Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM-DECISION and ORDER DAVID N. HURD, District Judge. TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION.356 II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND.356 III. DISCUSSION. 358 A. Motion for Summary Judgment. 358 B. Plaintiff’s Title VII Claims. 359 1. Individual Liability. 359 2. Statute of Limitations. 359 3. Gender Discrimination Claims Under Title VII. 360 a. A Prima Facie Case of Discrimination. 361 b. Legitimate, Non-discriminatory Reasons. 363 c. Establishing Pretext. 364 4. Retaliation Claims Under Title VII. 366 a. A Prima Facie Case of Retaliation. 366 b. Legitimate, Non-Retaliatory Reasons. 369 c. Establishing Pretext. 371 5. Hostile Work Environment Claims Under Title VII. 375 C. Plaintiff’s Claims Against Defendants Pursuant to New York’s Human Rights Law. 376 1.A Prima Facie Case of Discrimination. 377 a. The Removal as Public Information Officer. 377 b. The Transfer to the Technical Operations Section. 378 c. The Transfer to the Uniform Patrol Division. 378 D. Plaintiff’s Claims Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 380 1. Plaintiff’s Equal Protection Clause Claim Pursuant to § 1983. 380 2. Plaintiff’s Due Process Clause Claim Pursuant to § 1983. 381 3. Plaintiff’s First Amendment Claim Pursuant to § 1983. 382 E. Plaintiff’s Defamation Claim Under New York State Law. 383 F. Plaintiff’s Claim of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress. 383 G. Plaintiff’s Breach of Contract Claim. 384 H. Plaintiff’s Claims Against Defendant Lemm and Motion to Amend the Complaint. 384 1. Plaintiff’s First Amendment Claim Against Defendant Lemm Pursuant to § 1983. 385 2. Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend the Second Amended Complaint. 385 3. Plaintiff’s HRL Cause of Action Against Defendant Lemm. 386 IV. CONCLUSION. 387 V. ORDER. 388 I. INTRODUCTION Plaintiff Therese Lore brings suit against defendants City of Syracuse, City of Syracuse Police Department (“SPD”), SPD Chief of Police John Falge, SPD First Deputy Chief Daniel Boyle, SPD Deputy Chief Robert Tassone, Syracuse Mayor Roy Bernardi, SPD Lieutenant Mike Rathbun, SPD Captain Mike Kerwin, Syracuse Corporation Counsel Rick Guy, Michael Lemm, and John Doe. Plaintiff alleges: (1) she was discriminated against on the basis of her gender while working as a SPD police officer in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“§ 1983”), and the New York Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exboutive Law § 296 (2000); (2) that she was retaliated against for reporting and complaining of discrimination in violation of Title VII and § 1983; (3) that she was harmed as a result of a hostile work environment in violation of Title VII; (4) that she suffered injury as a result of defendants’ defamatory remarks; and (5) that defendants breached a contract negotiated by the Police Officers’ Union on behalf of plaintiff and other police officers. It should be noted from the outset that this case entails a lengthy procedural history since the filing of plaintiffs original complaint in December of 2000. A number of preliminary motions have already been decided, and the parties have engaged in a highly contested discovery period as well as substantial correspondence. Additionally, various requests for deadline extensions were issued and granted. The case was reassigned to the undersigned on February 21, 2008. Oral argument for the present motions was heard on May 2, 2008. Presently, defendants City of Syracuse, SPD, SPD Chief of Police John Falge, SPD First Deputy Chief Daniel Boyle, SPD Deputy Chief Robert Tassone, Syracuse Mayor Roy Bernardi, SPD Lieutenant Mike Rathbun, SPD Captain Mike Kerwin, and Syracuse Corporation Counsel Rick Guy (hereinafter referred to together as “defendants”) move for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. Defendant Lemm also moves for summary judgment on additional grounds not asserted by defendants. Plaintiff opposes both motions for summary judgment and files a cross a motion for leave to amend her complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15. Defendant Lemm opposes plaintiffs cross motion for leave to amend. II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND Plaintiff is a female police officer within the SPD. After approximately twelve years of service, plaintiff was promoted to the rank of Sergeant in 1990. Plaintiff remains employed by the SPD and has not been demoted from the rank of Sergeant. On May 10, 1999, plaintiff was removed from the position of Public Information Officer (“PIO”). On June 7, 1999, plaintiff was transferred to the Technical Operations Section of the SPD, resulting in a change of her responsibilities but no change in her salary or benefits. On or about August 23, 1999, plaintiff was transferred from the Technical Operations Section to a supervisory position in the Uniform Patrol Division of the SPD. The August 23, 1999, transfer did not result in any change of salary, but plaintiff was directed to surrender her SPD issued car, beeper, and telephone. On or about November 9, 1999, a male sergeant was assigned to a position within the SPD that plaintiff had requested. Plaintiff regularly filed grievances with the Police Officers’ Union in regard to the above events. On December 7, 1999, the Union entered into a resolution of plaintiffs grievances. As a result of the negotiated settlement, plaintiff was transferred to the Crime Prevention Unit of the Community Relations Division within the SPD on January 26, 2000. Upon this last transfer, plaintiff was ordered to wear a police uniform while performing her duties. Plaintiff alleges on February 21, 2000, a male sergeant was transferred to a position within the Community Relations Division for which plaintiff had requested assignment. Plaintiff alleges Defendants reported the position was not' available and would not be filled. Defendants deny plaintiffs allegations relating to the February 21 assignment within the Community Relations Division. On June 9, 2000, plaintiff was removed from the Marine Patrol Unit. On July 3, 2000, plaintiff filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) alleging gender discrimination by way of how she was treated at work and unequal assignments of overtime. On or about July 4, 2000, plaintiff went to the Audit Budget and Control (“ABC”) Office and took possession of the pay stubs of three male sergeants. Plaintiff made copies of the pay stubs using a SPD photocopier and returned the pay stubs to the ABC Office. Upon learning of plaintiffs actions, Defendant Boyle directed the ABC Office staff to bar plaintiff from the ABC Office. Plaintiff alleges Defendant Boyle said, “... and since she’s suing us, tell her to do it on a[n internal memo], because I don’t want to see her.” On August 24, 2000, plaintiff filed a supplemental EEOC claim alleging unlawful retaliation stemming from her decision to file a complaint of discrimination. On September 20, 2000, plaintiff presented copies of the pay stubs at an arbitration proceeding as evidence of unequal overtime assignments for female sergeants as compared to male sergeants. Plaintiff alleges that counsel for the SPD informed her attorney at the arbitration proceeding that the SPD would forego any criminal or administrative charges in exchange for plaintiffs agreement to discontinue her EEOC complaint. On September 22, 2000, the three sergeants whose pay stubs plaintiff photocopied filed a complaint with the Police Officer’s Union (the “Union”) asking