Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM & ORDER MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION WEINSTEIN, Senior District Judge. Table of Contents Page I.Introduction.............................................................374 II.Sources of Information Available to the City...............................374 III.Facts ...................................................................376 A. Retailer Factors.....................................................376 1. Number of Trace Handguns Linked to Criminal Investigations in New York and Elsewhere that are Attributable to a Defendant.....................................................376 a. Temporal Limitations ....................... 377 b. Inherent Limitations.........................................377 2. Distribution Practices and Their Possible Effects on Crimes in New York.....................................................377 a. The City’s Simulated Straw Purchases.........................377 b. Trafficking Prosecutions......................................377 c. Multiple Sales................................................378 3. Time-to-Crime of Retailer’s Guns Recovered in New York..........378 4. Sales Price and Type of Gun......................................379 5. Crimes Committed in New York with a Retailer’s Handguns.........379 6. Total Number of Handguns the Retailer Sold in the United States and its Total Revenue from the United States and New York Markets................................... 379 7. Actions of Regulatory Authorities Related to the Retailer’s Distribution Practices..........................................380 8. Defense Reliance on Formal Compliance with Federal and State Retail Sales Requirements......................................381 B. Each Moving Defendant..............................................381 1. Overview........................................................381 2. Factors as to Each Moving Defendant.............................382 a. Peddler’s Post — Wilmington, Ohio.............................383 (1) Number of Trace Handguns Linked to Criminal Investigations in New York and Elsewhere that are Attributable to the Defendant........................384 (2) Distribution Practices and Their Possible Effects on Crimes in New York....................................384 (a) Straw Purchases......................................384 i. United States v. Salazar .........................384 ii. United States v. Robinson........................384 iii. United States v. Walker..........................385 iv. United States v. Hancock ........................385 v. United States v. Perkins.........................385 (b) Multiple Sales........................................385 (3) Time-to-Crime of Retailer’s Guns Recovered in New York...................................................386 (4) Sales Price and Type of Gun...............................386 (5) Crimes Committed in New York with a Retailer’s Handguns............................... 386 (6) Total Number of Handguns the Retailer Sold in the United States and its Total Revenue from the United States and New York Markets ...........................386 (7) Actions of Regulatory Authorities Related to Peddler’s Post’s Distribution Practices.............................387 b. Patriot — Richmond, Virginia..................................388 (1) Number of Trace Handguns Linked to Criminal Investigations in New York and Elsewhere that are Attributable to the Defendant........................389 (2) Distribution Practices and Their Possible Effects on Crimes in New York....................................390 (a) Straw Purchases......................................390 (b) Multiple Sales........................................390 (c) Use of Trace Requests.................................390 (3) Time-to-Crime of Retailer’s Guns Recovered in New York...................................................390 (4) Sales Price and Type of Gun...............................391 (5) Crimes Committed in New York with a Retailer’s Handguns..............................................391 (6) Total Number of Handguns the Retailer Sold in the United States and its Total Revenue from the United States and New York Markets ...........................391 (7) Actions of Regulatory Authorities Related to Patriot’s Distribution Practices...................................392 c. Woody’s — Orangeburg, South Carolina.........................393 (1) Number of Trace Handguns Linked to Criminal Investigations in New York and Elsewhere that are Attributable to the Defendant........................394 (2) Distribution Practices and Their Possible Effects on Crimes in New York....................................394 (a) Straw Purchases......................................394 i. United States v. Brooks..........................394 ii. United States v. Rutledge........................394 Hi. United States v. Welcome :.......................395 iv. United States v. Brown ..........................395 (b) Multiple Sales........................................395 (c) Trace Requests .......................................396 (3) Time-to-Crime of Guns Recovered in New York.............396 (4) Sales Price and Type of Gun...............................396 (5) Crimes Committed in New York with a Retailer’s Handguns..............................................396 (6) Total Number of Handguns the Retailer Sold in the United States and its Total Revenue from the United States and New York Markets...........................397 (7) Actions of Regulatory Authorities Related to Woody’s Distribution Practices...................................397 d. Adventure Outdoors — Smyrna, Georgia.........................398 (1) Number of Trace Handguns Linked to Criminal Investigations in New York and Elsewhere that are Attributable to the Defendant........................399 (2) Distribution Practices and Their Possible Effects on Crimes in New York....................................399 (a) Straw Purchases......................................399 i. United States v. El-Saddique.....................400 ii. United States v. Rose............................400 iii. United States v. Garcia-Diaz.....................400 iv. United States v. Wilson..........................401 v. United States v. Vinson..........................401 vi. United States v. Pray............................401 vii. United States v. Gaddie..........................401 viii. United States v. Hurley..........................401 (b) Multiple Sales........................................401 (3) Time-to-Crime of Guns Recovered in New York.............401 (4) Sales Price and Type of Gun...............................402 (5) Crimes Committed in New York with a Retailer’s Handguns..............................................402 (6) Total Number of Handguns the Retailer Sold in the United States and its Total Revenue from the United States and New York Markets ...........................403 (7) Actions of Regulatory Authorities Related to Adventure Outdoors’ Distribution Practices.........................404 e. Mickalis — Summerville, South Carolina........................405 (1) Number óf Trace Handguns Linked to Criminal Investigations in New York and Elsewhere that are Attributable to the Defendant........................406 (2) Distribution Practices and Their Possible Effects on Crimes in New York .'...................................406 (a) Straw Purchases.................... 