Cabaniss v. City of Riverside (497 F. Supp. 2d 862, 2006)

DECISION AND ENTRY OVERRULING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS TO LIABILITY (DOC. #35); DECISION AND ENTRY OVERRULING IN PART AND OVERRULING, AS MOOT, IN PART PLAINTIFF’S MOTION IN LIMINE AND/OR FOR SANCTIONS (DOC. # 39); DECISION AND ENTRY OVERRULING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO STRIKE (DOC. #41); DECISION AND ENTRY SUSTAINING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF DEFENDANT GEORGE BROWN (DOC. #47); DECISION AND ENTRY SUSTAINING MOTION OF DEFENDANTS OTHER THAN GEORGE BROWN FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DOC. #60); DECISION AND ENTRY OVERRULING, AS MOOT, MOTION OF DEFENDANTS OTHER THAN GEORGE BROWN TO STRIKE TRANSCRIPT OF ALBERT FUGATE INTERVIEW (DOC. # 64); DECISION AND ENTRY SUSTAINING IN PART AND OVERRULING IN PART MOTION OF DEFENDANTS OTHER THAN GEORGE BROWN TO STRIKE DECLARATION OF JAMES MARSH (DOC. #66); DECISION AND ENTRY SUSTAINING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE AFFIDAVIT OF ALBERT FUGATE (DOC. #68); DECISION AND ENTRY SUSTAINING IN PART AND OVERRULING IN PART MOTION OF DEFENDANTS OTHER THAN GEORGE BROWN TO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT AND DECLARATION OF ALBERT FUGATE (DOC. #77); JUDGMENT TO BE ENTERED IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANTS AND AGAINST PLAINTIFF; TERMINATION ENTRY

RICE, District Judge.

Kevin Cabaniss (“Cabaniss”) spent much of May 21, 2003, drinking at the residence of his friend, Albert Fugate (“Fugate”), located at 6015 Hendon Avenue in the City of Riverside, Ohio (“Riverside”). Cabaniss became so intoxicated that he was vomiting and speaking incoherently. After having became frustrated with Cabaniss’ behavior inside his home, Fugate took his friend outside and left him there until he was able to sober up. Left outside by Fugate, Cabaniss walked to a neighboring house, where he broke the glass in an outdoor lamp. Cabaniss calmed down and returned to a grassy area between Fu-gate’s and his neighbor’s houses, where he laid down. Thereafter, someone then called 911, and Defendants David Craine (“Craine”), Jason Carlton (“Carlton”) and Robert Naff (“Naff’), police officers employed by Riverside, were dispatched to that residence. Craine was the first to arrive, followed shortly thereafter by Carlton and then Naff. Craine observed Caban-iss lying on the ground, acting agitated and clenching his fists. Nevertheless, Ca-baniss appeared to be coherent to the officers, although under the influence of alcohol.

When the officers arrived, a number of Cabaniss’ friends, including Fugate, came outside the residence. Craine asked one of them whether Cabaniss was diabetic. That individual indicated that he did not believe that Cabaniss suffered from that medical condition, although he had “freaked out” after consuming a large amount of alcohol. In response to an officer’s inquiry, Fugate indicated that Caban-iss was suicidal and that he had attempted suicide in the past. Craine requested that paramedics be sent to the location in order to check upon Cabaniss’ medical condition.

When the officers attempted to communicate with Cabaniss, he spit at them, as a result of which Carlton told Cabaniss that he (Carlton) would kick him (Cabaniss) in the teeth if he spit at the officers again. When Cabaniss insisted upon spitting at Carlton again, the officer flipped Cabaniss onto his stomach, handcuffed him and placed him under arrest, rather than kicking out his teeth. In order to accomplish that end, Carlton attempted to place Ca-baniss’ hands behind his back, while he (Cabaniss) was lying on his stomach. Ca-baniss, however, resisted, and Craine assisted Carlton in handcuffing Cabaniss. While Carlton walked Cabaniss to his cruiser, the latter cursed and threatened to kill the officers.

After Cabaniss had been seated in the back of Carlton’s cruiser, Defendants Edward Kronenberger (“Kronenberger”) and Shon Smith (“Smith”), paramedics employed by Riverside, arrived at the scene. Kronenberger opened the door to the cruiser and Cabaniss got out. The paramedic introduced himself and assured Ca-baniss that he was there to help him, asking him if he was injured or needed medical attention. Cabaniss responded to Kronenberger’s questions with additional cursing and threats against the paramedic and his family. Cabaniss would not permit Kronenberger to touch him during the paramedic’s assessment of his medical condition. The paramedic noticed that Ca-baniss smelled of alcohol and was agitated. However, since he was not able to determine that Cabaniss was injured or in need of medical attention, Kronenberger told him to sit in the back of the police cruiser.

After assisting Cabaniss back into the cruiser, Kronenberger spoke with the bystanders at the scene. One of them told Kronenberger that Cabaniss had been drinking and that he had destroyed a light. That individual also told the paramedic that Cabaniss had been acting mental, which Kronenberger interpreted as describing Cabaniss’ recent behavior. Kro-nenberger found that Cabaniss’ speech was slurred, that he smelled of alcohol and that his behavior was consistent with the use of same. Kronenberger also concluded that Cabaniss had not exhibited any signs of mental illness. Believing that a complete assessment of Cabaniss had been completed, Kronenberger and Smith, the paramedics, left Fugate’s residence on Hendon.

As Carlton started to drive away from that location, with Cabaniss in the back seat of his cruiser, Craine pulled his cruiser next to that of his fellow officer. While the two officers conversed, Craine noticed that Cabaniss was pushing his feet on the plexiglass divider in Carlton’s cruiser, as well as hitting his head on it. Although Carlton warned Cabaniss a number of times to stop kicking and hitting his head on the plexiglass, the latter ignored those warnings. Carlton then rolled down the back window in his cruiser and told Caban-iss that he would be sprayed with pepper spray if that behavior continued. Caban-iss ignored that warning as he had the others. As a consequence, Carlton sprayed Cabaniss with pepper spray, and the latter lowered his feet and stopped kicking the plexiglass divider.

