Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER KATZ, Senior District Judge. Before the court are the parties’ renewed cross-motions for summary judgment (Documents No. 40, 41, and 42) and their responses thereto (Documents No. 43 and 44). For the following reasons, the court will grant Defendants’ motion, deny Plaintiffs’ motion, and vacate the preliminary injunction entered on May 14, 2007. I.Background The extensive factual background to this suit is summarized in the court’s opinions of May 14, 2007, which denied Defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of standing and ripeness, and granted Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. See Pennsylvania Family Institute, Inc. v. Celluci, 489 F.Supp.2d 460 (E.D.Pa.2007) (denying motion to dismiss); Pennsylvania Family Institute, Inc. v. Celluci 489 F.Supp.2d 447 (E.D.Pa.2007) (granting motion for preliminary injunction). For purposes of their cross-motions for summary judgment, the parties do not dispute the following facts: 1. This is a civil action for declaratory and injunctive relief arising under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. It concerns the constitutionality of portions of the Pennsylvania Judicial Canon 7B(l)(c). 2. Pennsylvania state court judges are selected through a process of partisan judicial elections. Regulation of judicial conduct, as well as the conduct of candidates for judicial office, is governed by the Pennsylvania Code of Judicial Conduct (“the Canons”). 3. Canon 7B(l)(e) prohibits judicial candidates from “makfing] pledges or promises of conduct in office other than the faithful and impartial performance of the duties of the office,” (the “pledges and promises” clause), or from “makfing] statements that commit or appear to commit the candidate with respect to cases, controversies or issues that are likely to come before the court .... ” (the “commits” clause). 4. The Pennsylvania Judicial Conduct Board (“the Board”), established by Article V, § 18 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, is empowered to receive and investigate complaints regarding judicial conduct filed by individuals or initiated by the Board, to determine whether probable cause exists to file formal charges against a judicial officer, and to present its case in support of the filed charges before the Pennsylvania Court of Judicial Discipline. 5. The current members of the Board are: John R. Celluci, III, Charles A. Clement, Charles J. Cunningham, Patrick Judge, G. Craig Lord, Charlene R. McAbee, Jack A. Panella, Carolyn W. “Raven” Rudnitsky, Cecilia Griffen Golden, Edward R. Klett, James R. Weaver, and Cynthia N. McCormick. 6. Pennsylvania Rule of Professional Conduct 8.2(c) provides that a “lawyer who is a candidate for judicial office shall comply with the applicable provisions of Canon 7 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.” Pennsylvania Rule of Disciplinary Enforcement 207(b) provides that Disciplinary Counsel “shall have the power and duty” to act, in effect, as prosecutors in any matter involving alleged violation of the Code of Professional Conduct. Rule 102(a) defines “Disciplinary Counsel” as the “Chief Disciplinary Counsel and assistant disciplinary counsel.” 7. Current members of the Disciplinary Counsel in Pennsylvania are: Chief Disciplinary Counsel Paul J. Killion, Deputy Chief Disciplinary Counsel Paul J. Burgoyne, District I Office Disciplinary Counsel in Charge Anthony P. So-droski, District II Office Disciplinary Counsel in Charge Raymond W. Wier-ciszewski, District III Office Disciplinary Counsel in Charge, Edwin W. Frese, Jr., and District IV Office Disciplinary Counsel in Charge Angelea Allen Mitas. 8. Plaintiffs Jeffrey J. Reich, Howard F. Knisely, Donald R. Totaro, Margaret C. Miller, Jeffrey D. Wright, and Christopher A. Hackman (collectively “Candidate Plaintiffs”) are each residents of Lancaster County, Pennsylvania, and candidates for judicial office in Lancaster County in the 2007 judicial elections. 9. The Candidate Plaintiffs received from Lancaster County ACTION a 2007 Issues Survey (“ACTION Questionnaire”) asking them to announce their views on several disputed legal and political issues. Responses to the ACTION Questionnaire were due by April 9, 2007. 10. By letter dated April 6, 2007 in response to the Lancaster County ACTION 2007 Issues Survey, the Candidate Plaintiffs stated that “[a]ll of us, the Endorsed Republican Judicial candidates, pledge that, if elected, we will faithfully and impartially perform the duties of that office. Beyond that, Canon 7B(l)(c) of the Code of Judicial Conduct prohibits us from commenting on or making statements which appear to commit us with respect to the issues addressed in these questions.” Defendants stipulate that the April 6, 2007 letter made this statement, but do not stipulate that Canon 7B(l)(e) does in fact prohibit candidates from commenting on or making statements which appear to [commit] them with respect to the issues addressed in the ACTION Questionnaire. 11. On April 12, 2007, Plaintiff Donald R. Totaro sent a letter to the Judicial Ethics Committee of the Pennsylvania Conference of State Trial Judges, asking whether he was prohibited by Canon 7B(1) (c) from answering the ACTION Questionnaire. In correspondence dated April 13, 2007, the Judicial Ethics Committee responded that it was not authorized to advise whether judicial candidates could respond. 12. Plaintiff Pennsylvania Family Institute (“PFI”) is a non-profit corporation incorporated in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. PFI is not associated with any political candidate, political party, or campaign committee. PFI headquarters are located in the City of Harrisburg in Dauphin County. 13. PFI, among other things, gathers information and publishes questionnaires to educate citizens about candidates for public office. During the 2005 judicial elections, PFI brought suit challenging the constitutionality of several provisions of the Canons on First Amendment grounds. On November 4, 2005, PFI’s challenge was dismissed on standing grounds. Pennsylvania Family Institute v. Black, 2005 WL 2931825 (M.D.Pa. Nov.4, 2005). The Third Circuit affirmed that decision on May 25, 2007. 14. On April 3, 2007, PFI mailed an explanatory cover letter and a “2007 Pennsylvania Family Institute Judicial Candidate Questionnaire” to all candidates for judicial office in the Pennsylvania 2007 judicial elections. In this letter, PFI stated that all responses received would be published without alteration. 15. The Candidate Plaintiffs received copies of the PFI Questionnaire. They did not respond to the PFI Questionnaire, however, because they believed answering some of the questions on the PFI Questionnaire would violate Canon 7B(l)(c). This is based on their own opinion and reading of the canon and not due to any advice from Defendants, or anyone else. 16. PFI received twenty-one responses from judicial candidates. Two candidates responded by letter. One indicated that “[i]t is because I believe that doing so would violate the Pennsylvania Code of Judicial Conduct, or its spirit, that I feel compelled to decline to answer this questionnaire.” The other stated that “as a sitting judge and a candidate ... I feel it would be inappropriate for me to opine on many of the specifics about which you ask.” The letters did not specifically refer to Canon 7B(1) (c). 