Citations
- 573 F. Supp. 2d 599
Full opinion text
RULING ON CROSS MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY, District Judge.
Table of Contents
I. Introduction..............................................................605
II.Background...........................'....................................605
A. Champion’s Long Term Disability Plans.................................605
B. CORE ...............................................................606
III. Summary Judgment Standard..............................................607
IV. The Plaintiffs’ Claims for Denial of ERISA Benefits...........................607
A. Exhaustion of Plan Remedies...........................................607
1. Futility...........................................................608
2. Notice............................................................609
3. Individual Claims.................................................609
a. Dolphus Luther Treadway, Jr....................................609
b. Franziska Finney .............................................610
c. Darrell Keith Hill..............................................611
d. Wilson Daniel McClure.........................................612
B. Standard of Review of Merits of Claims..................................613
1. Conflict of Interest.................................................613
2. Failure to Exercise Discretion.......................................614
3. The Arbitrary and Capricious Standard..............................615
C. Scope of Review.......................................................616
D. Relevant Considerations in Evaluating Total Disability....................616
1. A Previous Decision to Award Benefits...............................616
2. “Subjective” Aspects of Disability....................................616
3. “Any Occupation”.................................................618
E. Reasonableness of the Benefits Determinations............................618
1. The Administrator was Arbitrary and Capricious in Terminating Boone, Brookshire, Clark, Haynes, Kirkpatrick, Lynn, Reece, Smith, and Whitley’s Benefits.....................................618
a. Transferable Skills Analyses....................................619
b. Individual Claims.............................................621
(1) Elizabeth Case Boone.......................................621
(2) Rosa Lee Brookshire........................................626
(3) Harrison Young Clark......................................628
(4) Wiley Haynes..............................................633
(5) Judith Case Kirkpatrick ....................................638
(6) Lois Lynn.................................................641
(7) Charles B. Reece...........................................643
(8) Harry L. Smith............................................647
(9) Martha Whitley............................................650
c. Remedies.....................................................654
2. Genuine Issues of Material Fact Preclude Grant of Summary Judgment to any Party as to Celia Darlene Metcalf..................656
V. Counts Three and Four: Breach of ERISA Statutory Requirements under § 1133..................................................................659
VI. Conclusion................................................................661
I. Introduction
The plaintiffs, fourteen former employees of defendant Champion International Corporation (“Champion”), brought this action under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq., alleging nonpayment of long term disability (“LTD”) benefits by Champion, its long term disability plans, its successor International Paper Company, and CORE, Inc., a consultant for Champion.
In Count One three former salaried employees seek benefits under the Long Term Disability Benefits Plan for Salaried Employees of Champion International Corporation # 506. In Count Two the remaining plaintiffs, former hourly manual laborers and low-to semi-skilled workers at Champion’s Canton, North Carolina paper mill, seek benefits under the Long Term Disability Benefits Plan for Hourly Employees of Champion International Corporation # 703. In Count Three the plaintiffs assert violations of 29 U.S.C. § 1133. In Count Four the plaintiffs assert violations of 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3). The plaintiffs and the remaining defendants have filed cross motions for summary judgment.
II. Background
Champion was a corporation organized under New York law. Until May 2000, Champion was engaged in the paper manufacturing business and had its headquarters in Greenwich, Connecticut. Defendant International Paper Company is a New York corporation with its principal place of business in Stamford, Connecticut. In June 2000, International Paper acquired Champion’s stock and assets through a merger agreement. In December 2000, Champion merged into International Paper.
A. Champion’s Long Term Disability Plans
Champion had two self-funded long term disability plans (collectively the “plans”): the Long Term Benefits Plan for Salaried Employees of Champion (the “salaried employees plan”) and the Long Term Benefits Plan for Hourly Employees of Champion (the “hourly employees plan”). Both plans provide long term disability coverage, calculated as a percentage of monthly earnings, to employees who become “totally disabled” as defined by the plans.
The plans were administered by the Champion Pension and Employee Benefits Committee, which Champion’s board of directors appointed. In turn, the Committee appointed the Employee Benefits Department of Champion to be “Plan Supervisor.”
The plans began to provide long term disability coverage six months after the onset of disability. During the first thirty months after the onset of disability, both plans defined “total disability” as “the inability of an Employee to perform the duties of his employment with the Employer.” This is commonly known as “own occupation” disability.
After thirty months, “total disability” is defined as “the inability to engage in any occupation or business for wage or profit for which [the participant] is or may become reasonably qualified by training, education or experience.” Salaried Employees Plan at 9; see also Hourly Employees Plan at 8 (“ ‘Total Disability’ means the inability to engage in any occupation or business for wage or profit for which [the participant] is or becomes reasonably qualified by training, education or experience.”) An employee is entitled to long term disability benefits as long as he or she remains totally disabled. The Plan Supervisor may require the employee to “undergo a physical examination at periodic intervals” to determine if the employee remains disabled.
Coverage is excluded during any period in “which there is a determination by a Physician selected by the Plan Supervisor that the Participant does not meet the definition of Total Disability.”
Under the terms of the plans, Champion had “the power and authority in its sole, absolute and uncontrolled discretion to control and manage the operation and administration of the Plants]” including the right to “determine all questions relating to the eligibility of Employees to participate,” to “determine the amount and kind of benefits payable to any Employee,” and to “interpret[ ] the provisions of the Plan(s).”
B. CORE
CORE is a Massachusetts corporation with which Champion contracted to assist it in managing its long term disability program. Effective January 1, 1996, CORE and Champion entered into a Services Agreement. The Services Agreement provided, inter alia, (1) that Champion would retain full and sole authority and responsibility for determining who was eligible to receive benefits and the amount of benefits to be paid under any plan sponsored by Champion; (2) that CORE would make written recommendations to Champion concerning employees’ eligibility for benefit payments; (3) that CORE would have no responsibility for any benefit or medical care decisions; and (4) that CORE would not be deemed to be the “appropriate named fiduciary” as defined by ERISA or have any other fiduciary duties under ERISA as a result of the Services Agreement. Prior to 1996, a division of The Travelers Companies (“Travelers”) provided disability management services to Champion.