In order to clean the pepper spray from Cabaniss, Carlton transported him to the Riverside Police/Fire Station. Craine also proceeded to that location. Upon arriving at the Riverside Police/Fire Station, Carlton parked his cruiser, and Naff, who had also returned to that location, took a picture of Cabaniss with pepper spray on him. The officers then rinsed that substance off Cabaniss’ face, using a garden hose. Thereafter, as Carlton was using that hose to clean the door of his cruiser, Cabaniss indicated that he was feeling better and asked if he could stand up outside the cruiser. Both Craine and Carlton told him that he could not. Although Cabaniss initially complied with the officers’ directive, causing Craine to step away from the cruiser, he apparently changed his mind, stood straight up, took a few steps and started to fall or to stumble forward. Carlton reached for Cabaniss and was able to put a hand on him; however, Cabaniss was able to break loose, thus foreclosing Carlton’s efforts to prevent him from falling. Cabaniss fell, striking his head on the concrete floor.

Carlton helped Cabaniss into a sitting position, and both he and Craine noticed a bump on Cabaniss’ head. Craine went inside the Station to obtain medical assistance. Kronenberger and a firefighter accompanied Craine outside. When he got outside, Kronenberger saw Cabaniss sitting next to Carlton. Although the officer was attempting to control him, Kronenber-ger observed Cabaniss purposefully lunge away from Carlton and strike his head on the ground. Kronenberger and other Riverside Fire Department personnel treated Cabaniss at the Riverside Police/Fire Department and transported him to the Miami Valley Hospital. Cabaniss subsequently died as a result of swelling on his brain.

After he learned that Cabaniss had died, Defendant George Brown (“Brown”), who was then Chief of the Riverside Police Department, ordered an internal investigation, which was conducted by officers employed by the Huber Heights Police Department.

Plaintiff brings this litigation, seeking compensation for damages suffered as a result of the death -of her father, Kevin Cabaniss (“Cabaniss”). She brings this action against Riverside, James Onello (“Onello”), Ken Curp (“Curp”), Sara Lom-matzsch (“Lommatzsch”), Shirley Reynolds (“Reynolds”), Johnie Doan (“Doan”), Vern Best (“Best”), Mike Smith, Jim Weaver (“Weaver”), Brown, D.K. Johnson (“Johnson”),. Carlton, Craine, Naff, Dan Alig (“Alig”), Kronenberger, and Smith. All individual Defendants, except Johnson, have been sued in their individual and official capacities. In her Amended Complaint (Doc. # 23), Plaintiff sets forth 23 claims for relief, to wit: 1) a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“§ 1983”), alleging that Craine, Carlton and Naff violated Caban-iss’ rights under the Fourth and Eighth Amendments by using excessive force and cruel and unusual punishment (First Claim for Relief); 2) a claim under § 1983, alleging that Craine, Carlton and Naff violated Cabaniss’ rights under the federal constitution by failing to protect him (Second Claim for Relief); 3) a claim under § 1983, alleging that Kronenberger and Smith violated Cabaniss’ rights under the federal constitution by failing to protect him (Third Claim for Relief); 4) a claim under § 1983, alleging that Craine, Carlton and Naff violated Cabaniss’ rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by failing to protect him (Fourth Claim for Relief); 5) a claim under § 1983, alleging that Kronenberger and Smith violated Cabaniss’ rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by failing to protect him (Fifth Claim for Relief); 6) a claim under § 1983, alleging that Craine, Carlton and Naff violated Cabaniss’ rights under the federal constitution by failing to provide him appropriate medical care (Sixth Claim for Relief); 7) a claim under § 1983, alleging that Kronenberger and Smith violated Cabaniss’ rights under the federal constitution by failing to provide him appropriate medical care (Seventh Claim for Relief); 8) a claim under § 1983, alleging that Craine, Carlton and Naff violated Caban-iss’ rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by failing to provide him appropriate medical care (Eighth Claim for Relief); 9) a claim under § 1983, alleging that Kronenberger and Smith violated Cabaniss’ rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by failing to provide him appropriate medical care (Ninth Claim for Relief); 10) a survivorship claim brought under § 2305.21 of the Ohio Revised Code against Craine, Carlton, Naff, Kronenber-ger and Smith, predicated upon the incidents giving rise to First through Ninth Claims for Relief (Tenth Claim for Relief); 11) a wrongful death claim brought in accordance with § 2105.01 of the Ohio Revised Code against Craine, Carlton, Naff, Kronenberger and Smith, predicated upon the incidents giving rise to First through Ninth Claims for Relief (Eleventh Claim for Relief); 12) a survivorship claim brought under § 2305.21, which does not appear to differ from the Tenth Claim for Relief (Twelfth Claim for Relief); 13) a civil conspiracy claim against Riverside, Craine, Carlton, Naff, Kronenberger, Smith and “others,” alleging that they conspired to deprive Cabaniss' of his rights under the United States and Ohio Constitutions, as well as under federal and state law, by failing to provide him adequate medical care, and fabricating a false and exculpatory version of events in order to prevent Cabaniss and his heirs from obtaining a remedy (Thirteenth Claim for Relief); 14) a claim under § 1983 against Riverside, alleging that it is liable for the constitutional violations of Craine, Carlton and Naff, because those violations were caused by policies, practices and customs of Riverside (Fourteenth Claim for Relief); 15) a claim under § 1983 against Riverside, alleging that it is liable for the constitutional violations of Kronenberger and Smith, because those violations were caused by policies, practices and customs of Riverside (Fifteenth Claim for Relief); 16) a claim under § 1983 against Riverside, alleging that it is liable for the constitutional violations of Craine, Carlton and Naff, because those violations were caused by its failure to train those officers (Sixteenth Claim for Relief); 17) a claim under § 1983 against Riverside, alleging that it is liable for the constitutional violations of Kronenberger and Smith, because it failed to train those paramedics (Seventeenth Claim for Relief); 18) a claim under § 1983 against Craine, Carlton and Naff, alleging that they violated Cabaniss’ constitutional rights by handcuffing him, spraying him with pepper spray and with a hose and refusing to allow him to stand, thus placing him in a dangerous and potentially dangerous position while creating a special relationship which imposed upon them the obligation of protecting Cabaniss and providing medical care to him (Eighteenth Claim for Relief); 19) a claim under § 1983 and state law against Craine, Carlton and Naff, alleging that they deprived Cabaniss of his constitutional rights and assaulted and battered him, by restraining him, throwing him into a police cruiser, spraying him with pepper spray and water and allowing him to hurt himself (Nineteenth Claim for Relief); 20) a claim under state law that Craine, Carlton, Naff, Kro-nenberger and Smith acted willfully' and wantonly and, thus, are not immune from Plaintiffs state law claims against them (Twentieth Claim for Relief); 21) a state law claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress against Craine, Carlton, Naff, Kronenberger and Smith (Twenty-First Claim for Relief); 22) a claim under § 1983 against Riverside, alleging it is liable for the constitutional violations of its employees under a respondeat superior theory (Twenty-Second Claim for Relief); and 23) a claim under state law against Riverside, alleging that it is liable for the wrongful acts of Craine, Carlton, Naff, Kronenberger and Smith, as a result of the failure to investigate the actions of those Defendants and to correct, punish and or prosecute them (Twenty-Third Claim for Relief).