17. Of the nineteen candidates who filled out questionnaire forms, eighteen answered question 1, which asked candidates to indicate “[wjhich of the former U.S. Presidents best represents your political philosophy?” These candidates circled the answer option “Decline to Respond Because of Judicial Canons,” which contained the explanation that: By circling this phrase, I hereby attest that I would have replied to this question but for the prospect that I may be disciplined for “announcing” my views under Canon 7(B)(1)(c) of the Pennsylvania Code of Judicial Conduct, which states that judicial candidates may not “make pledges or promises of conduct in office” or “make statements that commit or appear to commit the candidate with respect to cases, controversies or issues that are likely to come before the court,” and that I may be disciplined for failure to disqualify myself as a judge in any proceeding concerning the issue raise[d] in the question under Canon 3(C)(1), which states that judges must disqualify when their “impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” I further attest that responding to this question would neither cause me to be biased for or against parties nor affect my ability to be open-minded with regard to any issue. Plaintiffs do not believe, based on these responses and the plain language of the Canons, that judicial candidates are prohibited by Canon 7B(l)(c) from answering question 1. 18.Two candidates declined to answer question 2, which asked candidates to indicate “[wjhich one of the current Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court most reflects your judicial Philosophy?” These candidates circled the answer option “Decline to Respond Because of Judicial Canons,” which contained the explanation given in paragraph 17. Plaintiffs do not believe, based on these responses and the “plain language” of the Canons, that judicial candidates are prohibited by Canon 7B(l)(c) from answering question 2. 19. Three candidates declined to answer question 3, which asked candidates to “[r]ate your judicial philosophy on a scale of 1-10 with ‘living document’ approach as a 1’ and ‘strict constructionalist’ or ‘originalist’ as a 10.’ ” These candidates circled the answer option “Decline to Respond Because of Judicial Canons,” which contained the explanation given in paragraph 17. Plaintiffs do not believe, based on these responses and the “plain language” of the Canons, that judicial candidates are prohibited by Canon 7B(l)(c) from answering question 3. 20. One candidate declined to answer question 4, which asked candidates to “list the five organizations in which you are most involved as a member, through contributions, and/or through volunteering.” This candidate circled the answer option “Decline to Respond Because of Judicial Canons,” which contained the explanation given in paragraph 17. Plaintiffs do not believe, based on these responses and the “plain language” of the Canons, that judicial candidates are prohibited by Canon 7B(l)(c) from answering question 4. 21. Seven (7) candidates declined to answer question 5, which asked candidates to “announce” their views by indicating whether they thought Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S.Ct. 705, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973) was correctly decided. These candidates circled the answer option “Decline to Respond Because of Judicial Canons,” which contained the explanation given in paragraph 17. Eleven (11) candidates did answer this question. However, PFI will not publish their responses, for fear that they will be disciplined under the canons. 22. In addition, the Candidate Plaintiffs would have answered question 5 on the PFI Questionnaire but for the belief that they were prohibited from doing so by Canon 7B(l)(c). This is the candidates[’] own personal belief and reading of the canon and is not based on any advice from Defendants or anyone else. 23. Six (6) candidates declined to answer question 6, which asked candidates to “announce” their views by indicating whether they believed [“jthat the Pennsylvania Constitution permits display of the Ten Commandments in courtrooms?” These candidates circled the answer option “Decline to Respond Because of Judicial Canons,” which contained the explanation given in paragraph 17. Eleven (11) candidates did answer this question. However, PFI will not publish their responses, for fear that they will be disciplined under the canons. 24. In addition, the Candidate Plaintiffs would have answered question 6 on the PFI Questionnaire but for the belief that they were prohibited from doing so by Canon 7B(l)(c). This is the candidates!/] own personal belief and reading of the canon and is not based on any advice from Defendants or anyone else. 25. Six (6) candidates declined to answer question 7, which asked candidates to “announce” their views by indicating whether they believed “that the Pennsylvania Constitution recognizes a right to same-sex marriage?” These candidates circled the answer option “Decline to Respond Because of Judicial Canons,” which contained the explanation given in paragraph 17. Eleven (11) candidates did answer this question. However, PFI will not publish their responses, for fear that they will be disciplined under the canons. 26. In addition, the Candidate Plaintiffs would have answered question 7 on the PFI Questionnaire but for the belief that they were prohibited from doing so by Canon 7B(l)(c). This is the candidates’ own personal belief and reading of the canon and is not based on any advice from Defendants or anyone else. 27. Six (6) candidates declined to answer question 8, which asked candidates to announce their views by indicating whether they believed “that the Pennsylvania Constitution permits student-led graduation prayers in public schools?” These candidates circled the answer option “Decline to Respond Because of Judicial Canons,” which contained the explanation given in paragraph 17. Eleven (11) candidates did answer this question. However, PFI will not publish their responses, for fear that they will be disciplined under the canons. 28. In addition, the Candidate Plaintiffs would have answered question 8 on the PFI Questionnaire but for the belief that they were prohibited from doing so by Canon 7B(l)(c). This is the candidate’s [sic] own personal belief and reading of the canon and is not based on any advice from Defendants or anyone else. 29. PFI wants to publish information on the views of judicial candidates on legal and political issues in order to educate and inform citizens. PFI intended to publish responses to the PFI Questionnaire of judicial candidates before the May 15, 2007, primary election and intends to publish information on judicial candidates’ view[s] before the November 8, 2007, general and retention election. In addition, PFI intends to publish on its web site the responses of future judicial candidates to identical questionnaires to be sent to judicial candidates in future elections. 30. Although PFI would like to publish and distribute the answers to all questions of the PFI Questionnaire, PFI did not do so, prior to the preliminary injunction of the canon. Further, PFI has not published the substantive answers it has received to questions 5, 6, 7, and 8, because it fears doing so will expose responsive judicial candidates to discipline under Canon 7B(l)(c). 