Citations
- 475 F. Supp. 2d 1118
Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
DE MENT, Senior District Judge.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION.1122
II. JURISDICTION.1123
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW.1123
A. The Standard for Termination of the Consent Decree.1123
1. Generally.1123
2. The Terms of the Consent Decree and its Termination Clause.1124
a. Implementation of the “System of Care”.1124
b. Termination Clause.1124
e. The Requirements of the Consent Decree .1125
3. Substantial Compliance .1126
B. Evidentiary Hearing.1128
C. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.1129
IV. PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND BACKGROUND .1129
A. Brief Summary of R.C. 1.1129
B. Orders and Pleadings Filed after R.C. I .1130
C. The Court Monitor’s 2006 On-Site Sustainability Reviews.1132
V. DISCUSSION.1134
A. Analysis of Substantial Compliance under the First Prong of the Termination Clause of the Consent Decree.1134
B. Analysis of Substantial Compliance under the Second Prong of the Termination Clause of the Consent Decree.1136
1. Preliminary Findings Concerning the 2006 On-Site Sustainability Reviews and the Parties’ Positions as to What the Reviews Mean in terms of Substantial Compliance.1137
2. Ratings: Overall Child Status and Overall Performance.1138
3. Core Purpose One.1139
Jp. Core Purpose Four.1142
5. Core Purpose Two: Service Delivery and Competent Staff.1145
a. Service Delivery .1145
b. Competent Staff.1146
i. DHR’s Demonstrated Compliance with the Court’s Order on Developing a Licensed Child Welfare Social Worker Workforce.1146
ii. Stakeholders’Reports.1147
Hi. Training.1148
6. Core Purpose Two: Appropriate Caseloads.1148
a. Staffing Allocations and the Child Welfare Staffing Committee... .1150
b. DHR’s Compliance with the Monitoring and Reporting Sections of Court’s 1998 Order.1154
c. The Court Monitor’s Measurements for Ascertaining Substantial Compliance with the Court’s 1998 Order and Examination of the Evidence from the 2006 On-Site Sustainability Reviews.... 1154
i Counties’Average R.C. Workloads.1155
ii. Counties’ Seven-Month Track Record.1156
Hi. Data Pertaining to Percentages of Staff “Over Standards”.... 1157
Findings Regarding Exception Reports.1161
Findings Regarding Staff Turnover.1162
Findings Regarding DHR’s Good Faith.1163
d. The Court’s Overall Findings of Substantial Compliance Concerning Core Purpose Two’s Goal of Compliant Caseloads.... 1164
7. Core Purpose Three.1165
a. Positions of the Parties and the Court Monitor.1166
b. Timely Completion of ISPs.1166
c. Serviceable ISPs.1167
d. The 2006 On-Site Sustainability Reviews.1168
e. Findings.1169
8. Core Purpose Five.1170
9. The 2006 On-Site Sustainability Reviews: The Three Counties Which the Court Monitor Deemed Were Not in Substantial Compliance mth the Consent Decree .1177
a. The Arguments of the Parties.1177
b. DHR Has Detected Problems.1178
10. Other Noteworthy Evidence.1180
11. The End of Federal Judicial Supervision Does Not Mean the End of Oversight: DHR’s Quality Assurance System and Other Supervision Mechanisms. .1182
VI. CONCLUSION ..1183
VII. ORDER..... 1185
I. INTRODUCTION
This cause is before the court on the second motion for order terminating Consent Decree (Doc. No. 761), filed by the Honorable Page Walley, Ph.D., who by virtue of his position as the commissioner of the Alabama Department of Human Resources (“DHR”) is the defendant in this long-running litigation involving institutional reform of DHR’s child welfare system. The first motion for order terminating Consent Decree was denied by the court in a memorandum opinion and order entered on May 13, 2005. See R.C. v. Walley (“R.C.I”), 390 F.Supp.2d 1030 (M.D.Ala.2005). In R.C.I, the court found that “Defendant ha[d] not submitted evidence sufficient to sustain his burden of demonstrating that DHR ‘is’ and ‘will remain’ in substantial compliance with the terms of the Consent Decree and of the Implementation Plan as required for termination of said Decree.” Id. at 1033.
As grounds for his second motion, Defendant asserts that he has submitted an adequate evidentiary record to support termination of the Consent Decree, which has governed in this case since 1991, and that this evidence addresses and cures the deficiencies outlined by the court in R.C.I. Conversely, Plaintiffs, who opposed the first motion and likewise oppose the instant “second” motion, argue that there is no evidentiary basis for termination of the Consent Decree and that continued judicial oversight is necessary to bring Defendant in substantial compliance with the requirements of the Consent Decree.
After careful consideration of the arguments of counsel, the relevant law and the record as a whole, the court finds that DHR successfully has reformed its child welfare system by developing a system of care which substantially complies with the requirements of the Consent Decree and the Implementation Plan and that judicial oversight is no longer necessary to avoid return to the depraved conditions that led to the commencement of this lawsuit in 1988 and to the court’s intervention. The court finds that Defendant has met his burden of demonstrating DHR’s substantial compliance under the Consent Decree’s two-pronged termination clause and that, accordingly, Defendant’s motion is due to be granted.
