Full opinion text
OPINION AND ORDER THRASH, District Judge. This is a habeas corpus action in a state death penalty case. It is before the Court on the Amended Petition for Writ of Habe-as Corpus by a Person in State Custody [Doc. 10]. For the reasons set forth below, the Amended Petition is DENIED. I. BACKGROUND On March 11, 1986, Melbert Ray Ford was indicted by the Newton County, Georgia, grand jury for malice murder and felony murder of Lisa Chapman, malice murder and felony murder of Martha Chapman Matich, armed robbery, possession of a firearm during commission of a felony, and burglary. (Resp. Ex. 2 at 10-14.) The Supreme Court of Georgia, on direct appeal of his conviction and death sentence, set forth the facts of the case as follows: After his relationship with Martha Ma-tich broke up, Ford began harassing her by telephone. Two weeks prior to her death, Ford told a friend of his that he “was going to blow her ... brains out.” The day before her death, Ford unsuccessfully tried to convince a friend to drive him to the convenience store where Matich worked. Ford told the friend that he planned to rob the store and work revenge upon Matich by killing her. On March 6, 1986, Ford talked to several people about robbing the store. He told one that he intended to kidnap Ms. Matich, take her into the woods, make her beg, and then shoot her in the forehead. Ford tried to talk another into helping him with his robbery (Ford had no car). When this effort failed, Ford responded that “there wasn’t anybody crazy around here anymore.” Finally, Ford met 19-year-old Roger Turner, who was out of a job and nearly out of money. By plying him with alcohol, and promising him that they could easily acquire eight thousand dollars, Ford persuaded Turner to help him. They drove in Turner’s car to Chapman’s Grocery, arriving just after closing time. Ford shot away the lower half of the locked and barred glass door and entered the store. Turner, waiting in the car, heard screams and gunshots. Then Ford ran from the store to the car, carrying a bag of money. At 10:20 p.m., the store’s burglar alarm sounded. A Newton County sheriffs deputy arrived at 10:27 p.m. Ms. Matich was lying dead behind the counter, shot three times. Lisa Chapman was discovered in the bathroom, shot in the head but still alive, sitting on a bucket, bleeding from the head, and having convulsions. She could answer no questions. She died later. Ford and Turner were arrested the next day. Turner confessed first and was brought into Ford’s interrogation room to state to Ford that he had told the truth. Ford told him not to worry, that Turner was not involved in the murders. Afterwards, Ford told his interrogators that the shooting began after Martha Matich pushed the alarm button. He stated that, had he worn a mask, it would not have happened. Ford claimed at trial that he was too drunk to know what was happening, and that it was Turner who entered the store and killed the victims. Ford v. State, 257 Ga. 461, 462, 360 S.E.2d 258 (1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 943, 108 S.Ct. 1124, 99 L.Ed.2d 285, reh’g denied, 485 U.S. 1030, 108 S.Ct. 1588, 99 L.Ed.2d 903 (1988). The state sought the death penalty. At his trial in October, 1986, the Petitioner was found guilty of all counts. (Resp’t Ex. 2 at 119-20.) At the sentencing phase of the bifurcated trial, the jury found statute-ry aggravating circumstances as to each murder. The jury found that the malice murder of Lisa Chapman was committed while the Petitioner was engaged in the commission of another capital felony— armed robbery — and during the commission of a burglary. The jury found that the malice murder of Martha Matich was committed while the Petitioner was engaged in the commission of the capital felonies of armed robbery and murder and during the commission of a burglary. (Id. at 129-32.) The jury recommended that the Petitioner be sentenced to death for the two malice murders. (Id. at 129-32.) In accordance with the jury’s recommendation, the trial court sentenced the Petitioner to death on both malice murder counts, to run consecutively to each other; merged the two felony murder counts into the malice murder counts; and imposed a consecutive 20-year sentence for armed robbery, a consecutive five-year sentence for the firearm possession, and a consecutive 20-year sentence for burglary. (Id. at 136-42.) The Petitioner’s convictions and sentences were affirmed on direct appeal. Ford v. State, 257 Ga. 461, 360 S.E.2d 258 (1987). On March 7, 1988, the United States Supreme Court denied the Petitioner’s petition for writ of certiorari. Ford v. Georgia, 485 U.S. 943, 108 S.Ct. 1124, 99 L.Ed.2d 285, reh’g denied, 485 U.S. 1030, 108 S.Ct. 1588, 99 L.Ed.2d 903 (1988). The Petitioner filed his first state habe-as corpus petition in the Superior Court of Butts County on June 13, 1988, Ford v. Turpin, No. 88-V-1597 (Butts Super.Ct.) (“Ford I”). He subsequently amended the petition prior to the evidentiary hearing held on September 14, 1992. (Resp’t Exs. 15, 17.) Over the course of four years, the case was assigned to three different visiting judges. The first visiting judge presided at the September 14, 1992 evidentiary hearing. The third visiting judge entered a pretrial order in February 1996, directing the parties to present additional evidence in lieu of live testimony, to identify issues remaining for consideration, and set a deadline for filing post-hearing briefs. Ten years after the trial, in an order dated December 5, 1996, the state habeas corpus court denied relief. (Resp’t Ex. 16.) The court acknowledged Georgia’s procedural default rule of O.C.G.A. § 9-14-48(d) for original state petitions and further noted that this statutory provision contained a miscarriage of justice exception. (Id. at 1-2.) “Given the severity and finality of the punishment to be administered in this case, the Court has considered the validity of many issues that are proeedurally barred to insure that a miscarriage of justice has not occurred.” (Id. at 2.) The Petitioner filed a timely application for certificate of probable cause to appeal in the Supreme Court of Georgia on February 10, 1997. (Resp’t Ex. 18.) On September 29, 2000, the Georgia Supreme Court denied the Petitioner’s application for certificate of probable cause to appeal. (Resp’t Ex. 19.) The Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied on October 20, 2000. The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari on June 4, 2001. Ford v. Head, 532 U.S. 1068, 121 S.Ct. 2221, 150 L.Ed.2d 214 (2001). On September 27, 2001, the Petitioner filed his second state habeas corpus petition, styled Ford v. Head, No.2001-V-681 (Butts Super. Ct.) (“Ford II”). The Petitioner raised two grounds in the second state petition and, in a footnote, raised an ineffective assistance counsel claim that related to ground two. The Respondent asserted that the two substantive grounds were successive under O.C.G.A. § 9-14-51 and that the ineffective assistance claim was barred by res judicata. (Resp’t Ex. 21.) On October 23, 2001, the state habeas corpus court dismissed the second petition as successive, finding grounds one and two could reasonably have been raised in Ford I and that the ineffective assistance claim had been raised in Ford I and was barred from relitigation. (Resp’t Ex. 22.) The Georgia Supreme Court denied the Petitioner’s application for certificate of probable cause to appeal on