31. The Candidate Plaintiffs would like to express their views on various disputed legal and political issues, including by answering the PFI Questionnaire and the ACTION Questionnaire, but will not do so because they fear discipline under the canons. This fear is based on the candidates’ own interpretation of the canon and not on any advice from Defendants or anyone else. 32. The Candidate Plaintiffs do not wish to pledge or promise certain results in particular cases or classes or types of cases but merely wish to announce their views on disputed legal and political issues. 33. Answering the PFI Questionnaire and ACTION Questionnaire and announcing their views on disputed legal and political issues would not cause the Candidate Plaintiffs to be biased for or against any party and would not prevent them from remaining open-minded on any issue raised in the PFI Questionnaire or ACTION Questionnaire. 34. PFI has no connection to any judicial candidate and does not speak for them. 35. On May 14, 2007, Judge Katz entered an order preliminarily enjoining Canon 7B(l)(c) contingent on Plaintiffs depositing a $5000 bond with the Court. This bond was deposited on May 16, 2007. 36. On June 26, PFI resent the PFI Questionnaire to all candidates for judicial office in the Pennsylvania 2007 general election. In this letter, PFI stated that all responses received would be published without alteration. 37. PFI received sixteen responses to its general election questionnaire. Five responses were by letter. Of these, two (Judge John C. Mott and Judge Leslie Gorbey) cited Canon 3C(1) of the Code of Judicial Conduct as the basis for their decision not to respond, and one (Judge Joan Orie Melvin) cited Canon 7B(l)(c) as the basis for the candidate’s decision not to respond, despite that Canon’s being temporarily enjoined. 38. Eleven (11) judges and judicial candidates, including the Candidate Plaintiffs, answered the questions on the questionnaire. 39. Of the candidates who had marked “decline to respond” to questions 5, 6, 7, and 8 on the primary questionnaire, three (Charles R. Rosamilia, Jr., Steven F. Lachman, and Joe Weinroth) were not sent general election questionnaires as they did not win their primary elections. 40. Two of the candidates who had marked “decline to respond” to questions 5, 6, 7, and 8 of [sic] on the primary questionnaire responded to the general election questionnaire. One (Judge Tom Kistler) answered the questions on the questionnaire he had previously declined to respond to. The other (Judge John C. Mott) cited Canon 3C(1) as the basis for his decision not to respond to the questions. Defendants’ Motion, Attachment A (Joint Statement of Stipulated Facts). II. Legal Standard A summary judgment motion should be granted only if the court concludes that “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). In a motion for summary judgment, the moving party bears the burden of proving that no genuine issue of material fact is in dispute, see Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585 n. 10, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986), and the court must “view the underlying facts and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.” Pennsylvania Coal Ass’n v. Babbitt, 63 F.3d 231, 236 (3d Cir.1995); see also Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348. Once the moving party has carried its initial burden, the nonmoving party “must come forward with ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’ ” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)) (emphasis omitted); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (holding that the nonmoving party must go beyond the pleadings to show that there is a genuine issue for trial). The mere existence of some evidence in support of the nonmoving party will not be sufficient for denial of a motion for summary judgment; there must be enough evidence to enable a jury reasonably to find for the nonmoving party on that issue, see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). III. Discussion Plaintiffs argue that they are entitled to summary judgment, because the “pledges and promises” and “commits” clauses of Canon 7B(l)(c) of the Pennsylvania Code of Judicial Conduct unconstitutionally abridge their freedom of speech under the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution of the United States of America. More precisely, Plaintiffs argue that the two clauses, both on their face and as-applied, fail strict scrutiny and are over-broad and vague. Defendants respond by arguing that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, because Plaintiffs lack constitutional and prudential standing. In the alternative, Defendants contend that the court must construe the “pledges and promises” and “commits” clauses narrowly, and that the clauses are constitutional when so construed. For the reasons set forth below, the court will reject Defendants’ standing arguments but will adopt their narrow construction of the “pledges and promises” and “commits” clauses. The court therefore will hold that the narrowly construed clauses are constitutional, and will vacate the preliminary injunction, which had prohibited Defendants from enforcing the clauses against any candidate for judicial office. A. Plaintiffs Have Standing. The court previously denied Defendants’ Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss on the grounds that Plaintiffs lacked standing, and that their claims were not ripe. See Pennsylvania Family Institute, Inc. v. Celluci, 489 F.Supp.2d 460 (E.D.Pa.2007). Defendants now renew their challenge to the court’s subject matter jurisdiction on standing grounds only. More precisely, Defendants argue that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, because Plaintiffs lack both constitutional and prudential standing. The court will reject Defendants’ renewed challenge to its subject matter jurisdiction and hold that Plaintiffs have both constitutional and prudential standing. 1. Constitutional Standing a. Constitutional Standing Doctrine as Clarified in the Third Circuit’s Black Decision The Third Circuit recently summarized the law governing standing as follows: Article III of the Constitution restricts the “judicial power” of the United States to the resolution of cases and controversies. See Valley Forge Christian Coll, v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471, 102 S.Ct. 752, 70 L.Ed.2d 700 (1982). Subsumed within this restriction is the requirement that a litigant have standing to challenge the action sought to be adjudicated in the lawsuit. Id. Standing has constitutional and prudential components, both of which must be satisfied before a litigant may seek redress in the federal courts. Id.; Wheeler v. Travelers Ins. Co., 22 F.3d 534, 537 (3d Cir.1994). Absent Article III standing, a federal court does not have subject matter jurisdiction to address a plaintiffs claims, and they must be dismissed. Storino v. Borough of Point Pleasant Beach, 322 F.3d 293, 296 (3d Cir.2003). Taliaferro v. Darby Twp. Zoning Bd., 458 F.3d 181, 188 (3d Cir.2006); see also Pennsylvania Family Institute, Inc. v. Black, 489 F.3d 156, 164-65 (3d Cir.2007) (“We presume that federal courts lack jurisdiction unless the contrary appears affirmatively from the record.”) (quoting Presbytery of New Jersey of Orthodox Presbyterian Church v. Florio, 40 F.3d 1454, 1462 (3d Cir.1994)). With regard to the constitutional component of standing, the Supreme Court has declared: [T]he irreducible constitutional minimum of standing contains three elements. First, the plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact — -an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical. Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of — the injury has to be fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant, and not the result of the independent action of some third party not before the court. Third, it must be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992) (emphases added; internal citations, quotations, and footnote omitted). “The party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing these elements.” Id. at 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130. In the First Amendment context, however, the rule on constitutional standing is that “where a [willing] speaker exists ... the protection afforded is to the communication, to its source and to its recipients both.” Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 756, 96 S.Ct. 1817, 48 L.Ed.2d 346 (1976). “Therefore, where one enjoys a right to speak, others hold a ‘reciprocal right to receive’ that speech, which ‘maybe asserted’ in court.” Black, 489 F.3d at 165 (quoting Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 757, 96 S.Ct. 1817). The Black Court further clarified this rule as follows: A precondition of asserting this right to receive, however, is the existence of a willing speaker. [T]here may be other reasons present, but, reading the Supreme Court’s cases together with our own, we hold that in order to show the existence of a willing speaker for the purposes of establishing third party standing, a party must at least demonstrate that but for a regulation, a speaker subject to it would be unlling to speak Black, 489 F.3d at 165, 167 (emphasis added; internal quotations and citations omitted). b. Applying Constitutional Standing Doctrine to This Case In ruling on Defendants Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss, the court previously held that Plaintiffs had established constitutional standing on three grounds, and summarized these grounds as follows: First, the Candidate Plaintiffs allege that their First Amendment injury lies in their refusal to respond to the ACTION and PFI Questionnaires (i.e., their refusal to engage in protected political speech), because of their fear of discipline under Canon 7B(l)(c). Second, Plaintiff PFI alleges that its First Amendment injury lies in its inability to receive the protected political speech of the Candidate Plaintiffs and other willing speakers, who declined to answer the PFI Questionnaire out of fear of discipline under Canon 7B(l)(c). Third, Plaintiff PFI alleges that it can derive constitutional standing from its refusal to publish the protected political speech of those candidates who fully answered the PFI Questionnaire, because the threat of discipline against the answering candidates has caused it to refrain from publishing their answers in order to protect them from discipline. Pennsylvania Family Institute, Inc., 489 F.Supp.2d at 472. Contrary to Defendants’ argument, Black is consistent with the court’s conclusion that the Candidate Plaintiffs and Plaintiff PFI have constitutional standing on the first and second grounds, respectively. Black, however, squarely rejected the logic underlying the court’s holding that Plaintiff PFI has constitutional standing on the third ground. See 489 F.3d at 169 (“That PFI’s lawful and constitutionally protected actions might expose to liability other distinct individuals, with whom the organization has no relationship, is too speculative to constitute a cognizable injury necessary for the organization to have standing under Article III.”). i. The Candidate Plaintiffs and the First Ground Black does not affect the court’s analysis of the Candidate Plaintiffs’ constitutional standing, because the Candidate Plaintiffs are asserting their own right to speak, as opposed to Plaintiff PFI, which is asserting a “right to receive” the Candidate Plaintiffs’ speech. (Black addressed only the latter situation.) Moreover, discovery in this action has yielded no facts that call into question the court’s previous holding that the Candidate Plaintiffs have constitutional standing on the first ground. The court therefore stands by the reasoning that supported its previous holding and rejects Defendants’ argument that the Candidate Plaintiffs lack constitutional standing. The court also rejects Defendants’ argument that the Candidate Plaintiffs lack constitutional standing, because “[t]he canon Plaintiffs challenge has no application to them; so, it causes them no injury.” Defendants’ Brief at 13. Despite Defendants’ assurances to the contrary, see Defendants’ Motion, Attachment F (Affidavit of Joseph A. Massa, Jr.), a candidate who answered affirmatively or negatively some of the questions posed in the ACTION and PFI Questionnaires would be at considerable risk of violating the plain language of the pledges and promises and commits clauses. See Defendants' Motion, Attachment E (Plaintiffs’ responses to Requests for Admission Nos. 1 and 3 and Interrogatory No. 5); Compl., Exhibits 3 (ACTION Questionnaire — questions 1, 3, 4, and 5) and 6 (PFI Questionnaire — questions 5, 6, 7, and 8). The court’s rejection of this argument is therefore consistent with Lawson v. Hill, 368 F.3d 955 (7th Cir.2004), where the Seventh Circuit acknowledged that a plaintiff would have standing to challenge a statute, despite a low probability of being prosecuted for its violation, if he “ha[d] a reasonable basis for concern that he might be prosecuted.” Id. at 959 (citing Presbytery, 40 F.3d at 1468). See also The Pitt News v. Fisher, 215 F.3d 354, 361 n. 4 (3d Cir.2000) (“A party may demonstrate standing to litigate a claim even if they fail to make out a constitutional violation on the merits.”). The court’s rejection of this argument is also consistent with the courts that have found standing in similar cases without deigning to discuss this issue. See Buckley v. Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board, 997 F.2d 224 (7th Cir.1993); Duwe v. Alexander, 490 F.Supp.2d 968, 976 (W.D.Wisc.2007) (finding that the plaintiffs had standing despite the fact that “[rjesponses to the Wisconsin Right to Life survey do not constitute promises, pledges, or commitments such that they could be constitutionally restricted or sanctioned in the interest of judicial openmindedness”); Indiana Right to Life, Inc. v. Shepard, 463 F.Supp.2d 879 (N.D.Ind.2006); Stout, 440 F.Supp.2d at 1220-21; North Dakota Family Alliance, Inc. v. Bader, 361 F.Supp.2d 1021 (D.N.D.2005); Family Trust Foundation of Kentucky, Inc. v. Wolnitzek, 345 F.Supp.2d 672 (E.D.Ky.2004); compare Carey v. Wolnitzek, Civ. A. No. 3:06-36-KKC, 2006 WL 2916814, at *13 (E.D.Ky.2006) (finding that the plaintiff lacked constitutional standing where there was “an infinite number of ways in which [plaintiff] could answer” the open-ended questions he planned to pose to himself and other candidates). ii. Plaintiff PFI and the Second Ground In Black, the Third Circuit held that PFI could not establish constitutional standing as a recipient of protected speech in a similar lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of the pledges and promises and commits clauses. But Black is distinguishable from this case. In Black, the plaintiffs were PFI and two citizens; on appeal from the district court’s dismissal of their action for lack of standing and ripeness, PFI urged the Third Circuit “to find ‘willing’ the fourteen judicial candidates who circled ‘Decline to Answer* ’ as a response to one or all of the questionnaire’s seven multiple choice questions.” 