm) to that State’s proprietary interests that would not have occurred under the Roadless Rule. And in New Mexico, the Oliver Lee Memorial State Park is adjacent to an IRA in Lincoln National Forest, which is not protected from road construction under the current forest management plan put in place by the State Petitions Rule, but was protected under the Road-less Rule. Simon Decl. in Supp. of State Pis.’ Mot. for Summ. J. ¶2. Further, the new regime is burdensome on Plaintiff States that wish to regain the protection of the roadless areas within their borders that was afforded by the Roadless Rule. Plaintiff States must petition the Forest Service individually for these protection and, if their petitions are accepted, go through a rulemaking process. Even if Plaintiff States are ultimately successful, there is a likelihood of harm to their interests as forest plans allow road construction and timber harvesting in roadless areas during the pre-petition, petition and rule-making process. Indeed, Oregon and Washington have shown that the Forest Service dfenied their requests to expedite the petitioning process as a means to alleviate the threatened harm to their concrete interests in state land posed by the State Petitions Rule’s repeal of roadless protections. Declaration of Michael Carrier in Supp. of State Pis.’ Mot. for Summ. J. ¶¶ 7-8; Ex. A, B; Declaration of Christine Gregoire in Support of Washington State’s Mot. to Intervene ¶¶ 10-11; Ex. A, B. A Causation and redressability Because Plaintiffs have stated a procedural injury, their burden of showing causation and redressability is lessened. Defenders of Wildlife v. EPA, 420 F.3d 946, 957 (9th Cir.2005) (“Reliance on procedural harms alters a plaintiffs burden on the last two prongs of the Article III standing test. To establish standing by alleging procedural harm, the members must show only that they have a procedural right that, if exercised, could protect their con Crete interests and that those interests fall within the zone of interests protected by the statute at issue.”) (emphasis in original). In Citizens for Better Forestry, the court stated that “ ‘the causation question concerns only whether plaintiffs’ injury is dependent upon the agency’s policy, or is instead the result of independent incentives governing the third parties’ de-cisionmaking process.’ ” Citizens for Better Forestry, 341 F.3d at 973 n. 8 (quoting Wilderness Society v. Griles, 824 F.2d 4, 18 (D.C.Cir.1987)). Plaintiffs satisfy this requirement. Plaintiffs have shown that this injury is due to the agency’s change in policy and that if Defendants had undertaken environmental analysis under NEPA or ESA, their concrete interests could have been protected by at least permitting Plaintiffs to participate in and potentially influence the rulemaking process. Plaintiffs seek an order requiring compliance with NEPA and ESA, which would redress Plaintiffs’ procedural injury. Plaintiffs also seek reinstatement of the Roadless Rule in this case. Defendants’ argument that Plaintiffs have failed to show redressability because the Roadless Rule should not be reinstated is not persuasive. When deciding whether a plaintiff has standing, the court ordinarily will assume that it has the ability to grant the relief sought. See National Wildlife Fed’n v. FEMA 345 F.Supp.2d 1151, 1165-66 (W.D.Wash.2004) (rejecting intervenors’ argument that the plaintiffs could not establish redressability on the grounds that the agency’s actions were not discretionary actions requiring consultation under ESA because the discretion issue was more appropriately addressed in evaluating the merits of plaintiffs claims); Bonnichsen v. United States, 969 F.Supp. 628, 633 (D.Or. 1997) (“As a practical matter, however, if — in order to have standing — the plaintiff must prove that he has in fact been injured by this defendant, and that he is entitled to the relief sought then the court would be obliged to try the entire case just to resolve the threshold question of whether the plaintiff even has standing to maintain the action;” holding that when deciding whether a plaintiff has standing, the court will “assume that it has the ability to grant the relief that the plaintiff seeks.”); see also Bonnichsen v. United States, 367 F.3d 864, 873 (9th Cir.2004) (“The question in deciding whether a plaintiffs injury is re-dr essable is not whether a favorable decision is likely but whether a favorable decision likely will redress a plaintiffs injury, [citation omitted]. In deciding whether a plaintiffs injury is redressable, courts assume that plaintiffs claim has legal merit, [citation omitted]. Were the rule otherwise, courts would never have jurisdiction to entertain a lawsuit that appeared, at the pleading stage, and before evidence was considered, likely to fail on the merits. Such a rule would be illogical.”) (emphasis in original). Indeed, Defendants do not argue that the Court could not reinstate the Roadless Rule as a remedy if it found a violation, but rather that the Court should exercise its equitable discretion not to do so. Therefore, the Environmental Plaintiffs and the State Plaintiffs have standing for their procedural injury. B. State Plaintiffs’ Standing Based on Substantive Injury State Plaintiffs also assert standing based on a substantive injury. The State Plaintiffs do not assert parens patriae standing to sue on behalf of them citizens, but sue to vindicate them own proprietary interests. See City of Sausalito v. O’Neill, 386 F.3d 1186, 1197 (9th Cir.2004); Colorado River Indian Tribes v. Town of Parker, 776 F.2d 846, 848 (9th Cir.1985) (holding that municipalities do not have parens pat-riae standing because their power is derivative and not sovereign, but that municipalities may “sue to vindicate such of their own proprietary interests as might be congruent with the interests of their inhabitants”). 