Department of Commerce v. United States House of Representatives (525 U.S. 316, 1999)

Justice O’Connor

delivered the opinion of the Court, except as to Part III-B.

The Census Bureau (Bureau) has announced a plan to use two forms of statistical sampling in the 2000 Decennial Census to address a chronic and apparently growing problem of “undercounting” certain identifiable groups of individuals. Two sets of plaintiffs filed separate suits challenging the legality and constitutionality of the Bureau’s plan. Convened as three-judge courts, the District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia and the District Court for the District of Columbia each held that the Bureau’s plan for the 2000 census violates the Census Act, 13 U. S. C. § 1 et seq., and both courts permanently enjoined the Bureau’s planned use of statistical sampling to determine the population for purposes of congressional apportionment. 19 F. Supp. 2d 543 (ED Va. 1998); 11F. Supp. 2d 76 (DC 1998). We noted probable jurisdiction in both cases, 524 U. S. 978 (1998); 525 U. S. 924 (1998), and consolidated the cases for oral argument, 525 U. S. 924 (1998). We now affirm the judgment of the District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, and we dismiss the appeal from the District Court for the District of Columbia.

I

A

Article I, §2, el. 3, of the United States Constitution states that "Representatives . . . shall be apportioned among the several States . . . according to their respective Numbers.” It further requires that “[t]he actual Enumeration shall be made within three Years after the first Meeting of the Congress of the United States, and within every subsequent Term of ten Years, in such Manner as they shall by Law direct.” Ibid. Finally, §2 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that “Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed.”

Pursuant to this constitutional authority to direct the manner in which the "actual Enumeration” of the population shall be made, Congress enacted the Census Act (hereinafter Census Act or Act), 13 U. S. C. § 1 et seq., delegating to the Secretary of Commerce (Secretary) authority to conduct the decennial census. § 4. The Act provides that the Secretary "shall, in the year 1980 and every 10 years thereafter, take a decennial census of population as of the first day of April of such year.” § 141(a). It further requires that “[t]he tabulation of total population by States ... as required for the apportionment of Representatives in Congress among the several States shall be completed within 9 months after the census date and reported by the Secretary to the President of the United States.” § 141(b). Using this information, the President must then “transmit to the Congress a statement showing the whole number of persons in eaeh State... and the number of Representatives to which each State would be entitled.” 2 U. S. C. §2a(a). Within 15 days thereafter, the Clerk of the House of Representatives must “send to the executive of each State a certificate of the number of Representatives to which such State is entitled.” 2 U. S. C. §2a(b) (1994 ed., Supp. III).

The instant dispute centers on the problem of “under-count” in the decennial census. For the last few decades, the Bureau has sent census forms to every household, which it asked residents to complete and return. The Bureau followed up on the mailing by sending enumerators to personally visit all households that did not respond by mail. Despite this comprehensive effort to reach every household, the Bureau has always failed to reach — and has thus failed to count — a portion of the population. This shortfall has been labeled the census “undereount.”

The Bureau has been measuring the census undercount rate since 1940, and undercount has been the subject of public debate at least since the early 1970’s. See M. Anderson, The American Census: A Social History 221-222 (1988). It has been measured in one of two ways. Under one method, known as “demographic analysis,” the Bureau develops an independent estimate of the population using birth, death, immigration, and emigration records. U. S. Dept, of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Report to Congress: The Plan for Census 2000, p. 2, and n. 1 (Aug. 1997) (hereinafter Census 2000 Report). A second method, first used in 1990, involves a large sample survey, called the “Post-Enumeration Survey,” that is conducted in conjunction with the decennial census. The Bureau compares the information gathered during the survey with the information obtained in the census and uses the comparison to estimate the number of unenumerated people in the census. See National Research Council, Modernizing the U. S. Census 30-31 (B. Edmon-ston & C. Sehultze eds. 1995).

Some identifiable groups — including certain minorities, children, and renters — have historically had substantially higher undereount rates than the population as a whole. See Census 2000 Report 3-4. Accordingly, in previous censuses, the Bureau sought to increase the number of persons from whom it obtained information. In 1990, for instance, the Bureau attempted to reach out to traditionally under-counted groups by promoting awareness of the census and its importance, providing access to Spanish language forms, and offering a toll free number for those who had questions about the forms. Id., at 4. Indeed, the 1990 census was “better designed and executed than any previous census.” Id., at 2. Nonetheless, it was less accurate than its predecessor for the first time since the Bureau began measuring the undereount rate in 1940. Ibid.