489 F.3d at 166. The Third Circuit rejected this argument, because “PFI failed to prove at trial that the Canons and Rules played any actual causal role in candidates’ choice to ‘decline to answer.’ ” Id. at 167. More precisely, the Third Circuit “was not convinced that the footnote necessarily communicates the views of the judicial candidates,” and, even assuming that it did, was “unconvinced that it effectively communicates what PFI would like us to believe it communicates, namely, that there are willing speakers who would ... speak but for the Canons and Rules.” Id. at 168. The Third Circuit therefore held that PFI lacked constitutional standing as a recipient of speech, because it had failed to establish the existence of a willing speaker — i.e., a person who would have spoken but for the challenged regulation of speech. Id. at 169. Black is distinguishable from this case, because Plaintiff PFI has produced the evidence of a willing speaker that the Third Circuit found lacking in Black Black bolstered its holding that PFI lacked constitutional standing by contrasting the facts before it with those in two similar cases: North Dakota Family Alliance, Inc. v. Bader, 361 F.Supp.2d 1021 (D.N.D.2005) and Family Trust Found, of Ky. v. Wolnitzek, 345 F.Supp.2d 672 (E.D.Ky.2004). “In both of those cases, organizations similar to PFI circulated questionnaires and, when several candidates declined to respond, sought standing to challenge the relevant state judicial canons by asserting a ‘right to listen’ claim. In each case the district court found that the organization had standing, but only after determining that the judicial candidates sent in affirmative responses that clearly demonstrated that they would not respond because of the relevant canons.” Black, 489 F.3d at 167. Although the Third Circuit did not hold squarely in Black that the facts presented in Bader and Wolnitzek would establish constitutional standing for an organization like PFI, it strongly suggested that they would. Given the factual similarities between this case and Bader and Wolnitzek, the court concludes that Plaintiff PFI has constitutional standing under Black. In a letter dated April 6, 2007, the Candidate Plaintiffs in this case signed a joint response to the ACTION Questionnaire that read, in pertinent part, as follows: [In response to questions] 1, 3-5: All of us, the Endorsed Republican Judicial candidates, pledge that, if elected, we will faithfully and impartially perform the duties of that office. Beyond that, Canon 7B(l)(c) of the Code of Judicial Conduct prohibits us from commenting on or making statements which appear to commit us with respect to the issues addressed in these questions. Comph, Exhibit 4; see also id. ¶ 19. The Candidate Plaintiffs also allege that they received copies of the PFI primary election Questionnaire but did not respond, because they believed that answering some of the questions — specifically questions 5, 6, 7, and 8 — would violate Canon 7B(l)(c). Id. ¶¶ 23, 30, 32, 34, 36. Finally, after the court preliminarily enjoined the enforcement of Canon 7B(l)(c), the Candidate Plaintiffs answered PFI’s slightly different general election questionnaire, which shows that Canon 7B(l)(c) was indeed the reason why they previously had refused to respond to PFI’s primary election questionnaire. See Plaintiffs’ Motion, Exhibit A, at 2-13; Defendants’ Motion, Attachment B; see also Duwe, 490 F.Supp.2d at 972 (“The question is not whether the evidence was gathered after commencement of the case but whether a willing speaker existed at that time.”). Aside from the Candidate Plaintiffs, the record reveals two other willing speakers: M. Lucile Longo, Esq., and the Honorable Tom Kistler. In a letter dated April 11, 2007, Ms. Longo declined to answer the PFI Questionnaire, because she believed “that doing so would violate the Pennsylvania Code of Judicial Conduct, or its spirit.” Compl., Exhibit 7, at 1. As for Judge Kistler, he had marked “Decline to Respond Because of Judicial Canons* ” in response to questions 5, 6, 7, and 8 on PFI’s primary election questionnaire. After Canon 7B(l)(c)’s enforcement was preliminarily enjoined, however, Judge Kistler responded fully to PFI’s general election questionnaire. See Plaintiffs’ Motion, Exhibit A, at 26-27; Defendants’ Motion, Attachment I, at 26-27. As with the Candidate Plaintiffs, the court finds that Judge Kistler’s post-injunction response after previously refusing to respond because of Canon 7B(l)(c) establishes that he is a willing speaker under Black. See Duwe, 490 F.Supp.2d at 972. The above-mentioned self-generated responses are sufficiently similar to the ones in Bader and Wolnitzek for the court to conclude that they “clearly demonstrate[ ]” that the Candidate Plaintiffs, Judge Kist-ler, and Ms. Longo did not respond to PFI’s primary election questionnaire because of Canon 7B(1)(c). See Black, 489 F.3d at 167-68 (summarizing the affirmative responses in Bader and Wolnitzek and noting that each was “specifically drafted by the responding judicial candidate”). The court therefore holds that Plaintiff PFI has constitutional standing as a potential recipient of the chilled speech of the Candidate Plaintiffs, Judge Kistler, and Ms. Longo, because those individuals are willing speakers — ie., people who would have spoken but for the pledges and promises and commits clauses of Canon 7B(1)(c) of the Pennsylvania Code of Judicial Conduct. Black is also distinguishable from this case, because the “Decline to Respond Because of Judicial Canons* ” answer option in the PFI Questionnaire in this case differs from the “Decline to Answer* ” option in Black, and comports with Black’s rule that a “willing speaker” (for purposes of establishing constitutional standing for a “right to listen” claim) must be a person who would be willing to speak but for the challenged regulation. See Black, 489 F.3d at 165, 167. Although the Black Court expressed a general disdain toward PFI’s attempt to establish standing based on the “prepackaged and presupplied” footnote in its previous questionnaire, the court does not believe Black stands for the proposition that such footnotes may never serve to establish standing in “right to listen” cases like this one. In this case, the judicial candidates who received the PFI Questionnaire were given the option of answering “Decline to Respond Because of Judicial Canons* ” or “Refuse to Answer for Other Reason (describe).” So candidates who had reasons other than Canon 7B(l)(c) for not answering a particular question could have selected “Refuse to Answer for Other Reason (describe)” or not answered at all. The court therefore agrees with Plaintiffs that “[ajbsent any compelling reason to question the sincerity and integrity of Pennsylvania judges and judicial candidates, the candidate statements on the PFI Questionnaire are sufficient to establish the presence of a willing speaker.” See Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law at 8; see also Duwe, 490 F.Supp.2d at 972; Bader, 361 F.Supp.2d at 1033. The “Decline to Respond Because of Judicial Canons* ” answer option on the PFI Questionnaire was selected by one candidate in response to question 1, by two candidates in response to question 2, by three candidates in response to question 3, by one candidate in response to question 4, by seven candidates in response to question 5, and by six candidates in response to questions 6, 7, and 8. See Pennsylvania Family Institute, Inc., 489 F.Supp.2d at 468-69. The court therefore holds that these candidates are also willing speakers under Black, and that Plaintiff PFI has constitutional standing as a potential recipient of their chilled speech. 