This case is now before the Court on the following motions, to wit: Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment as to Liability (Doc. # 35); Plaintiffs Motion in Limine and/or for Sanctions (Doc. #39); Plaintiffs Motion to Strike (Doc. # 41); Brown’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. # 47); Motion of Defendants Other Than George Brown for Summary Judgment (Doc. # 60); Motion of Defendants Other Than George Brown to Strike the Transcript of the Interview of Albert Fu-gate (Doc. # 64); Motion of Defendants Other Than George Brown to Strike the Declaration of James Marsh (Doc. # 66); Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to File Affidavit of Albert Fugate (Doc. # 68); Motion of Defendants Other Than George Brown to Strike Affidavit and Declaration of Albert Fugate (Doc. # 77). Herein, the Court rules upon those motions, beginning its analysis by setting forth the standards it must apply whenever it rules upon a motion for summary judgment, then discussing related motions together.

I. Standards Applicable to Motions for Summary Judgment

Summary judgment must be entered “against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Of course, the moving party:

always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,” which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.

Id. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. See also Boretti v. Wiscomb, 930 F.2d 1150, 1156 (6th Cir.1991) (The moving party has the “burden of showing that the ..pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions and affidavits in the record, construed favorably to the nonraoving party, do not raise a genuine issue of material fact for trial.”) (quoting Gutierrez v. Lynch, 826 F.2d 1534, 1536 (6th Cir.1987)). The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party who “must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)). Thus, “[o]nee the moving party has met its initial burden, the nonmoving party must present evidence that creates a genuine issue of material fact making it necessary to resolve the difference at trial.” Talley v. Bravo Pitino Restaurant, Ltd., 61 F.3d 1241, 1245 (6th Cir.1995). Read together, Liberty Lobby and Celotex stand for the proposition that a party may move for summary judgment by demonstrating that the opposing party will not be able to produce sufficient evidence at trial to withstand a directed verdict motion (now known as a motion for judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 50). Street v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1478 (6th Cir.1989).

Once the burden of production has so shifted, the party opposing summary judgment cannot rest on its pleadings or merely reassert its previous allegations. It is not sufficient to “simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). See also Michigan Protection and Advocacy Service, Inc. v. Babin, 18 F.3d 337, 341 (6th Cir.1994) (“The plaintiff must present more than a scintilla of evidence in support of his position; the evidence must be such that a jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.”). Rather, Rule 56(e) “requires the nonmoving party to go beyond the [unverified] pleadings” and present some type of evidentiary material in support of its position. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548. Summary judgment “shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Summary judgment shall be denied “[i]f there are ... ‘genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.’ ” Hancock v. Dodson, 958 F.2d 1367, 1374 (6th Cir.1992) (citation omitted). Of course, in determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, a court must assume as true the evidence of the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences in the favor of that party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (emphasis added). If the parties present conflicting evidence, a court may not decide which evidence to believe, by determining which parties’ affiants are more credible; rather, credibility determinations must be left to the fact-finder. 10A Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 2726. In ruling on a motion for summary judgment (in other words, in determining whether there is a genuine issue of material fact), “[a] district court is not ... obligated to wade through and search the entire record for some specific facts that might support the nonmoving party’s claim.” InterRoyal Corp. v. Sponseller, 889 F.2d 108, 111 (6th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1091, 110 S.Ct. 1839, 108 L.Ed.2d 967 (1990). See also L.S. Heath & Son, Inc. v. AT & T Information Systems, Inc., 9 F.3d 561 (7th Cir.1993); Skotak v. Tenneco Resins, Inc., 953 F.2d 909, 915 n. 7 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 832, 113 S.Ct. 98, 121 L.Ed.2d 59 (1992) (“Rule 56 does not impose upon the district court a duty to sift through the record in search of evidence to support a party’s opposition to summary judgment_”). Thus, a court is entitled to rely, in determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists on a particular issue, only upon those portions of the verified pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with any affidavits submitted, specifically called to its attention by the parties.

II. Plaintiffs Motion in Limine and/or for Sanctions (Doc. # 89) and Motion to Strike (Doc. #11)

With her Motion in Limine and/or for Sanctions (Doc. #39), Plaintiff requests that the Court prevent the Defendants other than George Brown from calling any lay or expert witness, because those Defendants have failed to disclose the identity of such witnesses in accordance with the requirements of Rule 26(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and this Court’s Preliminary Pretrial Order (Doc. # 17). Alternatively, the Plaintiff requests that the Court impose sanctions on those Defendants. With her Motion to Strike (Doc. # 41), Plaintiff argues that the Court should strike the lay witness list of those Defendants, because they failed to make the initial disclosures required by Rule 26(a)(1). As a means of analysis, the Court will initially discuss these motions as they relate to lay witness, following which it will turn to Plaintiffs request to exclude expert witnesses.

