Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER REGARDING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO CONFIRM ARBITRATION AWARD BENNETT, District Judge. TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION. . 00 A. Background Findings of Fact. OO B. Procedural Background. OO II. LEGAL ANALYSIS.870 A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction.870 B. Conñrmation Or Vacation Of The Arbitration Award .873 1. Applicable standards.873 Statutory standards.873 a. Extra-statutory standards.874 b. “Irrationality ” and “manifest disregard of the law.” .875 i. ii. Arbitrariness and contravention of public policy .877 Hi. Fundamental unfairness.878 2. Application of the standards.880 a. Hoffman’s challenges.880 b. Hoffman’s statutory challenges.883 i. Section 10(a)(2) “partiality” challenges.883 ii. Section 10(a)(3) “misconduct” challenges.887 c. Hoffman’s extra-statutory challenges.889 i. “Irrationality” challenge.889 ii. “Manifest disregard of the law” challenges.891 Hi. “Fundamental unfairness” challenges ..891 III. CONCLUSION .895 Shortcuts may lead to long delays. Certainly, the hope that arbitration would prove to be “a less costly and less complicated alternative to litigation,” see, e.g., Morgan v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co., 729 F.2d 1163, 1165 (8th Cir.1984), has been disappointed in this case. Instead, this dispute over grain contracts between a grain producer and an owner of a grain milling facility has pursued a three-year odyssey through arbitration and litigation. The case has finally returned to federal court on the grain miller’s motion to confirm an arbitration award in its favor on its claims of breach of contract against the grain producer. The grain producer, however, now challenges this court’s subject matter jurisdiction to confirm the arbitration award, and further resists confirmation of the award on numerous grounds. I. INTRODUCTION This lawsuit between plaintiff Mark J. Hoffman, a grain producer, and defendant Cargill, Inc., the owner of a milling facility in Blair, Nebraska, involves disputes over ten contracts for the sale and delivery of almost half a million bushels of corn. The contracts were to be performed in 1996 and 1997, but performance of the contracts fell apart during the summer of 1996 when Hoffman questioned whether Cargill’s scales at its Blair facility, or the people operating those scales, were obtaining fair and accurate weights of corn upon delivery. Now before the court is Cargill’s motion to confirm the arbitration award of $408,262.50 plus interest in Cargill’s favor on its breaeh-of-eontract claims rendered by an arbitration panel of the National Grain and Feed Association (NGFA). Hoffman resists confirmation of the award. Date Contract Bushels Price Delivery Period 9/11/95 10306 50,000 $2.87 March 1-31, 1996 9/11/95 10307 100,000 $2.94 July 1-31, 1996 9/12/95 10320 100,000 $3.00 July 1-15, 1996 9/18/95 10388 50,000 $3.00 February 1-29, 1996 2/29/96 12794 50,000 $2.90 May 1-31, 1996 Date Contract Bushels Price Delivery Period 12/11/95 11592 20,000 $2.70 December 1-31, 1996 2/8/96 12406 30,000 $2.84 January 1-31, 1997 2/16/96 12615 25,000 $2.97 February 1-28, 1997 2/29/96 12795 30,000 $3.00 December 16-31, 1996 3/12/96 12887 20,000 $3.04 October 1-31, 1996 A. Background Findings of Fact In the fall of 1995 and winter of 1996, Hoffman, a farmer in Carroll County, Iowa, and Cargill, a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Minneapolis, Minnesota, entered into five contracts for the sale and purchase of corn from the last harvest, the so-called “old crop” contracts. Under those contracts, Hoffman was to deliver a total of 350,000 bushels of corn to Cargill’s milling facility at Blair, Nebraska, during the spring of 1996. During the winter of 1995 and early spring of 1996, Hoffman and Cargill also entered into five contracts for delivery of corn from the next harvest, the so-called “new crop” contracts, under which Hoffman was to deliver another 125,000 bushels of corn to Cargill’s milling facility at Blair, Nebraska, during late 1996 and early 1997. Although the specific terms of the ten contracts varied, each contract contained the following clause, directly above the signature line: PLEASE NOTE: Unless otherwise specified or modified herein, the rules of the appropriate association listed above shall govern this contract. All disputes relating to this transaction shall be resolved by binding arbitration in accordance with the rules of such associations. The parties agree to arbitrate, to be bound by the arbitration award, and agree that judgment upon the award may be entered in any Court having jurisdiction. Defendant’s Motion to Compel Arbitration, Exhibit A (emphasis in original). Additionally, each contract identified the National Grain and Feed Association (NGFA) as the association providing the rules to govern arbitration proceedings. According to the contracts, the “weights to govern” were “destination” weights, ie., weights determined at Cargill’s Blair facility. The weighing procedure at Cargill’s Blair facility required drivers to drive their trucks loaded with corn onto either of two Mettler-Toledo scales, signal the weigher to obtain a gross weight, dump the grain through the scale into a hopper — from which grain was conveyed to the milling facility by a conveyor belt— then signal the weigher to obtain a “tare” weight for the empty truck. Comparison of the gross and tare weights determined the net weight of grain delivered. A computer recorded the gross and tare weights and printed a ticket showing these weights as well as the net weight. This system, while efficient, did not provide any opportunity to reweigh a load if there was a dispute between the driver and weigher over the weight of the load. At the time the contracts in question were to be performed, Hoffman did not have his own scale available for weighing loads of grain. However, he has since put in a scale at his farm for determining “origin weights” on loads of corn he ships elsewhere. Hoffman trucked his own corn to the Blair facility, as well as contracting with several of his neighbors to deliver their corn to the Blair facility. The parties agree that at the time of contracting, the contract prices for future delivery at the Blair facility were at a significant premium over prices in the region generally for such contracts, making it attractive to bear the additional transportation costs to deliver at Blair, approximately 100 miles from Carroll, Iowa. However, owing to an unprecedented rise in corn prices during 1996, by the time delivery was due on Hoffman’s contracts, the contract prices were well below the prevailing “cash” market prices. Hoffman delivered 27,928 bushels of corn to Cargill’s Blair facility between March of 1996 and April 12, 1996, on his “old crop” contracts. However, beginning in about January of 1996, he had concerns that Cargill’s scales were inaccurate, or that Cargill’s weighers were obtaining weights at the wrong times, systematically shorting him by showing higher tare weights. In March and April, these concerns ripened into repeated complaints to Cargill officials and agents, to the point that Hoffman eventually refused to deliver any more grain until the problems were corrected. In an effort to resolve the dispute, the parties, through counsel, considered various solutions. Among the proposed solutions were that Hoffman’s loads should be weighed at the scales at another facility adjacent to Cargill’s Blair facility, but owned by Terra International, with