406 (b) Multiple Sales............:...........................406 (3) Time-to-Crime of Guns Recovered in New York.............406 (4) Sales Price and Type of Gun...............................407 (5) Crimes Committed in New York with the Retailer’s Handguns..............................................407 (6) Total Number of Handguns the Retailer Sold in the United States and its Total Revenue from the United States and New York Markets ...........................407 (7) Actions of Regulatory Authorities Related to Mickalis’ Distribution Practices...................................408 f. Webb’s — Madison Heights, Virginia............................409 (1) Number of Trace Handguns Linked to Criminal Investigations in New York and Elsewhere that are Attributable to the Defendant........................410 (2) Distribution Practices and Their Possible Effects on Crimes in New York ....................................410 (3) Time-to-Crime of Guns Recovered in New York.............410 (4) Sales Price and Type of Gun...............................410 (5) Crimes Committed in New York with a Retailer’s Handguns..............................................410 (6) Total Number of Handguns the Retailer Sold in the United States and its Total Revenue from the United States and New York Markets ...........................411 (7) Actions of Regulatory Authorities Related to Webb’s Distribution Practices...................................411 IV. Law ....................................................................411 A. Overview............................................................411 B. Long Arm Jurisdiction Generally.........................:...........412 1. C.P.L.R. 302(a)(3)(ii) ....................................>.........412 a. Legislative History...........................................412 b. Cases........................................................413 c. Injury Causing Acts as Tortious in Foreign and Forum State......................................................414 d. Burden of Proof..............................................416 e. Reasonable Expectation of Consequences in New York..........416 f. Derives Substantial Revenue from Interstate Commerce.........417 2. Due Process.....................................................418 a. Minimum Contacts.................................. 418 b. Reasonableness .............................................421 c. State Interest................................................421 3. Cumulative Parallel Conduct......................................422 C. Long Arm Jurisdiction in Gun Cases..................................424 V. Application of Law to Facts ..............................................425 VI. Conclusion as to Jurisdiction......... 429 VII. Denial of Certification for Interlocutory Appeal 429 VIII. Date For Trial.................... 429 I. Introduction In addition to the usual reasons for asserting personal jurisdiction over defendants, in this case of first impression, their knowing cumulative illegal parallel conduct outside New York causing widespread injury in New York made them amenable to suit in this state. See Parts IV.B.3 and V, infra. The City commenced this public nuisance and negligence action in May of 2006, against fifteen retail gun dealers operating from stores in Georgia, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina and Virginia. In a companion action, City of New York v. Bob Moates Sport Shop, Inc., 06-CV6504 (E.D.N.Y.2006), the City has sued 12 additional retail dealers on similar grounds. Of the 27 defendants sued to date by the City, 12 have entered into voluntary agreements with the City in which, at the City’s cost, the retailers’ employees will be trained to avoid retail practices that lead to illegal use of guns in New York City and the retailers’ sales practices will be monitored for three years. Complaints were filed against each of the present defendants after the City had assembled data documenting the regular arrival of illegally possessed guns into New York City which had been sold by defendants in other states. The relevant criteria of inappropriate retail sales practices distinguish defendants from what the City asserts are the 99.4% of retail gun dealers in the United States who conduct their business responsibly. As part of its investigation prior to suing the City allegedly assessed the current willingness of each of the sued retailers to enter into “straw” purchases by apparent buyers standing in for the real buyers, a practice known to speed guns through the illegal interstate market to New York. The six moving defendants move to dismiss, arguing that New York courts, state or federal, cannot assert personal jurisdiction over them. In rulings on similar motions defendants’ contentions have been rejected. See Johnson v. Bryco Arms, 304 F.Supp.2d 383, 397 (E.D.N.Y.2004) (“Johnson”); NAACP v. A.A. Arms, Inc., No. 99-CV-3999, No. 99-CV-7037, 2003 WL 21242939, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8238 (E.D.N.Y.2003) (“NAACP”); NAACP v. Acusport Corp., No. 99-CV-7037, 99-CV-3999, 2000 WL 1789094, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17573 (E.D.N.Y.2000) (“Acusport”); and Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 32 F.Supp.2d 47 (E.D.N.Y.1998) (“Hamilton ”). The motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction are denied for reasons explained below. Plaintiff has demonstrated, with a high degree of probability, that defendants’ knowing parallel conduct in their individual states, relying on interstate commerce, have been responsible for the funneling into New York of large quantities of handguns used by local criminals to terrorize significant portions of the City’s population. The City may seek redress in the Eastern District of New York where many of the New York crimes attributable to defendants’ activities take place. II. Sources of Information Available to the City The City has available to it five general sources of information concerning guns sold by the moving defendants: 1) Trace data from the National Firearms Trace Database, provided to the City by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (“ATF”), limited to guns recovered in New York City and New York State from 1994-2002 (the “New York Trace Data”). The numbers of ■ traces in the City’s Complaint was based only on New York City traces. The total number of guns attributed to certain moving defendants differs from those enumerated in the Complaint because of the inclusion of New York State traces. 2) Trace data from the National Firearms Trace Database sold by ATF, through a private vendor, and available to the public until approximately 2001. This trace data includes guns recovered nationwide, but is limited to recoveries made from 1990 to 1997 (the “National FOIA Data”). ATF did not begin comprehensive tracing of all guns recovered until 1999. See Pierce, G.L., Braga, A.A., Hyatt, R.R., and Koper, C.S., Characteristics and Dynamics of Illegal Firearms Markets, 21 Just. Q., 391, 398 (2004). Trace data earlier than 1999, including the National FOIA Data, under-represents the actual number of crime guns sold by a particular retailer. 3) ATF trace requests made directly to • a moving defendant that, if retained, should have been produced by defendants during the discovery in this action (the “Discovery Traces”). These written requests from ATF to retailers, seeking information on the retail purchaser of the gun being traced, were made available only by moving defendants Adventure Outdoors, Mickalis and Webb’s. ATF may also request information of retailers by telephone to help determine the disposition of a particular firearm in the course of a criminal investigation. 