II. JURISDICTION
The Consent Decree bestows upon the court shared authority with the court monitor to determine compliance with the Consent Decree, but sole authority to terminate the Consent Decree upon motion of Defendant. (Consent Decree ¶¶ 86, 91, 93, entered June 11, 1991 (Doc. No. 235)), as amended by 1999 Consent Order (Doc. No. 511); R.C.I, 390 F.Supp.2d at 1034. A court also maintains inherent jurisdiction over its decrees. See Vanguards of Cleveland v. City of Cleveland, 23 F.3d 1013, 1018 (6th Cir.1994); Berger v. Heckler, 771 F.2d 1556, 1568 (2d Cir.1985) (“Consent decrees are subject to continuing supervision and enforcement by the court.”). The court, thus, acts within its jurisdiction in ruling on the present motion to terminate the Consent Decree.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A. The Standard for Termination of the Consent Decree
1. Generally
The court begins with the principles, duly emphasized by Defendant, that Consent Decrees “are not intended to operate in perpetuity,” Board of Education of Oklahoma City Public Schools v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 248, 111 S.Ct. 630, 112 L.Ed.2d 715 (1991), and that ‘‘[returning governmental entities to the control of local authorities ‘at the earliest practicable date is essential to restore their true accountability to our governmental system.’ ” Jordan v. Wilson, 951 F.Supp. 1571, 1580 (M.D.Ala.1996) (quoting Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 490, 112 S.Ct. 1430, 118 L.Ed.2d 108 (1992)); see also Reynolds v. McInnes, 338 F.3d 1201, 1219 (11th Cir.2003) (“Federal court oversight of an interference in the operations of a state government department or agency ‘should be as narrow and short-lived’ as fulfilling the duty to eradicate [the violation] allows.”) (quoting Ensley Branch, NAACP v. Seibels, 31 F.3d 1548, 1574-75 (11th Cir.1994)) (brackets added). The court concurs wholeheartedly with the foregoing principles, and, as the court stated in R.C.I, it “is more anxious than Defendant to return this case to the State[.]” 390 F.Supp.2d at 1059. At the same time, however, while the goal of achieving state and local autonomy of non-federal public institutions is a substantial one, a parallel goal of obvious equal importance is that the offending party must “remedy the violation” which the consent decree seeks to cure. Freeman, 503 U.S. at 489, 112 S.Ct. 1430; Sims v. Montgomery County Com’n, 9 F.Supp.2d 1281, 1288 (M.D.Ala.1998). Stated in slightly different terms, termination of a consent decree is not appropriate unless the decree’s purposes have “ ‘been fully achieved.’ ” U.S. v. City of Miami, 2 F.3d 1497, 1505 (11th Cir.1993) (citation omitted).
In R.C.I, the court opined that, notwithstanding that the instant Consent Decree had been in effect at that time for almost fifteen years, termination was not warranted because, in essence, Defendant had failed to meet his evidentiary burden of demonstrating that DHR had remedied the violations which the Consent Decree sought to eliminate. See 390 F.Supp.2d at 1059. Defendant’s burden is embodied in the two-part termination clause of the Consent Decree, to which the court now turns.
2. The Terms of the Consent Decree and its Termination Clause
“A district court must look to the specific terms of a consent decree in determining whether and when to terminate supervision or jurisdiction over it.” Gonzales v. Galvin, 151 F.3d 526, 531 (6th Cir.1998). The Consent Decree is a detailed document, forty pages in length, which sets out a comprehensive agreement for transforming the operations of DHR’s child protective services and foster care systems (“child welfare system”). Paragraph 31 of the Consent Decree provides as follows:
Defendant shall ensure that DHR, pursuant to the timetable in the Implementation Plan:
a. Establishes a “system of care” for class members and their families;
b. Operates the “system of care” with the aim of achieving the goals described in Section VII below and in conformity with the “principles” or “standards” set forth in Section VIII below.
(Consent Decree at 13, § VII, ¶ 31 (Doc. No. 235).)
a. Implementation of the “System of Care”
As provided in ¶ 31 of the Consent Decree, above, execution of the “system of care” is governed by specific standards and deadlines set forth in the Implementation Plan, a separate document. (See Order approving Implementation Plan (Doc. No. 265).) The Implementation Plan ultimately was approved by the court on November 1, 1993. (Order approving Implementation Plan (Doc. No. 265)); (Order Regarding Implementation and the Implementation Plan) (Doc. No. 266). The Implementation Plan was developed to effectuate a manageable and cost-effective plan with specified deadlines to achieve the massive reforms required for DHR to incorporate into its child welfare system the goals and principles of the Consent Decree. (Consent Decree ¶¶ 64-68 (Doc. No. 235).) Therein, the parties agreed to a phased-in “conversion” process, meaning that each year specified counties were to be “converted” until all counties achieved “conversion” status. See R.C.I, 390 F.Supp.2d at 1034. As discussed in the next section, each of Alabama’s sixty-seven counties has been evaluated, and, at the time of evaluation, each county was declared “converted.”
b. The Termination Clause
The Consent Decree contains a termination clause which provides the ultimate standard by which the court is to measure whether the required system of care has been established and whether the Consent Decree’s goals and principles have been accomplished. As embodied in the Consent Decree and voluntarily agreed to by Defendant, two questions must be answered in Defendant’s favor in order for the court to terminate the Consent Decree. Specifically, the termination clause of the Consent Decree provides as follows:
On or after October 1, 2002, the defendant may move for termination of this Decree upon a showing that DHR is in substantial compliance with the requirements of the Decree and of the Implementation Plan and that DHR will remain in substantial compliance after termination of the injunction in this case.
(Consent Decree ¶ 93, entered June 11, 1991 (Doc. No. 235)), as amended by ¶ 10 of Consent Order Extending Time for Compliance, entered Feb. 11, 1999 (“1999 Consent Order”) (Doc. No. 511); see also R.C.I, 390 F.Supp.2d at 1041. In order to ascertain whether Defendant has attained the twofold goal of substantial compliance, the court must ascertain the “requirements” of the Consent Decree and of the Implementation Plan. (Consent Decree ¶ 93, as amended by the 1999 Consent Order.)
c. The Requirements of the Consent Decree
The Consent Decree’s requirements are embodied in the “principles” or “standards,” which are set forth in Sections VII and VIII of the Decree. In R.C.I, the court organized these principles into five core purposes. See 390 F.Supp.2d at 1045-46. Neither party has objected to the court’s categorization. Those five core purposes are as follows:
(1) the prevention of out-of-home placements and the advancement of family unification, but only when at-home placement provides an environment where the child is safe from imminent and serious harm (core purpose one); (2) the delivery of comprehensive services, in a coordinated and therapeutic manner, by competent staff with appropriate caseloads, to class members and families in home-based and community-based settings, devised pursuant to individualized service plans (“ISPs”), for the purposes of facilitating home placement, satisfying the unique physical, emotional, social, educational and other needs of class members, and promoting smooth transitions for class members when they “age out” of the system (core purpose two); (3) active participation by the child, parent and foster parent in the planning and delivery of services, to include informed involvement so that the child, parent and foster parent have full understanding of these services and their rights and options (core purpose three); (4) child safety, encompassing the prevention of sexual abuse and neglect and the timely intervention and investigation of class members believed to be victims of sexual abuse and/or neglect (core purpose four); and (5) stability and permanency in the class members’ living situations, including, if in the children’s best interest, that when children are removed from their homes, siblings are placed together and familial relationships are maintained through visitations and other means (core purpose five).
Id. at 1046 (internal footnote omitted).