In a further effort to address growing concerns about un-dereount in the census, Congress passed the Decennial Census Improvement Act of 1991, which instructed the Secretary to contract with the National Academy of Sciences (Academy) to study the “means by which the Government could achieve the most accurate population count possible.” § 2(a)(1), 105 Stat. 635, note following 18 U.S.C. §141. Among the issues the Academy was directed to consider was “the appropriateness of using sampling methods, in combination with basic data-colleetion techniques or otherwise, in the acquisition or refinement of population data.” Ibid. Two of the three panels established by the Academy pursuant to this Act concluded that “[differential undereount cannot be reduced to acceptable levels at acceptable costs without the use of integrated coverage measurement,” a statistical sampling procedure that adjusts census results to account for undereount in the initial enumeration, Census 2000 Report 7-8, and all three panels recommended including integrated coverage measurement in the 2000 census, id., at 29. See National Research Council, Preparing for the 2000 Census: Interim Report II (A. White & K. Rust eds. 1997) (report of Panel to Evaluate Alternative Census Methodologies); Modernizing the U. S. Census, supra (report of Panel on Census Requirements in the Year 2000 and Beyond); U. S. Dept, of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Census 2000 Operational Plan (1997).

In light of these studies and other research, the Bureau formulated a plan for the 2000 census that uses statistical sampling to supplement data obtained through traditional census methods. The Bureau plan provides for two types of sampling that are the subject of the instant challenge. First, appellees challenge the proposed use of sampling in the Nonresponse Followup program (NRFU). Under this program, the Bureau would continue to send census forms to all households, as well as make forms available in post offices and in other public places. The Bureau expects that 67 percent of households will return the forms. See Census 2000 Report 26. The Bureau then plans to divide the population into census tracts of approximately 4,000 people that have “homogenous population characteristics, economic status, and living conditions.” Id., at 27. The Bureau would then visit a randomly selected sample of nonresponding housing units, which would be “statistically representative of all housing units in [a] nonresponding tract.” Id., at 28. The rate of nonresponse followup in a tract would vary with the mail response rate to ensure that the Bureau obtains census data from at least 90 percent of the housing units in each census tract. Ibid. For instance, if a census tract had 1,000 housing units and 800 units responded by mail, the Bureau would survey 100 out of the 200 nonresponding units to obtain information about 90 percent of the housing units. However, if only 400 of the 1,000 housing units responded by mail, the Bureau would visit 500 of the 600 nonresponding units to achieve the same result. Id., at 29. The information gathered from the nonresponding housing units surveyed by the Bureau would then be used to estimate the size and characteristics of the nonresponding housing units that the Bureau did not visit. Thus, continuing with the first example, the Bureau would use information about the 100 non-responding units it visits to estimate the characteristics of the remaining 100 nonresponding units on which the Bureau has no information. See ibid.

The second challenged sampling procedure — which would be implemented after the first is completed — is known as Integrated Coverage Measurement (ICM). ICM employs the statistical technique called Dual System Estimation (DSE) to adjust the census results to account for undercount in the initial enumeration. The plan requires the Bureau to begin by classifying each of the country’s 7 million blocks into “strata,” which are defined by the characteristics of each block, including state, racial, and ethnic composition, and the proportion of homeowners to renters, as revealed in the 1990 census. Id., at 30. The Bureau then plans to select blocks at random from each stratum, for a total of 25,000 blocks, or an estimated 750,000 housing units. Ibid. Enumerators would then conduct interviews at each of those 750,000 units, and if discrepancies were detected between the pre-ICM response and ICM response, a followup interview would be conducted to determine the “true” situation in the home. Ibid. The information gathered during this stage would be used to assign each person to a poststratum — a group of people who have similar chances of being counted in the initial data collection — which would be defined by state geographic subdivision (e. g., rural or urban), owner or renter, age, sex, race, and Hispanic origin. Id., at 31.

In the final stage of the census, the Bureau plans to use DSE to obtain the final count and characteristics of the population. The census plan calls for the Bureau to compare the dual systems of information — that is, the data gathered on the sample blocks during the ICM and the data gathered on those same blocks through the initial phase of the census— to produce an estimation factor for each poststratum. The estimation factors would account for the differences between the ICM numbers and the initial enumeration and would be applied to the initial enumeration to estimate the total population and housing units in each poststratum. Id., at 31-32. The totals for the poststrata would then be summed to determine state and national population totals. Id., at 32.