18 U.S.C. § 923(g)(7) (2007). It is unclear whether any of the present defendants record and maintain telephone requests. The number of “Discovery Traces” yields a conservative estimate of the actual number of trace requests made by ATF to a particular defendant. Defendants Patriot, Peddler’s Post, and Woody’s apparently destroyed records of such requests. As to the adverse inference to be drawn against those three moving defendants see Hamilton, 32 F.Supp.2d at 68. 4) Court documents and related information generated in connection with federal criminal prosecutions. 5) Selling Crime: High Crime Gun Stores Fuel Criminals, Americans for Gun Safety Foundation (January 2004) (the “AGSF Report”). The AGSF Report uses ATF trace data compiled between 1996 and 2000 analyzed by National Economic Research Associates for the NAACP case. This report is limited to those retail firearms dealers with 200 or more guns traced to them for those-years. The City has made reasonable projections to fill in gaps created by ongoing trace data restrictions. See City of New York v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 429 F.Supp.2d 517, 529 (E.D.N.Y.2006). Moving defendants’ failure to retain ATF trace requests may also be considered in assessing the evidence. A reasonable assumption in addressing the years of unavailable data is that the mean number of guns traced to a particular retailer in prior years from New York City provides a rough prediction of the yearly recoveries in the City for the unavailable years, ie., 2003 to 2006. The use of such mean numbers of guns traced in prior years to fill in the missing years is a permissible predictor if there is no detectable trend— upwards or downwards — in the number of traces in prior, years. Reasonable calculations show that there is no such trend— ie., the number of traces was not systematically increasing or decreasing from year to year. The City’s table set out below provides mean annual traces and suggests that the number is not systematically increasing or decreasing: Mean number of crime gun traces of guns sold by moving defendants that were recovered annually in New York for the period 1994-2002, estimated annual change and probability that there was a linear trend in the number of traces per year. Retailer mean traces per year (standard deviation) estimated annual change (standard error) t statistic Significance (probability that there is no trend) All 6 retailers 5.61 (2.61) -0.06 (0.30) - .22 .829 Mickalis' 6.89 (3.37) -0.20 (0.46) -0.44 .676 Woody’s 15.44 (5.05) 0.33 (0.69) 0.49 .642 Webb’s 2.22 (1.48) -0.50 (0.20) -0.25 .813 Patriot 2.89 (1.62) 0.28 (0.20) 1.45 .191 Peddler’s 3.11 (3.62) -0.75 (0.41) -1.82 .111 Adventure 3.11 (1.69) 0.00 (0.23) 0.00 1.00 For the four years (2003 to 2006) for which New York Trace Data is unavailable, the number of expected traces for each moving defendant can be projected with sufficient accuracy for this motion by multiplying the mean number of traces per year by four years. The result is, 12 additional gun traces for Peddler’s Post, 11 additional gun traces for Patriot, 61 additional gun traces for Woody’s, 12 additional -gun traces for Adventure Outdoors, 27 additional gun traces for Mickalis, and 8 additional gun traces for Webb’s (hereafter, “Projected Traces”). It can be assumed for purposes of this motion that moving defendants have not changed their practices so as to be likely to have had fewer traces in more recent years because: (i) for the three moving defendants who have provided Discovery Traces, the number of annual traces has increased, not decreased, over what it was in the earlier period of time captured in the National’ FOIA Data; and (ii) every moving defendant’s sales have increased annually since 2000. Moreover, the deposition testimony of representatives of Adventure Outdoors and Patriot confirm that there has been no relevant change in sales practices. See Wallace Tr. at 239-41, 260, PI. Ex. U; Jarrett Tr. at 120-21, PI. Ex. N. The information available provides more than enough data to support the City’s factual claims on the present motions. III. Facts A. Retailer Factors 1. Number of Trace Handguns Linked to Criminal Investigations in New York and Elsewhere that are Attributable to a Defendant The number of “crime guns” purchased from a gun retailer recovered in New York State is the foundation for of any determination that the retailer is properly subject to jurisdiction in New York. “Crime gun” is a term of art coined by the ATF for a gun that has been submitted for tracing. “The [ATF] traces firearms at the behest of law enforcement officials, and it seems safe to assume that law enforcement officials do not generally opt to have traces conducted out of idle curiosity.” J & G Sales, Ltd. v. Truscott, 473 F.3d 1043, 1052 (9th Cir.2007). Notwithstanding the impediments that have been placed in the way of the City’s acquisition of relevant trace data, it has been able to compile sufficient information from the sources described in Part II, supra, to derive a conservative estimate of the number of crime guns for which each moving defendant is responsible. The City’s estimates are sufficiently reliable for deciding jurisdiction in view of (i) the temporal limitations on the data available to the City, and (ii) the inherent limitations on trace data as a quantitative measure of recovered guns. Both of these limitations are discussed below. a. Temporal Limitations The ATF trace data available to the City ends in 1997 for the National FOIA Data and in 2002 for the New York Trace Data. While the City also has in its possession national data containing traces through the end of 2005, it is presently foreclosed from using that information under the terms of the protective order entered in City of New York v. Beretta U.S.A, 429 F.Supp.2d 517 (E.D.N.Y.2006), as a result of federal legislation. The numbers of gun recoveries calculated by the City are derived from that data and, for the three moving defendants that did not destroy trace requests, from the Discovery Traces. For the three moving defendants that destroyed their records of ATF trace requests — Patriot, Peddler’s Post and Woody’s — “[sjince the necessary [jurisdictional] information is in the exclusive control of defendants, where they have failed to provide the information, plaintiffs have satisfied their burden .... ” Hamilton, 32 F.Supp.2d at 61. b. Inherent Limitations The number of traces per moving defendant probably under-represents the actual number of their crime guns recovered in New York because it is likely that not all guns recovered from illegal purchasers were entered into the Trace Database during the years for which trace data is available. Many guns identified in federal prosecutions as having been acquired from a moving defendant by traffickers in straw purchases do not appear in the trace data. See, e.cj., Calvin Walker and Brian Hancock cases (Peddler’s Post). (PI. Ex. L). It may be assumed, of course, that many illegal guns trafficked into New York are never recovered and therefore not traced back to their source. 