Deirmenjian v. Deutsche Bank, A.G. (526 F. Supp. 2d 1068, 2007)

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ PARTIAL MOTION TO DISMISS THE AMENDED COMPLAINT

MARGARET M. MORROW, District Judge.

On January 12, 2006, Varoujan Deirmen-jian and six other plaintiffs commenced this putative class action in Los Angeles Superior Court against Deutsche Bank, A.G., Dresdner Bank, A.G., and certain fictitious defendants (collectively, “defendants” or “German Bank Defendants”). On February 10, 2006, the action was removed to this court.

Plaintiffs bring the action on their own behalf, and on behalf of similarly situated individuals and the general public, to recover money and property purportedly withheld by defendants during the Armenian Genocide. Plaintiffs allege that they are the “rightful heirs” of that money and property and seek recovery of all deposited assets not returned, a full accounting, and disgorgement by the German Bank Defendants of interest and profits derived from the deposited assets. Plaintiffs also seek — on behalf of named plaintiff Raffi Bakian and the putative members of Class B — the return of all looted assets received by the German Bank Defendants. With respect to these assets, they plead state law causes of action for breach of special duty; expropriation and conversion; unjust enrichment; negligence; constructive trust; money had and received; and an accounting. It is these claims to which the current motion is addressed.

On September 11, 2006, the court issued an order granting in part and denying in part defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint. As relevant here, the court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss Ba-kian’s claim on behalf of the putative Class B plaintiffs, holding that (1) that under California Code of Civil Procedure § 361, the state’s “borrowing statute,” California statutes of limitations might apply to the Class B claims if those claims accrued while the Class B plaintiffs were citizens of California, but (2) that even if this were the case, the Class B claims were time-barred under California law, and the complaint contained insufficient allegations to toll the limitations period or estop defendants from asserting the statute of limitations as a defense. The court granted plaintiffs leave to amend to plead facts that would support tolling or estoppel.

On October 16, 2006, plaintiffs filed their first amended class action complaint. On November 28, 2006, defendants filed a motion to dismiss the amended Class B claims, arguing, inter alia, (1) that the amended complaint failed to rectify the pleading deficiencies noted by the court in its September 11, 2006 order, and (2) that a recently enacted California statute, which purports to extend the statute of limitations on the claims, and which plaintiffs cite in their complaint, is unconstitutional.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

A. General Allegations Underlying the Class B Plaintiffs’ Claims

In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, many ethnic Armenians lived in the Ottoman Turkish Empire. Plaintiffs alleges that, in 1910, a regime known as the Young Turks came to power and began to “cleanse” the Empire of all non-Turks, including ethnic Armenians. Initially, this effort purportedly took the form of forced deportations. Plaintiffs assert that, “[w]ith the onset of World War I, [however], the government of the Ottoman Turkish Empire launched a premeditated, systemic campaign to destroy ethnic Armenians through a process of massacre and deportation, which is now recognized as the Armenian Genocide.” Between April 1915 and 1923, an estimated 1.5 million to 2 million Armenians were allegedly killed; ninety percent of those deported allegedly perished.

In conjunction with this alleged program of forced relocation and extermination, the Young Turks purportedly transferred Armenian-owned businesses to Turks. In May 1915, the Young Turks allegedly issued a decree stating that all goods belonging to Armenians were to be considered abandoned property. Commencing January 1, 1916, the Ottoman Empire’s Minister of Commerce and Agriculture purportedly sent letters to financial institutions operating within the Empire, advising that the government had established Tasfiye Commissionou, or Liquidation Commissions. The financial institutions were directed to transfer all Armenian assets in their possession to the Commissions, which were to inventory the property — including land, bank deposits, and goods found in homes, churches, monasteries, and schools — and secure it under the ownership and control of the Ottoman Empire. Plaintiffs allege that, in total, the Young Turks seized approximately five million Turkish gold pounds ($22,450,000 in 1915 value) from Armenians, which they subsequently transferred to the German Bank Defendants.

Plaintiffs assert that the German Bank Defendants accepted the gold deposits knowing that the assets had been stolen from Armenians, or seized from their bank accounts, before or after they were killed. In return for the transfer of the gold deposits, the German Bank Defendants purportedly provided currency to the Young Turks for the purchase of war materiel, and sent some of the Armenian gold abroad as financial security for the Young Turk leaders. These activities allegedly generated enormous profits for the German Bank Defendants. Plaintiffs contend that' — since the end of World War I — the German Bank Defendants have actively and affirmatively concealed the existence of the accounts that held the looted assets, affirmatively misrepresented their knowledge of the accounts, and deliberately obstructed efforts to identify the accounts and transfer the assets to their rightful owners.

Raffi Bakian asserts that he is the rightful heir of both his paternal and maternal grandfathers, who were victims of the Armenian Genocide. He alleges that his grandfathers’ business assets and household contents were confiscated by the government of Ottoman Turkey, and that they were transferred to and deposited with the German Bank Defendants. Bakian purports to represent a class of putative plaintiffs consisting of “[t]he rightful owners of looted assets forcibly taken by the government of the Ottoman Turkish Empire after 1875 and deposited with the GERMAN BANK DEFENDANTS, whose property has not been returned.”

B. Allegations Regarding the Timeliness of the Class B Plaintiffs’ Claims

Bakian contends that the Class B claims are not time-barred because, effective January 1, 2007, the California legislature extended the statute of limitations for actions seeking the recovery of “looted assets” by any “Armenian Genocide victim” or any “heir or beneficiary of an Armenian Genocide victim” who resides in California; the statute provides that such actions can be brought on or before December 31, 2016. See 2006 Cal. Stats, ch. 443 (S.B.1524) (codified at Cal.Code Civ. Peoo. § 354.45). Alternatively, he pleads the following grounds for suspending the limitations bar: (1) fraudulent concealment and/or equitable estoppel, on the basis that defendants knew that the Young Turks had deposited assets looted from victims of the Armenian Genocide during the First World War in their institutions but actively concealed and denied the existence of such assets; and (2) equitable tolling and/or delayed discovery, on the basis that the substantial difficulties faced by Armenians who survived the genocide made it impossible for them to file the claims asserted in the complaint in a timely fashion.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard Governing Motions to Dismiss Under Rule 12(b)(6)

A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests the legal sufficiency of the claims asserted in the complaint. A Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is proper only where there is either a “lack of a cognizable legal theory” or “the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.” Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir.1988). In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6), the court generally looks only to the face of the complaint and documents attached thereto. Van Buskirk v. Cable News Network, Inc., 284 F.3d 977, 980 (9th Cir.2002); Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1555 n. 19 (9th Cir.1989).

