Full opinion text
OPINION AND ORDER MARBLEY, District Judge. I. INTRODUCTION This matter is before this Court on numerous pretrial motions filed by Defendant Nuradin Abdi (“Defendant”) and the Government. This Court conducted an oral hearing on several of these motions on July 6, 2007, and based on those arguments and those set forth in memoranda submitted to this Court, this Court rules as set forth below. II. BACKGROUND On June 10, 2004, a Grand Jury returned a four-count indictment against Defendant Nuradin Abdi. Count One alleges that from late 1997 until November 2003, Defendant, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2339A and 18 U.S.C. § 371, conspired to provide material support to terrorists with the knowledge or intent that his support would be used to carry out a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 956, which prohibits conspiracy to kill, kidnap, maim, and injure persons or property in a foreign country. Count Two alleges that from late 1997 or early 1998 until November 2003, Defendant, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2339B, conspired knowingly to provide material support to al Qaeda, a designated Foreign Terrorist Organization (“FTO”). The overt act alleged in furtherance of Counts One and Two charges that Defendant, on April 27,1999, applied for a travel document from Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”) and concealed his true destination by claiming that he would be visiting Germany and Saudi Arabia but, instead, intending to travel to Ogaden, Ethiopia for military-style training in preparation for a violent Jihad. Counts Three and Four both allege violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a), which prohibits, inter alia, fraud or misuse of immigration documents. Specifically, Count Three alleges that on June 11, 1999, Defendant knowingly possessed, obtained, and received a false Refugee Travel Document because the Travel Document had been granted on the basis of a falsified asylum application. Count Four alleges that on March 25, 2000, Defendant knowingly used a false Refugee Travel Document. The Indictment further charges that Defendant committed the offenses charged in Counts Three and Four in order to facilitate an act of international terrorism. III. ANALYSIS A. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for Prejudicial Pre-Indictment Delay [Doc. 44] Defendant moves this Court for an order dismissing the Indictment based on prejudicial delay between the time of the alleged events and the time of the return of the Indictment. Defendant states that the offenses in Counts One and Two of the Indictment are activities that allegedly occurred between “late 1997 to November 2003” and the overt act stated for both Counts allegedly occurred on April 27, 1999. Further, the offenses in Counts Three and Four are activities that allegedly occurred on June 11, 1999 and March 25, 2000, respectively. Defendant claims that his Fifth Amendment right to a fair trial as been substantially prejudiced by the delay between these events and the issuance of the Indictment, which was returned on June 10, 2004. Specifically, Defendant claims that the delay has allowed the Government to gain a tactical advantage over Defendant because the delay may affect the availability of witnesses and records. In response, the Government contends that it did not learn of Defendant’s criminal activities beginning in 1997 until the spring of 2003, and, therefore, the Government could not possibly have charged Defendant with any offense prior to that day. Additionally, the Government states that the period between the date of Defendant’s arrest on November 28, 2003 and the June 10, 2004 indictment was not for purposes of delay, but rather necessary for an adequate investigation. Although the statute of limitations is the primary protection against stale prosecutions “the Due Process Clause has a limited role in protecting against oppressive delay.” United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 789, 97 S.Ct. 2044, 52 L.Ed.2d 752 (1977). To obtain relief under the Due Process Clause, “the defendant [must] prove that the government’s delay in bringing the indictment was a deliberate device to gain an advantage over [the defendant] and that [the delay] caused him actual prejudice in presenting his defense.” United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 192, 104 S.Ct. 2292, 81 L.Ed.2d 146 (1984); see also United States v. Rogers, 118 F.3d 466, 475 (6th Cir.1997) (requiring defendant to prove both actual substantial prejudice and intentional delay on the part of the government). A delay resulting from investigative efforts “does not deprive [a defendant] of due process, even if his defense may have been somewhat prejudiced by the lapse of time.” Rogers, 118 F.3d at 476 (quoting United States v. Atisha, 804 F.2d 920, 928 (6th Cir.1986)); see also United States v. DeClue, 899 F.2d 1465, 1468-69 (6th Cir.1990) (holding that a due process claim of excessive pre-indictment delay will fail unless the petitioner can show that the government had no valid reason for the delay or that some tactical advantage was sought to be obtained by the delay). In this case, Defendant fails to demonstrate that the Government’s delay was used as a deliberate device to gain an advantage, or that the delay caused substantial prejudice to Defendant’s case. While Defendant’s alleged criminal acts occurred up to seven years before the return of the Indictment, little more than a year passed from the time the Government had reason to know of Defendant’s criminal actions to the time of the Indictment. The one-year delay was for legitimate investigatory reasons — reasons sufficient to avoid dismissal. See United States v. Solomon, 688 F.2d 1171, 1179 (7th Cir.1982) (holding that an investigatory delay of three and one-half years due to IRS investigation was legitimate). Defendant has set forth no factual basis to support a claim that the delay was deliberate in order to gain a tactical advantage; he has simply asserted that the delay was intentional. Mere allegations are insufficient to meet a defendant’s burden of showing deliberate delay. United States v. Royals, 111 F.2d 1089 (5th Cir.1985). Most, if not all, of Defendant’s complaints are traceable to the time between his alleged crimes and when the Government became aware of them. In other words, the delay is attributable to the success of Defendant’s alleged covert conspiracy. A defendant cannot elude prosecution for years and later use his own alleged successful evasive conduct to support a claim of pre-indictment delay. Further, Defendant has failed to put forth evidence of actual “substantial prejudice.” Defendant argues that because of the passage of time between his alleged acts and the Indictment, witnesses will be difficult to locate, their recollections may be poor, and certain records may no longer be available. These are general arguments, however, and Defendant fails to set forth specific grounds for his claim. Defendant notes his burden to prove actual prejudice and states that he will supplement his Motion with specific instances of such; this Court, however, has never received any supplement. For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Motion is DENIED. B. Defendant’s Substantive Motions to Dismiss Defendant filed the following motions to dismiss based on the substantive charges in the Indictment: • Defendant’s [First] Motion to Dismiss Count One, Count Two, Count Three and Count Four of the Indictment for Insufficiency [Doc. 50]; • Defendant’s [Second] Motion to Dismiss Count Two for Failure to State an Offense [Doc. 95]; • Defendant’s Second Motion to Dismiss Count One [Doc. 144]; • Defendant’s Third Motion to Dismiss Count Two [Doc. 145]; • Defendant’s Second Motion to Dismiss Counts Three and Four [Doc. 146] Because many of the issues overlap, and Defendant often restates the same arguments, this Court addresses the Motions together by reviewing each Count and the related challenges asserted by Defendant. 