LaFlamboy v. Landek (587 F. Supp. 2d 914, 2008)

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

AMY J. ST. EVE, District Judge.

Before the Court are four motions for summary judgment — in each case, the parties move as to all counts that name them. Defendants Steven Landek, John Curry, Joseph Kaput, Butch Sloan, and Steven Reynolds, (the “Village Defendants”), along with Defendant the Village of Bridgeview (the “Village”), move for summary judgment on Counts I, II, and III and also move to strike Plaintiffs responses to their Rule 56.1 Statement. (R. 415-1.) Defendant Vincent Cainkar (“Cain-kar”) separately moves for summary judgment as to Counts II and III; Defendant Allan Gustafson (“Gustafson”) moves for summary judgment as to Counts II, III, and IV; and Defendant Kenneth DeVries (“DeVries”) separately move for summary judgment as to Counts II and V. For the reasons discussed below, the Court grants summary judgment in part on Count I, denies summary judgment as to Count II; grants summary judgment on Count III as to all Defendants; and denies summary judgment as to Counts IV and V. In addition, the Court grants in part and denies in part the Village Defendants’ motion to strike.

BACKGROUND

1. Procedural Posture — Fourth Amended Complaint

Plaintiff John LaFlamboy’s Fourth Amended Complaint (“FAC”) asserts five causes of action against varying Defendants.

First, Count I alleges a civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”) claim, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c), against the Village Defendants, Steven Reynolds, and Fred Pascente (collectively, “the RICO Defendants”). Plaintiff asserts in Count I that beginning in May 1999, and extending through at least October 2005, the RICO Defendants violated RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c), by participating in a pattern of racketeering activity involving Plaintiffs former business, the World Golf Dome (“WGD”).

In Count II, Plaintiff alleges that the RICO Defendants, along with Defendants Allan Gustafson, Vincent Cainkar, Kenneth DeVries, and Adriana Mazutis violated 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) by conspiring to violate RICO. In particular, Plaintiff alleges that these Defendants agreed and conspired “to engage in a pattern of racketeering activity with the intention of cheating, defrauding, and otherwise forcing the Plaintiff to give up his ownership and control of the WGD.” (R. 299-1, Fourth Am. Compl. ¶ 86.) In Count III, Plaintiff asserts a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim, alleging that the RICO Defendants and the Village violated Plaintiffs constitutional rights, including his Fifth Amendment right not to be deprived of property without just compensation; and his Fourteenth Amendment right not to be deprived of property or livelihood without due process of law. In essence, Plaintiff alleges 1) that the Village Defendants’ practice of issuing citations, denying permits, and conducting unwarranted inspections interfered with Plaintiffs business; and 2) the Village Defendants’ schemes to obtain control of the WGD forced Plaintiff to give up his rights to his property. Plaintiff argues that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 entitles him to damages for these Constitutional violations.

Additionally, Plaintiff asserts a breach of fiduciary duty claim (Count IV) against Defendant Gustafson. Plaintiff and Gus-tafson formerly partnered in connection with the WGD, and Count IV alleges that has Defendant Gustafson breached his fiduciary duty to Plaintiff in connection with their partnership.

Finally, in Count V, Plaintiff alleges a state law breach of contract claim against Defendant DeVries. Plaintiff contends that DeVries breached a rental agreement entered into by DeVries and Plaintiff concerning leasing of space at the WGD.

II. The Parties’ Rule 56.1 Statements of Fact

When determining summary judgment motions, the Court derives the background facts from the parties’ Local Rule 56.1 statements. Local Rule 56.1 assists the Court by “organizing the evidence, identifying undisputed facts, and demonstrating precisely how each side propose[s] to prove a disputed fact with admissible evidence.” Bordelon v. Chicago Sch. Reform Bd. of Trs., 233 F.3d 524, 527 (7th Cir.2000). Pursuant to Local Rule 56.1(a)(3), the moving party must provide a concise “statement of material facts as to which the moving party contends there is no genuine issue.” (L.R. 56.1); Ammons v. Aramark Uniform Servs., Inc., 368 F.3d 809, 817 (7th Cir.2004). The non-moving party must respond by admitting or denying each and every factual statement proffered by the moving party with specific references to the record. Ciomber v. Coop. Plus, Inc., 527 F.3d 635, 643 (7th Cir.2008). Should the non-moving party fail to do so, the court may deem all well-supported facts set forth in the movant’s statement to be admitted. See Ciomber, 527 F.3d at 644; Cichon v. Exelon Generation Co., L.L.C., 401 F.3d 803, 810 (7th Cir.2005); Schrott v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 403 F.3d 940, 944 (7th Cir.2005). (“The district court was entitled to take these facts as uncontested, as the local rule provides”); Scott v. Edinburg, 346 F.3d 752, 759 (7th Cir.2003).

The operative phrase here is “well-supported.” Specifically, litigants must support facts with specific references to the record and evidence admissible at trial. As such, the Court may opt to disregard facts presented in a manner that does not comply with Rule 56.1. See Ciomber, 527 F.3d at 643; see also Roger Whitmore’s Auto. Serv., Inc. v. Lake County, 424 F.3d 659, 664 n. 2 (7th Cir.2005) (“It is not the duty of the district court to scour the record in search of material factual disputes ....”) (collecting cases). In addition, the Court will not consider documents that would not be admissible at trial when ruling on summary judgment. See Judson Atkinson Candies, Inc. v. Latini-Hohberger Dhimantec, 529 F.3d 371, 382 (7th Cir.2008); Eisenstadt v. Centel Corp., 113 F.3d 738, 742 (7th Cir.1997). A district court is “entitled to expect strict compliance” with Rule 56.1. See, e.g., Ciomber, 527 F.3d at 643; Cichon, 401 F.3d at 809 (collecting cases); Ammons, 368 F.3d at 817 (quoting Bordelon, 233 F.3d at 527).

A.Plaintiffs Response to Defendant Gustafson’s Rule 56.1 Statement

Plaintiff failed to timely respond to Defendant Gustafson’s Undisputed Statements of Material Fact. Plaintiff attempted to file a response to Defendant Gustafson’s Rule 56.1 statement (R. 396-1), but did so eight days after the court-imposed deadline of July 22. (R. 342-1.) As such, and based on the Plaintiffs pattern of dilatory filings, repeated inattention to Court orders, non-compliance with Court rules, and misrepresentation, the Court denied Defendant’s motion to file these documents instanter. (R. 398-1.) The Court deems all of Gustafson’s well-supported statements of fact admitted. Ciomber, 527 F.3d at 644; Cichon, 401 F.3d at 810; Schrott, 403 F.3d at 944.

B. Plaintiffs Response to Defendant Cainkar’s Rule 56.1 Statement

In response to nearly all of Cainkar’s statements of fact, Plaintiff merely denies the statement without proffering “specific references” to the record to support his general denials as required by Rule 56.1. Plaintiff attempted to file an amended response to Cainkar’s Statement (R. 391-1), but the Court struck that entry as dilatory and non-compliant. (R. 403-1.) As such, Plaintiff has admitted each of the supported facts in Cainkar’s Rule 56.1 Statement at paragraphs 5-7, 10, and 12-63. Despite the Village Defendants’ argument to the contrary, however, facts deemed admitted by Plaintiff for the purpose of Defendant Cainkar’s motion for summary judgment are not deemed admitted for the purpose of the Village Defendants’ motion. The Village Defendants must meet their own respective burdens.

