Sullivan v. Stein (487 F. Supp. 2d 52, 2007)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

KRAVITZ, District Judge.

In this action, Plaintiffs Philip Sullivan and Charlotte Sullivan, pro se, sued twenty-eight defendants, twenty of whom this Court has already dismissed from the case. See Rulings and Orders [docs. ## 141, 212, 234]. The following Defendants remain: Farmington Police Chief Michael Whalen; Farmington Police Officers Troy Williams, Daniel Devine, and Daniel Hebert; and the Town of Farming-ton (collectively, the “Municipal Defendants”); Inspectors Gregory Zigmont and Charles Coffey (collectively, the “State Defendants”); and scrap metal dealer J.W. Green Co., Inc. (“J.W.Green”). Plaintiffs’ claims against the remaining Defendants arise from a dispute between the Sullivans and certain of Mr. Sullivan’s relatives, who were originally among the defendants in this case and whom the Sullivans also sued in Connecticut state court for, among other claims: (1) unlawfully evicting them from a dwelling at 37 Valley View Drive, Farmington, Connecticut (the ‘Valley View residence”); (2) unlawfully entering that residence; and (3) stealing Mr. Sullivan’s bulldozer. This Court has had several occasions to address the Sullivans’ claims and directs readers to its prior opinions for additional background. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Stein, No. Civ. 3:03 CV 1203(MRK), 2005 WL 2209301 (D.Conn. Sept. 12, 2005); Sullivan v. Stein, No. Civ. 3:03 CV 1203(MRK), 2004 WL 1179351 (D.Conn. May 21, 2004). Several state courts have also discussed the Sullivans’ claims against their relatives. See Sullivan v. Delisa, 923 A.2d 760, 101 Conn.App. 605 (2007); State v. Sullivan, No. CR01106675, 2005 WL 895893 (Conn.Super.Ct. Mar. 11, 2005); Sullivan v. Delisa, CVN-009-1831 (Conn.Super. June 10, 2004) (slip op.) (reprinted as State Defendants’ Local Rule 56(a)(1) Statement [doc. #308] Ex. 2) (the “Housing Decision”); Sullivan v. Delisa, CVN-009-1831FA, 2002 WL 523076 (Conn.Super. Jan. 10, 2002).

The Sullivans sue all of the remaining Defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of their rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. In addition to their Fourteenth Amendment claims, the Sullivans also sue: (1) all of the Municipal Defendants for violations of the Connecticut Constitution and for intentional infliction of emotional distress; (2) Defendants Devine and Hebert for violations of the Sullivans’ rights under the Fifth Amendment; (3) the Town of Farmington for violation of their rights under the Fourth Amendment; (4) the State Defendants for violations of their rights under the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments; and (5) J.W. Green for violating Article First of the Connecticut Constitution and for intentional infliction of emotional distress. See Second Amended Civil Rights Complaint [doc. # 251].

Currently pending before the Court are the Municipal Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment [doc. # 297] and the State Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment [doc. #306]. Defendant J.W. Green has not moved for summary judgment. Because the Court finds that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the Municipal and State Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the Court GRANTS the Municipal Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment [doc. #297] and the State Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment [doe. # 306].

I.

As is required on a motion for summary judgment, the Court relates the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs. Further facts will be recited, as needed, in later sections.

Philip and Charlotte Sullivan are the son and daughter-in-law of the late Mary Cro-well, with whom they lived in the Valley View residence from 1970 until the summer of 2000. The events at issue in this case occurred between approximately June 2000 and May 2001, when Mr. Sullivan was arrested on charges of eavesdropping on his mother in violation of Connecticut General Statutes § 53a-189. See Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Municipal Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment [doc. # 317] Ex. E para. 4 (“Pis.’ Mem. In Opp’n to Municipal Defs.”); Plaintiffs’ List of Filings This Date [doc. # 353] Ex. 60.

On June 27, 2000, the Sullivans were informed that Ms. Crowell intended to move from her Valley View residence to a retirement community. See Local Rule 56(a)! Statement [doc. # 308] Ex. 4 at 82-83. The Sullivans were given the option of purchasing the Valley View residence from Ms. Crowell, see id. at 84, but on July 6, 2000, the Sullivans declined the offer to purchase the residence, in order, so they say, to allow Ms. Crowell to receive the full value of her residence for purposes of paying the expenses of her assisted living accommodations, see Housing Decision at 3. Mr. Sullivan announced his decision not to purchase the house while he and his sisters, Maryanne Delisa and Kathryn Hy-land, were present at the Valley View residence. See Pis.’ Mem. In Opp’n to Municipal Defs. [doc. # 317] Ex. E para. 5. When Mr. Sullivan declined to purchase the residence, Ms. Delisa and Ms. Hyland allegedly grew abusive, accusing the Sullivans of never paying rent. See id. In turn, Mr. Sullivan became unwilling to move out of the residence after Ms. Delisa accused Mrs. Sullivan of abusing Ms. Crowell, see Pis.’ List of Filings [doc. #353] Ex. IB para, li, even though the Sullivans claim they were initially amenable to doing so, see Local Rule 56(a)l Statement [doc. #308] Ex. 4 at 84; id. Ex. 5 at 160.

According to Mr. Sullivan, he experienced chest pain on account of his sisters’ accusations. He then left the Valley View residence and was admitted to St. Francis Hospital, where he and his wife spent the night. See Pis.’ Mem. In Opp’n to Municipal Defs. [doc. # 317] Ex. E para, 5.

The next day, on July 7, the Sullivans and their relatives, including Ms. Crowell, returned to the Valley View residence. According to the Sullivans, the family members resumed their verbal assault on the Sullivans. Strong words passed between the Sullivans and their relatives, Ms. Delisa allegedly stuck her finger in Mrs. Sullivan’s face, and Ms. Crowell allegedly poked Mrs. Sullivan with her cane. See Local Rule 56(a)l Statement [doc. #308] Ex. 4 at 73-74. Fearing for Mr. Sullivan’s health and that physical violence might soon erupt, the Sullivans gathered up some of their belongings, left the Valley View residence, and stayed at the home of Mrs. Sullivan’s father. See Pis.’ Mem. In Opp’n to Municipal Defs. [doc. # 317] Ex. A at 37-38. The Sullivans never again stayed overnight at the Valley View residence. See Local Rule 56(a) 1 Statement [doc. # 308] Ex. 6 at 47.