In its Preliminary Pretrial Order (Doc. # 17), the Court directed that the parties make the disclosures required by Rule 26(a)(1) by October 14, 2004. Rule 26(a)(1) requires, inter alia, that a parties disclose the identity of individuals with discoverable information. According to Plaintiff, thé Defendants other than George Brown have utterly failed to disclose the identity of any individual with discoverable information. The Plaintiff is mistaken in that regard. These Defendants have attached, to the memoranda in opposition to the Plaintiffs motions, copies of the correspondence from their counsel to Plaintiffs counsel on October 14, 2004, disclosing the identity of individuals with discoverable information. See Docs. ## 45 and 46. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the Defendants other than George Brown have not violated Rule 26(a)(1) or this Court’s Preliminary Pretrial Order (Doc. # 17), by failing to disclose the identity of individuals with discoverable information. Therefore, the Court rejects the Plaintiffs request that it prevent those Defendants from introducing testimony from any lay witness.

This Court’s Preliminary Pretrial Order (Doc. # 17) required that parties disclose primary expert witnesses, together with those witnesses’ reports, by December 16, 2004, and that they disclose rebuttal expert witnesses, together with their reports, by January 17, 2005. In her Motion in Limine and/or for Sanctions (Doc. # 39), Plaintiff states that the Defendants other than George Brown have failed to identify any expert witnesses. In their memorandum opposing this motion, those Defendants have not addressed Plaintiffs motion as it relates to expert witnesses. See Doc. # 45. Given that these Defendants have not ever indicated in this litigation that they intend to call an expert witness at trial, the Court is compelled to conclude that they do not intend to call such a witness. Therefore, this branch of Plaintiffs Motion in Limine and/or for Sanctions (Doc. # 39) is moot.

Accordingly, the Court overrules in part and overrules, as moot, in part Plaintiffs Motion in Limine and/or for Sanctions (Doc. # 39), and it overrules her Motion to Strike (Doc. # 41).

III. Motion of Defendants Other Than George Brown to Strike the Transcript of the Interview of Albert Fu-gate (Doc. # 61), Motion of Defendants Other Than George Brown to Strike the Declaration of James Marsh (Doc. # 66), Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to File Affidavit of Albert Fugate (Doc. # 68) and Motion of Defendants Other Than George Brown to Strike Affidavit and Declaration of Albert Fugate (Doc. # 77)

These motions raise the question of what evidence the Court will consider when it rules upon the pending motions for summary judgment. As a means of analysis, the Court will initially rule upon the three motions which relate to evidence from Fugate, following which it will turn to the request to strike the declaration of James Marsh.

A. Motion of Defendants Other Than George Brown to Strike the Transcript of the Interview of Albert Fu-gate (Doc. # 61), Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to File Affidavit of Albert Fugate (Doc. # 68) and Motion of Defendants Other Than George Brown to Strike Affidavit and Declaration of Albert Fugate (Doc. # 77)

To support her Motion for Summary Judgment as to Liability (Doc. # 35), Plaintiff has submitted, inter alia, a copy of the transcript of an interview of Fugate by Sergeant Rick May and Detective Eric Spicer of the Huber Heights Police Department. The Defendants other than George Brown have requested that the Court strike that transcript, arguing that the transcript is inadmissible hearsay and that it has not been authenticated. See Doc. # 64. Although Plaintiff has opposed that request (see Doc. # 71), she has also filed a motion requesting leave of Court to file an affidavit from Fugate, to which a copy of the transcript is attached. See Doc. # 68. This Court sustains the Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to File Affidavit of Albert Fugate (Doc. # 68). It bears emphasis, however, that the Court has merely concluded that a copy of the transcript of Fugate’s interview should be part of the record in this litigation. Whether any portions of that document may be considered when ruling on the pending motions for summary judgment must await the Court’s ruling on the request of the Defendants other than Brown to strike Fugate’s affidavit/declaration (Doc. # 77), with which they renew their challenges to the transcript. As a consequence of sustaining Plaintiffs motion seeking leave to file that affidavit/declaration, the Court overrules, as moot, the Motion of Defendants Other Than George Brown to Strike the Transcript of the Interview of Albert Fugate (Doc. # 64).

The Defendants other than Brown have responded to Fugate’s affidavit/declaration by filing their Motion to Strike Affidavit and Declaration of Albert Fugate (Doc. #77). The Plaintiff has not responded to that motion. Therein, the Defendants initially argue that the Plaintiff has failed to authenticate the copy of the transcript of the interview of Fugate and that, therefore, the Court must disregard the copy of the transcript attached to this affidavit/declaration. Rule 901(a) of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides that the “requirement of authentication or identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.” The Court concludes that sufficient evidence has been presented to allow it to find that the document claimed to be the transcript of the interview of Fugate is what it purports to be. As an initial matter, Plaintiffs counsel has submitted an affidavit, in which he states that the counsel for these Defendants provided a copy of the transcript to him in response to a discovery response. Indeed, these Defendants state in their'memoranda opposing Plaintiffs Motion in Limine and/or for Sanctions (Doc. # 39) and her Motion to Strike (Doc. # 41) that they produced a copy of the transcript to Plaintiffs counsel, before this litigation was initiated. See Doc. ## 45 and 46. The Defendants other than Brown have not provided evidence or even suggested that the copy of the transcript appended to Fugate’s affidavit/declaration is different from the one which their counsel had furnished to their counterpart for the Plaintiff. Moreover, the Defendants other than Brown have not supplied evidence, tending to demonstrate that their counsel forged a document and foisted it off on Plaintiffs counsel as a copy of the interview of Fugate. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the Plaintiff has met her burden under Rule 901(a) to demonstrate that the document which she asserts is a transcript of the interview of Fugate is, indeed, such a transcript and that, therefore, she has met her burden of establishing its authenticity.

The Defendants other than Brown argue in the alternative that the transcript of Fugate’s interview must be stricken, because that transcript is inadmissible hearsay. This Court agrees. The transcript is unquestionably hearsay, i.e., an out of court statement offered to prove the truth of the matters set forth therein. See Fed.R.Evid. 801(c). Nevertheless, Plaintiff argues that the transcript is admissible pursuant to the public records exception to the hearsay rule. See Fed.R.Evid. 803(8). This Court cannot agree. Rule 803(8) provides:

(8) Public records and reports. Records, reports, statements, or data compilations, in any form, of public offices or agencies, setting forth (A) the activities of the office or agency, or (B) matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by law as to which matters there was a duty to report, excluding, however, in criminal cases matters observed by police officers and other law enforcement personnel, or (C) in civil actions and proceedings and against the Government in criminal cases, factual findings resulting from an investigation made pursuant to authority granted by law, unless the sources of information or other circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness.

