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ORDER ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT GRITZNER, District Judge. This matter comes before the Court on a Motion for Summary 'Judgment filed by Defendant Schneider National Carriers, Inc. (Clerk’s No. 19). ‘ Plaintiff Deborah Schoonover is represented by Michael Carroll and Kodi Peterson. Defendant Schneider National Carriers, Inc. (“Schneider”), is represented by Dennis Ogden and Christopher McDonald. Following a May 7, 2007, hearing, this matter is fully submitted and ready for disposition. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY I. Factual Allegations. A. Introduction. Defendant Schneider National Carriers, Inc. (“Schneider”), is an international provider of trucking, transportation, logistics, and intermodal services headquartered in Green Bay, Wisconsin. The company employs approximately 15,000 truck drivers, each of whom is assigned to one of fifteen Schneider Operating Centers scattered throughout the United States. One such Operating Center is found in Des Moines, Iowa, which supports between 700 and 1,000 drivers. Each of Schneider’s over-the-road truck drivers are paid a rate per mile determined by seniority, driving experience, and other factors. Solo drivers are paid at the lowest end of the spectrum but would graduate to a higher level the longer they stayed with the company. Plaintiff Deborah Schoonover applied to work as a driver for Schneider on January 14, 2003, by submitting an application for employment to the company’s Recruiting Department, which has exclusive authority to hire truck drivers. Schoonover agreed that if she were offered employment, it would be at will and could be terminated “at any time, without recourse.” DefApp. 80 (application for employment); see also DefiApp. 86 (indicating Schoonover “recognize[d] and agree[d] that [her] employment [was] strictly at will and [could] be terminated by Schneider at any time, without cause”). She acknowledged that failing to update any information she provided, or “providing false, misleading or incomplete statements or data in [the] application and/or supplemental documents” in connection with the application would be “grounds for immediate termination” of employment, “regardless of when such information is discovered.” DefiApp. 80. The record shows Schoonover’s pay was to be $0.27 for each mile driven. This compensation was commensurate with other similarly situated drivers. Schneider offered Schoonover a job as a solo driver. Before Schoonover was permitted to drive for Schneider, the company required Schoonover to attend a driver training program in Green Bay, Wisconsin, to allow her to obtain a commercial driver license. After training, Schoonover was assigned to the Des Moines Operating Center. Schneider terminated Schoon-over’s employment on August 20, 2003, for allegedly providing false information in certain medical forms included in her employment application materials. B. Schneider’s Personnel and Operations. Sheri Houdesheldt worked as a Service Team Representative in the Des Moines Operating Center from January 2000 through September 2003. Houdesheldt provided day-to-day support for truck drivers but lacked managerial or supervisory authority over them. She routinely communicated with all drivers assigned to her, one of whom was Schoonover. Jeff Morse has been employed by Schneider for approximately nine years as a service team leader or senior service team leader in the Des Moines Operating Center. As a senior service team leader, Morse managed service team representatives, trained service team leaders, managed drivers, and provided customer service. She could also terminate the employment of Schneider’s drivers. Morse reported to Team Operations Manager Marla Williams. Since at least 2003, Williams has served as the Des Moines Operating Center’s Team Operations Manager. Williams ensured service team leaders followed corporate procedures and processes and properly worked through issues that arise during the day. Williams reported to Operating Center Manager Lisa Gonnerman, who was the highest ranking Schneider employee at the Des Moines facility. The Des Moines Operating Center des not assign trucks to drivers. Schneider’s Tractor Network Center handles that function. Schoonover agrees this is true but notes that when she would experience mechanical problems with her equipment, she would contact her supervisors at the Des Moines Operating Center. The Tractor Network Center uses a Van Tractor Assignment Policy “to ensure the right tractors are assigned to all work configurations and that appropriate drivers are assigned to drive them.” DefiApp. 72. The policy lists a variety of factors to consider, including mileage on the truck and the seniority and past performance of the driver. There is no specific record that a driver’s gender is among the factors weighed. Under the policy, new solo drivers like Schoonover received the lowest priority for truck assignments. Because new drivers in Schoonover’s position typically received old equipment, it was “fairly common” for the vehicles they drove to experience mechanical problems. ■ Houd-esheldt Dep. 21:6-22:4; Schoonover Dep. 54:3-55:2 (explaining her understanding that new drivers did not receive new equipment to use). As a result of mechanical problems, new drivers would frequently be shifted to drive several different trucks in the early days of their employment. The record shows, that during the course of her employment with Schneider, Schoonover was assigned to drive at least four different trucks. Schoonover admits the Van Tractor Assignment Policy exists but argues that in practice some factors are considered when making assignments and others are not, adding that Schneider’s management still may have at least some role in truck assignments. However, beyond a broad understanding that she would receive equipment upgrades the longer she stayed with the company, Schoonover confessed to having no knowledge about who makes truck assignments or the processes or criteria used. She also provided no specific examples of situations where only some of the required factors were used by the Tractor Network Center to assign any vehicle. In addition to equipment assignments, drivers are also provided routes to drive. Schoonover was cognizant of the general method used to assign work: Q: Can you tell me how loads were assigned to you? A: I don’t know. They — I would put in an end macro to my — on my computer, and after so long a load would come up. The computer would beep. I would either call [Morse] or [Houdesheldt] if I had questions on the load. Q: Okay. And you would put in — it was your responsibility ... to put in something on the QUALCOMM system that told them you were ready to take another load; is that right? A: That I had ended that load, yes. Q: And do you know where that communication would go to? A: No. Q: Would it be a surprise to you if that communication ended up in Green Bay somewhere? A: I don’t believe it did. Q: Where do you believe it went? A: I believe it went to my [Service Team Leader]. Q: Okay. Well, all right. But you’re not sure who it went to? A: No. Q: And what would happen, then, once you told them you were ready for a load is you would be communicated with again on the computer telling you what load was next? A: Yes. Q: And you don’t know where that communication