The core purposes of the Consent Decree are not subject to precise definition. As recognized by the court monitor, the foregoing “requirements” (or “core purposes,” as phrased by the court) are pliable, and an evaluation of how Defendant is performing in the areas delineated above, at times, requires a measure of discretion and subjectivity. In this regard, the Consent Decree “represents] a departure from the more structural approach to system reform that ha[s] been used in other system reform settlements,” (Ct. Monitor April 2006 Report at 5 (Doc. No. 812)), namely, because its provisions do not “speeify[] the precise means for accomplishing [its] ends.” (Consent Decree at 2 (Doc. No. 235), as amended by 1999 Consent Order (Doc. No. 511).) Rather, as set out above, the Consent Decree “lays out a set of ‘operating principles’ or ‘standards’ and directs defendant to ensure that [DHR’s] child protective services and foster care systems comply with these principles or standards by a date certain.’ ” (Id.)
3. Substantial Compliance
Although the Consent Decree does not define “substantial compliance,” that determination has not been made in a vacuum. “An agreed upon measurement process has been used through[out] the duration of the R.C. Consent Decree to evaluate the consistency, quality, and effectiveness of performance in each county of Alabama” during the staggered review process. (Ct. Monitor Nov. 2005 Report at 5 (Doc. No. 783).) In the court monitor’s November 2005 Report and in R.C.I, the “basic framework” employed was summarized. (See id. at 5-7); R.C.I. See 390 F.Supp.2d at 1035. This framework, with which the parties and the court are very familiar, was used to determine whether the data and other evidence revealed a level of practice in individual counties which substantially complied with the principles of the Consent Decree. Briefly,
[t]he basic framework for measurement of the conversion to practice in accordance with the system of care has been the detailed review of samples of children and families served by the system using a process that is now known as the Quality Service Review (QSR). The process determines whether the practitioners in the system of care are providing services in accordance with the agreed-on standards and with appropriate professional due diligence using a sample of children and families as a test of the system performance (see Appendix A for the specific domains examined). The QSR examines, for example, whether ISPs [individualized service plans] and child teams are operating functionally in the manner intended by the practice principles. In addition to the QSR child reviews, the monitor has tracked quantitative indicators that reflect the performance of system processes and outcome indicators.
(Ct. Monitor Nov. 2005 Report at 5 (Doc. No. 783) (brackets supplied) (internal footnote omitted) (footnote 7 added)); see also R.C.I, 390 F.Supp.2d at 1035. On pages 6 and 7 of his November 2005 Report, the court monitor further outlines “[t]he evidence used to determine that a county is ‘converted’ to practicing in accordance with the principles of the system of care[,]” see supra footnote 6. (Ct. Monitor Nov. 2005 Report at 6-7 (Doc. No. 783).)
As revealed, largely up to this point, the focus of the court, the court monitor and the parties has been on the achievement of substantial compliance in individual counties. That focus has been appropriate because achieving the goal of systemwide substantial compliance in a manageable way necessitated that only a few counties undergo scrutiny each year. (See, e.g., Agreement Regarding Implementation ¶ 22 (mandating “phased implementation by geographic areas, by subgroups of class members or both”).) It, however, is appropriate at this juncture for the court to state that it finds that the Consent Decree’s termination clause employs the phrase “substantial compliance” as a yardstick for measuring systemwide substantial compliance. (Consent Decree ¶ 93, entered June 11, 1991 (Doc. No. 235), as amended by ¶ 10 of the 1999 Consent Order (Doc. No. 511).) In other words, the court finds that now faced with the ultimate question of termination of the Consent Decree, the assessment of substantial compliance has more of a systemwide, as opposed to an individual county, focus. In pragmatic terms, this means that whether the goal of substantial compliance has been attained systemwide is not necessarily dependent upon every county demonstrating sustained substantial compliance. The court monitor recognized as much in his November 2005 Report, when he stated that substantial compliance with the Consent Decree requires that “most counties” are performing up to par. (Ct. Monitor Nov. 2005 Report at 26 (Doc. No. 783).) DHR also advocates that the emphasis of “substantial compliance” is on systemwide performance. It does not appear that Plaintiffs would disagree; in their brief arguing a different point, Plaintiffs emphasize that the issue for termination of the Consent Decree “was and is statewide compliance.” (Doc. No. 781 at 17 n. 8.)
“Substantial compliance,” the guiding phrase used in the Consent Decree’s termination clause, also has acquired legal meaning from the courts. In R.C.I, the court set out the meaning of “substantial compliance,” as defined and applied by courts faced with motions to terminate consent decrees in institutional reform cases. See 390 F.Supp.2d at 1043-45. The parties have not objected to those principles of law, and those principles again guide the court’s consideration in resolving the instant motion. (See, e.g., Doc. No. 781 at 4, wherein Plaintiffs describe the court’s legal discussion as the “law of the case”). The court need not repeat those principles here, but reemphasizes that “substantial compliance” is not 100 percent or strict compliance, but, at the same time, “substantial compliance” is not “ ‘susceptible to a mathematically precise definition.’” R.C.I, 390 F.Supp.2d at 1044 (quoting Joseph A. by Wolfe v. N.M. Dep’t of Human Servs., 69 F.3d 1081, 1085 (10th Cir.1995)). Indeed, the court must remain mindful that the standard for termination of consent decrees in governmental institutional reform litigation must be “flexible.” City of Miami, 2 F.3d at 1503.
Other factors also bear on the inquiry of whether Defendant has demonstrated substantial compliance with the core purposes of the Consent Decree. Some of these factors were set out in R.C.I, 390 F.Supp.2d at 1043, but bear repeating here. One factor is whether Defendant has complied in good faith with the terms of the Consent Decree since it was entered. See id.; City of Miami, 2 F.3d at 1503. This factor involves consideration of Defendant’s record of compliance with the Consent Decree and any other positive undertakings by Defendant toward the goal of compliance. See City of Miami, 2 F.3d at 1508. Another factor is whether the purposes of the litigation have been achieved “to the extent practicable.” Id. Relatedly, the court also should consider whether it is necessary or practical for the court to retain judicial control over DHR in order to achieve compliance with any outstanding orders. See Sims, 9 F.Supp.2d at 1287. “[T]he length of time a consent decree has been effect” and the “continuing efficacy of the consent decree’s enforcement” are two additional factors of which the court should be informed. Heath v. DeCourcy, 992 F.2d 630, 633 (6th Cir.1993) (citing Dowell, 498 U.S. at 237, 111 S.Ct. 630). To quote City of Miami, “[i]n sum, termination of the consent decree would be appropriate if the district court finds that the decree is clearly no longer necessary either to prevent [the constitutional deficiencies] in the future or to remedy the effect of past [violations].” 2 F.3d at 1508.