the Union for a departmental and criminal investigation into plaintiffs actions. On September 29, 2000, defendant Boyle issued a departmental memo directing that paychecks and pay stubs would from then onward be issued in sealed envelopes in an effort to protect employee privacy. On November 2, 2000, the SPD suspended plaintiff for ten days without pay for using a SPD photocopier for personal use. Plaintiff alleges defendants contacted newspapers afterwards and publicly commented on plaintiffs suspension. Plaintiff also alleges defendants misrepresented that plaintiff had copied paychecks instead of pay stubs. On November 3, 2000, plaintiff reported a minor injury she claims to have occurred while on duty. Defendant Kerwin rejected plaintiffs report as false and responded by reading plaintiff Miranda warnings for knowingly filing a false injury report — a criminal offense. Plaintiff alleges another dispute and act of retaliation occurred on November 28, 2000. On said date, plaintiff informed defendant Rathbun that she wished to work overtime. After a dispute over whether defendant Rathbun filled the overtime assignment before contacting plaintiff, plaintiff alleges defendant Rathbun said, “Why don’t you just go up and see the Chief and tell him you want to drop everything, forget everything, and everything will be fine.” In December of 2000, plaintiff made an application for a Temporary Restraining Order. Afterwards, plaintiff received harassing and threatening telephone messages. Plaintiff alleges defendant Lemm, a retired SPD police officer, left a message for her over the telephone during which he said, “Hey you 941 bitch, haven’t you retired yet? Nobody wants you anymore.” Plaintiff asserts that she recognized defendant Lemm’s voice and his use of SPD police parlance. In response, Plaintiff filed a criminal complaint against defendant Lemm and provided tape recordings to the Sheriffs Department and Internal Affairs Division of the SPD. Plaintiff alleges she received another harassing phone call but was unable to identify the caller. She again notified the Sheriffs Department and the Internal Affairs Division of the SPD and alerted them of her suspicion that the call was from a current SPD police officer named Steve Weigel. Sometime in the spring of 2001, defendant Lemm received a phone call from Officer Weigel and the two men arranged to meet in person. Officer Weigel had somehow received a copy of plaintiffs complaint filed with the Sheriffs Department and Internal Affairs Division and provided defendant Lemm with his own copy upon meeting with him. Defendant Lemm admits that no other person contacted him in regard to plaintiffs criminal complaint of aggravated harassment stemming from the threatening phone calls she claims to have received. After meeting with Officer Weigel, defendant Lemm contacted the Sheriffs Department on his own accord and denied plaintiffs allegations. After a meeting with members from the District Attorney’s Office, defendant Lemm accepted an offer for an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal (“ACD”) with a six month probation period. On March 5, 2001, at about 12:30 p.m., defendant Rathbun directed plaintiff to return to the Public Safety Building while she was on duty. Approximately one hour later, plaintiff called defendant Rathbun and reported she was en route to the Public Safety Building from the police garage. Upon her arrival at the Public Safety Building, plaintiff indicated she had been at the police garage on a police detail. On the following day, the Internal Affairs Division launched an investigation of plaintiffs conduct because (1) caller ID indicated plaintiff did not call defendant Rathbun from either her police issued cellular phone or the police garage telephone, and (2) calls made to the police garage in an effort to locate plaintiff indicated plaintiff had not been seen by anyone at the police garage for several hours. III. DISCUSSION A. Motion for Summary Judgment Summary judgment is warranted when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, and affidavits reveal no genuine issue as to any material fact. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56; Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2509-10, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). All facts, inferences, and ambiguities must be viewed in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). Initially, the burden is on the moving party to demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (1986). After the moving party has satisfied its burden, the non-moving party must assert specific facts demonstrating there is a genuine issue to be decided at trial. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56; Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 250, 106 S.Ct. at 2511. The non-moving party “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 586, 106 S.Ct. at 1356. There must be sufficient evidence upon which a reasonable fact finder could return a verdict for the non-moving party. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 248-49, 106 S.Ct. at 2510; Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. at 1356. B. Plaintiff’s Title VII Claims Plaintiff alleges she was discriminated against on the basis of her sex, retaliated against for complaining about said discrimination, and subjected to a hostile work environment, all in violation of, inter alia, Title VII. For purposes of efficiency, the arguments concerning questions of individual liability and the applicable statute of limitations will be considered before the Court addresses each of plaintiffs claims under Title VII. 1. Individual Liability Plaintiff brings her claims against defendants in both their personal and official capacities. Defendants contend that the Title VII claims against the defendants in their individual capacities are subject to dismissal because Title VII does not provide for individual liability. Although individual liability for workplace discrimination is sometimes possible under various state and federal causes of action, controlling precedent holds there is no individual liability under Title VII. Mandell v. County of Suffolk, 316 F.3d 368, 377 (2d Cir.2003); Wrighten v. Glowski, 232 F.3d 119, 120 (2d Cir.2000); Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1313 (2d Cir.1995), abrogated on other grounds by Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 118 S.Ct. 2257, 141 L.Ed.2d 633 (1998). Accordingly, plaintiffs Title VII claims against defendants in their individual capacities will be dismissed. 2. Statute of Limitations Defendants also contend that some of plaintiffs Title VII claims are time-barred. In particular, defendants argue that three of plaintiffs allegations are time barred under Title VII: (1) the removal of plaintiff on May 10, 1999, from her position as Public Information Officer; (2) the transfer of plaintiff on June 7, 1999, to the Technical Operation Section of the SPD; and (3) the transfer of plaintiff on August 16, 1999, to Uniform Patrol Division, resulting in the surrender of plaintiffs police-issued car, beeper, and telephone. Plaintiff filed an initial complaint with the EEOC on July 3, 2000 and a supplemental complaint on August 24, 2000. Following the EEOC’s decision not to pursue the complaint itself, plaintiff was granted leave to file the instant civil action on March 26, 2001. Title VII requires a plaintiff file a complaint with the EEOC within 300 days after the alleged discriminatory or retaliatory act occurs. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1); Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 104-05, 122 S.Ct. 2061, 2068, 153 L.Ed.2d 106 (2002). The Supreme Court explained in Morgan that claims of discrimination and retaliation constitute discrete acts and therefore are subject to a different statutory time period as compared to Title VII claims alleging a hostile work environment. Morgan, 536 U.S. at 113, 117, 122 S.Ct. at 2072, 2074. Further, the Court rejected the plaintiffs argument that discriminatory acts were part of a single unlawful employment practice and held that each specific act of discrimination or retaliation started a new 300 day time period within which the plaintiff had to file a claim with the EEOC. Id. at 113, 122 S.Ct. at 2072. In response, plaintiff puts forth the same argument rejected in Morgan. Plaintiff concedes some of the alleged acts of discrimination and retaliation fall outside the 300 day filing period but nonetheless argues her claims are not time barred because “all of the acts alleged are part of one unlawful employment practice.” PL’s Mem. Opp’n Summ. J., 3. Plaintiff reasons that so long as some of her claims are timely, all of her related claims of discrimination and retaliation are not barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Plaintiffs reasoning is flawed in light of the decision in Morgan, however. The Morgan Court made clear that Title VII claims alleging acts of discrimination or retaliation occurring after the 300 day time period are time barred, “even when they are related to acts alleged in timely filed charges.” 536 U.S. at 113, 122 S.Ct. at 2072. As a result, the three alleged incidents noted above and occurring before September 19, 1999, i.e., 300 days before the filing of plaintiffs initial EEOC complaint, will be dismissed as untimely and may not be considered in the context of plaintiffs discrimination or retaliation claims arising under Title VII. 3. Gender Discrimination Claims Under Title VII Defendant argues that plaintiff does not present a genuine issue of material fact as to the merits of her Title VII gender discrimination claim. Discrimination claims arising under Title VII are subject to the burden shifting analysis established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824-25, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973) and further deyeloped in Tex. Dep’t of Crnby. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253-54, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1093-94, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981). First, a plaintiff must demonstrate a pri-ma facie case of gender discrimination. McDonnell Douglas, 411 at 802, 93 S.Ct. at 1824. Second, after the plaintiff' establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant-employer to offer a legitimate and non-discriminatory reason for the action(s) giving rise to plaintiffs allegations of discrimination. Id. Third, if the defendant sufficiently produces a non-discriminatory explanation, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that defendant’s proffered explanation is nothing more than pretext for unlawful discrimination. Id. at 804, 93 S.Ct. at 1825. Despite this burden shifting analysis, “[t]he ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff.” Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253, 101 S.Ct. at 1093. a. A Prima Facie Case of Discrimination The plaintiff in a discrimination case is first required to demonstrate a prima facie case of discrimination by the preponderance of the evidence. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 252-53, 101 S.Ct. at 1093. To establish a prima facie case of discrimination, plaintiff must show: “(1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she is qualified for her position; (3) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) the circumstances give rise to an inference of discrimination.” Weinstock v. Columbia Univ., 224 F.3d 33, 41 (2d Cir.2000); see also McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. at 1824. Defendants assert that plaintiff cannot satisfy the third and fourth elements of a prima facie case of discrimination. An adverse employment action is defined as “a materially adverse change in the terms and conditions of employment.” Galabya v. New York City Bd. of Educ., 202 F.3d 636, 640 (2d Cir.2000). To constitute a materially adverse change in employment conditions, such change must be “more disruptive than a mere inconvenience or an alteration of job responsibilities.” Id. (citing Crady v. Liberty Nat’l Bank and Trust Co., 993 F.2d 132, 136 (7th Cir.1993)). Sufficiently adverse changes include, but are not limited to, termination of employment, demotions resulting in a decrease in salary or less distinguished title, a material loss of benefits, or a substantial reduction in material responsibilities. Galabya, 202 F.3d at 640 (citing Crady, 993 F.2d at 136). Although a plaintiffs “subjective preference, alone, is an insufficient basis for finding an adverse employment action,” Davis v. Town of Lake Park, Florida, 245 F.3d 1232, 1239 (11th Cir.2001), an adverse employment action will be considered material if it is “of such quality or quantity that a reasonable employee would find the conditions of her employment altered for the worse.” Torres v. Pisano, 116 F.3d 625, 632 (2d Cir.1997). Any alleged discriminatory conduct occurring after September 19, 1999, may be considered in the context of plaintiffs Title VII discrimination claim. Plaintiff alleges she was transferred to the Crime Prevention Unit of the Community Relations Division on January 26, 2000, and, unlike male sergeants assigned to the same unit, was ordered to wear a police uniform while performing her duties. Additionally, plaintiff also alleges a male sergeant was thereafter transferred to the front desk sergeant position- — a position within the SPD for which plaintiff had requested assignment in December of 1999. Although defendants deny such allegations in their answer, defendant SPD Chief John Falge admits in his affidavit that a male sergeant was transferred to the front desk sergeant assignment and that plaintiff had put in a transfer request for the same assignment. Falge Aff., ¶ 5. Plaintiff additionally alleges she was discriminated against on account of her gender because for two months she was the only officer of her rank and experience within ,her division who was not provided a department issued take-home vehicle. Further, plaintiff submits she was removed from the Marine Patrol Unit on June 9, 2000 but that some of her male counterparts were not removed. Defendants admit the June 9, 2000 transfer of plaintiff from the Marine Patrol Unit, but defendants offer non-discriminatory explanations for such transfer and the other actions relating to plaintiffs employment. Such explanations are irrelevant at this stage of analysis, however, for the determination of whether plaintiff has established a prima facie case of discrimination. Plaintiff has only a minimal burden of establishing a prima facie case of gender discrimination under Title VII. Mandell, 316 F.3d at 378 (citing Howley v. Town of Stratford, 217 F.3d 141, 150 (2d Cir.2000)). Although it is a close question whether the requirement that plaintiff wear a police uniform would be sufficient by itself, the actions of which plaintiff complains taken in their entirety resulted in a substantial alteration of her employment responsibilities as she was transferred to an entirely different division of the SPD. Plaintiff