March 12, 2002, Ford v. Head, No. S02E0560 (Ga. Mar. 12, 2002). (Resp’t Exs. 26, 27.) The 10-day period in which the Petitioner could move for rehearing expired, and the 90-day period in which he could file a petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court expired on or about June 10, 2002. On September 28, 2001, the day after he filed his second state petition, the Petitioner filed this federal habeas corpus action. He subsequently amended the petition. After a hearing, the Court granted in part the Petitioner’s motion for leave to conduct discovery, allowing the Petitioner to subpoena any written or recorded statements of Roger Turner or notes of interviews with Turner by law enforcement personnel. The Court further allowed the Petitioner to depose John Ott, the district attorney responsible for prosecuting the Petitioner. In a March 31, 2003 Order, the Court dismissed the following claims as procedurally defaulted: the Apprendi claim set forth in Claim P of the Amended Petition; the Giglio claim in Paragraph 119 of Claim K; Footnote 4 of Claim K; and Paragraphs 236 and 246 of the ineffective assistance of counsel claim set forth in Claim S. On April 13, 2004, the Court had an evidentiary hearing on the Petitioner’s remaining Giglio claim. Briefing on the merits of the Petition was completed on November 29, 2005. Twenty years after Petitioner’s conviction, the case is now before the Court for a ruling on the merits. II. STANDARD FOR HABEAS CORPUS RELIEF Pursuant to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), a federal court may not grant habeas corpus relief for claims previously adjudicated on the merits by a state court unless the state court adjudication resulted in a decision that (1) “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” or (2) “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The first step in resolving a federal habeas corpus claim is to determine the “clearly established law at the relevant time.” Neelley v. Nagle, 138 F.3d 917, 922 (11th Cir.1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1075, 119 S.Ct. 811, 142 L.Ed.2d 671 (1999); see Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 379, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000). To do so, a district court evaluating a habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) “ ‘should survey the legal landscape’ at the time the State court adjudicated the petitioner’s claim to determine the applicable Supreme Court authority; the law is ‘clearly established’ if Supreme Court precedent would have compelled a particular result in the case.” Neelley, 138 F.3d at 923. “Clearly established Federal law” does not refer to decisions of the lower federal courts but, rather, is limited to “the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of the Supreme Court’s decisions as of the time of the relevant state court decision.” Putman v. Head, 268 F.3d 1223, 1241 (11th Cir.2001) (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 412, 120 S.Ct. 1495). The second step of the analysis is to determine whether the state court adjudication was “contrary to” or an “unreasonable application of’ the clearly established Supreme Court case law. Neelley, 138 F.3d at 923. A state court decision is contrary to clearly established federal law when it applies a rule that contradicts the governing law as set forth in cases before the Supreme Court of the United States. Williams, 529 U.S. at 405, 120 S.Ct. 1495; Putman, 268 F.3d at 1241. Additionally, a “contrary to” finding will result if the state court confronts materially indistinguishable facts but arrives at a result different from that of the Supreme Court. Williams, 529 U.S. at 406, 120 S.Ct. 1495; Putman, 268 F.3d at 1241. Finally, the Supreme Court has explained that the “unreasonable application” prong applies when the “ ‘state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from the Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts’ of petitioner’s case.” Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003) (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 413, 120 S.Ct. 1495). In order to qualify as unreasonable, the state court decision must have been more than incorrect or erroneous. Id. Rather, the state court’s application of clearly established federal law must have been “objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 521 (citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 409, 120 S.Ct. 1495). III. DISCUSSION The Petitioner asserts twenty distinct and independently dispositive claims as well as an additional claim that the substantive and procedural errors, when viewed as a whole, violated his rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. It appears that counsel for the Petitioner assert what they consider to be the strongest claims first and the remaining claims in descending order. The Court will address them in the same order, with one exception — -the ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The Petitioner chose not to brief a number of claims. These claims will be addressed in the order in which they appear in the Amended Petition. Because the Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim overlaps with a number of independent claims, the Court will address the ineffective assistance of counsel claim last. A. Claim K — Failure to Disclose Complete Agreement with Co-Defendant Prior to the Petitioner’s trial, the State entered into a plea agreement with the Petitioner’s co-defendant, Roger Turner. Pursuant to the terms of the plea agreement, Turner agreed to plead guilty to armed robbery with a recommendation by the State that he be sentenced to twenty years in prison. The State agreed to drop the murder charges provided that Turner testified truthfully and in accordance with his statements to the police. (See Apr. 13, 2004 Hr’g.) The Petitioner now contends that the State made an undisclosed additional promise as part of the plea agreement. Specifically, the Petitioner claims that the prosecutor, John Ott, promised to write a letter to the Georgia Board of Pardons and Paroles recommending that it grant Turner parole as soon as he became eligible. The Petitioner contends that the prosecution failed to disclose that aspect of the agreement, in violation of Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972). Due process is violated when the prosecution suppresses evidence, irrespective of good or bad faith, that is favorable to the defense and material to the defendant’s guilt or punishment. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). The state’s knowing failure to correct false testimony also violates due process if the false testimony was material. Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269, 79 S.Ct. 1173, 3 L.Ed.2d 1217 (1959). Because the jury’s estimation of the truthfulness and reliability of witnesses may be determinative of the defendant’s guilt or innocence, the disclosure requirement of Brady applies with equal force to evidence that affects only the credibility of a witness. Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154, 92 S.Ct. 763; Napue, 360 U.S. at 269, 79 S.Ct. 1173. The purpose of this rule is “to insure that the jury knows the facts that might motivate a witness in giving testimony.” Brown v. Wainwright, 785 F.2d 1457, 1465 (11th Cir.1986). Accordingly, the prosecution has a duty to disclose evidence of promises made to a witness in exchange for testimony. Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154-55, 92 S.Ct. 763; Tarver v. Hopper, 169 F.3d 710, 716 (11th Cir.1999); Moore v. Kemp, 809 F.2d 702, 719 (11th Cir.1987) (en banc). To establish a Brady/Giglio violation, a petitioner must show that: (1) the prosecution suppressed evidence, either willfully or inadvertently; (2) the evidence was favorable to the accused because it was impeaching; and (3) prejudice ensued, i.e., the suppressed evidence was material. Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82, 119 S.Ct. 1936, 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999). Evidence is considered material for purposes of a Giglio claim “if there is any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury.” United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976); Brown v. Head, 272 F.3d 1308, 1317 (11th Cir.2001). The Petitioner did not present this claim either on direct appeal to the Georgia Supreme Court or in his state habeas corpus petitions. The Respondent argued that the factual basis for the claim was in existence and available to the Petitioner when he litigated his two state collateral attacks and, thus, the claim is procedurally defaulted. In a previous order, this Court found that the Petitioner’s appellate counsel exercised due diligence in investigating and pursuing the Petitioner’s claims in state court. Therefore, the claim was not barred and the Petitioner was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the matter. (Order, Feb. 6, 2004.) The evidentiary hearing on this claim was held on April 13, 2004. At the evidentiary hearing, John Ott testified that he entered into a plea agreement with Roger Turner because he was convinced that Turner did not know in advance about the murders, and he felt that Turner’s testimony would provide the State with the strongest case against the Petitioner. Ott, however, testified emphatically that the plea agreement did not include a promise to write a letter to the Parole Board because he would not have committed himself to writing such a letter prior to trial. (Apr. 13, 2004 Hr’g Tr. at 48.) His testimony was as follows: Q: And just in this agreement that you worked out with Mr. Lombardo [Turner’s counsel], did you agree to write the Parole Board on Mr. Turner’s behalf or assist in some sort of clemency at a future date? A: I want to say no. I want to say that Mr. Lombardo might have brought that up to me about would I do so, but I would never have committed myself prior to him testifying to doing that because I just don’t deal that way with defendants and how they testify. I would never want to put myself in a position of a defendant who got up on that stand and did not make a strong witness, did not testify well, and then after the trial came to me and said, well, now you got to write me a letter to the Parole Board. I would want to wait to see what the testimony was before I would ever commit to doing something like that. Like I said, I would never commit myself before trial to something like that. Now Mr. Lombardo might have wanted me to do that and asked me to do that, but I would have said the deal was that he would get to plead out for the 20 years confinement. And I don’t mean to be flippant, but I’ve never really had much to do with the Parole Board. They always seem to parole the people I don’t want them to parole and not parole the people that I think ought to be paroled, so I just don’t — I trust them about as much as I can pick them up and throw them. And like I said, I don’t mean to be flippant, but that’s just nothing I had control over. What I had control over was what he would plead guilty to and what sentence I could recommend to the judge that he would receive, and that’s what he would have committed to prior to his testimony. (Id. at 36-37; see also id. at 42, 47.) According to Ott, the decision was made to write a letter to the Parole Board only after Turner had testified in an impressive and nonevasive manner at the Petitioner’s trial. (Id. at 39-40.) Ott’s testimony is substantiated by the letter he eventually wrote to the Parole Board, dated February 18, 1991, in which he stated, in pertinent part: At the time of trial, I was impressed with Mr. Thomas’ [sic] acceptance of his illegal acts and strong desire to do whatever he could to rectify his wrongs, accept his punishment and then continue with his life. After prosecuting so many defendants who refuse to accept responsibility for their acts, it was refreshing to find one who did. I told Mr. Turner, after he had testified, that I would do whatever I could to see that he was paroled when the time came. (Id., Pet’r Ex. 5) (emphasis added). Additionally, Turner corroborated Ott’s recollection of the plea agreement, testifying that although he and his attorney discussed trying to get Ott to help with the Parole Board, his plea agreement with the State did not include a promise of assistance from Ott with the Parole Board. (Id. at 54-55, 58.) The Petitioner has offered no reason for Ott to withhold disclosure of an agreement to write a letter to the Parole Board if that had been part of the plea bargain. The Petitioner contends, however, that the testimony of Barry Lombardo, Turner’s counsel, and a number of letters written by Turner establish that the promise of a letter to the Parole Board was in fact part of the plea agreement. Lombardo testified that he requested and that Ott agreed to write a letter on Turner’s behalf when Turner became eligible for parole. (Apr. 13, 2004 Hr’g Tr. at 14-15.) According to Lombardo, this agreement was reached and communicated to Turner prior to the Petitioner’s trial. (Id. at 15.) However, Lombardo later admitted that the agreement was “very informal” and that he did not have a clear memory of when the discussions regarding assistance with the Parole Board actually took place, acknowledging that they could have occurred after Turner testified. (Id. at 24-25, 29.) In addition to Lombardo’s testimony, the Petitioner relies to a great extent on three letters written to Lombardo by Turner during the time that they were putting together materials for Turner’s parole petition. In each of these letters, dated August through December of 1990, Turner referenced the fact that Ott had given “his word” to help Turner, presumably with the Parole Board. (Apr. 13, 2004 Hr’g, Pet’r Exs. 6-8.) According to the Petitioner, the fact that Ott gave “his word” indicates that the parties had an “actual deal,” not a gratuitous promise, for which Ott would have expected something in return. He claims that the only possible consideration that Turner could offer was his testimony. The Petitioner, however, makes too much of Turner’s word choice, assuming that Turner must have been referring to an enforceable contract with bargained-for consideration. This argument is without merit. Turner’s letters establish little more than that Ott had agreed to act on Turner’s behalf, a fact about which there is no dispute. Nevertheless, the Petitioner argues that a quote contained in one letter, which Turner attributed to Ott, indicates that the agreement was made in August of 1986, approximately two months prior to the Petitioner’s trial. Specifically, Turner wrote: Have you talked to Ott yet? I’m very anxious to hear just to what extent he plans to help. Would he go so far as to go back and ask the judge for a reduction from 20 to 15 years (which would let me go in 5) or say “time served?” Could