The court must accept all factual allegations pleaded in the complaint as true, and construe them and draw all reasonable inferences from them in favor of the non-moving party. Cahill v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-38 (9th Cir.1996); Mier v. Owens, 57 F.3d 747, 750 (9th Cir.1995). It need not, however, accept as true unreasonable inferences or eonclusory legal allegations cast in the form of factual allegations. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, — U.S. -, -, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1965, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (“While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiffs obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)” (citations omitted)).

A complaint is properly dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) where it is apparent on the face of the pleading that plaintiffs claims are barred by the statute of limitations. See Jablon v. Dean Witter & Co., 614 F.2d 677, 682 (9th Cir.1980); see also Morales v. City of Los Angeles, 214 F.3d 1151, 1153 (9th Cir.2000) (“The district court may grant a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss on statute of limitations grounds ‘only if the assertions of the complaint, read with the required liberality, would not permit the plaintiff to prove that the statute was tolled,’ ” quoting TwoRivers v. Lewis, 174 F.3d 987, 991 (9th Cir.1999) (internal quotations omitted)). Where the dates pertinent to the running of the statute cannot be determined from the allegations of the complaint, however, the matter cannot be decided on a motion to dismiss, and defendants must raise the defense through a motion for summary judgment or at trial. See Jablon, 614 F.2d at 682.

B. Whether the Class B Plaintiffs’ Claims are Time-Barred

As noted, in its September 11, 2006 order granting in part and denying in part defendants’ motion to dismiss the original class action complaint, the court held that, assuming the California borrowing statute applied, the Class B claims were time-barred under California law, and the complaint did not adequately allege a basis for tolling the limitations period or estopping defendant from asserting timeliness as a defense. In their current motion, the German Bank Defendants argue that the amended complaint fails to rectify the pleading deficiencies previously noted by the court They also contend that recently enacted Code of Civil Procedure § 354.45, which purports to extend the statute of limitations for claims like Baki-an’s, and which is cited in the amended complaint as evidence of the timeliness of the Class B claims, is unconstitutional. The court addresses these arguments in reverse order.

1. Whether the Class B Plaintiffs’ Claims Are Timely Under California Code of Civil Procedure § 354.45

After the court issued its September 11, 2006 order, the California legislature enacted Code of Civil Procedure § 354.45, which extends until December 31, 2016 the statute of limitations for, inter alia, looted assets claims brought by victims of the Armenian Genocide or their heirs or beneficiaries. See Cal.Civ.PROC.Code § 354.45(b) (“Any action, including any pending action brought by an Armenian Genocide victim, or the heir or beneficiary of an Armenian Genocide victim, who resides in this state, seeking payment for, or the return of, deposited assets, or the return of looted assets, shall not be dismissed for failure to comply with the applicable statute of limitation, if the action is filed on or before December 31, 2016”). The German Bank Defendants contend that this statute is unconstitutional and that plaintiffs cannot rely on it to revive the time-barred Class B claims. Applying American Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 123 S.Ct. 2374, 156 L.Ed.2d 376 (2003), and Deutsch v. Turner Corp., 324 F.3d 692 (9th Cir.2003), the court concludes that the statute exceeds California’s power to engage in foreign affairs. As a result, it cannot apply § 354.45 to extend the statute of limitations on plaintiffs’ Class B claims.

a. State Statutes That Conflict with Treaties or Executive Agreement Are Preempted Under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution

The Constitution allocates “the foreign relations power” to the federal government and vests the authority to decide what the nation’s foreign policy should be in the executive branch. See Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 413-14, 123 S.Ct. 2374. The executive has authority to enter into treaties and “executive agreements” with foreign governments, including agreements that resolve the wartime claims of American citizens. Id. at 415, 123 S.Ct. 2374 (“Making executive agreements to settle claims of American nationals against foreign governments is a particularly longstanding practice”); Deutsch, 324 F.3d at 713-14 (“[T]he Constitution allocates the power over foreign affairs to the federal government exclusively, and the power to make and resolve war, including the authority to resolve war claims, is central to the foreign affairs power in the constitutional design”). The power of the federal government to resolve wartime claims extends not only to claims against a foreign government itself, but also to claims against its nationals, including corporations. See Garamendi 539 U.S. at 416, 123 S.Ct. 2374 (“Historically, wartime claims against even nominally private entities have become issues in international diplomacy.... [UJntangling government policy from private initiative during wartime is often so hard that diplomatic action settling claims against private parties may well be just as essential in the aftermath of hostilities as diplomacy to settle claims against foreign governments”).

Under the Supremacy Clause, treaties and executive agreements resolving wartime claims preempt state laws that have “more than incidental effect in conflict with [the] express foreign policy of the National Government” embodied in those agreements. Id. at 416-17, 420, 123 S.Ct. 2374; see also, e.g., id. at 421, 123 S.Ct. 2374 (“The exercise of the federal executive authority means that state law must give way where ... there is evidence of clear conflict between the policies adopted by the two”); Pink, 315 U.S. at 230-31, 62 S.Ct. - 552 (“[S]tate law must yield when it is inconsistent with, or impairs ... the superior Federal policy evidenced by a treaty or international compact or agreement”).

Taiheiyo Cement Corp. v. Superior Court, 117 Cal.App.4th 380, 12 Cal.Rptr.3d 32 (2004), a recent decision by the California Court of Appeals, illustrates the application of this constitutional principle. There, a United States citizen who was formerly a Korean national filed an action in Los Angeles Superior Court against a Japanese company, alleging that he had been forced to perform slave labor for the company during the Second World War. Id. at 386, 12 Cal.Rptr.3d 32. Plaintiff asserted that his claims were timely under California Code of Civil Procedure § 354.6. Section 354.6 authorized “slave labor victims” and “forced labor victims” to “bring an action to recover compensation for labor performed,” and stated that “[a]ny action brought under this section shall not be dismissed for failure to comply with the applicable statute of limitations, if the action is commenced on or before December 31, 2010.” Id. at 387, 12 Cal.Rptr.3d 32; see also Cal.Code Civ. Proc. § 354.6(b),(c).