C. The Village Defendants’ Rule 56.1 Statement

Defendants attack Plaintiffs Rule 56.1 statements in both their respective summary judgment papers and in the Village Defendants’ motion to strike. Having fully considered Defendants’ arguments, the Court largely agrees that Plaintiff has fallen far short of his Local Rule 56.1 obligations. The Village Defendants, however, are not without fault.

To begin with, the parties routinely cited exhibits that went unauthenticated either by deposition testimony or affidavit. Rule 56(e) requires that documents be “authenticated by and attached to an affidavit that meets the requirements of Rule 56(e) and the affiant must be a person through whom the exhibits could be admitted into evidence.” Scott, 346 F.3d at 759-760, n. 7 (quoting 10A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice & Procedure § 2722, at 379-80 & 382-84 (1998)). This requirement applies to all documentary exhibits, including, for example, expert reports. See Haywood v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 323 F.3d 524, 533 (7th Cir.2003) (excluding on summary judgment an expert report that was introduced “without any supporting affidavit verifying its authenticity.”).

Next, both Plaintiff and the Village Defendants routinely relied on hearsay evidence. But “hearsay is inadmissible in summary judgment proceedings to the same extent that it is inadmissible in a trial,” Eisenstadt, 113 F.3d at 742. The Seventh Circuit excepts from this prohibition only affidavits and depositions. Eisenstadt, 113 F.3d at 742. Both parties failed to justify their reliance on hearsay or provide sufficient information (via affidavits or otherwise) to bring the hearsay evidence within one of the exceptions provided by the Federal Rules of Evidence.

In addition, both parties continually “disagree” with the other party’s statements of fact. Absent a denial supported by specific reference to the record, mere disagreement is insufficient to support or defeat summary judgment. See Montano v. City of Chi, 535 F.3d 558, 569 (7th Cir.2008) (citing Smith v. Lamz, 321 F.3d 680, 683 (7th Cir.2003)).

Moreover, a proper Rule 56.1 statement attaches well-organized exhibits that are what the parties claim them'to be. The parties in this case submitted over 500 separate exhibits, representing thousands of pages of additional information. Both Plaintiff and the Village Defendants routinely cited to exhibits that were non-existent or mis-labeled. In each case, where the Court was confronted with a non-conforming, argumentative, or unsupported statement of fact, that fact was stricken.

D. Plaintiffs Response to the Village Defendants’ Rule 56.1 Statement

Although Plaintiff did file responses to the Rule 56.1 Statement of the Village Defendants, (R. 373-1; R. 392-1; 395-1), many of his responses fail to comply with Rule 56.1. First, in responding to each of these three Rule 56.1 Statements, Plaintiff initially failed to file any exhibits in support of his factual assertions. Instead, Plaintiff delivered a “courtesy copy” binder of untabulated exhibits — eight days late, and in violation of Local Rule 5.2(c). This failure potentially dooms Plaintiffs opposition to Defendants’ 56.1 statements, because a party facing summary judgment must “put up or shut up.” Steen v. Myers, 486 F.3d 1017, 1022 (7th Cir.2007). Even considering the binder of non-filed exhibits, the majority of Plaintiffs “disputed facts” are merely argumentative assertions that lack specific citations to the record. In some instances, Plaintiff identified genuine factual disputes but pointed to exhibits that either were not provided to the Court (see, e.g., R. 434-1, Pl.’s Ex. 81), represented something other than what Plaintiff contended (see, e.g., 434-1, Pl.’s Exs. 58, 59, 60, 66, 107, 108), or did not contain the pages for which Plaintiff cited them (see, e.g. 434-1, Pl.’s Exs. 36, 38, 40, 59, 111(b)). It is not the Court’s responsibility to root through the record to make Plaintiffs case for him. See Corley v. Rosewood Care Ctr., 388 F.3d 990, 1001 (7th Cir.2004).

Plaintiff also relies on broad, argumentative affidavits that are unsupported by facts or other citations to the record. Affidavits must be “made on personal knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)(1); Woods v. City of Chicago, 234 F.3d 979, 987 (7th Cir.2000). Plaintiff submitted transcripts of interviews with Tim Sparrow, Ken Keyser, and David Eldridge, (see, e.g., R. 434-1, Pl.’s Exs. 39, 40, 41, 105), and an unsigned statement purporting to be the “O’Connell Declaration” (R. 434-1, Pl.’s Ex. 28), each of which lacked signatures, authentication, or any evidentiary foundation whatsoever. Id.; see Market v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys., 276 F.3d 906, 912 (7th Cir.2002) (an affidavit not signed by affiant fails to comply with Rule 56(e)). The “declarations” also contain multiple levels of inadmissible hearsay and recite speculation clearly outside the declarant’s personal knowledge. See Haywood v. Lucent Techs., 323 F.3d 524, 533 (7th Cir.2003) (affirming district court’s striking of hearsay statements in the context of summary judgment); Woods, 234 F.3d at 987 (document was inadmissible under 56(e) where it contained statements regarding matters not within the declarant’s personal knowledge). As such, much of the Sparrow, Keyser, Eldridge, and O’Connell “declarations” are inadmissible, and thus improper under Rule 56(e).

Plaintiff also relies heavily on newspaper articles for support of his rebuttals to paragraphs 77, 104, 108, 116, 118, and 123. (R. 434-1, PL’s Exs. 93, 94). Although Plaintiff half-heartedly argues otherwise, he clearly offers the newspaper articles for the truth of the matters asserted therein, and they are therefore inadmissable. See Fed.R.Evid. 801(c); Chi. Firefighters Local 2 v. City of Chicago, 249 F.3d 649, 654 (7th Cir.2001) (“The evidence consists of a newspaper article, which is inadmissible hearsay ...”); Eisenstadt v. Centel Corp., 113 F.3d 738, 742 (7th Cir.1997) (newspaper article inadmissible hearsay in summary judgment proceedings); see also Galdikas v. Fagan, 342 F.3d 684, 695 (7th Cir.2003) (parties cannot rely on inadmissible hearsay in summary judgment opinions). Similarly, portions of Plaintiffs affidavit, (R. 434-1, Pl.’s Ex. 86 at ¶¶ 6, 7, 15), improperly rely on the newspaper articles and other hearsay evidence, such as a televised interview with Mayor Landek, which the Court cannot consider for the truth of the matters asserted. See Potter, 445 F.3d at 1009. Without the hearsay evidence, Plaintiffs responses to paragraphs 77, 104, and 108 are unsupported by any facts, and the Court therefore deems those paragraphs admitted.