B. Evidentiary Hearing
In conjunction with his first motion to terminate the Consent Decree, which was the subject of the court’s ruling in R.C.I, Defendant complained that he was denied an evidentiary hearing and, thus, was denied the opportunity to present evidence in support of that motion, (see, e.g., Doc. No. 825 at 2.) Although Defendant has not expressly requested an evidentiary hearing in connection with the instant “second” motion, given his unrelenting protestations in his present briefs, concerning the court’s prior denial of his request for a hearing, the court finds that it is appropriate to address Defendant’s statements.
When he filed his original motion to terminate the Consent Decree, Defendant did not cite any authority in support of his accompanying request for an evidentiary hearing. He did not point to the Consent Decree as his authority for the obvious reason that there is no requirement therein that the court hold a hearing prior to terminating the Consent Decree. Moreover, Defendant neither made any showing of what type of evidence would be adduced at a hearing, if permitted, nor made a proffer of any material disputed factual issues which would have justified presentation through the format of a hearing. Rather, Defendant generically made a request for a hearing, but otherwise insisted that the court monitor’s 61-page November 2004 Report demonstrated that Defendant had satisfied his twofold burden under the Consent Decree’s termination clause. For all of the reasons previously espoused by the court in R.C.I, that Report was woefully inadequate to sustain Defendant’s burden. In short, the court declined to hold a hearing merely for the sake of having a hearing because an undefined request for one was made by Defendant.
Defendant has not specifically requested a hearing in connection with his present motion. Plaintiffs, on the other hand, essentially advocate that the court can deny the motion on the written record, but cannot grant the motion without holding a hearing, (see Doc. No. 767 at 1, 3.) The court, however, finds again that a hearing only would prove to be superfluous and would not aid the court in its decisional process. The court has been immersed in this case for more than a decade and has an in-depth knowledge of the case. Throughout the duration of this litigation, the court has received frequent status reports from the court monitor and has reviewed the extensive filings by the parties.
Moreover, the court finds that there is a developed record in this case. In this regard, the parties have had the opportunity to conduct discovery in connection with Defendant’s “second” motion (see Sept. 2, 2005 Order (Doc. No. 768)), to amass evidence in support of their positions for and. against termination of the Consent Decree, and to file that evidence with the court. The record is replete with evidence and arguments from the parties, and the facts and data are extensive.
The court further finds that the material evidence is undisputed. In this regard, the court finds that, as in the past, the issues turn on an interpretation of the Consent Decree and whether the material evidence is sufficient under the Consent Decree to warrant its termination. The authority cited by Plaintiffs (see Doc. No. 767 at 17 n. 5) does not support their argument that, under the circumstances presented in this case and described above, a hearing is either mandated or warranted. Cf. Cody v. Hillard, 139 F.3d 1197, 1200 (8th Cir.1998) (observing the absence of authority that “a hearing is a necessary prerequisite to terminating supervision over a [consent] decree (as opposed to modifying a decree)” and stating that “the necessity of a hearing depends on whether there are disputed factual issues”).
C. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
While the court finds that an evidentiary hearing is not warranted, this finding does not in any way abdicate the court’s responsibility to provide the parties with a sufficient explanation of the facts and reasons underlying its ruling. Dowell, 498 U.S. at 246, 111 S.Ct. 630 (observing that, “[i]f ... a [consent] decree is to be terminated or dissolved, respondents ... are entitled to a [precise] statement from the court”). As stated by the Sixth Circuit, a district court, which is considering whether to terminate a consent decree, “should make sufficiently detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law under Rule 52(a), Fed.R.Civ.P., to advise the parties of the factual basis for its decision and permit informed appellate review.” Bradley v. Milliken, 772 F.2d 266, 272 (6th Cir.1985); see also Joseph A. by Wolfe, 69 F.3d at 1089 (vacating and remanding judgment for failure of lower court “to make the specific and clear findings required” by Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). This opinion constitutes the court’s findings of fact and conclusions .of law in accordance with the foregoing dictates.
IY. PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND BACKGROUND
The extensive background of this case is very familiar to the parties and the court and is recited in the court’s prior opinion in which the court denied Defendant’s first motion to terminate the Consent Decree. See R.C.I, 390 F.Supp.2d at 1034-41. A detailed updating of that background is not necessary here, and the court refers the reader to its prior opinion.
A. Brief Summary of R.C.I
In R.C.I, the court found that Defendant had not met his twofold burden for termination of the Consent Decree because the evidence did not demonstrate that Defendant was and would remain in substantial compliance with the requirements of the Consent Decree and of the Implementation Plan, as required for termination of the injunction in this case. The court set out in detail its conclusion that, in light of the governing law, there was insufficient evidence to support a finding that those requirements, which the court distilled into five core purposes (as set out in the previous section of this opinion), had been achieved. Consequently, the court rejected the ultimate recommendation of the court monitor in his November 2004 Report that “the court find that DHR is in substantial compliance with the Consent Decree” and “that the independent monitoring of the Consent Decree” cease. R.C.I, 390 F.Supp.2d at 1059. As detailed in its prior opinion, the court was “unable to reconcile the court monitor’s recommendation of ‘substantial compliance’ with the data and other information in the court monitor’s November 2004 Report.” Id. at 1048. The court also deemed telling the fact that the court monitor did not expressly state that he believed DHR “will remain in substantial compliance,” which is the second prong of Defendant’s burden for termination of the Consent Decree, but instead advocated continued supervision by the court for a period of a year to monitor the “areas of performance” discussed in his report. See Id. at 1058-59 (citing Ct. Monitor Nov. 2004 Report at 60-61).
Although in R.C.I the court declined to release the court monitor or to terminate the Consent Decree, the court concurred with the recommendation of the court monitor that Defendant file a performance report with the court which “contained] facts addressing the same areas of performance as the monitor’s report” and which “include[d] the county ratings ordered by the court.” Id. at 1058-59; (Ct. Monitor Nov. 2004 Report at 61.) In R.C.I, the court set a deadline of August 4, 2005, for the filing of the performance report and stated that, at that time, “Defendant may renew his motion to terminate the Consent Decree and Implementation Plan,” if the evidence supports such a motion. See 390 F.Supp.2d at 1059.