The appellate court initially held that the statute did not impermissibly infringe on the federal government’s exclusive power over foreign affairs. The California Supreme Court granted review; while the matter was pending before it, the United States Supreme Court decided Garamendi. The California Supreme Court therefore remanded to the Court of Appeal with directions that it reconsider its decision in light of Garamendi. Id. at 385, 12 Cal.Rptr.3d 32.

Applying Garamendi, the Court of Appeal noted that federal law need not expressly preclude the action taken by the state. Id. at 390. Rather, the court stated, “[t]he critical inquiry is whether the federal expression of foreign policy conflicts with the state law.” Id. Viewing the question in this light, the court concluded that § 354.6 was unconstitutional, because it “encourag[ed] coercive litigation of [wartime] claims” against Japan and its nationals, and thus “conflicted] with the federal policy embodied in the [Treaty of Peace between the United States and Japan that formally ended World War II (’1951 Treaty’) ],” which contemplated that such claims would be resolved “diplomatically.” Id. The court noted that the 1951 Treaty waived all Allied claims against Japan and its nationals, and recognized that the claims of non-signatory nations (like Korea) and their citizens would be resolved through separate negotiations between those governments and Japan. Id. at 391-92, 12 Cal.Rptr.3d 32 (noting that the 1951 Treaty “embodied] the federal purpose and foreign policy that WWII claims by individuals of nonsignatory nations were to be resolved through diplomacy”). The court thus concluded that, even if § 354.6 were deemed to be merely a “procedural” statute that lengthened the statute of limitations, it unconstitutionally conflicted with the federal foreign policy embodied in the 1951 Treaty. Id. at 394-96, 12 Cal.Rptr.3d 32.

The Ninth Circuit had earlier reached a similar conclusion regarding the constitutionality of § 354.6 in Deutsch, 324 F.3d at 692, which it decided before the Supreme Court’s decision in Garamendi. The Deutsch court held that § 354.6 “imper-missibl[y] ... intrude[d] on the federal government’s exclusive power to make and resolve war, including the procedure for resolving war claims.” Id. at 712. The court noted that the 1951 Treaty neither created, either “explicitly or implicitly [,] a private right of action against Japan or its nationals” nor “authorized states of the United States to create such a right.” Id. at 714. “[I]n the absence of some specific action that constitutes authorization on the part of the federal government,” the court observed, “states are prohibited from exercising foreign affairs powers, including modifying the federal government’s resolution of war-related disputes.” Id.; see also id. (“[Wjithout [explicit] authorization, states lack the power to alter the federal government’s resolution of disputes relating to the [Second World War]”).

The court rejected the argument of certain Korean and Chinese petitioners that their claims were not barred by the 1951 Treaty because their nations had not been parties to the agreement. It held that this was “immaterial” because, “[w]hen the United States has been a party to a war, the resolution it establishes to that war is the resolution for the whole part of the United States. States lack the power to modify that resolution, regardless of the citizenship of those seeking redress.” Id. at 714 n. 14.

b. Section 354.45 Conflicts with the Federal Government’s Resolution of Wartime Claims Arising Out of World War I and Is Consequently Preempted

Just as § 354.6 created a cause of action for victims of slave or forced labor during World War II, § 354.45 creates a cause of action for those who were victims of the Armenian Genocide that culminated during World War I, and their heirs and beneficiaries. Like § 354.6, which extended the statute of limitations on forced labor claims to 2010, § 354.45 extends the statute of limitations governing Armenian Genocide claims to 2016. The question is whether the federal government previously exercised its exclusive power to resolve claims arising out of World War I through post-war diplomacy, and thus whether the state statute impermissibly intrudes on the federal government’s foreign affairs power.

The answer to this question is clearly yes. In the Claims Agreement Between the United States of America and Turkey (the “Ankara Agreement”), the Republic of Turkey agreed to pay the United States a “lump sum” of $1,300,000 “in full settlement of the claims of American citizens which are embraced by the Agreement of December 24, 1923.” That agreement— embodied in an exchange of notes — in turn provided that the “reciprocal claims” of American and Turkish nationals based on acts occurring during World War I would be adjudicated by a mixed claim commission. Following payment of the lump sum settlement, Fred. K. Nielsen — who had been assigned to the Turkish-American Claims Commission by the President in February 1933 and who executed the Ankara Agreement on the President’s behalf — submitted a report to the Secretary of State to document the process by which the settlement was reached and the manner in which it should be distributed. Nielsen recognized that the “claims of persons ... considered to be persons of Turkish origin under Turkish law” were not filed with (but rather only “furnished to”) the Commission, due to Turkey’s refusal to recognize its liability for such claims. Nielsen made clear, however, that the parties intended the Ankara Agreement to be a final settlement of all such claims:

“While ... the Commission did not consider the[ ] claims of naturalized citizens of Turkish origin [in reaching the amount of the lump sum settlement], the Agreement of October 25, 1934 concluded by the two Governments was framed to effect a final settlement of all outstanding claims of the nationals of each country against the other ...”

Nielsen stated that Article II of the Ankara Agreement — which provides that “the Government of the Republic of Turkey will be released from liability with respect to all [claims of American citizens which are embraced by the Agreement of December 24,1923],” and that “every [such] claim ... shall be considered and treated as finally settled” — was intended to effectuate a universal settlement of all claims “in harmony with international practice in relation to such matters,” as exemplified by previously executed reparations treaties that contained facially broader release and settlement clauses.

Nielsen’s report is reflective of the diplomatic negotiations that culminated in the execution of the Ankara Agreement. As letters exchanged by the parties prior to execution of the agreement make clear, the “lump sum” settlement was in lieu of the separate adjudication of disputed claims before a mixed claims commission, and was intended to settle the wartime claims of American nationals of both Ottoman and non-Ottoman origin. See, e.g., Letter of Robert P. Skinner, Ambassador to Turkey, to Secretary of State Cordell Hull (Mar. 11, 1934) (stating that the United States stipulated that the claims commission “would examine in its ensemble the total list of claims without thorough examination of nationality of claimants and by common accord would propose a lump sum”), reprinted in 1934 State Department Report, supra note 30, at 911; Turkish Counter Proposal for a Lump Sum Settlement of American Claims Against Turkey, Transmitted in Dispatch No. 70 from Turkish Ambassador to Sec. of State (Dec. 15, 1933) (“[A] third list of 1504 petitions relates exclusively to claims presented by naturalized Americans, formerly Turkish nationals. The three above-mentioned lists comprise therefore 1880 cases representing, according to the claims of the interested parties, a grand total of 55 million dollars. To cut short all discussion and to spare both parties the trouble of a detailed examination of individual claims which would be apt to take a considerable period of time ... the American Delegation proposes to reach an understanding upon the basis of the payment by Turkey of a lump sum of five million dollars corresponding approximately to ten percent of the total claimed by the interested parties. The Turkish Delegation shares the view that it would be preferable to avoid the examination of individual cases and that the payment by Turkey of a lump sum in reasonable installments could, in principle, constitute a basis of a satisfactory agreement”), reprinted in 1934 State Department Report, supra note 30, at 904.