Further confusing things, many of Plaintiffs responses to the Village Defendants’ Rule 56.1 Statement refer back, or otherwise incorporate, responses to other statements of fact. Some of these incorporating responses, namely paragraphs 21 and 22, point to a number of other responses, some of which admit, others of which deny, Defendants’ statements. Many of the incorporating responses (paragraphs 25, 28, 29, and 89), for example, fail to specifically address the facts for which Plaintiff apparently incorporated them, while others (paragraphs 84, 85, and 86) incorporate non-existent responses. Because the Court cannot determine the meaning of these responses, and because the responses fail to comply with Rule 56.1(b)(3)(A) and (B), Plaintiff has admitted the well-supported facts contained in the Village Defendants’ Statement at paragraphs 21, 22, 25, 28, 29, 84, 85, 86, 89 and 109-111.

Moreover, Plaintiffs attempts to introduce new facts in the context of his responses to Defendants’ Rule 56.1 statements are also improper. Plaintiffs responses to at least Village Defendants’ paragraphs 61, 69, 74, and 75 attempt to introduce new facts in contravention of the Local Rules, which require delineation of additional facts in a separate statement. See Loe. R. 56.1(b)(3); Ammons, 368 F.3d at 817 (“Rule 56.1 envisions a separate statement of additional facts.”). As such, the Court strikes these “additional facts” for failure to comply with Local Rule 56.1(b)(3). See Ammons, 368 F.3d at 817 (holding that district court did not abuse its discretion by striking facts included in non-movant’s responsive memorandum).

Given Plaintiffs evasive responses, improper arguments, mis-citations, lack of citations, missing exhibits, reliance on inadmissible evidence, and failure to address Defendants’ statements of fact, Plaintiff has admitted the Village Defendants’ statements of fact, to the extent that the statements are well-supported, at paragraphs 3, 7-12,14,16, 18, 19, 23, 24, 27, 30, 32, 34, 36, 41, 43-45, 50-52, 53, 57, 61, 62-65, 66, 70, 73, 75, 80, 81, 82, 83-86, 89-92, 95-98, 106, 108, 115, 116, 120, and 121.

E. Plaintiffs Additional Statement of Facts

Rule 56.1 permits the non-moving party to file a statement of additional facts to overcome summary judgment. See Loc. R. 56.1(b)(3). Here, Plaintiff filed such a document (R. 394-1), but for many of the reasons discussed above, it fails to comply with Local Rule 56.1. The Village Defendants have moved to strike Plaintiffs Statement of Additional Facts. (R. 415-l.)

Plaintiffs additional facts lack supporting exhibits, rely on inadmissible evidence, and are rife with improper arguments and erroneous citations. As such, the Court strikes the first sentence of the first paragraph 4 in Plaintiffs Additional Statement of Fact as unsupported by evidence. The Court also strikes the last two sentences of paragraph 3, the first sentence of paragraph 6, the last sentence of paragraph 8, the second sentence of paragraph 12, along with the first sentence of paragraph 21, and the last clause of paragraphs 19, and 20 as containing improper argument and lacking in evidentiary support. In addition, the Court strikes the last clause of paragraph 5, the first two sentences of paragraph 8, the last sentence of paragraph 12, and paragraphs 7,10,16,18,- and 22 as unsupported by admissible evidence and/or the record provided to the Court.

III. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is proper when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P 56(c). A genuine issue of material fact exists if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). In determining summary judgment motions, “facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party only if there is a ‘genuine’ dispute as to those facts.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 1776, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007). The party seeking summary judgment has the burden of establishing the lack of any genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). After “a properly supported motion for summary judgment is made, the adverse party ‘must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’ ” Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (quoting Fed R. Civ. P. 56(e)). A nonmoving party must, however, present more than a scintilla of evidence in support of its claim. Rozskowiak v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 415 F.3d 608, 612 (7th Cir.2005). Rather, to overcome summary judgment, the nonmoving party must present “evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the nonmoving party.” Id. at 612.

IV. Facts

A. Individuals

From 1999 to 2003, Plaintiff John LaF-lamboy, Sr. and Defendant Allan Gustaf-son co-owned an inflatable dome structure called the World Golf Dome (“WGD”), which was located in the Village of Bridge-view, Illinois. (R. 373-1 at ¶ 1.) Plaintiff and Gustafson entered into an agreement whereby with each owned a 50% interest in the WGD. (R. 364-3 at ¶ 7.) Plaintiff and Gustafson never reduced their agreement to writing. (Id. at ¶ 10.) The WGD employed a number of individuals, including John LaFlamboy, Jr., (R. 373-1 at ¶ 10) and Donna O’Connell. (Id. at ¶ 12.) In addition, Defendant Kenneth DeVries leased a bar and restaurant on the WGD premises.

Defendant Steven Landek was (and remains) the mayor of the Village of Bridge-view. (Id. at ¶ 5.) At times relevant to this case, Defendant John Curry served as the Village’s Code Enforcement Inspector and had the power to issue citations and enforce violations of Village ordinances. (Id. at ¶ 120.) Defendant Joseph Kaput was the Village’s Director of Buildings and In-spectional Services. (Id. at ¶¶ 15; 121.) Defendant Forrest Sloan served as a Village Police Commander. (Id. at ¶ 122.) Defendant Vincent Cainkar is an outside attorney who was hired by the Mayor to serve as counsel for the Village to draft legal documents and correspondence for the Village. (R. 406-1 at ¶ 2.) Defendant Steve Reynolds worked for the Village as an independent contractor, working first to ensure compliance with the local liquor laws, and later in the public works department. (R. 373-1 at ¶ 116.) Defendant Adriana Mazutis was Steve Reynold’s girlfriend, and her name appears on an agreement transferring ownership of the WGD. Defendant Fred Pascente was Reynold’s friend, and accompanied Reynolds at the WGD on September 12, 2003. (Id. at ¶ 63.)

B. The Opening of the World Golf Dome

The WGD facility opened in November 1999, offering an indoor driving range and all-season space for sporting events. In addition to the Dome, the facility included a brick structure that housed office space and a restaurant. Within one week of being elected in 1999, Mayor Landek met with WGD co-owners Gustafson and LaF-lamboy to discuss how the Village could assist business at the WGD. (R. 371-1 at ¶ 5.) Mayor Landek also recommended Defendant DeVries to the Plaintiff. (R. 371-1 at ¶ 2.) DeVries later leased space in the WGD’s brick structure and opened a restaurant called the Scoreboard.