A. The July 11 Incident Involving the Municipal Defendants

Four days later, on July 11, 2000, the Sullivans again returned to the Valley View residence. Ms. Delisa, her husband Thomas Delisa, and Ms. Hyland were already on the premises. See id. Ex. 4 at 33. Ms. Crowell apparently was not present. See id. at 34. Mr. Sullivan claims that Ms. Delisa again verbally accosted the Sullivans. She also accused the Sullivans of abandoning the residence and of never paying rent, she told the Sullivans that the house had been sold, and she ordered the Sullivans to vacate the premises. See id. Ex. 5 at 48. Mr. Sullivan responded by telling the Delisas and Ms. Hyland to leave the residence and, when they refused, Mr. Sullivan called the Farmington Police Department, requesting protection and assistance to remove his relatives from the Valley View residence. See id. Ex. 4 at 17-18. Farmington Police Officer Daniel Devine soon arrived, followed shortly thereafter by Chief Michael Whalen and Officer Troy Williams. See id. at 17, 20.

Mr. Sullivan informed the police that he and his wife were the lawful occupants of the Valley View residence, that his relatives were trespassing and harassing them, and that his relatives had no right to be on the premises. See id. at 26-28. Mr. Sullivan’s relatives thereupon produced a key to the residence, which Ms. Delisa claimed Ms. Crowell had given them. See id. at 27, 34-35. Ms. Delisa also stated that Ms. Crowell had given them permission to be on the premises. See id. at 35. Mr. Sullivan’s relatives told the police that Mr. Sullivan was not a tenant, had never paid rent, and had never done anything around the house. See id. at 25-26.

In order to demonstrate the work he had done around the residence, Mr. Sullivan took Officer Williams to the backyard. See id. at 26. There, he showed the officer tree limbs that Mr. Sullivan had removed with his bulldozer following a recent storm. The bulldozer was parked behind the house. While behind the house, Mr. Sullivan pleaded with Officer Williams to remove his family members from the Valley View residence and told him that the situation might become violent. See id. Ex. 5 at 58. However, to the Sullivans’ consternation, the officers did not remove Mr. Sullivan’s relatives from the premises. Rather, pointing to the fact that the relatives had a key for the premises and claimed to have the permission of Ms. Crowell — the residence’s owner — to be there, the police informed Mr. Sullivan that he would need to retain a lawyer and go to civil court in order to resolve his differences over the residence with his family members. See id. According to Mr. Sullivan, the officers also told him not to call the police again about his dispute with his family over the property. See Pis.’ Mem. In Opp’n to Municipal Defs. [doc. # 317] Ex. E paras. 11, 16. At this point, again allegedly fearing physical violence and concerned about Mr. Sullivan’s health, the Sullivans left the property, taking several changes of clothing and no more. See Local Rule 56(a)l Statement [doc. # 308] Ex. 5 at 64. The Sullivans returned to the house of Mrs. Sullivan’s father. See id. Ex. 6 at 37-38.

On July 20, 2000 and July 31, 2000, Ms. Crowell left phone messages for Mr. Sullivan advising him that she would be renting the Valley View residence and directing him to remove his belongings before August 6, 2000, when the door locks to the residence would be changed. See Pis.’ List of Filings [doc. # 353] Ex. IB para. 3; id. Ex. 11 at 125-26. Ms. Crowell also sent a letter to the Sullivans, which they received, advising them to remove their belongings by the August 6th date. See Pis.’ List of Filings [doc. #353] Ex. IB para. 9a. On August 1, 2000, the Sullivans entered into a lease for an apartment in Newington, Connecticut, in which they have continuously lived since that date. See Local Rule 56(a) 1 Statement [doc. #308] Ex. 5 at 16-17. While it is clear that the Sullivans have remained at the apartment in Newington for over six years, they consistently characterize it as a “temporary shelter from the cold, the rain and the elements,” and maintain that they never ceased residing at the Valley View residence. See, e.g., Pis.’ Mem. In Opp’n to Municipal Defs. [doc. # 317] Ex. D at 16-18.

On July 30, 2000, Mr. Sullivan replied by letter to Ms. Crowell’s messages, warning her not to move his belongings and directing her to inform any purchaser of the property of his tenancy at the Valley View residence. See Pis.’ List of Filings [doc. #353] Ex. 43. On August 20, 2000, Mr. Sullivan received a letter from Ms. Cro-well’s attorney, who renewed Ms. Crowell’s demand that the Sullivans move out and warned them that the locks to the residence would soon be changed. See id. Ex. IB para. 16. The Sullivans returned to the Valley View residence (though never stayed the night) several times between July 11, 2000, and September 7, 2000, on which date Mr. Sullivan discovered that his key to the residence no longer opened the door. See Local Rule 56(a)l Statement [doc. # 308] Ex. 6 at 47; Pis.’ List of Filings [doc. # 353] Ex. IB para. 18. Despite receiving multiple warnings and having many opportunities to do so, the Sulli-vans never removed their possessions from the Valley View residence or removed Mr. Sullivan’s bulldozer from the property. See Local Rule 56(a)! Statement [doc. OO -a ZD OO Ol 5 * OO OO o OO

B. The September 7 Incident Involving the Municipal Defendants

On September 7, 2000, Mr. Sullivan again returned to the Valley View residence, which Ms. Crowell had transferred by quitclaim deed to Ms. Delisa and Ms. Hyland on July 25, 2000. See Pis.’ Mem. In Opp’n to Municipal Defs. [doc. # 317] Ex. O. Mr. Sullivan discovered that the locks had been changed and also that his bulldozer was no longer in the backyard. See Local Rule 56(a)l Statement [doc. # 308] Ex. 4 at 45, 87-88. He immediately called the Farmington police, and Officer Daniel Hebert arrived at the residence a few minutes later. Mr. Sullivan told Officer Hebert that his bulldozer had been stolen. Officer Hebert asked Mr. Sullivan whether he could verify his ownership of the bulldozer, and Mr. Sullivan responded that he had papers attesting his ownership, but that the papers were located in the Valley View residence and that his key no longer opened the door. See Pis.’ Mem. In Opp’n to Municipal Defs. [doc. # 317] Ex. J at 47. Officer Hebert also confirmed that, while Mr. Sullivan claimed that he still lived at the Valley View residence, his contact address was at his father-in-law’s house in Newington. See Local Rule 56(a) 1 Statement [doc. # 308] Ex. 4 at 50.