2. Prudential Standing The court discussed prudential standing only briefly in its opinion denying Defendants’ motion to dismiss. The court explained the law governing prudential standing as follows: With regard to the prudential component of standing, the Supreme Court has observed: Although we have not exhaustively defined the prudential dimensions of the standing doctrine, we have explained that prudential standing encompasses “the general prohibition on a litigant’s raising another person’s legal rights, the rule barring adjudication of generalized grievances more appropriately addressed in the representative branches, and the requirement that a plaintiffs complaint fall within the zone of interests protected by the law invoked.” Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 12, 124 S.Ct. 2301, 159 L.Ed.2d 98 (2004) (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751, 104 S.Ct. 3315, 82 L.Ed.2d 556 (1984)); accord Mariana v. Fisher, 338 F.Sd 189, 204-05 (3d Cir.2003). Put more simply, prudential standing “embodies judicially self-imposed limits on the exercise of federal jurisdiction.” Newdow, 542 U.S. at 11, 124 S.Ct. 2301 (internal quotation omitted). In the First Amendment context, however, the Supreme Court “has enunciated other concerns that justify a lessening of prudential limitations on standing.” Sec’y of State of Maryland v. Joseph H. Munson Co., Inc., 467 U.S. 947, 956, 104 S.Ct. 2839, 81 L.Ed.2d 786 (1984). “[Wjhere the claim is that a statute is overly broad in violation of the First Amendment, the Court has allowed a party to assert the rights of another without regard to the ability of the other to assert his own claims and ‘with no requirement that the person making the attack demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn with the requisite narrow specificity.’” Id. at 957, 104 S.Ct. 2839 (quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973)). Pennsylvania Family Institute, Inc., 489 F.Supp.2d at 471-72; accord Amato v. Wilentz, 952 F.2d 742, 753 (3d Cir.1991) (“The Supreme Court rather freely grants standing to raise overbreadth claims, on the ground that an overbroad statute or regulation may chill the expression of others not before the court.”). The court then held that the combination of Plaintiffs’ constitutional standing and their First Amendment overbreadth claims gave them prudential standing under Joseph H. Munson. See id. at 473 (“Since both the Candidate Plaintiffs and Plaintiff PFI have constitutional standing, their facial over-breadth challenges to the pledges and promises clause and the commits clause of Canon 7B(l)(c) give them prudential standing.”) (citing See Joseph H. Munson, 467 U.S. at 956-57, 104 S.Ct. 2839). As Defendants correctly note, the court’s statement of the law governing prudential standing in First Amendment cases was incomplete. But the cases Defendants cite — Amato v. Wilentz, 952 F.2d 742 (3d Cir.1991) and The Pitt News v. Fisher, 215 F.3d 354 (3d Cir.2000) — apply only when a party with constitutional standing asserts the rights of a third party — ie., a party not before the court. Here, Plaintiff PFI is asserting the rights of the judicial candidates to whom it send the PFI Questionnaire, and six of those candidates — the Candidate Plaintiffs — are before the court seeking to vindicate those same rights. Amato and The Pitt News therefore do not govern this case, and the court will stand by its previous holding that Plaintiffs have prudential standing to bring this action. B. The Court Must Construe the Pledges and Promises and Commits Clauses Narrowly. And now to the merits. Plaintiffs argue that they are entitled to summary judgment, because the pledges and promises and commits clauses of Canon 7B(l)(c) of the Pennsylvania Code of Judicial Conduct unconstitutionally abridge their freedom of speech under the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. More precisely, Plaintiffs argue that the two clauses, both on their face and as-applied, fail strict scrutiny and are over-broad and vague. Defendants counter that they are entitled to summary judgment, because the two clauses are constitutional when narrowly construed, as they must be in this case. In this section, the court will explain why it agrees with Defendants that it is proper to construe the clauses narrowly as Defendants have proposed. The court then will make clear what its narrow construction of the clauses entails. 1. Stretton v. Disciplinary Bd. of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 944 F.2d 137 (3d Cir.1991) In Stretton, the Third Circuit considered the constitutionality of Canon 7B(l)(c) of the Pennsylvania Code of Judicial Conduct, which at that time read as follows: B. Campaign Conduct. (1) A candidate ... for a judicial office (c) should not make pledges or promises of conduct in office other than the faithful and impartial performance of the duties of the office; announce his views on disputed legal or political issues; or misrepresent his identity, qualifications, present position, or other fact. Stretton, 944 F.2d at 141 (quoting Pa.Code of Jud. Conduct, Canon 7B(1)(c) (1974)). The first clause of the version of Canon 7B(l)(c) challenged in Stretton is identical to the pledges and promises clause at issue in this action. The second clause of that version of Canon 7B(1)(c) is identical to the “announce” clause held unconstitutional in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 122 S.Ct. 2528, 153 L.Ed.2d 694 (2002). Confronted with facial and as-applied challenges to the above-quoted version of Canon 7B(l)(c), the Third Circuit, like the Supreme Court in White, applied strict scrutiny. See White, 536 U.S. at 774-75, 122 S.Ct. 2528; Stretton, 944 F.2d at 141. (“Under the strict-scrutiny test, respondents have the burden to prove that the announce clause is (1) narrowly tailored, to serve (2) a compelling state interest.” White, 536 U.S. at 774-75, 122 S.Ct. 2528.) The Stretton Court first held that the state had established a “compelling interest in an impartial judiciary”—i.e., “ ‘in ensuring that judges be and appear to be neither antagonistic nor beholden to any interest, party, or person.’ ” 944 F.2d at 142, 144 (quoting Mortal v. Judiciary Comm’n, 565 F.2d 295, 302 (5th Cir.1977)). It then held that it was obliged to construe Canon 7B(l)(e) narrowly to prohibit only a candidate’s announcement of his views on disputed legal or political issues “that [we]re likely to come before the court.” Id. at 144. Having done that, the Court found it easy to conclude that Canon 7B(1)(c) was “narrowly tailored to serve the state’s compelling interest in an impartial judiciary,” and that “the plaintiffs challenges to Canon 7B(1)(c), both facially and as applied, must fail.” Id. White abrogated the result in Stretton, but it did not abrogate Stretton’s interpretive approach. In fact, the announce clause held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in White had been given a narrow construction in the lower courts similar to the one that Stretton applied to Canon 7B(1)(c). See White, 536 U.S. at 771-72, 122 S.Ct. 2528 (“In light of the constitutional concerns, the District Court construed the clause to reach only disputed issues that are likely to come before the candidate if he is elected judge. The Eighth Circuit accepted this limiting interpretation by the District Court, and in addition construed the clause to allow general discussions of case law and judicial philosophy.”) (internal citation omitted). Although the White Court found that “these limitations upon the text of the announce clause [we]re not all that they appealed] to be,” id. at 772, 122 S.Ct. 2528, it did not reject them. Rather, it held that the announce clause, even as narrowly construed by the Eighth Circuit, was facially unconstitutional, because it could not withstand strict scrutiny. Since Stretton’s interpretive approach is intact after White, the court must determine what that approach entails, and how it should be applied to this case. Stretton’s interpretive reasoning proceeded as follows; The respective Boards are defendants in this litigation and evidence was presented on their behalf by their Counsel. Defendants argued for a restrictive reading of Canon 7 in the district court as well as on appeal to this court. Having adopted the position in litigation that the Canon is to be interpreted narrowly, the Boards are barred from returning to court and adopting a contrary position. See Delgrosso v. Spang and Co., 903 F.2d 234, 241 (3d Cir.1990); Murray v. Silberstein, 882 F.2d 61, 66 (3d Cir.1989); Oneida Motor Freight, Inc. v. United Jersey Bank, 848 F.2d 414, 419 (3d Cir.1988); Associated Hospital Service v. Pustilnik, 497 Pa. 221, 439 A.2d 1149, 1151 (1981). The Boards are thus bound by the argument that Canon 7’s use of “announce views” is limited to situations in which the candidate’s speech pertains to matters that may come before the court for resolution. To some extent, therefore, the administrative agencies charged with enforcement of the Canon have taken a position that is entitled to consideration by us. Their interpretation, however, is entitled to less deference than would be appropriate if formal rulemaking had authoritatively expressed the agencies’ stance. See Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). In Pennsylvania the definitive construction of the Canon is that put upon it by the state Supreme Court, but we would be naive not to recognize that the Judicial Inquiry Review Board’s position is, at the very least, a straw in the wind indicating the direction that court will go. The role of Counsel to the Judicial Inquiry Board is somewhat broader than simply advisory. The General Counsel decides whether to begin an investigation into suspected violations and whether to recommend sanctions to the Board. The state Supreme Court acts only upon recommendation from the Board, although it is free to disagree. Pennsylvania Constitution Art. V, § 18(g)(h); Matter of Cunningham, 517 Pa. 417, 538 A.2d 473, appeal dismissed, 488 U.S. 805, 109 S.Ct. 36, 102 L.Ed.2d 16 (1988). Giving a narrow construction to “announce views” in Canon 7 is consistent with other provisions of the Code. For example, Canon 4 permits judges to write and speak about the law, the legal system and the administration of justice so long as the judge does not cast doubt on his capacity to decide any issue that may come before him. When a statute or regulation is challenged, it should be interpreted to avoid constitutional difficulties. “[T]he elementary rule is that every reasonable construction must be resorted to, in order to save a statute from unconstitutionality.” Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575, 108 S.Ct. 1392, 1397, 99 L.Ed.2d 645 (1988), (quoting Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648, 657, 15 S.Ct. 207, 211, 39 L.Ed. 297 (1895)); Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 483, 108 S.Ct. 2495, 2501, 101 L.Ed.2d 420 (1988). In fact, courts routinely narrow statutes to avoid a potentially overbroad reach. Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 110 S.Ct. 1691, 1698, 1701-02, 109 L.Ed.2d 98 (1990). We are aware that the state Supreme Court has in the past interpreted its rules in the light necessary to obviate constitutional objections. See Laudenberger v. Port Authority, 496 Pa. 52, 436 A.2d 147 (1981) (prejudgment interest rule is procedural, not substantive), appeal dismissed, 456 U.S. 940, 102 S.Ct. 2002, 72 L.Ed.2d 462 (1982). Taking into account this practice, the position of the Judicial Inquiry Board, the compelling state interest and the constitutional difficulties, we are persuaded that the broad interpretation of Canon 7 urged upon us by plaintiff would be rejected by the state Supreme Court and that it would adopt the construction advanced by the Boards here. This reading of Canon 7 does not violate the First Amendment because the limitation does not unnecessarily curtail protected speech, but does serve a compelling state interest. 944 F.2d at 143-44. 2. Applying Stretton to this Case This case presents almost the same issues as Stretton. Defendants have attached to their motion for summary judgment an affidavit from Joseph A. Massa, Jr., the Chief Counsel of the JCB, in which he offers his “analysis and interpretation” of Canon 7B(1)(c). See Defendants’ Motion, Attachment F. More precisely, Mr. Massa “interprets] the pledge, promise, or commit canon to mean that a candidate is prohibited from pledging, promising, or committing to decide an issue or a case in a particular way once elected judge,” id. at ¶4, and he offers his opinion that “[a]ny speech by a judicial candidate, short of a pledge, promise, or commitment to adjudicate a particular result, is speech permitted by the canon and by the First Amendment.” Id. at ¶ 5 (emphasis added). As in Stretton, this proffered interpretation does not conflict with the other provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct, and Defendants freely acknowledge that advocating this interpretation of the pledges and promises and commits clauses in this case will, by virtue of the doctrine of judicial estoppel, preclude them from arguing for a different interpretation in subsequent litigation. See Defendant’s Brief at 46; see also In re Teleglobe Communications Carp., 493 F.3d 345, 377 (3d Cir.2007) (“Judicial estoppel prevents a party from ‘playing fast and loose with the courts’ by adopting conflicting positions in different legal proceedings (or different stages of the same proceeding).”) (quoting Delgrosso, 903 F.2d at 241). Given the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s past practice of interpreting statutes and rules to obviate constitutional objections, as well as the fact that the JCB’s position “is, at the very least, a straw in the wind indicating the direction that court will go,” the court will consider whether it should adopt Defendants proffered narrow construction of the pledges and promises and commits clauses, though it will give their proffered construction “less deference than would be appropriate if formal rulemaking had authoritatively expressed [the JCB’s] stance.” Stretton, 944 F.2d at 143-44. Controlling Third Circuit and Supreme Court case law, including Stret-ton, requires the court to determine whether the pledges and promises