At the time of the WGD’s opening, on November 12,1999, Plaintiff obtained from the Village a temporary business license, (R. 343-3, Village Defs.’ Ex. 12), and a temporary Certificate of Occupancy. (R. 343-6, Village Defs.’ Ex. 69A.) The Certificate of Occupancy states that it is “per letter of intent.” (R. 343-6, Village Defs.’ Ex. 69A.) The letter of intent, signed by Plaintiff, listed seven open tasks to be completed and required Plaintiff to provide a $60,000 letter of credit to guarantee completion of the listed tasks. (Id.) As of November 17, 1999, the Village had not yet received the letter of credit, and so Defendant Curry sent a letter to Plaintiff notifying him that his “business is immediately ‘Closed.’ After we receive the letter of credit, a new Temporary Certificate of Occupancy Permit will be issued.” (R. 343-6, Village Defs.’ Ex. 66.) On that same date, November 17, 1999, Defendant Curry issued two Village Citations, Nos. CC-689-201 and CC-689-202, citing Plaintiff for occupying a building without an occupancy permit and for operating a business without a business permit. (R. 343-6, Village Defs.’ Ex. 66.) The next day, November 18, 1999, Plaintiff sent a letter to Defendant Curry confirming that the $60,000 letter of credit had been delivered to Curry on November 18, 1999 at 2:30 pm and requesting that the Village issue a new Temporary Certificate of Occupancy. (R. 343-6, Village Defs.’ Ex. 69.) The Village issued another Temporary Certificate of Occupancy on November 19, 1999 subject to the same stipulations in Plaintiffs November 12 letter of intent. (R. 373-1 at ¶ 22.)

Defendant Curry denied Plaintiffs business license application on December 14, 1999, citing “insufficient parking.” (Id.) The parties agree that Village Zoning Ordinance 98-08 required that the WGD maintain 150 spaces. (Id.) Plaintiff testified, however, that the WGD did, in fact, have 150 spaces when it opened in 1999. (R. 394-1 at ¶ 21.) When Plaintiffs tenant, Defendant DeVries, later applied for a business license on April 6, 2000, his application stated that The Scoreboard (part of the WGD facility) had 250 parking spaces. (Id. at ¶ 21.) The Village granted DeVries’ request for a business license. (Id.)

C. Village Citations

Plaintiff alleges the Village Defendants engaged in a pattern of issuing overzealous and/or wrongful citations in order to harass him into selling the WGD. In addition to the November 17, 1999 citation, for example, the Village issued a December 8, 2001 citation for failing to obtain a proper business license. (Id. at ¶ 22.) When the citation issued, the Village placed a sticker on the door of the WGD. (Id. at ¶ 23.) Plaintiff removed the sticker from the WGD door and received yet another citation for unlawfully defacing a Village of Bridgeview sticker. (Id.) Plaintiff also complained that, after the December 8, 2001 citation issued, Village police officers sought to drive away WGD customers. (Id.)

In another instance, the Village issued another citation to the WGD on September 24, 2000 for permitting weeds to grow too high. (Id. at ¶ 24.) Plaintiff does not deny that the weeds were too high but notes that he cut the weeds and the citation was dismissed. (Id.) Plaintiff also points to the testimony of Village police officer Kenneth Keyser regarding an incident in which Defendant Sloan asked Key-ser to “take a ride down to the golf dome and issue a citation for tall weeds,” which Keyser claims he refused because he “was uncomfortable issuing a citation for something that I don’t normally issue citations for.” (Id.) The Village Defendants do not dispute this testimony but note that Key-ser also testified that the citation — for tall weeds — was warranted.

The Village also issued citations to Plaintiff on October 14, 2000 and April 27, 2001 for serving food without a permit. (Id. at ¶ 25.) The October 14, 2000 citation resulted from a pizza business serving food in the WGD during a haunted house event. (Id.) The Village issued the April 27, 2001 citation when a third-party organization hosted an event for disabled children at the WGD. (Id.) Plaintiff testified that the organization ordered pizzas to be delivered to the WGD and Defendant Curry arrived shortly thereafter and “started screaming at them they can’t eat pizza.” (Id.)

In another incident, a Village police officer issued a citation to Plaintiff for disobeying a police order, namely dumping truckloads of stone in the WGD parking lot after being ordered not to do so. (Id. at ¶ 26.) According to Plaintiff, Defendant Curry sent Plaintiff a letter notifying him that the WGD parking lot had eroded and requesting that Plaintiff add additional stone to the area. (Id.) Plaintiff complains that he ordered the stone, but when it was delivered, the police arrived and inexplicably told him not to dump the stone. (Id.) Plaintiff admits that he dumped the stone after being told by the police not to do so. (Id.)

On December 14, 2000, the WGD received four citations, for: (1) storing combustible materials; (2) maintaining fuel fire heaters without permission; (3) possessing heating devices which failed to comply with standards; and (4) inadequate ventilation. (Id. at ¶ 27.) Plaintiff admits the underlying grounds for which the December 14 citations were issued. (Id. at ¶ 27, 28.) On July 21, 2001, the Village issued Defendant Allan Gustafson a citation for a faulty security fence around the WGD. (Id. at ¶29.) Gustafson also received, on July 31, 2001, a citation for maintaining debris on the WGD premises. (Id.)

The Village dismissed all citations issued to Plaintiff, Defendant Gustafson, and the WGD between 1999 and 2001 either because the citation amount was paid, or because Plaintiff demonstrated that he had corrected the underlying issue. No citations were dismissed based on any judicial finding that the citation was unfounded. Plaintiff presented some evidence, however, that Village officials used their “power to issue or deny residents a license or permit to do business — for the purpose of forcing businesses to turn over income or property to Mayor Landek and his allies.” Plaintiff offered no evidence, however, that Mayor Landek instructed Curry or Kaput regarding the issuance of citations to the WGD.

D. Special Events at the WGD

Plaintiff also alleges that the Village Defendants repeatedly blocked Plaintiffs attempts to make money through non-sporting events at the WGD. The WGD also hosted some 4500 members of the public at the “Tattoo the Earth Concert” on July 26, 2000. (R. 373-1 at ¶¶ 35, 36; R. 364-3 at ¶ 13.) Prior to the concert, on June 21, 2000, Mayor Landek sent a letter to Plaintiff stating that he had not yet met his conditions of occupancy, as stated in Plaintiffs November 12, 1999 letter of intent, and that it would be “extremely difficult” for Plaintiff to complete the tasks before the event. (R. 373-1 at ¶ 114.) Plaintiff did not obtain a special use permit for the “Tattoo the Earth” concert. (Id. at ¶ 41.) Despite the concerns expressed in Lan-dek’s letter, and despite the fact that the Village contended that the WGD had neither an occupancy permit nor a business license, the concert was not cancelled.

An agreement between Plaintiff, Defendant DeVries, and the concert’s promoters governed the proceeds of the “Tattoo the Earth” concert. This contract required the WGD to donate a portion of the concert revenue as a “political donation.” (Id. at ¶ 42.) Plaintiff asserts that the donation was meant for Mayor Landek as a kickback. Specifically, Plaintiff testified that Defendant DeVries told Plaintiff that he should pay the kickback if he wanted to stay in business, (R. 434-1, PL’s Ex. 76A; R. 344-2, Village Defs.’ Ex. 173), and that when Plaintiff complained to Mayor Lan-dek soon thereafter, the Mayor did not deny the kickback. (R. 434-1, Pl.’s Ex. 61; 76A.) Plaintiff has admitted, however, that he did not personally see Mayor Landek receive revenues from the concert. (R. 373-1 at ¶ 43.) Two days after the concert, Plaintiff contacted federal prosecutors and the Federal Bureau of Investigation regarding the alleged illegal conduct by Village officials. (R. 364-3 at ¶ 13.)