CORE used a system called “WorkAbility” to determine the presumed time an employee would be out of work for any given medical condition. According to the plaintiffs, CORE recommended that Champion terminate disability payments if an employee was out of work longer than this presumed time.
Effective January 1, 1999, CORE, Champion, and Sedgwick Claims Management entered into a “SCORE Services Agreement,” whereby CORE and Sedg-wick furnished disability management services to Champion.
According to the plaintiffs, CORE and SCORE exceeded the scope of the Services Agreement and made all benefits decisions. The plaintiffs maintain that Champion’s Plan Supervisor merely rubber-stamped CORE’S benefits determinations.
III. Summary Judgment Standard
Although, as set forth below, this case involves the review of an administrative record, the familiar summary judgment standard applies. See Gibbs ex rel. Estate of Gibbs v. CIGNA Corp., 440 F.3d 571, 575 (2d Cir.2006). The burden is on the moving party to establish that there are no genuine issues of material fact in dispute and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56; Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A court must grant summary judgment “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)); accord Miner v. City of Glens Falls, 999 F.2d 655, 661 (2d Cir.1993). A dispute regarding a material fact is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505.
Where the nonmoving party has the burden of proof at trial, the moving party need only demonstrate that there is a lack of evidence to support the nonmovant’s claim. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-25, 106 S.Ct. 2548; Tops Mkts., Inc. v. Quality Mkts., Inc., 142 F.3d 90, 95 (2d Cir.1998). Once the movant has established a prima facie case demonstrating the lack of a genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving party must provide enough evidence to support a jury verdict in its favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505; Bryant v. Maffucci, 923 F.2d 979, 982 (2d Cir.1991). A plaintiff, as the nonmovant, may not rely on conclusory statements or mere contentions that the evidence in support of summary judgment is not credible. Ying Jing Gan v. City of New York, 996 F.2d 522, 532 (2d Cir.1993). Similarly, a plaintiff may not rest “merely on allegations or denials” in its complaint to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). Therefore, after discovery, if the nonmoving party “has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of [its] case with respect to which [it] has the burden of proof,” then summary judgment is appropriate. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. When addressing a motion for summary judgment, the Court resolves “all ambiguities and draw[s] all inferences in favor of the nonmoving party in order to determine how a reasonable jury would decide.” Aldrich v. Randolph Cent. Sch. Dist., 963 F.2d 520, 523 (2d Cir.1992). Thus, “[o]nly when reasonable minds could not differ as to the import of the evidence is summary judgment proper.” Bryant, 923 F.2d at 982.
IV. The Plaintiffs’ Claims for Denial of ERISA Benefits (Counts One and Two)
A. Exhaustion of Plan Remedies (Fin-ney, Hill, McClure & Treadway)
The defendants argue that four of the plaintiffs, Franziska Finney, Darrell 'Keith Hill, Wilson Daniel McClure, and Dolphus Luther Treadway, Jr., failed to exhaust the administrative remedies available to them under the plans. Thus, the defendants maintain that they are entitled to summary judgment on these four plaintiffs’ claims for denial of benefits.
These plaintiffs argue that the exhaustion requirement should be waived because (1) it would have been futile to exhaust Champion’s appeals process; and (2) Champion failed to provide a notice of denial consistent with ERISA’s requirements, or a fair appeals process. In addition, Treadway and McClure argue that they attempted to exhaust plan remedies, but that Champion never responded to their appeals.
ERISA requires both that employee benefit plans have reasonable claims procedures in place and that plan participants avail themselves of these procedures before turning to litigation. See 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1 (1998) (detailing requirements of claims procedures, including notification of adverse decisions within ninety days and the availability of a full and fair review of the initial determination); see also Jones v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 223 F.3d 130, 140 (2d Cir.2000) (noting that “there is a ‘firmly established federal policy favoring exhaustion of administrative remedies in ERISA cases’ ”) (quoting Kennedy v. Empire Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 989 F.2d 588, 594 (2d Cir.1993)). Unless a “clear and positive showing” is made that it would be futile for the claimant to pursue her claim through the internal claims process, “that remedy must be exhausted prior to the institution of litigation.” Jones, 223 F.3d at 140 (internal quotation marks omitted).
1. Futility
Allegations of bad faith or breach of fiduciary duties may be sufficient to establish futility. See, e.g., DePace v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am., 257 F.Supp.2d 543, 560 (E.D.N.Y.2003) (“In cases where the plan fiduciary has acted in bad faith ... courts have invoked the futility doctrine and waived exhaustion as a precondition for judicial review ... ”) (internal citations omitted). However, allegations that an administrator initially unreasonably denied a benefits claim are insufficient to establish futility. Greifenberger v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., 131 Fed.Appx. 756, 759 (2d Cir.2005) (holding that allegations that administrator “denied coverage for long term disability benefits that were properly due under the policy” were insufficient to establish futility).
These plaintiffs argue that it would have been impossible to obtain a full and fair review from Champion because of CORE’S domination of the claims review process, conflicts of interest that affected the review of claims by both CORE and Champion, and Champion’s failure to consider all of the relevant factors in evaluating disability claims.
Under the terms of the plans, beneficiaries may “file a claim regarding the nonpayment of a Plan benefit” by writing to the plan administrator. The Plan Supervisor is then required to decide the claim within a “reasonable period of time” not to exceed ninety days absent special circumstances. If the “nonpayment” is upheld, then the plans permit the beneficiary to seek further review by writing within sixty days or a longer period that is “reasonable and related to the nature of the benefit which is the subject of the Claim and to other attendant circumstances.” This is the final review and was performed by the Claims Review Committee, a delegate of Champion’s Pension and Employee Benefits Committee. The members of the Claims Review Committee received a complete copy of each beneficiary’s claims file, reviewed the file, and then met to discuss the file with the other members of the Committee. The Committee would then vote to uphold denial of benefits, to reinstate benefits, or request additional information. The Court finds that Champion has presented evidence that it provided a meaningful opportunity for administrative review by the Claims Review Committee, and that the plaintiffs have failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact that pursuing these opportunities would have been futile.