came from, do you? A: No. Q: You assumed it came from [Morse] or someone who was your [Service Team Leader]? A: Yes. Q: But it may have come from somewhere else; you don’t know? A: It could have, yes. Schoonover Dep. 133:12-134:25. Schneider fills in the details regarding work assignments. The Transportation Planning Department in Green Bay, Wisconsin, schedules loads for Schneider’s drivers. Employees known as transportation planners are vested with final decision-making authority for all work assignments, and no person outside the department can override an assignment. Transportation planners use a computer program called Global Scheduling System (“GSS”) to assign routes. The program maximizes efficiency and profitability by weighing a variety of factors, including driver location, hours of availability, dates of availability, equipment availability, customer needs, and other factors. Defendant contends the focus is on efficiency, not the sex of the drivers. The GSS system allows for limited flexibility in route assignments. For example, while drivers can request to be home for specific days, Schneider cannot guarantee a driver’s return on a specific date because schedules depend heavily on the movement of freight, company needs, and driver availability. Thus, drivers would sometimes miss important events at home. A driver could appeal an unfavorable assignment to the service team leader or service team representative, who would then contact the transportation planners to attempt to negotiate a plan so the driver could return home. In other words, an Operating Center could attempt to intervene on a driver’s behalf, but if a change was made, it would come from the transportation planners. Schoonover points out that in some cases, transportation planners must make adjustments. For example, a work assignment can be shifted if a driver experiences a medical emergency and is physically incapable of driving. She adds that while the GSS program may not consider a driver’s sex, transportation planners might. However, she has identified no transportation planner who manipulated or failed to follow proper procedures when assigning equipment to Schoonover or any other driver. C. Overview of Schoonover’s Employment. 1. Equipment Assignments. Schoonover’s first solo run occurred on April 22, 2003. This trip was made in a cabover truck. Schoonover argues she should not have been assigned to a cabover because she and two trainers had informed Morse she would be unable to drive that style of truck because of large breast size. After complaining to Morse, Schoonover was assigned to a different truck. Even though Schoonover was removed from the cabover truck for a reason uniquely situated to her being female, she conceded her assignment to that style of truck was not discriminatory: Q: .... Well, are you saying that [Morse] intentionally assigned you that truck because you are a woman? A: No. Q: All right. So my understanding was you believed that this truck was assigned to you because of discrimination? A: No. Q: Okay. So you don’t believe that? A: I didn’t believe that at the time, no. Q: Okay. That wasn’t my question ma'am. Do you believe that now? A: I believe, looking back, it was a menagerie of the things that happened that were discrimination, not that one — . At the time I didn’t believe that one thing was discrimination. I didn’t believe that the cabover was discrimination. Q: I know you didn’t believe that at the time, but are you saying you believe that now? A: Yes. Q: So you believe that [Morse] intentionally assigned you a cabover truck because you were a woman? A: Not on gender, no. Q: ... You’re saying that [Morse] intentionally did things to you that were discriminatory because you’re a woman? A: No. Schoonover Dep. 60:14-61:12; 62:15-18. Schneider points out Schoonover expected that she would be placed in a cabover truck at the time of her hire. A second truck was assigned to Schoon-over. The second truck was equipped with a conventional cab. Schoonover agrees her assignment to this truck was not an act of discrimination. The second truck was soon taken out of service, but Schoon-over concedes the truck was not taken out of service or dismantled to discriminate against her. Schoonover was assigned to a third different truck. After a time, she dropped this truck at an Operating Center in Gary, Indiana, so she could rent a car to return to Iowa for her daughter’s wedding. While Schoonover attended the wedding, the truck Schoonover left in Indiana was reassigned, and Schoonover was given a different truck. Schoonover testified as follows when she was asked whether she felt the reassignment of this vehicle was discriminatory: Q: Now, are you saying that the fact that you were reassigned a truck at that point or the truck was reassigned and you were sent to another truck was discrimination? A: That is just one part of it, yes. Q: So what you’re saying is that you believe that the truck in Gary was reassigned and you were sent to a different truck ... because of discrimination? A: It was one of the aspects that led up to the discrimination, yes. Q: .... Do you think that they did that because you were a woman ... or for some other discriminatory reason? A: No. Not — not wholly, no. Q: Okay. And when you say wholly, I’m assuming you’re not referring to holy as in God, but wholly as in whole or in part; is that right? A: Yes. Q: So what you’re saying is that you think part of the reason they did that was because you were a woman ... ? A: No. Not that instance, no. Q: Okay. So is it fair to say that you don’t believe any of those circumstances really were because somebody wanted to discriminate against you? A: No. Schoonover Dep. 31:21-33:4 (emphases added). This testimony reveals Schoon-over’s belief that the reassignment at least partially displays discriminatory intent. However, she has not buttressed this belief with positive evidence illustrating how the reassignment was discriminatory. Schoonover used this final truck until the end of her employment. While Schoonover did not experience mechanical problems with this vehicle after July 18, 2003, she did before then. On one occasion, she reported to maintenance personnel that the truck did not sound right when she was preparing to leave Des Moines, but she was told to take the truck and depart on a trip headed east. She reported the truck was experiencing mechanical problems near Walcott, Iowa, but was forced to drive the truck to the Operating Center in Indiana. When she arrived, the truck required significant repairs. Schoonover viewed her equipment assignments in the aggregate as discriminatory because male drivers with whom she trained did not experience changes with the same frequency: Q: Okay. And are you saying that you believe that your experience with changing trucks, being different than what you would call normal, was the result of discrimination? A: Yes. Q: Okay. Can you give me the facts that you base that on? A: Other students in my same class did not change trucks as often as I did. They went from their cabover to a conventional, and in the time of employment, that was the only change that they had made was one change, [sic] Schoonover Dep. 37:14-25; see also Schoonover Dep. 38:7-39:1 (testifying that “several drivers” — including at least one female — had the same truck each time she saw them, whereas she had a different vehicle). However, when pressed, she could not remember who the male classmates were or when she spoke with them. In addition to observations of her co-worker’s vehicles, Schoonover points to comments made by a trainer at the Des Moines Operating Center who joked that the number of times Schoonover was reassigned seemed high. Moreover, based on the “industry standard” as represented in trade magazines, Schoonover believed repeated reassignments without corresponding upgrades in equipment were unusual. Schoonover claims she complained about her perpetual reassignments to Morse and Houdesheldt, but she was ignored. Responding, Schneider argues Schoon-over’s receipt of inferior equipment was not based on her sex but was based on the fact that she was a new, inexperienced driver. 