Meier v. Musburger (588 F. Supp. 2d 883, 2008)

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

JEFFREY COLE, United States Magistrate Judge.

INTRODUCTION

This case began five years ago with a dispute between Garry Meier, a popular radio talk show host in Chicago, and his attorney, Todd Musburger. Unfortunately, their falling-out came in the middle of contract negotiations between Mr. Meier and the radio station for which he worked, and it had the effect of scuttling any deal that might have been made. That left Mr. Meier without a show or income, and left Mr. Musburger without that portion of the fees he otherwise would have earned had he been able to negotiate a new contract for Mr. Meier. Each felt badly used by the other, and as inevitably occurs when people quarrel over money and perceived wrongdoing, the parties found themselves in litigation. Mr. Musburger sued for the fees he said he had earned in connection with the unsuccessful negotiation for the new contract; Mr. Meier responded with a counter claim for negligence and breach of fiduciary duties. The case was ultimately tried to a jury, which found for Mr. Mus-burger. An appeal followed in the Illinois Appellate Court.

Rather than awaiting the outcome of the appeal — the case remains pending — Mr. Meier sued Mr. Musburger in this court charging that he violated the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (“RICO”). 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq. The 64-page First Amended Complaint (“Complaint”) — much of which is single-spaced— contains two RICO counts and 26 claims under Illinois law. The first 133 paragraphs of the 181-paragraph complaint span 40 pages and purport to set forth the operative facts on which all the counts are based. They are the same facts that underlay the state court complaint. Without the RICO count there would be no federal jurisdiction since the parties are both citizens of Illinois. See Lincoln Property Co. v. Roche, 546 U.S. 81, 89, 126 S.Ct. 606, 163 L.Ed.2d 415 (2005).

Mr. Musburger has moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing, inter alia, that: (1) because the jury’s verdict in the state court had settled the underlying dispute in his favor, the complaint was barred by either or both the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and the doctrine of res judicata, and (2) Mr. Meier had failed to adequately state a claim under RICO. As we shall see, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is inapplicable, and the question of whether res judi-cata applies eludes easy answer for, as the Seventh Circuit has said, “[t]o be blunt, we have no idea what the law of Illinois is on the question whether a pending appeal destroys the claim preclusive effect of a judgment.” Rogers v. Desiderio, 58 F.3d 299, 302 (7th Cir.1995). But no matter, because the unanswerable argument is that the RICO claims are deficient and constitute an attempt to fabricate federal jurisdiction, and an action will not lie in federal court if the federal claims are made solely for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction or where such claims are wholly insubstantial and frivolous. Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 513, 126 S.Ct. 1235, 163 L.Ed.2d 1097 (2006); Jagla v. LaSalle Bank, 253 Fed.Appx. 597, 599 (7th Cir.2007).

But there is one more wrinkle. In response to the motion to dismiss, Mr. Meier’s counsel did an odd thing: he moved to stay the case under the Colorado River abstention doctrine, Colorado River Water Conservation List. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 96 S.Ct. 1236, 47 L.Ed.2d 483 (1976), and the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Rogers, supra, because of the pending appeal of the state court judgment. That’s a curious move from a plaintiff who filed the federal lawsuit and initially insisted that it proceed while his state appeal was pending. One reason might have been to avoid the state court judgment’s possible immediate preclusive effect in the hope the case would be reversed during the stay. But during a hearing on the motion, Mr. Meier’s counsel expressed the view that the outcome of the appeal was irrelevant to the outcome of this case.

It was his position that if the state court case were reversed, this case could still proceed, and if it were affirmed, this case would proceed apparently in tandem with a new trial in the state court. Given that theory — which seems wrong — no purpose would be served by a stay. In any event, the Colorado River doctrine is inapplicable here. Under the doctrine, there are limited circumstances where a federal court may abstain from exercising its jurisdiction over a case where there is a parallel state court suit. See Colorado River Water Conservation List., 424 U.S. at 813-17, 96 S.Ct. 1236; Tyrer v. City of South Beloit, Ill., 456 F.3d 744, 747 (7th Cir.2006). As Mr. Meier’s RICO claims are deficient, there is no jurisdiction to abstain from exercising. See infra at 898.

I.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND A.

The Negotiations For The 2004 Renewal Of The 1999 Contract Begin

For several years prior to 2003, Mr. Meier had co-hosted a radio talk show with Roe Conn on WLS-AM in Chicago. Beginning in 1998, he was represented in his contract negotiations with the station by Mr. Musburger, an attorney licensed to practice in the State of Illinois. (Complaint, ¶¶ 6-12). Mr. Musburger’s professional corporation was Todd W. Musbur-ger, Ltd., which was registered with the Illinois Secretary of State, but not with the Illinois Supreme Court under Rule 721. Neither Mr. Musburger nor Todd W. Mus-burger, Ltd. was licensed as an employment agency under the Illinois Private Employment Agency Act. (Complaint, ¶¶ 74, 160). Mr. Musburger was operating his law practice under the name, “The Law Offices of Todd W. Musburger, Ltd.” (Complaint, ¶¶ 8,109-130).

For many years prior to 1998, Mr. Mus-burger had been Mr. Meier’s “agent and exclusive legal representative for the negotiating and drafting of [his] agreements in the entertainment fields of radio and television, in exchange for a fee of five percent (5%) of the gross amount of any employment compensation and income payable to [him] under each such agreement.” (Complaint, ¶ 12). In 1999, after Mr. Musbur-ger had handled negotiations on plaintiffs behalf, plaintiff signed a new contract with WLS-AM, which was set to expire in February 2004.

Things went well until the summer of 2003 when it was time to negotiate a new deal. The plaintiffs co-host, Roe Conn, was represented by a different agent, and had a separate contract with the station. But it occurred to Mr. Meier and Mr. Musburger that they could secure the best terms in a new pact if plaintiff and Mr. Conn “presented] a unified front” in the upcoming negotiations. (Complaint, ¶ 16). Mr. Musburger drew up a proposed agreement to that effect for Mr. Conn’s approval and sent it to his agent. Mr. Conn never signed the agreement, but whenever plaintiff asked Mr. Musburger about it, he assured him it “had been ‘taken care of.” (Complaint, ¶¶ 19-20).

On August 6, 2003, WLS-AM submitted a written proposal for a contract renewal for plaintiff, but he and Mr. Musburger concurred that the offer from Mr. Jones, the President and General Manager of WLS, was “truly insulting.” (Complaint, ¶ 35). They also agreed that part of their strategy going forward would be to avoid contact with Mr. Jones. (Complaint, ¶¶ 23-22). Within two months, the plaintiff and Mr. Musburger were not to see eye-to-eye on anything.