2. Notice
The plaintiffs' argue that McClure, Fin-ney, and Hill received inadequate notice of denial because their denial letters did not include “[a] description of any additional material or information necessary for the claimant to perfect the claim and an explanation of why such material or information is necessary,” as required by 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(f) (1997).
“ ‘Defendants who • give inadequate notice of the right to administratively appeal a denial of benefits are thus precluded ... from asserting failure to exhaust administrative remedies as a defense.’ ” Strom v. Siegel Fenchel & Peddy P.C. Profit Sharing Plan, 497 F.3d 234, 246 (2d Cir.2007) (quoting Veltri v. Building Service 32B-J Pension Fund, 393 F.3d 318, 324 (2d Cir.2004)). However, a participant, is “required to exhaust even if [he or] she was ignorant of the proper claims procedure.” Davenport v. Harry N. Abrams, Inc., 249 F.3d 130, 134 (2d Cir.2001). Thus, a participant will not be excused from exhausting ádministrative remedies because an individual communication from the administrator does not strictly meet ERISA requirements. See, e.g., Kent v. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 96 F.3d 803, 807-08 (6th Cir.1996); Sheppard & Enoch Pratt Hosp., Inc. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 32 F.3d 120, 127 (4th Cir.1994); Halpin v. W.W. Grainger, Inc., 962 F.2d at 693-94; Davidson v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 953 F.2d 1093, 1096 (8th Cir.1992); Crocco v. Xerox Corp., 956 F.Supp. 129, 142-43 (D.Conn.1997), aff'd in part and rev’d in part on other grounds, Crocco v. Xerox Corp., 137 F.3d 105, 108 (2d Cir.1998); but see Nichols v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 406 F.3d 98, 106-08 (2d Cir.2005) (holding that substantial compliance with ERISA requirements by the administrator cannot delay accrual of the right to sue).
3. Individual Claims
Turning to the claims made by the individual plaintiffs, the Court finds that there is a genuine issue of material fact concerning whether Treadway exhausted his administrative remedies. However, the Court finds that Finney, Hill, and McClure have failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact concerning exhaustion.
a. Dolphus Luther Treadway, Jr.
Treadway was hired as an hourly employee by Champion in 1972. He worked as a “Chip Deliverer” or “First Operator” until December 1995, when he left on short term disability related to coronary artery disease, and myocardial infarction (heart attack). In June 1996, he was awarded long term disability benefits.
In June 1998, the Plan initiated a review of Treadway’s condition to determine if he was eligible for continued benefits under the any occupation definition of disability. Following this review on September 11, 1998, CORE notified Treadway that his LTD benefits were being terminated. Treadway appealed the termination of his benefits by at least December 1998.
According to unsigned handwritten notes in Champion’s records “per call from Janice EE has signed ret forms eff 2/1/99. Loc contact EE re: dropping appeal on LTD & and has requested a letter from attorney stating withdrawing appeal. Let go thru appeal & not start Pension with/o signing waiver. Check with/ Sharon- — • does he have to sign a waiver for LTD?” On March 12, 1999, Treadway’s counsel wrote to Mary Lee Dixon concerning the status of Treadway’s appeal. He did not indicate that the appeal had been withdrawn.
The Court finds that there is a genuine issue of material fact concerning whether Treadway withdrew his appeal, or Champion failed to act on that appeal. Accordingly, summary judgment is denied as to all parties on this basis as to Treadway.
b. Frcmziska Finney
Champion hired Finney as an hourly employee in 1983. Finney began receiving short term disability benefits on November 7, 1994. When Finney’s short term disability benefits were exhausted, her claim converted to a long term disability claim.
On August' 26, 1997, Finney was informed by letter on CORE letterhead that her long term disability benefits were being terminated because she was “not disabled as defined in the Plan.” The letter indicated that the decision was “[b]ased on the 7/23/97 Functional Capacity Evaluation (FCE)” which found that Finney was “able to perform light duty work for 8 hours per day.” The letter also informed Finney of her right to appeal.
On October 1,1997, Finney appealed the termination of her benefits and submitted recent medical records. On December 22, 1997, CORE recommended “upholding of the previous denial of further long term disability benefits.”
On February 9, 1998, the Plan advised Finney that “[bjased on the review by CORE, our decision is to uphold the denial of LTD benefits.” The letter summarized the information CORE reviewed and concluded that “[t]his information does not substantiate your disability as being totally and permanently disabled from any occupation as defined in the Plan.” The letter noted the applicable Plan terms and advised Finney that she was entitled to further review by notifying Champion in writing within sixty days of receipt of the denial. Finney did not request further review within that time period.
While the denial letters Champion issued may not have provided guidance on information Finney could have submitted to supplement her claim, they provided sufficient notice of the right to seek further review and the method for doing so. Finney did not avail herself of this opportunity within the time allowed by the Plan. Accordingly, Finney has not presented evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact that the exhaustion requirement should be waived in her case.
Because Finney has not presented evidence suggesting that she exhausted her administrative remedies, or that exhaustion should be excused, summary judgment is granted in favor of the defendants.
c. Darrell Keith Hill
Champion hired Hill as an hourly employee in 1972. In November 1990, Hill injured his right ankle and leg, and subsequently had a below the knee amputation of his right leg. Hill thereafter received short term disability from Champion. In May 1991, Champion approved Hill’s claim for long term disability benefits.
In 1998, Champion initiated a review of Hill’s eligibility for benefits. CORE scheduled Hill for an Independent Medical Examination (“IME”), which was apparently performed on June 25, 1998. The report of the Independent Medical Examination was not included in the administrative record provided to the Court.
On July 29, 1998, the Plan informed Hill that his long term disability benefits had been terminated and that he had a right to have this decision reviewed. The denial letter' indicated that Hill’s claim was not approved because he was “[n]ot disabled as denied in the Plan.” It continued, “The Independent Medical Examination found you capable of work 8 hours per day, 5 days per week in a sedentary job. The Transferable Skills Analysis revealed skills that can be utilized in jobs of a Drafter Assistant, a Drafter Apprentice, and a Stuffer (toy — sport equipment production.)” On the same date, in a document titled “Confidential Service Report # 5” Core reported that “Case Management’s assessment and intervention” had saved Champion $75,850.