The Defendants other than Brown argue that the transcript of the interview of Fu-gate does not come within Rule 803(8), because it merely recorded statements by Fugate who was a third party, rather than a public official with a duty to report. The Sixth Circuit has held that statements by third-parties are not admissible in accordance with Rule 803(8), even though they are contained in a police report. Miller v. Field, 35 F.3d 1088, 1091-92 (6th Cir.1994). In accordance with Miller, this Court concludes that the transcript of the interview of Fugate is inadmissible hearsay. Moreover, the transcript of the interview of Fugate cannot be considered the functional equivalent of an affidavit or a deposition, since there is no indication that he had been sworn before being interviewed. Therefore, the Court will not consider that document when ruling on the pending motions for summary judgment.

In his affidavit/declaration, Fugate sets forth information concerning the events which gave rise to this litigation, in addition to attempting to authenticate the transcript of his interview. The Defendants other than Brown argue that the Court should strike a number of paragraphs set forth in that affidavit/declaration. The Court will discuss those arguments in the order presented.

First, in the first sentence of ¶ 14 of his affidavit/declaration, Fugate states that he had been informed that emergency personnel refused to transport Cabaniss to a hospital and took him to jail instead, because he had threatened them. The Defendants other than Brown argue that the Court must strike those statements, because they constitute inadmissible hearsay. Unquestionably, the first sentence of paragraph 14 of Fugate’s affidavit/declaration is an out of court statement offered to prove the truth of the matters set forth therein and that, therefore, it is hearsay. See Fed.R.Evid. 801(c). Moreover, given that the Plaintiff has not responded to this motion, she has not argued that the statements set forth in the first sentence of ¶ 14 may be considered in accordance with an exception to the hearsay rule. Therefore, this Court will strike the first sentence of ¶ 14 of Fugate’s affidavit/declaration as inadmissible hearsay, and will not consider the statements set forth therein when ruling on the pending requests for summary judgment.

Second, the Defendants other than Brown argue that the Court must strike portions of ¶¶ 15 and 16 of the affidavit/declaration, because Fugate has failed to establish that he has personal knowledge of the information set forth in those portions of those paragraphs. It can not be questioned that an affidavit or declaration submitted in support of or in opposition to a motion for summary judgment must be based upon personal knowledge. See Rule 56(e) (“Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein.”). See also, Weberg v. Franks, 229 F.3d 514, 526 (6th Cir.2000) (noting that statements in affidavits that have not been made on personal knowledge must be disregarded when ruling on a motion for summary judgment). In the second sentence of ¶ 15 of his affidavit/declaration, Fugate states that Cabaniss had a number of incidents with police officers during his life and had a history of reckless behavior and, in the second sentence of ¶ 16, states that he understood that Cabaniss gave a substantial portion of his earnings to his children. This Court agrees with the Defendants other than Brown that Fugate has failed to affirmatively show in his affidavit/declaration that he has personal knowledge of and is, therefore, competent to testify about the matters set forth in the second sentences of ¶¶ 15 and 16 of that document. Therefore, the Court will not consider those sentences when ruling upon the pending motions for summary judgment.

Third, the Defendants other than Brown request that the Court strike the first sentence of ¶ 15 of the affidavit/declaration of Fugate, wherein he states that it is his opinion that the actions of the arresting officers antagonized Cabaniss and resulted in his uncooperative and aggressive behavior. According to these Defendants, those statements are not admissible as lay opinion testimony under Rule 701 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which permits a lay witness to give opinions that are “(a) rationally based on the perception of the witness, (b) helpful to a clear understanding of the witness’ testimony or the determination of a fact in issue, and (c) not based on-scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702.” JGR, Inc. v. Thomasville Furniture Industries, Inc., 370 F.3d 519, 525 (6th Cir.2004). According to these Defendants, the statements in the first sentence of ¶ 15 are not rationally based upon Fu-gate’s perception. The Court disagrees. He could observe the interaction of the officers and Cabaniss and draw an opinion as to how the latter reacted to the actions of the former. The Court agrees with these Defendants, however, that the second part of that sentence (i.e., that the actions of the arresting officers resulted in Cabaniss’ uncooperative and aggressive behavior) is not based upon Fugate’s personal perception, in the absence of an explanation as to what actions of Cabaniss caused him to reach the opinion about the cause and effect relationship.

In sum, the Court sustains in part and overrules in part the Motion of the Defendants other than George Brown to Strike Affidavit and Declaration of Albert Fugate (Doc. # 77). The Court sustains that motion as it relates to the transcript of the interview of Fugate, as well as the following parts of his affidavit/declaration, to wit: the first sentence of ¶ 14, all of ¶ 15, except the statement that the arresting officers antagonized Cabaniss, and the second sentence of ¶ 16. Otherwise, the Court has overruled that motion.

B. Motion of Defendants Other Than George Brown to Strike the Declaration of James Marsh (Doc. # 66)

To support her request for summary judgment and to oppose those filed by the Defendants, the Plaintiff has submitted, among other evidence, the declaration of James Marsh (“Marsh”). The Plaintiff has retained Marsh to provide expert testimony in the areas of police policy and procedure. In ¶¶ 5 and 13-15 of his declaration, he sets forth the following opinions:

¶ 5. It is more probable than not that the injury to Cabaniss on May 21, 2003, was caused by a pattern or practice of deliberate indifference by the Riverside Police Department.

¶ 13. The lack of supervision, inadequate training and failure to follow departmental guidelines represent deliberate indifference to Cabaniss’ safety on the part of Riverside and Craine, Carlton and Naff.

¶ 14. The policy and practice of the Riverside Police Department of allowing supervisors to violate the rules and allowing officers to be unsupervised and to violate the law was more probably than not a contributory factor to Cabaniss’ injury and represents deliberate indifference to the safety, well-being and handling of individuals with suicidal behavior or mental illness.