B. Orders and Pleadings Filed after R.C.I
The court now picks up where its prior opinion left off. On August 3, 2005, Defendant complied with the court’s directives issued in R.C.I and, consequently, filed the instant “second motion for order terminating the Consent Decree,” which is accompanied by a plethora of evidence. (Doc. No. 761.) On August 29, 2005, Plaintiffs submitted an opposition to Defendant’s motion, attaching their own evidence and requesting discovery should the court not be inclined to deny the motion outright. (Doc. No. 767 at 1, 7, 17-18.)
After reviewing the parties’ submissions, the court entered an order, directing the court monitor to file by November 18, 2005, a report responding to all assertions in Defendant’s second motion to terminate the Consent Decree and in Plaintiffs’ response. (Sept. 2, 2005 Order at 1 (Doc. No. 768).) The court’s order further provided, “The court monitor shall provide specific and detailed discussion of whether he believes that Defendant has met both prongs of the twofold burden for termination of the consent decree and shall include particularized references to an analysis of the evidence which justifies his conclusions.” (Id.) In the same order, the court also authorized Plaintiffs and Defendant to engage in limited discovery for a period of two months, (id. at 2), and permitted the parties to file any additional evidence and/or further arguments in support of their respective positions pertaining to the second motion to terminate the Consent Decree. (See id.)
In compliance with the court’s order of September 2, 2005, Plaintiffs and Defendant filed briefs and evidence in support of their respective positions regarding termination of the Consent Decree, and the court monitor filed a 64-page report. (Doc. Nos.779, 781, 783.) To briefly summarize, in his November 2005 report, the court monitor found that the then “current data,” primarily arising from QSR “sustainability reviews” (see supra footnote 7), was insufficient to demonstrate that DHR was complying with the five core purposes of the Consent Decree. Although the court monitor praised DHR’s accomplishments, the court monitor concluded that the data was “not consistent with the achievement of Core Purpose One,” that the QSR reviews showed “significant weaknesses in performance” of individualized service plans (“ISPs”) (core purpose two), that essentially there was no “quantitative data” to support Core Purpose Three, and that “[t]he [then] current evidence for achievement of Core Purpose Five [was] mixed.” Core Purpose Four received a positive review from the court monitor. (Id. at 56-59.) In his conclusion, the court monitor stated that “[t]here are particular weaknesses in the achievement of Core Purposes Two and Three [which] are an underpinning for achieving the other core purposes.” (Id. at 59-60.)
The court monitor explained that all sixty-seven of Alabama’s counties at one point in time had successfully “converted” their child welfare practices in conformity with the core purposes of the Consent Decree and that the counties had established the infrastructure or “building blocks” necessary to support compliance with the second prong of the Consent Decree’s termination clause. The court monitor, however, concluded that the then existing data showed a “lack of consistency [by the counties] in meeting the core purposes.” (Ct. Monitor Nov. 2005 Report at 9, 60-61 (Doc. No. 783).) The court monitor observed that a more accurate analysis of the second prong of the Consent Decree
would require on-site work in a sample of counties to verify current caseloads, [to] conduct additional QSR reviews of a significant sample of children, and to compare the findings to the quantitative data, qualitative data, and stakeholder input provided at the time of the determination of conversion to the current performance levels.
(Id. at 64.) In his November 2005 report, the court monitor emphasized the importance of on-site reviews during the “conversion” process. After careful study of Defendant’s and Plaintiffs’ submissions and the court monitor’s report, the court entered an order on December 15, 2005 (Doe. No. 787), in which it concurred with the court monitor’s recommendation and directed the court monitor
to perform on-site work in a random and representative sample of counties in order to verify current caseloads, to conduct additional QSR reviews of a random and representative sample of children, and to compare the findings to the quantitative data, qualitative data, and stakeholder input provided at the time of the determination of conversion to present. The court monitor shall determine the method for generating a random and representative sample of counties and children to accomplish his purposes of evaluating Defendant’s level of compliance with the terms of the consent decree, and, if desired, he may seek input from counsel for Plaintiffs and Defendant.
(Doc. No. 787 at 2.)
The court set a deadline of February 28, 2006, for the court monitor to complete his reviews and submit a report of his findings. (Id.) In the same order, the court stated that it would “hold in abeyance” Defendant’s second motion to terminate the Consent Decree until the completion of these reviews. (Id. at 3.) Subsequently, over objection by Defendant (Doc. Nos. 788, 791, 792), but based upon the court monitor’s representation that, logistically, it was not possible to complete the reviews by the February 28 deadline, the court, after holding a telephone conference on the matter (Doc. Nos.793-94), extended the court monitor’s deadline to March 31, 2006, to conduct the court-ordered on-site reviews and to April 21, 2006, to submit his report to the court. (Doc. No. 803 at 1-2); (Ct. Monitor April 2006 Report at 1 (Doc. No. 812).)
C. The Court Monitor’s 2006 On-Site Sustainability Reviews
The court monitor sought input from both Defendant and Plaintiffs regarding the process for completing the court-ordered reviews. (Ct. Monitor April 2006 Report at 2 (Doc. No. 812).) Ultimately, the court monitor selected the following ten counties to be reviewed: Chambers, Randolph, Conecuh, Jackson, Lauderdale, Lee, Montgomery, Macon, Marshall and Jefferson. These counties comprise three small counties, four mid-sized counties and three large counties. The total number of children included in the reviews was 152, and, for each county, the court monitor “evenly split as much as possible” the number of children in foster care and the number under protective supervision. (See id. at 3.) No serious argument has been advanced by either Defendant or Plaintiffs that these ten counties and the children in those counties whose cases were scrutinized are not “random” and “representative” of the state as a whole. (Doc. No. 787 at 2.)
The court monitor completed his reviews by the March 31, 2006 deadline, and timely filed his report on April 21, 2006. (Ct. Monitor April 2006 Report (Doc. No. 812).) In his April 2006 Report, the court monitor explains that he employed the “review methodology followed during previous compliance reviews,” (id. at 2), and that the “[sjample sizes of children within the respective counties are comparable to the number used by the monitor during his previous on-site reviews.” (Id. at 3.) These sample sizes also are larger than the number of children included in the QSR reviews, which received some criticism from the court in R.C.I. See 390 F.Supp.2d at 1048-49. “The methodology included completing QSRs on a randomly selected sample of children in each county, reviewfing] ... quantitative county data, and conducting a series of focus groups with county staff and local children’s community stakeholders.” (Ct. Monitor April 2006 Report at 2 (Doc. No. 812).)