testified at her deposition as to the reduction in responsibilities and benefits she experienced as a result of her transfer to the Community Relations Division. Specifically, she explains her responsibilities consisted of knocking on residents’ front' doors and distributing pamphlets to people to instruct them in crime prevention methods. Defs’. Ex. D, Pi’s. Dep., 98. Plaintiff adds that she was also asked to conduct follow-ups to reported burglaries and was required to wear a uniform. Id. Plaintiff discusses the subsequent lack of overtime assignments within the division. Id. at 98-101. Plaintiffs deposition testimony is more than a conclusory statement as it is grounded in factual assertions based upon her personal knowledge of her working conditions and thus serves as sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude that a reasonable employee in plaintiffs position could have felt her employment conditions were changed for the worse, particularly in light of defendants’ failure to dispute plaintiffs description of her employment responsibilities. Accordingly, the proffered employment actions were sufficiently adverse for plaintiff to satisfy the third prong of establishing a prima facie case of gender discrimination. Likewise, plaintiff is able to satisfy the minimal burden of presenting factual circumstances giving rise to an inference of gender discrimination. Plaintiff essentially argues that the above transfers and uniform requirements constitute disparate treatment as a result of her gender. Putting aside defendants’ non-discriminatory explanations for their employment actions, the assignment of a male sergeant of equal rank to a position for which plaintiff requested gives rise to the inference of gender discrimination. See Mandell, 316 F.3d at 379 (holding a showing of disparate treatment raises a sufficient inference of discrimination in the context of establishing a prima facie case). Although plaintiff “must show that she was similarly situated in all material respects to the individuals with whom she seeks to compare herself’ in order to establish disparate treatment, Graham v. Long Island R.R., 230 F.3d 34, 39 (2d Cir.2000), “the question whether two employees are similarly situated is a question of fact for the jury.” Mandell, 316 F.3d at 369. Sufficient evidence exists for a fact finder to conclude that other officers who were not subject to the same transfers or requirements as plaintiff and the male officer who received the assignment plaintiff requested were similarly situated to plaintiff in order to support an inference of discrimination. Therefore, plaintiff has established a prima facie case of gender discrimination and has satisfied the minimal requirement under the first prong of the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting analysis. b. Legitimate, Non-discriminatory Reasons The establishment of a prima facie case creates a presumption of employment discrimination. Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs, 450 U.S. at 254, 101 S.Ct. at 1094. The burden then shifts to the defendant-employer to present admissible evidence of legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for the adverse employment actions taken with respect to the plaintiff. Id. In response to plaintiffs allegation that she was transferred to the Crime Prevention Unit of the Community Relations Division as a result of her gender, defendants offer evidence of an arbitration agreement between the City of Syracuse and plaintiff as a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for her transfer. Plaintiff goes as far as to admit in her deposition testimony that she was transferred to that position as a result of an agreement between her and the City of Syracuse resolving the grievances she had previously filed. Pi’s. Dep., 96. Defendants contend the transfer was a result of negotiations between the City of Syracuse and plaintiff rather than some discriminatory motive. Evidently, defendants have proffered a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for plaintiffs transfer to the Community Relations Division. With respect to plaintiff being ordered to wear a uniform upon the transfer to her new position, defendants contend that wearing a uniform is pertinent to the responsibilities of officers within the Crime Prevention Unit of the Community Relations Division. Defendants explain that officers within the Crime Prevention Unit often visit victims of crimes in their homes and ask citizens if they require any assistance from the SPD. Because these officers must often approach citizens’ front doors and enter private homes, defendants explain that a police uniform is necessary to thwart the suspicion that the approaching officer is someone impersonating a police officer in an effort to commit a burglary. Defendants indicate that a number of officers have reported being denied access to crime victims’ homes until their uniforms may be clearly viewed. Defendants also explain that all officers within plaintiffs unit, including the unit’s three male officers, are required to wear a uniform. Further, officers of higher rank than plaintiff are frequently required to wear a uniform when interacting with members of the community. For example, Police Chief John Falge wore his uniform to community meetings in order to foster trust in police officers and to encourage citizens to seek the assistance of the SPD when necessary. The particular duties of the Crime Prevention Unit, coupled with the fact that male officers within the unit are also required to wear a uniform, supports the legitimacy of defendants’ non-discriminatory reason for ordering plaintiff to wear a uniform. In response to plaintiffs allegation that she was denied her request for the front desk sergeant position on account of her gender, defendants reference the criteria within the Police Union’s contract for the approval of officers’ transfer requests. This criteria includes seniority, experience, education, training, evaluations, health, skills, unique qualifications, and individual requests. Rather than make a decision based upon the candidates’ genders, defendants contend that the male sergeant appointed to the position was more qualified than plaintiff. In particular, defendants cite the experience criterion within the Police Union contract as the primary basis for their decision. Defendants explain the male sergeant selected had prior experience working at the very same position but on a different shift. Accordingly, defendants have proffered a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for selecting the male sergeant rather than approving plaintiffs transfer request because the male sergeant was of equal rank and had more experience at the position than plaintiff. Defendants offer a different explanation for why plaintiff was not provided with a take-home police vehicle for a two month period. Defendants again reference the arbitration agreement between the City of Syracuse and plaintiff in which plaintiffs grievance was resolved. Pursuant to the arbitration agreement, plaintiff was to be provided with a take-home vehicle if all other sergeants within her division were also provided with vehicles. Because plaintiff was the only sergeant within her division, defendants contend they were not required to provide plaintiff with a take-home vehicle. In recognition of the fact that plaintiff could still be discriminated against despite defendants’ compliance with the arbitration agreement, defendants also submit that plaintiff was