¶ 15. Riverside had a pattern and practice of deliberate indifference regarding staffing needs, supervision, discipline, directives [sic], training and the attitude of officers toward public. In addition, this pattern and practice of deliberate indifference had a negative impact within the Police Department upon its guidelines regarding the use of force and the handling of intoxicated, mentally ill or suicidal persons, and this pattern and practice more probably than not was a contributory factor of the injury to and death of Cabaniss.

In their motion (Doc. # 66), the Defendants other than Brown argue that the Court should strike Marsh’s declaration, because the opinions he has expressed therein do not comply with Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993). The Plaintiff disagrees. See Doc. # 70. Although the caption of this motion indicates that it is directed at the entirety of Marsh’s affidavit, these Defendants only expressly address ¶¶ 5 and 13-15. Accordingly, the Court considers striking only those paragraphs and begins its analysis by reviewing the standards it must apply whenever a party argues that expert opinion evidence is not admissible under Rule 702 and Daubert.

Rule 702 provides:

If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.

In Daubert, the Supreme Court “established a general gatekeeping [or screening] obligation for trial courts” to exclude from trial expert testimony that is unreliable and irrelevant. Conwood Co., L.P. v. U.S. Tobacco Co., 290 F.3d 768, 792 (6th Cir.2002) (citations omitted). This gatekeeping function applies “when considering all expert testimony, including testimony based on technical and other specialized knowledge.” Clay v. Ford Motor Co., 215 F.3d 663, 667 (6th Cir.2000), citing Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999)

(emphasis in original). In determining whether evidence is admissible under Dau-bert, the District Court must determine whether the evidence “both rests on a reliable foundation and is relevant to the task at hand.” Id. In assessing relevance and reliability, the district court must examine whether the expert is proposing to testify to scientific knowledge that will assist the trier of fact to understand or determine a fact in issue. Jahn v. Equine Servs., PSC, 233 F.3d 382, 388 (6th Cir. 2000). This involves a preliminary inquiry as to whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue. Id. Some of the factors that may be used in such an inquiry include: 1) whether the theory or technique can be tested, 2) whether it has been subjected to peer review and publication, 3) whether the potential rate of error is known, and 4) its general acceptance. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94, 113 S.Ct. 2786; Hardyman v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 243 F.3d 255, 260 (6th Cir.2001). “This inquiry is a flexible one, with an overarching goal of assessing the ‘scientific validity and thus the evidentiary relevance and reliability’ of the principles and methodology underlying the proposed expert testimony.” United States v. Langan, 263 F.3d 613, 621 (6th Cir.2001) (citation omitted). “[A] trial judge must have considerable leeway in deciding in a particular case how to go about determining whether particular expert testimony is reliable.” Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 152, 119 S.Ct. 1167. Of course, “nothing in either Dau-bert or the Federal Rules of Evidence requires a district court to admit opinion evidence that is connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the expert.” General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146, 118 S.Ct. 512, 139 L.Ed.2d 508 (1997). The proponent of expert opinion evidence has the burden of demonstrating by the preponderance of the proof that the evidence complies with Rule 702 and Daubert. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592 n. 10, 113 S.Ct. 2786; Nelson v. Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co., 243 F.3d 244, 250 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 822, 122 S.Ct. 56, 151 L.Ed.2d 25 (2001).

As an initial matter, the Defendants other than Brown suggest that the Court must strike certain paragraphs in Marsh’s declaration, because he merely sets forth legal conclusions therein. This Court agrees. In Berry v. City of Detroit, 25 F.3d 1342, 1353 (6th Cir.1994), the Sixth Circuit in an excessive force case brought under § 1983 held that, although a properly qualified expert witness may testify that a municipality is lax in the discipline of its officers and about the effects of such laxity, he may not testify that such a policy constitutes deliberate indifference. In the ¶¶ 5 and 13-15 of his declaration, Marsh states that certain actions constituted deliberate indifference. In accordance with Berry, this Court concludes that it must strike those paragraphs from Marsh’s declaration.

Moreover, in Brainard v. American Skandia Life Assur. Corp., 432 F.3d 655 (6th Cir.2005), the Sixth Circuit recently noted that “[a]n expert opinion submitted in the context of a summary judgment motion must be more than a conclusory assertion about ultimate legal issues.” Id. at 663-64 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Rather, such an affidavit must “set forth facts ...,” which “outline a line of reasoning arising from a logical foundation.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Herein, ¶¶ 5 and 13-15 of Marsh’s declaration merely set forth his conclusory assertion about an ultimate legal issue, rather than setting forth facts which “outline a line of reasoning arising from a logical foundation.”

Accordingly, the Court sustains the Motion of Defendants Other Than George Brown to Strike the Declaration of James Marsh (Doc. # 66). The Court will not consider ¶¶ 5 and 13-15 of that document when ruling on the pending motions for summary judgment. However, the remainder of the declaration will be considered.

IV. Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment as to Liability (Doc. # 35), Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendant George Brown (Doc. # J7) and Motion of Defendants Other Than George Brown for Summary Judgment (Doc. # 60)

Having decided what evidence it can consider, the Court turns to the three pending motions seeking summary judgment. With her motion, Plaintiff seeks summary judgment as to liability on her claims against Craine, Carlton, Naff, Kro-nenberger, Smith and Riverside. See Doc. # 35. With his motion, Brown requests that the Court enter summary judgment in his favor on all of Plaintiffs claims against him. See Doc. #47. With their motion, the Defendants other than Brown request summary judgment on all of Plaintiffs claims against them. See Doe. # 6. As a means of analysis, the Court will initially rule upon Brown’s motion, following which it will discuss the other two motions together. When ruling upon the Defendants’ two motions seeking summary judgment, the Court must construe the evidence in the manner most favorable to the Plaintiff. However, when ruling upon that filed by the Plaintiff, the Court must construe the evidence in the manner most favorable to the Defendants.

A. Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendant George Brown (Doc. # k.7)

Brown was the Chief of the Riverside Police Department when the events giving rise to this litigation occurred. Plaintiff has sued Brown in his individual and official capacities. The Court need not tarry long on Plaintiffs official capacity claims against Brown. It is well-settled that a claim against an officer or employee of a governmental entity, in his or her official capacity, is a claim against the governmental entity itself. See e.g., Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985). Thus, in E.J. v. Hamilton County, Ohio, 707 F.Supp. 314, 318-19 (S.D.Ohio 1989), Judge Rubin dismissed the official capacity claims against Hamilton County Commissioners, since Hamilton County itself was a party, making the official capacity claims redundant. Similarly, herein, Brown’s municipal employer, Riverside, is a Defendant in this litigation. Therefore, official capacity claims against Brown are redundant, and the Court sustains Brown’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. # 47), as it relates to such claims.

Turning to individual capacity claims against Brown, a close review of Plaintiffs Amended Complaint (Doc. #23) fails to reveal any individual capacity claims which have been pled specifically against him. Indeed, Brown is only mentioned three times in that pleading, to wit: in the caption; in ¶ 10 where he is identified as the Chief of the Riverside Police Department and an employee, agent, servant and representative of Riverside; and in ¶ 104 where it is alleged that he had previously warned Riverside about a lack of policies and personnel in its Police Department and a failure to train and to supervise officers, and that he requested an assessment of the department by officials of the Kettering or Huber Heights Police Department. In addition, Plaintiff alleges in ¶ 34 of her Amended Complaint that the failure of the Chief of Police of Riverside and other officials of that municipality to implement and to communicate appropriate policies and procedures to officers and paramedics, and to train and to supervise such individuals in the use of pepper spray and the medical needs of prisoners constitutes gross negligence and deliberate indifference, entitling Plaintiff to recover punitive damages . from Riverside. In bears emphasis that ¶ 34 appears in the section of Plaintiffs Amended Complaint, wherein she sets forth the factual background upon which her claims are based, rather than in one of the 23 claims for relief included in that pleading.

In his motion, Brown argues that he is entitled to summary judgment on any claims Plaintiff may have intended to assert against him, because the evidence fails to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether he can be held liable. Plaintiff, in contrast, contends that Brown can be held liable under both federal and state law, because he is responsible for the actions of Craine, Carlton and Naff, which Plaintiff contends led to Cabaniss’ death. As a means of analysis, the Court will initially set forth the standards it must apply whenever a party seeks to impose liability under § 1983 on a supervisor such as Brown, for the alleged constitutional deprivations by those he supervises.

In Turner v. City of Taylor, 412 F.3d 629 (6th Cir.2005), the Sixth Circuit reviewed the standards which must be applied to determine whether a supervisory employee such as Brown can be held liable under § 1983 for the constitutional actions of the employees he or she supervises:

This Court has explained the standards for supervisory liability under § 1983 as follows:

[T]he § 1983 liability of supervisory personnel must be based on more than the right to control employees. Section 1983 liability will not be imposed solely upon the basis of respon-deat superior. There must be a showing that the supervisor encouraged the specific incident of misconduct or in some other way directly participated in it. At a minimum, a § 1983 plaintiff must show that a supervisory official at least implicitly authorized, approved or knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct of the offending subordinate.

Bellamy v. Bradley, 729 F.2d 416, 421 (6th Cir.1984) (citing Hays v. Jefferson County, 668 F.2d 869, 872-74 (6th Cir.1982)); see also Mills v. City of Barbourville, 389 F.3d 568, 580 (6th Cir.2004) (“In order to establish liability pursuant to § 1983, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant, as a supervisory official, is personally responsible for the alleged unconstitutional actions that caused his injury... .At a minimum, the plaintiff must demonstrate that a supervisory official condoned, encouraged, or knowingly acquiesced in the alleged unconstitutional misconduct.”) (emphasis added in Mills; citing Bellamy, 729 F.2d at 421); Bass v. Robinson, 167 F.3d 1041, 1048 (6th Cir.1999) (holding that § 1983 plaintiff must prove that officer “did more than play a passive role in the alleged violation or showed mere tacit approval of the goings on.... Supervisory liability under § 1983 cannot attach where the allegation of liability is based upon a mere failure to act ... and cannot be based upon simple negligence.”) (citing Leach v. Shelby County Sheriff, 891 F.2d 1241, 1246 (6th Cir.1989)).

Id. at 643.

Herein, there is no evidence that Brown was personally involved in the events which gave rise to this litigation. Moreover, the Plaintiff has failed to supply evidence which raises a genuine issue of material fact concerning the question of whether Brown condoned, encouraged or knowingly acquiesced in the alleged unconstitutional misconduct by Craine, Carlton and Naff. Nevertheless, Plaintiff arguably implies in her Amended Complaint that Brown can be held liable along with other Defendants for failing to investigate the events giving rise to this litigation or to take remedial action as a result of those events. See Doc. # 23 at ¶ 154. Based upon the following, this Court concludes that the Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that the evidence raises a genuine issue of material fact on whether Brown can be held liable for failing to investigate those events or to take remedial action.

In Marchese v. Lucas, 758 F.2d 181, 182 (6th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 916, 107 S.Ct. 1369, 94 L.Ed.2d 685 (1987), the Sixth Circuit held that a failure to investigate may give rise to supervisory liability under § 1983. Therein, “there was, in fact, no serious investigation conducted” by any supervisory officials. Id. at 188. In Walker v. Norris, 917 F.2d 1449, 1457 (6th Cir.1990), the Sixth Circuit noted that, in Márchese, it had indicated that post-event actions of a supervisor could give rise to liability under a supervisory liability theory for failure to investigate the events. However, the Walker court indicated that such liability was limited to instances where no investigation had been conducted. Therein, the Sixth Circuit concluded that the District Court had properly granted a directed verdict in favor of two supervisory employees, because an investigation had been conducted. Thus, in Broyles v. City of Dayton, 1997 WL 1764763 (S.D.Ohio 1997), affirmed, 1998 WL 476154 (6th Cir.1998), this Court indicated that a supervisory employee can be held liable for failure to investigate, only “if there is a complete failure to conduct a meaningful investigation.” Id. at *7. Herein, there is no evidence tending to support the proposition that there was a failure to conduct a meaningful investigation. On the contrary, at Brown’s request, officers employed in the Huber Heights Police Department conducted an investigation into the events which led to this litigation. As part of their investigation, officers in that department interviewed the participants in and witnesses to the events surrounding Cabaniss’ death.