1.Count One: Conspiracy to Provide Material Support to Terrorists Count One charges as follows: 1. From in or about late 1997 to on or about November 27, 2008, the defendant, Nuradin M. Abdi, in the Southern District of Ohio and elsewhere, did knowingly and willfully combine, conspire, confederate, and agree with other persons, known and unknown to the Grand Jury, to violate Title 18, United States Code, Section 2339A. 2. It was a part and object of the conspiracy that the defendant, Nuradin M. Abdi, and other persons known and unknown to the Grand Jury, would and did, within the United States, provide material support and resources and conceal and disguise the nature, location, source, and ownership of material support and resources, knowing and intending that they were to be used in preparation for, and in carrying out, a violation of Section 956 of Title 18, United States Code (conspiring to kill, kidnap, maim, and injure persons and to damage and destroy property in a foreign country), and in preparation for, and in carrying out, the concealment and an escape from the commission of such violation. 3.[Over Act:] In furtherance of the conspiracy and to effect the illegal objects thereof, the following Overt Act, and others, was committed by the defendant: On April 27, 1999, the defendant, Nu-radin M. Abdi, applied to the Immigration and Naturalization Service (currently known as the Department of Homeland Security, Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement) (“INS”) for a travel document, wherein he concealed his destination by representing that he intended to visit Germany and Saudi Arabia for the purpose of “Umrah (Holly [sic] — Mecca) and visit my relative,” when, as the defendant then well knew, he planned to travel to Ogaden, Ethiopia, for the purpose of obtaining military-style training in preparation for violent Jihad. All in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 371 and 2339A. Defendant argues that Count One should be dismissed because: (1) it is insufficient to apprise Defendant of the charges against him; (2) the version of 2339A under which Defendant was indicted has been invalidated; and (3) the present version of 2339A remains unconstitutional as amended. Insufficiency Defendant argues that this Court should dismiss Count One due to insuffi-ciencies in the charges. Federal Criminal Procedure Rule 7(c)(1) contains the relevant standard: “The indictment or the information shall be a plain, concise and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged.... It need not contain a formal commencement, a formal conclusion or any other matter not necessary to such a statement.” Fed.R.Crim.P. 7(c)(1). An indictment complies with this rule, which derives from the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, if it: “(1) ‘contains the elements of the offense charged;’ (2) ‘fairly informs a defendant of the charge against which he must defend;’ and (3) ‘enables him to plead an acquittal or conviction in bar of future prosecutions for the same offense.’ ” United States v. Titterington, 374 F.3d 453, 456 (6th Cir.2004) (quoting Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117, 94 S.Ct. 2887, 41 L.Ed.2d 590 (1974)). In other words, an indictment satisfies the Fifth and Sixth Amendments if it first, sets out all of the elements of the charged offense and gives notice to the defendant of the charges he faces; and second, is sufficiently specific to enable the defendant to plead double jeopardy in a subsequent proceeding, if charged with the same crime based on the same facts. Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 82 S.Ct. 1038, 8 L.Ed.2d 240 (1962); see also United States v. Martinez, 981 F.2d 867, 872 (6th Cir.1992). An indictment generally meets these sufficiency requirements when it tracks the language of the statute. Hamling, 418 U.S. at 117, 94 S.Ct. 2887; United States v. Phibbs, 999 F.2d 1053, 1083 n. 14 (6th Cir.1993). With respect to Count One, Defendant specifically argues that it should be dismissed for insufficiency because it: (1) fails to particularize the type of material support that Defendant allegedly provided and how such support was provided, disguised, or concealed; (2) fails to state who Defendant and others were conspiring to kill, maim, kidnap, damage, or injure under 18 U.S.C. § 956; and (3) omits the facts of the conspiratorial agreements, including when said agreement was made, the object of the conspiracies, and any specific dates. The Government counters that Count One meets constitutional requirements because it sets out all of the elements of the charged offenses and tracks the statutory language of § 2339A almost verbatim. The Court finds the Government’s position well-taken. The Indictment tracks the language of the statute and sets out all of the elements of the offenses charged in Count One. Section § 2339A reads as follows: Whoever provides material support or resources or conceals or disguises the nature, location, source, or ownership of material support or resources, knowing or intending that they are to be used in preparation for, or in carrying out, a violation of section ... 956 ... or in preparation for, or in carrying out, the concealment of an escape from the commission of any such violation, or attempts or conspires to do such an act [shall be guilty of a crime]. 18 U.S.C. § 2339A. The language used in Count One of the Indictment closely mirrors the words of the statute alleging that Defendant conspired to “provide material support and resources and conceal and disguise the nature, location, source, and ownership of material support and resources, knowing and intending that they were to be used in preparation for, and in carrying out, a violation of Section 956 ... in preparation for, and in carrying out, the concealment and an escape from the commission of such violation.” In addition to tracking the statute’s language virtually verbatim, the words used contain the essential elements of § 2339A, including: (1) an agreement; (2) to provide material support (3) with the knowledge or intent that it will be used in preparation for a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 956 (conspiring to kill, kidnap, maim, and injure persons and to damage and destroy property in a foreign country), thereby satisfying the constitutional requirements. Defendant’s argument that the Indictment does not allege conspiracy with adequate specificity is unpersuasive. It is well established that “the defendant does not ‘need’ detailed evidence about a conspiracy in order to prepare for trial properly,” nor do “[d]etails as to how and when a conspiracy was formed, or when each participant entered it, need [to] be revealed before trial.” United States v. Strawberry, 892 F.Supp. 519, 526 (S.D.N.Y.1995). Similarly, an allegation of conspiracy need not be dismissed for failing to identify specific co-conspirators. Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 375, 71 S.Ct. 438, 95 L.Ed. 344 (1951) (“[A]t least two persons are required to constitute a conspiracy, but the identity of the other members of the conspiracy is not needed, inasmuch as one person can be convicted of conspiring with persons whose names are unknown.”); United States v. Rey, 923 F.2d 1217, 1222 (6th Cir.1991) (“[I]t is not essential that a conspirator know all other conspirators” because “[i]t is the grand jury’s statement of the existence of the conspiracy agreement rather than the identity of those who agree which places the defendant on notice of the charge he must be prepared to meet.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Moreover, with regard to 18 U.S.C. § 956 (conspiring to kill, kidnap, maim, and injure persons and to damage and destroy property in a foreign country), the Indictment need not state who Defendant and others conspired to kill, kidnap, maim, or injure, or what property Defendant and others conspired to damage and destroy. See United States v. Sattar, 314 F.Supp.2d 279 (S.D.N.Y.2004) (“[T]he language of § 956(a) does not require that an indictment allege the identities of contemplated victims or the specific location outside of the United States where the contemplated killing, kidnapping, or maiming is to occur.”). Additionally, “[i]t is well settled that in an indictment for conspiring to commit an offense — in which the conspiracy is the gist of the crime — it is not necessary to allege with technical precision all the elements essential to the commission of the offense which is the object of the conspiracy....” United States v. Branan, 457 F.2d 1062, 1064 (6th Cir.1972). Thus, the Court rejects Defendant’s argument that Count One is insufficient. Invalidation of 2339A Defendant states that the grand jury in this case indicted him “under the mistaken belief that his alleged conduct could constitute a crime.” Defendant asserts that the Government has accused him of lying on an immigration document for the purpose of visiting a training camp, yet fails to allege that: a) the training camp was under the control of or affiliated with any specific organization; b) Defendant had any specific intent on where he might use the training; or c) that Defendant actually went to the training camp. Defendant argues that without alleging any of these facts, he cannot be convicted of a crime. In support of his arguments, Defendant relies upon a series of Ninth Circuit eases involving the Humanitarian Law Project, in which Defendant asserts that the court found § 2339A to be unconstitutionally vague. Defendant misinterprets the line of cases, however, and confuses §§ 2339A and 2339B, both of which Defendant is accused of violating. In the Humanitarian Law Project cases, plaintiffs — five organizations and two United States citizens seeking to provide support to the lawful, nonviolent activities of several groups designated as foreign terrorists organizations — -feared that providing such support would expose them to criminal prosecution under § 2339B for proving material support and resources to foreign terrorist organization. The plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction barring the enforcement of § 2339B against them, asserting that the terms “training” and “personnel” were impermissibly vague under the Fifth Amendment. The District Court agreed, Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 9 F.Supp.2d 1176 (C.D.Cal.1998) and the Ninth Circuit affirmed, Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130 (9th Cir.2000) (“HLP I”). In response, the district court issued a permanent injunction, which the Ninth Circuit upheld. See Humanitarian Law Project v. United States Department of Justice, 352 F.3d 382 (9th Cir.2003) (“HLP II”), vacated after statutory amendment, 393 F.3d 902 (9th Cir.2004). In addition to upholding the district court’s conclusion that “personnel” was impermissibly vague in 2339B, the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in HLP II construed § 2339B to require that the donor of material support have knowledge that the recipient either had been designated as a foreign terrorist organization or engaged in terrorist activities (and not, merely, knowledge of providing material support). On December 17, 2004, as part of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub.L. 108-458, codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(h) (hereafter “IRTPA”), Congress amended the term “personnel” in the definition of material support, as applied to § 2339B only. No person may be prosecuted under this section in connection with the term “personnel” unless that person has knowingly provided, attempted to provide, or conspired to provide a foreign terrorist organization with 1 or more individuals (who may be or include himself) to work under that terrorist organization’s direction or control or to organize, manage, supervise, or otherwise direct the operation of that organization. Individuals who act entirely independently of the foreign terrorist organization to advance its goals or objectives shall not be considered to be working under the foreign terrorist organization’s direction and control. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(h). Defendant argues that, unlike the time during which he was indicted, it is now clear that § 2339A is limited to employees or employee-like operatives who serve the designated group and work at its command. Defendant asserts that the grand jury found probable cause under § 2339A at a time when the Government and others “were under the erroneous impression that merely visiting a training camp” could constitute a violation of 2339A, or that independent actors attending unaffiliated camps could be encompassed under the statute. Defendant asserts that the Government has not adequately charged him with providing “personnel” under the present version of the statute because it has not alleged that Defendant maintained an employee-like relationship with any terrorist organization, or that the training camp where the Government alleged Defendant planned to visit was affiliated with any terrorist organization. Defendant’s arguments lack merit on several basis. First, the “personnel” amendment referred to in HLP I and II applies to § 2339B and not § 2339A. The plaintiffs in the HLP cases did not challenge § 2993A, but rather used that provision to distinguish 2339B. “While the statutory language of 2339A includes an explicit mens rea requirement to further illegal activities, such a requirement is notably missing from the statutory language of 2339B.” Humanitarian Law Project v. Gonzales, 380 F.Supp.2d 1134, 1146 (C.D.Cal.2005). Instead, § 2339B requires only that an individual knowingly provide material support or resources to an organization engaged in terrorist activities. The Court in HLP III noted that the legislative history indicates that Congress enacted § 2339B in order to close a loophole left by § 2339A. As § 2339A was limited to individuals (such as donors) who intended to further the commission of specific federal offenses, § 2339B encompassed donors who, though contributing to FTOs, acted without the intent to further federal crimes. Congress made a specific finding that “foreign organizations that engaged in terrorist activity are so tainted by their criminal conduct that any contribution to such an organization facilitates that conduct.” 