Officer Hebert then radioed for another officer, and Officer Devine soon appeared on the scene. Mr. Sullivan claims that Officer Devine informed him that he knew where Mr. Sullivan’s bulldozer was, and he warned Mr. Sullivan that if he did not actually own the bulldozer, Mr. Sullivan would be arrested. See id. Mr. Sullivan never heard back from either Officer Hebert or Officer Devine regarding the whereabouts of his bulldozer, and Mr. Sullivan eventually requested a copy of the police report of the incident. See Pis.’ Mem. In Opp’n to Municipal Defs. [doc. # 317] Ex. E para. 28. When he received the police report, Mr. Sullivan discovered that Officer Hebert had interviewed Mr. Delisa, who admitted that he had removed the bulldozer at Ms. Crowell’s request, had sold the bulldozer for scrap value, and had given the sale proceeds to Ms. Crowell. See id. (attached incident report). The police report also noted, falsely according to the Sullivans, that Mr. Sullivan had moved from the Valley View residence and was engaged in longstanding litigation with his family members. See id.

The Sullivans then filed an entry and detainer action against their relatives in state court on September 18, 2000. The background to that action is described in Sullivan v. Delisa, 2002 WL 523076, in which Judge Juliett Crawford of the Connecticut Superior Court denied the Sullivans’ application for a prejudgment remedy in the amount of $ 231,251.00 against Ms. Delisa, Ms. Hyland, and Ms. Crowell. Judge Crawford rejected this application, in part because she found that “[t]he evidence presented [was] not indicative of a landlord-tenant relationship” between the Sullivans and Ms. Crowell. Sullivan v. Delisa, 2002 WL 523076, at *6. Two years later, in a ruling on the merits of the Sullivans’ entry and detainer action, state Superior Court Judge Angelos dos Santos credited testimony given by the late Ms. Crowell that Mr. Sullivan told her he would move out of the Valley View residence on July 7, 2000, and that he and Mrs. Sullivan had abandoned the residence that evening. Accordingly, Judge dos Santos found as a matter of fact that the Sullivans had no possessory interest in the Valley View residence after July 7, 2000. See Housing Decision at 10-12. Judge dos Santos also made a number of other factual findings that are relevant to this case and that are discussed below. The Sullivans promptly appealed Judge dos Santos’s decision, and the Connecticut Appellate Court issued an advance release opinion affirming Judge dos Santos’s opinion on May 30, 2007. That opinion will be officially published on June 5, 2007.

C. The Incidents Involving the State Defendants

At all relevant times, Gregory Zigmont and Charles Coffey were Inspectors assigned to the State of Connecticut Statewide Prosecution Bureau of the Office of the Chief State’s Attorney. See Local Rule 56(a)l Statement [doc. # 808] Ex. 8 para. 2; id. Ex. 9 para. 2. On September 29, 2000, Inspectors Zigmont and Coffey went to the Valley View residence in response to a criminal complaint against Mr. Sullivan that James Hyland — Ms. Cro-well’s son-in-law — had submitted on behalf of Ms. Crowell to the Connecticut Department of Civil Justice sometime after September 14, 2000. See id. Ex. 8 para. 5; id. Ex. 4 at 92-94. The complaint accused Mr. Sullivan of illegally taping Ms. Crowell’s telephone conversations without her permission. See Pis.’ List of Filings [doc. # 353] Ex. 29.

Inspectors Zigmont and Coffey specifically went to the Valley View residence in order to meet with Mr. Hyland, whom Ms. Crowell had directed them to contact and who suggested meeting at the Valley View residence. See id.; Local Rule 56(a)l Statement [doc. # 308] Ex. 7 para. 39. Mr. Hyland explained to Inspectors Zig-mont and Coffey that he believed that the Sullivans had abandoned the premises and their belongings in early July, that the locks to the house had later been changed, that the Sullivans did not have keys or access to the premises, that the Sullivans had recently filed an entry and detainer action against his family in the Connecticut Housing Court, and that he had authority to consent to the Inspectors looking around the entirety of the house. See id. paras. 44-46. Mr. Hyland then explained to the Inspectors that he, his wife Kathryn, and the Delisas had found several audiotapes while cleaning up the house after the events of July 11, 2000, and that several of these audiotapes contained conversations between Ms. Crowell and her children. See Pis.’ List of Filings [doc. # 353] Ex. 4. Mr. Hyland informed Inspector Zigmont that neither he nor Ms. Cro-well had consented to the taping of one conversation that Mr. Hyland provided to them. See id. Ex. 3 at 1; Local Rule 56(a)l Statement [doc. # 308] Ex. 7 para. 19.

Mr. Hyland also told the Inspectors of several alterations that had been made to the telephone wires within the Valley View residence that Mr. Hyland did not believe to be the work of the telephone company. See id. Ex. 8 paras. 20-21. These alterations consisted of “some junction boxes that were apparently added on to the phone system,” Local Rule 56(a)l Statement [doc. #308] para. 90, and “a telephone junction box that was nailed to a wall, some sort of phone line switching box as well as some headphones,” id. para. 91. Mr. Hyland, an engineer, said that he believed that Mr. Sullivan had used this equipment to record and listen to Ms. Cro-well’s phone calls, as evidenced by the audiotapes. See Pis.’ List of Filings [doc. # 353] Ex. 53 at 2. Mr. Hyland gave the Inspectors three audiotapes on September 29, 2000, see Local Rule 56(a)l Statement [doc. # 308] Ex. 8 para. 36, which was the only property the Inspectors removed from the property on this date, and he also showed them the alterations to the phone lines, as well as the garage and den, in which all of the Sullivans’ belongings were then stored, see id. para. 34.

On January 8, 2000, Inspector Zigmont interviewed Ms. Crowell and her son Martin. See id. paras. 41, 47. Inspector Zig-mont played for Ms. Crowell one of the tapes that Mr. Hyland had given to him, and he took a sworn statement from Ms. Crowell, in which she stated that she had not consented to the taping of her conversation. See Pis.’ List of Filings [doc. # 353] Ex. 3. Ms. Crowell also stated that on one occasion, she spoke on the telephone with her son Martin about a missing safe deposit key and that the key had mysteriously re-appeared in its accustomed place the following day. See id. Martin Crowell corroborated the telephone conversation. See Local Rule 56(a)! Statement [doc. # 308] para. 126.

On January 22, 2001, Inspector Zigmont returned to the Valley View residence, but he did not enter the house. From the exterior of the home, he looked through a window into the den and garage and saw a black box with headphones and a box of audiotapes sitting on the interior den windowsill. The next day, he completed an application for a search warrant for the Valley View residence in order to retrieve the items left on the windowsill, as well as any other pertinent evidence. Inspector Zigmont submitted this warrant application on January 23, 2001, and it was granted by Connecticut Superior Court Judge Douglas S. Lavine on that date. See Pis.’ List of Filings [doc. # 353] Ex. 53 at 5. Inspector Zigmont executed the warrant on January 25, 2001, and removed the black box, headphones, and audiotapes from the Valley View residence. See Local Rule 56(a)l Statement [doc. # 308] Ex. 8 paras. 60-61.