B.

A Rift Develops Between Mr. Meier And Mr. Musburger

On September 4th, Mr. Musburger submitted a new fee agreement to plaintiff. It included several new provisions, the most troubling for the plaintiff being the following:

(a) We may render similar services to others, including persons of the same general qualifications and eligibility for similar employment, and such representation shall not constitute a violation of our fiduciary or other obligations hereunder.

(Complaint, ¶ 25). Plaintiff refused to sign the new fee agreement. In fact, he left a voice mail for Mr. Musburger saying he “want[ed] to put everything on hold right now” and take a week or so to think things over. (Complaint, ¶¶ 26-27). He instructed Mr. Musburger not “to meet with anyone or have any further conversations with anyone,” and to cancel any meetings regarding the WLS contract renewal that he might have scheduled. The plaintiff proposed that the two meet on September 23, 2003, to discuss things. (Complaint, ¶ 27). Plaintiffs wife also sent Mr. Musburger an email to the same effect. He later learned that, during the negotiations, Mr. Musburger was also representing another talk show host, from another Chicago station, whom he suspects Musburger was attempting to seat in the plaintiffs chair beside Mr. Conn. (Complaint, ¶¶ 65-72).

Mr. Musburger responded to plaintiffs voice mail the next day with two letters, which he sent by messenger to the plaintiff. In the first, he reminded the plaintiff that he had a previously scheduled meeting about the new pact with Mr. Jones and Mike Packer, operations director at WLS-AM, that day and said that it was “evident that ABC is poised to finalize an agreement with us in the financial range that Garry is seeking. This would take the program to the highest level ever reached in Chicago radio.” (Complaint, ¶ 29). He cautioned against the two-week delay proposed by Mr. Meier, but said he would be happy to meet on the 23rd of September. (Id.).

In the second letter, Mr. Musburger wrote that he was “mystified as to the reasons for the delay,” and warned that negotiations — -which he felt were nearing a conclusion — could be derailed by such a tactic. Mr. Musburger thought the plaintiff was deliberately avoiding having a conversation with him, and so he wondered whether plaintiff was considering terminating their relationship. He went on to laud the work that he had performed thus far:

The energy put into this negotiation, which has involved multi-party interest in your show, balancing the restrictions in your present agreement, and finessing the always-difficult ABC management team is no small task. We have met these challenges head on and I can say unequivocally that the work for you has been performed with the highest degree of attention and professionalism, both with WLS and the competition. We have also eagerly advanced the interests of your on-air partnership wherever we could. I am very satisfied with and proud of the work that has been completed to date.

(Complaint, ¶ 30). If plaintiff wanted to terminate the agreement, Mr. Musburger explained that “all that would be required is for the work that has been completed, including the final steps that have been prepared, to be properly and fully compensated. These amounts are in addition to what is owed for our work under your present ABC agreement.” (Id.). He then mentioned that he had “other business with Zemira Jones scheduled for today” and could not reschedule. (Id.). Recall that his other letter indicated that he had a previously scheduled meeting about the plaintiffs contract. Mr. Musburger expressed concern that when he informed WLS-AM, and other stations with which he was speaking of the delay, it diminished their interest and negatively affected negotiations. (Id.).

Mr. Musburger, along with his son Brian, who was not a lawyer, went ahead with the meeting with Mr. Jones and Mr. Packer. He did not mention that plaintiff instructed him not to meet with them, but told them “that something very wrong was going on internally, and he, ... was in trouble with [plaintiff].” (Complaint, ¶ 32). The group went on to discuss the specifics of a potential new deal for plaintiff, despite plaintiffs instructions. (Complaint, ¶ 33).

Plaintiff responded to Mr. Musburger’s September 11 correspondence by letter on the 12th. He explained that he was not avoiding a personal conversation with him:

What has happened is this. During our last telephone discussion you mentioned that you were sending an updated fee agreement. When Cynthia asked if you wanted to talk about it you declined. This written agreement was dated September 4, 2003 and Friday, September 5th and both Cynthia and I immediately called you to express our disappointment with both the document and the manner in which it was handled. Neither of us was able to speak with you personally and left voice messages.

(Complaint, ¶ 34). At some point, Mr. Musburger had apparently suggested that they just use the “old agreement.” (Id.). It was then, according to the plaintiff, that he suggested taking a week off. He thought a new fee arrangement ought to have been discussed earlier, and not during what Mr. Musburger conceded was a sensitive period in their dealings with the station. (Id.).

The plaintiff went on to express concern that, despite their earlier agreement to avoid discussions with Mr. Jones, Mr. Musburger was meeting with him. Worse, he was revealing what the plaintiff felt was confidential information. (Complaint, ¶ 34). The plaintiff was surprised that Mr. Musburger thought he was being terminated. The plaintiff also expressed surprise that Mr. Musburger was demanding compensation for the work he had already done, since the fee arrangement had been tied to a percentage of the plaintiffs remuneration under whatever contract Mr. Musburger successfully negotiated. (Id.). The plaintiff requested an explanation and an itemization of this demand. (Id.). He reiterated his request that Mr. Musburger refrain from meeting with WLS-AM principals, as well as his request for a meeting on September 23rd. (Id.).

Two days later, on the 13th, plaintiffs wife emailed Mr. Musburger. She echoed the plaintiffs concerns that Mr. Musbur-ger was continuing to meet with radio station executives regarding the plaintiffs contract. And she questioned whether those meetings were as productive as Mr. Musburger claimed:

You stated that ABC is “poised” to meet Garry’s number. I can only assume, given the history of our involvement with Zemira, that you have those numbers in writing from ABC. Otherwise, I am hard pressed to believe that you could, in good faith, use the word “poised” in relationship to their current position, given that you yourself have said that you can’t take Zemira’s word for anything.... Therefore, if those numbers are in hand, please forward them to Garry and me immediately. If you do not have anything in writing from Zemira, Garry does not want you to now contact him, in light of our earlier requests.

(Complaint, ¶ 35). In closing, she asked Mr. Musburger for an email detailing the meeting, and indicated that the plaintiff was available to meet with him on September 23rd. (Id.).

Thereafter, the plaintiff alleges that Mr. Musburger had lengthy phone conversations with Mr. Conn’s agent and Mr. Jones. He also again met with Mr. Jones, unbeknownst to plaintiff and against his wishes, on September 18, 2003. (Complaint, ¶¶ 41-42). Mr. Musburger’s son, Brian, was also at that meeting. What Mr. Musburger did not do was respond to plaintiffs previous email. And so, on September 22nd, the plaintiff sent him a long letter, complaining that he had been waiting for more than a week for details as to what occurred at Mr. Musburger’s meeting with Mr. Jones and Mr. Packer on September 11th, despite having requested that information “immediately.” (Complaint, ¶ 48). There had also been nothing “in writing” from the station; nothing to reveal the basis for Mr. Musburger’s conclusion “that they were ‘poised to finalize an agreement with [the plaintiff] in the financial range’ which [he was] seeking.” (Id.).