weighing charges to be paid by Cargill. Another proposed solution was that delivery on Hoffman’s contracts with Cargill would be accepted at the AGRI Grain Marketing elevator in Council Bluffs, which was affiliated with Cargill, with Cargill offering to pay Hoffman an extra 2 cents per bushel to cover Hoffman’s additional transportation costs to Council Bluffs. On July 8, 1996, in what he described as a “test,” Hoffman delivered two loads of corn, approximately 900 bushels net each, first weighing the loads at the Terra facility, then reweighing them at Cargill’s Blair facility for comparison. Payment was made according to the more favorable weights. Although one load showed nearly identical weights at the two facilities, the weights for the second load differed by a few hundred pounds. Hoffman believed that the difference proved that Cargill’s Blair scales or weighers were systematically shorting him, or at least were obtaining unreliable weights. Although the Blair scales “failed the test,” according to Hoffman, he nonetheless rejected all proposals to weigh or deliver corn anywhere other than at Cargill’s Blair facility, and reiterated his refusal to deliver at Blair until the weighing problems were corrected. Hoffman next complained to the Nebraska Department of Agriculture, Weights and Measures Division. Steve Malone, Director of the Nebraska Weights and Measures Division, reviewed Hoffman’s records from the “test” on July 8, 1996. Malone found that the weight discrepancies raised sufficient concerns that he and Richard Suiter, a field supervisor, went to examine the scales at Cargill’s Blair facility on August 12, 1996. They were able to demonstrate that, contrary to assertions of Cargill employees — and apparently much to the surprise of those employees — tare weights could be obtained on the scales at Blair before all grain was removed from the hopper, at least potentially resulting in higher tare weights than would be obtained with a proper procedure. After discussions with Cargill personnel, the State inspectors required that certain changes be made to the operating system for the scales at the Blair facility. These changes included changes to the computer software to introduce some time delays before weights could be taken and adding some sensors to the bottom of the hopper to make sure that the scale did not print a ticket until there was no grain in the hopper. More specifically, the system was reconfigured to put in a 12-second time delay between the time the trucker pushed the button indicating the trucker was ready for a weight to be taken and the time the weight would actually be taken and a ticket printed if the weigher also pushed his or her button. Furthermore, unless the sensors in the hopper indicated the hopper was empty at the time the buttons were pushed, no weight would be taken, and no ticket would be printed, until the hopper was empty, the weigher had reset the system, and the weigher pushed the button again. Steve Malone testified before this court that the State instructed Cargill on what was expected, but that the actual proposed solutions came from Car-gill. Although Mr. Malone described the changes as “requirements,” the State inspectors did not institute a formal administrative action or “red-tag” the scales, which would have taken them out of commercial operation, because the scales could obtain accurate weights if used appropriately. The State inspectors originally directed that the changes to the Blair scales be completed by early September. On September 5, 1996, however, Cargill requested an extension of time to complete the changes. The changes were ultimately completed in early December of 1996. Mr. Malone and Mr. Suiter again inspected the scales on December 18, 1996, and determined that all corrections had been made. After the Blair scales failed his “test” on July 8, 1996, Hoffman again refused to deliver any more grain on the “old crop” contracts. On July 25, 1996, Cargill made a final proposal that Hoffman deliver corn — “old” or “new” crop — in October and November against the “old crop” contracts, but pay a $1.34 per bushel market difference. Cargill informed Hoffman that unless this proposal was accepted, the “old crop” contracts would be canceled and Cargill would seek damages for Hoffman’s breach. Hoffman did not accept the offer. On July 29, 1996, Cargill canceled the “old crop” contracts, claiming damages of $464,760.14 as the difference between the contract prices and the actual market price of $4.42 per bushel. Notwithstanding cancellation of the “old crop” contracts in July of 1996, between October 21 and October 24, 1996, Hoffman delivered five loads of corn against “new crop” contract 12887. Hoffman testified that it was his understanding from Mr. Malone that the scales at Blair would be fixed by mid-October; however, he had not received the confirmation Mr. Malone had promised him that the scales were fixed before delivering some of his corn in late October. Cargill withheld payment on these deliveries, instead placing the funds in what it described as an “escrow” account, pending payment of its damages on the “old crop” contracts. When Hoffman did not receive payment for the October deliveries, he informed Cargill that he would not deliver any more corn to the Blair facility. Cargill therefore canceled the five “new crop” contracts on November 11,1996. B. Procedural Background Pursuant to the arbitration clauses in the contracts, in December of 1996, Cargill initiated arbitration proceedings for the five “old crop” contracts. On December 3, 1996, Cargill and Hoffman executed a Contract for Arbitration as required by NGFA rules. This contract provided that both parties agreed to submit disputes relating to contracts numbered 10306,10307,10320, 10388 and 12795 — the “old crop” contracts — to arbitration by the NGFA. Car-gill filed its First Argument with the NGFA on January 3, 1997. Hoffman submitted his combined Notice of Revocation of Agreement to Arbitrate and Answer on February 11, 1997. Hoffman stated that he “revokefd] the agreement to arbitrate this dispute and further [gave] notice of his intention to refuse to continue these arbitration proceedings,” asserting that the arbitration clauses were not enforceable under either Iowa or Nebraska law, and that the NGFA arbitration rules were inadequate to resolve the disputes between the parties, because they did not provide any discovery procedures. Instead of proceeding to arbitration, on February 21, 1997, Hoffman filed this diversity lawsuit pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. In Count I of his complaint, Hoffman sought declaratory judgment that the arbitration clauses were invalid and thus unenforceable. In Count II, he sought reformation of the contracts. In Counts III through VII, Hoffman sought specific performance of the contracts as well as damages for breach of contract, misrepresentation, negligence, and conversion. On March 17, 1997, in lieu of answering Hoffman’s complaint in this federal court, Cargill moved to compel arbitration and stay proceedings, or in the alternative to dismiss. The court heard telephonic oral arguments on Cargill’s motion on June 23, 1997. Thereafter, by order dated July 2, 1997, the court granted Cargill’s motion to compel arbitration, stayed these proceedings pending arbitration, and denied Car-gill’s motion to dismiss as moot. See generally Hoffman v. Cargill, Inc., 968 F.Supp. 465 (N.D.Iowa 1997). However, the court included in that order the following expression of concern: One final word of caution. In