These 2006 on-site sustainability reviews required the retention and work of many reviewers. To decrease expenses and at the urging of Defendant, the court monitor agreed to use 50 percent of reviewers provided by DHR. (See id. at 3.) The court monitor chose the other 50 percent of reviewers, whom at the time of his selection he deemed more trained and experienced than the DHR reviewers. (Id.) Ultimately, though, the court monitor concluded that the reviews performed by the “independent reviewers and the DHR reviewers were conducted with diligence!,] and the findings were closely comparable and accurate.” (Id.) The 2006 on-site sustainability reviews also included between fifty and one hundred interviews in each county (with more interviews conducted in Jefferson County) with key stakeholders in the child welfare system. (Id. at 4.) The format for stakeholder interviews paralleled the typical format used by the court monitor during the original on-site compliance reviews. Key stakeholders included DHR employees (both management and front-line workers), “local providers of services, family court judges, foster parents, educators, guardian ad litems, DHR attorney[s,] juvenile probation officers,” and law enforcement officials. (Id.)
In his April 2006 report (see Doc. No. 812), discussed in more detail later in this opinion, the court monitor outlines his conclusions that seven of the ten counties are sustaining performance consistent with the principles of the Consent Decree. These counties are Chambers, Randolph, Cone-cuh, Jackson, Lauderdale, Lee and Montgomery. In the court monitor’s opinion, however, three counties are not sustaining, one small-, one medium- and one large-sized county, i.e., Macon, Marshall and Jefferson counties, respectively. (See Ct. Monitor April 2006 Report at 89 (Doc. No. 812).) He stops short of rendering an express finding of substantial compliance as a whole, but states that “[t]he findings of the ten county reviews are consistent with the findings and issues reported in the monitor’s September 2005 report to the court,” (i.e., Doc. No. 783), a report in which he concluded that Defendant had not demonstrated the second prong of the Consent Decree’s termination clause. (Id. at 94.)
V. DISCUSSION
The court independently has reviewed the evidence, as it always has done, and for the reasons articulated below, determines that there is evidentiary and legal support for a finding that Defendant has satisfied both prongs of the Consent Decree’s termination clause. The court emphasizes that it has considered all of the evidence in reaching its findings. The omission of any reference or discussion to any discrete fact, exhibit or other evidence, therefore, should not be interpreted to mean that the court ignored or did not weigh that evidence. The court has weighed both the negative and the positive evidence, and the court is cognizant of Plaintiffs’ criticisms. The court, however, has discerned that these criticisms are not serious enough to foreclose a finding of substantial compliance or to call into doubt Defendant’s ability to remain in substantial compliance in the future.
A. Analysis of Substantial Compliance under the First Prong of the Termination Clause of the Consent Decree
The first prong of the termination clause of the Consent Decree mandates that Defendant demonstrate that “DHR is in substantial compliance with the requirements of the Decree and of the Implementation Plan[.]” (Consent Decree ¶ 93, entered June 11, 1991 (Doc. No. 235), as amended by ¶ 10 of the 1999 Consent Order (Doc. No. 511).) For the reasons to follow, the court finds that Defendant has demonstrated substantial compliance under the first prong.
Pursuant to the Implementation Plan, the parties agreed that the principles of the Consent Decree would be phased in by geographic areas, namely counties, and that “each fiscal year an identified group of counties [would] be ‘converted.’ ” (Order Regarding Implementation and Implementation Plan at 3 (Doc. No. 266).) Although DHR was unable to attain conversion in all counties by the original agreed-upon deadline of October 1, 1999, (see Consent Decree ¶ 66), that goal finally was reached on March 11, 2005. See R.C.I, 390 F.Supp.2d at 1035-36, 1046 (describing the extensions of deadlines and the final attainment of conversion in all sixty-seven counties). Through the court monitor’s thorough and systematic evaluation of each county in Alabama, each county has reformed its child welfare practices and has demonstrated that it can provide care for its children in a manner which conforms to the requirements of the Consent Decree. The court monitor has stated that the findings that each county, at the time of “conversion,” was “substantially in compliance” with the Consent Decree constitute the “primary support for finding compliance with prong one of the Consent Decree.” (Ct. Monitor Nov. 2005 Report at 7 (Doc. No. 783).) The court also recognized this great achievement, stating in R.C.I that “the fact that the court monitor has declared each and every county ‘converted’ is monumental, as paragraph 31 of the Consent Decree anticipated a county-by-county conversion, pursuant to staggered deadlines set out in the Implementation Plan.” 390 F.Supp.2d at 1046-47.
The court monitor also has cited, in general terms, Defendant’s abidance with the mandated obligations in the Implementation Plan and with the court’s orders entered throughout this litigation and, in specific terms, has stated that DHR has implemented the “infrastructure” required by the Implementation Plan, which is necessary to support practice in accordance with the Consent Decree. (See Ct. Monitor Nov. 2005 Report at 9, 25, 60 (Doc. No. 783)); (see, e.g., Order Regarding Implementation and Implementation Plan at 7-9 (Doc. No. 266)); (Implementation Plan, Infrastructure, at 1); (see also Doc. No. 761 at 9.)
Plaintiffs have not presented any detailed challenge to the court monitor’s conclusion that prong one of the Consent Decree’s termination clause has been satisfied. Rather, Plaintiffs, as well as Defendant, devote the majority of their discussions in their briefs to the second prong of the Consent Decree’s termination clause, focusing on “sustainable substantial compliance,” to borrow Plaintiffs’ phraseology. (Doc. No. 781 at 3.) Indeed, in recent years, it appears that an understanding has evolved, if not express then implied, that Defendant would satisfy the first prong of the Consent Decree’s termination clause when the last of Alabama’s sixty-seven counties attained “conversion” status, which as stated occurred on March 11, 2005.
Based on the foregoing discussion and the court’s independent evaluation of the record, the court concurs with the court monitor’s recommendation that Defendant has satisfied the requirements of prong one of the Consent Decree’s termination clause. The court bases its decision upon the evidence in the record, as highlighted above, and the remarkable fact that the child welfare practices in every county in Alabama have been scrutinized and have been declared “converted.” The court also bases its finding on its concurrence with the court monitor that DHR effectively has overhauled its pre-R.C. practices and has implemented an infrastructure which is sufficient to support a system of care which incorporates all of the core purposes of the Consent Decree. Other of DHR’s accomplishments, which the court finds further amplify Defendant’s demonstration of substantial compliance under prong one, are set out in the court monitor’s November 2004 Report. (See Ct. Monitor Nov. 2004 Report at 2, 58-59); (see also Ct. Monitor Nov. 2005 Report at 9, 60 (Doc. No. 783).)