1. Injury in fact State Plaintiffs have stated concrete proprietary interests in protecting natural resources and in specific lands whose resources would be affected by roadless policies, including lands adjacent to National Forest lands with IRAs. See Simon Decl. in Supp. of State Pis.’ Mot. for Summ. J. ¶ 2 (New Mexico owns Oliver Lee Memorial State Park, which is adjacent to an IRA); Stevenson Decl. in Supp. of State Pis.’ Mot. for Summ. J. ¶ 7 (New Mexico owns properties in proximity to IRAs in which the state has proprietary interest in protecting wildlife); Declaration of Stephen Farris in Supp. of State Pis.’ Mot. for Summ. J. ¶¶ 3-4 (New Mexico has trust responsibilities to protect and conserve wildlife found in IRAs, and has a proprietary interest in protecting water quality); Carriel' Decl. in Supp. of State Pis.’ Mot. for Summ. J. ¶ 6 (Oregon has proprietary interest in wildlife in state); Declaration of Claudia Polsky in Supp. of State Pis.’ Mot. for Summ. J. ¶ 10 (California has proprietary interest in forests with IRAs). The State Petitions Rule, which repealed protections for IRAs, may harm these proprietary interests. City of Sausalito, 386 F.3d at 1198 (“A municipality also has a proprietary interest in protecting its natural resources from harm, [citation omitted] We have also found constitutionally sufficient injury to proprietary interests where ‘land management practices of federal land could affect adjacent [city]-owned land.’ [citation omitted]”); see also Central Delta Water Agency v. United States, 306 F.3d 938, 950-51 (9th Cir.2002) (stating that “ ‘public agency has standing to seek judicial review of governmental action that affects performance of its duties;’ ” there the plaintiffs were agencies charged with protecting state’s water supply and therefore had standing) (quoting Washington Utilities & Transp. Comm’n v. FCC, 513 F.2d 1142, 1151 (9th Cir.1975)); Hodges v. Abraham, 300 F.3d 432, 444-45 (4th Cir.2002) (where Governor had control over land in state and where state highways ran through project site, Governor had standing to challenge NEPA violation). 2. Causation and redressability State Plaintiffs have satisfied the causation prong of the standing analysis by showing that their injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000). As discussed in more detail below, State Plaintiffs allege that the State Petitions Rule repealed the Roadless Rule, which protected IRAs within each State Plaintiffs border, without environmental analysis. The State Plaintiffs contend that the State Petitions Rule, including its elimination of protections for roadless areas during the petition period, will constrain decision-making. Finally, as discussed above, the injury to State Plaintiffs’ proprietary interests can be redressed by an order requiring compliance with environmental statutes and reinstatement of the Roadless Rule, which is the relief sought here. C. Prudential standing requirements Even if a plaintiff falls within the constitutional boundaries, a plaintiff may still lack standing under judicially-imposed prudential principles. Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99-100, 99 S.Ct. 1601, 60 L.Ed.2d 66 (1979). The prudential standing requirement under the Administrative Procedure Act requires that “ ‘the interest that plaintiff seeks to protect [must be] arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute ... in question.’ ” National Credit Union Admin. v. First National Bank & Trust Co., 522 U.S. 479, 488, 118 S.Ct. 927, 140 L.Ed.2d 1 (1998) (quoting Association of Data Processing Service Organizations v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152, 90 S.Ct. 827, 25 L.Ed.2d 184 (1970)); Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 175, 117 S.Ct. 1154, 137 L.Ed.2d 281 (1997) (to determine whether a plaintiffs interest is protected within the meaning of the zone of interest test, a court must examine the particular provision of law upon which the plaintiff relies, not the overall purpose of the Act in question). Specifically, under the prudential standing test, a plaintiff must establish: “ ‘(1) that there has been final agency action adversely affecting the plaintiff; and (2) that, as a result, it suffers legal wrong or that its injury falls within the zone of interests of the statutory provision the plaintiff claims was violated.’ ” Citizens for Better Forestry, 341 F.3d at 976 (quoting Public Citizen, 316 F.3d at 1019 (quoting Churchill County, 150 F.3d at 1078)). Here, both Environmental and State Plaintiffs meet the prudential standing requirements. Indeed, Defendants do not dispute this issue. The State Petitions Rule, which was published as a final rule in the Federal Register, satisfies the first prong of the test. As to the second prong of the test, the APA “ ‘require[s] that the “interest sought to be protected by the complainant is arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question.”’” Public Citizen, 316 F.3d at 1019-20 (quoting Presidio Golf Club v. National Park Serv., 155 F.3d 1153, 1158 (9th Cir.1998)). “NEPA has twin aims: First, it ‘places upon an agency the obligation to consider every significant aspect of the environmental impact of a proposed action.’ [citation omitted]. Second, it ensures that the agency will inform the public that it has indeed considered environmental concerns in its decisionmaking process, [citation omitted].” Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 462 U.S. 87, 97, 103 S.Ct. 2246, 76 L.Ed.2d 437 (1983). The purpose of the ESA requirement for consultation by the federal agency proposing action is “to allow either the [National Marine] Fisheries Service or the FWS to determine whether the federal action is likely to jeopardize the survival of a protected species or result in the destruction of its critical habitat, and if so, to identify reasonable and prudent alternatives that will avoid the action’s unfavorable impacts.” Turtle Island Restoration Network v. National Marine Fisheries Serv., 340 F.3d 969, 974 (9th Cir.2003). Plaintiffs here seek to facilitate informed decisionmaking by the Forest Service. Thus, their suits lie well within the zone of interests for NEPA and ESA. V. RIPENESS Amici American Forest Resource Council (“AFRO”) and California Association of 4 Wheel Drive Clubs, et al. (“Recreational Groups”) argue that Plaintiffs’ claims are not ripe. See Lujan, 497 U.S. at 891, 110 S.Ct. 3177 (“... [A] regulation is not ordinarily considered the type of agency action ‘ripe’ for judicial review under the APA until the scope of controversy has been reduced to more manageable proportions, and its factual components fleshed out, by some concrete action applying the regulation to the claimant’s situation in a fashion that harms or threatens to harm him”). In deciding whether an agency’s decision is ripe for judicial review, the test is: “(1) whether delayed review would cause hardship to the plaintiffs; (2) whether judicial intervention would inappropriately interfere with further administrative action; and (3) whether the courts would benefit from further factual development of the issues presented.” Ohio Forestry Association, Inc. v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726, 733, 118 S.Ct. 1665, 140 L.Ed.2d 921 (1998) (citing Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140, 87 S.Ct. 1507, 18 L.Ed.2d 681 (1967)). Of particular' relevance here, “a person with standing who is injured by a failure to comply with the NEPA procedure may complain of that failure at the time the failure takes place, for the claim can never get riper.” Ohio Forestry, 523 U.S. at 737, 118 S.Ct. 1665; Kern v. United States Bureau of Land Management, 284 F.3d 1062, 1071 (9th Cir.2002) (adopting dicta from Ohio Forestry and finding that a NEPA challenge was ripe because the injury occurred “when the allegedly inadequate EIS was promulgated.”). Here, the State Petitions Rule has been published as a final rule in the Federal Register, so judicial intervention would not interfere with further administrative action with respect to this Rule and no further factual development is required for a judicial determination of this action. Although Amici argue that the State Petitions Rule is not final because it contemplates further rulemaking regarding IRAs in those states which choose to petition, the Rule has already repealed the protections afforded IRAs under the Roadless Rule. Cf. Citizens for Better Forestry, 341 F.3d at 977 (“the planning of site-specific action vel non is irrelevant to the ripeness of an action raising a procedural injury.”); National Wildlife Fed’n v. Clark, 630 F.Supp. 412, 417 (D.D.C.1985) (holding that repealing regulations and issuing nonbinding guidelines in their place constituted final agency action pursuant to NEPA). Further, delayed review would cause hardship to Plaintiffs who are already facing incursions in roadless areas that would not have taken place under the Roadless Rule. The impact of the State Petitions Rule is not speculative; it replaced the Roadless Rule, thereby reducing protections of the IRAs across the country by reverting to the land management plans for each forest. Further, because the Forest Service denied requests to expedite state petitions, states must engage in a lengthy, uncertain and burdensome process to regain protections several years later, if at all. Plaintiffs have made a showing that at least one project, phosphate mining in the Caribou National Forest, has already gone forward after implementation of the State Petitions Rule that would have been forbidden in whole or in part by the Roadless Rule that it replaced. Shortly after the May 13, 2005 issuance of the State Petitions Rule, on May 25, 2005, the Bureau of Land Management issued a Public Notice of Phosphate Exploration License for land in the Caribou National Forest. See Hoyt Decl. in Supp. of State Pis.’ Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. A. The next day, the Forest Service affirmed the decision of the Forest Supervisor in signing the Finding of No Significant Impact for the State Petitions Rule. See Hoyt Deck in Supp. of State Pis.’ Mot. for Summ. J. ¶ 11(b); Ex. B. Roads were constructed in the mining area at some point before September 2005 (see Hoyt Deck in Supp. of State Pis.’ Mot. for Summ. J. ¶ 11(d); Ex. C), and in December 2005, the Forest Service issued a Draft Environmental Impact Statement for expansion of the existing Simplot mining project that would impact roadless areas, including road construction. See Hoyt Deck in Supp. of State Pis.’ Mot. for Summ. J. ¶ 13; Smoky Canyon Mine Draft Environmental Impact Statement at ES-16 (Dec. 2005). The parties stipulated that there have been fourteen incursions into IRAs for timber harvesting and road reconstruction (nine of -which were outside the Ton-gass National Forest) that have been authorized pursuant to interim directives since the repeal and after reinstatement of the less protective forest plans. See Stipulation in Response to Court Order at 5-9. The Forest Service points out that it concluded that these incursions would not affect or would not significantly affect the “roadless character” of the IRAs, although it only contends that one of the projects was permissible under the Roadless Rule, implicitly conceding that the rest were not. See Defs.’ Further Briefing in Response to Court Order at 2-4. This project-by-project approach to determining environmental effects does not take into consideration the nationwide impact of activities in road-less areas that was the crux of the Road-less Rule. No regulation any longer prevents additional projects in roadless areas from being approved and commenced during the petitioning process. This is Plaintiffs’ only opportunity to challenge the programmatic Rule. Cf. Citizens for Better Forestry, 341 F.3d at 973-74 (“More importantly, perhaps, if the agency action only could be challenged at the site-specific development stage, the underlying programmatic authorization would forever escape review.”). Accordingly, this matter is ripe for judicial review. VI. STANDARD OF REVIEW Here, because the Forest Service decided to issue the State Petitions Rule without preparing an Environmental Assessment (“EA”) or an EIS pursuant to NEPA, the Court reviews that decision for reasonableness. Northcoast Environmental Center v. Glickman, 136 F.3d 660, 667 (9th Cir.1998); cf. Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council, 490 U.S. 360, 376-77, 109 S.Ct. 1851, 104 L.Ed.2d 377 (1989) (holding that where an agency already conducted an Environmental Assessment, whether the agency needed to conduct an EIS is reviewed under the arbitrary and capricious standard). The reasonableness standard is somewhat less deferential than the arbitrary and capricious review. Glickman, 136 F.3d at 667. However, the Forest Service’s decision to apply a categorical exclusion under NEPA is reviewed under the arbitrary and capricious standard. Greenpeace Action v. Franklin, 14 F.3d 1324, 1331-32 (9th Cir.1992) (to ensure that the agency has taken the requisite “hard look” at the environmental consequences of its proposed action, a court must carefully review the record to determine whether the agency decision is “founded on a reasoned evaluation of the relevant factors.”). The Court reviews challenges under the ESA to ensure that the agency has not acted in a manner that is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” Okanogan Highlands Alliance v. Williams, 236 F.3d 468, 471 (9th Cir.2000); 5 U.S.C. § 706. Further, Normally, an agency rule would be arbitrary and capricious if the agency has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise. Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association of the United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43, 103 S.Ct. 2856, 77 L.Ed.2d 443 (1983). The Court’s role is to: consider whether the [agency’s] decision was based on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of judgment, [citation omitted]. Although this inquiry into the facts is to be searching and careful, the ultimate standard of review is a narrow one. The court is not empowered to substitute its judgment for that of the agency. The final inquiry is whether the Secretary’s action followed the necessary procedural requirements. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416, 91 S.Ct. 814, 28 L.Ed.2d 136 (1971). VII. DISCUSSION A. National Environmental Policy Act The National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”), 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et. seq., embodies the national policy of encouraging productive and enjoyable harmony between man and the environment, and to promote efforts to prevent or eliminate damage to the environment. 42 U.S.C. § 4321. One of the responsibilities of the Federal government under NEPA is to “preserve important historic, cultural, and natural aspects of the national heritage, and maintain, wherever possible, an environment which supports diversity and variety of individual choice[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b)(4). NEPA provides that a detailed Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS”) shall be prepared for “major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment....” 