2. Distribution Practices and Their Possible Effects on Crimes in New York a. The City’s Simulated Straw Purchases This action for public nuisance was commenced, the City says, against each defendant only after it demonstrated a willingness to engage in what the plaintiff construes as an obvious straw purchase, a high-risk sales practice that is a well-recognized source of illegally trafficked guns. See Compl. ¶¶ 56-57. An ATF investigation of gun-trafficking showed straw-purchasing to be involved in half of ATF’s trafficking investigations, and in two-thirds of ATF’s trafficking investigations in the Northeast. Straw purchasing accounted for the movement of 26,000 guns in the two-year period of the study. Following the Gun-Enforcing Federal Laws Against Firearms Traffickers (ATF, Washington DC 2000), at ix, 13, 18. The simulated straw purchase program conducted by City testers strongly suggests that federally-licensed firearms retailers (“FFLs”) are able to recognize, and decline to participate in, straw purchases, as evidenced by the fact that approximately one-third of the retailers approached declined such sales, explaining that completing the sale would constitute (from their perspective) an illegal straw purchase. See, e.g., Compl. ¶¶ 93, 234. By contrast, each moving defendant sold a gun in the course of a simulated straw purchase, permitting an inference that it will engage in straw purchases, negligently or deliberately, when presented with the opportunity to do so. b. Trafficking Prosecutions The City has assembled direct evidence of illegal trafficking from some of the moving defendants’ retail stores to the City, as evidenced by prosecutions of moving defendants’ customers. See PI. Exs. W, L, R (documenting trafficking from Adventure Outdoors, Peddler’s Post, and Woody’s to New York City). For these moving defendants, participation in the City’s simulation confirms evidence, in the form of prior prosecutions, that they repeatedly facilitated straw purchasing. Whether there have been at least eight such prior prosecutions, as for Adventure Outdoors; five prior prosecutions, as for Peddler’s Post; or four prior prosecutions, as for Woody’s; the evidence of gun trafficking from these moving defendants’ stores is substantiated. Compilations of prosecutions such as those presented here present a conservative basis for estimating actual trafficking. Relevant prosecutions can be located in federal court files only on the basis of their lead charge. Thus, if the lead charge in a case is something other than gun trafficking, the case cannot readily be associated with guns. Additionally, ATF estimates that prosecutors are able to charge these violations in less than 45 percent of the straw purchasing cases. Following the Gun at 43. In fact, “most federal laws controlling guns result in almost no prosecutions; this is particularly true of prosecutions for smuggling guns across state boundaries .... ” NAACP v. Acusport, 271 F.Supp.2d 435, 501 (E.D.N.Y.2003). c. Multiple Sales ' Sales of multiple handguns at one time, to one purchaser, is an established indicator of gun trafficking. “Multiple sales in some states to the same person at the same or almost the same time result in many guns being diverted to criminal elements.” NAACP v. Acusport, 271 F.Supp.2d at 502; see Inspection of Firearms Dealers by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, Rpt. I (USDOJ July 2004), at iii-iv. There is a well-known relationship between straw purchasing and multiples sales: straw purchasers are likely to buy multiple guns. Crime Gun Trace Reports: National Report (2000) (ATF, Washington, DC, 2002) at ix, 52; Commerce in Firearms in the United States, (2000) (ATF, Washington, DC) at 21-22. 3. Time-to-Crime of Retailer’s Guns Recovered in New York “Time-to-crime is the time from the retail sale of a firearm to the time it is recovered at a crime scene or is traced. The average time-to-crime [for guns recovered nationwide] is six years.” Blaustein & Reich, Inc. v. Buckles, 365 F.3d 281, 285 (4th Cir.2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1052, 125 S.Ct. 887, 160 L.Ed.2d 774 (2005). According to ATF, a short time-to-crime suggests that a firearm was recently and illegally diverted from a retail outlet. Crime Gun Trace Reports: National Report (2000) at ix, 30. As to what constitutes a “short” time-to-crime: [T]hree years is considered a short time to crime, and is considered an important trafficking indicator, suggesting rapid movement to the illegal gun market. Thus, by identifying those dealers that have ten traces or more per year with a short time to crime of three years or less, ATF can obtain a sense of which dealers tend to sell guns that are ultimately used in crimes. Blaustein & Reich v. Buckles, 220 F.Supp.2d 535, 540 (E.D.Va.2002) (citations omitted), aff'd, 365 F.3d 281 (4th Cir.2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1052, 125 S.Ct. 887, 160 L.Ed.2d 774 (2005). Short times-to-crime of a retailer’s recovered guns are relevant from a jurisdictional perspective for two reasons. First, the shorter the time-to-crime in New York, the more likely that the retailer is in fact directly serving the New York market. Short times-to-crime are especially telling when the recovery time in the retailer’s home state is comparable to, or even longer than, the recovery time in a foreign state — strengthening the inference that the retailer is engaged in direct out-of-state commerce with the foreign state. As shown below, for each moving defendant, the time-to-crime of their guns is faster in New York, or only slightly longer, than in their immediate home state. Second, “straw purchasing is a pattern of trafficking that is likely to result in crime guns with relatively short time-to-crimes.” Pierce, G.L., Braga, A.A., Hyatt, R.R., and Koper, C.S., Characteristics and Dynamics of Illegal Firearms Markets, 21 Just. Q., 391, 399 n. 2 (2004). 4.Sales Price and Type of Gun Certain brands of cheap handguns are more likely to give rise to public nuisance and public danger when they are in the hands of prohibited purchasers. Sales of such guns is a factor to be weighed for jurisdictional purposes. See NAACP, at *8, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8238 at *27 (noting, for jurisdictional purposes, defendant’s advertising of “lower-end” guns costing less than $100). The term “Saturday Night Special” is generally used to refer to the cheap, poorly-made handguns that are favored by some criminals. See id. at *11, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8238 at *35-36. Saturday Night Specials are more likely to have shorter times-to-crime, more likely to have been purchased by a straw purchaser or other illegal purchaser, and more likely to have defaced serial numbers. For example, of the 780,000 guns recovered in crimes and contained in the National FOIA Data, well-known Saturday Night Special brands — such as Bryco, Lorcin, and Hi-Point — were found to be recovered in crimes far more quickly than more expensive brands, e.g., Colt, Beretta or Smith & Wesson: Manufacturer Time-to-crime Colt 9.4 years Beretta 8.9 years Smith & Wesson 6.3 years Lorcin 2.9 years Bryco 2.8 years Hi-Point 2.0 Of the 32,000 crime guns recovered by the New York Police Department (“NYPD”) contained in the database of the NYPD Firearms Analysis Section, Saturday Night Special brands are more likely to be recovered with a defaced serial number than more expensive brands: Manufacturer Percent defaced Smith & Wesson 6.4% Colt 8.3% Beretta 8.6% Hi-Point 16.9% Bryco 23% Lorcin 23% ATF has reported that a defaced or obliterated serial number is an indication of an intent to traffic the gun at the time it was purchased. Commerce in Firearms at 30; Following the Gun at 26 (“Serial number obliteration is a clear indicator of firearms trafficking”). 