The court also finds that it is fitting at this point to spotlight the fact that a common theme emanates and predominates in the extensive record and that theme is that the parties and the court monitor have effectuated remarkable and demonstrable improvements in DHR’s child welfare system. DHR’s child welfare system is, no doubt, far different and far better today than it was at the time that this litigation commenced. The quality of care which children under DHR’s supervision receive has improved substantially, (see, e.g., Doc. No. 781 at 2 (although arguing against termination of the Consent Decree, plaintiffs state that “all would agree” that there has been “notable improvement since the entry of the Consent Decree in 1991”).) With that said, the court recognizes that Plaintiffs take strong issue with DHR’s compliance with prong two of the Consent Decree’s termination clause, as they aptly state that the material question is not whether “the system now treats children better than it did in 1988.” (Doc. No. 820 at 3.) It is appropriate now for the court to turn to a discussion of the second prong. As should be evident from the court’s discussion below, the court has given very serious consideration to whether the evidence demonstrates that DHR has satisfied prong two of the Consent Decree’s termination clause.
B. Analysis of Substantial Compliance under the Second Prong of the Termination Clause of the Consent Decree
The second prong of the termination clause of the Consent Decree requires that Defendant demonstrate “that DHR will remain in substantial compliance after termination of the injunction in this case.” (Consent Decree ¶ 93, entered June 11, 1991 (Doc. No. 235), as amended by ¶ 10 of the 1999 Consent Order (Doc. No. 511).) In R.C.I, the court stated that, “in [its] opinion, the best evidence to support a finding that DHR ‘will remain in substantial compliance’ ... is evidence that, after conversion, counties have continued to operate in a manner that substantially complies with the Consent Decree.” R.C. I, 390 F.Supp.2d at 1058. In R.C.I, however, the court found that the “evidence [was] lacking” in that regard. Id. Plaintiffs complain that DHR has not had ample time in the interim between the court’s May 2005 memorandum opinion and order, denying Defendant’s first motion to terminate the Consent Decree, and Defendant’s present filing to bring DHR’s child welfare system in compliance with the requirements of prong two of the termination clause of the Consent Decree. (Doc. No. 767 at 3.)
Plaintiffs’ argument is slightly off-key. In its May 2005 memorandum opinion and order, the court’s primary reason for denying Defendant’s motion to terminate the Consent Decree rested on the conclusion that the court monitor’s report submitted in November 2004, upon which Defendant heavily relied, contained insufficient data to support the court monitor’s recommendation of substantial compliance. In other words, it was unclear whether evidence of substantial compliance existed or not because there were large gaps in the eviden-tiary proof.
Notwithstanding Plaintiffs’ further objection, for the reasons to follow, the court finds that the missing evidence has been supplied and that Defendant has demonstrated that DHR “will remain” in substantial compliance with the Consent Decree and the Implementation Plan after termination of the injunction in this case. As discussed herein, that evidence is supplied, in part, by the 2006 on-site sustainability reviews which were ordered by the court and conducted by the court monitor.
1. Preliminary Findings Concerning the 2006 On-Site ,Sustainability Reviews and the Parties’ Positions as to what the Reviews Mean in Terms of Substantial Compliance
Initially, regarding the 2006 on-site sustainability reviews, the results of which'are elaborated upon in the court monitor’s April 2006 Report (Doc. No. 812), the court makes the following findings and observations which hopefully will help clarify what issues are not before the court for exhaustive analysis.
First, the court finds that the results of the 2006 on-site sustainability reviews constitute valuable evidence in evaluating the merits of the present motion for the following reason. During the “conversion” process of each county, the court monitor’s on-site compliance review was the yardstick by which the court monitor determined if a county had implemented the required system of care into its child welfare practices and had achieved a level of practice which conformed to the requirements of the Consent Decree. The 2006 on-site sustainability reviews conducted by the court monitor replicate these original on-site compliance reviews. The court monitor has explained that he employed the same “review methodology” that he used when he initially evaluated each of Alabama’s sixty-seven counties and that the “[sjample sizes of children within the respective counties [were] comparable to the number used by the monitor during his previous on-site reviews.” (Ct. Monitor April 2006 Report at 2-3 (Doc. No. 812).) As recited earlier herein, in R.C.I, the court set out the methodology underlying the review process employed by the court monitor in conducting his initial on-site compliance reviews, see 390 F.Supp.2d at 1036, and the court finds that the methodology is sound.
Second, the court accepts all of the data articulated by the court monitor in his April 2006 Report. Neither party has lodged an objection as to the accuracy of this data. Instead, Plaintiffs and Defendant essentially argue that the data supports a finding in their favor on the issue of substantial compliance and that the other party’s interpretation of the data is wrong.
Third, the court accepts the conclusions reached by the court monitor as to whether or not each of the ten counties reviewed presently is demonstrating substantial compliance. To reiterate, the court monitor says that, overall, seven counties are sustaining substantial compliance and that three are not. Although the court concurs with the court monitor that three counties are not substantially complying with the Consent Decree, the court parts ways with the court monitor to the extent that the court monitor 'is recommending that the court find that DHR has not met its burden under the second prong of the Consent Decree’s termination clause.
Fourth, the court finds that, when viewed collectively, the ten counties selected for reviews are “representative” of the status of the state as a whole.
Notwithstanding the foregoing findings, the court’s task has not been a simple one. Perhaps, if the court monitor had found that all ten counties had failed or that all had passed the “substantial compliance” inquiry, the court’s job would have been simplified. As it stands, seven counties passed the court monitor’s substantial compliance scrutiny, two of those seven with marginal but, importantly, passing grades, and three did not pass. Given the varied complex facets of the core purposes, many of which are subjective in nature, and the pliancy of the substantial compli-anee standard, particularly in institutional reform cases such as this one, the court’s task has been more complicated. It would be superficial as well to predicate a finding on a pure percentage basis, i.e., to say that a compliance ratio of seven out of ten counties or 70 percent either does or does not equate substantial compliance, and the court does not understand either party to advance such a position. (see Doc. No. 820 at 5, 8.)