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C); 40 C.F.R. § 1508.11. The purpose of an EIS is to provide full and fair discussion of significant environmental impacts and to inform decision makers and the public of reasonable alternatives which would minimize adverse impact to the environment. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.1. NEPA does not contain a separate provision for judicial review, so compliance with NEPA is reviewed under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), which draws no legal distinction between the process required for the promulgation or repeal of rules. 5 U.S.C. § 551(5) (defining rulemaking as “agency process for formulating, amending, or repealing a rule.”). The threshold that triggers the requirement for NEPA analysis is relatively low: An EIS must be prepared if ‘substantial questions are raised as to whether a project ... may cause significant degradation of some human environmental factor.’ Idaho Sporting Congress, 137 F.3d at 1149 (internal quotation omitted). Thus, to prevail on a claim that the Forest Service violated its statutory duty to prepare an EIS, a ‘plaintiff need not show that significant effects will in fact occur.’ Id. at 1150. It is enough for the plaintiff to raise ‘substantial questions whether a project may have a significant effect’ on the environment. Id. Blue Mountains Biodiversity Project v. Blackwood, 161 F.3d 1208, 1212 (9th Cir.1998). Plaintiffs contend that the State Petitions Rule crossed this threshold because it substantively repealed uniform, national protections against road construction and timber harvesting in inventoried roadless areas and substituted a localized planning process. Defendants respond that Plaintiffs miseharaeterize the impact of the State Petitions Rule, which is purely procedural and therefore properly exempt from environmental analysis due to a categorical exclusion for routine administrative procedures. 1. The State Petitions Rule did not fit within the categorical exclusion invoked by the Forest Service In general, “new or revised agency rules, regulations ... or procedures,” such as the State Petitions Rule, constitute “major federal actions” requiring an EA or EIS pursuant to NEPA. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18(a). Further, the Council on Environmental Quality has explained: An EIS must be prepared if an agency proposes to implement a specific policy, to adopt a plan for a group of related actions, or to implement a specific statutory program or executive directive. [40 C.F.R.] Section 1508.18. In addition, the adoption of official policy in the form of rules, regulations and interpretations pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, treaties, conventions, or other formal documents ■ establishing governmental or agency policy which will substantially alter agency programs, could require an EIS. [40 C.F.R.] Section 1508.18. In all cases, the policy, plan, or program must have the potential for significantly affecting the quality of the human environment in order to require an EIS. It should be noted that a proposal “may exist in fact as well as by agency declaration that one exists.” [40 C.F.R.] Section 1508.23. Forty Most Asked Questions Concerning CEQ’s National Environmental Policy Act Regulations, 46 Fed.Reg. 18,026, 18,033 (March 23, 1981) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 1500, 1501, 1502, 1503, 1504, 1505, 1506, 1507 and 1508). Agencies may, however, exempt actions from this requirement pursuant to categorical exclusions for categories of actions “which do not individually or cumulatively have a significant effect on the human environment and which have been found to have no such effect in procedures adopted by a Federal agency in implementation of these regulations.” 40 C.F.R. § 1508.4. Here, Defendants argue that the State Petitions Rule came within the categorical exclusion for “Rules, Regulations or policies to establish Service-wide administrative procedures, program processes, or instructions.” Defs.’ Ex. 11 in Supp. of Cross-Mot. for Summ. J. (Forest Service Handbook) at § 30.12(2) (emphasis added). In promulgating the State Petitions Rule, the Forest Service briefly cited this categorical exclusion and stated that: “This final rule is merely procedural in nature and scope and, as such, has no direct, indirect, or cumulative effect on the environment.” State Petitions Rule, 70 Fed. Reg. at 25,660. In their cross-motion for summary judgment, Defendants state, Plaintiffs’ claim is based on their characterization of the State Petitions Rule as a substantive repeal of the protections contained in the 2001 Roadless Rule. However, the State Petitions Rule is a procedural rule and became effective when the Roadless Rule was not operative. Thus, the USDA’s adoption of the State Petitions Ride did not constitute a repeal of the Roadless Ride. Defs.’ Cross-Mot. for Summ. J. at 20:12-15 (emphasis added). Defendants contend that the State Petitions Rule only replaced the Roadless Rule “on paper” because at the time the State Petitions Rule issued, the Roadless Rule was subject to the Wyoming court injunction. Defs’ Cross-Mot. for Summ. J. at 39:18-24. Defendants’ argument that the Wyoming court’s injunction converted the replacement of the Roadless Rule by the State Petitions Rule into a procedural or mere paper exercise, obviating the need to do an environmental