he not entertain a “motion of mitigation” and call the case back up and reduce the sentence? I mean, I’m hoping his (hopefully, face-to-face, but in the least “official”) word of recommendation will be enough to move the board, but if not how far will he go to “help [me] out when the time comes” (Quoted from Ott 8-86) ? (Id., Pet’r Ex. 6) (emphasis added). When questioned about this quote, Turner testified that he had not been quoting from any document and could not recall specifically to what he had been referring. The Petitioner has presented insufficient evidence to establish the existence of a pretrial deal under which Ott would write a letter to the Parole Board in exchange for Turner’s testimony. Turner’s letters contain ambiguous references to Ott’s promise and the mere possibility that Turner indicated, four years later, that the agreement to help was made in August of 1986, is insufficient evidence of a pretrial deal. Ott testified unequivocally that he would not have entered into an agreement to write a letter to the Parole Board before being assured as to how Turner would testify. In contrast, Lombardo could only testify that he had “reason to believe” that Ott agreed to this prior to the trial. (Apr. 13, 2004 Hr’g Tr. at 29.) Without for a moment questioning Lombardo’s honesty or sincerity, the Court finds that the testimony of Ott and Turner was more persuasive. Therefore, having found no evidence of an undisclosed “deal,” habeas relief based on the prosecution’s failure to disclose is not warranted. Furthermore, even assuming that the promise to write a letter to the Parole Board on Turner’s behalf was made prior to the Petitioner’s trial, the Petitioner’s Giglio claim still fails. The government is not required to disclose every conversation or agreement with a witness or his lawyer. United States v. Curtis, 380 F.3d 1311, 1316 n. 7 (11th Cir.2004) (quoting Tarver, 169 F.3d at 717). Rather, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has made clear that “[s]ome promises, agreements, or understandings do not need to be disclosed, because they are too ambiguous, or too loose or are of too marginal a benefit to the witness to count.” Tarver, 169 F.3d at 717. For example, in McCleskey v. Kemp, 753 F.2d 877, 883-84 (11th Cir.1985) (en banc), a police detective offered to “speak a word” on the witness’s behalf with federal authorities. The Eleventh Circuit found that the “detective’s statement offered such a marginal benefit ... that it is doubtful it would motivate a reluctant witness, or that disclosure of the statement would have had any effect on his credibility.” Id. at 884; see also Depree v. Thomas, 946 F.2d 784, 797-98 (11th Cir.1991) (prosecutor’s statement that he would “take care” of witness need not be disclosed). Because the Parole Board has the final say regarding whether an individual will be paroled, a promise merely to write a letter to the Parole Board on Turner’s behalf would offer a similar marginal benefit. See Jenkins v. Byrd, 103 F.Supp.2d 1350, 1371 n. 14 (S.D.Ga.2000) (government would not be required to disclose district attorney’s promise to write a “nice letter” to pardon and parole board). As such, even if the promise to write a letter was part of Turner’s agreement, the prosecution was not required to disclose the promise under Giglio. Lastly, in order to establish a Gig-lio claim, the Petitioner must show that the undisclosed promise was material, i.e., there is a reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury. Brown, 272 F.3d at 1317. The Petitioner argues that the jury’s judgment of Turner’s credibility would have been affected, had they heard about the alleged promise to write a letter to the Parole Board, because such a promise indicated that Turner was really receiving only a five-year sentence for armed robbery rather than the 20-year sentence that he testified to during trial. The Petitioner’s argument is without merit. First, as noted above, Turner was not guaranteed parole after five years simply because Ott wrote a letter to the Parole Board. Moreover, the jury had already been informed that in return for his testimony, the prosecution planned to dismiss the two counts of malice murder against Turner and that Turner had received a 20-year sentence for armed robbery, an offense which carries a possible life sentence. See O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(b). Therefore, after hearing of this substantial impeaching evidence, there is not a reasonable likelihood that the jury’s assessment of Mr. Turner’s credibility or the outcome of the trial could have been affected had they been advised that Ott intended merely to write a letter on Turner’s behalf. Because he has not established a promise that the prosecution was required to disclose or that any such promise was material, the Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief based on his Gig-lio claim. B. Claim A — Right to Counsel During Custodial Interrogation The Petitioner contends that his Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated because law enforcement officers continued to interrogate him after he invoked his right to counsel in violation of Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981) and Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 105 S.Ct. 490, 83 L.Ed.2d 488 (1984). As an initial matter, the Court notes that although the Petitioner alleges a violation of his Sixth Amendment rights, his claim based on Edwards v. Arizona deals solely with the Fifth Amendment right to counsel. The Sixth Amendment right to counsel arises only “at or after the initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings-whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment.” United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 188, 104 S.Ct. 2292, 81 L.Ed.2d 146 (1984) (internal punctuation and citation omitted). At the time of the custodial interrogation, no adversary judicial criminal proceedings had been initiated. Thus, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel had not yet attached. To the extent that the Petitioner asserts a Sixth Amendment claim, the claim is without merit. In contrast to the Sixth Amendment, the Fifth Amendment guarantees that “[n]o person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” U.S. Const. amend. V. In an effort to counteract the “inherently compelling pressures” of custodial interrogation, the Supreme Court has extended the prohibition against compelled self-incrimination to include the right to have counsel present during a custodial interrogation. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). In Edwards, the Supreme Court clarified this right, holding that a person in custody who has “expressed his desire to deal with the police through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.” Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-85, 101 S.Ct. 1880. The applicability of the “rigid prophylactic rule” set forth in Edwards depends on a two part inquiry. Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 95, 105 S.Ct. 490, 83 L.Ed.2d 488 (1984). First, the court must determine whether the accused “actually invoked his right to counsel.” Id. (citing Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-85, 101 S.Ct. 1880 (whether accused “expressed his desire” for, or “clearly asserted” his right to, the assistance of counsel)). If the right to counsel was invoked, the court should then evaluate whether the accused initiated further discussions with the police and knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel. Id. During the Petitioner’s trial, the trial court held a Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908 (1964) hearing, to determine the admissibility of statements made by the Petitioner while he was in custody. G.B.I. Agent Gary Nicholson testified to the circumstances of the Petitioner’s interrogation. He testified that at some point during the interrogation, the Petitioner was informed that Turner had made a statement implicating himself and the Petitioner in the robbery and the murders. After learning this, the Petitioner stated that he did not believe that Turner had made such a statement and asked if he could call an attorney. (Resp’t Ex. 6 at 387-88, 401.) Agent Nicholson advised the Petitioner that he could and asked if he would like to continue the interview at that time or stop the interview and talk to his attorney. The Petitioner did not initially respond to Agent Nicholson but then began asking questions about Turner’s statement. Before responding to his questions, Agent Nicholson testified that he again asked the Petitioner if he wanted to talk to an attorney before continuing the interview. According to Agent Nicholson, the Petitioner responded that he wanted to continue without an attorney. (Id. at 401-02, 430, 433, 479-80.) Following the hearing, the trial court found that: (1) the Petitioner’s request for counsel had been equivocal; (2) each time an attorney was mentioned, interrogation stopped except for questions to clarify what the Petitioner meant; and (3) no further interrogation took place until the Petitioner voluntarily initiated a continuance of the interview. (Id. at 463-64.) The Supreme Court of Georgia agreed with the findings of the trial court and held that the Petitioner’s right to counsel under Edwards had not been violated and that his statements were voluntarily given to authorities. In reaching this conclusion, the court stated that the Petitioner had not only failed to clearly invoke his right to counsel but had also been the one to initiate further conversation with the police. Ford v. State, 257 Ga. at 466, 360 S.E.2d 258. The court further held that the Petitioner limited a second invocation of his right to counsel to giving a videotaped statement and that the police were not required to honor the invocation to a greater extent. Id. (citing Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523, 107 S.Ct. 828, 93 L.Ed.2d 920 (1987)). The Petitioner acknowledges that the Georgia Supreme Court correctly identified the applicable Supreme Court law, but he contends that the court applied it in an unreasonable manner. The Petitioner argues that the Georgia Supreme Court unreasonably concluded that he did not clearly invoke his right to counsel when he asked if he could call an attorney. In support of his contention, the Petitioner cites only lower court decisions that have found statements similar to his to constitute an unequivocal request. See United States v. de la Jara, 973 F.2d 746, 750 (9th Cir.1992) (“Can I call my lawyer?” or “I should call my lawyer.”); Cannady v. Dugger, 931 F.2d 752, 755 (11th Cir.1991) (“I think I should call my lawyer.”); Robinson v. Borg, 918 F.2d 1387, 1393 (9th Cir.1990) (“I have to get me a good lawyer, man. Can I make a phone call?”); Smith v. Endell, 860 F.2d 1528, 1529-31 (9th Cir.1988) (“Can I talk to a lawyer?”); United States v. Hughes, 921 F.Supp. 656, 657-58 (D.Ariz.1996) (“Can I call a lawyer?”). On the other hand, other courts have characterized as ambiguous and equivocal statements such as “Maybe I should talk to a lawyer” and “I think I need a lawyer.” Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 462, 114 S.Ct. 2350, 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994); Burket v. Angelone, 208 F.3d 172, 198 (4th Cir.2000); see also United States v. Cherry, 733 F.2d 1124, 1130 (5th Cir.1984) (equivocal request when accused stated: “Maybe I should talk to an attorney before I make a further statement,” and then a few minutes later stated: “Why should I not get an attorney?”); Nash v. Estelle, 597 F.2d 513, 519-20 (5th Cir.1979) (in context, defendant’s statement that he wanted attorney appointed was equivocal). In addition, all of the cases relied on by the Petitioner were decided after the Georgia Supreme Court’s decision. Moreover, even if decided before the relevant state court decision, those cases are not the clearly established federal law relevant to a habeas analysis as they are not holdings of the Supreme Court of the United States. At the time of the Georgia Supreme Court’s decision, the United States Supreme Court had not addressed what constituted an ambiguous or equivocal request. The Court, however, had provided some guidance in this area by indicating that whether a statement is ambiguous is to be determined by an objective standard. See Barrett, 479 U.S. at 582, 107 S.Ct. 851; see also Davis, 512 U.S. at 459, 114 S.Ct. 2350 (“Invocation of the Miranda right to counsel ‘requires, at a minimum, some statement that can reasonably be construed to be an expression of a desire for the assistance of an attorney.”) (quoting McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 178, 111 S.Ct. 2204, 115 L.Ed.2d 158 (1991)); Coleman v. Singletary, 30 F.3d 1420, 1424 (11th Cir.1994) (“A suspect must articulate his desire to cut off questioning with sufficient clarity that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand the statement to be an assertion of the right to remain silent.”)- The Court had also suggested that ambiguity could be created by “events preceding the request” or “nuances inherent in the request itself.” Smith, 469 U.S. at 99-100, 105 S.Ct. 490. Here, the Petitioner did not state that he wanted an attorney at that time. Compare id., 469 U.S. at 93, 105 S.Ct. 490 (request not ambiguous or equivocal when after being informed of right to consult with a lawyer and have one present during questioning, accused stated “Uh, yeah. I’d like to do that.”) Rather, he simply inquired whether he was permitted to call an attorney. Such a general inquiry creates ambiguity in the request. Therefore, even if the Supreme Court of Georgia erroneously found that the statement was not a clear invocation of the right to counsel, its decision was not an objectively unreasonable application of the clearly established Supreme Court precedent at the time. The Petitioner also contends that the Supreme Court of Georgia applied clearly established federal law in an unreasonable manner when it held that the Petitioner reinitiated the interview with police. The Petitioner relies on Smith v. Illinois in support of his argument. That reliance is misplaced. In Smith, the Supreme Court held that “postrequest responses to further interrogation may not be used to east doubt on the clarity of the initial request itself.” Smith, 469 U.S. at 100, 105 S.Ct. 490 (emphasis omitted). However, whether a request is ambiguous and whether the right to counsel has been waived by reiniti-ating the conversation are two distinct inquiries. There is nothing to indicate that the Georgia Supreme Court relied on statements made after the Petitioner asked if he could call a lawyer when making its determination that the request was ambiguous. To the extent that the Petitioner claims that Smith prohibited the police from asking any questions following his request, this argument also fails. In Smith, the Supreme Court recognized that an accused’s assertion of his right to counsel could be ambiguous or equivocal. Smith, 469 U.S. at 95, 105 S.Ct. 490. ‘At that time, courts had developed the following three standards to address what police could or could not do following such a request: (1) all questioning must cease when a request was made, regardless of how equivocal or ambiguous it may be; (2) requests falling below a court-created threshold standard did not trigger the right to counsel; and (3) if a request was ambiguous, further police questioning was limited to attempts to clarify the statement. Id. at 96 n. 3, 105 S.Ct. 490. The Eleventh Circuit applied the third standard in holding: “When a defendant makes an equivocal request for an attorney during a custodial interrogation, ‘the scope of that interrogation is immediately narrowed to one subject and one subject only. Further questioning thereafter must he limited to clarifying that request until it is clarified.’ ” Owen v. Alabama, 849 F.2d 536, 539 (11th Cir.1988) (quoting Thompson v. Wainwright, 601 F.2d 768, 771 (5th Cir.1979)); see also Lightbourne, 829 F.2d at 1018 (“[W]hen a purported invocation of a Fifth Amendment privilege is ambiguous, the police may question the accused for the narrow purpose of clarifying the equivocal request.”) (internal punctuation and citation omitted). The Supreme Court of Georgia has likewise followed this approach. Hall v. State, 255 Ga. 267, 273, 336 S.E.2d 812 (1985). Although the Smith Court acknowledged the various approaches to the consequences of ambiguity, because the statement at issue in that ease was deemed clear and unequivocal, the Court declined to address the conflict among the lower courts. Smith, 469 U.S. at 96, 100, 105 S.Ct. 490. In Connecticut v. Barrett, the Court again left the question open. Bar rett, 479 U.S. at 529 n. 3, 107 S.Ct. 828. Therefore, the law regarding the consequences of an ambiguous or equivocal reference to an attorney during a custodial interrogation was not clearly established at the time of the Georgia Supreme Court’s decision. See Davis, 512 U.S. at 456, 114 S.Ct. 2350 (“Although we have twice previously noted the varying approaches the lower courts have adopted with respect to ambiguous or equivocal references to counsel during custodial interrogation, we have not addressed the issue on the merits.”) (citations omitted). Thus, it was not unreasonable for the Georgia Supreme Court, having found the statement to be ambiguous, to hold that the interrogator was justified in asking questions to determine whether the Petitioner wanted to call his attorney or continue with the interview. Ford v. State, 257 Ga. at 465, 360 S.E.2d 258. Finally, even if the right to counsel was invoked, the Court agrees with the Georgia Supreme Court that the Petitioner initiated further conversation with the police. The Supreme Court has made clear that “Edivards does not foreclose finding a waiver of Fifth Amendment protections after counsel has been requested, provided the accused has initiated the conversation or discussions with the authorities.” Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 156, 111 S.Ct. 486, 112 L.Ed.2d 489 (1990). In order to show such initiation, the previous police interrogation must have ended prior to the accused’s alleged initiatory remarks. Christopher v. Florida, 824 F.2d 836, 845 (11th Cir.1987). Although police are not required to remain totally silent, questions “relating directly or indirectly to the investigation” will constitute continued interrogation. Id. (quoting Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1045, 103 S.Ct. 2830, 77 L.Ed.2d 405 (1983)). Here, the record shows that after the Petitioner asked whether he could call an attorney, the police did not continue to interrogate him concerning the crimes. Rather, the questioning was limited to clarifying whether the Petitioner wanted to call a lawyer then or wanted to continue with the interview. Following the attempts to clarify, the Petitioner himself resumed discussions relating to the crimes by questioning the police about Turner’s statement. Thus, the Georgia Supreme Court properly found that the Petitioner reinitiated the conversation by asking a question relating to the crimes. To be valid, a waiver of counsel must be made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602); Edwards, 451 U.S. at 482, 101 S.Ct. 1880. In other words, the choice to relinquish the rights must have been deliberate, not the product of intimidation, coercion, or deception, and the waiver must have been made with “a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it.” Id. The Petitioner claims that he could not have knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel because he did not know for certain whether he was undergoing a custodial interrogation. However, the record indicates that the Petitioner was placed in handcuffs and driven to G.B.I. headquarters in a state vehicle. (Resp’t Ex. 6A at 526.) In addition, the Petitioner was advised of Ms Miranda rights on two occasions — when he was initially stopped by the police and again when he arrived at the G.B.I. headquarters. (Resp’t Ex. 6 at 380, 383; Resp’t Ex. 6A at 526-27.) Under these circumstances, it is difficult to imagine that the Petitioner was not aware that he was in custody and undergoing a custodial interrogation. Furthermore, while in custody the Petitioner signed a written form acknowledging that he understood his rights and waived them. (Resp’t Ex. 6 at 385, 513-14; Resp’t Ex. 6A at 544.) He does not allege that he did not understand the consequences of the waiver. Finally, the record fully supports the conclusion of the state courts that the Petitioner’s statements were made voluntarily as there is nothing to indicate that the police coerced or pressured the Petitioner into reinitiat-ing the conversation or making any statements. Therefore, the Georgia Supreme Court did not unreasonably apply clearly established federal law by holding that the Petitioner waived the right by voluntarily initiating further conversation with the police. Habeas relief based on a denial of the Fifth Amendment right to counsel is therefore not warranted. C. Claim, S — Mental Health Expert Following a brief mental health examination by the Forensic Services Team of the Georgia Medical Health Institute, the Petitioner moved for funds to retain an independent mental health expert. According to the Petitioner, the trial court granted the request provided, however, that the Petitioner disclose the results of the mental health examination to the court as well as the State. (See Resp’t Ex. 2 at 82-83, 83A-83C.) The Petitioner accepted the condition and hired Dr. Cassandra Newkirk, a forensic psychiatrist recommended by the ACLU. She evaluated the Petitioner and testified for the defense during the sentencing phase. However, the Petitioner alleges that under the circumstances, he was denied his due process right to the services of a competent and independent mental health expert under Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 105 S.Ct. 1087, 84 L.Ed.2d 53 (1985), in two ways. First, he contends that his right to an independent and confidential psychiatric expert was compromised because he was required to make a copy of the expert’s report available to the prosecution. Second, the Petitioner claims that Dr. Newkirk did not conduct a