The plaintiff found this “unacceptable,” and listed defects in Mr. Musburger’s work including violating confidences and breaching fiduciary duties. He cancelled the September 23rd meeting, as it was “pointless,” and terminated Mr. Musbur-ger’s services, although he indicated he would likely continue to pay him from the contract he had with WLS-AM, until it expired in February 2004. (Id.).

On January 23, 2004, Mr. Musburger sent the plaintiff a bill on Law Offices of Todd W. Musburger, Ltd. letterhead charging him for 170 hours of work at $475 per hour, and 40 hours of work at $300 per hour for a total of $92,750. (Complaint, ¶ 85). More on the name in a bit. The bill covered a period ending September 22, 2003. (Complaint, ¶ 85). The forty hours — representing $12,000 of the total— were logged by Mr. Musburger’s son, Brian, “[f]or professional services,” although Brian was not named in the bill. Brian was not an attorney, and, according to the plaintiff, he did not “perform substantial services.” (Complaint, ¶ 101). There was never any agreement that Mr. Musburger would be charging the plaintiff for his son’s time; in fact, when Brian appeared at a meeting, Mr. Musburger said he was “just learning the business.” (Complaint, ¶¶ 92, 99,100).

The plaintiff did not discover the details of the billing until depositions during the state court case. (Complaint, ¶ 95). The plaintiff also contends — indeed, it is a sore point with him — that the defendants were operating under the assumed name, the “Law Offices of Todd W. Musburger, Ltd.” (Complaint, ¶¶ 5, 8, 98, 113). According to the Complaint, which places inordinate emphasis on Mr. Musburger’s use of this assumed name, the use of this designation enabled the defendants to obtain illegally large sums of money from the plaintiff. (Complaint, ¶¶ 8, 95,108,113).

C.

Mr. Musburger’s Suit For Attorney’s Fees In State Court

On April 1, 2004, Mr. Musburger sued Mr. Meier in state court to recover the $92,000 in fees he claimed he was entitled to for his efforts to negotiate the renewal of Mr. Meier’s contract with WLS-AM. (Complaint, ¶ 56). In his complaint— brought under the name of “The Law Offices of Todd W. Musburger, Ltd.” — Mr. Musburger said he spent well over 200 hours in negotiations, and was able to coax an offer of $12 million over ten years from WLS-AM. His complaint made no mention of the new fee agreement he sent the plaintiff — only the original agreement, whereby Mr. Musburger would receive five percent of plaintiffs salary and any expenses Mr. Musburger incurred on plaintiffs behalf. (Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Ex. E). He charged plaintiff with breach of contract and sought recovery under a theory of quantum meruit.

At that time of the state court suit, plaintiff was still mired in negotiations with the radio station. Mr. Musburger attached as Exhibit A to his complaint, a complete copy of the plaintiffs 1999 WLS-AM contract, thereby making public the financial terms and conditions of his recently expired broadcast agreement. (Complaint, ¶ 57). The plaintiff submits that this was confidential information, and by revealing it to the public, Mr. Musbur-ger violated the attorney-client privilege, not to mention Illinois Supreme Court Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.6. (Complaint, ¶ 58). This disclosure made the local newspapers, and disrupted the plaintiffs negotiations, which, according to the Complaint, was exactly what Mr. Mus-burger intended. (Complaint, ¶¶ 60-63).

There was another disclosure: the reason why Mr. Musburger told the plaintiff WLS-AM was “poised” to give him what he wanted. During the state court case, Mr. Musburger testified under oath that at his September 18, 2003 meeting, WLS-AM orally communicated the substance of an offer to retain the plaintiffs “personal services for a period of ten (10) years, at an initial salary of $1.5 million to $1.6 million per year, with bonuses and a signing bonus.” (Complaint, ¶ 49). According to the plaintiff, if Mr. Musburger had communicated the- terms of that offer, he “would have given it the utmost serious consideration, and would, in all likelihood, have accepted such an offer.” (Complaint, ¶ 51). Mr. Musburger never informed plaintiff of this oral offer; but at the same time, plaintiff does allege that as of September 13th, he instructed Mr. Musburger that he did not want to hear from him unless he had something in uniting. (Complaint, ¶ 35).

In response to Mr. Musburger’s complaint, Mr. Meier raised affirmative defenses that alleged that: (1) “The Law Offices of Todd W. Musburger, Ltd.” was not a legal entity with the capacity to sue; (2) he had paid Mr. Musburger all fees due under their fee agreement, and the services for which he was seeking compensation were not provided pursuant to that agreement, (3) Mr. Musburger breached his fiduciary duty by representing clients whose interests conflicted with plaintiff, and sent plaintiff a new fee agreement dictating that he be allowed to do so — an agreement plaintiff refused to sign; and (4) Mr. Musburger violated his fiduciary duties by failing to follow plaintiffs instructions regarding refraining from contact with Zemira Jones, continuing to meet with WLS-AM principals despite plaintiffs instruction not to, and failing to provide information regarding negotiations and contract offers when plaintiff requested. Plaintiff also filed a counterclaim alleging breach of fiduciary duty, intentional infliction of emotional distress — because Mr. Musburger had attached plaintiffs 1999 contract with WLS-AM to his state court complaint — and public disclosure of private facts. (Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Ex. F).

As the state court case progressed, plaintiff ultimately filed a Third Amended Counterclaim that charged Mr. Musburger with professional negligence stemming from Mr. Musburger’s failure to finalize the “unified front strategy” and failing to keep plaintiff adequately informed of what occurred in that regard (Count I); breach of fiduciary duty for disobeying plaintiffs directives following Mr. Musburger’s proposal of a new fee arrangement (Count II); professional negligence stemming from Mr. Musburger’s failure to disclose WLS-AM’s new offer to plaintiff (Count III); public disclosure of private facts for attaching the prior pact between plaintiff that the radio station to his state court complaint (Count IV); breach of fiduciary duty stemming from representing another client with interests in conflict with plaintiffs (Count V); breach of fiduciary duty for excessive, improper, and fraudulent billing (Count VI). (Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Ex. G). Plaintiff also sought leave to file a third party complaint against Brian Musburger, alleging that he breached his fiduciary duties, impermissibly split fees with a lawyer, charged for services that plaintiff did not consent to, and overcharged for his services. (Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Ex. H). The trial court denied plaintiff leave to file his third party complaint, but struck Count VI of the Third Amended Counterclaim because after Mr. Musburger was terminated, he no longer had any fiduciary duties to plaintiff. (Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Ex. I).