The Bureau’s announcement of its plan to use statistical sampling in the 2000 census led to a flurry of legislative activity. Congress amended the Census Act to provide that, “[njotwithstanding any other provision of law, no sampling or any other statistical procedure, including any statistical adjustment, may be used in any determination of population for purposes of the apportionment of Representatives in Congress among the several States,” H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 105-119, p. 67 (1997), but President Clinton vetoed the bill, see Message to the House of Representatives Returning Without Approval Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Legislation, 33 Weekly Comp, of Pres. Doc. 846, 847 (1997). Congress then passed, and the President signed, a bill providing for the creation of a “comprehensive and detailed plan outlining [the Bureau’s] proposed methodologies for conducting the 2000 Decennial Census and available methods to conduct an actual enumeration of the population,” including an explanation of any statistical methodologies that may be used. 1997 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Recovery From Natural Disasters, and for Overseas Peacekeeping Efforts, Including Those in Bosnia, Tit. VIII, 111 Stat. 217. Pursuant to this directive, the Commerce Department issued the Census 2000 Report. After receiving the Report, Congress passed the 1998 Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, §209, 111 Stat. 2482, which provides that the Census 2000 Report and the Bureau’s Census 2000 Operational Plan “shall be deemed to constitute final agency action regarding the use of statistical methods in the 2000 decennial census.” The Act also permits any person aggrieved by the plan to use statistical sampling in the decennial census to bring a legal action and requires that any action brought under the Act be heard by a three-judge district court. Ibid. It further provides for review by appeal directly to this Court. Ibid.

B

The publication of the Bureau’s plan for the 2000 census occasioned two separate legal challenges. The first suit, styled Clinton v. Glavin, was filed on February 12,1998, in the District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia by four counties (Cobb County, Georgia; Bucks County, Pennsylvania; Delaware County, Pennsylvania; and DuPage County, Illinois) and residents of 13 States (Arizona, California, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Montana, Nevada, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Wisconsin), who claimed that the Bureau’s planned use of statistical sampling to apportion Representatives among the States violates the Census Act and the Census Clause of the Constitution. They sought a declaration that the Bureau’s plan is unlawful and/or unconstitutional and an injunction barring use of the NRFU and ICM sampling procedures in the 2000 census.

The District Court held that the case was ripe for review, that the plaintiffs satisfied the requirements for Article III standing, and that the Census Act prohibited use of the challenged sampling procedures to apportion Representatives. 19 F. Supp. 2d, at 547, 548-550, 553. The District Court concluded that, because the statute was clear on its face, the court did not need to reach the constitutional questions presented. Id., at 553. It thus denied defendants’ motion to dismiss, granted plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, and permanently enjoined the use of the challenged sampling procedures to determine the population for purposes of congressional apportionment. Id., at 545, 553. We noted probable jurisdiction on October 9,1998. 525 U. S. 924.

The second challenge was filed by the United States House of Representatives on February 20, 1998, in the District Court for the District of Columbia. The House sought a declaration that the Bureau’s proposed use of sampling to determine the population for purposes of apportioning Members of the House of Representatives among the several States violates the Census Act and the Constitution. The House also sought a permanent injunction barring use of the challenged sampling procedures in the apportionment aspect of the 2000 census.

The District Court held that the House had Article III standing, the suit was ripe for review, equitable concerns did not warrant dismissal, the suit did not violate separation of powers principles, and the Census Act does not permit the use of the challenged sampling procedures in counting the population for apportionment. 11 F. Supp. 2d, at 93, 95, 97, 104. Because it held that the Census Act does not allow for the challenged sampling procedures, it declined to reach the House’s constitutional challenge under the Census Clause. Id., at 104. The District Court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss, granted the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, and issued an injunction preventing defendants from using the challenged sampling methods in the apportionment aspect of the 2000 census. Id., at 79, 104. The defendants appealed to this Court and we noted probable jurisdiction on September 10,1998,524 U. S. 978, and consolidated this case with Clinton v. Glavin, No. 98-564, for oral argument, 525 U. S. 924 (1998).

W-i 1 — f

We turn our attention first to the issues presented by Clinton v. Glavin, No. 98-564, and we begin our analysis with the threshold issue of justiciability. Congress has eliminated any prudential concerns in this case by providing that “[a]ny person aggrieved by the use- of any statistical method in violation of the Constitution or any provision of law (other than this Act), in connection with the 2000 census or any later decennial census, to determine the population for purposes of the apportionment or redistrieting of Members in Congress, may in a civil action obtain declaratory, injunctive, and any other appropriate relief against the use of such method.” § 209(b), 111 Stat. 2481. In addition, the District Court below correctly found that the ease is ripe for review, and that determination is not challenged here. 19 F. Supp. 2d, at 547; see Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U. S. 136, 149 (1967). Thus, the only open justiciability question in this case is whether appellees satisfy the requirements of Article III standing.