this age of complex and costly litigation, the incantation “ADR” (alternative dispute resolution) is an increasingly popular mantra. Arbitration, a longstanding form of ADR, is considered by some to be a panacea for the perceived evils of civil litigation. However, when arbitration proceedings fail to reach a minimum level of fairness, they become an “alternative” by which this court will not abide. The court is acutely aware that through § 10 of the [Federal Arbitration Act or] FAA, [9 U.S.C. § 10,] Congress has placed strict limitations on its discretion to review the adequacy of arbitration proceedings. Nevertheless, upon request of either party, this court is committed to a post-arbitration review to ensure that any result reached is the product of a fundamentally fair arbitration proceeding. Id. at 478. The question of whether the parties received a fundamentally fair arbitration proceeding is now before the court. Pursuant to the court’s order to compel arbitration, the parties reinitiated NGFA arbitration to attempt to resolve their dispute. In the arbitration proceedings, Car-gill asserted its claims of breach of contract based on Hoffman’s refusal to deliver grain. Cargill sought damages of $464,-760.14 plus interest as the difference between the contract and market prices of grain at the time of breach and cancellation of the “old crop” contracts. Hoffman asserted counterclaims of breach of contract by issuing weight certificates falsely representing that Cargill’s weighers were federally licensed and by not providing accurate destination weights. He also asserted claims that Cargill had violated NGFA Grain Trade Rules by attempting to change contract terms and by canceling the “new crop” contracts on the basis of alleged breach of the “old crop” contracts. Hoffman sought to be excused from the “old crop” contracts on the basis of Car-gill’s breach, but on his own claims, he sought specific performance of the contracts or damages for their breach, as well as damages for load shortages in 1995 and 1996, non-payment for his October 1996 deliveries, and storage costs for grain he could not deliver because of Cargill’s breach. His monetary damages allegedly totaled $298,264.30 plus interest. The parties voluntarily exchanged some documents and conducted depositions of some pertinent witnesses, but the NGFA arbitration rules do not provide for formal discovery. The parties admit that the discovery conducted was in the shadow of this court’s order expressing concern that the arbitration proceedings be fundamentally fair. A hearing was held before a panel of three arbitrators in Omaha, Nebraska, on July 28 and 29, 1998. The chairman of the arbitration panel was Vince Goecke, the Vice President of Columbia Grain International, Inc., in Great Falls, Montana, and the other members were Jay Mathews, Grain Manager, Effingham Equity, in Eff-ingham, Illinois, and Richard West, Chief Executive Officer of Prairie Central Coop, Inc., in Chenoa, Illinois. Hoffman requested that the hearing be continued to a later date so that he could obtain certain discovery, and the parties jointly requested that the arbitration panel issue subpoenas to compel the attendance of certain witnesses. Both requests were denied. However, the record was left open for post-hearing supplementation. The panel rendered its unanimous decision on December 16, 1998. In their decision, the arbitrators found that Cargill’s contracts specifically provided that Cargill could designate any reasonable alternative delivery points if necessary; thus, the arbitrators concluded that Cargill was entitled to designate other delivery points as alternatives to the Blair facility. In these circumstances, the panel concluded that Cargill was entitled to cancel the contracts when Hoffman refused to deliver at points other than the Blair facility. The panel thus held for Cargill on its breach-of-contract claims. On Hoffman’s claims, the arbitrators found that the State of Nebraska had determined that operator error could cause errors to occur in printed scale tickets at the Blair facility, but that the scales themselves were accurate. Because the State of Nebraska had not taken regulatory action, the arbitrators concluded that no load shortages had occurred. The arbitrators also found that the contracts in question permitted Cargill to set off payment on corn delivered on the “new crop” contracts against its damages for nondelivery on the “old crop” contracts, and that there was no evidence that Hoffman had actually stored 320,167 bushels of corn as the result of Cargill’s alleged breach of the contracts, as he contended, thus denying Hoffman’s claims for damages on these grounds. The arbitrators also rejected Hoffman’s claim for legal expenses. However, the arbitrators found that Cargill had improperly canceled the “new crop” contracts at contract price, rather than at fair market value. In light of these conclusions, the arbitrators set off against Cargill’s damages the $14,781.57 payment for Hoffman’s “new crop” deliveries that had been held in “escrow” and $41,716.07 on Hoffman’s counterclaim for miscalculation of damages on cancellation of the “new crop” contracts. Following set-offs, the arbitrators awarded Cargill $408,262.50 plus interest on its breach-of-contract claims. As the party requesting an arbitration hearing,. Hoffman had been required to advance $7,500 toward the arbitrators’ expenses. Of that sum, $746.83 was refunded. Hoffman attempted to appeal the arbitration decision pursuant to NGFA rules. However, he was unable to pay the arbitration award by cashier’s check to be held by the national secretary of the NGFA pending disposition of the appeal, as required by NGFA rules. His appeal was consequently denied on January 20, 1999. On December 22, 1998, Cargill filed in this court a notice of the arbitration decision. Then, on January 4, 1999, Cargill moved this court to confirm the arbitration award. Hoffman did not timely resist that motion, so the court entered an order granting Cargill’s motion to confirm the arbitration award on January 22, 1999. Judgment was entered accordingly on January 22,1999. On January 28, 1999, Hoffman belatedly resisted Cargill’s notice of the arbitration decision and filed a motion to vacate judgment, or in the alternative to reconsider and stay the judgment. Hoffman argued, in essence, that he had not received Car-gill’s motion to confirm the arbitration award and had not deemed it necessary to resist the notice of the arbitration decision. On February 18, 1999, the court entered an order vacating the judgment, restraining Hoffman from dissipating assets, establishing deadlines for pre-hearing submissions, and setting a hearing on Cargill’s reanimated motion to confirm the arbitration award. Hoffman filed a pre-hearing submission on March 3, 1999, asserting that the arbitration award should be vacated, or at least not confirmed, on several grounds. Also on March 3, 1999, Hoffman filed a resistance to Cargill’s motion to confirm the arbitration award, asserting that this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to confirm (or vacate) the award. On March 11, 1999, Cargill filed a reply in support of its contention that this court does have subject matter jurisdiction to confirm the arbitration award. On March 17, 1999, Cargill filed its own pre-hearing submission in support of confirmation of the arbitration award. The court heard evidence and argument in support of confirmation or vacation of the arbitration award on March 22, 1999. Plaintiff Mark J. Hoffman was