On the eve of the January 23, 2007 trial, plaintiff filed a motion to dismiss Mr. Mus-burger’s complaint and sought leave to file a fourth amended counterclaim and a fifth affirmative defense, both of which relied on plaintiffs assertion that Mr. Musburger acted as an employment agency without registering, in violation of the Illinois Private Employment Agency Act. (Memorandum in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Ex. I; K). After a hearing on January 22, 2007, the court dismissed this claim on the merits, finding that Mr. Mus-burger’s law office was not acting as an employment agency as envisioned by the Private Employment Agency Act. (Id., Ex. L, at 17-18). Next, Mr. Meier voluntarily dismissed his remaining counterclaims.

After a week-long trial in the Circuit Court of Cook County at the end of January 2007, the jury awarded Mr. Musburger $68,750 on the single count remaining at issue-Mr. Musburger’s quantum meruit claim. (Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Ex. M). Plaintiff filed a motion to vacate the judgment, arguing that there was no record of any registration for “Law Offices of Todd W. Musburger, Ltd.” with the Illinois Supreme Court Clerk’s Office to practice law, with the Illinois Secretary of State as a corporation, or with the County Clerk’s office as a business, meaning it was a nonentity without the capacity to sue. (Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Ex. P). The trial court denied the motion, accepting Mr. Musburger’s argument that this was merely a technical defect. (Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Exs. Q, R). Plaintiff then filed a post-trial motion, attacking the jury verdict on various grounds, which was denied on September 26, 2007.

On November 8, 2007, Mr. Meier appealed, and that appeal is still pending. (Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Ex. O).

D.

The Federal Case

Plaintiff waited all of two months after filing the notice of appeal in the state case, before instituting the instant case on January 9, 2008. The Complaint charges the defendants — one of whom is Mr. Mus-burger’s son — with a substantive RICO violation (Count I) and with RICO conspiracy (Count II). The remaining 26 counts purport to charge legal malpractice for failing to follow through with Mr. Conn executing the “unified front” agreement (Count III), breach of fiduciary duty for failing to follow his directives regarding meetings with WLS-AM executives and providing details of those meetings (Count IV), legal malpractice for failing to disclose WLS-AM’s oral offer (Count V), public disclosure of private facts (Count VI), breach of fiduciary duty and conflict of interest for representing another talk-show host concurrently with plaintiff (Count VII), fraud stemming from billing for Brian’s services as an attorney (VIII), violating the Private Employment Agency Act, which requires an employment agency or counselor to be licensed by the state’s department of labor before charging a fee for their services (Count IX), legal malpractice for suing plaintiff to recover for Brian’s services (Count X), fraud and deceit (Count XI), violating the Illinois Attorneys Act (Count XIII), violating the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practice Act for acting without license as an employment agency (Count XV), violating the Illinois Antitrust Act by requiring plaintiff to have exclusive representation (Count XVI), and unjust enrichment (Count XVII)- In addition, the plaintiff seeks: a declaratory judgment that all contracts between the parties were void ab initio (Count XII), “Recession” [sic] (Count XIV), and to pursue his claims as part of a class action (Count XVIII).

The Illinois statutory and common law claims were advanced in the state court case either as affirmative defenses or counterclaims. Indeed, a comparison of the federal complaint with the state court pleadings — the Third Amended Counterclaim, the proposed Third Party Complaint against Brian Musburger, and the Petition to Vacate the Judgment — suggests virtual identity, although there was some immaterial shuffling of paragraphs and a bit of editing between state and federal pleadings. But there had to be federal jurisdiction as well, so to get into federal court while his appeal of the state court judgment is pending, the plaintiff added Counts I and II under RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1961, et seq. Presto, federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Unfortunately for the plaintiff, federal jurisdiction depends on more than artful pleading, and neither labels, conclusions, nor a formulaic recitation of the elements of 18 U.S.C. § 1961, et seq. will suffice to create a RICO claim or otherwise to establish federal jurisdiction. See Jennings v. Auto Meter Products, Inc., 495 F.3d 466, 472 (7th Cir.2007). As we shall see, the complaint fails to state a claim under RICO — indeed it demonstrates that there can be no viable RICO claim — and thus, there is no jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Consequently, following the counsel of Williams v. Aztar Indiana Gaming Corp., 351 F.3d 294, 300 (7th Cir.2003), I decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Mr. Meier’s state law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).

II.

ANALYSIS

A.

The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine Does Not Apply In This Case

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine derives its name from two Supreme Court decisions decided sixty years apart: Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 44 S.Ct. 149, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923) and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983). It is a jurisdictional bar that prohibits federal district courts from reviewing final state court judgments. It springs from the principle that district courts have only original jurisdiction; the Supreme Court alone has appellate jurisdiction over state court judgments. Kelley v. Medr-1 Solutions, LLG, 548 F.3d 600 (7th Cir.2008). Although a simple concept at its core, the Circuit Courts of Appeals have diverged in their application of Rook-er-Feldman.

Much of the trouble has stemmed from the natural tendency to equate Rooker-Feldman with preclusion principles and how to decide which claims were “inextricably intertwined” with state court judgments, language first introduced in Feldman. In 2005, the Supreme Court narrowed the scope of Rooker-Feldman in Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 125 S.Ct. 1517, 161 L.Ed.2d 454 (2005). Concluding that many of the Circuits had expanded the doctrine beyond its original meaning, the Supreme Court emphasized the doctrine’s limited application, despite failing to explain “inextricably intertwined.” Id. at 283-84, 125 S.Ct. 1517. But the Seventh Circuit had always interpreted the doctrine narrowly. In GASH Assocs. v. Village of Rosemont, Ill., 995 F.2d 726 (7th Cir.l993)(Easterbrook, J.), the court formulated a test to determine if Rooker-Feldman applies:

[I]s the federal plaintiff seeking to set aside a state judgment, or does he present some independent claim, albeit one that denies a legal conclusion that a state court has reached in a case to which he was a party? If the former, then the district court lacks jurisdiction; if the latter, then there is jurisdiction and state law determines whether the defendant prevails under principles of preclusion.

Id. at 728. The court was careful to distinguish between Rooker-Feldman and preclusion. Id. It noted that while equating the two was natural, preclusion of federal litigation following a state court judgment rests on the Full Faith and Credit Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1738. Id. Preclusion requires federal courts to give state court judgments the same effect as another state court would. Id.