Plaintiff also argues that liability can be imposed upon Brown under § 1983, because he is responsible for failing to train Riverside’s police officers and to enforce its policies and procedures, and for permitting inexperienced officers to operate without sufficient supervision. As an initial matter, it should be noted that a failure to train municipal employees, which constitutes deliberate indifference, can serve as the basis for imposing liability oh a municipal employer for the constitutional torts committed by its employees. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989). It cannot be questioned that liability can be imposed on a supervisor when he has condoned, encouraged or knowingly acquiesced in the alleged unconstitutional violations of his subordinates. The Plaintiff, however, has failed to cite any decision by the Supreme Court or the Sixth Circuit, holding that liability can also be imposed upon a supervisor for the constitutional violations of his subordinates, when he has failed to train those subordinates and that failure amounted to deliberate indifference to the safety of others. In the absence of such authority in support of this theory of liability, this Court is not free to amend the standards for supervisory liability, restated by the Sixth Circuit in Turner, supra, to include failure to train subordinates.

The other bases of liability (i.e., failure to enforce policies and procedures and permitting officers to work without adequate supervision) all involve some sort of alleged failure of Brown to supervise Riverside’s Police Department. In Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295 (6th Cir.1999), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1264, 120 S.Ct. 2724, 147 L.Ed.2d 988 (2000), the Sixth Circuit indicated that a supervisor’s failure to supervise or to control his subordinates was not actionable, “unless the supervisor either encouraged the specific incident of misconduct or in some other way directly participated in it. At a minimum a plaintiff must show that the official at least implicitly authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct of the offénding officers.” Id. at 300 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Since there is no evidence that Brown directly participated in or implicitly authorized, approved, or knowingly acqtdesced in the alleged unconstitutional conduct, the evidence fails to raise a genuine issue of material fact on Plaintiffs theory that Brown can be held hable under § 1983 for his failure to supervise his subordinates.

Based upon the foregoing, the Court concludes that Brown is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs individual capacity claims against him under § 1983.

Brown argues that he is also entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs state law claims, to the extent that any such claims have been asserted against him. In particular, Brown argues that he is immune from liability under state law in accordance with § 2744.03(A)(6) of the Ohio Revised Code. This Court agrees. Section 2744.03(A)(6) provides:

(6) In addition to any immunity or defense referred to in division (A)(7) of this section and in circumstances not covered by that division or sections 3314.07 and 3746.24 of the Revised Code, the employee is immune from liability unless one of the following applies:

(a) The employee’s acts or omissions were manifestly outside the scope of the employee’s employment or official responsibilities;

(b) The employee’s acts or omissions were with malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner;

(c) Civil liability is expressly imposed upon the employee by a section of the Revised Code. Civil liability shall not be construed to exist under another section of the Revised Code merely because that section imposes a responsibility or mandatory duty upon an employee, because that section provides for a criminal penalty, because of a general authorization in that section that an employee may sue and be sued, or because the section uses the term “shall” in a provision pertaining to an employee.

The circumstances presented by this litigation are not covered by either § 3314.07, which deals with the immunities of sponsors of community schools, or § 3746.24, which addresses the immunity of certain individuals working with hazardous substances. In addition, there is no evidence that Brown was acting manifestly outside the scope of his employment or that he acted with a malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner. Finally, Plaintiff has pointed to no provision in the Ohio Revised Code which would expressly impose liability upon Brown under the present circumstances. Indeed, Plaintiff cites only § 2744.02, which deals with the immunity of political subdivisions, like Riverside, and the exceptions to that immunity. Given that Brown is not a political subdivision (see § 2744.01(F) (defining political subdivision)), § 2744.02 is irrelevant to the question of whether Brown can be held liable for Plaintiffs state law claims. Accordingly, the Court concludes that Brown is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs state law claims.

Based upon the foregoing, the Court sustains Brown’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. # 47) in its entirety.

B. Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment as to Liability (Doc. # 35) and Motion of Defendants Other Than George Brown for Summary Judgment (Doc. # 60)

As an initial matter, the individual Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs official capacity claims against them, since Riverside is a party to this litigation. See E.J., supra. Accordingly, the Court sustains the Motion of Defendants Other Than George Brown for Summary Judgment (Doc. # 60), as it relates to the official capacity claims against Onello, Curp, Lommatzsch, Reynolds, Doan, Best, Mike Smith, Weaver, Alig, Craine, Carlton, Naff, Kronenberger and Smith.

The Court now turns the Plaintiffs individual capacity claims against the individual Defendants and her claims against Riverside. As a means of analysis, the Court will initially rule upon the parties’ motions as they relate to the Plaintiffs individual capacity claims against Onello, Curp, Lom-matzsch, Reynolds, Doan, Best, Mike Smith, Weaver and Alig. The Court will then turn to the motions as they relate to Plaintiffs individual capacity claims against Craine, Carlton, Naff, Kronenber-ger and Smith, before ruling on her claims against Riverside.

a. Plaintiffs Individual Capacity Claims against Onello, Curp, Lom-matzsch, Reynolds, Doan, Best, Mike Smith, Weaver and Alig

For reasons which follow, the Court concludes that Onello, Curp, Lommatzsch, Reynolds, Doan, Best, Mike Smith and Weaver are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs individual capacity claims against them. As is indicated above, Onello is alleged to be the City Manager, while Curp is alleged to be Riverside’s Mayor. Lommatzsch, Reynolds, Doan, Best, Mike Smith and Weaver are alleged to be members of the Riverside City Council. Alig was the Chief of Riverside’s Fire Department when the events giving rise to this litigation occurred. In her Amended Complaint, the Plaintiff lists these individuals and identifies them. See Doc. # 23 at ¶¶ 7-9 and 13. In addition, she alleges in the “Facts” section of that pleading, rather than in one of the 23 claims for relief set forth therein, that the failure of, inter alia, these Defendants “to implement appropriate policies and procedures, communicate lawful policies and procedures, training, education, and appropriate supervision in the use of pepper spray and medical needs of prisoners amounts to gross negligence and a deliberate indifference to the safety of the