professionally competent mental health evaluation. The state habeas court denied both claims. The Petitioner argues that the decision of the state habeas court was contrary to clearly established federal law because it misstates the rule of Ake. Additionally, he contends that the state court decision was an unreasonable application of Ake. 1. Independent and Confidential Mental Health Expert The Fourteenth Amendment’s due process guarantee of fundamental fairness entitles indigent defendants to “an adequate opportunity to present their claims fairly within the adversary system.” Ake, 470 U.S. at 77, 105 S.Ct. 1087 (quoting Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 612, 94 S.Ct. 2437, 41 L.Ed.2d 341 (1974)). Accordingly, states are required to provide indigent defendants with the “basic tools of an adequate defense or appeal.” Id. (quoting Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226, 227, 92 S.Ct. 431, 30 L.Ed.2d 400 (1971)). In Ake v. Oklahoma, the Supreme Court recognized competent psychiatric assistance as one such “basic tool.” The Ake Court held that “when a defendant demonstrates to the trial judge that his sanity at the time of the offense is to be a significant factor at trial, the State must, at a minimum, assure the defendant access to a competent psychiatrist who will conduct an appropriate examination and assist in evaluation, preparation, and presentation of the defense.” Id. at 83, 105 S.Ct. 1087. The Petitioner contends that Ake clearly establishes the right to an independent and confidential psychiatrist and that this right was violated because he was not provided with a psychiatrist that was working exclusively for the defense. In addressing this claim, the state habeas court found that “the psychiatrist was provided adequate information by defense counsel to conduct her evaluation, and that she provided Petitioner with a competent and independent evaluation.” (Resp’t Ex. 16 at 21.) The Petitioner argues that this decision was contrary to clearly established federal law because the court relied only on a state court decision that misstates the rule of Ake. Specifically, the state habeas court cited the decision of the Supreme Court of Georgia in McNeal v. State, 263 Ga. 397, 435 S.E.2d 47 (1993), which states that “[t]he Fourteenth Amendment’s due process guarantee of fundamental fairness requires that an indigent defendant be given ‘meaningful access to justice,’ e.g\, access to a competent expert necessary to an effective defense .... ” McNeal, 263 Ga. at 398, 435 S.E.2d 47, (quoting Ake, 470 U.S. at 77, 105 S.Ct. 1087). The Petitioner’s argument that the decision was contrary to Ake fails for two reasons. First, the Supreme Court has made expressly clear that “[fjederal courts are not free to presume that a state court did not comply with constitutional dictates on the basis of nothing more than a lack of citation.” Bell v. Cone, 543 U.S. 447, 125 S.Ct. 847, 853, 160 L.Ed.2d 881 (2005). A state court is not required to cite any federal law and, in fact, need not even be aware of controlling Supreme Court precedent, “so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision contradicts them.” Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8, 123 S.Ct. 362, 154 L.Ed.2d 263 (2002); Maharaj v. Secretary for Dep’t of Corr., 432 F.3d 1292, 1320 n. 8 (11th Cir.2005). Second, the Petitioner appears to take issue with the fact that, although it clearly cited to Ake, McNeal did not quote the verbatim holding. However, assessing whether a decision is “contrary to” Supreme Court precedent does not depend on the use of specific verbiage. The McNeal court’s reference to “access to a competent expert necessary to an effective defense” reasonably summarizes the requirement of Ake that a defendant be provided “access to a competent psychiatrist who will conduct an appropriate examination and assist in evalúation, preparation, and presentation of the defense.” Ake, 470 U.S. at 83, 105 S.Ct. 1087. A decision is not contrary to clearly established federal law simply because the state court uses shorthand references to Supreme Court standards. See Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 23-24, 123 S.Ct. 357, 154 L.Ed.2d 279 (2002) (“[RJeadiness to attribute error is inconsistent with the presumption that state courts know and follow the law [and] ... is also incompatible with § 2254(d)’s highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings, which demands that state court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.”) (internal citation omitted). Therefore, by merely summarizing rather than quoting, the state habeas court did not misstate or render a decision contrary to Ake. The Petitioner argues that even if the state habeas court applied the correct standard, its decision was unreasonable because it found no error in requiring the defense to share Dr. Newkirk’s report with the prosecution. In support, the Petitioner relies on two circuit court cases that held that the right to psychiatric assistance is not satisfied by a neutral psychiatrist. Cowley v. Stricklin, 929 F.2d 640 (11th Cir.1991); Smith v. McCormick, 914 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir.1990). In Smith, the trial court appointed a neutral psychiatrist that reported directly to the court and did not assist in the evaluation or preparation of the defense. Smith, 914 F.2d at 1158. According to the Ninth Circuit, “to grant court-appointed psychiatric assistance only on condition of automatic full disclosure to the fact finder impermissibly compromises presentation of an effective defense, by depriving him of an adequate opportunity to present his claims fairly within the adversary system.” Id. at 1159 (internal punctuation and citation omitted). In Cowley, the trial court denied the defendant’s motion for an independent psychiatrist and instead required that the evaluating state psychiatrist provide his report to both the prosecution and defense. Cowley, 929 F.2d at 641, 644. The Eleventh Circuit noted that the psychiatrist was called by the prosecution, testified against the defendant, and, as in Smith, provided little if any assistance in the defense’s trial preparation. Id. at 644. In concluding that the psychiatrist’s lack of assistance did not satisfy Ake, the court relied on the statement in Smith that “[t]he right to psychiatric assistance does not mean the right to place the report of a ‘neutral’ psychiatrist before the court; rather it means the right to use the services of psychiatrist in whatever capacity defense counsel deems appropriate.” Id. (quoting Smith, 914 F.2d at 1157). In Ake, the Supreme Court established the general rule that a state must provide an indigent defendant a competent psychiatrist to assist in preparing and presenting his defense. However, the Court expressly left the decision to the states as to how to implement the right to psychiatric assistance. Ake, 470 U.S. at 83, 105 S.Ct. 1087. The Ninth and Eleventh Circuits have interpreted this decision to mean that appointing a psychiatrist whose report is provided to the court and the prosecution violates due process. However, because these cases are not clearly established law as determined by the Supreme Court, they are not controlling. Moreover, the Fifth Circuit has taken a position directly contrary, holding that providing “an indigent defendant with the assistance of a court-appointed psychiatrist, whose opinion and testimony