Some of these audiotapes allegedly contained the political opinions of Mr. Sullivan. The Sullivans allege that, at some point in time, Inspectors Zigmont and Coffey “observed, read and listened to plaintiff Philip Sullivan’s political writings and expressions set forth in his seized cassette tapes.” See Second Am. Civil Rights Compl. [doc. #251] at 26-27. According to the Sullivans, these writings “dare to reveal a magnitude of corrupt subversive mis-information and government conduct.” Id. at 27.

On April 3, 2001, Inspector Zigmont again interviewed Ms. Crowell and also interviewed Ms. Hyland. See Pis.’ List of Filings [doc. # 353] Ex. 59. After listening to a tape previously given to Inspector Zigmont by Mr. Hyland, both Ms. Crowell and Ms. Hyland signed sworn statements that the voices on the tape were theirs and that they had not given consent to the recording of the tape. See id. On April 19, 2001, Inspector Zigmont again spoke to Mr. Hyland, who told Inspector Zigmont that he had found a sales catalog and video for what Mr. Hyland described as eavesdropping and surveillance equipment, and that these items were still in the Valley View residence. See Pis.’ List of Filings [doc. #353] Ex. 16 at 2A. Mr. Hyland stated that within this catalog was a bill of sale with an attached credit card receipt that was filled out in the name of Philip Sullivan, see id. at 3, and that the catalog had handwritten notes next to certain eavesdropping devices. On the basis of this information, Inspector Zigmont completed an application for another search warrant application, which appears to have been granted by the Superior Court on April 19, 2001. See id. at 5. Inspector Zigmont executed the second warrant on April 20, 2001, and he removed the sales catalog and video from the residence. See Local Rule 56(a)l Statement [doc. #308] Ex. 8 paras. 76-80.

Inspector Zigmont completed an application for Mr. Sullivan’s arrest on May 10, 2001. The warrant application was signed by Assistant State’s Attorney Terri Sonne-mann, see Pis.’ List of Filings [doe. # 353] Ex. 17; Local Rule 56(a)l Statement [doc. # 308] Ex. 8 para. 89, and was granted by Connecticut Superior Judge Wendy Susco on May 17, 2001, see id. para. 90.

Inspector Zigmont arrested Mr. Sullivan on criminal eavesdropping charges on May 25, 2001. See id. para. 91. The criminal proceedings were continued for four years while the Sullivans’ entry and detainer suit was litigated in Housing Court. See Local Rule 56(a)l Statement [doc. #308] Ex. 6 at 71; Pis.’ List of Filings [doe. # 353] Ex. 22B at 1. The State ultimately entered a plea of nolle prosequi on the eavesdropping charges on April 1, 2005, following both the death of Ms. Crowell and a ruling by a Superior Court judge that her pre-death statements would be inadmissible in the trial of Mr. Sullivan. See Pis.’ List of Filings [doc. # 353] Ex. 24; State v. Sullivan, 2005 WL 895893.

D. The Filing of This Action

The Sullivans filed this action on July 10, 2003, before resolution of them housing action and the criminal case against Mr. Sullivan. After the Court granted motions to dismiss filed by a majority of the original defendants, see Rulings and Orders [docs. ## 141, 212, 234], the Court permitted Plaintiffs to file their Second Amended Civil Rights Complaint [doc. # 251], which they untimely filed on October 3, 2005. The Court nevertheless accepted the complaint.

In motions to this Court and during the course of their depositions, the Sullivans later opposed the taking of discovery on certain subjects because they contended that the requested discovery might jeopardize their housing claims, should they prevail on their appeal of Judge dos Santos’s 2004 ruling. On October 11, 2006 and December 21, 2006, the Municipal and State Defendants filed their respective motions for summary judgment. The Sulli-vans moved for an extension of time for the filing of their response to the Municipal Defendants’ motion until the Court ruled on their motion to compel, which they had filed on October 10, 2006. See Motion for Discovery Intervention [doc. # 293]. The Court granted the motion for extension. See Plaintiffs’ Motion for Extension of Time [doc. # 301]; Order [doc. # 303]. On November 21, 2006, the Court denied Plaintiffs’ Motion for Discovery Intervention. See Ruling on Motion to Compel [doc. # 305]. The Sullivans claimed never to have received that ruling, because when they received the State Defendants’ motion for summary judgment in December, they informed the Court that they would not respond to that motion either until the Court had ruled on their Motion for Discovery Intervention. See Plaintiffs’ Notice to the Court & Defendants [doc. # 312]. The Court again allowed the Sulli-vans additional time to respond to both summary judgment motions, even though it had ruled on their motion to compel nearly two months before. See Order [doc. # 313],

On January 22, 2006, the Sullivans moved for a further extension of time, see [doc. # 314], and the Court granted them an additional month in which to respond to the summary judgment motions, see [doc. # 315]. On the day before their extended deadline, the Sullivans filed an opposition to the Municipal Defendants’ motion, see [doc. # 316], moved to strike the State Defendants’ motion and to stay the pending action, see [doc. # 320], and moved to amend their complaint yet again to add another theory of liability against the Town of Farmington, see [doc. # 321]. The Court denied both motions and directed the Sullivans to respond to the State Defendants’ motion on or before March 30, 2007. See Ruling and Order [doc. # 327].

On April 3, 2007, the Sullivans filed an untimely and incomplete response to the State Defendants’ Motion, informing the Court and the Defendants that they would supplement their memorandum in one week’s time with footnotes and exhibits. The Court permitted the filing. See [docs. # # 347, 348]. The Sullivans also moved at that time to strike three exhibits submitted by the State Defendants. On April 9, 2007, the Sullivans filed their amended response to the State Defendants’ motion. State Defendants filed their reply on April 23, 2007. The Sullivans, without seeking leave, filed a sur-reply on May 7, 2007. The Court nevertheless has considered all of the Sullivans’ filings in its analysis of the Defendants’ summary judgment motions.

II.

The summary judgment standard is a familiar one. Summary judgment is appropriate only when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). “A dispute regarding a material fact is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Williams v. Utica College of Syracuse Univ., 453 F.3d 112, 116 (2d Cir.2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The substantive law governing the case will identify those facts that are material, and ‘only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.’ ” Bouboulis v. Transp. Workers Union of Am., 442 F.3d 55, 59 (2d Cir.2006) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). The moving party bears the burden of demonstrating that no genuine issue exists as to any material fact, see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-25, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986), and the Court must draw all ambiguities and inferences in favor of Plaintiffs, see Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505. If the moving party carries its burden, the party opposing summary judgment “may not rest upon mere allegations or denials.... ” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). Rather, the opposing party must “set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. In short, the nonmoving party “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). “If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

Where one party is proceeding pro se, the court reads the pro se party’s papers liberally and interprets them to raise the strongest arguments suggested therein. See Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir.2006). Despite this liberal interpretation, however, a “bald assertion,” unsupported by evidence, cannot overcome a properly supported motion for summary judgment. Carey v. Crescenzi, 923 F.2d 18, 21 (2d Cir.1991).