represented by John Werden of Van Dyke & Werden in Carroll, Iowa. Defendant Cargill, Inc., was represented by Robert D. Houghton of Shuttleworth & Ingersoll in Cedar Rapids, Iowa. On April 29, 1999, the NGFA sought leave to file an amicus brief in support of confirmation of the arbitration award. Hoffman resisted the filing of such a brief and, in the alternative, sought an order permitting discovery from the NGFA. The court allowed the filing of the amicus brief, over Hoffman’s objection, on May 17, 1999, and denied Hoffman’s motion for discovery from the NGFA. This matter is now fully submitted. II. LEGAL ANALYSIS Among Hoffman’s challenges to confirmation of the arbitration award is his assertion that this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to confirm an arbitration award entered in another district. Thus, the court must first examine the fundamental question of its subject matter jurisdiction to address the confirmation question, before turning to the merits of the parties’ arguments for and against confirmation of the award. See Morris v. Winnebago Indus., Inc., 936 F.Supp. 1509, 1530 (N.D.Iowa 1996) (federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and must assure themselves that they have subject matter jurisdiction over claims before them at all stages of the proceedings, even if the parties do not raise the question of subject matter jurisdiction themselves, citing McCorkindale v. American Home Assur. Co., 909 F.Supp. 646, 649 n. 4 (N.D.Iowa 1995), and Laird v. Ramirez, 884 F.Supp. 1265, 1269-70 (N.D.Iowa 1995)). A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction For his argument that this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to confirm the arbitration award, Hoffman relies exclusively on the bare language of a provision of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16, specifically 9 U.S.C. § 9. That provision of the FAA provides, in its entirety, as follows: § 9. Award of arbitrators; confirmation; jurisdiction; procedure If the parties in their agreement have agreed that a judgment of the court shall be entered upon the award made pursuant to the arbitration, and shall specify the court, then at any time within one year after the award is made any party to the arbitration may apply to the court so specified for an order confirming the award, and thereupon the court must grant such an order unless the award is vacated, modified, or corrected as prescribed in sections 10 and 11 of this title. If no court is specified in the agreement of the parties, then such application may be made to the United States court in and for the district within which such award was made. Notice of the application shall be served upon the adverse party, and thereupon the court shall have jurisdiction of such party as though he had appeared generally in the proceeding. If the adverse party is a resident of the district within which the award was made, such service shall be made upon the adverse party or his attorney as prescribed by law for service of notice of motion in an action in the same court. If the adverse party shall be a nonresident, then the notice of the application shall be served by the marshal of any district within which the adverse party may be found in like manner as other process of the court. 9 U.S.C. § 9 (emphasis added). The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained that “[sjection 9 permits a party to seek confirmation of the award in the court specified by their agreement, or, if no court is specified, in the district within which such award was made.” Stroh Container Co. v. Delphi Indus., Inc., 783 F.2d 743, 747 n. 7 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1141, 106 S.Ct. 2249, 90 L.Ed.2d 695 (1986). On the basis of the italicized statutory language, Hoffman “suggested” that “the Court that has subject matter jurisdiction of the enforcement of this arbitration award may only be in [sic] the United States District Court for the District of Nebraska.” Plaintiffs Resistance to Motion to Confirm Arbitration Award. Car-gill disagrees, asserting that the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has suggested, and other federal courts have held, that the cited provision is a permissive venue statute, but does not create a limitation on • subject matter jurisdiction. Looking first to the plain meaning of the statute, it seems readily apparent to the court that the second sentence of the statute is permissive, because it uses the word “may,” thus indicating which forum “may” hear an action to confirm an arbitration award in the absence of an effective choice of forum by the parties to the arbitration. This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that plainly mandatory language, such as “shall,” is used elsewhere in the statute. See, e.g., Terra Int’l, Inc. v. Mississippi Chem. Corp., 922 F.Supp. 1334, 1370-72 (N.D.Iowa 1996) (distinguishing between permissive terms, using “may,” and unmistakably mandatory terms, using “shall,” “will,” or “must”), aff'd, 119 F.3d 688 (8th Cir.1997), and cert. denied, — U.S.-, 118 S.Ct. 629, 139 L.Ed.2d 609 (1997); accord Val-U Constr. Co. v. Rosebud Sioux Tribe, 146 F.3d at 573, 581 (8th Cir.1998) (concluded that § 9 is also permissive in another respect, its designation of a one-year period for filing a motion to confirm an arbitration award, and therefore does not state a statute of limitations for an application for confirmation of an award, because “[i]f Congress intended for the one year period to be a statute of limitations, then it could have used the word ‘must’ or ‘shall’ in place of ‘may’ in the language of the statute”). The difference seems to this court to be more than coincidence or sloppy drafting; rather, when provisions of the statute are mandatory, mandatory language is consciously used, and when provisions of the statute are merely permissive, permissive language is consciously used. Nor does the plain meaning of the statute support Hoffman’s assertion that the statute pertains to “jurisdiction”; rather, it pertains to “venue,” that is, the appropriate forum for the confirmatory action, because the question the statute appears to answer is not whether federal courts can hear such an action, but which federal court is the appropriate forum in the absence of an effective choice of forum. Nor is this conclusion necessarily undermined by the language of § 10, which states grounds for judicial vacation of an arbitration award, and again refers to action by “the United States court in and for the district wherein the award was made.” 9 U.S.C. § 10(a). Section 10 simply follows on from the nonexclusive venue provision in § 9, and therefore cannot be read as limiting jurisdiction to a particular reviewing court. Instead, § 10 states grounds upon which the reviewing court, identified in § 9, may vacate the arbitration award. Thus, the plain meaning of § 9, upon which Hoffman relies, simply does not preclude this court from hearing Cargill’s confirmatory action, on either jurisdictional or venue grounds. Furthermore, in Stroh Container Company, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected an argument that § 9 of the FAA confers exclusive subject matter jurisdiction for an action to confirm an arbitration award on the court in the district in which the award was entered. Stroh Container Co., 783 F.2d at 747 n. 7. The court noted that “[t]he linchpin of [one party’s] jurisdictional challenge is its premise that section 9 establishes a jurisdictional limitation on the availability of a federal forum for confirmation