2. Route Assignments. One contested issue is the importance of the fact that most of Schoonover’s routes either originated or terminated east of the Missouri River. Schoonover argues that compared to routes west of the Missouri River, routes to the east are less desirable because the terrain is generally less flat and roadways are more congested. The implication is that it takes more time to travel the same distance, resulting in less profitable trips. Schneider responds by arguing there is no advantage to working in any particular area of the country. Logic dictates otherwise: Because the time in which a driver traverses a set distance is inversely proportional to the rate at which the driver accumulates pay, a driver forced to traverse hilly terrain and curvy roads earns money less quickly than one driving on flat, straight roads. While the record is factually poor on this issue, when viewed favorably to Schoonover, this set of facts infers westbound trips tended to be more desirable. Schneider’s better argument is based on United States Census Bureau statistics showing that in the year 2000, only 25 percent of all United States residents lived in the West. See U.S. Census Bureau, Demographic Trends in the 20th Century 19 fig. 1-7 (2002) (hereinafter “Census Report”), available at http://www.census.gov/ prod/2002pubs/censr-4.pdf (last visited June 8, 2007). Therefore, Schneider claims, it should not be confounding that a larger percentage of the destinations to which its drivers delivered cargo to and from are east of the Missouri River. It follows, the argument goes, that Schoon-over’s routes typically took her east of the Missouri River not because of her sex but because Schneider’s drivers were assigned to routes where the most work remained to be performed. In this manner, Schneider contends Schoonover’s assignments were no different from any other driver’s. The value of the Census Report to the Court is minimal without proof that the distribution of work performed by Schneider approximately mirrors the distribution of America’s populous. Schoonover counters by arranging a phalanx of ways she believes proves she was treated differently than other drivers with respect to route assignments. First, Schoonover notes that on one occasion, she was assigned to pick up a load from a shipper but was then told another company had taken the assignment. The record does not show the assignment went to a male, or that Schneider had any role in the reassignment of the cargo. Schoonover next notes that on a different occasion, she was assigned to deliver a load that would have given her significant mileage but claims she was “pulled off of [the] load for no reason,” Schoonover Dep. 130:11-14, and given a short load going east, Schoon-over Dep. 139:1-8; Pl.App. 57 (log entry indicating Schoonover was pulled from a load “for no reason” and assigned to a “short haul going east” because Morse indicated she “shouldn’t have been put on [the] load [going west]”). Schoonover does not know whether the westbound assignment was given to a male. While Schoon-over claims there were other times where she was removed from loads going west and given easterly destinations, she could not remember when they occurred or where the destinations were. Despite much conversation about route and equipment assignments, Schoonover has not identified any Schneider employee she believes discriminated against her because of her sex; instead, she identified problems occurring during her employment and concluded she must have had those experiences because she is female: Q:.... And I think we’ve talked a little bit about the truck changes. I guess I haven’t heard one yet — if I’m understanding what you’re telling me. I haven’t heard of a truck change yet that you believe resulted from some discrimination. There was the one in Gary, the going up to Minnesota and being reassigned, and then the cabover ..., but as I understand it, none of those, in your view, resulted from somebody wanting to discriminate against you. A: I — . Just looking at it collectively — . I can’t say at the time that it was purposely done. I’m just looking at it after the fact. It’s not normal. None of it was normal. Q: Okay. Well, and are you saying that there’s just no other conclusion, then, you know, you were treated abnormally because you were a woman? Is that what you’re saying? A: Yeah. Schoonover Dep. 66:5-24. She elaborated: Q: So you come to the conclusion that somebody had to mean for this to happen to you; is that what you’re saying? A: In my belief, whether they meant for it to happen, they let it continue to happen. Q: Who is “they”? A: [Morse], [Houdesheldt]. That was — . I would bring up the problems and they let it continue. Q: All right. Are you saying that [Houdesheldt] was doing this to you because you were a woman? A: She very well could have been. At the time I was just trying to get through my year so I could move on, put it behind me, and let it go. I tried not to complain. And in the meeting with [Houdesheldt] and [Williams], I did bring it up, and that’s the way that I felt, it was because I was a woman. I asked them if that was the reason. Q: Okay. What facts that you know led you to believe that [Houdesheldt] was taking adverse action against you because you were a woman? A: I was sitting broke most of the time. I would call and I — -with a safety issue and was told, “Well, take it to the [Operating Center].” Q: Who told you that? A: [Houdesheldt] would tell me that. And I told her over an air conditioning issue, “I can’t take the heat. I will get very sick.” And she said, ‘Well, you got to wait until you get back into Indiana to have it fixed.” I said, “[Houdesheldt], I can’t take the heat.” I explained to her that I just had a hysterectomy and the hot flashes with the high heat. “Well, you’ll just have to wait until you get to the Indiana [Operating Center].” I said, “It needs fixed.” Q: But why do you think that it was the result of the fact that you were a woman? A: I can’t name one thing. I just look back and its collective. Yes it was insensitive. Had I pulled in to a scale — had I known at that time to pull in to a scale and pull around back and say, “Inspect it, air conditioner ain’t working,” they would have been out there to fix it right then and there. Q: “They” meaning Schneider? A: Yeah. They would have had to before the truck moved. Q: Okay. A: Safety issues, where it was brought up that I was too cautious, and it was by [Houdesheldt], and it was brought up at that point that it was because I’m a girl. Q: Okay. A: Didn’t say because I was a woman, said because I was