The Court notes two preliminary matters. First, in their brief, the Sullivans represented to the Court that they no longer intend to pursue any claims against the Municipal Defendants under the Connecticut Constitution. See Pis.’ Mem. In Opp’n to Municipal Defs. [doc. # 317] at 45. Therefore, the Court will grant judgment for the Municipal Defendants on the Sullivans’ claims based upon the Connecticut Constitution.

Second, all moving Defendants argue that the Sullivans are collaterally es-topped from denying or attacking certain factual findings made by Judge dos Santos in his 2004 opinion in the entry and detain-er action, and that Judge dos Santos’s findings preclude a reasonable jury from returning a verdict for the Sullivans on any of their federal claims. The Court has already ruled that some of the determinations reached by Judge dos Santos have preclusive effect in this action, and the Court will not repeat its prior ruling here. See Ruling and Order [doc. # 327]; Sullivan v. Stein, 2005 WL 2209301, at *3. Suffice it to say that the Court holds that the Sullivans are bound by the following rulings of Judge dos Santos:

(1) the Sullivans did not have a possession of the Valley View residence after July 7, 2000, see Housing Decision at 10-12;

(2) the Sullivans were at no time the tenants of Ms. Crowell, see id. at 9-10;

(3) the Sullivans’ “possession of the master bedroom or family room or the other portions of the property was not exclusive,” id. at 11;

(4) the Sullivans “by their actions abandoned their possession of the” Valley View residence “as defined in Section 47a-43” of the Connecticut General Statutes, id. at 12;

(5) the Sullivans’ family members “did not violate the provisions of’ Connecticut General Statutes § 47a-16, id. at 13; and

(6) the Sullivans “had ample opportunity to remove the bulldozer and their personal property from the property, but admitted they had no intention of removing their belongings from the property. ... Consequently, the plaintiffs have failed to prove ... that their personal belongings were stolen by” their relatives, id. at 15.

However, in their briefs, the Sullivans argue, once again, that the Defendants cannot rely on any issues decided by Judge dos Santos because the Sullivans are appealing his decision. As the Court has already noted, however, the Connecticut Appellate Court has issued an advance release opinion affirming Judge dos Santos’s opinion.

Moreover, to the extent that the Sulli-vans may now attempt to argue that they may still appeal the most recent ruling to the Connecticut Supreme Court, their argument still fails. As this Court has previously stated in its Ruling [doc. # 327] on their Motion to Strike State Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion for a Temporary Stay [doc. # 320], the fact that the Sullivans may appeal a lower court’s decision does not alter the Court’s conclusion that Judge dos Santos’s findings are entitled to preclusive effect in this action, unless and until they are reversed on appeal. See LaBow v. Rubin, 95 Conn.App. 454, 467, 897 A.2d 136 (App.Ct.2006) (“[T]he plaintiffs pending appeal in the partition action does not preclude the application of collateral estoppel to her quiet title count.”); Camemolla v. Walsh, 75 Con.App. 319, 327-28, 815 A.2d 1251 (App.Ct.2003) (“Because collateral estop-pel is a much narrower aspect of res judi-cata, and a pending appeal does not preclude the application of res judicata, we conclude that the plaintiffs pending appeal in the criminal action did not preclude the defensive application of collateral estoppel in the civil action.”). The foregoing issues were “actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, and [were] essential to the judgment.” LaSalla v. Doctor’s Assocs., 278 Conn. 578, 587, 898 A.2d 803 (2006). Therefore, the Court will not allow the Sullivans to relitigate those issues in this case. The import of this conclusion is that the vast majority of the Sullivans’ claims are precluded by Judge dos Santos’s factual findings. There are, nevertheless, multiple reasons for why the Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the majority of the Sullivans’ claims, as the Court discusses more fully below.

III. Section 1983 Claims Against the Municipal Defendants

The Sullivans’ claims against the Municipal Defendants arise from two incidents, each of which will be discussed below: (1) the participation of Chief Whalen and Officers Williams and Devine in an alleged constructive eviction of the Sullivans from the Valley View residence on July 11, 2000; and (2) the investigation by Officers De-vine and Hebert into Mr. Sullivan’s report that his bulldozer was stolen from the Valley View residence on September 7, 2000.

A. Claims Arising From July 11, 2000 Incident

According to the Sullivans, the basis for their claims arising from the July 11 incident is their “contention that the defendants did not ‘protect’ them from [Mr. Sullivan’s relatives,] Maryanne Delisa, Thomas Delisa and Kathryn Hyland by failing to remove the Delisas and Hyland from [the Valley View residence] or arrest them” on July 11, 2000. Local Rule 56(a)l Statement [doc. #299] para. 22. Furthermore, notwithstanding Judge dos Santos’s factual findings as to their status after July 7, 2000, the Sullivans still maintain that they were tenants of Ms. Crowell and that they have remained in lawful possession of the Valley View residence up to this very day. Thus, the Sullivans maintain that Chief Whalen and Officers Williams and Devine took part in the unlawful eviction of the Sullivans by their relatives on July 11, 2000, when the officers failed to remove the Sullivans’ family members from what the Sullivans claim is their Valley View residence. These actions purportedly violated the Sullivans’ equal protection and due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as their Fourth Amendment rights, because they were allegedly deprived of their property interests and of the quiet enjoyment of the Valley View residence that they claim is guaranteed to them by the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Connecticut General Statutes §§ 47a-16, 47a-23, 47a-43, and 53a-108. The actions allegedly giving rise to these claims also purportedly made the Sullivans more vulnerable to the later actions of the State Defendants by enhancing the confidence of Mr. Sullivan’s relatives and spurring them to further abuse the Sullivans. Thus, the Sullivans also assert that the Municipal Defendants are responsible for any subsequent harm the couple sustained.

1. Equal Protection Claim

In asserting their equal protection claim, the Sullivans do not allege and have not demonstrated that they belong to a protected class and were denied equal protection on that basis. Rather, the Sullivans appear to assert a class-of-one equal protection claim under Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 120 S.Ct. 1073, 145 L.Ed.2d 1060 (2000) (per curiam). The Sullivans argue that Municipal Defendants refused to remove the Sullivan relatives— whom they paint as the agents of their landlord, Ms. Crowell — from the Valley View residence, but granted a similar remedy to another unknown and unidentified tenant in the Town of Farmington. See Local Rule 56(a)l Statement [doc. # 299] Ex. B at 60-62. Mr. Sullivan alleges that he was told about this incident involving the unidentified tenant by Mr. Delisa, who allegedly locked out this tenant, only to be rebuffed and ordered to restore the tenant by unnamed Farmington police officers. See id. at 61-62.