The conclusion that the United States resolved claims arising out of World War I with Turkey in such a manner as to foreclose the assertion of claims now by Armenian-Americans finds additional support in the Treaty of Lausanne of August 6, 1923, which was separately negotiated by the United States and Turkey following the end of World War I. Although the Senate failed to ratify this treaty, it is noteworthy that it contained no provisions “with respect to the protection of minorities,” which the United States considered “one of [a] great[ ] number of concessions” it was required to make in negotiating the agreement. See Letter from Joseph C. Grew, Representative of Special Mission at Lausanne to Secretary of State, June 21, 1923, reprinted in 2 U.S. Dep’t of State, FoReign Relations of the United States, 1923: Europe, Near East and Africa 1092 (1923); Letter from Joseph C. Grew to Secretary of State, August 6,1923, reprinted in 2 U.S. Dep’t of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1923: Europe, Near East and Afrioa 1148 (1923). Indeed, in attempting to secure ratification of the Treaty of Lausanne by the Senate, the State Department represented that it had deliberately chosen not to include any concrete measures regarding minority rights in the treaty because doing so would have been counterproductive to concluding an agreement. See Letter from Secretary of State to Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, May 5, 1924 (stating that, in negotiating the treaty, the United States had “avoided the advocacy of measures [safeguarding minorities] impossible of realization by methods short of war or of measures which would only be calculated to make more difficult the reaching adjustments between the Minorities and the authorities in control of the country,” and noting “the traditional policy of the United States against intervention in behalf of the nationals of other countries or the assumption of treaty obligations in such matters”), reprinted in 2 U.S. Dep’t of State, FoReign Relations of the United States, 1924: Europe, Near East and Africa 715, 719-20 (1924).

In short, the executive agreements into which the United States and Turkey entered following World War I demonstrate that the United States elected to settle the claims of victims of the Armenian Genocide through the Ankara Agreement. While California may consider the settlement the United States reached inadequate, see generally S.B. 1524, “[t]he federal government, acting under its foreign affairs authority, provided its own resolution to the war [and] California has no power to modify that resolution.” Deutsck, 324 F.3d at 715.

The series of agreements by which the United States resolved claims arising out of World War I with Germany are to like effect. On August 25, 1921, the United States entered into a bilateral treaty with Germany (the “Treaty of Berlin”), which formally ended hostilities between the two parties. On August 10, 1922, the United States and Germany entered into an executive agreement, which established a “mixed commission” to determine the amount to be paid by Germany in satisfaction of its financial obligations under Treaty of Berlin. The mixed commission was to resolve, inter alia, claims by American citizens for damage to their property and rights within German territory, other claims suffered by the United States or its nationals as a result of the war, and debts owed to American citizens by the German government or German nationals. “[T]he whole purpose of the agreement was to ascertain how much was due from one government to the other on account of the [wartime claims] of their respective citizens,” Z. & F. Assets Realization Corp. v. Hull, 114 F.2d 464, 472 (D.C.Cir.1940), aff'd, 311 U.S. 470, 61 S.Ct. 351, 85 L.Ed. 288 (1941), and the mixed commission was the sole body established to adjudicate such claims, see, e.g., Edwin M. Borchard, The Opinions of the Mixed Claims Commission, United States and Germany, 19 AM. J. Int’l L. 133, 134 (1925) (“The terms of the treaty fix and limit Germany’s obligations to pay ...” (emphasis added)). The parties agreed that “[t]he decision of the commission and those of [its] umpire ... shall be accepted as final and binding.” Notably, the executive agreement that created the mixed commission was premised on the notion that American citizens would have no private right of action against Germany or its nationals. See Z. & F. Assets Realization Corp., 114 F.2d at 472 (“The [executive agreement] is between the two governments; the citizens are not parties thereto; and no provision is made or contemplated therein, for submitting any question to the courts” (footnote omitted)).

Given the provisions of the Ankara Agreement, the diplomatic correspondence leading up to the execution of that agreement, and the executive agreement creating the mixed commission to address claims to be paid by Germany, the court must conclude that § 354.45 is an attempt by the California legislature to “modify” the executive’s “resolution to the war” as it concerns claims against German nationals for the return of confiscated property by heirs of victims of the Armenian Genocide. Deutsch, 324 F.3d at 715. As noted, however, “California lacks the power to create a right of action — or, alternatively, to resurrect time-barred claims — in order to provide its own remedy for war-related injuries inflicted by out former enemies and those who operated in their territories.” Id. at 716. As a result, under the controlling constitutional precepts articulated in Garamendi and Deutsch, the court is constrained to conclude that § 354.45 is unconstitutional and cannot be applied to revive the Class B plaintiffs’ otherwise time-barred claims, just as § 354.6 could not be applied to revive the time-barred claims of “slave laborers” that arose out of World War II. To the extent that the executive did not entirely waive plaintiffs’ Class B claims through the signing of the Ankara Agreement, the federal government dictated long ago that the wartime claims of American citizens against German corporations, like the German Bank Defendants, were to be decided by the mixed claims commission. That plaintiffs did not — or could not — seek relief in that arbitral forum is immaterial; California’s “dissatisfaction” with the remedial procedure established by the federal government to resolve wartime claims, no matter how well-intentioned or deeply felt, does not render constitutional its attempt to provide plaintiffs an alternate forum in the California courts.

c. Plaintiffs’ Arguments to the Contrary Are Unavailing

In supplemental briefing filed after the hearing on defendants’ motion to dismiss the Class B claims, plaintiffs advanced a number of arguments to demonstrate that § 354.45 is not preempted by the Ankara Agreement and other executive agreements that ended World War I. The court finds none of these arguments persuasive.