18 U.S.C. § 2339B advisory note. As discussed further below in the analysis for Count Two, the 2004 amendment provides a mens rea requirement so that § 2339B covers only those who knowingly contribute to a FTO, knowing that such organization is in fact an FTO or an organization that engages or engaged in terrorist activities. The statute, however, still covers individuals such as donors who contribute to an organization knowing that it is an FTO even if they do not intend to further criminal conduct. In essence, Congress is restricting the ability of FTOs to raise funds needed for terrorist acts because providing support intended to aid an organization’s peaceful activities frees up resources that can be used for terrorist acts. Under the amended “personnel” definition, however, individuals such as the plaintiffs in the HLP Cases can provide aid as long as they act independently of the FTO; criminal conduct is limited to those working under the “direction or control” of an FTO or actually managing or supervising an FTO operation. Again, this only addresses § 2339B as § 2339A already includes a mens rea requirement that the individual provide material support — such as personnel, not limited to the personnel as amended in 2339B — ■with the intent that the support be used to further the commission of federal crimes. Defendant’s reliance on the HLP Cases is, therefore, wholly irrelevant and inappropriate with respect to § 2339A and Count One of the Indictment. Second — and perhaps more importantly — Defendant, in several motions, confuses the criminal conduct alleged in Count One with the overt act provided in the indictment. Defendant states that the grand jury erroneously concluded that “merely visiting a training camp” could constitute a violation of 2339A. Defendant, however, is not charged with “merely visiting a training camp.” He is charged under § 2339A with conspiring to provide material support to terrorists knowing and intending that such support be used in violation of other federal crimes. The overt act alleged by the Government is Defendant’s plan to attend a training camp, and his misrepresentation on an INS document in order to do so. The “material support” that Defendant allegedly conspired to provide to terrorists, may include himself (as personnel at a training camp) but it is not limited to such simply because the Government included that activity as a specific overt act. Defendant’s contention that § 2339A has been found unconstitutionally vague, therefore, is not well taken. Constitutionality of 2339A Defendant, again confusing § 2339A with § 2339B, and the crime charged with the overt act alleged, asserts that § 2339A remains unconstitutionally vague despite the amendment of “personnel.” Section 2339A was not amended; the “personnel” amendment only applies to the material support criminalized in § 2339B. Further, Defendant’s argument that § 2339A has a chilling effect on First Amendment freedoms were it to bar visits to lawful training camps is without merit. Again, Count One charges him with providing material support to terrorists, intending that such support be used to commit other federal crimes. Count One does not charge him with attending a training camp; it provides such action as an overt act taken in furtherance of the underlying conspiracy. Defendant’s Motions to Dismiss Count One are, therefore, DENIED. 2. Count Two: Conspiracy to Provide Material Support to a Designated Foreign Terrorist Organization Count Two charges as follows: 4. From in or about late 1997 or early 1998 to on or about November 27, 2003, the defendant, Nuradin M. Abdi, in the Southern District of Ohio and elsewhere, did knowingly combine, conspire, confederate, and agree with other persons, known and unknown to the Grand Jury, to violate Title 18, United States Code, Section 2339B. 5. It was a part and an object of the conspiracy that the defendant, Nuradin M. Abdi, and other persons known and unknown to the Grand Jury, would and did, within the United States, knowingly provide material support and resources to a foreign terrorist organization, to wit, al Qaeda, which was designated by the Secretary of State as a foreign terrorist organization on October 8, 1999, pursuant to Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, and was redes-ignated as such on or about October 5, 2001, and October 2, 2003. 6.[Over Act:] In furtherance of the conspiracy and to effect the illegal objects thereof, the following Overt Act, and others, was committed by the defendant: On April 27, 1999, the defendant, Nu-radin M. Abdi, applied to INS for a travel document, wherein he concealed his destination by representing that he intended to visit Germany and Saudi Arabia for the purpose of “Umrah (Holly [sic] — Mecca) and visit my relative,” when, in fact, as the defendant then well knew, he planned to travel to Ogaden, Ethiopia, for the purpose of obtaining military-style training in preparation for violent Jihad. All in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 2339B. Much like Count One, Defendant argues that this Court should dismiss Count Two because: (1) it is insufficient to apprise adequately Defendant of the charges; (2) the version of 2339B under which Defendant was indicted has been invalidated; and (3) the present version of 2339B remains unconstitutional as amended. In addition, Defendant argues that Count Two should be dismissed for failure to state an offense. Insufficiency Beyond sufficiency arguments considered and rejected by this Court with respect to Count One, Defendant asserts that Count Two is insufficient because it fails to allege adequately mens rea — i.e., that Defendant knew the material support he allegedly provided was for al Qaeda, a designated FTO. At the time of his indictment, § 2339B read: “[W]hoever knowingly provides material support or resources to a foreign terrorist organization, or attempts or conspires to do so, shall [be guilty of a crime].” “Knowingly,” the key term in analyzing the level of mens rea in this statute, can be read in either of two ways: (1) as only modifying the verb “provides,” or (2) as modifying “provides” as well as the remaining elements in the statute. United States v. Marzook, 383 F.Supp.2d 1056, 1069 (N.D.Ill.2005). “ ‘Congress certainly intended by use of the word ‘knowingly’ to require some mental state with respect to some element of the crime,’ but either interpretation would ‘accord with ordinary usage.’ ” Id. (quoting Liparota v. United, States, 471 U.S. 419, 424-25, 105 S.Ct. 2084, 85 L.Ed.2d 434 (1985)). Several interpretations arose in relevant case law due to the ambiguity in the statute. Id. (providing the various interpretations). The first interpretation requires the Government to prove only that a defendant knowingly provided material support to an organization, regardless of whether a defendant knew the organization was a designated FTO or engaged in terrorism. Id. (concluding that such a reading, in effect, would create a strict liability crime because a defendant could be guilty for providing material support, such as a donation, that ended up in the hands of an FTO, even if by happenstance). The second interpretation requires the Government to prove both that Defendant knowingly provided material support, and that he knew that the organization was either a designated FTO or engaged in terrorism. Id. (adopting such interpretation); see also HLP II, 352 F.3d at 400 (“when Congress included the term “knowingly” in § 2339B, it meant that proof that a defendant knew of the organization’s designation as a terrorist organization or proof that a defendant knew of the unlawful activities that caused it to be so designated was required to convict a defendant under the statute”), vacated on other grounds, 393 F.3d 902 (9th Cir.2004). The third interpretation requires the Government to prove that the defendant knowingly provided material support, knew the organization was either a designated FTO or engaged in terrorism, and specifically intended to further the organization’s terrorist activities. See United States v. Al-Arian, 308 F.Supp.2d 1322, 1338-39 (holding that the government not only must prove that a donor knew the recipient was an FTO, but also that the donor specifically intended to further the terrorist activities of the organization); Marzook, 383 F.Supp.2d at 1070 (stating that such interpretation would allow a defendant to contribute material support with impunity to any number of organizations that engage in terrorist activity, so long as the defendant did not know that the Secretary of State had designated the recipient an FTO). Of these interpretations, this Court agrees with the second reasoning, as set forth by Marzook, which requires the government to prove that Defendant knowingly provided material support and that he knew that the organization (al Qaeda) was either a designated FTO or engaged in terrorist activities. Although reached independently, this conclusion comports with Congress’s December 17, 2004 passage of IRTPA, in which Congress clarified § 2339B’s scienter requirement: To violate [2339B], a person must have knowledge that the organization is a designated terrorist organization (as defined in subsection (g)(6)), that the organization has engaged or engages in terrorist activity (as defined in section 212(a)(3)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act), or that the organization has engaged or engages in terrorism (as defined in section 140(d)(2) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989). 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2004). Thus, the Court finds, under either the former or new version of the statute, the prosecution must not only prove that Defendant knowingly provided material support to al Qaeda, but also that Defendant knew either that al Qaeda had been designated a FTO or that al Qaeda engaged or engages in terrorism or terrorist activities. While Congress added the scienter requirement after Defendant’s indictment, the definition largely tracked prior judicial decisions concerning the requirement, and was later included to eliminate the uncertainty created by the aberrant Al Arian decision. See Humanitarian Law Project v. Gonzales, 380 F.Supp.2d 1134, 1147 (C.D.Cal.2005) (viewing legislation as a rejection of the Al-Arian ruling); Linde, 384 F.Supp.2d at 587 (in adopting definition of “knowingly,” “Congress appears to have expressed its disagreement with decisions relied upon by [defendant] ... e.g., U.S. v. Al-Arian ”). Thus, this Court rejects Defendant’s claim that Count Two is insufficient for not specifically charging that Defendant knew that the alleged support was provided to an FTO. The Court, however, provides this analysis — and the requirements for proof under 2339B — to assist the parties in trial preparation and to provide the parties an opportunity to draft appropriate jury instructions with regard to § 2339B. Invalidation of 2339B Defendant repeats the same arguments as set forth for § 2339A, above. Although Defendant’s reliance on the HLP Cases is now appropriate (as those cases address § 2339B), Defendant’s arguments still lack merit. Defendant’s arguments are premised on the assumption that the “material support” alleged by Count Two constitutes providing “personnel” (i.e., himself) as a potential jihadist combatant. As discussed above, the courts in the HLP cases held that, as applied to the plaintiffs in the civil law suit — 'who wished to advocate on behalf of certain FTOs — the term “personnel” was unconstitutionally vague because, without a more specific definition, such term could encompass the sort of advocacy that the plaintiffs wished to provide, thereby implicating First Amendment violations. The Government asserts that, in contrast to the HLP civil litigants, Defendant’s conduct, set out sufficiently in the Indictment, lies well within the central meaning of the statute’s prohibitions and does not involve mere advocacy association. The Government asserts that, as applied to offering oneself to serve as a combatant on behalf of persons bent upon committing acts of terrorism (18 U.S.C. § 2339A) or FTOs, such as al Qaeda (18 U.S.C. § 2339B), the phrase “providing ‘personnel’ ” has never been held to be unconstitutionally vague. Further, the Government contends that Defendant lacks standing to assert that, as to other hypothetical parties, the statute is unconstitutionally vague and threatens First Amendment rights. This Court finds the Government’s argument, and the related controlling case law, persuasive. See, e.g., Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. 489, 495, 102 S.Ct. 1186, 71 L.Ed.2d 362 (1982) (“[a] plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others”); Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 755-56, 94 S.Ct. 2547, 41 L.Ed.2d 439 (1974) (a criminal defendant “who has fair notice from the language of [the statute] that the particular conduct is punishable [cannot] ... challenge the vagueness of [the statute] as [it] might be hypothetically applied to the conduct of others”); United States v. Marzook, 383 F.Supp.2d 1056, 1064 (N.D.Ill.2005) (“[i]f the actor is given sufficient notice that his conduct is within the proscription of the statute, his conviction is not vulnerable on vagueness grounds, even if, as applied to other conduct, the law would be unconstitutionally vague”); see also Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 649-50, 104 S.Ct. 3262, 82 L.Ed.2d 487 (1984) (rejecting vagueness challenge where statute clearly applied to plaintiff, despite statute’s implication of First Amendment concerns); L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 1036 (2d ed., 1988) (“[o]ne to whose conduct a statute clearly applies may not challenge it on the basis that it is ‘vague’ as applied to others”). To satisfy due process, a criminal statute — such as the prohibition against providing “material support,” including “personnel,” to a FTO — must be sufficiently clear to give a person of “ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited.” Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972). To satisfy this requirement, the legislature need not define an offense with “mathematical certainty” (Grayned, 408 U.S. at 110, 92 S.Ct. 2294), but need only provide “relatively clear guidelines as to the prohibited conduct.” Posters ‘N’ Things, Ltd. v. United States, 511 U.S. 513, 525, 114 S.Ct. 1747, 128 L.Ed.2d 539 (1994). Section 2339B, which prohibits individuals from providing material support to FTOs in the form of personnel, satisfies such standards insofar as it applies to combatants (or would-be combatants). As the court observed in United States v. Lindh, 212 F.Supp.2d 541, 577 (E.D.Va.2002) (though in the context of a consummated offense): under any reasonable construction of Section 2339B’s statutory language, a person who joins the armed forces of a foreign terrorist organization, receives combat training from that organization, and serves in a combat unit to protect the organization and advance its goals has provided material support and resources — including, specifically, “personnel” — to that group. By any measure [the defendant] provided personnel, i.e. himself, to [the FTO] when he allegedly joined these organizations and engaged in a variety of conduct, including combat to further the goals of these organizations. Thus, to provide personnel is to provide people who become affiliated with the organization and work under its direction: the individual or individuals provided could be the provider himself, or others, or both. See id. at 577 n. 87 (relying upon the dictionary definition of “personnel,” i.e., “ ‘a body of persons usually employed (as in a factory, office or organization)’ or ‘a body of persons employed in some service’ ”); accord United States v. Marzook, 383 F.Supp.2d at 1065 (term “personnel” not unconstitutionally vague as applied to person who recruits members to join Ha-mas; such a fact, as charged, “quite plainly constitutes conduct one would expect to be criminalized under a statute that proscribes the provision of ‘personnel’ to an FTO”); United States v. Goba, 220 F.Supp.2d 182, 194 (W.D.N.Y.2002) (relying upon Lindh and rejecting vagueness challenge to violation of § 2339B in the form of “providing personnel” to an FTO by offering one’s services to be indoctrinated and trained as a resource). Thus, Defendant’s argument that the version of § 2339B with which he was charged has been invalidated is not well-taken. To the extent that Count Two charges Defendant with providing material support by way of personnel (which, again, is not entirely accurate; it is, instead, the overt act that alleges Defendant’s provision of “personnel”), this Court finds that § 2339B was not unconstitutionally vague as applied to him at the time of his June 2004 Indictment. Constitutionality of 2339B as Amended As discussed above, Congress, as part of IRTPA promulgated in 2004, clarified the term “personnel” as it is employed in § 2339B by adding a new subsection (h) defining the term, as it is used in the definition of “material support.” The current statute provides: Provision of Personnel. No person may be prosecuted under this section in connection with the term “personnel” unless that person has knowingly provided, attempted to provide, or conspired to provide a foreign terrorist organization with 1 or more individuals (who may be or include himself) to work under that terrorist organization’s direction or control or to organize, manage, supervise, or otherwise direct the operation of that organization. Individuals who act entirely independently of the foreign terrorist organization to advance its goals or objectives shall not be considered to be working under the foreign terrorist organization’s direction and control. The Government argues that, although this amendment post-dated Defendant’s indictment (and the conduct charged in Count Two), it ensures that no jury will convict him — as he maintains is yet possible — for merely expressive conduct in “the exercise of First Amendment freedoms.” This Court agrees. Because the amendment makes clear that prosecution is limited to those who “ ‘work under [a] terrorist organization’s direction and control or to organize, manage, supervise, or otherwise direct the operation of that organization,’ ” there is no longer any likelihood that a person will be convicted for independently engaging in protected expression on behalf of an FTO, rather than for conduct while acting under its direction and control. See Humanitarian Law Project v. Gonzales, 380 F.Supp.2d 1134, 1152-53 (C.D.Cal.2005). More fundamentally, Defendant is not charged with either engaging in Jihad (which he asserts may be protected activity under the First Amendment right to freedom of expression) or traveling to a training camp for that purpose but, rather, with conspiring to provide material support to an FTO. Allegations concerning his attempts to attend a jihadist training camp are not essential elements of Count Two, but are merely alleged as overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy. This Court, therefore, rejects Defendant’s argument that § 2339B remains unconstitutionally vague as amended. Failure to State an Offense Defendant moves to dismiss Count Two in its entirety because the overt act alleged occurred before al Qaeda was designated an FTO. Count Two notes that the Secretary of State designated al Qaeda an FTO on October 8, 1999, pursuant to Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act. The overt act, however, allegedly occurred on April 27,1999. Defendant asserts that even if he had provided material support to al Qaeda on April 27, 1999, such support would have been lawful at that point; thus, Count Two, according to Defendant’s argument, fails to charge an offense. The Government disagrees, arguing that there is no overt act requirement under § 2339B, and asserting that it is well established law that a court is prohibited from reading an overt act requirement into a conspiracy statute. This Court finds the Government’s argument well-taken. The Supreme Court has explained that there are two types of conspiracy statutes: those that are modeled after 18 U.S.C. § 371, which requires an overt act, and those that are modeled after the common law of conspiracy, which does not require an overt act. Whitfield v. United States, 543 U.S. 209, 125 S.Ct. 687, 160 L.Ed.2d 611, (2005). Section 371 reads as follows: “If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against the United States, or to defraud the United States, or any agency thereof in any manner or for any purpose, and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both” 18 U.S.C. § 371 (emphasis added). Where, however, “Congress ha[s] omitted from the relevant provision any language expressly requiring an overt act, the Court [will] not read such a requirement into the statute.” Whitfield, 543 U.S. at 213, 125 S.Ct. 687 (finding 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h), which reads “[a]ny person who conspires to commit any offense defined in [§ 1956] or section 1957 shall be subject to the same penalties as those prescribed for the offense the commission of which was the object of the conspiracy,” did not require an overt act because Congress had omitted any mention thereof); see also Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373, 33 S.Ct. 780, 57 L.Ed. 1232 (1913) (finding no overt act requirement in the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, which reads “[E]very person who shall make any contract or engage in any combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a felony”, reasoning “we can see no reason for reading into the Sherman Act more than we find there”). In drafting section § 2339B, Congress omitted any language requiring an overt act. The statute, at the time of the indictment, read: “[WJhoever knowingly provides material support or resources to a foreign terrorist organization, or attempts or conspires to do so, shall [be guilty of a crime].” 