Plaintiff planned another event — a public dance called the “Boogie Tribe Dance Party” — -at the WGD for late August 2000. On or about August 9, 2000, Defendant Cainkar sent a letter to Plaintiff expressing the Village’s concerns regarding possible zone violations relating to the party. (R. 373-1 at ¶ 45). When Plaintiff failed to seek a special one-day temporary use permit from the Village, Defendant Cainkar, the Village’s attorney, sought a temporary restraining order against Plaintiff. (R. 373-1 at ¶¶ 45-46). Plaintiff agreed to the injunction, and he cancelled the party. Id.

In December 2000, Mayor Landek arranged for the WGD to host a Christmas party for the Bridgeview bank. (R. 373-1 at ¶ 5.) Neither party submitted evidence as to (1) whether the Village issued a special one-day temporary use permit for the event; (2) how many people attended the event; or (3) whether food was served at the event.

E. Fall 2000 Appraisal

Plaintiff further claims that as part of the scheme to gain control of the WGD, Mayor Landek ordered an appraisal of the WGD without notifying Plaintiff. In late fall 2000, Plaintiff met with Mayor Landek in Landek’s office. The parties disagree as to the specific substance of the conversation, but Landek testified that at some point during the conversation, Landek asked Plaintiff how much he would accept for the WGD. Landek testified that Plaintiff stated, “$3 million.” Landek also testified that the conversation was “just in passing.” (R. 373-1 at ¶ 113.)

At some point thereafter, Landek asked Defendant Cainkar, then the Village’s attorney, to get an appraisal of the WGD. (Id.) On October 5, 2000, Defendant Cain-kar sent a facsimile to Thomas Holcer requesting that Holcer appraise the WGD. The facsimile states in part,

The Village of Bridgeview is investigating the possibility of purchasing the World Golf Dome ... We don’t need a full blown appraisal, and one of the owners doesn’t know that the Village is interested, so you can’t say anything. What is happening is that the majority owner is sick and tired of the publicity and wants to sell out. I believe the number mentioned was $1,400,000 but it might go down to $1,250,000.

(R. 406-1 at ¶ 4; R. 434-1, Pl.’s Ex. 111.) The resulting appraisal is dated November 1, 2000. (R. 373-1 at ¶ 113; R. 406-1 at ¶ 4; R. 346-7, Village Defs.’ Ex. 347.) Neither party disputes that Plaintiff was not immediately made aware of the Village obtaining an appraisal of the WGD in the fall of 2000.

On May 30, 2002, Defendant Cainkar sent a facsimile to Mayor Landek, stating in part,

The appraiser called me late yesterday and provided information regarding new golf dome just constructed at the Green Gardens Golf Course in Frankfort, IL. Of course the golf dome was constructed by our friend from Bridgeview ... A rough cost for the facility would be $1,600,000. The appraisal from Tom Holcer 2 years ago was $1,200,000 to $1,500,000 so this is pretty consistent.

(R. 434-1, Pl.’s Ex. 111.) On that same day, Thomas E. Holcer sent a fax to Defendant Cainkar stating, “I was informed this morning that the life expectancy of a golf dome structure is 25 to 30 years.” (Id.) In addition, a facsimile dated June 18, 2002 from Landek to Plaintiff states in part, “John — attached is the appraisal for the golf dome we discussed.” (Id.) This document also has a facsimile transmission report attached, however, indicating that the fax did not go through to Plaintiff. (Id.)

F. “Bogus Lawsuits”

During the 1999-2003 time period, Plaintiff and Defendant Gustafson were named in a number of lawsuits. Plaintiff has alleged that the Village Defendants instructed individuals to file “bogus lawsuits” against Plaintiff and the WGD. Plaintiff has not, however, put forward any admissible evidence of such conduct. Nor has Plaintiff put forward evidence showing that Mayor Landek was involved in any lawsuits brought by DeVries against Plaintiff or the WGD.

G. Inspections

In March of 2003, Plaintiff hired structural engineer Gerald Carstens of GRC Engineering to inspect the WGD and report back to the Village, for the purpose of assisting Plaintiff in obtaining a building permit to repair the WGD. (R. 373-1 at ¶ 58.) Carstens sent a letter to Defendant Kaput reporting his findings. (Id.) Car-stens testified that after sending the report to the Village, he spoke to Kaput by phone, and Kaput requested that Carstens prepare an additional report for the Village. According to Carstens, he agreed to prepare the report as long as his findings were his own. (Id.) Kaput replied that he “wanted to close the WGD down, and that [Carstens’] report was to facilitate such purpose.” (Id.)

At some point thereafter, Kaput engaged a third party engineering firm, Var-ga & Associates, to review the Carstens inspection. (R. 373-1 at ¶ 58.) Varga requested additional information from Kaput at least once. (R. 345-5, Village Defs.’ Ex. 220.) Varga, Kaput, and Defendants Curry and Sloan conducted an inspection of the WGD on March 27, 2003 in Plaintiffs presence, and Varga submitted his report on March 31, 2003. (Id.) The parties’ submissions do not make clear what happened in the intervening months, but on June 24, 2003, Defendant Kaput sent a letter to Plaintiff noting three areas “that Mr. Var-ga deemed necessary to complete the project.” (Id.) Plaintiff claims that the March inspection was a “foreordained condemnation” of the WGD.

H. The Chicago Fire

Plaintiff alleges that one motive for the Village Defendants’ scheme to defraud him of his interest in the WGD was that Mayor Landek wanted the WGD to improve Bridgeview’s chances of winning a bid to host the Chicago Fire, a Major League Soccer team. Sometime in 2003, the owners of the Chicago Fire considered the Village of Bridgeview as a potential location in which to relocate their soccer team. (R. 373-1 at ¶ 104.) In connection with their search for a home for the Fire, the team owners issued requests for proposals (“RFPs”) from various municipalities, including Bridgeview. (Id.) Ultimately, the team owners and the Village entered into a thirty-year agreement providing that the Fire would play all of its home games in Bridgeview. (Id. at ¶ 105.) This agreement does not require the Village to provide an all-weather practice facility, such as the WGD, for the team. (Id.) Nor has the Fire ever practiced at the WGD. (Id.) Plaintiff did, however, provide evidence that in August of 2003, Mayor Landek told Bridgeview Police Chief Charles Chigas that he wanted to acquire the WGD “at all cost” in order to “guarantee” that the Chicago Fire would choose Bridgeview. (PL’s Ex. 44, Eldridge Aff. at ¶ 4.)

I. Transfer of the WGD

1. Meetings between Gustafson and various Defendants

In late July 2003, Defendant Gustafson began discussing a potential sale of his interest in the WGD with Defendant Reynolds. (R. 364-3 at ¶ 33.) Gustafson testified that he told Reynolds at their first meeting that Plaintiff owned a 50% interest in the WGD. (Id.) Gustafson also testified that Plaintiff attended at least one meeting with Gustafson and Reynolds, but that during that meeting, Gustafson refused Reynolds’ offer of $1.2 million. (R. 350-2, Gustafson’s Ex. F at 112:17-113:11.) In a subsequent meeting with Reynolds, unattended by Plaintiff, Gustafson agreed to sell his interest in the WGD to Adriana Mazutis for $1.25 million. (Id. at 114:6-115:21.) This meeting took place right after Labor Day, 2003. (Id.)