On October 1,1998, Hill’s wife submitted additional information to support Hill’s claim, including information suggesting that the conclusions of the Transferable Skills Analysis were unreasonable. By letter dated October 19, 1998, Mrs. Hill requested review of the Plan’s decision to terminate her husband’s disability benefits.
In response, CORE asked its consulting physician to review Hill’s claim. The consulting physician’s report was.not included in the administrative record provided to the Court.
On February 17, 1999, the Plan informed Hill that it was upholding denial of his claim for continued benefits, and informed Hill that he had a right to appeal the denial. The denial letter included a description of a CORE physician consultant’s conclusions after reviewing the, medical documentation submitted by Hill. It also noted that “we have completed a Transferable Skills Analysis that determined that you have skills to perform other occupations.”
Hill did not respond to this letter until September 1999, when his attorney requested copies of Hill’s claim file and all Plan documents. Then, in December 2000, Hill requested reconsideration of the decision to terminate his benefits.
Evidence that CORE evaluated cost savings in reviewing Hill’s eligibility for benefits does not amount to a clear and positive showing that exhaustion would have been futile. Similarly, while the denial letters Champion issued may not have provided guidance on information Hill could have submitted to supplement his claim, they provided sufficient notice of the right to seek further review and the method for doing so. Hill did not avail himself of this opportunity within the time allowed by the Plan. Accordingly, Hill has not presented evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact that the exhaustion requirement should be waived in his case and summary judgment is granted in favor of the defendants:
d. Wilson Daniel McClure
McClure worked as a Maintenance Supervisor for Champion until February 1, 1989, when he began receiving short term disability benefits. In August 1989, he began receiving long term disability benefits.
As part of a periodic review of McClure’s eligibility, CORE scheduled McClure for an Independent Medical Examination with Dr. C. Ruffin Stephenson in July 1996. Dr. Stephenson concluded that McClure could not perform the duties of his Maintenance Supervisor position, but that he would “be able to do some type of sedentary work or desk job, particularly one where he could get up and move around when his back gets stiff and sore, and would allow him such freedom as that.”
On October 16, 1996, CORE notified McClure that, based on the results of Dr. Stephenson’s Independent Medical Examination, the Plan was terminating his long term disability benefits. The letter noted that “[a]ccording to the IME findings, you are not disabled from any occupation.” The letter indicated that McClure was “entitled to obtain further review of this initially denied claim” and instructed McClure to include “the reason you believe your claim should be treated differently [including] any new, additional facts or medical information you consider important for us to give your appeal proper consideration.”
On December 13, 1996, McClure requested through counsel that Champion review termination of his benefits and submitted medical records and the Social Security Administration’s decision granting his claim for disability benefits.
On April 9, 1997, the Plan notified McClure of its decision to deny his claim for long term disability benefits. The denial letter informed McClure that Champion had based its decision on the Independent Medical Examination and May 9, 1994 examination notes from McClure’s treating physician indicating that McClure had the physical capacity to perform work other than the job he had performed at Champion. The letter also informed McClure that he had sixty days to appeal the Plan’s determination and attached a copy of the Independent Medical Examination.
On July 1, 1997, over eighty days after the date on the denial letter, McClure’s counsel notified the Plan that he had received the Plan’s April 9, 1997, denial of McClure’s claim for long term disability benefits. He indicated that he was in the process of collecting medical information and requested an additional sixty days to collect such records. Champion did not respond to this request.
Over a year later, on October 19, 1998, McClure’s counsel wrote the following letter to Champion:
I have been informed by Wilson D. McClure that you have received various additional medical evidence regarding his claim for long term disability benefits following the decision of April 9, 1997 ... Please let me know the status of his claim and whether or not you did receive additional medical evidence in the form of documents from Mr. McClure.
A note on this letter indicates, “Per Kelly @ Core has not rec’d any add’l info re: appeal since denied claim of 4-9-97,” and “Called attorney to advise that we have never rec’d any add’l info for review.”
Because McClure did not request additional time to collect medical evidence until the period to appeal the April 1997 denial had elapsed, and because he has not presented evidence that additional medical evidence was ever actually submitted to CORE, the Court finds that McClure has failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact concerning whether he exhausted Champion’s administrative remedies.
Further, while the denial letters Champion issued may not have strictly complied with all ERISA requirements, they provided sufficient notice of the right to seek further review and the method for doing so. McClure did not avail himself of this opportunity within the time allowed by the Plan. Accordingly, like Finney and Hill, McClure has not presented evidence suggesting that the exhaustion requirement should be waived in his case.
Because McClure has failed to create a genuine issue of material fact that he exhausted available administrative remedies, or should be excused from exhausting such remedies, summary judgment is granted in favor of the defendants.
B. Standard of Review of Merits of Claims
“[A] denial of benefits challenged under [ERISA] is to be reviewed under a de novo standard unless the benefit plan gives the administrator or fiduciary discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits or to construe the terms of the plan.” Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115, 109 S.Ct. 948, 103 L.Ed.2d 80 (1989). Where the plan grants discretion to the administrator to determine eligibility and construe the terms of the plan, the administrator’s decision is ordinarily reviewed to determine whether it was arbitrary and capricious. See Pagan v. NYNEX Pension Plan, 52 F.3d 438, 441 (2d Cir.1995).
The plaintiffs concede that the plans confer discretion on Champion. However, they argue that they are nonetheless entitled to a de novo review because (1) Champion/CORE operated under a conflict of interest, or (2) Champion/CORE failed to exercise its discretion in making benefits determinations.
1. Conflict of Interest
After oral argument on the motion for summary judgment, the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, — U.S. -, 128 S.Ct. 2343, 171 L.Ed.2d 299 (2008). In Glenn ■ the Court held that when the entity that administers an employee benefits plan “both determines whether an employee is eligible for benefits and pays benefits out of its own pocket ... this dual role creates a conflict of interest.” 128 S.Ct. at 2346. That conflict is “a factor in determining whether the plan administrator has abused its discretion in denying benefits.” Id. The significance of this factor “dependfs] upon the circumstances of the particular case.” Id.; see also Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., 489 U.S. at 115, 109 S.Ct. 948, 103 L.Ed.2d 80 (“if a benefit plan gives discretion to an administrator or fiduciary who is operating under a conflict of interest, that conflict must be weighed as a factor in determining whether there is an abuse of discretion”).