Plaintiffs argue first that the Ankara Agreement is not relevant, because their claims are against German nationals rather than against Turkey or Turkish nationals. The court does not agree. As plaintiffs themselves recognize, their “Class B claims arise out of crimes committed by the Ottoman Turkish government, and its German Bank agents, against it[s] own citizens commencing in the 1890s and carrying on into the 1920s.” As a result, under Garamendi, the Ankara Agreement is broad enough to encompass plaintiffs’ claims against German banks that operated in the Ottoman Empire during World War I, and purportedly assisted the Ottoman regime in wrongfully expropriating Armenian assets. See Garamendi, 589 U.S. at 416, 123 S.Ct. 2374 (noting that “wartime claims against even nominally private entities have become issues in international diplomacy” because “untangling government policy from private initiative during wartime is often so hard that diplomatic action settling claims against private parties may well be just as essential in the aftermath of hostilities as diplomacy to settle claims against foreign governments”); see also Steinberg v. Int’l Comm’n on Holocaust Era Ins. Claims, 133 Cal.App.4th 689, 700-01, 34 Cal.Rptr.3d 944 (2005) (“Plaintiffs suggest that Garamendi is distinguishable because their class is limited to policyholders and heirs whose claims were rejected by Gen-erali, an Italian company not subject to the executive agreements signed with Germany and Austria. The distinction is irrelevant. It is not the executive agreements themselves which dictated the result in Garamendi, but the policy reflected in them, a policy which extends to claims against Generali”).

Even if the Ankara Agreement did not encompass plaintiffs’ Class B claims, however, the Treaty of Berlin would. Plaintiffs argue in this regard that the Treaty of Berlin settled only the wartime claims of those who were American citizens at the time the treaty was executed, i.e., that it did not settle the claims of Turkish nationals who were later naturalized as American citizens. A similar argument was considered and rejected by the Ninth Circuit in Deutsch. See Deutsch, 324 F.3d at 714 n. 14 (“It is immaterial that many of the Appellants are nationals of two nations, China and Korea, that were not signatories of the San Francisco treaty. When the United States has been a party to a war, the resolution it establishes to that war is the resolution for the whole of the United States. States lack the power to modify that resolution, regardless of the citizenship of those seeking redress”); see also Taiheiyo Cement Corp., 117 Cal.App.4th at 398, 12 Cal.Rptr.3d 32 (“The fact that [plaintiff] was a Korean national when his war claim arose does not diminish the federal government’s constitutional power to declare, as a matter of United States foreign policy, how his claim should be resolved_Just like [plaintiff], th[e] Holocaust victims [in Deutsch ] were foreigners at the time their claims arose. Just as the Supreme Court perceived no constitutional impediment to the resolution of those claims by executive agreement, we see none where the federal determination has been made by treaty”). The court consequently cannot accept plaintiffs’ argument that their ancestors’ status as Ottoman nationals at the time of the alleged Turkish expropriations has any bearing on whether § 354.45 is preempted by the Treaty of Berlin. For the same reason, it is immaterial that the Treaty of Berlin did not establish specific mechanisms for victims of the Armenian Genocide to recover expropriated assets from the German Banks Defendants. Cf. id. at 395-96, 12 Cal.Rptr.3d 32 (“[Plaintiff] seeks to distinguish Garamendi by contending that unlike the executive agreements at issue in that case, which provided compensation to Holocaust victims, there has been no current federal attempt to establish a similar compensation system for WWII victims of the Japanese government. [Plaintiff] misreads Garamendi and the 1951 Treaty. The executive agreements in Garamendi did not necessarily provide compensation to Holocaust victims. Indeed, as the dissent pointed out, the voluntary system encouraged by the President had yielded settlement of ‘only a tiny proportion of the claims,’ and the insurers’ disclosure of policy information had not been ‘significant.’ The Court’s focus in Garamendi was [the California statute’s] conflict with the President’s foreign policy embodied in the agreements encouraging the voluntary disclosure of insurance policy information and the nonadversarial settlement of insurance claims. Just as the effectiveness of the President’s foreign policy was irrelevant to the Garamendi majority’s conflict determination, it is likewise irrelevant whether the government-to-government negotiation contemplated by article 4(a) will result in satisfactory results” (citations omitted)).

Plaintiffs also contend that, even if the Ankara Agreement is applicable, their Class B claims are not among those settled by the agreement. In a related vein, they assert — as a matter of historical fact — that the Armenian Genocide was not a part of World War I, and hence that their claims cannot be considered to be among those settled by an agreement whose purpose was to settle claims arising from that war. The former argument is belied by the historical record. As noted, Nielsen’s 1937 report to the Secretary of State and the diplomatic correspondence leading up to the execution of the Ankara Agreement make clear that the Ankara Agreement was expressly intended to settle the expropriation claims of American nationals of Ottoman origin against the Republic of Turkey. As a result, it is immaterial how contemporary historians characterize the Armenian Genocide, because it was clearly contemplated that the acts of expropriation about which plaintiffs complain would be encompassed in the settlement of war-related claims included in the Ankara Agreement. Cf., e.g., Taiheiyo Cement Corp., 117 Cal.App.4th at 387 n. 5, 12 Cal.Rptr.3d 32 (holding that the California “slave labor victim” and “forced labor victim” statute — which covered the time period of 1929 to 1945—was preempted by the federal government’s settlement of claims against Japan arising from World War II, even though the United States did not formally enter the war until the bombing of Pearl Harbor in December 1941).