Defendant argues that “the overall results” of the 2006 on-site sustainability reviews “[are] impressive and provide solid evidence that (1)[ ] Defendant has sustained compliance with the Consent Decree for an extended period of time and (2) practice under the RC principles is improving across the state.” (Doc. No. 811 at 3.) Just as emphatically, Plaintiffs contend otherwise. After very careful consideration, the court finds that the evidence in the court monitor’s April 2006 Report (Doc. No. 812), when considered against the legal principles governing substantial compliance and other evidence in the record, legalistically tilts in favor of a finding that Defendant has met its burden under prong two of the Consent Decree’s termination clause. The court now turns to a discussion of the evidence, which the court finds appropriately begins with a discussion of DHR’s ratings from the 2006 on-site sustainability reviews in the categories of “overall child status” and “overall performance.” The court, thereafter, will provide a more specific analysis of the evidence as to each of the five core purposes of the Consent Decree; the account of this evidence, however, is not in numerical sequence.
2. Ratings: Overall Child Status and Overall Performance
Defendant maintains that the rating in the category of “overall child status” is the “single most important measure of the effectiveness of the System of Care, because it is the ranking that measures the outcomes for the children under care.” (Doc. No. 811 at 4.) Plaintiffs do not disagree, (see Doc. No. 767 at 11 (stating that the overall child status and overall performance measures “form[ed] the foundation of the Monitor’s determination of compliance” during on-site reviews).) The “overall child status” rating assesses “how well” as a whole a “child [is] presently doing” based on the thirteen child and family status domains which reviewers probe when evaluating a county’s compliance with the requirements of the Consent Decree. (See Ct. Monitor Nov. 2005 Report, Appendix A (Doc. No. 783).) The “overall child status” is measured based upon a “special scoring procedure” which uses a “6-point rating scale.” (Id.)
In line with the parties’ assessment, the court finds that the composite rating attributed to the counties, which were part of the 2006 on-site sustainability reviews, in the category of “overall child status” is a good indicator that, systemwide, children within DHR’s care are safe and are doing well and that DHR is sustaining substantial compliance with the Consent Decree. Impressively, the aggregate “overall child status” rating for all ten counties subject to the 2006 on-site sustainability reviews was 96 percent. (Ct. Monitor’s April 2006 Report at 90, 92 (Doc. No. 812).) Even the three counties which the court monitor found not to be sustaining substantial compliance — Macon, Marshall and Jefferson counties — achieved an aggregate “overall child status” rating of 93 percent. (Id. at 92.) The impressiveness of these ratings is amplified when one considers that, throughout the implementation of the Consent Decree, the court monitor generally has declared a county converted “ ‘when 85% of child status and system performance ratings [were] acceptable during an on-site compliance [review].’ ” R.C.I, 390 F.Supp.2d at 1035; (see also Ct. Monitor April 2006 Report at 4 (Doc. No. 812).)
Moreover, Defendant asserts that the rating in the category of “overall performance” constitutes “the next most important measurement.” (Doc. No. 811 at 4 & n. 4.) This assertion has not been contradicted. The composite rating from the 2006 on-site sustainability reviews in the category of “overall performance” shows marked improvement from the evidence which was before the court when it entered R.C.I. In R.C.I, the limited evidence revealed that fifteen counties had been subjected to QSR reviews and that only three of those counties demonstrated an “overall performance” rating of 85 percent or better and that, “[disturbingly, five of the fifteen counties received ratings of only 25 percent.” 390 F.Supp.2d at 1050 (citing Ct. Monitor Nov. 2004 Report at 35). In the 2006 on-site sustainability reviews; half of the counties scored 90 percent or better, two scored in the eightieth percentile range, and no county scored as low as 25 percent.
S. Core Purpose One
Core purpose one is the prevention of out-of-home placements and the advancement of family unification, but only when at-home placement provides an environment where the child is safe from imminent and serious harm. In R.C. I, the court found that the evidence in the record at that time revealed that the percentage of children in out-of-home care steadily had been increasing since 1995. The court found, though, that there was insufficient explanation in the record as to the cause of the increase. The evidence was mixed and limited as to whether the increase in out-of-home placements was due to regression in DHR’s standard of care or due to a rise in methamphetamine abuse in homes, an external factor outside of DHR’s control. See R.C. I, 390 F.Supp.2d at 1051-52. This limited evidence did not assist this court in determining the cause of the increase.
The court finds that there now is unre-futed evidence indicating that the challenge for counties in the areas of family unification, the prevention of out-of-home placements (and the related goal of achieving permanence in a child’s living situation, a component of core purpose five) has been sparked largely by an external factor, that is, the rapid increase in the use and production of crystal methamphetamine affecting families in Alabama. Some counties have suffered more than others, but all appear to have suffered. For example, in discussing the current methamphetamine epidemic which plagues Jackson County, the court monitor states as follows in his April 2006 Report:
The major issue affecting practice [in Jackson County] is the rapid increase in the presence and use of crystal methamphetamine. Use and production have increased and are seen in homes with multi-generational use. Half of the intakes in Jackson County are attributed to crystal methamphetamine. Increase in the number of labs is posing more health risks for children and for workers.
(Ct. Monitor April 2006 Report at 29 (Doc. No. 812).) Notably, of the ten children who were reviewed in Jackson County, 70 percent of the cases were opened due to substance abuse. (Id. at 3.) In fact, with Conecuh County presenting the only exception, substance abuse by a parent was the leading reason in all counties that a case was opened.
Defendant also has submitted evidence which reveals that the adverse consequences of the methamphetamine boom have been felt systemwide, and the court monitor has “concurred] with DHR’s assessment of the role of methamphetamine[].” (Ct. Monitor Nov. 2005 Report at 52 (Doc. No. 783).) The director of Covington County, for example, attests: “Work with families in home environment seems to have evolved from neglect due to the poverty of being in a rural community to explosive methamphetamine labs.” (Aff., Attach. B to Doc. No. 779-3.) Defendant also submitted the affidavit of Freída Baker (“Baker”), who signed her statement as DHR’s Deputy Director of the Family Services Division. (Baker Aff. — '“Children in Care” at 2 (electronically filed as Ex. 36 to Doc. No. 761).) As noted by Baker, the percentage of children coming into care as a result of substance abuse increased more than 500 percent during the three years preceding the signing of her affidavit, and “[t]he complexity of substance-abusing families presents a national challenge, particularly in the area of crystal-methamphetamine.” (