The plaintiffs argue that Champion/ CORE operated under a conflict of interest. Specifically, the plaintiffs argue that the inherent structural conflict under which any self-funded plan operates influenced Champion’s benefits determinations, and that CORE was conflicted by its desire to preserve its consulting contract with Champion. Champion admits that CORE provided “savings information” in “Confidential Service Reports” generated in response to five of the fourteen plaintiffs’ claims for benefits. CORE also provided detailed information about disability rates and trends among Champion employees.
“[CJonflicts are but one factor among many that a reviewing judge must take into account” and weigh against one another. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, — U.S.-, 128 S.Ct. 2343, 2351, 171 L.Ed.2d 299 (2008). The Court finds that the plaintiffs have not presented evidence that Champion’s conflict was so severe that it alone rendered Champion’s claims process arbitrary and capricious. Accordingly, for the purposes of summary judgment the Court will give the conflict substantial weight in evaluating the defendants’ motion, and a de minimis weight in evaluating the plaintiffs’ motion.
2. Failure to Exercise Discretion
In addition, the plaintiffs argue that they are entitled to a de novo review because Champion/CORE did not actually exercise any discretion granted to it under the plan. The plaintiffs maintain that CORE’S WorkAbility system removed any individualized discretion from benefits decisions.
“[Fjailure to exercise ... discretion [vested in the plan administrator], requires de novo review of the denial of benefits.” Nichols v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 406 F.3d 98, 101, 109 (2d Cir.2005) (holding that plaintiff was entitled to de novo review where plan administrator failed to exercise discretion by failing to act on appeal within regulatory period); see also Strom v. Siegel Fenchel & Peddy P.C. Profit Sharing Plan, 497 F.3d 234, 243 (2d Cir.2007) (de novo review required because administrators’ benefits “decision” was not based on interpretation of key plan term).
However, uniform application of a policy that “was itself a discretionary decision in the first instance” does not constitute failure to exercise discretion and does not support de novo review of a benefits determination consistent with such a policy. Krauss v. Oxford Health Plans, Inc., 517 F.3d 614, n. 7 (2d Cir.2008).
In order to be entitled to deference the Plan Administrator must be the entity that exercises discretion. Allison v. Unum Life Ins. Co., No. CV 04-0025, 2005 WL 1457636, *8 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 11, 2005) (applying de novo standard where plan language vested discretion in plan administrator, but a different entity exercised discretion without proper delegation).
Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, the Court finds that no reasonable fact finder could conclude that Champion’s Claims Review Committee failed to examine the administrative record and make individualized benefits determinations. Accordingly, the Court will not deviate from deferential review for this reason.
3. The Arbitrary and Capricious Standard
“A decision is arbitrary and capricious if it is without reason, unsupported by substantial evidence or erroneous as a matter of law.” Zervos v. Verizon New York, Inc., 277 F.3d 635, 646 (2d Cir.2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). Substantial evidence “is such evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support the conclusion reached by the [de-cisionmaker and] ... requires more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance.” Miller v. United Welfare Fund, 72 F.3d 1066, 1072 (2d Cir.1995) (internal quotation marks omitted, alteration in the original). Additionally, a decision must be “based on a consideration of the relevant factors.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Accordingly, in resolving the pending motions, the Court must determine whether there are genuine issues of material fact concerning the evidence before the Administrator, and the factors it considered. See Wojciechowski v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 1 Fed.Appx. 77, 79 (2d Cir.2001). If there are no such genuine issues of material fact, then the Court must determine “whether the aggregate evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, could support a rational determination that the plan administrator acted arbitrarily in denying the claim for benefits.” Leahy v. Raytheon Co., 315 F.3d 11, 17 (1st Cir.2002).
A decision may also be arbitrary and capricious if it was rendered after less than a full and fair review. See Cohen v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 485 F.Supp.2d 339, 353 (S.D.N.Y.2007) (holding that participant was denied “full and fair review” where administrator obtained additional material from treating professionals in connection with an appeal without informing participant); Soron v. Liberty Life Assurance Co., 318 F.Supp.2d 19, 28 (N.D.N.Y.2004) (holding that participant was denied “full and fair review” where administrator did not disclose relevant evidence until after final review).
ERISA requires every benefit plan to “afford a reasonable opportunity to any participant whose claim for benefits has been denied for a full and fair review by the appropriate named fiduciary of the decision denying the claim.” 29 U.S.C. § 1133. “The purpose of the full and fair review requirement is to provide claimants with enough information to prepare adequately for further administrative review or an appeal to the federal courts.” Juliano v. Health Maint. Org. of N.J., Inc., 221 F.3d 279, 287 (2d Cir.2000) (internal quotations and citations omitted). “At the very least, a full and fair review requires that the fiduciary inform the participant or beneficiary of the evidence that the fiduciary relied upon and provide an opportunity to submit written comments or rebuttal documents.” Lidoshore v. Health Fund 917, 994 F.Supp. 229, 236-37 (S.D.N.Y.1998) (internal quotations and citation omitted); Crocco v. Xerox Corp., 956 F.Supp. 129, 139 (D.Conn.1997) (the plan administrator “must also inform the participant of what evidence he relied upon and provide him with an opportunity to examine that evidence and to submit written comments or rebuttal documentary evidence.”), aff'd in relevant part, 137 F.3d 105, 108 (2d Cir.1998). Thus, ERISA regulations require every appeals procedure to provide that the claimant or his duly authorized representative an opportunity to “[r]eview pertinent documents; and ... [s]ubmit issues and comments in writing.” 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-l(g) (1998). The plans contain similar provisions.
C. Scope of Review
In an ERISA case, review is ordinarily limited to the administrative record. See, e.g., Krizek v. Cigna Group Ins., 345 F.3d 91, 97 (2d Cir.2003). However, a court may expand its review for good cause. Good cause is most often found where there was a conflict of interest and a defect in the procedures followed during administrative review. See, e.g., Id. at 98, n. 3 (“[District courts [should] resolve the conflict issue in advance and, only upon finding ‘good cause,’ permit the parties to introduce evidence beyond the administrative record.”).