not provided a take-home vehicle because no such vehicles were available. Defendant Chief Falge states he determined a take-home vehicle was not critical for plaintiff to perform her duties. Defendants explain that plaintiff was provided a take-home vehicle two months after her transfer when a vehicle became available in March of 2000. Defendants’ determination that a take-home vehicle was not necessary for plaintiff to perform her duties, coupled with the unavailability of vehicles within the SPD, constitute a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the decision not to provide plaintiff with a take-home vehicle for a two month period following her transfer to the Crime Prevention Unit. Defendants also offer a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the removal of plaintiff from the Marine Patrol Unit. Following the review of an accident involving the Marine Patrol Unit’s vessel, the SPD implemented new requirements for officers working in the Marine Patrol Unit, including mandatory certification of all unit members in American Red Cross lifesaving techniques. Plaintiff is among several officers, some of which are men, who were removed from the Marine Patrol Unit because they did not have an American Red Cross lifesaving certification. Plaintiff remains eligible to be reinstated to the Marine Patrol Unit upon her. being certified in American Red Cross lifesaving techniques, but plaintiff has declined to obtain such a certification. As a result of the SPD’s new requirements, defendants have proffered a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for plaintiffs removal from the Marine Patrol Unit. To summarize, defendants have proffered legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for each of plaintiffs allegations of gender discrimination. Consequently, defendants have satisfied the second prong of the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting analysis and the onus returns to plaintiff. c. Establishing Pretext Once a Title VII defendant offers sufficient evidence of legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the adverse employment actions, the burden of production shifts back to the plaintiff to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendants’ proffered reasons are nothing more than pretext for unlawful discrimination. McDonnell Douglas, 411 at 802, 93 S.Ct. at 1824. The plaintiffs burden at the third stage of the McDonnell Douglas analysis is substantially higher than the burden at the first stage. Mein v. Dacon, 759 F.2d 989, 996 n. 10 (2d Cir.1985) (recognizing the “de minimis” nature of a plaintiffs burden of proof at the first stage of the McDonnell Douglas analysis). A Title VII plaintiff may successfully establish pretext “either directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.” Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs, 450 U.S. at 256, 101 S.Ct. at 1095. Upon reaching the third stage of the burden shifting analysis, summary judgment will be warranted unless the plaintiff provides “adequate evidence to support a rational finding that the legitimate non-discriminatory reasons proffered by the employer were false, and that more likely than not the employee’s sex or race was the real reason for the discharge.” Holt v. KMI-Continental, Inc., 95 F.3d 123, 129 (quoting Viola v. Philips Med. Sys. of N. Am., 42 F.3d 712, 717 (2d Cir.1994)). Perhaps most importantly, the Title VII plaintiff must offer concrete particulars of fact rather than “conclusory allegations of discrimination” in order to overcome a motion for summary judgment. Meiri, 759 F.2d at 998. In response to defendants’ nondiscriminatory reasons for the adverse employment actions, plaintiff offers the report and deposition testimony of her police procedures expert, W. Ken Katsaris, as evidence of pretext. Of the fifteen opinions stated in Mr. Katsaris’s report and later discussed in his deposition, none of the opinions specifically address the adverse employment actions of which plaintiff alleges she was discriminated against, namely, plaintiffs transfer to the Crime Prevention Unit, the requirement that plaintiff wear a police uniform while on duty, the denial of plaintiffs request for the front desk sergeant position, the decision not to provide plaintiff with a take-home vehicle for a two month period, and the removal of plaintiff from the Marine Patrol Unit. Instead, most of Mr. Katsaris’s opinions concern plaintiffs allegations of retaliation as a result of her complaint of gender discrimination filed with the EEOC. Only two of Mr. Katsaris’s opinions address the assignment of female officers in the most general of terms. In opinion number 10, Mr. Katsaris states that a review of the SPD’s internal hierarchy for January of 2000 shows an unequal delegation of supervisory authority between male and female officers. Pi’s. Ex. Q, Katsaris Aff., 5. Mr. Katsaris states in opinion number eleven that “sexually discriminatory assignments and transfers have resulted in perpetuation of sexual stereotypes” bé-cause candidates’ experience is a factor for making assignment determinations. Id. Even viewing all facts, inferences, and ambiguities in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, i.e., the plaintiff, the evidence offered by plaintiff is wholly inadequate to persuade the court that defendants were more likely motivated by a discriminatory reason or that the proffered legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons are not worthy of belief. Nowhere in Mr. Katsaris’s report is there any analysis of the adverse employment actions taken by defendants with respect to plaintiff. For example, Mr. Katsaris fails to compare the qualifications of plaintiff and the male sergeant selected for the front desk position plaintiff requested. Rather than involve plaintiff directly, Mr. Katsaris’s opinions concerning plaintiffs allegations of discrimination (as opposed to his opinions concerning allegations of retaliation) constitute blanket assertions of systemic discrimination throughout the SPD. More than blanket assertions are needed to establish pretext, however. See Murphy v. Bd. of Educ. of the Rochester City Sch. Dist., 273 F.Supp.2d 292, 302 (W.D.N.Y.2003) (holding plaintiff did not meet his burden to establish pretext because he did not relate his allegations of systemic racial discrimination to any specific action taken against him). Outside of her expert’s opinions, plaintiffs evidence of discrimination amounts to little more than conclusory statements made by her or her attorney. Therefore, plaintiff has not established pretext and defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to plaintiffs discrimination claims will be granted. 4. Retaliation Claims Under Title VII Plaintiffs retaliation claim under Title VII is subject to the same burden shifting analysis established in McDonnell Douglas. Amin v. Akzo Nobel Chemicals, Inc., 282 Fed.Appx. 958, 961 (2d Cir.2008); Slattery v. Swiss Reinsurance Am. Corp., 248 F.3d 87, 94 (2d Cir.2001). a. A Prima Facie Case of Retaliation To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII, plaintiff must show (1) that she was engaged in protected activity; (2) that the employer was aware of that activity; (3) that plaintiff was thereafter subjected to an adverse employment decision; and (4) that there was a causal connection between plaintiffs protected activity and the adverse action. Collins v. New York City Transit Auth., 305 F.3d 113, 118 (2d Cir.2002) (quoting Manoharan v. Columbia University College of Physicians & Surgeons, 842 F.2d 590, 593 (2d Cir.1988)). Notably, since the filing of plaintiffs lawsuit, the Supreme Court has expanded the scope of conduct constituting an “adverse action” in relation to a Title VII retaliation claim. Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 66, 126 S.Ct. 2405, 2414, 165 L.Ed.2d 345 (2006). The anti-retaliation provision within Title VII is no longer limited to employment-related acts of retaliation and can include harm occurring outside the workplace. Id. at 63-64, 126 S.Ct. at 2412 (citing Rochan v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d 1211, 1213 (D.C.Cir.2006) (holding FBI’s failure to investigate death threats made against an FBI agent and his wife was actionable retaliation under Title VII); Berry v. Stevinson Chevrolet, 74 F.3d 980, 984, 986 (10th Cir.1996) (determining employer’s filing of false criminal charges against employee who complained of discrimination was sufficient act of retaliation)). Defendants contend plaintiff cannot satisfy the third and fourth prongs of establishing a prima facie case of retaliation. As a result of the Burlington Northern decision, defendants concede that two of the employment actions of which plaintiff complains — her November 2, 2000, suspension and the reading of Miranda warnings — constitute adverse employment actions. Nevertheless, defendants maintain plaintiff cannot establish a causal connection between the filing of her complaint and the two admittedly adverse employment actions, and therefore argue that plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie of retaliation with respect to those actions. Further, defendants argue that the remainder of plaintiffs complaints of retaliation do not rise to the level of adverse employment actions notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s decision in Burlington Northern. A plaintiff satisfies the third prong of establishing a prima facie case of retaliation if she can show that a reasonable employee would have found the employer’s conduct materially adverse as to “dissuade[ ] a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” Burlington Northern, 548 U.S. at 68, 126 S.Ct. at 2415 (internal quotations omitted). An action will be considered material if it is “ ‘likely to deter victims of discrimination from complaining to the EEOC,’ the courts, and their employers.” Id. (quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346, 117 S.Ct. 843, 848, 136 L.Ed.2d 808 (1997)). The Court explained that the employer’s conduct must be examined through the lens of the “reasonable” employee because an objective standard can avoid the difficulties of determining “a plaintiffs unusual subjective feelings.” Id. at 68-69, 126 S.Ct. at 2415. For the reasons discussed above, plaintiffs allegations of retaliation are subject to the same statute of limitations as her discrimination claims. Accordingly, any alleged retaliatory action occurring after September 19, 1999, may be considered in the context of plaintiffs Title VII retaliation claim. Plaintiffs allegations of unlawful retaliation are as follows: (1) on July 14, 2000, approximately two weeks after she filed her EEOC complaint, defendant Boyle retaliated against her by way of barring her from the ABC Office and requiring her to file an internal memo should she seek further information from the ABC Office; (2) during an arbitration proceeding on September 20, 2000, the attorney for the SPD stated to plaintiffs arbitration attorney, Patrick MacRae, that the SPD would “forego criminal and administrative charges” against plaintiff in exchange for her agreement to drop her EEOC complaint; (3) on November 3, 2000, defendants filed administrative charges against plaintiff for using a photocopier for personal use, suspended plaintiff for ten business days without pay, and asked the Onondaga County District Attorney’s Office to seek criminal charges against plaintiff; (4) defendants immediately thereafter retaliated against plaintiff by contacting newspapers and commenting on her suspension, including the allegation that plaintiff had seized and made photocopies of other officers’ paychecks rather than their pay stubs; (5) defendant Ker-win retaliated against plaintiff by reciting Miranda warnings to plaintiff over the phone following plaintiffs report of a minor work-related injury; (6) on November 28, 2000, defendant Rathbun retaliated against plaintiff by refusing to schedule her for an overtime assignment she requested and stating to her that her work conditions would improve if she met with defendant Falge and agreed to withdraw her EEOC complaint; and (7) plaintiff received sub-par performance evaluations only after, and as a result of, filing her EEOC complaint. Plaintiffs allegations of retaliation are sufficiently material to constitute adverse actions under the expanded Burlington Northern standard. Putting aside temporarily any legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons for defendants’ conduct, plaintiff has been charged administratively for misconduct which frequently goes unpunished; barred from areas within the SPD which other officers frequently enter; threatened with criminal charges; received sub-par evaluations; and received offers of better treatment in exchange for the voluntary discontinuation of her complaint, all of which only occurred after she complained of gender discrimination. Any of these actions in isolation could dissuade a reasonable employee from approaching her employer, the EEOC, or the courts with a complaint of discrimination. Taken together, the discouraging effect of the alleged acts is compounded and easily meets the standard for materiality delineated in Burlington Northern. Defendants fail to present a substantive argument to the contrary in both their initial and supplemental memorandums of law in support of the instant motion and go as far as to concede the issue of materiality in regard to plaintiffs ten day suspension and the reading of Miranda warnings. As a result, the alleged retaliatory acts constitute “adverse employment actions” for the purposes of establishing plaintiffs prima facie case. The fourth prong of a prima facie case of retaliation can be established either “(1) indirectly, by showing that the protected activity was followed closely by discriminatory treatment, or through other circumstantial evidence such as disparate treatment of fellow employees who engaged in similar conduct; or (2) directly, through evidence of retaliatory animus directed against the plaintiff by the defendant.” Gordon v. New York City Bd. of Educ., 232 F.3d 111, 117 (2d Cir.2000). Defendants argue plaintiff cannot satisfy the fourth prong of a prima facie case of retaliation with respect to her November 2, 2000, suspension and the reading of Miranda warnings to plaintiff after she filed an injury report. Defendants premise their argument upon case law holding that temporal proximity alone cannot be sufficient evidence of causality to establish a prima facie case unless the temporal relationship between the complaint of discrimination and the adverse employment action is “very close.” Clark County Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273-74, 121 S.Ct. 1508, 1511, 149 L.Ed.2d 509 (2001). In short, defendants argue that too much time elapsed between plaintiffs suspension and the reading of Miranda warnings— both of which occurred in early November of 2000 — and plaintiffs EEOC complaint which was initially filed on July 3, 2000, and later supplemented on August 24, 2000. Temporal