For their Olech claim to withstand summary judgment, the Sullivans must produce evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that Chief Whalen and Officers Williams and Devine intentionally treated the Sullivans differently in comparison to other similarly-situated individuals and that the differential treatment was irrational and wholly arbitrary. See Clubside, Inc. v. Valentin, 468 F.3d 144, 158-160 (2d Cir.2006) (“[Plaintiffs state an equal protection claim where they allege that they were intentionally treated differently from other similarly-situated individuals without any rational basis.”); Neilson v. D’Angelis, 409 F.3d 100, 104 (2d Cir.2005) (“In order to succeed on a ‘class of one’ claim, the level of similarity between plaintiffs and the persons with whom they compare themselves must be extremely high.”); see also Blackhawk Sec., Inc. v. Town of Hamden, No. 3:03CV2101 (MRK), 2005 WL 1719918, at *4 (D.Conn. July 20, 2005) (“[A]n Olech plaintiff must establish [that] (i) no rational person could regard the circumstances of the plaintiff to differ from those of a comparator to the degree that would justify the differential treatment on the basis of a legitimate government policy; and (ii) the similarity in circumstances and difference in treatment are sufficient to exclude the possibility that the defendant acted on the basis of a mistake.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

There is no evidence, let alone admissible evidence, to support a jury finding for the Sullivans on their Olech equal protection claim. First, Judge dos Santos found as a fact that on July 11, 2000, the Sulli-vans were not tenants of Ms. Crowell, and, indeed had never been tenants. Therefore, even assuming that there were admissible evidence regarding the supposedly better-treated individual to whom the Sullivans seek to compare themselves (and there is no such admissible evidence), the Sullivans are not “prima facie identical” to that individual, as is required by the Second Circuit. See Neilson, 409 F.3d at 105 (“The similarity and equal protection inquiries are thus virtually one and the same in such a ‘class of one’ case, and the standard for determining whether another person’s circumstances are similar to the plaintiffs must be ... whether they are ‘prima facie identical.’ ”); Blackhawk Sea, Inc., 2005 WL 1719918, at *5 (“[T]he relevant question is whether flaggers and uniformed police officers are so similar that no rational person could regard their differential treatment as justified on the basis of a legitimate governmental policy.”).

Second, the Sullivans do not even allege, let alone offer any evidence, that any of the Municipal Defendants before this Court were involved in the incident with the unidentified tenant in Farmington that Mr. Sullivan describes. Simply put, the Sullivans have presented no evidence that Chief Whalen and Officers Williams and Devine treated any other similarly-situated individual differently from the Sullivans. Therefore, the Court GRANTS the Municipal Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment [doc. # 297] as to Plaintiffs’ claims under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

2. Fourth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Claims

“To prevail on a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege (1) ‘that some person has deprived him of a federal right,’ and (2) ‘that the person who has deprived him of that right acted under color of state ... law.’ ” Velez v. Levy, 401 F.3d 75, 84 (2d Cir.2005) (citing Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640, 100 S.Ct. 1920, 64 L.Ed.2d 572 (1980) (alteration in original)). “An official acts under color of state law for Section 1983 purposes when the official exercises a power possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is cloaked with the authority of state law.” Colombo v. O’Connell, 310 F.3d 115, 117-18 (2d Cir.2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The Fourth Amendment, which applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits ‘unreasonable ... seizures,’ ” Bryant v. City of N. Y, 404 F.3d 128, 136 (2d Cir.2005) (citing U.S. Const. amend IV) (alteration in original and internal citation omitted), and the relevant test “is one of objective reasonableness,” id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “A seizure of property ... occurs when there is some meaningful interference with an individual’s possessory interests in that property.” Soldal v. Cook County, Illinois, 506 U.S. 56, 61, 113 S.Ct. 538, 121 L.Ed.2d 450 (1992) (internal quotation marks omitted).

To succeed on a Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claim, the Sulli-vans must demonstrate “(1) that [they] had a valid property interest ..., and (2) that the defendants infringed that property interest in an arbitrary or irrational manner.” Clubside, Inc., 468 F.3d at 152 (internal quotation marks omitted). However, the Second Circuit has “said that a substantive due process claim requires more: To trigger liability, a police officer’s action must ‘shock[ ] the conscience.’ ” Russo v. City of Bridgeport, 479 F.3d 196, 209-10 (2d Cir.2007) (quoting County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846, 118 S.Ct. 1708, 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1998) (alteration in original)). “That is, it must be ‘arbitrary in the constitutional sense.’ ” Id. (quoting O’Connor v. Pierson, 426 F.3d 187, 203 (2d Cir.2005) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

Thus, both the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims require the Sullivans to demonstrate that they had a protectable property interest. The Sullivans appear to claim that they had a such an interest in the security and quiet enjoyment of the Valley View residence and that Municipal Defendants denied them those rights either by cooperating with Mr. Sullivan’s relatives in the Sullivans’ constructive eviction from the Valley View residence on July 11, 2000, or by failing to remove the Sullivans’ relatives from the residence. Whether analyzed under the Fourth Amendment or Fourteenth Amendment, the Sullivans’ due process claim has no merit for several reasons.

To begin with, the Court has considerable doubt that the Sullivans had any pro-tectable property interest in the Valley View residence. After all, Judge dos Santos ruled that the Sullivans were at no time Ms. Crowell’s tenants at the Valley View residence, that they did not hold possession of the premises on July 11, 2000, and that they had abandoned the property by that time. See Housing Decision at 11-12. Accordingly, the Sullivans appear to have lacked even a possessory interest in the residence as of July 11, only further undermining their Fourth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment claims. See Soldal, 506 U.S. at 61, 113 S.Ct. 538 (“A seizure of property ... occurs when there is some meaningful interference with an individual’s possessory interests in that property.”) (emphasis added and internal quotation marks omitted); Ostensen v. Suffolk County, 378 F.Supp.2d 140, 148 (E.D.N.Y.2005) (“Without being able to establish that she had possessory interest in the house, the Plaintiff cannot successfully maintain an unreasonable seizure claim”), aff'd, — Fed.Appx. -, 2007 WL 1492856 (2d Cir.2007); Ansell v. D’Alesio, 485 F.Supp.2d 80, 85, 2007 WL 1229088, at *5 (D.Conn.2007) (‘“To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire and more than a unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.’ ” (quoting Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 756, 125 S.Ct. 2796, 162 L.Ed.2d 658 (2005) (internal quotation marks omitted))).