The plaintiffs argue that they are entitled to rely on documents outside of the administrative record because of the alleged conflict of interest discussed above. The Court does not find that good cause exists to expand its review beyond the administrative record as to most of the plaintiffs. The additional documents offered by the plaintiffs either should have been offered to the Administrator during its review, or were created after the fact and not relevant to the plaintiffs’ conditions at the time their claims were denied.
D. Relevant Considerations in Evaluating Total Disability
The plaintiffs argue that Champion failed to consider a number of important factors in evaluating their eligibility for continued benefits. Champion maintains that these factors were not relevant to determining eligibility under the terms of the plans. The Court finds that previous eligibility determinations, evidence of pain and other “subjective” aspects of disability, and all other circumstances related to the plaintiffs’ ability to pursue an occupation are relevant to determining whether the plaintiffs were entitled to continued benefits, and thus, whether Champion was rational in terminating their benefits.
1. A Previous Decision to Award Benefits
If benefits are terminated absent any change in the participant’s medical condition, or the applicable policy language, the previous decision to award benefits is relevant in evaluating the reasonableness of terminating benefits. See Connors v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 272 F.3d 127, 136 (2d Cir.2001) (noting significance of a decision to terminate long term disability benefits absent any evidence of a change in the plaintiffs condition).
2. “Subjective” Aspects of Disability
“This Circuit has long held that the subjective element of pain is an important factor to be considered in determining disability.” Mimms v. Heckler, 750 F.2d 180, 185 (2d Cir.1984), quoted by Connors, 272 F.3d at 136. Even when a plan gives the administrator discretionary authority, the administrator may only evaluate the credibility of the claimant’s subjective complaints of pain; the administrator may not dismiss the claimant’s subjective pain as legally insufficient evidence. Krizek v. Cigna Group Ins., 345 F.3d 91, 101-02 (2d. Cir.2003) (“[W]hile a district judge is not required to accept a plaintiffs subjective complaints as credible, it cannot dismiss complaints of pain as legally insufficient evidence of disability.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Short v. UNUM Life Ins. Co., No. Civ. 302CV827 (MRK), 2003 WL 22937720, at *6, *9 (D.Conn. Dec.3, 2003) (noting that even when the plan administrator has discretionary authority, the administrator still has a duty to consider all relevant evidence, including subjective evidence). Indeed, when credible evidence is before the administrator, “subjective pain may serve as the basis for establishing disability, even if such pain is unaccompanied by positive clinical findings or other ‘objective’ medical evidence.” Marcus v. Califano, 615 F.2d 23, 27 (2d. Cir.1979); see also Lijoi v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 414 F.Supp.2d 228, 245 (E.D.N.Y.2006) (holding that “credible complaints of pain ... cannot be disregarded” even though plan terms required participant to submit “objective medical findings” to substantiate a disability claim).
However, the administrator need not find a participant disabled every time subjective evidence of pain is presented. For example, if the plan administrator determines that the participant’s subjective complaints of pain are inconsistent with objective medical evidence, the administrator may reasonably discount the participant’s credibility and thus properly deny disability benefits. See Williams v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 509 F.3d 317, 322-23 (7th Cir.2007) (noting that while an administrator may not reasonably require “objective” evidence of pain or fatigue, it may require “accurate documentation from a treating physician that the claimant’s subjective symptoms of pain or fatigue limit his functional abilities in the workplace”).
The evaluation of and weight given to subjective and objective evidence is largely dependent on the circumstances of a particular case. In this case, many of the plaintiffs suffer from fibromyalgia, a condition diagnosed by subjective pain. The Merck Manual of Diagnosis and Therapy 321 Mark H. Bears et al. eds., (Merck Research Laboratories 18th ed.2006) (fi-bromyalgia “is suspected in patients with generalized pain and tenderness, especially disproportionate to the physical findings.”) It would thus be unreasonable to require objective evidence to support a diagnosis of fibromyalgia. Accordingly, even if the participant’s subjective reports are not supported by objective medical evidence, the participant’s subjective pain by itself may constitute sufficient evidence of a disability. Green-Younger v. Barnhart, 335 F.3d 99, 108 (2d Cir.2003) (noting that “fibromyalgia is a disabling impairment and that ‘there are no objective tests which can conclusively confirm the disease.’ ”)
While an administrator may look to objective evidence to evaluate the credibility or severity of reports of pain, it is arbitrary and capricious to deny a disability claim solely based on the unavailability of such evidence. See Crawford v. Bowen, No. 87 CV 2862, 1989 WL 88005, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. July 31, 1989) (“The fact that the clinical findings do not substantiate the severity of pain alleged by the claimant is not a sufficient ground for denying claimant disability benefits if other evidence demonstrates that claimant suffers from debilitating back pain.”); Oliver v. Coca-Cola Co., 497 F.3d 1181, 1195-99 (11th Cir.2007) (holding that administrator was arbitrary and capricious in requiring objective evidence of pain where the plan did not specifically require such evidence or exclude coverage for pain related disabilities), vacated in part on other grounds on petition for reh’g, 506 F.3d 1316 (11th Cir.2007).
3. “Any Occupation ”
“A finding that a claimant is physically capable of sedentary work is meaningless without some consideration of whether [he or] she is vocationally qualified to obtain such employment, and to earn a reasonably substantial income from it, rising to the dignity of an income or livelihood, though not necessarily as much as she earned before disability.” Demirovic v. Bldg. Serv. 32 B-J Pension Fund, 467 F.3d 208, 213-14 (2d Cir.2006) (“[A] reasonable interpretation of a claimant’s entitlement to payments based on a claim of ‘total disability’ must consider the claimant’s ability to pursue gainful employment in light of all the circumstances.”) Thus, an administrator must consider whether a beneficiary has “the vocational capacity to perform any type of work ... that actually exists in the national economy.” ' Id. at 215.