5.Crimes Committed in New York with a Retailer’s Handguns Crimes committed with guns sold by the moving defendants have been identified by matching the complaint number provided in either the National FOIA Data or the New York Trace Data with the matching complaint number in the NYPD’s On-line Complaint System. Guns traced to the moving defendants by means other than trace data, i.e., through the Discovery Traces, are, after further analysis, matched to crimes as well. 6.Total Number of Handguns the Retailer Sold in the United States and its Total Revenue from the United States and New York Markets New York City’s strong gun control laws create a scarcity, thus providing a profitable market for moving guns to the City. The ease with which guns may be purchased in the Southeast, in particular, means that “dealers have long been able to make a profit by buying guns in Virginia or points south and running them northward to the street markets of northeastern cities.” United States v. Cavera, Nos. 05-4591-CR (L), 05-5210-CR (CON), 2007 WL 1628799, at *9, 2007 U.S.App. LEXIS 13003, at *29 (June 6, 2007) (Calabrese, J., concurring) (quoting Philip J. Cook, et ah, Guns and Violence Symposium: Regulating Gun Markets, 86 J.Crim. L. & Criminology 59, 72 (1995)). 7. Actions of Regulatory Authorities Related to Retailer’s Distribution Practices In 1999, ATF determined that 1.2% of FFL retailers — approximately 1,000 of the then more than 80,000 retailers — accounted for more than half of all crime guns traced nationally. Commerce in Firearms in the United States, at 23-24. ATF determined that approximately 450 retailer FFL’s were each the source of ten or more crime guns with times-to-crime of three years or less. Based on this data, ATF began to demand additional sales information from the 450 FFL retailers identified by those criteria. See Blaustein & Reich, 365 F.3d at 285. The demands, now known as “ATF Demand Letters,” imposed additional record-keeping requirements on these retailers. See 18 U.S.C. § 923(g)(5)(A) (2007). The threshold for a Demand Letter was raised to 15 traced guns in 2002. See J & G Sales, Ltd. 473 F.3d at 1052. A retailer’s receipt of a Demand Letter — or the simple fact that a retailer has met the criteria for receipt of a Demand Letter — is a determination by an administrative agency with expertise in the subject area that the retailer’s practices are associated with the recovery of a disproportionate number of crime guns. As the ATF Demand Letters themselves explain, “[ATF’s] research ha[s] demonstrated that a high volume of gun traces with a short time-to-crime may indicate illegal firearms trafficking by an FFL dealer.” Blaustein & Reich, 365 F.3d at 291. A Demand Letter is significant for personal jurisdictional analysis because the Letter itself evidences suspect marketing and sales practices; it permits an inference that the retailer is tied-to interstate second hand gun sales. For reasons intrinsic to the tracing process ATF trace data does not include second-hand guns sold by retail gun dealers. See Blaustein & Reich, 220 F.Supp.2d at 540. This is an additional reason for concluding that the number of guns attributable to each moving defendant is probably larger than shown in the various sources of trace data. “Focusing exclusively on new guns likely underestimates the true extent of gun trafficking.” Following the Gun at 25. ATF requires retailers in receipt of a Demand Letter to also turn over their second-hand gun information because: The [ATF] reasonably deduced that since this small group of dealers was the original source of a disproportionate share of the new firearms that were traced, this same group might also be the source — through illegal or legal means — of a substantial percentage of secondhand firearms that are traced. Blaustein & Reich, 365 F.3d at 291; accord J & G Sales, 473 F.3d at 1053 (“We can think of no reason, and J & G has not offered one, to believe that an FFL retailer who sells a large number of new firearms that end up being traced would not similarly sell a large number of used firearms that also end up being traced.”); Blaustein & Reich, 220 F.Supp.2d at 540-41 (dealers that sell significant numbers of new guns that quickly become crime guns are likely also to sell a significant number of used guns that eventually are used in crime). Receipt of a Demand Letter or meeting the requirement for receipt of one is a relevant factor weighing in favor of the exercise of long-arm jurisdiction. 8. Defense Reliance on Formal Compliance With Federal and State Retail Sales Requirements It is defendants’ contention that they comply with the whole array of federal and state laws applicable to sales by licensed retailers of firearms, viz: each of them obtains and reviews government issued photographic identification from the prospective purchaser, which, in the case of a handgun sale must demonstrate that the prospective purchaser is a resident of the state. In addition, the prospective purchaser is required to complete a form 4478 and affirm, under penalties of perjury, that he: (1) is the actual buyer of the firearm; (2) is not presently under indictment or information in any court for a felony or any other crime for which the judge could imprison him for more than one year; (3) has not been convicted of a felony or any other crime for which the judge could imprison him for more than one year; (4) is not a fugitive from justice; (5) is not an unlawful user of, or addicted to, marijuana, or any depressant, stimulant, or narcotic drug, or any other controlled substance; (6) has never been adjudicated mentally defective nor ever been committed to a mental institution; (7) has not been discharged from the Armed Forces under dishonorable conditions; (8) has not been the subject of a court order restraining him from harassing, stalking, or threatening his child or an intimate partner or child of such partner; (9) has not been convicted in any court of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence; (10) has never renounced his United States Citizenship; (11) is not an illegal alien in the United States; and (12) is not a non-immigrant alien, or if so, falls within any of the exceptions mentioned on the form. Once the retailer has reviewed the prospective purchaser’s government issued photographic identification and responses on the form 4473, it contacts the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) to determine whether the prospective purchaser is legally entitled to purchase a firearm based on the results of an inquiry to the National Criminal Background Check System (“NICS”). Assuming that all these formal protective steps are taken before each sale, they are rendered completely nugatory if the transaction is a straw sale to a person who is standing in for another — the real purchaser. Fraud by the seller, the formal purchaser arid the actual purchaser constitutes a tortious act in the state in which the sale takes place. See Part IV.B.l.c, infra B. Factors as to Each Moving Defendant 1. Overview Moving defendants’ principal jurisdictional argument is that they sell only to residents of their home state, and not in interstate commerce. Because Federal law only permits handgun sales to persons resident in the state in which the retailer is located, each claims compliance with that law, and denies receiving any revenue from goods used in New York or in interstate commerce. Whatever movants