The court stressed that “[t]he Rooker-Feldman doctrine ... has nothing to do with § 1738. It rests on the principle that district courts have only original jurisdiction; appellate jurisdiction over judgments of state courts in civil cases lies in the Supreme Court of the United States, and parties have only a short time to invoke that jurisdiction.” Id. GASH’s test for the application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine echoes throughout the Seventh Circuit case law on the subject: the state court judgment must have caused the injury, not the federal plaintiffs adversary. See e.g., Garry v. Geils, 82 F.3d 1362, 1365 (7th Cir.1996); Long v. Shorebank Development Corp., 182 F.3d 548, 555 (7th Cir.1999); General Auto Service Station LLC v. City of Chicago, 319 F.3d 902, 905 (7th Cir.2003).

The test is easily applied here and with obvious results. Rooker-Feldman requires that the complained of injury derive from the state court judgment, itself. Since, none of the counts in the federal complaint stems from or attacks the state court judgment, the doctrine does not apply here. As Defendant correctly points out, each of plaintiffs claims are identical to or variations of his affirmative defenses, counterclaims, or an issue raised in his Petition to Vacate the Judgment in the state court proceedings. (Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, at 6-7). Plaintiffs two RICO claims — the only reason he is in federal court in the first place — are clearly directed at the same universe of facts involved in the state court claims.

As further proof that the claims are independent of the state court judgment, the majority of Mr. Meier’s alleged injuries took place between 1998 and September 22, 2003, more than six months before Mr. Musburger filed his complaint in state court on April 1, 2004. The rest of his claims are a result of Mr. Musburger’s actions during the state court proceedings, namely that Mr. Musburger made public privileged information when he attached the 1999 WLS/Meier contract to his state court complaint. (Complaint, ¶¶ 57-63).

Plaintiffs unhappiness with the outcome of the state court case underlies his obvious efforts to bypass the adverse judgment by artful pleading — a gambit that courts in all circumstances refuse to countenance. But that attempted end-around does not trigger Rooker-Feldman’s bar of federal jurisdiction, which would occur if there were an attack on the state court’s judgment. The court’s observation in Zurich American Insurance Co. v. Superior Court for the State of California, 326 F.3d 816, 822 (7th Cir.2002) is applicable here: “[plaintiffs] injury was not caused by the state court, but by its adversary’s conduct ...; its only gripe with the state court is that it failed to remedy that conduct .... [plaintiffs] federal claim simply seeks to bypass the state court’s order, and does not directly attack it, so Rooker-Feldman does not apply.” His injury did not result from the state court judgment—e.g., a confirmation of a sale of property or a decision not to award parental custody — he suffered an injury at the hands of his adversary and failed to obtain relief from state court. See Garry, 82 F.3d at 1366 (explaining the critical difference between failing to obtain relief from the state court and suffering an injury from the state court judgment).

The same is true here. Mr. Meier’s claimed injuries occurred long before he lost in the state court, and it is those injuries and the conduct he claims caused them for which he seeks recompense. Therefore, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply, and we turn to the merits.

B.

The Complaint Does Not State A Claim Under RICO

1.

To Survive A Motion To Dismiss, A Complaint Must State A Plausible, Not Merely A Conceivable Claim

In opposing the motion to dismiss the RICO counts, the plaintiff argues that “ ‘[a] complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts which would entitle him to relief.’ ” (.Memorandum, in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss, at 5). The difficulty is this is the standard the Supreme Court set forth fifty years ago in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957), but interred in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1969 and n. 8, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007), eight months before Mr. Meier filed this case.

Under Bell Atlantic, a complaint must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 1974. While Bell Atlantic “must not be overread” as supplanting the basic notice-pleading standard, id. at 1973, n. 14 (disclaiming the establishment of any “heightened pleading standard”); accord Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1082-1083 (7th Cir.2008), it must not be underread to ignore the fact that the opinion “teaches that a defendant should not be forced to undergo costly discovery unless the complaint contains enough detail, factual or argumentative, to indicate that the plaintiff has a substantial case.” Limestone Development Corp. v. Village of Lemont, Ill., 520 F.3d 797, 802-03 (7th Cir.2008). Here is how Judge Posner’s panel opinion in Limestone Development put it:

Under Bell Atlantic, the complaint in a potentially complex litigation, or one that by reason of the potential cost of a judgment to the defendant creates the “in terrorem” effect against which Blue Chip [Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 95 S.Ct. 1917, 44 L.Ed.2d 539 (1975) ] warned, must have some degree of plausibility to survive dismissal. It is true that the narrowest holding in Bell Atlantic is merely that an antitrust complaint charging an agreement between firms not to compete must contain “enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest that an agreement was made ...” But the concern is as applicable to a RICO case, which resembles an antitrust case in point of complexity and the availability of punitive damages and of attorneys’ fees to the successful plaintiff. RICO cases, like antitrust cases, are “big” cases and the defendant should not be put to the expense of big-case discovery on the basis of a threadbare claim.

520 F.3d at 803. Accord, Tamayo, 526 F.3d at 1083. The Complaint fails the plausibility test — and rather badly.

2.

The Structure And Purpose Of RICO

We begin with an outline of RICO’s provisions. RICO created a civil cause of action for any person “injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962.” See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c). Section 1962, in turn, consists of four subsections: Subsection (a) makes it “unlawful for any person who has received any income derived, directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or through collection of an unlawful debt ... to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of such income, or the proceeds of such income, in acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce.” Section 1961(1) contains an exhaustive list of acts of “racketeering,” commonly referred to as “predicate acts.” This list includes mail and wire fraud, which are arguably charged as acts of racketeering by the Complaint.