Plaintiffs’ final two arguments are equally unavailing. Plaintiffs assert that § 354.45 is a procedural rather than a substantive statute, and thus is not preempted by the executive agreements into which the federal government entered at the end of World War I. As noted, this . argument was squarely considered and rejected by both the Ninth Circuit in Deustch and the California Court of Appeals in Taiheiyo Cement Corp. Plaintiffs also cite Alperin v. Vatican Bank, 410 F.3d 532, 538 (9th Cir.2005), for the proposition that “state-created property claims for looted and plundered property that arose during World War II are actionable.” Presumably, plaintiffs assert that the same should be true of “state-created property claims for looted and plundered property” that arose during World War I. Plaintiffs’ reliance on Alperin is misplaced, however, as that decision addressed the political question doctrine, and did not consider the constitutionality of a state statute that conflicts with the federal government’s settlement of wartime claims. See Alperin, 410 F.3d at 541 n. 4 (“The viability of the Holocaust Survivors’ claims apart from the issue of the political question doctrine is not before us. Nevertheless, looking ahead, we note that the statutory grounds on which the Holocaust Survivors base their claims have, for the most part, not fared well in recent litigation.... In [Deutsch ], we held that a California statute on which the Holocaust Survivors’ claims are based in part, Cal.Civ.Proc. Code § 354.6, unconstitutionally intruded on the foreign affairs power of the federal government. We leave the district court to determine in the first instance to what extent the Holocaust Survivors have correctly invoked these and other jurisdictional bases”). Stated differently — and contrary to plaintiffs’ assertion — Alperin did not categorically hold that state-created property claims for looted and plundered property that arose during World War II are “actionable.”

d. Conclusion Regarding § 354.45

For the foregoing reasons, the court finds that § 354.45 unconstitutionally intrudes on the federal government’s power to conduct foreign affairs. Having concluded that the Class B plaintiffs cannot rely on § 354.45 to show that their claims are timely, the court must next evaluate whether they have adequately alleged the tolling of the limitations periods otherwise applicable to their claims, or facts indicating defendants should be estopped to assert the statute of limitations as a defense.

2. Whether the Statute of Limitations on the Class B Plaintiffs’ Claims Was Tolled or Whether Defendants Should Be Estopped to Assert It

Defendants argue that plaintiffs’ Class B claims must be dismissed because the amended complaint fails to rectify the pleading deficiencies noted in the court’s September 11, 2006 order. Specifically, they assert that plaintiffs have again failed to plead facts supporting their claims that they did not discover defendants’ tortious conduct until recently, that the statute of limitations was tolled, and/or that defendants are guilty of fraudulent concealment and estopped to rely on a limitations defense as a consequence.

a. Fraudulent Concealment/Equitable Estoppel

“Equitable estoppel, also termed fraudulent concealment, halts the statute of limitations when there is active conduct by a defendant, above and beyond the wrongdoing upon which the plaintiffs claim is filed, to prevent the plaintiff from suing in time.” Guerrero v. Gates, 442 F.3d 697, 706 (9th Cir.2006) (internal quotations omitted). “In order to establish fraudulent concealment, the complaint must show: (1) when the fraud was discovered; (2) the circumstances under which it was discovered; and (3) that the plaintiff was not at fault for failing to discover it or had no actual or presumptive knowledge of facts sufficient to put him on inquiry.” Baker v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 39 Cal.App.3d 315, 321, 114 Cal.Rptr. 171 (1974). A defendant’s “[s]ilence or passive conduct ... is not deemed fraudulent, unless the relationship of the parties imposes a duty upon the defendant to make disclosure”; however, “[t]he affirmative act of denying wrongdoing may constitute fraudulent concealment where the circumstances make the plaintiffs reliance upon the denial reasonable.” Rutledge v. Boston Woven Hose & Rubber Co., 576 F.2d 248, 250 (9th Cir.1978).

“Under either California or federal authority, the plaintiff must plead with particularity the facts which give rise to the claim of fraudulent concealment.” Conerly v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 623 F.2d 117, 120 (9th Cir.1980); accord Guerrero, 442 F.3d at 707 (“The plaintiff must demonstrate that he relied on the defendant’s misconduct in failing to file in a timely manner and must plead with particularity the facts which give rise to the claim of fraudulent concealment” (emphasis added)); Baker, 39 Cal.App.3d at 321, 114 Cal.Rptr. 171 (“ ‘The existence of such fraud [giving rise to equitable estoppel] must be alleged clearly and unequivocally and must not rest upon inference,’ ” quoting Bank of America v. Williams, 89 Cal.App.2d 21, 25, 200 P.2d 151(1948)).

The amended complaint, like its predecessor, does not sufficiently plead fraudulent concealment. Plaintiffs contend that Armenian Genocide victims were displaced and struggled for decades to start a new life and achieve financial stability, and that these circumstances prevented them from making timely inquiry regarding the missing assets. They assert that numerous victims nonetheless asked defendants where their assets were, and that, in addition, many of their heirs purportedly sought information from consulates and other governmental agencies regarding the property and assets that had been taken from their ancestors.

Plaintiffs assert that defendants had actual knowledge that the Young Turks deposited with them assets looted from victims of the Armenian Genocide during the First World War, and that they actively concealed and denied the existence of such assets, e.g., by “denfying] all inquiries by Armenians regarding their assets and/or ... claiming] that they were unable to discover whether looted assets had once been in their possession.” They contend that defendants’ misrepresentations dissuaded heirs of Armenian Genocide victims from pursuing claims against the banks to recover the assets.

While these allegations may explain, in general, why some victims of the Armenian Genocide did not file timely claims to recover looted assets, they do not demonstrate when Bakian discovered defendants’ purported fraud, or why he was diligent in not learning of it sooner. Baki-an does not allege that he or his ancestors asked defendants to provide information concerning the missing assets. Nor does he assert that he was personally deceived by any defendant’s statements or representations. Similarly, Bakian provides no information as to where his ancestors settled, or for what period of time they were financially insecure or unable to pursue these claims.

In short, while the amended complaint alleges that defendants concealed the fact that they had the looted assets in their possession from some victims of the Armenian Genocide, it does not adequately explain why Bakian waited so long to file suit. Cf. Rutledge, 576 F.2d at 250 (“The sole averments in the ... complaint directed to the fraudulent concealment argument are as follows: ‘Defendant has fraudulently concealed the existence of the aforesaid price discrimination through the adoption of elaborate schemes, resorting to secrecy to avoid detection, and by denying that such discrimination or price differential existed.’ The only averment that is not conclusory is the allegation that defendant denied that such discrimination or price differential existed. [Plaintiff] cannot rely upon conclusory statements to avoid the bar of limitations. He must plead with particularity the circumstances surrounding the concealment and state facts showing his due diligence in trying to uncover the facts” (citations omitted)).