may say that they do de jure, the central issue on this motion is whether they de facto serve an out-of-state market, including New York, through their illegal sales practices. The City has assembled substantial evidence that each of the moving defendants in fact serves an interstate market, through regular sales to straw purchasers, through multiple gun sales, or through internet sales. These practices permit moving defendants effectively to operate as if they were selling guns directly in New York. The City’s evidence confirms that moving defendants’ wares regularly, and rapidly, arrive in New York via criminal channels. Three of the moving defendants have histories of selling guns to customers who engage in interstate gun-trafficking, as evidenced by the federal prosecutions of their customers. The three other moving defendants have histories of engaging in sales of guns that are relatively rapidly recovered out-of-state, confirming that these retailers also engage in sales practices that fuel the substantial interstate gun market. For both sets of movants, the evidence shows repeated illegal sales of firearms in a manner that has direct consequences in New York. While the moving defendants argue that their allegedly modest sales volumes should weigh against any assertion of jurisdiction, discovery has established that they in fact sell guns in volumes comparable to distributors over whom jurisdiction was previously deemed appropriate in NAACP. See NAACP, at *9-10, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8238 at *31-32 (asserting jurisdiction, for example, over Brazas Sporting Arms with sales of 2,000 guns per year). Moreover, the number of traces to New York from the moving defendants is comparable to, or exceeds, the number of traces to New York deemed sufficient for jurisdiction over distributors in NAACP. See id. at *10-11, *11-12, *13-14, *14, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8238 at *35, *38, *43, *45 (Excel Industries, 34 handguns traced to New York; Bill Hicks, 59 traced guns; Riley’s Inc., 23 traced guns; William’s Shooter’s Supply, 35 traced guns). 2. Each Moving Defendant As documented in five straw purchase prosecutions from 1994 to 2005, the Central Ohio location of Peddler’s Post’s permits it to operate as a high-volume center for interstate gun trafficking, supplying such Midwest cities as Chicago and Detroit, as well as cities in the Northeast, including New York, Boston, Rochester and Buffalo. (1) Number of Trace Handguns Linked to Criminal Investigations in New York and Elsewhere that are Attributable to the Defendant The National FOIA Data (1990-1997) documents at least 218 guns sold by Peddler’s Post that were recovered in crimes nationally. Because Peddler’s Post apparently discards trace requests received from the ATF — it has produced none here — it is impossible to determine the national volume of its post-1997 traces. The interstate nature of Peddler’s Post’s business is demonstrated in the National FOIA Data: only about 7% of Peddler’s Post’s traced guns were recovered in its home state of Ohio; 93% of its crime guns were recovered outside of Ohio. This includes recoveries in California, Canada, Illinois, Michigan, Puerto Rico, Nevada, New York and elsewhere. Approximately 53% of Peddler’s Post’s guns are recovered in Michigan (nearly all in Detroit); approximately 12% were recovered in New York State, and 11% were recovered in Illinois (principally Chicago). According to the New York Trace Data, 28 guns sold by Peddler’s Post were recovered in New York State between 1994 and 2002. Nine were recovered in New York City; nineteen were recovered elsewhere in New York State — in Buffalo, Rochester and Albany. Including information obtained from a 2004 gun-trafficking case, in which a convicted trafficker admitted bringing 27 guns purchased from Peddler’s Post into New York City, (PI. Ex. J; see Salazar, described below; see also PL Ex. L), Peddler’s Post accounts for a total of 55 crime guns traced to New York State. Including the 12 Projected Traces, see Part II, supra, Peddler’s Post accounts for a total of 67 crime guns traced to New York State. (2) Distribution Methods and Their Possible Effects on Crimes in New York (a) Straw Purchases The City’s “successful” straw purchase at Peddler’s Post on April 12, 2006, supports the City’s contention that there has been a long history of straw purchasing there, evidenced by at least five prosecutions of straw-purchasing rings between 1994 and 2005: (i) United States v. Salazar, U04-CR-00452 (S.D.N.Y.). Between February 2002 and June 2004, straw purchasers working as part of a gun and drug trafficking conspiracy organized by Ohio resident Noah O’Brien and New York resident Manny Salazar, bought approximately 49 guns from Ohio firearms retailers, including 27 from Peddler’s Post, obliterated the serial numbers, and transported them to New York City, principally to the Mott Haven housing project in the Bronx. (O’Brien Tr. 16, Pl.Ex. J). The details of the O’Brien/Salazar purchases establish that Peddler’s Post knew, or should have known, that the guns were purchased for subsequent re-sale out of state. (O’Brien Tr. 14-15, 29-30, Pl.Ex. J). In April 2004, Kristen Campbell straw-purchased three Hi-Points 9mm pistols for O’Brien. (O’Brien Tr. 26, 42-45, PL Ex. J). (ii) United States v. Robinson, 1:05-CR-0033 (S.D.Ohio). On September 9, 2002, Rowena Robinson straw-purchased four handguns from Peddler’s Post. On November 10, 2002, she straw-purchased an additional four handguns from Peddler’s Post. Robinson was subsequently convicted for both transactions. Several of the firearms she purchased were recovered at crime scenes in Boston. (See Pl. Ex. L). (iii) United States v. Walker, 3:98-CR-096 (S.D.Ohio). Between February and September 1994, Calvin Walker straw-purchased approximately 50 handguns from Peddler’s Post. (Bee PL Ex. L). Of the 50 guns, at least seven were subsequently recovered in New York. (iv) United States v. Hancock, 3:95-CR-16 (S.D.Ohio). Between October 1993 and February 1994, Brian Hancock straw-purchased, on behalf of three individuals, 117 handguns from Peddler’s Post. The guns were purchased in 21 multiple purchases over just a four-month period. The guns were trafficked to Michigan, Washington, D.C. and a third location (not specified in the available documents) outside of the State of Ohio. (See Pl. Ex. L). The Hancock exhibit (PL Ex. L) demonstrates how court documents do not always provide complete information on the full number of guns purchased. The criminal complaint in Hancock documents the purchase of 117 guns, while the indictment charges only 11. Those trafficking cases for which only indictments are available may therefore under-represent the number of guns actually trafficked. (v) United States v. Perkins, 3:95-CR-18 (S.D.Ohio). In March and April 1993, Daniel Perkins straw purchased 33 handguns from Peddler’s Post. Five were purchased on March 25, 1993, including two identical Lorcins and two identical Cobray pistols. On April 18, 1993, Perkins purchased two identical Lorcins. The indictment charges the purchase of 33 guns between these two dates, the number of multiple purchases by Perkins is likely much higher. (Bee PL Ex. L). These five straw purchase prosecutions establish the interstate nature of Peddler’s Post’s business, even as Peddler’s Post’s own records appear to reflect sales only to Ohio residents. (b) Multiple Sales The straw purchasing cases illustrate the common