Subsection (b), insofar as relevant here, makes it “unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering activity ... to acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce.” Subsection (c) makes it “unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity....” Pattern of racketeering activity requires at least two acts of racketeering activity, one of which occurred after the effective date of this chapter and the last of which occurred within ten years after the commission of a prior act of racketeering activity. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5). Finally, subsection (d) makes it unlawful “for any person to conspire to violate any of the provisions of subsection (a), (b), or (c)----”

Congress passed RICO in an effort to combat organized, long-term criminal activity. H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 492 U.S. 229, 242, 109 S.Ct. 2893, 106 L.Ed.2d 195 (1989); Midwest Grinding Co., Inc. v. Spitz, 976 F.2d 1016, 1019 (7th Cir.1992). Even though Congress never intended that the statute be employed to allow plaintiffs to turn garden-variety state law fraud and breach of fiduciary duty cases into RICO claims, Jennings, 495 F.3d at 472; Gamboa v. Velez, 457 F.3d 703, 707 (7th Cir.2006), from the beginning, the breadth of RICO’s text and the lure of treble damages and attorneys’ fees proved irresistible to those bent on federalizing such claims. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc., 473 U.S. 479, 499, n. 16, 105 S.Ct. 3275, 87 L.Ed.2d 346 (1985); Morgan v. Bank of Waukegan, 804 F.2d 970, 973 (7th Cir.1986). Thus, plaintiffs have tried — unsuccessfully—to wedge every manner of ordinary dispute into a RICO case. The reported cases run the gamut from a delivery of damaged furniture, Pizzo v. Bekin Van Lines Co., 258 F.3d 629, 633 (7th Cir.2001); to a breach of a computer leasing agreement, Mendelovitz v. Vosicky, 40 F.3d 182 (7th Cir.1994), to poaching customers from a competitor, Midwest Grinding Company, Inc. v. Spitz, 976 F.2d 1016 (7th Cir.1992), to—as here—a dispute over attorney’s fees. McDonald v. Schencker, 18 F.3d 491 (7th Cir.1994). A few plaintiffs have trafficked in more exotic fare: a compulsive gambler complaining about a casino’s promotional mailings, Williams v. Aztar Ind. Gaming Corp., 351 F.3d 294 (7th Cir.2003), or a track star’s dispute of a failed drug test. Slaney v. The Intern. Amateur Athletic Federation, 244 F.3d 580 (7th Cir. 2001). But like more routine attempts to manufacture federal jurisdiction, the Seventh Circuit has not taken kindly to them. Aztar Ind. Gaming, 351 F.3d at 299-300.

To prevent RICO from being misused as a vehicle for federalizing state court fraud claims, the courts sought to limit RICO’s seemingly limitless reach. Perhaps the most prominent restriction stems from the Supreme Court’s recognition that seldom can a pattern of racketeering activity consist of two separate acts or racketeering. H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 236, 109 S.Ct. 2893, et seq., Gamboa, 457 F.3d at 710; Corley v. Rosewood Care Center, Inc. of Peoria, 388 F.3d 990, 1008 (7th Cir.2004).

3.

Count I Does Not Adequately Allege A Pattern Of Racketeering Activity

Taken in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, the Complaint charges a scheme that consists of: 1) non-registration with the Illinois Department of Labor by Mr. Musburger and his son as an employment agency under the Illinois Private Employment Act; 2) use of the name, “The Law Offices of Todd W. Musburger, Ltd.”; 3) breach of fiduciary duty in September 2003 when Mr. Meier was asked to sign an agreement allowing Mr. Musburger to simultaneously represent a competing talk show host; and 4) breach of fiduciary duty by Mr. Musburger when, a few months later, he submitted a bill for legal services that was allegedly excessive and included time for the services of his son who was not a lawyer. The facts underlying the supposed scheme to defraud are set forth in 133 paragraphs spanning 40 pages. This is an extraordinary amount of detail under any circumstances, but it is especially so since the duration of claimed racketeering activity — perhaps the closest thing we have to a brightline continuity test, Vicom, Inc. v. Harbridge Merchant Services, Inc., 20 F.3d 771, 780 (7th Cir. 1994)—covers a period of four to six months. That is an insufficient duration to show a pattern or to pose the kind of threat of continuing activity that RICO was designed to combat.

a.

To state a claim under either § 1962(b) or (c), a plaintiff must adequately plead a “pattern of racketeering activity.” H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 238, 109 S.Ct. 2893. Indeed, ‘“the heart of any RICO complaint is the allegation of a pattern of racketeering.’ ” Rotella v. Wood, 528 U.S. 549, 556, 120 S.Ct. 1075, 145 L.Ed.2d 1047 (2000)(Emphasis in original). While § 1961(5) defines a pattern of racketeering activity as consisting of at least two predicate acts of racketeering committed within a ten-year period, Jennings, 495 F.3d at 472; Midwest Grinding, 976 F.2d at 1019, two of anything seldom make out a pattern. In the context of RICO, courts carefully scrutinize the pattern requirement in order to curb “widespread attempts to turn routine commercial disputes into civil RICO actions,” to “forestall RICO’s use against isolated or sporadic criminal activity, and to prevent RICO from becoming a surrogate for garden-variety fraud actions properly brought under state law.” Midwest Grinding, 976 F.2d at 1022.

To fulfill the pattern requirement, plaintiffs must satisfy “the so-called ‘continuity plus relationship’ test: the predicate acts must be related to one another (the relationship prong) and pose a threat of continued criminal activity (the continuity prong).” Id. (citing H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 239, 109 S.Ct. 2893); Jennings, 495 F.3d at 473. The “relationship” requirement often proves uncontroversial. See, e.g., Corley v. Rosewood Care Center, Inc., 142 F.3d 1041, 1048 (7th Cir.1998); Vicom, Inc. v. Harbridge Merchant Serv., Inc., 20 F.3d 771, 779 (7th Cir.1994). While the Complaint inexactly and incorrectly refers to the use of the “wires and U.S. mail” as the vehicles by which the “racketeering activity” was “accomplished” (¶ 136), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343, are never referred to. Instead, money laundering, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(a)(1)(A)(I); (B)(ii), is explicitly charged to as the racketeering activity. (¶ 135). Curiously, the plaintiffs brief in opposition speaks only of mail and wire fraud. (Plaintiff’s Memoranda [sic] in Opposition, at 24-25).

Although it is left unaddressed by plaintiff, one could assume that these predicate acts were related because they all had the purpose of advancing a scheme to charge plaintiff for representation while the defendants’ had a conflict of interest and were unregistered under an Illinois regulatory statute governing private employment agencies. See H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 240, 109 S.Ct. 2893 (predicate acts of racketeering satisfy the relationship test if they have the same or similar purposes, results, participants, victims, or methods of commission, or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated events).

The “continuity” requirement is another matter. In Morgan v. Bank of Waukegan, 804 F.2d 970 (7th Cir.1986), the Seventh Circuit held that the factors relevant to determining whether there is continuity “include the number and variety of predicate acts and the length of time over which they were committed, the number of victims, the presence of separate schemes and the occurrence of distinct injuries.” 804 F.2d at 975. See also RWB Services, LLC v. Hartford Computer Group, Inc., 539 F.3d 681, 688 (7th Cir.2008); Jennings, 495 F.3d at 473. Here, the Complaint has alleged one victim, one scheme, one injury and very few predicate acts: money laundering, and no more than a few candidates for what might be mail or wire fraud. (Complaint, ¶¶ 25, 29, 30, 37, 40). And, as we shall see, even those few allegations are inadequately stated.