We have repeatedly noted that in order to establish Article III standing, "[a] plaintiff must allege personal injury fairly traceable to the defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the requested relief.” Allen v. Wright, 468 U. S. 737, 751 (1984). See also Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 560-561 (1992); Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U. S. 464, 472 (1982). To prevail on a Federal Rule of Givil Procedure 56 motion for summary judgment — as opposed to a motion to dismiss — however, mere allegations of injury are insufficient. Rather, a plaintiff must establish that there exists no genuine issue of material fact as to justiciability or the merits. See Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U. S. 871, 884 (1990). See also id., at 902 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Here, the District Court, considering a Rule 56 motion, held that the plaintiffs-appellees, residents from 13 States, had established Article III standing to bring suit challenging the proposed method for conducting the 2000 census because they had made “[gleneral factual allegations of injury resulting from Defendant’s conduct.” 19 F. Supp., at 548-550. The court did not, however, consider whether there was a genuine issue of material fact as to standing.

Nonetheless, because the record before us amply supports the conclusion that several of the appellees have met their burden of proof regarding their standing to bring this suit, we affirm the District Court’s holding. See Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs v. Perini North River Associates, 459 U. S. 297, 303-305 (1983) (holding that presence of one party with standing assures that controversy before Court is justiciable); Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U. S. 252, 264, and n. 9 (1977) (same). In support of their motion for summary judgment, appellees submitted the affidavit of Dr. Ronald F. Weber, a professor of government at the University of Wisconsin, which demonstrates that Indiana resident Gary A. Hofmeister has standing to challenge the proposed census 2000 plan. Affidavit of Dr. Ronald F. Weber, App. in No. 98-564, pp. 56-79 (hereinafter Weber Affidavit). Utilizing data published by the Bureau, Dr. Weber projected year 2000 populations and net undercount rates for all States under the 1990 method of enumeration and under the Department’s proposed plan for the 2000 census. See id., at 62-63. He then determined on the basis of these projections how many Representatives would be apportioned to each State under each method and concluded that “it is a virtual certainty that Indiana will lose a seat . . . under the Department’s Plan.” Id., at 65.

Appellants have failed to set forth any specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue of standing for trial. See Fed. Rule Civ. Proe. 56(e). Appellants have submitted two affidavits that detail various deficiencies in the statistical analysis performed by Dr. Weber. See Declaration of Signe I. Wetrogan, Assistant Division Chief for Population Estimates and Projections, United States Bureau of the Census, App. in No. 98-564, pp. 92-99 (hereinafter Wetrogan Declaration); Declaration of John H. Thompson, Associate Director for the Decennial Census, United States Bureau of the Census, id., at 100-110 (hereinafter Thompson Declaration). Appellants’ experts do not, however, demonstrate that any alleged flaw in Dr. Weber’s analysis calls into question his ultimate conclusion that Indiana is virtually certain to lose a seat. One expert, for example, claims that Dr. Weber’s statement that Indiana is virtually certain to lose a seat is “of dubious credibility,” but she fails to provide any specific factual support for this assertion. Wetrogan Declaration 97. She claims that Dr. Weber used outdated population numbers, but she does not demonstrate the impact that using more recent population data would have on Dr. Weber’s ultimate conclusion about Indiana. Id., at 97-98. Neither of the appellants’ experts reestimates the populations of the States using more “accurate” or “up-to-date” data to show that this data would produce different results. Indeed, the Associate Director for the Decennial Census specifically admits in his declaration that Dr. Weber used precisely the same data that the Bureau uses “to help it estimate expected error rates for Census 2000.” Thompson Declaration 106. Appellants have therefore failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding Indiana’s loss of a Representative.

Appellee Hofmeister’s expected loss of a Representative to the United States Congress undoubtedly satisfies the injury-in-fact requirement of Article III standing. In the context of apportionment, we have held that voters have standing to challenge an apportionment statute because “[t]hey are asserting ‘a plain, direct and adequate interest in maintaining the effectiveness of their votes.’” Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186, 208 (1962) (quoting Coleman v. Miller, 307 U. S. 433, 438 (1939)). The same distinct interest is at issue here: With one fewer Representative, Indiana residents’ votes will be diluted. Moreover, the threat of vote dilution through the use of sampling is “concrete” and “actual or imminent, not ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical.’ ” Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U. S. 149, 155 (1990). It is clear that if the Bureau is going to alter its plan to use sampling in the 2000 census, it must begin doing so by March 1999. See Oversight of the 2000 Census: Putting the Dress Rehearsals in Perspective, Hearing before the Subcommittee on the Census of the House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, 105th Cong., 2d Sess., 84 (1998) (statement of James P. Holmes, Acting Director of the Bureau) (“I must caution that by this time next year [i