proximity is only one of several methods for demonstrating the requisite causal link between an adverse employment action and a charge of unlawful retaliation, however. See Gordon, 232 F.3d at 117. First, it deserves mention that the case to which defendants cite, Clark County Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, involved an adverse employment action taken 20 months after the plaintiff made a charge of discrimination, whereas the plaintiff in this case made a complaint of discrimination within approximately five months of the two adverse actions defendant challenges on grounds of causation. Second, the suspension and Miranda warnings were only two of several alleged incidents of retaliation, the first of which occurred less than two weeks after plaintiff filed her EEOC complaint. Third, and perhaps most importantly, plaintiff does not solely rely on a “mere temporal proximity” to establish causation. See Richmond v. ONEOK, Inc., 120 F.3d 205, 209 (10th Cir.1997) (holding that a three month period between plaintiffs protected activity and her termination did not entirely destroy any causal connection, but such a time period, “standing alone, does not establish a causal connection”) (emphasis added). Plaintiff has submitted additional evidence in the form of her expert’s opinion giving rise to the inference of disparate treatment and a retaliatory animus because other officers were not treated the same way after engaging in similar or more serious conduct than did plaintiff. With respect to the Miranda warnings specifically, defendants contend no causal relationship exists because the officer who read plaintiff the warnings was not aware of her pending grievances or discrimination claims until he was served with her complaint in 2001. Even if a jury were to believe defendant Kerwin’s testimony that he was not aware of plaintiffs complaints of discrimination when he read her Miranda warnings, a jury could still find the necessary causal connection between the charge of discrimination and the adverse employment action. See Gordon, 232 F.3d at 117. Although “the lack of knowledge on the part of particular individual agents is admissible as some evidence of a lack of a causal connection,” id. (emphasis in original), a jury may nonetheless “find retaliation even if the agent denies direct knowledge of a plaintiffs protected activities ... so long as the jury finds that the circumstances evidence knowledge of the protected activities or the jury concludes that an agent is acting explicitly or implicit upon the orders of a superior who has the requisite knowledge.” Id. Defendant Kerwin’s assertion that he was not aware of plaintiffs complaint of discrimination does not shut-off the causal relationship between the protected activity and adverse employment action because it is undisputed that the SPD was aware of plaintiffs complaint by November of 2000. Furthermore, the evidence regarding the chain of command within the SPD and the close working relationship between defendants Kerwin and Falge could allow a reasonable jury to find circumstances showing defendant Kerwin was either indeed aware of plaintiffs complaints of discrimination or that he was acting under the command of defendant Falge who had the requisite knowledge of plaintiffs complaint as evidenced by his affidavit and his testimony given at the September 2000 arbitration hearing. Therefore, plaintiff has established the necessary causal relationship between her protected activity and the adverse employment actions. As a result, plaintiff has established her prima facie case of retaliation. b. Legitimate, Non-Retaliatory Reasons Like the burden-shifting analysis for discrimination claims under Title VII, once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of retaliation, the burden shifts to the defendant to proffer legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons for the adverse employment actions taken. Amin, 282 Fed.Appx. at 962. With respect to the decision to bar plaintiff from the ABC Office and require her to file internal memoranda should she seek additional information from the office, defendants contend this action was in response to plaintiffs copying of three police sergeants’ pay stubs without the sergeants’ permission. Plaintiff admits copying the sergeants’ pay stubs and nowhere does plaintiff assert she had permission to do so. Defendants explain that the three sergeants complained about violations of their privacy and that the SPD was compelled to take action regarding plaintiffs conduct. Further, there is testimony offered by Martha Thompson, an ABC Office employee, indicating that it was consistent with SPD policy to require officers to submit in writing requests for confidential information about other officers. Therefore, defendants have proffered a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for banning plaintiff from the ABC Office and requiring her to submit requests for additional information pertaining to other officers in writing. Defendants flatly deny plaintiffs allegation that their legal counsel stated the SPD would forego bringing administrative charges against plaintiff if- plaintiff agreed to discontinue her EEOC complaint. Defendants contend even if the statement was made, that it was made for the purposes of negotiating a resolution with plaintiff rather than to retaliate against her for her complaints of discrimination. In light of the frequent negotiating that occurs between counsel in an effort to amicably resolve a dispute, defendants have proffered a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for their attorney having made the alleged statements to plaintiffs counsel during arbitration. In response to plaintiffs allegation that she was retaliated against by way of administrative charges being filed against her, her ten-day suspension, and the SPD’s request that criminal charges be pursued, defendants offer a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for their actions. First, defendants’ expert, Frank Sardino, explains it is a violation of SPD policy to copy another officer’s pay stub information for personal use. Mr. Sardino references an order disseminated by former SPD Deputy Chief Timothy Cowin stating that no paycheck could be "removed from the ABC Office without first signing out for the given documents. Defendants contend that plaintiffs violation of SPD policy, rather than any alleged retaliatory animus, was the reason administrative charges were filed and she received a ten-day suspension. Further, in regard to the pursuit of criminal charges, defendants explain that the officers whose pay stubs were photocopied by plaintiff requested she be prosecuted. These officers have stated that they felt their privacy was violated and that they asked the SPD to pursue criminal action against plaintiff. Defendants also direct the court’s attention' to the fact that plaintiffs own counsel advised her to assert her Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination when she was questioned during arbitration as to how she obtained the officers’ pay stubs and that plaintiff ultimately followed her counsel’s advice after a short attorney-client conference. For all of these reasons, defendants have satisfied their burden of establishing a legitimate, non-retaliatory motivation for suspending plaintiff and asking the Onondaga County District Attorney’s Office to pursue criminal charges. With respect to the allegation that defendants retaliated against plaintiff by making statements to newspaper