18 U.S.C. § 2339B. The statute’s language does not reflect the words of 18 U.S.C. § 371; thus, the Court will not read an overt act requirement into the statute. Because § 2339B does not require an overt act, Count Two need not be dismissed because the alleged overt act occurred before the Secretary of States designated al Qaeda an FTO. More fundamentally, however, this Court notes that the fact that Congress designated al Qaeda as an FTO after the alleged overt act makes no difference to the sufficiency of the Indictment, even if an overt act were required. As set forth above, a defendant can violate § 2339B if he knows that the material support is going to an FTO, or if he knows that the material support is going to an organization that engages or engaged in terrorism or terrorist activities. As discussed below in this Court’s analysis of Defendant’s Motion to Exclude Legal Arguments, although a conspiracy to provide material support to al Qaeda would not have been an offense under § 2339B on April 27, 1999 — because al Qaeda had not yet been designated an FTO — Defendant may still have provided material support to al Qae-da at that time knowing that the organization engaged in terrorism or terrorist activity, regardless of its designation of an FTO. Because an overt act predating the date of designation is admissible to demonstrate the formation of the conspiracy, its nature and scope, and Defendant’s intent in participating in it, Count Two is sufficient. Defendant’s Motions to Dismiss Count Two are, therefore, DENIED. 3. Counts Three and Four Counts Three and Four both allege violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a), which prohibits, inter alia, the fraud or misuse of any immigration documents. Specifically, Count Three alleges as follows: 7. On or about June 11, 1999, in the Southern District of Ohio and elsewhere, the defendant, Nuradin M. Abdi, did knowingly possess, obtain, and receive a false Refugee Travel Document, a document required by INS and prescribed by statute or regulation for entry into the United States, knowing said Refugee Travel Document was falsely made, procured by means of false claims and statements, and otherwise unlawfully obtained, and that said Refugee Travel Document was obtained based on defendant’s representations that he had been granted valid asylee status, when, in fact, as the defendant then well knew, his asylum application had been procured by means of false statements. Similarly, Count Four alleges as follows: On or about March 25, 2000, in the Southern District of Ohio and elsewhere, the defendant, Nuradin M. Abdi, did knowingly use a false Refugee Travel Document, a document required by INS and prescribed by statute or regulation for entry into the United States, knowing said Refugee Travel Document was falsely made, procured by means of false claims and statements, and otherwise unlawfully obtained, in that said Refugee Travel Document was based on defendant’s representations that he had been granted valid asylee status, when, in fact, as the defendant then well knew, his asylum application had been procured by means of false statements. Both Counts also allege that Defendant violated § 1546(a) in order “to facilitate an act of international terrorism,” in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2331. Should the jury agree, its finding will warrant a statutorily mandated twenty-five year enhancement. 18 U.S.C. § 1546 (“Whoever knowingly [violates § 1546] [s]hall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 25 years (if the offense was committed to facilitate an act of international terrorism (as defined in section 2331 of this title).... ”)). Section 2331 defines “an act of international terrorism” as follows: (1) the term “international terrorism” means activities that— (A) involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State, or that would be a criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the United States or of any State; (B) appear to be intended— (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping; and (C) occur primarily outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, or transcend national boundaries in terms of the means by which they are accomplished, the persons they appear intended to intimidate or coerce, or the locale in which their perpetrators operate or seek asylum; 18 U.S.C. § 2331(1)(A)-(C). Defendant alleges that the Indictment is insufficient because it does not outline the components constituting “an act of international terrorism,” but merely alleges that Defendant committed acts under § 1546 to “facilitate an act of international terrorism” without specifying the act, the intended consequence of the alleged act, or where the alleged act occurred. The Government counters that because “international terrorism” is a term of art that is defined by statute, the Indictment “need not parrot the component parts of the statutory definition.” Stated differently, the word, in and of itself, is sufficient. The Court finds that the Government need not allege the entire definition of “international terrorism” in the indictment. As explained by the Court in U.S. v. Kovach, 208 F.3d 1215, 1218-19 (10th Cir.2000), the various component parts of a statutory definition need not always be charged in the indictment. There, in an analogous situation, a defendant, charged with possessing counterfeit securities in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 513, challenged the indictment for its failure specifically to charge him with possessing securities that operated or affected interstate commerce, as required by § 513 (“[T]he statute contains a jurisdictional element which ensures, through a case-by-case inquiry that the crime in question involves ... interstate commerce”). The Court found that the word “organization,” which was contained in the indictment, sufficiently alleged the jurisdictional element because it was statutorily defined and was a term of art. This [statutory] definition [of organization], which is narrower than the common definition of the word “organization,” “is not merely a generic or descriptive term, but a legal term of art” .... Because this definition is applicable to all indictments charging a violation of § 513(a), its use is “sufficiently definite in legal meaning to give a defendant notice of the charge against him,” ... even if the “various component parts of the [statutory] definition of’ organization are not specifically alleged in the indictment. Id. (citing United States v. Wicks, 187 F.3d 426, 428 (4th Cir.1999) (holding that an indictment need not contain the component parts of a legal term of art)). This Court finds that the reasoning of Kovach and Wicks controls. The Indictment does not charge Defendant with a vague or undefined term. Rather, the words “international terrorism” are defined by Section 2331 and can only be defined thereunder when alleged in an indictment, and thus, the Court DENIES Defendant’s Motions to Dismiss Counts Three and Four. C. Defendant’s Motion for a Bill of Particulars [Doc. 55] Defendant has requested a bill of particulars on all four counts. The purposes of a bill of particulars are: to inform the defendant of the nature of the charge against him with sufficient precision to enable him to prepare for trial, to avoid or minimize the danger of surprise at the time of trial, and to enable him to plead his acquittal or conviction in bar of