Second, and in any event, the Sullivans have produced no evidence that it was the Municipal Defendants’ actions that deprived the Sullivans of any alleged property interest. Importantly, the Sullivans do not claim that the Municipal Defendants themselves physically removed the Sulli-vans or ejected them from the Valley View premises. See, e.g., Pis.’ Local Rule 56(a)2 Statement [doc. # 318] para. 19. To the contrary, it is clear from the record that all the police did was inform the Sullivans that they would have to proceed through the civil courts in order to establish their claim to the Valley View residence. The officers’ mere presence at the scene of this family dispute does not constitute state action sufficient to trigger either Fourth or Fourteenth Amendment protection. See, e.g., Barrett v. Harwood, 189 F.3d 297, 302 (2d Cir.1999) (discussing the issue of when “an officer’s presence and activities at the scene of a repossession become state action”); Sullivan v. Stein, 2004 WL 1179351, at *35 (“[W]hen analyzing allegations of state action, the court must begin ‘by identifying the specific conduct of which the plaintiff complains.’ ” (quoting Szekeres v. Schaeffer, 304 F.Supp.2d. 296, 306 (D.Conn.2004) (internal quotation marks omitted))).

In Harwood, for example, the plaintiffs alleged that a police officer “had a duty to advise [the repossessor] to cease repossessing their truck and to proceed through legal action. According to the [plaintiffs], Officer Durant aided in the unlawful repossession through his conduct and threat of arrest.” 189 F.3d at 300-01. For instead of complying with the plaintiffs’ request, the police officer “informed the [plaintiffs] that the repossession was a civil matter in which he could not get involved.” Id. at 303. In rejecting the plaintiffs’ claim, the Second Circuit first looked to other courts’ decisions on the “spectrum of police involvement at the scene of a repossession.” Id. at 302. As the court explained, “[a]t one end of the spectrum is de minimus police involvement .... [such as] a police officer’s mere presence at the scene[, which] is insufficient to constitute state action.” Id. (emphasis added). The Second Circuit stated that, in deciding whether the actions of police officers at the scene of a repossession rise to the level of state action,

the crucial question is whether the police officer was (1) present simply to stand by in case there was a breach of the peace, or (2) taking an active role that either affirmatively assisted in the repossession over the debtor’s objection or intentionally intimidated the debtor so as to prevent him from exercising his legal right to object to the repossession.

Id. at 302-03. In answering that critical question, the Second Circuit held that the police officer’s actions “amounted to no more than the carrying out of his duty to prevent violence in the event of a breach of the peace and that there was no state action to facilitate the repossession.” Id. at 303; see also id. at 302 (quoting Menchaca v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 613 F.2d 507, 510-12 (5th Cir.1980) (no state action where police officers informed the plaintiff that “ ‘repossession was a civil matter,’ ” even though plaintiff claimed that one officer threatened to arrest him)).

Here, the facts are even less favorable for the Sullivans than they were for the plaintiffs in Harwood. For there was no attempt by the police to remove the Sulli-vans from the premises and no threat of arrest if the Sullivans did not leave. Rather, the Municipal Defendants — faced with a family dispute — wisely and properly informed the Sullivans that they would need to proceed through the civil courts to resolve their property claim. While the Sul-livans argue that the Municipal Defendants should have removed the Sullivans’ relatives from the Valley View residence or arrested them, the police “have no responsibility to clarify property rights, are not trained to do so, and follow a standard procedure of telling disputing property owners to seek a civil remedy because they seldom know when called to a property dispute who the real owners are” or “the precise nature of their rights.” Longmoor v. Nilsen, 329 F.Supp.2d 289, 302 (D.Conn. 2004).

The Sullivans principally rely on the Supreme Court’s decision in Soldal in support of their claim that the Municipal Defendants’ actions deprived them of them alleged interest in the Valley View residence. See 506 U.S. 56, 113 S.Ct. 538, 121 L.Ed.2d 450. In Soldal, a tenant sued his landlord, a mobile home park owner, the park manager, five deputy sheriffs, and a deputy lieutenant for violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments caused by the removal of the tenant’s mobile home from the mobile home park without a valid eviction order. The private defendants in that case called the local sheriffs to keep the peace while the mobile home was dismantled and physically removed from the park. The deputy sheriffs informed the tenant that they would prevent him from interfering with the removal. And a deputy lieutenant declined to accept a complaint of criminal trespass from the tenant because the removal was a civil matter between the tenant and the park owner. The Supreme Court held that the officers’ involvement in the forcible removal of the mobile home constituted a “seizure” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.

Soldal is distinguishable from the present case in several salient ways. For one, Soldal had a valid tenancy and an indisputable possessory interest in his home. For another, the officers in Soldal knew that the private defendants did not have an eviction order and that their actions in removing the home were illegal, and the officers had known this for some period of time before the actual date of removal. See id. at 58-59, 113 S.Ct. 538. In this case, by contrast, there is no evidence that Chief Whalen or Officers Williams and De-vine had any knowledge of the dispute between the Sullivans and them relatives before July 11, 2000; nor do the Sullivans allege that any conspiracy to deprive them of their rights began before the police arrived on that date. Also, the officers in Soldal were called by the re-possessors to assist them in the repossession. Here, by contrast, the Sullivans themselves called the police in order to have the Municipal Defendants forcibly remove Mr. Sullivan’s relatives from the property. See Ostensen, 378 F.Supp.2d at 147 (finding no state action in part because the police officer responded to calls from both the party alleging the deprivation and the alleged dispossessor).

Finally, the Seventh Circuit, in ruling on Soldal’s initial appeal, had determined that “because the police prevented Soldal from using reasonable force to protect his home from private action that the officers knew was illegal, there was sufficient evidence of a conspiracy between the private parties and the officers.” Soldal, 506 U.S. at 60 n. 6, 113 S.Ct. 538. To sustain a claim of civil conspiracy to violate their civil rights under § 1983, “the plaintiffs] must allege facts showing an agreement or meeting of the minds between the state actor and private actor to engage in a conspiracy to deprive the plaintiff of a constitutional right.” Simpson v. Denardo, No. 3:02CV1471(MRK), 2004 WL 1737444, at *5 (D.Conn. July 29, 2004). The Sullivans have not satisfied that standard. While the Sullivans baldly assert that the Municipal Defendants conspired with Mr. Sullivan’s relatives to constructively evict them from the premises, that claim is solely based on the Sullivans’ allegation that the Municipal Defendants “didn’t do their job. They didn’t do what their duty is, and that’s to protect citizens.” See Pis.’ Mem. In Opp’n to Municipal Defs. [doc. # 317] Ex. D at 85. There is no evidence in this case of any agreement or plan between the Municipal Defendants and Mr. Sullivan’s relatives. And there is no evidence that the police directed the Sullivans to leave or attempted in any way to impede the Sulli-vans from protecting themselves or the Valley View residence.