On the morning of September 11, 2003, Defendant Gustafson met with Defendants Landek, Cainkar, and Reynolds in Lan-dek’s office. (R. 364-3 at ¶ 46.) At the meeting, Reynolds indicated that he knew both of the WGD partners, Plaintiff and Defendant Gustafson, and could facilitate the Village’s purchase of the WGD by acquiring both interests and reselling the property to the Village. (Id.) Landek asked Cainkar, the Village’s attorney, to prepare the documents necessary for the transfer of the WGD, because, according to Cainkar, Landek “wanted to get things moving.” (R. 406-1 at ¶ 2; R. 364-3 at ¶ 46.) At that same meeting, Reynolds agreed to secure the corporate documents necessary to allow Cainkar to draft the transfer documents. (R. 364-3 at ¶ 46.)

Later that same day, pursuant to the instructions of Defendant Cainkar, Defendants Gustafson and Reynolds traveled together to the office of Tom Morrison, the attorney who held the corporate books for the WGD. (R. 350-2, Gustafson’s Ex. F at 121:15-124:1.) Morrison was not in the office and so Gustafson left a note with Morrison, instructing him to turn the WGD corporate books over to Reynolds later that day. (R. 364-3.) Reynolds signed a receipt indicating that he had received “the corporate records of World Golf Dome, Inc., and an unsigned copy of agreement for sale of business with real estate (World Golf Dome), as authorized by Allan Gustafson, this 11th Day of September, 2003.” (Id.; R. 350-2, Gustafson’s Ex. Y.)

Also on September 11, 2003, Cainkar sent a facsimile to Defendant Landek enclosing the “first draft” of a settlement agreement, and asking Landek:

I would appreciate if you would review the Agreement to see if I have left anything out (highly unlikely). Because this is such a rush maybe there is something that I don’t know about. If the Agreement is acceptable, then I would recommend that copies be signed by Gustafson first. Then it should be taken over to LaFlamboy so that he can sign the Agreement, the stock transfer, and the assignment of beneficial interest. I will prepare those documents so that they can be picked up tomorrow morning.

(R. 434-1, Pl.’s Ex. 111(a).) Cainkar did not speak with LaFlamboy before drafting this agreement, and Cainkar did not represent either Gustafson or LaFlamboy in preparing the document. (R. 406-1 at ¶ 2.)

2. The Events of September 12, 2003

On September 12, 2003, Plaintiffs girlfriend, Donna O’Connell, went to the WGD office on an errand for Plaintiff. (R. 406-1 at ¶ 9.) O’Connell testified that the WGD was closed, but when she arrived, she saw two men leaving the WGD office, one carrying a plaque from Plaintiffs office. (Id.) One of the men, Defendant Reynolds, questioned her in an intimidating manner and pushed her. (Id.) The two men, Defendants Pascente and Reynolds, told her that they were interested in purchasing Plaintiffs share of the WGD and demanded that she call Plaintiff. (Id.; R. 373-1 at ¶ 63.) The parties dispute what happened next, but all agree that O’Connell called the Village Police Department, that Village police officers arrived on the scene, and that the police left within twenty minutes of arriving. (R. 406-1 at ¶ 9; R. 373-1 at ¶ 64, 65.)

After the police left, O’Connell testified that Reynolds showed her some documents that included Defendant Gustafson’s name, and asked her to call Plaintiff again. (R. 406-1 at ¶ 9.) O’Connell testified that, at one point, a vehicle pulled up carrying two people whom she recognized as Village employees, and that Defendant Reynolds handed the plaque to one of them. (Id.) At some point, O’Connell testified, Reynolds began talking about Mayor Landek. O’Connell does not recall exactly what was said, but she asked Reynolds to call Mayor Landek, and Reynolds placed the call. (Id.) O’Connell spoke briefly to Landek on Reynolds’ cell phone and recognized Lan-dek’s voice. (Id.) O’Connell testified that Reynolds was on the phone “back and forth” throughout their encounter, although, with the exception of her brief call with Mayor Landek, she did not know to whom Reynolds spoke. (Id.)

According to O’Connell, she sat in Rey-nold’s car with Reynolds and Pascente for approximately two and a half hours as the three waited for Plaintiff to drive in from a far west suburb. (Id.) O’Connell also stated that at one point, Defendant Reynolds pulled a gun from a leg holster and showed it to O’Connell, asking her if the gun would make Plaintiff arrive sooner, and telling her that Plaintiff “wasn’t going to leave there alive if he didn’t sign the documents.” (Id.)

Once Plaintiff arrived, O’Connell told him, “he’s (Reynold’s) got a gun. Be careful.” Plaintiff agreed to go into the WGD office with Defendants Reynolds and Pas-cente. (Id.) The parties dispute what happened in the next twenty minutes, but during that time, Plaintiff apparently-agreed to sell the WGD for $175,000. (Id.) At some point that day, LaFlamboy signed a one-page agreement for the sale of the WGD to “Steve Reynolds in good faith” (“the September 12 Settlement Agreement”). (R. 345-7, Village Defs.’ Ex. 268 at 2220G.) According to the terms of the September 12 Settlement Agreement, LaFlamboy agreed to transfer his interest in the WGD in exchange for $175,000 and release from all liabilities related to the WGD. (Id.) The September 12 Settlement Agreement was signed by LaFlamboy as the “seller” and Pascente — not Reynolds— as the “buyer.” (Id.) By its terms, the September 12 Agreement was contingent on the execution of a formal contract no later than September 16. (Id.)

Immediately following the encounter with Pascente and Reynolds, Plaintiff called his attorney, Ken Thiesen, and instructed him to draft a purchase agreement concerning the sale of the WGD. (R. 373-1 at ¶ 71.) Thiesen testified that Plaintiffs voice gave him reason to believe that something was wrong. Thiesen asked Plaintiff if he felt threatened, and Plaintiff told Thiesen that he did. (R. 373-1 at ¶ 71.) Thiesen prepared the document. That same day, September 12, Thiesen drafted a formal purchase agreement (“Purchase Agreement”) transferring LaF-lamboy’s interest in the WGD to Fred Pascente in exchange for $175,000 and a release from all WGD liabilities. (R. 345-7, Village Defs.’ Ex. 268 at JL00043-00050.) It is undisputed that both LaFlam-boy and Pascente signed the Purchase Agreement. According to its terms, the Purchase Agreement was contingent upon several conditions being satisfied prior to the closing, which was scheduled for two days later, on September 14.

Viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the evidence suggests that LaF-lamboy signed the Purchase Agreement only because he was coerced to do so. Within ten days of the September 12 incident, however, Plaintiff requested the $175,000 payment from Steve Reynolds on three separate occasions. (R. 373-1 at ¶ 82.) Moreover, when Reynolds and Pas-cente failed to pay Plaintiff the $175,000 specified in the Purchase Agreement, Plaintiff instructed his attorney to place a lien on the WGD. (Id.) On October 24, 2004, Plaintiff filed a lien on the WGD claiming a right to compensation in the amount of $175,000. (Id.)