To the extent that Bakian asserts that defendants are estopped to assert the statute of limitations because they fraudulently concealed the basis for the claims from plaintiffs, therefore, his allegations are deficient under Rule 12(b)(6).

b. Delayed Discovery/Equitable Tolling

The discovery rule is not a tolling theory per se. Rather than suspending the statute of limitations, it postpones the date on which a cause of action accrues until plaintiff “suspects or should suspect that [his] injury was caused by wrongdoing, [i.e.,] that someone has done something wrong to [him].” Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co., 44 Cal.3d 1103, 1110, 245 Cal.Rptr. 658, 751 P.2d 923(1988). A plaintiff whose complaint shows on its face that his claim would be time-barred absent application of the discovery rule “must plead that, despite diligent investigation of the circumstances of the injury, he or she could not have reasonably discovered facts supporting the cause of action within the applicable statute of limitations period.” Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc., 35 Cal.4th 797, 808, 27 Cal.Rptr.3d 661, 110 P.3d 914 (2005). In other words, plaintiff must plead specific facts showing “(1) the time and manner of discovery and (2) the inability to have made earlier discovery despite reasonable diligence.” Hopkins v. Dow Coming Corp., 33 F.3d 1116, 1120 (9th Cir.1994) (quoting Saliter v. Pierce Bros. Mortuaries, 81 Cal.App.3d 292, 146 Cal.Rptr. 271 (1978)). Conclusory allegations of diligence are insufficient. McKelvey v. Boeing N. Am., Inc., 74 Cal.App.4th 151, 160, 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 645 (1999) (citing CAMSI IV v. Hunter Tech. Corp., 230 Cal.App.3d 1525, 1536-37, 282 Cal.Rptr. 80 (1991), and Mangini v. Aerojet-General Corp., 230 Cal.App.3d 1125, 1150-51, 281 Cal.Rptr. 827 (1991)).

Bakian alleges that the statute of limitations has not yet begun to run on his looted assets claims because the substantial difficulties that faced survivors of the Armenian Genocide made it impossible for them to discover the underlying facts and pursue claims in a timely fashion. This conclusory allegation does not adequately plead delayed discovery. While his ancestors may have faced considerable difficulties pursuing their looted asset claims, Bakian fails to allege specific facts showing that these difficulties continued up to the filing of this action, such that it was reasonable for him to have waited to pursue the claims. Rather than pleading facts that would support a finding of reasonable diligence, Bakian alleges only that he is “without any fault or want of diligence or due care” in pursing the claims. The pleading provides no information as to when or how Bakian (or his parents) first discovered the facts underlying the looted asset claims, nor when he (or his parents) were first in a position, despite the lasting impact of the Armenian Genocide on their “[fives] and financial stability,” to assert such claims against defendants. Additionally, Bakian does not allege any facts regarding the steps he (or his ancestors) took to discover the claims, such that his (or their) diligence can be assessed.

To the extent, therefore, that the amended complaint relies on the delayed discovery rule to render the claims timely, it is deficient under Rule 12(b)(6). Cf. In re African-American Slave Descendants Litig., 375 F.Supp.2d 721, 779 (N.D.Ill.2005) (“It is true that because of the institution of slavery, the Jim Crow laws, and the fingering bigotries and separatist views following the Civil War, African-Americans were obstructed from obtaining necessary information on their claims and in some instances access to the legal system. Nevertheless, Plaintiffs’ ancestors knew of their injury at the time that it occurred. They knew, or should have known, that they were wrongfully being forced to work without compensation, and that somebody was making a profit from their labor. Yet, neither Plaintiffs nor their ancestors ever asserted these claims in a court of law until now. Plaintiffs have not shown that they acted with all due diligence in attempting to obtain vital information about their claims, and assert them timely”).

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, defendants’ motion to dismiss the looted assets (Class B) claims is granted. Because the court is not yet convinced that Bakian can plead no set of facts that would entitle him to relief on the claims, it once again grants leave to amend the looted assets claims. The court notes that Bakian has already had two opportunities to plead facts that would permit him to invoke the delayed discovery rule and/or adequately plead that defendants are estopped to rely on the statute of limitations as a defense to the claims. Bakian is cautioned that, if defendants challenge his pleading of these matters in a future motion to dismiss, and the court concludes that his allegations are insufficient, the claims will be dismissed with prejudice. Bakian may file an amended complaint within twenty days of the date of this order. Defendants are directed to file an answer or motion to dismiss within twenty days thereafter. No continuances of these dates will be granted. The only issue defendants may raise in a new motion to dismiss is the adequacy of Bakian’s pleading of delayed discovery and/or fraudulent concealment.

Once the pleadings are fixed, the court will issue a minute order modifying the scheduling order, and setting a briefing schedule for, and hearing on, plaintiffs’ motion for class certification.

. Notice of Removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (Diversity Jurisdiction). The court accepted a transfer of the case from Judge Stephen V. Wilson, since it is related to a prior action assigned to this court, Tachjian et al. v. Deutsche Bank et al., CV 04-7248 MMM (RCx). Plaintiffs subsequently filed a motion for remand, which was denied on April 27, 2006, after the court concluded that it had jurisdiction to hear the action under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub.L. No. 109-2, § 4, 119 Stat. 4 (2005), codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1332(d).

. Specifically, plaintiffs allege that the German Bank Defendants:

“a. concealed and prevented the recovery of assets which were deposited in accounts with the GERMAN BANK DEFENDANTS by Armenians prior to World War I and the Armenian Genocide; and

b. accepted looted assets forcibly taken by the government of Ottoman Turkey during World War I and the Armenian Genocide.” (First Amended Class Action Complaint, ¶ 2.)

. Id., ¶¶ 3-5.

. Id., ¶¶ 72-88, 103-125.

. California's "borrowing statute,” CaiXiv. Proc.Code § 361, provides:

"When a cause of action has arisen in another State, or in a foreign country, and by the laws thereof an action thereon cannot there be maintained against a person by reason of the lapse of time, an action thereon shall not be maintained against him in this State, except in favor of one who has been a citizen of this State, and who has held the cause of action from the time it accrued.”

. See Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants’ Motion To Dismiss with Leave To Amend ("Sept. 11 Order”) at 58-62.

. Id. at 69-77.

. Id. at 77-78.

. First Amended Class Action Complaint, ¶ 24.

. Id., ¶ 25.

. Id., ¶ 26.

. Id., ¶ 27. While ostensibly continuing its "deportation and relocation” program, the government issued a secret directive ordering the military to exterminate all males under fifty, soldiers, priests, and teachers of Armenian ethnicity. (Id.) Women and children were to be Islamized. (Id.)