So the complaint fails in terms of number of predicate acts, number of schemes, number of victims, and number of injuries. In the continuity analysis, that leaves only the length of time of the claimed racketeering activity. Continuity can be “both a closed- and open-ended concept.” Midwest Grinding, 976 F.2d at 1022 (quoting H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 241, 109 S.Ct. 2893); Jennings, 495 F.3d at 473. Closed-ended continuity “refers to criminal behavior that has come to a close, but endured for such a substantial period of time ‘that the duration and repetition of the criminal activity carries with it an implicit threat of continued criminal activity in the future.’ ” Jennings, 495 F.3d at 473 (quoting Midwest Grinding, 976 F.2d at 1022-23). Open-ended continuity, on the other hand, is “ ‘a course of criminal activity which lacks the duration and repetition to establish continuity.’ ” Jennings, 495 F.3d at 473 (quoting Midwest Grinding, 976 F.2d at 1023). See also Corley, 142 F.3d at 1048; Roger Whitmore’s Auto. Services, Inc. v. Lake County, Illinois, 424 F.3d 659, 674 (7th Cir.2005). The Complaint provides no clue as to which type of continuity it has in mind. Consequently, it must be examined in terms of both.

It is immediately apparent that plaintiff cannot be alleging a pattern of racketeering activity with open-ended continuity. Schemes with a “clear and terminable goal have a natural ending point.” Roger Whitmore’s Auto. Services, Inc., 424 F.3d at 674; Gamboa, 457 F.3d. at 707. That’s what plaintiff has alleged here: he says his attorney billed him exorbitantly while representing a competing talk show host without his permission, and running afoul of a claimed (but inapplicable) registration requirement under the Private Employment Agency Act. But once plaintiff terminated the defendants as his representatives, the “scheme” was at an end. And if not then, surely it ended a short time later when the final bill was received.

McDonald v. Schencker, 18 F.3d 491 (7th Cir.1994) demonstrates the futility of any attempt to make this a RICO case. In McDonald a disgruntled client, sued her lawyer for allegedly excessive billing and unethical conduct in converting money that was being held in escrow by the defendant. In affirming the dismissal of the complaint, the court of appeals pointed to a number of deficiencies, all of which exist in this case as well. First, the court emphasized that two acts of racketeering activity, while necessary to make a pattern, are normally not sufficient, id. at 493, 497, for “in common parlance, two of anything do not generally form a ‘pattern.’ ” Sedima, 473 U.S. at 497, n. 14, 105 S.Ct. 3275. It went on to note that even if a pattern of racketeering activity had been sufficient pled, the complaint “utterly failed to demonstrate how [defendants’] actions posed a threat of continuing future criminal acts against McDonald.” 18 F.3d at 494. Finally, the court of appeals held that a scheme or artifice to defraud under the mail or wire fraud statutes is not satisfied by merely alleging unethical conduct by a lawyer. Id. at 495, n. 3. See also Diaz v. The Paul J. Kennedy Law Firm, 289 F.3d 671 (10th Cir.2002)(affirming dismissal of RICO complaint brought by a client dissatisfied with his lawyer’s representation and billing); Britt v. Fox, 110 Fed.Appx. 627 (6th Cir.2004)(same).

The similarities between this case and McDonald are striking: Mr. Meier fired his attorney on September 22, 2003. “[S]o that takes care of the threat of repetition on [Mr. Musburger’s part].” 18 F.3d at 498. The kind of misconduct alleged in the Complaint is analytically indistinguishable from that in McDonald as both involved claimed breaches of the fiduciary duty owed by a lawyer to his client, as in McDonald and Roger Whitmore’s, “[plaintiff] pleaded himself out of showing a continuing threat of continued activity, because the alleged scheme had a natural ending point....” Roger Whitmore’s, 424 F.3d at 674. Instead, plaintiffs “allegations at best constitute!] ‘the type of short-term, closed-ended fraud that, subsequent to H.J., this circuit consistently has held does not constitute a pattern.’ ” Jennings, 495 F.3d at 474 (quoting Uni*Quality, Inc. v. Infotronx, Inc., 974 F.2d 918, 922 (7th Cir.1992)). There is absolutely nothing in the Complaint to suggest the threat of continuing criminal behavior that RICO was designed to combat.

Plaintiff fares no better with regard to alleging a pattern of racketeering activity with closed-ended continuity. In such instances, the criminal activity must generally have gone on for a substantial period of time. The duration of the alleged racketeering activity is “ ‘perhaps the most important element of RICO continuity.’ ” Jennings, 495 F.3d at 473-74. The first “predicate act” of mail fraud is alleged to have occurred on September 4, 2003, when the defendants sent plaintiff the new fee agreement ostensibly absolving them of any conflict of interest. (Complaint, ¶¶ 14, 25). The plaintiff fired the defendants on September 22, 2003. (Complaint, ¶ 48). The scheme arguably ended then. The mailing of the bill — a predicate act in furtherance of the alleged scheme— occurred four months later on January 23, 2004. (Complaint, ¶¶ 84-85). Either way, the period of the scheme is simply too short to show the necessary continuity for a pattern of racketeering activity. See Jennings, 495 F.3d at 474 (measuring relevant period from first alleged instance of mail/wire fraud to last). Even if the defendants’ filing of its lawsuit to collect on the bill in April 2004 (Complaint, ¶ 56) is factored in, which it should not be, the period is still only a little more than six months.

The cases are quite consistent in holding that racketeering activity having this kind of a brief duration generally will not satisfy RICO’s pattern requirement. See e.g., Jennings, 495 F.3d at 474 (ten months period too short); Midwest Grinding, 976 F.2d at 1024 (a nine-month period insubstantial); Olive Can Co. v. Martin, 906 F.2d 1147, 1151 (7th Cir.1990)(six months to be a “short period of time”); Uni*Qudlity, Inc. v. Infotronx, Inc., 974 F.2d 918, 922 (7th Cir.l992)(predicate acts lasting at most seven to eight months was “precisely the type of short-term, closed-ended fraud that, subsequent to H.J. Inc., this circuit consistently has held does not constitute a pattern.”); J.D. Marshall Intern., Inc. v. Redstart, Inc., 935 F.2d 815, 821 (7th Cir.1991)(13 months and relating to a single scheme with a single victim); Hughes v. Consol-Pennsylvania Coal Co., 945 F.2d 594, 611 (3rd Cir.1991) (“Twelve months is not a substantial period of time.”); Primary Care Investors Seven, Inc. v. PHP Healthcare Corp., 986 F.2d 1208, 1215 (8th Cir.1993) (activity lasted between 10 and 11 months; “we deem this period insubstantial”); Lipin Enterprises v. Lee, 803 F.2d 322 (7th Cir.1986)(predicate acts spanning “several months” and relating to the same transaction did not constitute a pattern).