relationship between straw purchasing, multiple gun sales and gun trafficking. In each of the Peddler’s Post straw purchase prosecutions, the straw purchasers bought multiples of the same brand of handgun, on the same day, and on repeat visits. Plaintiffs exhibit K, an analysis from the National FOIA Data, shows Peddler’s Post’s multiple sales for a period of time prior to 2000, indicating that multiple sales account for a large proportion of Peddler’s Post’s crime guns. By sorting Peddler’s Post’s recovered guns according to purchase date, brand, and place of recovery, the National FOIA Data reveals frequent purchases of multiple guns of the same brand, purchased on the same day, which are then later recovered in the same out-of-state city. When guns purchased as part of a multiple sale are recovered in crimes in the same city, the inference that the guns were purchased for purposes of trafficking is especially strong. For example, on November 24, 1993, five identical Lorcins were purchased at Peddler’s Post, all of which were subsequently recovered in Chicago. That same day, two Brycos were purchased, both of which were later recovered in Detroit. A January 19, 1994, purchase of two Hi-Points was similarly followed by the recovery of both guns in Detroit. (See PL Ex. K). These multiple sales support the conclusion that multiple sales by Peddler’s Post helped support its interstate trade in crime guns. Peddler’s Post’s discovery responses confirm that, between 2000 and 2006, it sold 720 guns in multiple sales. (Peddler’s Post’s Supp. Resp. to City’s (First Set of) Interrogs at 13-14, PL Ex. M). Peddler’s Post’s high volume of traces and straw purchasing prosecutions evidences a specific intent to serve an interstate market. By comparing Peddler’s Post with other nearby retailers, as shown below, it can be inferred that most such retailers have far fewer traces, and far fewer prosecutions, than Peddler’s Post. This comparison suggests that retailer conduct is a significant factor in fueling interstate trafficking._ # National # Straw Name of Retailer # NY FOIA Purchase (30 mile radius) Traces Traces Prosecutions PEDDLER’S POST 28 220_5_ Bill’s Gun Shop_0_0_0_ Jim’s Guns & Whatever_25_35_ Rich’s Pawn Shoo 0_0_0_ Hall’s Guns_0_0_0_ Jim’s Guns & Whatever was named as a defendant in the present action. Subsequently it settled and agreed to independent monitoring of its sales practices. (3)Time-to-Crime of Retailer’s Guns Recovered in New York The average time-to-crime for all of the Peddler’s Post guns in the National FOIA Data is 2.35 years, a notably short interval — since ATF deems recoveries in less than 3 years to be an indicator of trafficking. See Blaustein & Reich, 365 F.3d at 285. By sorting Peddler’s Post guns according to the state in which a traced gun was recovered, the time-to-crime data also confirms that Peddler’s Post guns are moving rapidly into interstate commerce. (See Pl. Ex. K). . The time-to-crime for Peddler’s Post’s guns is only 1.95 years for New York and 1.72 years for Michigan, versus 2.43 years for Ohio, where Peddler’s Post is located. As measured by the New York Data, Peddler’s Post’s time to crime is 3.26 years, a time that differs from the National FOIA Data because the two data sets measure a different sample of guns, with the New York Data including five additional years of traces. A Peddler’s Post gun was recovered in New York City as soon as four months after the sale; four guns were recovered less than one year from sale. Nearly 70% of the 28 crime guns sold by Peddler’s Post and recovered in New York were recovered in less than the three-year threshold that ATF sets for guns suspected of being trafficked. (4)Sales Price and Types of Guns Approximately one-third of Peddler’s Post sales between 2000 and 2006 consisted of Saturday Night Specials. {See Peddler’s Post’s Supp. Resp. to City’s (First Set of) Interrogs. at 13, PI. Ex. M). The percentage of Saturday Night Specials among the Peddler’s Post guns recovered in New York City is even higher, 37%. Of the 238 handguns purchased from Peddler’s Post by gun traffickers and for which the brand was identified in court documents (106), 92% were Saturday Night Specials. (PI. Ex. K). Based on Peddler’s Post average annual sales volume, the straw sales made by Peddler’s Post in the Walker, Hancock and Perkins cases alone comprised more than 7.8% of Peddler’s total annual sales volume for those two years. (5)Crimes Committed in New York with a Retailer’s Handguns Of the guns sold by Peddler’s Post that have been recovered in New York State, one (in New York City) was recovered in a homicide; several were recovered in connection with drug crimes;, and others were seized from prohibited possessors. (ComplJ 238). (6)Total Number of Handguns the Retailer Sold in the United States and its Total Revenue from the United States and New York Markets Peddler’s Post’s interrogatory responses document the sale of 8,080 guns between 2000 and 2006, an average of 1,154 guns per year. (PL Ex. M). The National FOIA Data indicates that, between January 1994 and June 2002, 220 guns sold by Peddler’s Post were recovered in crimes, an average of 26 crime guns per year. Assuming Peddler’s average yearly sales of 1,154 guns applied to the period in which the National FOIA Data recoveries were made, some 2% of Peddler’s Post’s annual gun sales involved guns subsequently recovered in crimes. This percentage may be recognized as conservative, reduced both by significant under-reporting of identified crime guns, and by the fact that many crime guns are never recovered. The firearms trafficking cases, Walker (53 guns), Hancock (117 guns) and Perkins (33 guns), represent purchases in 1993 and 1994 alone of more than 200 guns identified as trafficked (PI. Ex. L), yet the Peddler’s Post traces in the National FOIA Data total only 220 between 1994 and 2002. Only a few of the guns listed in the Perkins and Walker indictments can be located in the National FOIA Data, confirming that the trace data does not contain all that have been straw purchased. (7) Actions of Regulatory Authorities Related to Retailer’s Distribution Practices Peddler’s Post meets the ATF requirements for issuance of a Demand Letter, having more than the fifteen traces in one year with a time-to-crime of less than three years. Patriot has not produced any documents in this case. Discovery suggests that, immediately after receiving notice of this lawsuit, Patriot’s owner, James Jarrett, deliberately took steps to dispose of Patriot’s documents and hide Patriot’s assets in a “new” business in order to avoid this court’s jurisdiction and any ultimate finding of liability. Claiming that he was acting in accordance with “ATF policies,” Patriot sent 40 boxes of records to the ATF, (see Jarrett Tr. at 30, PL Ex. N), kept no copies, and then continued conducting its same business at the same location, with the same phone number, under a different name: Virginia Firearms & Transfers (VF & T). Id. at 21-24. Jarrett admits that VF & T has the same owner as Patriot, the same sales help, and the same distributors. VF & T also attends the same gun shows as Patriot. (See Jarrett Tr. at 21-24, Pl. Ex. N). Having taken these steps to try to put Patriot, and Patriot’s records, beyond the reach of this court, Jarrett has done nothing to retrieve copies of anything from ATF, even after receiving the City’s document requests. Id. at 31. He claims ATF, not Patriot, now has all of Patriot’s records concerning: (1) possible