Age is a relevant factor in determining vocational capacity. Id. at 213, 216; see also SSR 83-10 “Determining Capability to do other Work — the Medical-Vocational Rules of Appendix 2” available at 1983 WL 31251 (noting that age must be considered to determine a claimant’s vocational adaptability).
Although the plaintiffs have presented evidence that CORE interpreted the plans to exclude these considerations, neither party has presented evidence that Champion itself interpreted the plans in such a way (or that Champion explicitly adopted CORE’S interpretation). To the extent that any of the benefits determinations in this case implicitly turn on the plans being interpreted in this manner, the Court finds that such an interpretation is unreasonable as a matter of law.
E. Reasonableness of the Benefits Determinations
1. The Administrator was Arbitrary and Capricious in Terminating Boone, Brookshire, Clark, Haynes, Kirkpatrick, Lynn, Reece, Smith, and Whitley’s Benefits
The Court finds that Champion was arbitrary and capricious in terminating Elizabeth Case Boone, Rosa Lee Brookshire, Harrison Young Clark, Wiley Haynes, Judith Case Kirkpatrick, Lois Lynn, Charles R. Reece, Harry L. Smith, and Martha Whitley’s long term disability benefits.
This section has three parts. The first discusses a problem common to Champion’s review of many of the plaintiffs’ claims. The second examines the individual plaintiffs’ claims, and the Court’s reasons for finding that, as a matter of law, Champion did not afford these plaintiffs a full and fair review. Further, as set forth more fully below, the Court finds that Champion was unreasonable in evaluating Boone, Clark, Haynes, and Whitley’s claims. The final section sets forth the considerations relevant to determining an appropriate remedy for each plaintiff.
a. Transferable Skills Analyses
Champion relied on “Transferable Skills Analyses” in determining that' many of the plaintiffs had skills that would permit them to return to work consistent with their physical limitations. Most of these analyses suffered from serious flaws and were an inadequate basis for determining that the plaintiffs were vocationally qualified to work at “any occupation or business for wage or profit for which [they were] or may become reasonably qualified by training, education or experience.”
Because these analyses applied the same methods, the Court will discuss the flaws it has identified in general, before turning to the reasonableness of benefits determinations made for the individual plaintiffs based in part on these analyses.
Most of the Transferable Skills Analyses were performed by Jennifer Mikeska, MRC, for Cost Review Services, a division of CORE. Mikeska identified the plaintiffs’ work histories by referring to their “profile sheets,” presumably the “Personal Profile Evaluations” completed by the plaintiffs. The Administrative Record does not reflect that Mikeska interviewed any of the plaintiffs in connection with these analyses, or that she spoke with anyone at Champion to obtain information about the plaintiffs’ work histories. Mikeska then apparently used these profile sheets to determine which positions in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles most closely corresponded to the plaintiffs’ past occupations.
The Dictionary of Occupational Titles (4th Ed., Rev.1991) (“DOT”) is a publication of the Department of Labor. Although it was last updated in 1991, it is commonly used to determine alternative occupations in Social Security and private disability cases. See, e.g., Krizek v. Cigna Group Ins., 345 F.3d 91, 96 (2d Cir.2003) (ERISA); Jasinski v. Barnhart, 341 F.3d 182, 183 (2d Cir.2003) (Social Security). The DOT includes a variety of information about each listed occupation, reflected in numerical codes in the occupation title and “trailer.” DOT, “Introduction: Parts of the Occupational Definition.” This information includes the industry, worker functions involved in the occupation, the date the definition was last updated, the level of specific vocational preparation required, and the reasoning, language, and math skills required. DOT, “Appendix C: Components of the Definition Trailer.” “Worker functions” are divided into functions related to “data,” “people,” and “things.” DOT, “Appendix B: Explanation of Data, People, and Things.” For example, a highly responsible position might require “mentoring” others, while a less responsible position would require “taking instructions-helping” others. Id. (noting that worker functions may be seen as a “hierarchy only in the most general sense.”)
Mikeska used the “worker function” codes in the DOT to determine each plaintiffs “transferable skills.” For example, Mikeska concluded that Boone’s transferable skills were “comparing,” “taking-instructions,” and “handling,” the least responsible worker functions in each category. Mikeska then searched for occupational titles within the plaintiffs’ exer-tional limitations, that used the same worker functions, and were within the same work field or otherwise were similar to the plaintiffs’ prior occupations. In evaluating some of the plaintiffs, Mikeska also considered non-exertional physical limitations and the level of vocational preparation necessary to perform alternative occupations. Some of the evaluations also reflect that Mikeska considered whether alternative occupations were obsolete.
As described in more detail below, the Transferable Skills Analyses performed by CORE suffer from some or all of the following defects: '
First, Mikeska did not obtain sufficient information about the plaintiffs’ work histories, instead relying on brief job descriptions. An accurate assessment of a claimant’s work history is critical to a valid Transferable Skills Analysis. Creech v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 162 Fed.Appx. 445, 457-60 (6th Cir.2006) (per cu-riam) (holding that reliance on Transferable Skills Analysis based on an inaccurate description of prior work was arbitrary and capricious). “Neither an occupational title by itself nor a skeleton description is sufficient” to determine activities involved in past work experience. SSR 82-41 “Work Skills and Their Transferability as Intended by the Expanded Vocational Factors Regulations Effective February 26, 1979,” available at 1982 WL 31389. In addition, while “people are not expected to do more complex jobs than they have actually performed,” id., some of the anályses suggest alternate occupations at a higher skill level than the prior occupations Mikeska identified.
Next, Mikeska unreasonably treated “worker functions” as skills. “A skill is knowledge of a work activity which requires the exercise of significant judgment that goes beyond the carrying out of simple job duties and is acquired through performance of an occupation which is above the unskilled level.... A skill gives a person a special advantage over unskilled workers in the labor market.” Id.; see also The American Heritage College Dictionary, 3rd ed. (defining “skill” as “proficiency, facility, or dexterity that is acquired or developed through training or experience.”) The worker functions reflect the level of skill involved in a position, and some of the more responsible functions may indicate the existence of particular skills. However, worker functions, particularly less responsible worker functions, are not themselves skills.