a girl I was a little bit too safety-conscious on — . Because I got really upset about a mechanical issue.... And when I had talked to [Houdesheldt], she said, “That’s just because you’re a girl that you’re a little bit more sensitive you know, to those things.” Schoonover Dep. 67:3-69:25. Three immediate observations follow from this testimony. First, despite her limited experience in the industry, Schoonover believed she received an unusual number of equipment reassignments. Second, she believed, for no discernible reason, that her equipment reassignments were based on her sex. Third, Houdesheldt’s comments that Schoonover was cautious because she was “a girl” are not relevant because Houdesheldt was not the decisionmaker with respect to Schoonover’s route or equipment assignments or Schoonover’s ultimate termination. Regardless of who discriminated against her, Schoonover made clear that she believed Morse did not: Q: Okay. You’re saying that [Morse] intentionally did things to you that were discriminatory because you’re a woman? A: No. Q: Okay. Do you have any reason to believe that [Morse] meant to cause you these problems because you were a woman? A: No. Q: So you don’t think [Morse] had anything against you because you were a woman? A: No. Schoonover Dep. 62:15-18, 64:4-10. In fact, of those at the Des Moines Operating Center with whom Schoonover interacted, Morse “tried to be the fairest of everyone.” Schoonover Dep. 159:25-160:9. That does not mean Schoonover believed Morse was harmless: Q:.... Well, do you have any facts on which you could base a conclusion that [Morse] did anything to you or caused you any problem in your employment with Schneider because you were a woman? A: I just look at the list of events, and that’s the only facts that I have---- Schoonover Dep. 64:16-21. The “list of events” includes the route and equipment assignments discussed above. See Schoon-over Dep. 64:24-66:4. D. The Concluding Days of Schoon-over’s Employment. 1. Schoonover’s Meeting with Schneider Management. Schoonover met with Williams and Houdesheldt on either August 4 or 5, 2003, regarding what Houdesheldt believed were alleged discrepancies in Schoonover’s paycheck. At the meeting, Schoonover contends Williams admitted Schoonover had spent enough time driving east and would try to arrange trips for her elsewhere. Shortly after the meeting, Schoonover departed Des Moines for Wyoming and Utah. Schoonover contends that at this early August meeting she “brought up discrimination.” Schoonover Dep. 45:2-7. As evident from the portions of Schoon-over’s deposition quoted above, Schoon-over did not complain of discrimination; she noted she received less desirable routes and equipment assignments and “asked them” if she received those assignments because of her sex. 2. The Investigation into Schoon-over’s Allergies. On July 30, 2003, Schneider’s Occupational Health Department was notified Schoonover would miss work with a urinary tract infection but would return on August 1, 2003. On August 13, 2003, Schoonover again took herself out of service for issues related to a urinary tract infection. That same day, an employee at the Des Moines Operating Center called her “to see when she was going to be ready to come back to work.” Def.App. 33. Schoonover indicated she was afraid she would have an allergic reaction to new medication she was prescribed to treat her urinary tract infection and so removed herself from service. DefApp. 33 (Operating Center notes indicating Schoonover said she could return to work on “[Saturday] or [S]un[day] since she was taking a different medicine starting on [T]hurs[day;] she is afraid of an allergic reaction to the medicine and doesn[’]t feel safe to [drive] for 24-48 h[ours] after taking the new medication”). After speaking with Schoonover, an employee at the Des Moines Operating Center called Schneider’s Occupational Health Department, which advised that Schoonover “would have to provide return to work documentation from a doctor [and would] need documentation on the severe drug allergy.” DefApp. 71. All non-work related medical issues for truck drivers are routed through the company’s Occupational Health Department. Wendy Sullivan is Schneider’s Occupational Health Manager, and is “responsible for DOT compliance from a medical perspective in the organization” for the company’s drivers. Sullivan Dep. 3:4-17. During Schoonover’s employment, Sullivan was a nurse in the same department. Her duties were substantially the same, but she was more involved in medical document review, a process where applicants’ medical records are examined for potential health problems posing safety concerns. She could not hire or fire drivers; she could recommend an individual’s employment be terminated. Because Schoonover’s urinary tract infection was not a work-related injury, the Occupational Health Department became involved. On August 13, 2003, an individual at that department telephoned Schoon-over. In the call, Schoonover reiterated that she did not wish to drive because she was fearful of an allergic reaction to her new medication. She stated that she had self-imposed a 24- to 48-hour driving ban. Def.App. 37 (log entry by Sullivan reporting Schoonover indicated she “ha[d] to start a new med again for [an] infection she is fighting and it is her rule that she waits at least 24 hrs to see how she does on a new medication”). Sullivan’s notes reflect these limitations grew from a reaction Schoonover had “from a narcotic in the past” and from a concern that she had “passed out once when she got near cocaine.” DeflApp. 37. Sullivan told Schoonover her allergic reaction was not disclosed in her employment application materials and that Sullivan would have to check Schoonover’s application materials again. Turning to those materials, the record shows that in January 2003, Schoonover completed a Post Job Offer Medical Questionnaire Form for Schneider. The redacted version of the form contained in the record is not signed by Schoonover. The form provides that “[a]ny false statements” therein would justify an immediate termination “regardless of when such information is discovered.” DeflApp. 77. This form was apparently filled out over the telephone: the record shows an individual from Schneider asked questions and then transcribed Schoonover’s answers. Schoonover’s response to question 8 on the form, which called for emergency room visits, is incomplete because it lists no emergency room visits for any allergic reactions. Also around the time of her application, Schoonover completed and signed a Medical Examination Report for Commercial Driver Fitness Determination, which was required by the United States Department of Transportation. See DeflApp. 191-193 (medical report); see also 49 C.F.R. § 391.41, .43 (2006) (setting forth the physical qualifications for drivers and the items covered in a Medical Examination Report). In the Health History section of the report, Schoonover checked that she had not experienced “[s]hortness of breath.” DeflApp. 191. However, at her deposition, Schoonover testified that she had experienced airway restrictions during allergic reactions to codeine and ampieillin. Schoonover also indicated in the Medical Examination Report that she had experienced no “[n]ervous or psychiatric disorders, e.g., severe depression,” DeflApp. 191, but in her Post Job Offer Medical Questionnaire stated that she was treated in 1994 for depression. Schoonover explains that she acknowledged suffering from depression at a post-job offer interview but argues her depression is not “severe.” Returning to the Medical Examination Report, Schoonover checked that she had not experienced any “[l]oss of, or altered consciousness” or “[f]ainting [or] dizziness,” Def.App. 191; but at her deposition she testified that she repeatedly lost consciousness as a result of allergies to drugs, Schoonover Dep. 175:18:21 (loss of consciousness from the use of an epinephrine autoinjector); 176:6-177:13 (loss of consciousness from administration of cocaine for a dental procedure); 178:18-180:5 (recalling numerous instances where she was present where cocaine was used, resulting in a loss of consciousness because cocaine was “in the air”). Schoonover claims she discussed how to complete the Medical Examination Report with the physician who examined her. After hearing of Schoonover’s allergies, the examiner reportedly told Schoonover to indicate she had not lost consciousness because the question was designed to unearth random occurrences liked epilepsy. The record somewhat supports this allegation because the medical examiner noted Schoonover’s drug allergies on another form. See PLApp. 61 (medical questionnaire on February 11, 2003, indicating allergies to “cocaine (RX), amp, [and] codeine”). The document disclosing Schoonover’s allergies was apparently unseen by Schneider before the company decided to offer her a job. Schoonover claims Schneider was aware of her medical problems through other channels. For example, Schoonover notes she asked for time off during training because she was taking cold medication and believed it was safer to refrain from driving during that time. Around the same time, she recalls telling Morse she had reactions to certain medications and reiterated her allergies to Morse just before she started driving. Schneider counters by claiming that many of Schoonover’s observations are simply not relevant. For example, because the Recruitment Department hires drivers, comments to individuals outside that department could not have had an impact on the decision to hire Schoonover. Comments by Schoonover to her examining physician are also not relevant because the Recruitment Department relied on the written form Schoonover signed — not the verbal exchange occurring at the examination — to decide whether to hire Schoon-over. 3. Schoonover’s Termination. After examining Schoonover’s medical forms, Sullivan determined she had not disclosed a pre-existing medical condition. Sullivan testified, Q: .... What was it that you were looking for to be fully disclosed that you believed was not fully disclosed? A: I believe what was not fully disclosed to the occupational health department was certainly the medication reactions. My main concern was the fact that she indicated to me that she passed out when she got near cocaine. To me, that translates to a concern because, A, that is not a typical reaction. And, B, of course I had some concerns about being around a DOT knockout drug. And, C, I had some concerns about driving a truck with a predisposition to passing out. Q: Well, when you use the term, “predisposition,” what do you mean? A: Well, if it was such in her medical makeup that she had severe medication reaction[s], albeit, you know, an antibiotic! ], albeit, a narcotic, if you know, for example, at the DOT, it is perfectly acceptable to take an antibiotic and drive, but if it is such that she is potentially going to pass out from a bad medication reaction, that would be a concern to me driving a commercial vehicle. Sullivan Dep. 38:21-39:15. Sullivan informed the Des Moines Operational Center that the Occupational Health Department had no records showing Schoonover suffered from drug allergies or needed to miss work each time she stared a new medication. DefApp. 37; see also Def. App. 76 (fax from Sullivan to Morse indicating the Occupational Health Department “[d]id not know [at] the time of hire [Schoonover] would need to be off 24 [hours] each time she was put on new medication] due to [her] allergy history” and that there was a “falsification” in her application materials). Because resolution of the pending motion depends largely upon Morse’s mental processes in the time frame spanning the end of Schoonover’s employment, examination of Morse’s testimony in some detail is necessary: Q: [W]hat caused you to contact Occupational Health about Deb Schoon-over? A: .... I received information from Sheri Houdesheldt that we were waiting for a return-to-work document from a physician related to a drug allergy, and so I made contact with the Occupational Health Department inquiring about the situation .... [D]uring the course of [the conversations with that department], I learned that this information was not disclosed at the time of hire. Q:.... What was your understanding that you had obtained from Ms. Houdesheldt regarding the drug allergy? What was your understanding? A: That Deb Schoonover could not return to work because of a drug allergy where she was needing — I don’t know what — I think it was 24 to 48 hours time off before returning to work [after] starting a new medication. Q: .... When you learned ... that there was going to be some delay in Ms. Schoonover’s return to work because of a drug allergy, did you immediately within the day or two days pick up the phone and call Occupational Health, or did you undertake any other investigation on your own? A: The investigation would be I called the Occupational Health Department to inquire of what — I guess to confirm what [Houdesheldt] was telling me. Q: .... What prompted your phone call to Occupational Health? A: Because I was — I wanted to know if they had received a document, and if there was anything as far as a medication or something where it’s a ... DOT knockout drug — where a person would be off greater than that. So that is what concerned me and why I would call Occupational Health. Q: Okay. And what did you learn from Occupational Health? A: I can’t remember the conversation vividly, but I learned from Occupational Health that they had received documentation from the clinic — or a fax or however they receive it — that the Occupational Health Department did not have prior knowledge [of] the drug allergy up to that point. Q: .... Did you ask Occupational Health whether it had done any investigation of whether Ms. Schoon-over had disclosed any allergies or drug allergies around the time of her hire? A: Yes. Q: What did they tell you? A: Well, first of all, it was not disclosed at the time of hire. That would be what they — . When I called up there to ask about the situation with Occupational Health, that was what my communication was inquiring, if we knew of this. So they couldn’t have investigated it if they did not know about it at the time of hire. So my investigation was — . The first time I investigated the situation was when Sheri Houdesheldt told me. I contacted Occupational Health. We had a conversation regarding it. During that conversation or conversations [I learned] that we did not have any record or disclosure of the allergy to a medication. Q: [D]o you recall having a discussion with Wendy Sullivan or anyone else in Occupational Health that said, in essence, “This allergy history regarding medication was not disclosed at the time of hire and could be a falsification issue/grounds for termination?”