is available to both sides,” satisfies a defendant’s due process rights under Ake. Granviel v. Lynaugh, 881 F.2d 185, 191 (5th Cir.1989), cert. denied sub nom, Granviel v. Texas, 495 U.S. 963, 110 S.Ct. 2577, 109 L.Ed.2d 758 (1990). The Supreme Court has neither addressed nor held that making available the report of the appointed psychiatrist constitutes a violation of due process, particularly where there is no objection in the trial court. The conflicting authority in the circuits regarding what satisfies a defendant’s due process rights with respect to psychiatric assistance highlights the fact that the existing Supreme Court precedent did not compel a particular result under these circumstances. As such, this Court cannot conclude that the state habeas court unreasonably applied, or acted contrary to, clearly established federal law. 2. Ineffective Assistance of Expert Witness The Petitioner also contends that Dr. Newkirk failed to conduct an adequate and professionally appropriate psychiatric examination in accordance with the applicable standard of care and, thus, he did not receive the assistance of a competent psychiatrist. (See Am. Petition ¶¶ 178-88.) In conducting her evaluation, Dr. Newkirk met with the Petitioner on two occasions, spoke with the Petitioner’s parents and trial counsel, and reviewed various medical and psychological records that she was able to obtain. (Resp’t Ex. 6A at 994-95; see also Resp’t Ex. 2 at 83A.) The Petitioner maintains that such an evaluation was incomplete and inadequate. According to the Petitioner, in order to assess an individual properly and render an accurate diagnosis, the standard of care requires a psychiatrist to: (1) obtain an accurate medical and social history from the patient and sources independent of the patient; (2) conduct a thorough physical examination, including a neurological examination; and (3) conduct appropriate diagnostic studies in light of the history and physical examination. In addition, the Petitioner maintains that a standard mental status examination cannot be relied upon in isolation as a diagnostic tool in assessing the presence or absence of organic impairment. (Am. Petition ¶ 182.) The Petitioner alleges that Dr. Newkirk’s evaluation did not meet the standard of care in a number of ways. First, he claims that Dr. Newkirk obtained incomplete psychological and medical histories of the Petitioner because she failed to interview enough people, review available records, or conduct a physical examination. Second, he contends that Dr. Newkirk fell below the standard of care because she conducted no psychological testing. According to the Petitioner, based on the inadequate evaluation, Dr. Newkirk misdiagnosed the Petitioner with antisocial personality disorder and ultimately offered testimony harmful to the defense. He further asserts that had Dr. Newkirk acted in a professionally competent manner, she would have developed evidence that would have affected the outcome of the guilt-innocence and sentencing phases of the Petitioner’s trial. As discussed, the Supreme Court has established that due process requires that a state “assure the defendant access to a competent psychiatrist who will conduct an appropriate examination.... ” Ake, 470 U.S. at 83, 105 S.Ct. 1087. The focus of Ake was to establish a due process right to access to a competent psychiatrist; however, the Supreme Court emphasized that a defendant does not have a constitutional right to choose a psychiatrist of his personal liking. Id. The Petitioner does not argue that the trial court denied him access to psychiatric assistance. Instead, he alleges a denial of due process based on incompetent psychiatric assistance. In evaluating whether a defendant’s due process rights were violated, a court must “examine the information before the trial court when it is alleged to have deprived the defendant of due process” and “determine whether that information should have led the trial court to conclude that the defendant would probably not receive a fair trial.” Clisby v. Jones, 960 F.2d 925, 930 (11th Cir.1992). The Petitioner does not point to any information available to the trial court that should have led to a conclusion that the Petitioner would probably not receive a fair trial. The Petitioner has never attacked or taken issue with the general qualifications and competency of Dr. Newkirk. At no point during or prior to the trial did the Petitioner’s trial counsel ever complain that Dr. Newkirk’s examination was inadequate nor did he present any facts to alert the trial court to any inadequacy. Instead, the Petitioner relies almost entirely on the report of a licensed clinical psychologist that was introduced during the state habeas hearing to establish Dr. Newkirk’s alleged incompetence. (Am. Petition ¶¶ 181-88.) However, none of this information was before the trial court and, therefore, it cannot be considered in the due process analysis. Thus, the Petitioner has not alleged any action or inaction of the trial court regarding the competency of Dr. Newkirk that would establish a denial of due process. Rather than setting forth any allegations implicating due process, the Petitioner’s claim is more akin to one of professional malpractice or ineffective assistance of a mental health expert. Neither claim is recognized under Ake. In recognizing the right of access to a competent psychiatrist, the Supreme Court relied exclusively on due process grounds and explicitly refused to consider the applicability of the Sixth Amendment. Ake, 470 U.S. at 87 n. 13, 105 S.Ct. 1087; Clisby, 960 F.2d at 934. In addition, although Ake held that the Due Process Clause requires access to a competent mental health professional who will conduct an appropriate examination, the Court never defined what qualifies as an “appropriate” psychiatric evaluation nor did it establish what, if any, level of psychiatric competence is mandated by the Constitution. See Mason v. Mitchell, 320 F.3d 604, 616 (6th Cir.2003); Wilson v. Greene, 155 F.3d 396, 402 (4th Cir.1998); Harris v. Vasquez, 949 F.2d 1497, 1517-18 (9th Cir.1990); Silagy v. Peters, 905 F.2d 986, 1013 (7th Cir.1990). The Petitioner has not cited to any holding of the Supreme Court establishing a cognizable claim of ineffective assistance of a mental health expert. See Moody v. Polk, 408 F.3d 141, 150 (4th Cir.2005); Clisby, 960 F.2d at 934. Rather, somewhat to the contrary, the Supreme Court emphasized in Ake that psychiatry is not an exact science and that “psychiatrists disagree widely and frequently on what constitutes mental illness, on the appropriate diagnosis to be attached to given behavior and symptoms, on cure and treatment, and on likelihood of future dangerousness.” Ake, 470 U.S. at 81, 105 S.Ct. 1087. Accordingly, the state habeas court’s rejection of the Petitioner’s claim of incompetent psychiatric assistance was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, and the Petitioner’s claim for relief is denied. D. Claim P — Modification of Jury Verdict (Apprendi) The Petitioner alleges that the trial court improperly modified the jury verdict at the sentencing phase in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. He contends that the jury returned a verdict that did not contain any valid statutory aggravating circumstances as required by Georgia law. The Petitioner argues that the trial court rewrote the verdict making the finding of statutory aggravating circumstance