sales of guns to dealers in New York; (2) sales of inexpensive guns; and (3) multiple guns sales. He also claims he is unable to testify about what the “now-missing” records show. Id. at 34, 49-51. Records relevant to this case were also delivered to Patriot’s bankruptcy attorney, Leonard Starr, as part of Patriot’s attempt to stay this lawsuit or move it to Virginia. (See Jarrett Tr. at 55, PL Ex. N) (“If we filed [for bankruptcy] in the 4th Circuit then the lawsuit would be stayed and it would be tried in the 4th Circuit and not the 2nd Circuit.”). Mr. Jarrett has not attempted to retrieve copies of those documents either. Id. at 54. A subpoena to Mr. Starr remains outstanding and unresponded to. Jarrett’s strategy to conceal Patriot’s records after this lawsuit was commenced creates an adverse inference supporting the decision that the facts demonstrate that this court has personal jurisdiction over Patriot. See generally In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., 319 F.Supp.2d 301, 317 (E.D.N.Y.2004) (citing Kronisch v. United States, 150 F.3d 112, 126 (2d Cir.1998) (“It is a well-established and longstanding principle of law that a party’s intentional destruction of evidence relevant to proof of an issue at trial can support an inference that the evidence would have been unfavorable to the party responsible for its destruction.”); Hamilton, 32 F.Supp.2d at 68 (“Since the necessary [jurisdictional] information is in the exclusive control of defendants, where they have failed to provide the information, this Court finds that plaintiffs have satisfied their burden, and the case should proceed.”)). Even absent any adverse inference from spoliation, the City has assembled sufficient evidence to independently establish that this court has jurisdiction over Patriot: (1) Number of Trace Handguns Linked to Criminal Investigations in New York and Elsewhere that are Attributable to the Defendant According to the National FOIA Data, 118 guns sold by Patriot were recovered nationwide between 1990 and 1997. The AGSF Report (reporting on traces from 1996 to 2000) indicates that 210 guns sold by Patriot were recovered in connection with crimes nationwide, gaining Patriot a place on AGSF’s list of the 120 gun retailers with the highest number of traces nationwide (out of a U.S. total of over 80,000 retailers). (PL Ex. D). The interstate nature of Patriot’s business is confirmed by the National FOIA Data: 25% of the guns sold by Patriot and recovered in crimes were recovered outside of Virginia, including recoveries in California, Maryland, New York and Wisconsin, with one gun recovered as far afield as Ecuador. (PL Ex. O).' The New York Trace Data shows that at least 22 guns sold by Patriot were recovered in New York City through October 2001. (New York Trace Data). Additional data available to the City from the NYPD shows at least 28 more Patriot guns were recovered between October 2001 and December 2005, bringing the total number of Patriot’s guns recovered in the City to 50, or seven per year. (N.Y.PD tabulation produced at NYC 003038, PI. Ex. O). (2) Distribution Methods and Their Possible Effects on Crime in New York Patriot is a “kitchen table” retailer without a storefront location. It makes most of its sales at gun shows (Jarrett Tr., PI. Ex. N), which, according to the ATF, are particularly significant sources of crime guns. (See ATF, “Following the Gun: Enforcing Federal Laws Against Firearms Trafickers,” at 12 (explaining that gun shows are the second leading source of firearms recovered in illegal gun trafficking investigations)). (a)Straw Purchases Based on direct observation by City testers, Patriot is willing to tolerate straw purchases. (See Compl. ¶209). Patriot’s typical staffing practice and procedures at gun shows — with one salesperson assisting the customer and a second filling out the necessary paperwork, without even seeing the manner in which the transaction was conducted — readily facilitates straw purchases. Moreover, Patriot relies on “volunteers” who are often young and inexperienced, to complete the federal documentation required to accompany gun sales. Jarrett explained that Melanie Smith, the 17-year old female Patriot cashier appearing in the City’s test scenario, “was just helping out. She’s not a responsible person as far as ATF is considered.” (Jarrett Tr. at 105, PI. Ex. N). In order to become a “responsible” person, the ATF requires that an individual be at least 21 years of age, and that there be a written certification that the person “is familiar with and understands all published State laws and local ordinances....” 27 C.F.R. § 55.49(b)(2). In addition to Ms. Smith, Jarrett acknowledged that another teenager also frequently worked for Patriot at gun shows. Id. at 112. Although Jarrett first claimed that all persons who worked for Patriot at these shows were “authorized to sell firearms,” and had gone through protective steps (such as providing fingerprints and photographs to the Virginia State Police) to obtain “seller numbers”, he later admitted that Patriot employed people at these shows who did not have seller numbers. Id. at 71-72, 111, 117. (b)Multiple Sales Patriot has engaged in numerous multiple sales of identical guns. (PI. Ex. O). For example, on February 1, 1993 Patriot sold three identical Lorcins, subsequently recovered in the Bronx, New York, Camden, New Jersey and Norfolk, Virginia. An October 7, 1996 purchase of two Lor-cins resulted in subsequent recoveries in Washington D.C. and Reston, Va. (National FOIA Data, PI. Ex. O). (c)Use of Trace Requests Jarrett confirmed that Patriot did receive trace requests which Patriot no longer has in its possession. He could not recall whether any such requests came as a result of firearms recovered in New York City or from authorities in New York. (Jarrett Tr. at 98, Ex N). (3) Time-to-Crime of Retailer’s Guns Recovered in New York Guns sold by Patriot were recovered in crimes in New York City as soon as 66 days after sale. (New York Trace Data). Seven of Patriot’s guns were recovered in the City less than 2 years after purchase, and in three instances, less than six months after purchase. The average time-to-crime for the 22 recovered guns in the New York Trace Data is 3.43 years, compared to a 6 year time-to-crime for all crime guns recovered in New York City, with more than 50% of the Patriot guns recovered in the City recovered in less than the three-year threshold ATF sets for guns suspected of being trafficked. (New York Trace Data). (4) Sales Price and Types of Guns More than one-third of the guns sold by Patriot and traced to New York City are cheap Saturday Night Specials. (New York Trace Data). While Jarrett claims an inability to comply with this Court’s February 6, 2007 Order to “disclose by year and make the number of Bryco, Hi-Point, Lorcin and Taurus firearms that were sold” by Patriot, (Jarrett Tr. at 49, PI. Ex. N), he acknowledged that, even after learning in 2004 that Patriot was on the Americans for Gun Safety Foundation’s list of “High Crime Dealers,” Patriot deliberately continued to sell “inexpensive guns.” (See Jarrett Tr. at 106-08, PI. Ex. N). Moreover, more than one-third of the guns sold by Patriot that were recovered in New York City were found with defaced serial numbers. (New York Trace Data). (5) Crimes Committed in New York with a Retailer’s Handguns Reported crimes in New York City involving Patriot guns include the following: • In June 2001, the arrest of a 16-year-old bo