.... A: Yes. Q:.... Did you just take Occupational Health’s representation to you as true, that this medication allergy was not disclosed by Ms. Schoonover at the time of her hire? A: That is correct. Q: [H]ow did you know that Ms. Schoonover didn’t tell someone at some point during the [hiring] process about this medication allergy? A: From our Occupational Health Department, who keeps those medical records an the history of our driver associates. Morse Dep. 9:19-22:2. After this investigation, on August 20, 2003, Morse decided to terminate Schoonover’s employment because he believed she submitted false or incomplete medical materials. Morse Dep. 7:16-24, 23:14-19, 24:19-23; see also Def. App. 37 (Occupational Health Department notes explaining why Schoonover was to be terminated), 71 (Morse’s notes detailing reasons for Schoonover’s termination); 89 (termination notice signed by Morse and Williams explaining why Schoonover was terminated). Morse notes Sullivan recommended termination. Morse testified that if he believed termination was not the correct course, he would not have fired Schoonover. Schneider claims neither Houdesheldt nor Williams mentioned their early August meeting with Schoonover where she inquired into whether her route and equipment assignments were made on the basis of her sex. Morse testified as follows: Q: .... Did you talk to Marla Williams about the decision to terminate [Schoonoverj’s employment? A: No. Q: Did either Marla Williams or Sheri Houdesheldt inform you that they had a meeting, either/or both of them, that they had a meeting with Deb Schoonover about concerns Deb had about loads, tractor assignments, pay, that sort of thing? A: I don’t remember. Q: Did you ever hear from [Houdesh-eldt] or [Williams] that [Schoon-over] had complained to either or both of them that she felt she was being discriminated against based on her gender in tractor assignments, loads, pay? A: No. Morse Dep. 51:25-52:13. Specifically, the record shows neither Houdesheldt nor Williams advised, consulted, or had any input into the decision to end Schoonover’s employment, and the record is silent as to any indication to the contrary. Schoon-over concedes Houdesheldt had no involvement with her firing but argues Williams was part of the decisionmaking process because she signed (along with Morse) a form known as a Driver/Power Term Sheet, which listed the reasons for Schoonover’s termination. Morse signed the document on August 20, 2003; Williams’ signature is next to an illegible date. Schoonover wishes the Court to infer Williams’ signature means Williams and Morse conferred before Morse decided to discharge Schoonover, and Schoonover’s inquiry into discrimination voiced in early August must have been discussed. Schneider argues the most that can be inferred from Williams’ signature is that at some point after the decision to fire Schoonover was made, Williams signed a form prepared by her subordinate. Schneider also points to Williams’ deposition, where she testified she had no role in the decision to fire Schoonover: Q: Did you have any input into the decision to fire Deb Schoonover? A: No. Q: Do you know who did? A: Jeff Morse. Q: Did Mr. Morse talk to you about his decision prior to announcing it to Ms. Schoonover? A: No. Q: Prior to Ms. Schoonover being fired, had you [had] any discussions with Ms. Schoonover about concerns or complaints she had about her employment? A: No, not that I recall. Q: Had you heard from Mr. Morse or Ms. Houdesheldt about any concerns or complaints expressed to them by Ms. Schoonover? A: No, not that I recall. Williams Dep. 4:16-5:10. Further, Schneider notes it is standard procedure for a Service Team Leader to terminate a driver’s employment without consulting his superiors, implying Morse would have gone outside established protocols had he and Williams discussed Schoonover’s termination before the decision to fire her was made. Morse did not recall hearing about the meeting between Williams, Houdesheldt, and Schoonover before making his decision to fire Schoonover. Regardless of whether he heard about the fact that a meeting occurred, the record shows he was unaware of the meeting’s substance: Morse testified that he did not “hear from [Houd-esheldt] or [Williams] that [Schoonover] had complained to either or both of them that she felt she was being discriminated against based on her gender in tractor assignments, loads, [or] pay.” Morse Dep. 52:9-13. The record contains no evidence from which to infer the contrary. II. Procedural History. Schoonover filed a timely complaint with the Iowa Civil Rights Commission (“ICRC”), which was cross-filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). The EEOC returned administrative releases and right to sue letters on November 8 and November 15, 2005, and the ICRC provided Schoonover with a right to sue letter on February 10, 2006. Schoonover commenced this action on February 1, 2006, amending her Complaint after receiving her ICRC administrative release. In Count I of her Amended Complaint, Schoonover alleges she was terminated based on her gender, constituting a violation of section 703(a)(1) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (2006). Count V sets forth similar allegations but is brought under section 7 of the Iowa Civil Rights Act of 1965, as amended, Iowa Code § 216.6(l)(a) (2006). In Count II, Schoonover alleges she was terminated in retaliation for complaining about disparate treatment she received, constituting a violation of section 704(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). And in Count VI, Schoonover brings similar complaints under section 8 of the Iowa Civil Rights Act, as amended, Iowa Code § 216.11(2). Schneider has moved for summary judgment on all four counts. DISCUSSION I. Summary Judgment Standards. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 permits parties against whom claims are brought to move for summary judgment. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(b). That rule provides that summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. R. 56(c). “ ‘When the moving party has carried [this] burden under Rule 56(c), its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.’ ” Scott v. Harris, - U.S. -, -, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 1776, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (footnote omitted and alteration by the Scott Court)). In other words, “ ‘the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat’ ” a properly supported motion for summary judgment; instead, there must be “ ‘no genuine issue of material fact.’ ” Id. (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (emphases by the Anderson Court)). Where there are competing narratives, “one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Id. Instead, it takes two or more sides of a factual dispute each supported by evidence to metamorphose a generic factual dispute into a “genuine” one. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (to reject a motion for summary judgment, “the evidence [must be] such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party”), 249 (“[T]here is no issue for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party.”) (citing First Nat’l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-89, 88 S.Ct. 1575, 20 L.Ed.2d 569 (1968)); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 675 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348 (“Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’ ”). That is, demonstrating only “some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts” is not sufficient. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348; see also Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 600, 118 S.Ct. 1584, 140 L.Ed.2d 759 (1998) (in the face of a properly supported motion, requiring a nonmoving party to “identify affirmative evidence from which a jury could find that the plaintiff has carried his or her burden of pro[of]”); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (if evidence supporting a claim “is merely colorable or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted”) (citing Cities Serv., 391 U.S. at 290, 88 S.Ct. 1575; Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82, 87 S.Ct. 1425, 18 L.Ed.2d 577 (1967) (per curiam)). Of course, locating a genuine factual dispute capable of resolution in favor of the nonmoving party does not compel denial of summary judgment: The dispute must be about a fact that is material. A genuine issue of fact is material if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505; see also Nebraska v. Wyoming, 507 U.S. 584, 590, 113 S.Ct. 1689, 123 L.Ed.2d 317 (1993) (when deciding if a material factual dispute exists, a court must “view[] the evidence through the prism of the controlling legal standard”). Conversely, genuine disputes about “irrelevant or unnecessary” facts are not sufficient to avoid summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Proeedurally, the party seeking summary judgment must acquaint the Court with the basis for its motion by highlighting portions of the record featuring the absence of genuine issues of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The resisting party must then go beyond the pleadings and present “ ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)); accord Dep’t of Commerce v. U.S. House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316, 329, 119 S.Ct. 765, 142 L.Ed.2d 797 (1999) (“To prevail on a ... motion for summary judgment — as opposed to a motion to dismiss— ... mere allegations ... are insufficient.”); Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 309, 116 S.Ct. 834, 133 L.Ed.2d 773 (1996) (holding that when considering a motion for summary judgment, “the plaintiff can no longer rest on the pleadings and the court looks to the evidence before it (in the light most favorable to the plaintiff)” (citation omitted)); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992) (holding that “[i]n, ... response to a summary judgment motion ... [a] plaintiff can no longer rest on ... ‘mere allegations,’ but must ‘set forth’ by affidavit or other evidence ‘specific facts’ ”) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)); Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (a properly supported motion must be resisted by a party’s “own affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file” which “designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial” (quotation marks omitted)). If a party bears the burden of proof at trial, summary judgment is appropriate against that party if it “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case.” Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548; accord Nebraska v. Wyoming, 507 U.S. at 590, 113 S.Ct. 1689; Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Feder., 497 U.S. 871, 884, 110 S.Ct. 3177, 111 L.Ed.2d 695 (1990). There is no burden upon “the moving party to negate the elements of the nonmoving party’s case;” instead, it is inherent upon the nonmoving party to designate specific facts demonstrating the need for a trial. Nat’l Wildlife Feder., 497 U.S. at 885, 110 S.Ct. 3177. If the nonmoving party fails, “[t]he moving party is ‘entitled to judgment as a matter of law’ because the nonmoving party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element.” Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548; accord Nat’l Wildlife Feder., 497 U.S. at 884, 110 S.Ct. 3177. Throughout this process, the Court must view the record and reasonable inferences derivable from the record in a light favorable to the nonmoving party, see Behrens, 516 U.S. at 309, 116 S.Ct. 834; Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158-59, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970)); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 587-88, 106 S.Ct. 1348, presume the nonmoving party’s version of a disputed issue is the correct one, Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 456, 112 S.Ct. 2072, 119 L.Ed.2d 265 (1992); Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 339, 102 S.Ct. 2466, 73 L.Ed.2d 48 (1982); Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 551, 119 S.Ct. 1545, 143 L.Ed.2d 731 (1999); Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 641, 118 S.Ct. 2196, 141 L.Ed.2d 540 (1998); Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130, while avoiding jury functions like making credibility determinations, weighing the evidence, and “drawing ... legitimate inferences from the facts,” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505; see also Cromartie, 526 U.S. at 552, 119 S.Ct. 1545 (error to resolve disputed fact). But if after analyzing the record, “ ‘it is quite clear what the truth is,’ ” summary judgment may be granted: While ‘“the purpose of the rule is not to cut litigants off from their right of trial by jury if they really have issues to try,'” Poller v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 467, 82 S.Ct. 486, 7 L.Ed.2d 458 (1962) (quoting Sartor v. Ark. Natural Gas Corp., 321 U.S. 620, 627, 64 S.Ct. 724, 88 L.Ed. 967 (1944)), summary judgment erects “the ultimate screen to weed out truly insubstantial lawsuits prior to trial,” Crawford-El, 523 U.S. at 600, 118 S.Ct. 1584; see also Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323-24, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (stating that “[o]ne of the principal purposes of the summary judgment rule is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims or defenses, and ... it should be interpreted in a way that allows it to accomplish this purpose”). Cf. Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 708, 117 S.Ct. 1636, 137 L.Ed.2d 945 (1997) (suggesting Rule 56 serves as a deterrent to the initiation of “frivolous and vexatious litigation”). The Eighth Circuit has recently and repeatedly cautioned that “summary judgment should be used sparingly in the context of employment discrimination and/or retaliation cases where direct evidence of intent is often difficult or impossible to obtain.” Wallace v. DTG Operations, Inc., 442 F.3d 1112, 1117-18 (8th Cir.2006) (citing Haas v. Kelly Servs., Inc., 409 F.3d 1030, 1034-35 (8th Cir.2005)); accord Higgins v. Gonzales, 481 F.3d 578, 584 (8th Cir.2007) (“ ‘seldom ... used’ ” (quoting Stidham v. Minn. Mining & Mfg., Inc., 399 F.3d 935, 937 (8th Cir.2005))); Arnold v. Nursing & Rehab. Ctr. at Good Shepherd, LLC, 471 F.3d 843, 845-46 (8th Cir.2006) (“ ‘used sparingly’ ” (quoting Whitley v. Peer Review Sys., Inc., 221 F.3d 1053, 1055 (8th Cir.2000))); Bass v. SBC Commc’ns, Inc., 418 F.3d 870, 873 (8th Cir.2005) (“ ‘seldom ... granted’ ” (quoting Mayer v. Nextel West Corp., 318 F.3d 803, 806 (8th Cir.2003) (quotation marks omitted))); Pope v. ESA Servs., Inc., 406 F.3d 1001, 1006 (8th Cir.2005) (“ ‘seldom ... used’ ” (quoting Stidham, 399 F.3d at 937)); Rodgers v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 417 F.3d 845, 850 (8th Cir.2005) (“ ‘used sparingly’ ” (quoting Whitley, 221 F.3d at 1055)); Berg v. Norand Corp., 169 F.3d 1140, 1144 (8th Cir.1999) (“generally inappropriate”); see also United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716, 103 S.Ct. 1478, 75 L.Ed.2d 403 (1983) (noting the difficulty in identifying intent because “[tjhere will seldom be ‘eyewitness’ testimony as to the employer’s mental processes.”). However, employment discrimination and retaliation cases are not to be treated with delicacy: “No separate summary judgment standard exists for discrimination or retaliation cases.” DTG Operations, Inc., 442 F.3d at 1118; see Berg, 169 F.3d at 1144 (stating that “there is no ‘discrimination case exception’ to the application of [Rule] 56, and it remains a useful pretrial tool to determine whether or not any case, including one alleging discrimination, merits a trial”); see also Aikens, 460 U.S. at 716, 103 S.Ct. 1478 (indicating trial courts should not “treat discrimination differently from other ultimate questions of fact”). This pair of standards is reducible to the following: “Although Rule 56 contains only one standard, [this Court] must exercise particular caution when examining the factual question of intent to ensure that [it] dutifully extendfs] all justifiable inferences in favor of the non-moving party.” DTG Operations, Inc., 442 F.3d at 1118 (emphasis in the original). Informed by these standards, the Court turns to the parties’ arguments. II. Discrimination Claims. The Court opens with Schoonover’s gender discrimination claim. A. Legal Standards. In relevant part, section 703 of the federal Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it unlawful for an employer to “discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s ... sex....” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l)(2006). The Iowa Civil Rights Act of 1965, as amended, Iowa Code ch. 216 (2006), makes it an unlawful employment practice for a “[p]erson to refuse to hire, accept, register, classify, or refer for employment, to discharge any employee, or to otherwise discriminate in employment against ... any employee because of the ... sex ... of such ... employee, unless based upon the nature of the occupation,” Id. § 216.6(l)(a). Because Schoonover does not rely on direct evidence of discrimination, the three-part burden-shifting framework devised by the United States Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), applies to Schoonover’s sex discrimination claim. Under that test, a plaintiff carries the “initial burden” of setting forth a pri-ma facie case of unlawful discrimination. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817; accord Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000); St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993); Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981). If the record contains such evidence, the employee is entitled to “a rebuttable ‘presumption that the employer unlawfully discriminated against’ ” her. Aikens, 460 U.S. at 714, 103 S.Ct. 1478 (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254, 101 S.Ct. 1089). A burden of production then arises upon the employer “to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for” the employment action. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817; accord Reeves, 530 U.S. at 142, 120 S.Ct. 2097; Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253-54, 101 S.Ct. 1089. If the record contains such evidence, the employee must then “be afforded a fair opportunity to show that [the employerjs stated reason for [the adverse employment action] was in fact pretext.” McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804, 93 S.Ct. 1817; accord Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253, 101 S.Ct. 1089; see also McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 805, 93 S.Ct. 1817 (the employee must be given an opportunity to show “the presumptively valid reasons for [the adverse employment action] were in fact a coverup for a ... discriminatory reason”). Throughout this process, the burden of persuasion remains with the Plaintiff. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 248, 101 S.Ct. 1089 (“The ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff.”) (citing Bd. of Trustees of Keene State College v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24, 25 n. 2, 99 S.Ct. 295, 58 L.Ed.2d 216 (1978)); accord Reeves, 530 U.S. at 143, 120 S.Ct. 2097; Hicks, 509 U.S. at 507, 517-18, 113 S.Ct. 2742. The burden of production carried by the employer in the intermediate stage “is intended progressively to sharpen the inquiry to the elusive factual question of intentional discrimination,” Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255 n. 8, 101 S.Ct. 1089; see also Id. at 255-56, 101 S.Ct. 1089 (placing a burden of production on the employer “serves simultaneously to meet the plaintiffs prima facie case by presenting a legitimate reason for the action and to frame the factual issue with sufficient clarity so that the plaintiff will have a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate pretext”), but does not give rise to a burden of persuasion on the part of the employer. The Court is aware that “[t]he prima facie case method established in McDonnell Douglas was ‘never intended to be rigid, mechanized, or ritualistic,’ ” and is instead “ ‘merely a sensible, orderly way to evaluate the evidence in light of common experience as it bears on the critical question of discrimination.’ ” Aikens, 460 U.S. at 711, 103 S.Ct. 1478 (quoting Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577, 98 S.Ct. 2943, 57 L.Ed.2d 957 (1978)). Flexible as it may be, the three-part framework is mandatory. More importantly, perhaps, the Court is guided by “ ‘[t]he broad, overriding interest, shared by employer, employee, and consumer[:] efficient and trustworthy workmanship assured through fair and ... neutral employment and personnel decisions.’ ” Burdine, 450 U.S. at 259, 101 S.Ct. 1089 (quoting McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 801, 93 S.Ct. 1817) (alteration by the Burdine Court). Title VII was not intended to create a rule whereby preferential treatment is given to minorities or women by “requiring] the employer to restructure his employment practices to maximize , the number of minorities and women hired.” Burdine, 450 U.S. at 259, 101 S.Ct. 1089 (citing Furnco Constr. Corp., 438 U.S. at 577-78, 98 S.Ct. 2943); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (“Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be interpreted to require any employer ... to grant preferential treatment to any individual ... because of the race, color, religion, sex, or national origin of such individual”). The statute does not supplant “ ‘traditional management prerogatives.’ ” Burdine, 450 U.S. at 259, 101 S.Ct. 1089 (quoting Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 207, 99 S.Ct. 2721, 61 L.Ed.2d 480 (1979)). As a result, this Court cannot and will not serve as a conduit through which an employee wishes to protest the reasons for her firing, except to the extent the employe