Therefore, even taking the facts in the light most favorable to the Sullivans, the Court concludes that there is no evidence that any state actor deprived the Sullivans of any property right on July 11, 2000, or “constructively evicted” them from the Valley View residence on July 11, as they claim. In Soldal, for example, the defendants, allegedly “acting under color of state law, dispossessed the Soldáis of their trailer home by physically tearing it from its foundation and towing it to another lot.” Soldal, 506 U.S. at 72, 113 S.Ct. 538. Accordingly, the Supreme Court noted, “this was no ‘garden-variety’ landlord-tenant ... dispute.” Id. Here, the record shows that the Sullivans left the Valley View residence of their own accord on July 11, just as they had on July 6 and July 7. While the Sullivans assert quite vociferously that they did not leave willingly, but rather were forced from the premises by the aggression of their relatives, the record shows that their relatives did nothing more than sit on the porch of the house, while refusing to leave and arguing with the Sullivans. Those actions are a world away from the physically destructive actions of the defendants in Soldal.

Because the Municipal Defendants did not restrain the Sullivans from protecting themselves or their property, or indeed, take any affirmative act, there was no Fourth or Fourteenth Amendment violation on July 11, 2000. Furthermore, because the Sullivans have not demonstrated that Chief Whalen and Officers Williams and Devine acted improperly on July 11, these Defendants also cannot be held responsible for any harm later allegedly sustained by the Sullivans as a result of their family members’ actions.

B. Claims Arising From September 7, 2000 Incident

The Sullivans claim that Officers Devine and Hebert effectively stole Mr. Sullivan’s bulldozer on September 7, 2000, by failing to take any action after they learned that Mr. Sullivan’s brother-in-law, Thomas De-lisa, was responsible for removing the bulldozer from the property and selling it. They also allege that these Municipal Defendants: (1) falsified the police incident report by stating in it that the Sullivans had abandoned the Valley View residence and were in the middle of “longstanding litigation” with the Sullivans’ family members; (2) should have known that Mr. Sullivan was voicing a complaint for unlawful eviction and should have taken action on the complaint; and (3) failed to protect the Sullivans from their relatives, which later emboldened their relatives to plant evidence and frame Mr. Sullivan for eavesdropping, thereby enabling the State Defendants to violate the Sullivans’ rights. See Second Am. Civil Rights Compl. [doc. # 251] at 19-20.

Much of what the Court has already said regarding the July 11 incident applies with equal force to the Sullivans’ allegations regarding the September 7 incident. Once again, as with the July 11 incident, Judge dos Santos’s findings in the state court action undermine the Sullivans’ claims arising from the September 7 incident. Thus, Judge dos Santos found as a fact that Mr. Delisa, who removed the bulldozer from the property at Ms. Crowell’s direction and arranged for it to be sold, did not steal the bulldozer. See Housing Decision at 15. As Judge dos Santos stated, “[t]he Court finds that the plaintiffs had ample opportunity to remove the bulldozer ... from the property, but admitted that they had no intention of removing [it] from the property.... Consequently, the plaintiffs have failed to prove by ‘clear and convincing evidence’ that their personal belongings were stolen by the defendants.” Id. Judge dos Santos also found that no eviction had occurred, see id. at 11-12, and therefore the Sullivans were not deprived of any property rights by the Municipal Defendants’ failure to intuit and act upon Mr. Sullivan’s non-existent eviction complaint.

More important, as with the July 11 incident, the Municipal Defendants did not “effectively steal” Mr. Sullivans’ bulldozer or take any affirmative action to deprive Mr. Sullivan of his property. Indeed, that is the essence of the Sullivans’ complaint against the Municipal Defendants — that they did not act. Yet, as discussed above, in the context of this case, the officers’ failure to act on the Sullivans’ complaints cannot be transformed into state action violative of the Sullivans’ Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. See, e.g., Lombardi, 485 F.3d 73, 78-79.

In summary, the Court concludes that there are no genuine issues of material fact regarding the Sullivans’ claims against the Municipal Defendants arising from either the July 11 or September 7 incidents and that the Municipal Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the Sulli-vans’ § 1983 claims. The Sullivans also maintain that the Town of Farmington is responsible for the individual Municipal Defendants’ violations of the Sullivans’ constitutional rights. See Smith v. Edwards, 175 F.3d 99, 107 (2d Cir.1999) (“Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a municipality may be held liable for a constitutional violation if the plaintiff can prove that the violations resulted from a municipality’s customs or policies.”) (citing Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978)). Because the Sullivans have failed to demonstrate that they suffered a constitutional violation at the hands of the individual Municipal Defendants, the Town of Farmington is also entitled to summary judgment on the Sulli-vans’ § 1983 claims. See Justin F. v. Maloney, 476 F.Supp.2d 141, 158 (D.Conn. 2007); see also Ricciuti v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 124 F.3d 123, 132 (2d Cir.1997) (citing City of L,A. v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799, 106 S.Ct. 1571, 89 L.Ed.2d 806 (1986)).

IV. Section 1983 Claims Against the State Defendants

The Sullivans contend that on four separate occasions — September 29, 2000, January 22, 2001, January 25, 2001 and April 20, 2001 — Inspector Zigmont unlawfully entered the Valley View residence. The Sullivans sue Inspector Coffey because he accompanied Inspector Zigmont on the first alleged unlawful entry and supervised Inspector Zigmont’s activities throughout this period. The Sullivans claim that during the course of the entries, Inspector Zigmont allegedly conducted unlawful searches of the Valley View residence and unlawful seizures of the Sullivans’ property, including several tape recordings in which Mr. Sullivan expressed criticism of Connecticut politicians and government employees. Suing under § 1983, the Sulli-vans contend that the State Defendants’ actions violated their rights under the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments. See Second Am. Civil Rights Compl. [doc. # 251] at 20-36.

A. Entries on September 29, 2000 and January 22, 2001

The Sullivans allege that Inspectors Zig-mont and Coffey first unlawfully entered, searched, and seized items from the Valley View residence on September 29, 2000, when they met with Ms. Crowell’s son-in-law, James Hyland, to discuss Ms. Cro-well’s crim