. Id., ¶ 28.

. Id., ¶ 29.

. Id., ¶ 30.

. Id., ¶ 31.

. Id.

. Id., ¶ 32.

. Id., ¶ 33.

. Id., ¶ 34.

. Id.

. Id., ¶ 36.

. Id., ¶ 35.

. Id., ¶ 36.

. id., ¶¶ 37-38.

. Id., ¶ 11.

. Jd„ ¶ 6.

.Id., ¶ 40.

.Id., ¶¶ 41-46, 50-56.

.Id. ¶¶ 47-49.

. Defendants argue that before assessing the timeliness of Bakian's claims, the court must engage in a choice of law analysis. (Defendants' Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Their Partial Motion To Dismiss the Amended Complaint ("Defs.’ Mem.”) at 11-19.) This appears to be the rule the Ninth Circuit articulated in Huynh v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 465 F.3d 992, 997 (9th Cir.2006) ("First, the court must decide what choice-of-law rule governs the selection of the statute of limitations. Second, the Court must apply that rule to determine which jurisdiction’s limitations law applies. Third, and finally, the Court [must] determine whether plaintiffs' claims fall within the relevant limitations period”). It is undisputed that Bakian's Class B claims are time-barred under either Turkish or German law. (See Declaration of Professor M. Fadlullah Cerrahoglu in Support of Defendants' Motion To Dismiss the Amended Complaint; Declaration of Professor Dr. Burkhard Hess in Support of Defendants' Motion To Dismiss the Amended Complaint.) Because, for reasons stated infra, the court concludes that Bakian's Class B claims are also untimely under California law, it need not conduct a choice-of-law analysis in this case.

. The borrowing statute applies only if an individual was a citizen of California at the time his or her cause of action accrued. See Cal.Code Civ Proc. § 361; see also Giest v. Sequoia Ventures, Inc., 83 Cal.App.4th 300, 303, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 476 (2000). In its September 11, 2006 order, the court noted that it could not determine from the allegations of the complaint whether the assets in question were looted before or after Bakian’s ancestors were killed, or whether the immediate heirs of his grandfathers knew or should have known of the looting. Consequently, the court held that it could not ascertain when the cause of action had accrued and whether the borrowing statute applied. (See Sept. 11 Order at 61-62.) Defendants argue that the Class B claims necessarily accrued at the time the looted assets were converted by the Ottoman Turkish Empire because the discovery rule is not applicable to conversion claims. (See Defs.' Mem. at 19-21.) Although the general rule in California is that "the statute of limitations for conversion is triggered by the act of wrongfully taking property,” see Bono v. Clark, 103 Cal.App.4th 1409, 1433, 128 Cal.Rptr.2d 31 (2002), courts have recognized a " 'discovery rule’ exception” when "the defendant in a conversion action fraudulently conceals the relevant facts or ... fails to disclose such facts in violation of his or her fiduciary duty to the plaintiff.” AmerUS Life Ins. Co. v. Bank of America, N.A., 143 Cal.App.4th 631, 639, 49 Cal.Rptr.3d 493 (2006). It is doubtful that defendants owed the Class B plaintiffs a fiduciary duty since they allegedly received the assets from the Ottoman Turkish government rather than from plaintiffs' ancestors, and since banks typically do not owe fiduciary duties to depositors. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Bank of America, 163 Cal.App.3d 431, 437, 209 Cal.Rptr. 541 (1985) ("[U]nder ordinary circumstances the relationship between a bank and its depositor is that of debtor-creditor, and is not a fiduciary one ...”). The former basis for invoking the discovery rule may be applicable, however. Plaintiffs have alleged that the German Bank Defendants actively and affirmatively concealed the existence of the accounts that held the looted assets, affirmatively misrepresented their knowledge of the accounts, and deliberately obstructed efforts to identify the accounts and transfer the assets to their rightful owners. (First Amended Class Action Complaint, ¶¶ 37-38.) If these allegations were proved, there might be a basis for applying the discovery rule exception to accrual of plaintiffs' conversion claims. This in turn could trigger application of California's borrowing statute; that Turkish authorities (as opposed to the banks) did not conceal their conversion of plaintiffs’ assets would not be relevant.

. Sept. 11 Order at 69-77.

. Defs.’ Mem. at 24-43.

. Id. at 4-11.

. Defendants contend that this statutory provision applies only if a plaintiff also satisfies the requirements of the California borrowing statute, i.e., if the plaintiff was a citizen of California at the time his cause of action accrued. See Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 361. (Defendants’ Reply Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Further Support of Their Partial Motion To Dismiss the Amended Complaint (“Defs.' Reply”) at 8-10.) Given the plain language of § 354.45, the court cannot agree. First, the statute states that its provisions control “notwithstanding any other law.” It is true that in enacting a similar statute, Code of Civil Procedure § 354.3, the legislature explicitly stated that "[sjection 361 does not apply to this section.” See CaiXode Civ. Proc. § 354.3(b). The phrase "notwithstanding any other law,” however, is unambiguous and susceptible of only one meaning. See People v. Murphy, 25 Cal.4th 136, 157, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 387, 19 P.3d 1129 (2001) (holding that the Three Strikes sentencing scheme applied in addition to other sentencing enhancements because the phrase “notwithstanding any other law” was unambiguous). That the court’s interpretation is correct is confirmed by other provisions in the statute. Section 354.45(a), for example, defines “Armenian Genocide victim” as "any person of Armenian or other ancestry living in the Ottoman Empire during the period of 1890 to 1923, inclusive, who died, was injured in person or property, was deported, or escaped to avoid persecution during that period." Id., § 354.45(a)(1) (emphasis added). It allows such a victim "who resides in this state and has a claim arising out of a failure of a bank to pay or turn over deposited assets, or to turn over looted assets” to "bring an action ... to recover on that claim in any court of competent jurisdiction in this state, which court shall be deemed the proper forum for that action until its completion or resolution." Id., § 354.45(b) (emphasis added). As noted, the statute also extends the statute of limitations for any action brought by an "Armenian Genocide victim” seeking the return of bank deposits or looted assets to December 31, 2016. Id., § 354.45(c). As these provisions demonstrate, the statute does not require that an "Armenian Genocide victim” have been a citizen of California at the time his or her claims accrued.