and commits clauses are reasonably susceptible to Defendants’ proffered narrow construction, and, if so, whether it saves those clauses from unconstitutionality. See Sypniewski v. Warren Hills Regional Bd. of Educ., 307 F.3d 243, 259 (3d Cir.2002) (“[W]e must determine whether the relatively broad language of the policy can reasonably be viewed narrowly enough to avoid any overbreadth problem.”); see also Stretton, 944 F.2d at 144. The answer to both questions is “yes”—the clauses can reasonably be construed as Defendants have proposed in Mr. Massa’s affidavit, and the narrowly construed clauses are constitutional. The court will address the reasonableness issue in this section, and the ultimate issue of constitutionality immediately thereafter. a. The Pledges and Promises Clause The pledges and promises clause can reasonably be construed as Defendants have proposed, because it fulfills the clause’s purpose — i.e., prohibiting judicial candidates from promising particular rulings once elected — and changes the text of the clause only as much as is necessary to eliminate its overbreadth problem. The purpose of the pledges and promises clause becomes clear when one realizes that a judge’s job consists primarily of deciding cases or controversies in a particular way. The drafters of the clause therefore must have thought that judicial candidates could make only two kinds of pledges or promises of conduct in office: (1) pledges or promises to rule a particular way on an issue, case, or controversy; and (2) pledges or promises to perform their judicial duties faithfully and impartially. The pledges and promises clause permits the latter and forbids the former. Viewed this way, the clause appears perfectly consistent with the First Amendment, which does not protect judicial candidates from discipline when they violate the due process rights of litigants that come before them by promising particular rulings on issues, cases, or controversies before they are elected. See Defendants’ Motion, Attachment E (Candidate Plaintiffs’ answers to interrogatories number 17 and 18); see also Stretton, 944 F.2d at 142; Buckley, 997 F.2d at 227 (“[0]nly a fanatic would suppose that ... the principle of freedom of speech should be held to entitle a candidate for judicial office to promise to vote for one side or another in a particular case or class of cases.”) The First Amendment problem with the pledges and promises clause is that, contrary to what its drafters must have thought, judicial candidates can make more than two kinds of pledges or promises of conduct in office. That is, judicial candidates can make pledges or promises of conduct in office that guarantee neither particular results nor the faithful and impartial performance of their judicial duties. See id. (Candidate Plaintiffs’ answers to interrogatory number 19). Moreover, the pledges and promises that fall into this third category, and are therefore prohibited by the clause, appear to be protected political speech under the First Amendment. See Shepard, 463 F.Supp.2d at 889-90; Bader, 361 F.Supp.2d at 1038-39; Stout, 440 F.Supp.2d at 1231-33; Wolnitzek, 345 F.Supp.2d at 697-701. The Wol-nitzek Court pointed this out by noting that “a literal reading of the promises clause could mean it bars a simple promise to ‘be tough on crime’ ” or “to ‘uphold the First Amendment.’” 345 F.Supp.2d at 697. But the court’s analysis does not end here. The overbreadth of the pledges and promises clause that Wolnitzek revealed should not result in the clause being struck down as unconstitutional if there is a way to reasonably construe it and thereby avoid the constitutional problem. See Sypniewski, 307 F.3d at 259; Stretton, 944 F.2d at 144. Defendants have proposed just such a reasonable construction. Specifically, Defendants propose a narrow construction of the pledges and promises clause which would prohibit only “pledging, promising, or committing to decide an issue or a case in a particular way once elected judge,” Defendants’ Motion, Attachment F (Affidavit of Joseph A. Massa, Jr.), at ¶ 4, and which would permit a judicial candidate to promise to be tough on crime, and, presumably, to uphold the First Amendment. The court concludes that the pledges and promises clause is reasonably susceptible to this narrow construction, because it fulfills the clause’s purpose — i.e., prohibiting judicial candidates from promising particular rulings once elected — and changes the text of the clause only as much as is necessary to eliminate its overbreadth. The court is aware of only one other decision where there pledges and promises clause was construed narrowly to avoid unconstitutionality—In re Watson, 100 N.Y.2d 290, 763 N.Y.S.2d 219, 794 N.E.2d 1 (2003). In Watson, the Court was confronted with an appeal of a ruling by the New York Commission on Judicial Conduct that a judicial candidate had violated the pledges and promises clause by “explicitly and repeatedly indicat[ing] that he intended to ‘work with’ and ‘assist’ police and other law enforcement personnel if elected to judicial office.” Id. at 222, 794 N.E.2d at 4. In upholding the Commission’s ruling the Watson Court construed the pledges and promises clause as follows: By its terms, the provision does not ban all ‘pledges or promises’ but only those that compromise the faithful and impartial performance of the duties of the office .... [M]ost statements identifying a point of view will not implicate the ‘pledges or promises’ prohibition. The rule precludes only those statements of intention that single out a party or class of litigants for special treatment, be it favorable or unfavorable, or convey that the candidate will behave in a manner inconsistent with the faithful and impartial performance of judicial duties if elected. Id. at 225, 794 N.E.2d at 7 (emphasis added). As the above-quoted passage makes clear, the New York Court of Appeals read the pledges and promises clause non-literally. That is, the Watson Court did not read the clause to prohibit all pledges and promises “other than the faithful and impartial performance of the duties of the office.” Instead, the Watson Court read the clause as prohibiting only pledges and promises that “compromised” or were “inconsistent with” faithful and impartial performance. The court admits that Watson’s narrow construction of the pledges and promises clause is attractive for its simplicity, but the court does not believe it solves the overbreadth problem exemplified by the apparently prohibited pledges/promises “to be tough on crime” and “to uphold the First Amendment.” According to Watson, [Candidates need not preface campaign statements with the phrase “I promise” before their remarks may reasonably be interpreted by the public as a pledge to act or rule in a particular way if elected. A candidate’s statements must be reviewed in their totality and in the context of the campaign as a whole to determine whether the candidate has unequivocally articulated a pledge or promise of future conduct or decision-making that compromises the faithful and impartial performance of judicial duties. 763 N.Y.S.2d 219, 794 N.E.2d at 4. Under this standard, a judicial candidate’s promise “to be tough on crime” could be viewed as a pledge/promise “to ‘work with’ and ‘assist’ police and other law enforcement personnel,” which is exactly what Watson held to be a violation of New York’s pledges and promises clause. Likewise, a