3. The September 15, 2003 Settlement Agreement

On September 15, 2003, Defendant Gus-tafson met with Defendant Reynolds at a Bridgeview bank and signed a document titled Settlement Agreement Between Alan Gustafson and John LaFlamboy Concerning the World Golf Dome (“the September 15 Agreement”), (R. 345-7, Village Defs.’ Ex. 269). The document purports to contain both Gustafson’s and LaFlamboy’s signatures, although LaFlamboy disputes that the signature is his. (R. 406-1 at ¶ 1.) According to the terms of the September 15, 2003 Agreement, LaFlamboy transferred his share of the WGD to his business partner, Gustafson, in return for forgiveness of debts and liabilities of the WGD corporation, including, but not limited to, one or more bank loans and additional loans made to the corporation by Gustafson. (R. 345-7, Village Defs.’ Ex. 269; R. 373-1 at ¶¶ 53, 61, 68.) The parties do not dispute that the September 15 Agreement is the agreement drafted by Defendant Cainkar on September 11, 2003 and faxed to Mayor Landek. (See, e.g., R. 364-3 at ¶ 46, 52; R. 406-1 at ¶2.) LaF-lamboy did not personally witness the alleged forgery, and has presented no evidence that Defendants Landek, Sloan, Curry, Cainkar, or Gustafson personally forged the document. According to Gus-tafson, the September 15 Agreement already included Plaintiffs signature when Gustafson signed the document. (R. 364-3 at ¶ 60.) Gustafson maintains that the September 15 Agreement transferred Plaintiffs 50% interest in the WGD to Gustafson. (Id.)

4. Mazutis Agreement

At the same September 15, 2003 meeting, Defendant Gustafson executed a handwritten contract purporting to transfer Gustafson’s 100-percent ownership interest in the WGD to Adriana Mazutis in exchange for $1,250,000. (R. 406-1 at ¶ 13; R. 346-7, Village Defs.’ Ex. 357; R. 356-1, Gustafson’s Ex. DD.)

On September 18, 2003, Defendant Cain-kar faxed Thomas Holcer a request for an appraisal of the World Gold Dome. The facsimile states in part:

On November 6, 2000, you prepared a Limited Scope Market Value Appraisal for the above property [the WGD] showing a range of market value from $1,200,000 to $1,500,000. The Village needs this updated as talks are serious with a purchase price in the range of $1,600,000. Of course, if the Village owns the property, it will be exempt from real estate taxes and make its operation more profitable. I would appreciate if you could put a rush on this ...

(R. 434-1, PL’s Ex. 111.) The parties have not submitted any resulting appraisal.

Beginning on September 24, 2003, Defendant Cainkar sent at least four separate facsimiles to attorney Stephen H. Dabrow-ski, requesting at various points, “a written agreement with Alan Gustafson for the purchase of the World Golf Dome,” and “any type of agreement that your client has entered into with Gustafson.” On October 22, 2003, Cainkar’s facsimile provided:

In order to facilitate the closing and with the permission of the Mayor, I would suggest that your client assign its agreement to purchase the World Golf Dome property to the Village. The Village would then close on the purchase at the same price that your client is paying as a result of the assignment. This should minimize the complaints that someone is making a profit other than the current owners. Then the difference between the amount which would be paid by the Village to your client and the amount paid at the Gustafson closing would then be paid when all of the title matters, including the lawsuits are dismissed. This would put the onus on your client to resolve these matters before getting paid and would protect the Village.

(Pl.’s Ex. 111(a).) Viewing the facts in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, Mr. Da-browski represented both Defendant Adriana Mazutis and Defendant Reynolds in connection with the transfer of the WGD. (R. 395-1 at ¶ 47; R. 346-7, Village Defendants’ Exs. 355; 356.)

On October 31, 2003, the Village of Bridgeview entered into an agreement with Mazutis, whereby the Village purchased the WGD from Mazutis for a total cost of $1,650,000. (R. 406-1 at ¶13.) The agreement contains signatures purporting to belong to Mayor Landek and Ms. Mazutis. (Id.) Under this agreement, Ms. Mazutis assigned her 100-percent interest in the WGD to the Village for a net gain of $242,366.97, with the Village paying $1.2 million to Defendant Gustafson. (Id.) The Village subsequently issued two checks to Ms. Mazutis totaling $142,366.97. (Id.) In addition, the Village had previously issued a check to Mazutis on August 20, 2003 for $100,000. (Id.)

Ms. Mazutis testified, however, that she did not receive any checks from the Village of Bridgeview and that she never received any money from the Village in connection with the WGD. (R. 406-1 at ¶ 13.) Ms. Mazutis also testified that she does not recall ever meeting Mr. Gustafson, she does not recall signing an agreement to purchase the WGD, that she had never been inside the WGD, and that prior to September 15, 2003, she had never spoken to anybody with the Village about purchasing the WGD. (Id.) Ms. Mazutis did testify, however, that it was common for her boyfriend, Defendant Reynolds, to give her documents to sign, and that she would sign the documents without first reading them. (Id.) The Village Defendants claim that “[a]ll of the evidence indicates that Mazu-tis and/or Reynolds received $242,367, which was properly accounted for and disclosed.” (R. 373-1 at ¶ 18.) Defendants have not provided any evidence confirming who received the $242,367, what this amount represented, or how it was “properly accounted for and disclosed.”

5. November 6, 2003 Letter

On November 6, 2003, Village Attorney Cainkar sent Plaintiffs attorney a letter that states:

As you are aware, I an the attorney for the Village of Bridgeview which is interested in purchasing the above property. At this time I do not know what if any interest your client, John LaFlamboy, has in the property, but I do know that he has filed a document entitled Purchase Agreement Lien.

Be advised that the Village is not using any physical pressure on your client and if such pressure is being exerted, then it is being made without Village authorization and knowledge. If your client is required to sign any document, I will require that the document be signed before a notary public or before an attorney. If you advise me in writing that any document signed by your client is not a valid document, then the Village will treat the same as invalid.

If a voluntary sale of the above property cannot be accomplished, then the Village can simply file an eminent domain action and let a court sort out the interests of all the parties.

(R. 373-1 at ¶ 83; R. 346-1, Village Defs.’ Ex. 296.) At the time he received Cain-kar’s letter, Plaintiffs attorney understood Cainkar to be referring to the agreement with Pascente signed by Plaintiff on September 12, 2003. (R. 373-1 at ¶ 84; R. 346-1, Village Defs.’ Ex. 297.) Plaintiffs attorney sent Plaintiff a copy of Cainkar’s letter. Plaintiff never responded to Mr. Cainkar’s letter, nor did he instruct his attorney to do so. (Id.)

Defendant Gustafson closed on the sale of his interest in the WGD to the Village on November 26, 2003 for $1.2 million. (R. 364-3 at ¶ 67; R. 356-1, Gustafson’s Ex. DD.) Neither party disputes that the Village of Bridgeview currently owns the WGD. In addition, the parties do not dispute that LaFlamboy received no money from any of the various transactions.