reporters, defendants fail to offer a specific, non-retaliatory reason for making such comments. Despite plaintiffs allegation of retaliation and the newspaper articles attached as exhibits, defendants do not address the comments made by defendants Guy or Bernardi and neglect to direct the Court’s attention to any proffered reason for why the comments were made. Defendants merely offer a general denial of plaintiffs allegations as to the comments made to the media. See Defs’. Answer, ¶ 44. Accordingly, defendants have not satisfied their burden under the McDonnell Douglas analysis and plaintiff need not establish pretext as to her claim of retaliation stemming from the comments made to the newspaper. In response to plaintiffs allegation that defendant Kerwin retaliated against her when he read her Miranda warnings over the phone, defendants reference the Police Union contract as evidence that a police officer must receive proper Miranda warnings if she is a target or suspect in a criminal investigation or could be arrested. Additionally, defendants correctly explain that it is a crime to falsely report a work-related injury. Defendant Kerwin’s deposition testimony offers evidence that he conducted an investigation of plaintiffs filing of an injury alleged to have occurred while on duty and afterwards concluded plaintiff may have committed a crime by falsely filing an injury report. Defendant Kerwin stated that he attempted to read plaintiff Miranda warnings so that she was aware of her constitutional rights rather than out of some retaliatory motive. Therefore, defendants have proffered a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for reading plaintiff Miranda warnings. Defendants also satisfy their McDonnell Douglas burden with regard to plaintiffs allegation that she was retaliated against by not receiving an overtime assignment. Defendants explain that the assignment plaintiff requested was at a non-government facility, the Carousel Mall. Because the Carousel Mall pays the City of Syracuse for police officers’ overtime assignments, the Mall’s security director may make requests for which officers are selected to work at the facility. Defendants proffer that Tim Erwin, the security director for the Carousel Mall, requested that the same officers be assigned to the mall detail on a rotating basis in an effort to maximize the personnel’s familiarity with the local criminal element. Additionally, internal records showing plaintiff received more overtime assignments than most other sergeants bolsters defendants’ claim that plaintiff did not receive the Carousel Mall overtime assignment for a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason. Therefore, defendants have satisfied their burden with respect to plaintiffs claim of retaliation as a result of not receiving an overtime assignment and plaintiff must show the proffered reason is merely pretext for unlawful retaliation. Finally, defendants offer adequate evidence of a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason with respect to plaintiffs allegation that she received sub-par performance evaluations and was subject to internal investigations as a result of her complaints of discrimination. Specifically, defendant Rathbun stated that plaintiff was missing from her assignment for several hours when she was needed to work a detail. Defendant Rathbun conducted an investigation of plaintiffs whereabouts and reports from other officers indicated plaintiff lied to her supervising officer about her location and had abandoned her assignment while on duty. Defendant Rath-bun issued a report criticizing plaintiff for her actions and reflecting poorly on plaintiffs judgment skills, but did not take formal disciplinary action against plaintiff. Defendants proffer that plaintiffs violation of SPD policy, rather than any alleged retaliatory motive, was the reason for defendant Rathbun’s report and any subsequent negative performance evaluation. Therefore, defendants have satisfied their burden with respect to this incident and plaintiff must establish that the proffered reason is pretext. c. Establishing Pretext After a defendant has met its burden of articulating a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for an adverse employment action, “the plaintiff must point to evidence that would be sufficient to permit a rational factfinder to conclude that the employer’s explanation is merely a pretext for impermissible retaliation.” Cifra v. Gen. Elec. Co., 252 F.3d 205, 216 (2d Cir.2001). Defendants have proffered legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons for all of the alleged acts of retaliation except for the alleged comments to newspaper reporters about the details surrounding plaintiffs grievances and her suspension. Consequently, plaintiff is required to establish pretext for all of her allegations of retaliation with exception to the alleged comments made to newspaper reporters. To establish pretext, plaintiff must produce sufficient evidence to cast doubt onto defendants’ proffered reasons, “and that more likely than not retaliation for complaints of discrimination was the real reason” for the adverse employment actions. Johnson v. Nicholson, No. 05-CV-2740 (JMA), 2007 WL 1395546, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. May 11, 2007) (internal citations omitted). Plaintiff is not required to disprove defendants’ proffered reasons altogether, however. See Fields v. New York State Office of Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities, 115 F.3d 116, 120-21 (2d Cir.1997). Instead, a Title VII plaintiff may satisfy the third step of the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting analysis “by proving that an impermissible factor was a motivating factor, without proving that the employer’s proffered explanation was not some part of the employer’s motivation.” Id. at 120; see also Cronin v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 46 F.3d 196, 203 (2d Cir.1995) (“[P]laintiff is not required to show that the employer’s proffered reasons were false or played no role in the employment decision, but only that they were not the only reasons and that the prohibited factor was at least one of the ‘motivating factors.’ ”). Plaintiff may therefore prevail so long as she provides evidence that retaliation was “a substantial motivating reason for the adverse employment actions,” and she is not required to show retaliation was the only motivating factor. Fields at 121 (emphasis in original). Notwithstanding this standard, if a plaintiffs “allegations are conclusory and unsupported by evidence of any weighty they are insufficient to satisfy the requirements under Rule 56(e).” Smith v. Am. Exp. Co., 853 F.2d 151, 155 (2d Cir.1988) (citing Meiri, 759 F.2d at 998). Although defendants cite concern for officers’ privacy as a lawful reason for banning plaintiff from the ABC Office, plaintiff has produced sufficient evidence for a reasonable factfinder to question defendant Boyle’s motive and conclude that defendant Boyle sought to retaliate against plaintiff. To begin with, there are inconsistencies between Ms. Thompson’s affidavit and her testimony, namely, whether plaintiff was permitted the same access to the ABC Office as other officers following her complaints of discrimination. Ms. Thompson goes as far as to admit in her deposition that after defendant Boyle’s order, plaintiff would stand at the threshold of the office to receive her check from an employee whereas other officers would enter and leave the office to retri