actions above and beyond ordinary diversity and federal question requirements.” Id. at 748 n. 7. The court, however, “construe[d] section 9 ... not as creating a jurisdictional barrier, but as a special venue provision.” Id. Thus, where the party seeking confirmation of an arbitration award properly pleaded diversity of citizenship as a basis for jurisdiction over the confirmatory action in a district other than the one in which the award was made, “subject matter jurisdiction was not defective” in the court entertaining the confirmatory action. Id. Other Circuit Courts of Appeals have more recently held that subject matter jurisdiction is proper over actions to confirm arbitration awards in districts other than the one in which the arbitration award was made, i.e., that § 9 identifies only “special venue,” or establishes “permissive” but not “exclusive” jurisdiction, in a particular district, although this conclusion is not quite unanimous. Compare Apex Plumbing Supply v. U.S. Supply Co., 142 F.3d 188, 191-92 (4th Cir.) (noting the split in the circuits on the question, but concluding that “a majority of the circuits interpret section nine’s venue provision as permissive,” and after citing supporting decisions from other circuits, and the plain meaning of the statute, concluding that “section nine of the FAA confers permissive, rather than mandatory, venue upon district courts in and for the district in which an arbitration award was made,” but that any district court that otherwise possesses subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction over the parties’ confirmation petition may properly hear the confirmation petition), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 119 S.Ct. 178, 142 L.Ed.2d 145 (1998); Sutter Corp. v. P & P Indus., Inc., 125 F.3d 914, 918-19 (5th Cir.1997) (resolving an apparent ambiguity in that circuit’s law to hold that “[v]enue under § 9 is not mandatory” and did not prevent a federal district court in the district in which arbitration had been brought from “staying, dismissing or transferring” the “motion to confirm” to another district); In re VMS Securities Lit., 21 F.3d 139 (7th Cir.1994) (concluding, after thorough examination of the text of the statute and comparing it with other statutory provisions, that § 9 of the FAA is permissive, and does not restrict the venue of other courts), with Sunshine Beauty Supplies, Inc. v. United States Dist. Court for the Central Dist. of Cal, 872 F.2d 310, 312 (9th Cir.1989) (holding that venue in the district identified in § 9 was mandatory). See also Baltin v. Alaron Trading Corp., 128 F.3d 1466, 1468 n. 4 (11th Cir.1997) (also noting the split in the circuits on the question of whether “venue” under 9 U.S.C. § 9 is exclusive or permissive, but finding it did not have to decide the question, because the district court in which the confirmatory action had been brought otherwise lacked subject matter jurisdiction), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 119 S.Ct. 105, 142 L.Ed.2d 84 (1998). This court will follow Stroh Container Company and the majority position of other Circuit Courts of Appeals to hold that venue and subject matter jurisdiction for Cargill’s confirmatory action are proper in this district, because this district court has diversity subject matter jurisdiction over the action and personal jurisdiction over the parties. Also, one court recently held that “when a federal district court grants a motion to compel arbitration it retains jurisdiction to confirm or vacate the resulting arbitration award under 9 U.S.C. §§ 9-10.” TranSouth Fin. Corp. v. Bell, 149 F.3d 1292, 1297 (11th Cir.1998). This court is also the court that granted Car-gill’s motion to compel arbitration — in an action originally brought by the party now challenging this court’s subject matter jurisdiction to hear the confirmatory motion — and thus, pursuant to TranSouth Financial Corporation, this court has retained jurisdiction to confirm or vacate the resulting arbitration award under 9 U.S.C. §§ 9 and 10. Hoffman’s jurisdictional challenge to this court’s power to hear Cargill’s confirmatory motion is consequently overruled. B. Confirmation Or Vacation Of The Arbitration Award 1. Applicable standards Section 9 of the FAA states that a federal district court having jurisdiction over the matter “must grant” a motion to confirm an arbitration award, “unless the award is vacated, modified, or corrected as prescribed in sections 10 and 11 of this title.” 9 U.S.C. § 9; see also UHC Management Co. v. Computer Sciences Corp., 148 F.3d 992, 997 (8th Cir.1998) (making this observation); accord P & P Indus., Inc. v. Sutter Corp., 179 F.3d 861, 870 (10th Cir.1999) (also making this observation). More specifically, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals recently observed, Congress has ordained a specific, self-limiting procedure for how such a review is to occur. Section 9 of the FAA provides that federal courts “must grant” an order confirming an arbitration award “unless the award is vacated, modified, or corrected as prescribed in sections 10 and 11 of this title.” Congress did not authorize de novo review of such an award on its merits; it commanded that when the exceptions do not apply, a federal court has no choice but to confirm. UHC Management Co., 148 F.3d at 997. The court reiterated the narrowness of judicial review of arbitration awards under the FAA: “Judicial review of an arbitration award is extremely limited.” Kiernan [v. Piper Jaffray Companies, Inc.], 137 F.3d [588,] 594 [ (8th Cir.1998) ]. We may not set an award aside simply because we might have interpreted the agreement differently or because the arbitrators erred in interpreting the law or in determining the facts. Although this result may seem draconian, the rules of law limiting judicial review and the judicial process in the arbitration context are well established and the parties here, both sophisticated in the realms of business and law, can be presumed to have been well versed in the consequences of their decision to resolve their disputes in this manner. Stroh Container Co., 783 F.2d at 751 (citation omitted). UHC Management Co., 148 F.3d at 998. Furthermore, the court pointed out that “selective modification” and “confirmation” of an arbitration award was only permitted on the grounds stated in section 11 of the FAA. Id. at 998-99. Thus, the first place to look for standards for judicial review of an arbitration award is in the FAA itself. a. Statutory standards The FAA provides for judicial vacation of arbitration awards, in pertinent part, as follows: § 10. Same; vacation; grounds; rehearing (a) In any of the following cases the United States court in and for the district wherein the award was made may make an order vacating the award upon the application of any party to the arbitration— (1) Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means. (2) Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of them. (8) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced. (4) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a). Section 11 of the FAA provides further grounds for “modification or correction” of an arbitration award by the court, but the parties have not asserted that § 11 is pertinent here. b. Extra-statutory standards Cargill appears to assert that judicial vacation, or denial of confirmation, of the arbitration award is only available on the four statutory grounds stated in § 10(a) of the FAA. Hoffman, however, has asserted numerous grounds, including a general “fairness” challenge, some of which do not clearly fall within any of the statutory grounds. As mentioned above, this court has stated that it is committed to considering the “fundamental fairness” of arbitration proceedings. See supra at p. 868; see also Hoffman, 968 F.Supp. at 478. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has observed that “[fjederal courts have never limited their scope of review [of an arbitration award] to a strict reading of [9 . U.S.C. § 10].’ ” Bowles Fin. Group v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., 22 F.3d 1010, 1012 (10th Cir.1994) (quoting Jenkins v. Prudentialr-Bache Secs., Inc., 847 F.2d 631, 633 (10th Cir.1988)); see also Denver & Rio Grande Western R.R. Co. v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 119 F.3d 847, 849 (10th Cir.1997) (“A court may only vacate an arbitration award for reasons enumerated in the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 10, or for a handful of judicially created reasons.”). Thus, the first question in this part of the court’s legal analysis is whether the court may consider additional grounds to confirm or vacate an arbitration award beyond those stated in § 10(a) — and if so, which ones. i. “Irrationality” and “manifest disregard of the law.” Although UHC Management Company might seem to suggest that statutory grounds are the only ones available for judicial review of arbitration awards in the Eighth Circuit, see UHC Management Co., 148 F.3d at 997-98, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has elsewhere considered review standards beyond those listed in sections 10 and 11 of the FAA. For example, in Val-U Construction Company v. Rosebud Sioux Tribe, 146 F.3d 573 (8th Cir.1998), the court began, as it had in UHC Management Company, 148 F.3d at 998, by noting that “ ‘[jjudicial review of an arbitration award is extremely limited.’” See Val-U Constr. Co., 146 F.3d at 578 (quoting Kieman, 137 F.3d at 594). However, the court continued, “ ‘Beyond the grounds for vacation provided in the FAA, an award will only be set aside where “it is completely irrational or evidences a manifest disregard for the law.” ’ ” Id. at 578 (quoting Kieman, 137 F.3d at 594, in turn quoting Lee v. Chico, 983 F.2d 883, 885 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 906, 114 S.Ct. 287, 126 L.Ed.2d 237 (1993), with quotation marks and citations omitted, as in Val-U Constr. Co.). In Val-U Construction Company, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals first found that none of the statutory grounds for vacation applied. Id. at 579. The court then observed that “[w]e cannot say that the arbitration award is completely irrational or evidences a manifest disregard for the law.” Id. Thus, as this court reads Val-U Constmction Company, “irrationality” and “manifest disregard of the law” are separate, additional, extra-statutory grounds for vacation of an arbitration award in this circuit, not merely shorthand formulations of the review on the basis of the § 10(a) factors. This reading appears to be confirmed by Stroh Container Company, the seminal case in this circuit on review of arbitration awards, in which the court treated “irrationality” and “manifest disregard of the law” as criteria separate from and in addition to statutory factors. See Stroh Container Co., 783 F.2d at 749 (“There is simply no suggestion in the findings made by the arbitrators on the procedural arbitrability question that they expressly flouted the law in reaching their decision or otherwise acted irrationally. Nor are any of the bases for judicial action enumerated in sections 10 and 11 met here. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 10,11.”). In Stroh Container Company, the court explained that “irrationality” means that the arbitration award “fails to draw its ‘essence’ from the agreement, or contravenes a deeply rooted public policy.” Stroh Container Co., 783 F.2d at 749-750 (internal citations omitted); see also Homestake Mining Co. v. United Steelworkers of Am., AFL — CIO, 153 F.3d 678, 680-81 (8th Cir.1998) (reviewing arbitration of a collective bargaining agreement under the “irrationality” and “manifest disregard” standards articulated in Lee, 983 F.2d at 885, and Stroh Container Co., 783 F.2d at 750, and considering violation of public policy as part of the “irrationality” review). Other Circuit Courts of Appeals have also recognized “irrationality” as a ground for review of an arbitration award under the FAA. See Apex Plumbing Supply, 142 F.3d at 193-94 & n. 5 (decision of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals stating, “An arbitration award will not be set aside unless it is irrational or evidences manifest disregard for law,” relying on the decision of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Upshur Coals Corp. v. United Mine Workers of America, Dist. 31, 933 F.2d 225, 229 (4th Cir.1991), but concluding that the arbitrator did not “irrationally” disregard exclusions in the contract or make an improper valuation of items under the contract, because he relied on, among other evidence, the expert testimony of a certified public accountant on the question of inventory valuation); Lapine Tech. Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., 130 F.3d 884, 888 (9th Cir.1997) (“It is beyond peradventure that in the absence of any contractual terms regarding judicial review, a federal court may vacate or modify an arbitration award only if that award is ‘completely irrational,’ exhibits a ‘manifest disregard of law,’ or otherwise falls within one of the grounds set forth in 9 U.S.C. §§ 10 or 11.”). In Kiernan v. Piper Jaffray Companies, Inc., 137 F.3d 588 (8th Cir.1998), the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals explained “manifest disregard of the law,” the other extra-statutory ground for review expressly recognized in this Circuit, as follows: Under this standard, arbitrators’ interpretation of the law is insulated from review, but when they “understand and correctly state the law but proceed to disregard” it, manifest disregard may be shown. Stroh Container Co. v. Delphi Indus., Inc., 783 F.2d 743, 750 (8th Cir.1986) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The Kiernans assert only that the “panel was unversed in the niceties of the burden of proof in civil rights actions,” not that the panel knew the applicable legal standards and consciously chose to disregard them. Even though the panel did not discuss whether Piper Jaffray had met its burden of producing evidence that Kiernan could not perform the essential functions of an investment executive even with reasonable accommodation, it correctly placed the ultimate burden of persuasion on Kiernan to show that he suffered unlawful discrimination. See Benson [v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.], 62 F.3d [1108,] 1112 [ (8th Cir.1995) ] (citing St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 516, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 2752, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993)). Regardless of the wisdom of the panel’s conclusion, it in no way demonstrates a manifest disregard for the law warranting vacation of the arbitration award in this case. Kieman, 137 F.3d at 594-95. “Manifest disregard of the law” appears to be a well-settled ground for vacation of or refusal to confirm an arbitration award in other circuits as well as this one, see, e.g., P & P Indus., Inc. v. Sutter, 179 F.3d 861, 870 (10th Cir.1999); Weaver v. Florida Power & Light Co., 172 F.3d 771, 774-75 n. 9 (11th Cir.1999); Gallus