Further, in some cases, Mikeska failed to consider non-exertional limitations including (1) intellectual and psychological limitations, including those related to the side effects of prescription medications and pain; (2) limited manual dexterity; and (3) a limited ability to remain seated for an extended period of time. Such non-exer-tional limitations can be important aspects of vocational capacity. See Rabuck v. Hartford Life and Accident Ins. Co., 522 F.Supp.2d 844, 876-77 (W.D.Mich.2007) (holding that failure to consider non-strength limitations of former company president with short-term memory limitations rendered Transferable Skills Analysis “incredible”). For low skill, sedentary and light duty positions, bilateral manual dexterity, and the ability to remain in a particular posture are important non-exer-tional limitations. SSR 83-14, “Capability to Do Other Work — the Medical-Vocational Rules as a Framework for Evaluating a Combination of Exertional and Nonexer-tional Impairments,” available at 1983 WL 31254 (“[BJilateral manual dexterity is necessary for the performance of substantially all unskilled sedentary occupations.”); SSR 83-12 “Capability to Do Other Work — the Medical-vocational Rules as a Framework for Evaluating Exertional Limitations Within a Range of Work or Between Ranges, of Work” available at 1983 WL 31253 (noting that only a few highly skilled sedentary positions permitted changes of position at will), cited by Nelson v. Bowen, 882 F.2d 45, 48^49 (2d Cir.1989). Similarly, Mikeska failed to consider the plaintiffs’ ages in determining whether they could reasonably adapt to a new occupation.
Finally, Mikeska failed to consider whether the alternate occupations she identified still existed in the national economy. Many of the occupational titles in the DOT, including most of the occupations identified for the plaintiffs in this case, were lasted updated in 1977. Some of these were obviously obsolete by the mid-1990’s. Accordingly, the identification of an alternate occupation in the DOT was not necessarily an adequate indication that an alternate occupation actually existed in the national economy.
b. Individual Claims
(1) Elizabeth Case Boone
In 1976, Elizabeth Boone was hired as an hourly employee at Champion’s facility in Canton, North Carolina. In 1987, while she was working as a “cutter sort checker,” Boone applied for disability benefits. Boone was approved for short term disability benefits -in May 1987 and left active employment. In November 1987, Boone’s claim converted to a long term disability claim, and Champion determined that Boone was “still wholly and continuously disabled” because of neck pain. In particular, according to Boone’s treating physician, she underwent an “anterior cervical diskectomy, with interbody fusion C4-5.”
Over the next ten years, Boone’s eligibility was periodically reviewed. After each review, Champion found that Boone’s medical condition was largely unchanged and that her eligibility continued “based on the chronicity and persistence of [her]' symptoms.” Core Case Management Confidential Service Report # 1 dated November 21,1996.
In 1997, the Plan requested additional personal and medical information from Boone. In response to this request, Boone submitted, among other materials, a report from her treating physician, Dr. Jill Vargo, a rheumatologist, stating that she was totally disabled from any occupation. In reviewing Boone’s eligibility for continuation of benefits, Dr. J.D. Beavers, a physician and Medical Director for CORE, spoke with Dr. Vargo. According to Dr. Beavers’ notes, Dr. Vargo indicated that there were no objective findings to report, and that “she’s not sure if [Boone] is any-occupation disabled.”
Dr. Beavers recommended that Champion “not certify any-occupation disability,” but Dr. Vargo refused to authorize Boone to return to work. As a result, Champion referred Boone to an Independent Medical Examination with Dr. Charles Shields, a physiatrist. Dr. Shields concluded that Boone could work up to six hours a day “with 1 hour changes of position.” Dr. Shields also noted that Boone had limited or no ability to use her left hand for repetitive tasks, grasping, and tasks requiring manual dexterity.
On March 3, 1998, CORE recommended “a denial of continued LTD benefits ... given the results of the independent medical exam.” Confidential Service Report # 3. In the same document, CORE commented on the savings terminating Boone’s benefits would achieve: “Please refer to the estimated savings analysis for the LTD benefit period.... It is estimated that without the intervention of LTD Case Management, the employee would continue to receive LTD benefits through the age of 65.” Id.
On March 9, 1998, in a letter on CORE letterhead, Dr. Beavers notified Boone that her long term disability benefits would be terminated.
In a letter dated March 24, 1998, Dr. Vargo stated that “as a board certified rheumatologist and in following this patient over a long period of time, I can say that there has not been a substantial change in her disability status.” Dr. Var-go continued that she did “not expect Ms. Boone to improve to the point where she can return to gainful employment.” On April 8, 1998, Boone appealed the termination of her benefits. ■ •
On April 29, 1998, CORE commissioned Dr. Alan Marks, a rheumatologist, to conduct a “Peer Review Analysis” of Boone’s appeal. Dr. Marks concluded that Boone was not disabled and that another Independent Medical Examination was not indicated' because “[pjatients with neck pain, left arm and leg pain, without demonstrable neurological abnormalities ... cannot be thought of as being disabled from any occupation, even though the individual may feel incapable of holding down a job.” As a result, CORE recommended that the Plan “uphold the previous denial of LTD benefits.”
By letter date July 2, 1998, the Plan Supervisor notified Boone that Champion’s “decision is to uphold the denial of LTD benefits” and advised her of her rights to obtain further review of her claim.
On August 16,1998, Boone again appealed denial of her claim for long term disability benefits. Her appeal was supported by reports from two additional treating physicians, Dr. John Stringfield and Dr. Sean Maloney. Dr. Stringfield reported that he supports “this patient’s continued disability.” Dr. Maloney noted that Boone was “currently disabled and unable to do even sedentary work on a consistent basis.” Medical notes dated April 6, 1998. Dr. Vargo also submitted an additional letter concluding that Boone was “unable to be employed at any level of job including sedentary.” Letter dated July 16,1998.
. On September 3, 1998, the Plan commissioned a Transferable Skills Analysis of Boone. The Transferable Skills Analysis identified fifteen occupational titles — such as clip-on sunglasses inspector, asbestos shingle inspector, and cuff folder — as appropriate for Boone.
On September 24, 1998, Champion’s Claims Review Committee met to consider Boone’s appeal. After a three-hour meeting, in which five other cases were also considered, the Committee voted to uphold denial o