Of course, there is no algorithmic test against which to measure the duration of criminal activity. Criminal activity lasting only several months may be enough to satisfy the pattern requirement. See e.g., Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Arnett, 875 F.2d 1271 (7th Cir.1989)(single scheme lasting over a four-month period); Liquid Air Corp. v. Rogers, 834 F.2d 1297 (7th Cir.1987), (single scheme over seven months). The same is true where a complaint alleges that the racketeering activity affected only a single victim, see e.g., Fujisawa Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. v. Kapoor, 115 F.3d 1332 (7th Cir.1997); Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co. v. Mutual Trading Corp., 63 F.3d 516, 523-24 (7th Cir.1995), or where only a single scheme is alleged. Morgan v. Bank of Waukegan, supra. In these, and similar cases the complaint sufficiently stated a claim under RICO because there were multiple separate and distinct injuries and the threat of criminal activity “continue[d] to manifest itself over time and thus pose[d] a special threat to society.” Mor gan, 804 F.2d at 978 (Ripple, J., concurring).

The standard is fact-dependent and requires a careful case-by-case analysis, Morgan, 804 F.2d at 977, the goal of which is to achieve “ ‘a natural and common sense result consistent with Congress’s concern with long-term criminal conduct.’ ” Jennings, 495 F.3d at 473.

In the instant case, that analysis leads to the firm conclusion that the Complaint affirmatively demonstrates an absence of the necessary “continuity” — closed- or open-ended' — for there to be a finding that there was a pattern of racketeering activity. Consequently, Count I must be dismissed. See Gamboa, 457 F.3d at 710-11(accepting interlocutory appeal and reversing denial of motion to dismiss where plaintiff faded to adequately allege continuity aspect of pattern of racketeering).

Stripped to its essentials, the complaint charges nothing more than a short-lived dispute between Mr. Meier and Mr. Mus-burger over his legal representation and the legal fees that Mr. Meier was charged. This is not the kind of conduct that RICO was designed to combat.

b.

Although the Complaint includes at the end a class action allegation, it is based on “information and belief’ that “their[sie] exists a class of other persons who have likewise been subject to payment of large salary and or income commissions for Defendants’ procurement of employment....” (Complaint, ¶ 179). But such speculative, general allegations do not pass muster. The Seventh Circuit has “repeatedly held that a plaintiffs conclusory allegations that ‘defendants’ also defrauded unidentified ‘others’ are not enough to plead the requisite pattern of fraud.” Goren v. New Vision Intern., Inc., 156 F.3d 721, 729 (7th Cir.1998). See also Jennings, 495 F.3d at 466 (“unspecific assertions” regarding “a vast array of victims” “are inadequate”).

In Emery v. American General Finance, Inc., 71 F.3d 1343 (7th Cir.1995), the court was clear about the need for specificity:

The plaintiff pleaded with adequate particularity the fraud directed against her, but with regard to other customers ... alleged merely that the company did the same thing to them. There are no names or dates or other details of transactions involving any other customers besides [plaintiff]. These details ... are necessary to identify a violation of RICO, which requires ... more than one fraud and only one is alleged to have been perpetrated against [plaintiff] herself.

71 F.3d at 1348.

4.

Count I Does Not Adequately Allege Predicate Acts

a.

The Mail and Wire Fraud Allegations

Given the breadth of the mail and wire fraud statutes, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343, mailings and wirings have always been favored predicate acts in cases like this where ordinary disputes are sought to be transformed into RICO claims. See Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Associates, Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 149, 107 S.Ct. 2759, 97 L.Ed.2d 121 (1987). And it is that very breadth that has caused judicial concern that the statutes not be given too vague and encompassing a scope— especially in a civil RICO context. Emery, 71 F.3d at 1346. That makes them a not-so-favored means as far as the Seventh Circuit is concerned. See Roger Whitmore’s, 424 F.3d at 673; Vicom, 20 F.3d at 781 (collecting cases). Predictably, the Complaint seems to mention mail and wire fraud as possible predicate acts. (Complaint, ¶ 136; Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss, at 24). But the existence of even multiple mailings or wir-ings does not mean that there is a pattern of racketeering activity:

[RICO] plaintiffs are mistaken to emphasize the raw number of mail and wire fraud violations. Some of the present uncertainty over the pattern element stems from such arguments which depend upon the unusual nature of these two most commonly alleged RICO predicate acts.... In mail and wire fraud, each mailing or interstate communication is a separate indictable offense, even if each relates to the same scheme to defraud, and even if the defendant did not control the number of mailings or communications. Thus, the number of offenses is only tangentially related to the underlying fraud, and can be a matter of happenstance.

Pizzo, 258 F.3d at 632-33 (quoting Ashland Oil, 875 F.2d at 1278)(internal citations omitted).

As already noted, the Complaint alleges relatively few instances of mail and wire fraud. “The fairly small number of predicate acts cuts against showing continuity, particularly when a large proportion of the acts involved wire or mail fraud, neither of which are favored means of establishing a RICO pattern in this circuit.” Roger Whitmore’s, 424 F.3d at 673. Thus, even if the plaintiff came up with a much longer list of instances of mailings and/or wirings, it would be unavailing, for even the few instances alleged are pled insufficiently and without the requisite particularity demanded by Rule 9(b). Slaney, 244 F.3d at 599; Lachmund v. ADM Investor Services, Inc., 191 F.3d 777, 784 (7th Cir.1999); Goren v. New Vision Int'l, Inc., 156 F.3d 721, 726 (7th Cir.1998). Rule 9(b) requires that a RICO plaintiff must allege the identity of the person who made the misrepresentation, the time, place and content of the misrepresentation, and the method by which the misrepresentation was communicated to the plaintiff. Slaney, 244 F.3d at 599; Lachmund, 191 F.3d at 784; Goren, 156 F.3d at 726. Each alleged use of the mails or wires must satisfy the requirements of Rule 9(b). Slaney, 244 F.3d at 599; Emery v. American Gen. Fin., Inc., 134 F.3d 1321, 1323 (7th Cir.1998).

There are only four candidates for “mailings” among the 133 paragraphs purportedly detailing the “scheme.” (Complaint, ¶¶ 18, 25, 29, 30, 84). First, there is the new agreement that Mr. Musburger wanted plaintiff to sign:

... on September 4, 2003, TODD W. MUSBURGER, L