ANALYSIS

Four summary judgment motions are pending before the Court. The Village Defendants have moved on Counts I, II, and III. (R. 363-1.) Defendant DeVries has moved on Counts II and V. (R. 369-1.) In addition, Defendant Cainkar separately moves for summary judgment as to Counts II and III (R. 381-1); Defendant Gustaf-son moves for summary judgment as to Counts II, III, and IV (R. 364-1; 366-1). Defendants Pascente, Reynolds, and Ma-zutis did not move for summary judgment as to the Counts asserted against them. The Court addresses each Count in turn.

I. RICO Claims — Count I

Plaintiff brings Count I under the Civil RICO statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1964(e), which provides civil remedies to a person “injured in his business or property by reason of a violation” of the criminal RICO statutes. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c); Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 547 U.S. 451, 453, 126 S.Ct. 1991, 1994, 164 L.Ed.2d 720 (2006). Specifically, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) makes it a crime for “any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity.” 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). To establish a civil RICO claim, Plaintiff must prove the following elements: (1) conduct (2) of an enterprise (3) through a pattern (4) of racketeering activity. Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co., — U.S. —, —-—, 128 S.Ct. 2131, 2137-38, 170 L.Ed.2d 1012 (2008); Gamboa v. Velez, 457 F.3d 703, 705 (7th Cir.2006).

Plaintiff asserts that the Village Defendants violated Section 1962(c) by conducting the Village’s (the charged RICO enterprise) affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity, including mail fraud, official misconduct, and various other crimes. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges sixty-three separate racketeering acts. Excluding acts allegedly committed by Defendants Allan Gustafson, Kenneth DeVries, Vincent Cainkar, and Adriana Mazutis, Steven Reynolds, and Fred Paseente, (see Notes 1 and 2, supra), Plaintiff alleges thirty separate racketeering acts committed by the Village Defendants.

The Village Defendants have challenged Plaintiffs Section 1962(c) claim on seven independent grounds. First, the Village Defendants argue that employees acting on behalf of municipal corporations cannot be held liable under RICO. Second, Defendants argue that many of Plaintiffs alleged “predicate acts” either do not constitute “racketeering activity” as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) or lack evidentiary support. As such, Defendants argue that Plaintiff cannot show that Defendants committed a “pattern” of racketeering activity. Third, Defendants argue that the predicate acts taken as a whole fail to create a pattern of racketeering activity. Fourth, Defendants contend that Plaintiff ratified the WGD transaction and has thus has waived his right to claim damages. Fifth, Defendants assert that Plaintiff cannot establish that he was proximately injured by Defendants’ conduct. Sixth, Defendants argue that Plaintiff lacks standing to recover for losses incurred by the WGD. Finally, Defendants Curry, Kaput, and Sloan contend that they did not “operate or manage” the enterprise.

A. Standing

Although Defendants raise the issue of standing toward the end of their brief, standing is a jurisdictional requirement that the Court must consider before reaching the merits of Plaintiffs RICO claim. See Evans v. City of Chicago, 434 F.3d 916, 924 (7th Cir.2006) (RICO standing “represents a jurisdictional requirement which remains open to review at all stages of the litigation”) (citation omitted).

Defendants allege that Plaintiff lacks standing because he alleges harm on behalf of the WGD corporation. “Where the shareholder’s injury resulted directly from an injury to the corporation, but only indirectly from the harm the wrongdoer wreaked upon the corporation, the RICO claim belongs to the corporation, and not the shareholder.” Gagan v. American Cablevision, Inc., 77 F.3d 951, 959 (7th Cir.1996) (citing Sears v. Likens, 912 F.2d 889, 892 (7th Cir.1990) (“Shareholders of a corporation do not have standing as individuals to bring a RICO action for diminution in the value of their stock caused allegedly by racketeering activities conducted against the corporation”); Flynn v. Merrick, 881 F.2d 446, 449 (7th Cir.1989); Rylewicz v. Beaton Servs., Ltd,., 888 F.2d 1175, 1178-79 (7th Cir.1989)).

In each of the cases cited in Gagan, the racketeering acts directly harmed the corporation and only indirectly harmed the shareholders — who suffered harm by virtue of diminished share value. Sears involved minority shareholders alleging that racketeering acts committed against the corporation diminished the value of their stock. Sears, 912 F.2d at 891. In Flynn, shareholders complained that corporate assets were sold at unfair prices. Flynn, 881 F.2d at 448. Rylewicz involved a third party engaging in racketeering acts to force a corporation to settle a lawsuit. Rylewicz, 888 F.2d at 1179.

In this case, however, Plaintiff alleges direct harm to his business and property interest. Although Plaintiff alleges harm to the WGD corporation in lost business, he also alleges that his interest in the WGD was sold out from under him. Unlike the plaintiffs in the Sears line of cases, he is not merely alleging injury to the corporation based on inadequate compensation in the transfer, but rather that he was individually singled out and swindled. Indeed, the WGD corporation itself may have lost nothing in the transfer of its real estate assets as one of the owners received $1.2 million in compensation. See, e.g., Joyce v. Morgan Stanley & Co., Inc., 538 F.3d 797, 800 (7th Cir.2008) (finding direct injury where shareholders alleged harm caused by actions of third parties and not by injury to corporation).

Plaintiffs case is more analogous to Gagan than to the Sears line of cases. In Gagan, the Seventh Circuit found that a limited partner had standing to recover on a RICO claim where Gagan, “not the limited partnership, was injured by the conspiracy to sell the limited partnership’s assets and divert the proceeds from the sale” and “the limited partnership’s assets were sold and the partnership dissolved at the time Gagan brought suit.” Gagan, 77 F.3d at 960. To begin with, Plaintiff was not merely a shareholder of the WGD corporation but rather a 50% owner, along with Plaintiff Gustafson, of a closely-held corporation. As discussed in Section IV, below, Illinois courts treat such 50% shareholders as de facto partnerships. Rexford Rand Corp. v. Ancel, 58 F.3d 1215, 1218-1219 (7th Cir.1995); Illinois Rockford Corp. v. Kulp, 41 Ill.2d 215, 222, 242 N.E.2d 228, 233 (1968); Hagshenas v. Gaylord, 199 Ill.App.3d 60, 145 Ill.Dec. 546, 552, 557 N.E.2d 316, 323 (1990). In addition, the parties do not dispute that one of the 50% partners, Gustafson, received $1.2 million for his interest in the WGD while the Plaintiff received nothing. By the time Plaintiff brought suit, the WGD corporation’s real estate assets had been sold and the corporation itself dissolved. The policy behind the shareholder standing rule, as the Seventh Circuit has noted, is to “prevent individuals from securing a double recovery — one directly as an individual and another indirectly as a shareholder of the corporation.” Gagan, 77 F.3d at 959. As was the case in Gagan, Plaintiffs claims do not implicate these concerns— the corporation was compensated for its sale. Only Plaintiff suffered injury. Plaintiffs measure of damages is, at the very least, his share of the sale of the WGD.

In addition, to the extent that Plaintiff alleges lost business arising fro