another prosecution for the same offense when the indictment itself is too vague and indefinite for such purpose. United States v. Jones, 678 F.Supp. 1302, 1304 (S.D.Ohio 1988) (quoting United States v. Birmley, 529 F.2d 103, 108 (6th Cir.1976)). A motion for a bill of particulars is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 98-99, 88 S.Ct. 269, 19 L.Ed.2d 305 (1967); United States v. Salisbury, 983 F.2d 1369, 1375 (6th Cir.1993). With respect to Counts One and Two, Defendant would like the Government: (1) to clarify which conspiracy the overt act in Count One underlies: the conspiracy alleged under 18 U.S.C. § 2339A or 18 U.S.C. § 956; (2) to narrow the alleged conspiracy’s time frame; (3) to state with whom the alleged agreement was made and how the Government will show that Defendant knew the object of the agreement; (4) to particularize the type of material support Defendant allegedly provided; (5) to identify the geographic location(s) other than the Southern District of Ohio mentioned in Counts One and Two, which read “in the Southern District of Ohio and elsewhere, [Defendant] did knowingly ....”; and (6) to specify in Count Two the al Qaeda person or entity with whom Defendant had contact and how the Government intends to establish such contact. The Government argues that the Motion should be denied because the Motion requests discovery beyond the scope of Rule 16 and characterizes Defendant’s motion as little more than a ill-disguised discovery tool, arguing that bill of particulars is not available for the purpose of discovering the Government’s theories or obtaining detailed disclosure of Government evidence prior to trial. The Government asserts that the Indictment is sufficiently detailed in that it contains the exact dates of the alleged Overt Acts, it specifies Ethiopia as the country to which “and elsewhere” refers, and that Defendant’s alleged plan to travel to Ogaden, Ethiopia, for the purpose of obtaining military-style training in preparation for a violent Jihad constitutes “personnel” within the definition of material support. The Court finds that the Indictment, taken together with the discovery already provided in this case, sufficiently apprises Defendant of the charges against him and will adequately allow Defendant to avoid surprise at trial. See United States v. Hernandez, 330 F.3d 964, 975 (7th Cir.2003) (“[A] bill of particulars is not required when the information a defendant needs to prepare his defense is available through some other satisfactory form”); see also United States v. Sattar, 314 F.Supp.2d 279, 318-319 (finding the government’s representations in its briefs, taken together with the indictment and discovery obviated the need for a bill of particulars). With respect to Defendant’s remaining requests on Counts One and Two, which include additional information about the conspiracy, and the names of the Al Qaeda representatives, and the geographic locations other than the Southern District of Ohio, these particular requests are either “merely an attempt to preview the Government’s evidence or legal theories, a ground on which the Court will not grant a bill of particulars,” U.S. v. Sattar, 272 F.Supp.2d 348, 382-83 (S.D.N.Y.2003), or have been adequately provided in some other form. In Sattar, the Defendant was similarly charged with conspiracy to provide material support and requested a bill of particulars detailing the date the defendant became a member of the conspiracy, the names of her alleged co-conspirators, and the date and location of each act that she allegedly performed in furtherance of the conspiracy. Id. The court explained that “demands for particular information with respect to where, when, and with whom the Government will charge the defendant with conspiring are routinely denied,” reasoning that the indictment and “extensive other materials provided to the defendants adequately apprise the defendants of the charges against them.” Id. (citations omitted). Likewise, the Indictment sufficiently apprises Defendant of the geographic locations, Ethiopia and the Southern District of Ohio, where Defendant allegedly committed the offenses. The information needed to prepare Defendant’s defense is readily obtainable through the Indictment and ample discovery. Similarly, the Court denies Defendant’s Motion for a Bill of Particulars with regard to Counts Three and Four because the indictment, read in conjunction with the discovery that the Government provided, adequately informs Defendant of the charges against him and are sufficient enough to avoid surprise at trial. Defendant’s Motion for a Bill of Particulars is, therefore, DENIED. D. Government’s Motion in Limine to Admit Expert Testimony [Doc. 99] and Defendant’s Motion in Limine to Exclude Government’s Expert and Request for a Daubert Hearing [Doc. 184] The Government moves this Court to admit testimony by Dr. Rohan Gunaratna, an expert with specialized knowledge in the field of international terrorism. The Government asserts that Dr. Gunaratna’s proposed testimony is reliable and relevant, as required by Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, ie., it is based upon a reliable methodology that can be applied to the facts of this case, and should be admitted at trial. Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999); Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993). Defendant objects to Dr. Gunaratna’s testimony, asserting that it is not reliable as required by Rule 702, and requests a Daubert hearing. In United States v. Damrah, 412 F.3d 618, 625 (6th Cir.2005), the Sixth Circuit sanctioned the use of expert testimony in a terrorism prosecution. See Also United States v. Sabir, 2007 WL 1373184 at *9 (S.D.N.Y.2007). The expert witness in Damrah based his testimony on press releases, newspaper articles, and a U.S. government publication. The defendant sought an order to determine the admissibility of the proposed testimony (under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and Dau-beH); the district court conducted a hearing, and subsequently denied Defendant’s motion. The court reasoned that the witnesses’s methodologies were rehable, and “[g]iven the secretive nature of terrorists, the Court can think of few other materials that experts in the field of terrorism would rely upon on.” Id. Given that expert testimony is permitted in such case, the question for this Court becomes whether the expert testimony of Dr. Gunaratna requires a Daubert hearing. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 702, If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data, (2)the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case. The Supreme Court has interpreted Rule 702 as requiring the district court to perform a gate-keeping function to “ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589, 113 S.Ct. 2786. In Daubert, the Court listed the following factors that may bear upon the reliability of an expert’s testimony: whether his theory or technique has been tested; whether the theory or technique has been subject to peer review and publication; whether the technique has a high known or potential rate of error; and whether the theory or technique enjoys general acceptance. Id. at 592, 113 S.Ct. 2786. When the proffered expert testimony is not scientific in nature, the district court must nevertheless still perform the gate-keeping function. In Kumho Tire, the Supre