Inv., L.P. v. Pudgie’s Famous Chicken, Ltd., 134 F.3d 231, 233-34 (4th Cir.1998) (recognizing scrutiny on statutory grounds stated in § 10(a), “and scrutiny for whether the award evinces a ‘manifest disregard’ of applicable law”), and it has been recognized by the United States Supreme Court. See First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 942, 115 S.Ct. 1920, 131 L.Ed.2d 985 (1995). Indeed, as the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has pointed out, “every other circuit except the Fifth (which has declined to adopt any non-statutory grounds for vacating arbitration awards), has expressly recognized that ‘manifest disregard of the law’ is an appropriate reason to review and vacate an arbitration panel’s decision.” Montes v. Shearson Lehman Bros., Inc., 128 F.3d 1456, 1460-61 (11th Cir.1997) (citing cases so holding, and expressly adopting “manifest disregard of the law,” but distinguishing it from mere errors of law by the arbitrators, which are not grounds for vacation). However, still other extra-statutory grounds have also been identified by the Circuit Courts of Appeals. ii. Arbitrariness and contravention of public policy. Other extra-statutory standards have been articulated, for example, by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. That court will consider three extra-statutory grounds for vacation of an arbitration award, in addition to the grounds stated in § 10 of the FAA: In the Eleventh Circuit, a party may challenge an arbitration award without reliance on the FAA if the award is: (1) arbitrary and capricious; (2) in contravention of public policy; or (3) entered in “manifest disregard of the law.” See Montes v. Shearson Lehman Bros., Inc., 128 F.3d 1456 (11th Cir.1997) (describing the first two grounds and adopting the third). Scott v. Prudential Securities, Inc., 141 F.3d 1007, 1017 (11th Cir.1998). Some of the extra-statutory grounds recognized by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals overlap those recognized by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals: Both the Eighth and Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeals recognize “manifest disregard of the law” as an extra-statutory ground for judicial review of an arbitration award; and, although the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals apparently treats “contravention of public policy” as a separate ground to vacate an arbitration award, contravention of public policy is encompassed within the “irrationality” standard in the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, as that standard was explained in Stroh Container Company. See Stroh Container Co., 783 F.2d at 749-50 (“irrationality” means that the arbitration award “fails to draw its ‘essence’ from the agreement’ or contravenes a deeply rooted public policy”). Thus, the additional ground entertained by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals is consideration of whether the arbitrators’ decision is “arbitrary and capricious.” See Scott, 141 F.3d at 1017. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has explained that an arbitration award is “arbitrary and capricious” only if “ ‘a ground for the arbitrator’s decision can[not] be inferred from the facts of the case.’ ” Id. (quoting Raiford v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 903 F.2d 1410, 1413 (11th Cir.1990)). At first glance, there appears to be no meaningful distinction, beyond mere choice of words, between the “arbitrary and capricious” review of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals and the “irrationality” review recognized in the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, at least if “irrationality” review encompasses the inferences to be drawn from the evidence or facts as well as from the terms of an agreement, as it does in other circuits. Compare Stroh Container Co., 783 F.2d at 749-750 (“irrationality” means that the arbitration award “fails to draw its ‘essence’ from the agreement, or contravenes a deeply rooted public policy”) (internal citations omitted), with Apex Plumbing Supply, 142 F.3d at 193-94 & n. 5 (reviewing factual determinations under the “irrationality” standard, by noting that an arbitrator’s valuation of inventory was not “irrational,” because it was founded on expert testimony of a certified public accountant). Nonetheless, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has expressly rejected “arbitrary and capricious” review of arbitration awards. See Alvey, Inc. v. Teamsters Local Union No. 688, 132 F.3d 1209, 1212 (8th Cir.1997) (“We reject the ‘arbitrary and capricious’ standard of review urged by Alvey. That standard governs appeals under the Administrative Procedure Act, see 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), not the Federal Arbitration Act, see 9 U.S.C. § 10.”). This court notes that a specific sort of arbitrariness was asserted in Alvey: The party challenging the arbitration award asserted that the award was “arbitrary and capricious,” because it required that party, an employer, to prove an employee guilty of violating a company rule beyond “sufficient doubt,” relying on a case holding that it was improper to import a criminal standard of proof “beyond a reasonable doubt” into the employer-employee context. See Alvey, Inc., 132 F.3d at 1212. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals found first that the arbitrator had expressly stated that he was not applying a “reasonable doubt” standard of proof. Id. The court then stated that “[u]nless there is specific controlling language in the collective bargaining agreement, we agree with the Eleventh Circuit that ‘[a]n arbitrator’s decision allocating the burden of proof among the parties or in fixing the legal framework for evaluation of a grievance ordinarily cannot be reviewed in federal court.’ ” Id. (quoting Sullivan, Long & Hagerty, Inc. v. Local 559 Laborers’ Int’l Union, 980 F.2d 1424, 1429 (11th Cir.1993)). This conclusion may appear to narrow the court’s rejection of the “arbitrary and capricious” standard to the circumstances presented, that is, rejection of the applicability of an “arbitrary and capricious” standard to determinations of the allocation of the burden of proof or the legal framework for decision. However, in light of the broad language the appellate court used in Alvey to exclude “arbitrary and capricious” review under the FAA, see Alvey, Inc., 132 F.3d at 1212 (“arbitrary and capricious” is a standard that “governs appeals under the [APA], not the [FAA]”), this court must nevertheless conclude that “arbitrary and capricious” review of arbitration awards under the FAA is not generally available in this circuit. This conclusion leads the court to the further conclusion that the “irrationality” review specifically authorized in this circuit, see, e.g., Val-U Constr. Co., 146 F.3d at 578; Kiernan, 137 F.3d at 594; Stroh Container Co., 783 F.2d at 749-750, is a more restrictive standard of review than “arbitrary and capricious” review. Indeed, the standard in this circuit is usually stated as “complete” irrationality, suggesting an extreme error with a complete lack of foundation. See id.; Kiernan, 137 F.3d at 594; Stroh Container Co., 783 F.2d at 749-750. Such a restrictive standard of “irrationality” review would be in keeping with the principle that judicial review of arbitration awards is “limited” or “narrow,” and an arbitration award cannot be overturned simply because the court would have interpreted the agreement differently, or because the arbitrators erred in interpreting the law or in determining the facts. See, e.g., UHC Management Co., 148 F.3d at 998. iii. Fundamental unfairness. In its prior ruling on Cargill’s motion to compel arbitration, this court suggested that yet another ground for review of arbitration awards may be appropriate. See Hoffman, 968 F.Supp. at 474-75. This court made a preliminary exploration of the question of its power to review an arbitration award on the basis of the “fundamental unfairness” of the proceedings. Id. This court observed, The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals recently observed that “[c]ourts have created a basic requirement that an arbitrator must grant the parties a fundamentally fair hearing.” Bowles Fin. Group, Inc., 22 F.3d [1010,] 1012 [ (10th Cir.1994) ] (citing Burchell v. Marsh, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 344, 349, 15 L.Ed. 96 (1854)); see also Employers Ins. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 933 F.2d 1481, 1491 (9th Cir.1991) (concluding that although a party did not receive a “perfect hearing,” the party did receive a fair hearing); Ficek v. Southern Pac. Co., 338 F.2d 655, 657 (9th Cir.1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 988, 85 S.Ct. 1362, 14 L.Ed.2d 280 (1965) (noting court may decline to recognize an arbitration award if the arbitration proceedings do not provide inter alia a “full and fair hearing”); Areca, Inc. v. Oppenheimer & Co., 960 F.Supp. 52, 55 (S.D.N.Y.1997) (concluding parties were not denied a “fundamentally fair hearing”). The absence of a fair hearing may constitute a fifth ground, in addition to the four statutory protections set out in 9 U.S.C. § 10, for vacating an arbitration award. See McMahan & Co. v. Dunn Newfund I, Ltd., 230 A.D.2d 1, 656 N.Y.S.2d 620, 621 (1997) (citing Bowles Fin. Group, 22 F.3d at 1012-13). Hoffman, 968 F.Supp. at 474-75. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has since reiterated its recognition of “fundamental fairness” of proceedings as a separate, extra-statutory ground for judicial review of an arbitration in P & P Indus., Inc. v. Sutter Corp., 179 F.3d 861 (10th Cir.1999). In that decision, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals wrote, We have stated that “[a] court may only vacate an arbitration award for reasons enumerated in ... § 10, or for a handful of judicially created public policy reasons.” Denver & Rio Grande Western R.R. Co. v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 119 F.3d 847, 849 (10th Cir.1997). Section 10 allows vacation of an arbitration award only where (1) the award was procured by corruption, fraud or undue means; (2) there was evident partiality or corruption on the part of the arbitrators; (3) the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct; or (4) the arbitrators exceeded or imperfectly executed their powers. See 9 U.S.C. § 10(a). In addition to these statutory grounds for vacation, courts have on occasion vacated arbitration awards which violate public policy, were based on a manifest disregard of the law, or were arrived at without a fundamentally fair hearing. See Denver & Rio Grande, 119 F.3d at 849 (citing cases). P & P Indus., Inc., 179 F.3d at 870 (emphasis added). Other courts have also embraced “fundamental unfairness” of proceedings as a criterion in judicial review of arbitration awards, although “fundamental unfairness” is sometimes read as a standard for determining whether statutory failings, such as misconduct falling under statutory standards in § 10(a), are sufficiently severe to warrant judicial intervention. See, e.g., Trans Chem. Ltd. v. China Nat’l Machinery, 161 F.3d 314, 319 (5th Cir.1998) {per curiam) (adopting the district court’s decision at 978 F.Supp. 266 (S.D.Tex.1997), in which the district court construed the question to be “whether the arbitration proceedings were ‘fundamentally fair,’ ” but evaluated fundamental fairness solely on the basis of the statutory grounds, because the district court observed that “[j]u-dicial review of arbitrators’ decisions is ‘extraordinarily narrow’ under the FAA; it is limited to the statutory exceptions enumerated in the FAA,” 978 F.Supp. at 303); Gallus Inv., L.P., 134 F.3d at 234 (rejecting a party’s challenge to an arbitration award on the denial of its “right to a ‘fundamentally fair hearing’ and ‘due process,’ ” concluding no constitutional claim was implied, the challenge did not clearly fit within a statutory ground, that “[without greater specificity, this argument is more rhetorical than real,” and finding that, even if the conduct alleged might be so “fundamentally unfair” as to violate § 10, there was no actual violation in that case); Tempo Shain Corp. v. Bertek, Inc., 120 F.3d 16, 20 (2d Cir.1997) (concluding that judicial “review is restricted to determining whether the procedure was fundamentally unfair,” but noting that “[cjourts have interpreted section 10(a)(3) to mean that except where fundamental fairness is violated, arbitration determinations will not be opened up to evidentiary review,” and “although not required to hear all the evidence proffered by a party, an arbitrator must give each of the parties to the dispute an adequate opportunity to present its evidence and argument”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); Teamsters Local 312 v. Matlack, Inc., 118 F.3d 985, 995 (3d Cir.1997) (noting that in its prior precedent, it had allowed a court to vacate an arbitration award under § 10(c) (now § 10(a)(3)) if the arbitrator’s refusal to hear proffered testimony so affected the rights of a party that it may be said that the party was deprived of a fair hearing, or if the party has not been given notice and an opportunity to present arguments and evidence on the merits of the dispute); Gulf Coast Indus. Workers Union v. Exxon Co., USA 70 F.3d 847, 850 (5th Cir.1995) (positing that the question addressed on judicial review of an arbitration award is “whether the arbitration proceedings were fundamentally fair,” but making such a determination only on the basis of grounds set out in the FAA). Whatever the scope of the “fundamental unfairness” review, it is plain that all of the courts to entertain such a ground for review look only to the “fundamental unfairness” of the 'proceedings, not the “fundamental unfairness” of any determination or award by the arbitration panel. See P & P Indus., Inc., 179 F.3d at 870 (considering whether the challenging party received “a fundamentally fair hearing”); Trans Chem. Ltd. v. China Nat’l Machinery, 161 F.3d at 319 (adopting the district court’s decision, which stated the standard as be “whether the arbitration proceedings were ‘fundamentally fair,’ ” 978 F.Supp. at 303); Tempo Shain Corp., 120 F.3d at 20 (concluding that judicial “review is restricted to determining whether the procedure was fundamentally unfair”); Gulf Coast Indus. Workers Union, 70 F.3d at 850 (the question addressed on judicial review of an arbitration award is “whether the arbitration proceedings were fundamentally fair”). Although the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has never formally recognized “fundamental unfairness” as an extra-statutory ground for judicial review of an arbitration award, it has not specifically rejected such review, as it has “arbitrary and capricious” review. See Alvey, Inc., 132 F.3d at 1212 (rejecting “arbitrary and capricious” review of arbitration awards). Furthermore, this court does not believe a “fundamental unfairness” standard is inimical to the standards of review the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeal