Full opinion text
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS AND GRANTING PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION; AMENDING ORDER REGARDING PROTECTIVE ORDER ALAN S. GOLD, District Judge. I. INTRODUCTION THIS MATTER is before the Court on Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction [DE 3] and on the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction and Lack of Standing [DE 23, 24]. In their complaint and motions, the Plaintiffs challenge the constitutionality of amendments to the Florida Sellers of Travel Act, Florida Statutes, Chapter 559, enacted as SB 1310 (“An Act Relating to Sellers of Travel”) effective July 1, 2008 (“Travel Act Amendments”) and seek declaratory and injunctive relief to enjoin enforcement of the Travel Act Amendments by state officials. The Travel Act Amendments, among other things, (1) automatically make any violation of federal law by the Plaintiffs a third-degree felony under Florida law; (2) require companies providing lawful travel related services to Cuba to post a bond in an amount ranging from $100,000 to $250,000 and allows the Defendant to use the bond to pay its own investigatory expenses without any limits to the exposure under the bond; (3) create two classes of travel providers subject to a vastly different standards (i.e. those doing business with Cuba and other “terrorist states” and those who do not do business with Cuba); and (4) require disclosure and identification by Plaintiffs of each company with whom each Plaintiff does business and make that information available to the public and Plaintiffs’ competitors. Plaintiffs argue that the Travel Act Amendments violate the following provisions of the United States Constitution: the Supremacy Clause, the Foreign Affairs Power, the Foreign Commerce Clause, and the Interstate Commerce Clause. Plaintiffs also claim that the Travel Act Amendments further violate them due process rights, constitute a taking of property in violation of the Fifth Amendment, constitute a violation of the Eighth Amendment by constituting penalties that are grossly disproportionate to the severity of the offense, and violate the Right to Travel. The Defendant denies these claims and moves to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and standing to sue. The Defendant argue that this Court is prohibited from hearing the matter under the Eleventh Amendment and Article III of the United States Constitution [DE 23 and 24]. This matter is also before the Court on Non-Party Florida House of Representatives’ (the “House”) Expedited Motion for. a Protective Order [DE 33]. As a preliminary matter, I granted the Motion on August 14, 2008 [DE 35], and pursuant to the hearing held on August 27, 2008, I continued the protective order without prejudice [DE 50]. In that Order, I reserved ruling on the House’s Motion until the hearing on the Motion for Preliminary Injunction. For reasons set forth in this Order, Plaintiffs are permitted to renew their request to depose Representative Rivera, consistent with this Order. In the event the Plaintiffs make such a request, I will further consider the Motion for Protective Order. Having heard oral argument on Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, and following an evidentiary hearing on the Motion for Preliminary Injunction on Friday, September 25, 2008, I deny the Motion to Dismiss and grant a preliminary injunction in favor of the Plaintiffs, for the reasons set forth in this Order. While the primary issue before me on this Preliminary Injunction hearing is Plaintiffs’ likelihood of success on the merits, it is with significant concern that I note that the Travel Act Amendments-which include extraordinary expensive registration and bonding requirements, exorbitant fines and a felony conviction for those who fail to comply with the law-constitute little more than an attempt to impose economic sanctions on travel to designated foreign governments, particularly the Republic of Cuba. But the right and power to impose such sanctions, and to establish foreign policy, remains, under our Federal Constitution, solely within the exclusive domain of the Congress of the United States and the President, and not within the aegis of the State of Florida under the guise of consumer protection. For reasons stated in this Order, I find a likelihood of success on the merits and convert the temporary restraining order into a preliminary injunction. I further amend my prior Order regarding the House’s Motion for Protective Order as it relates to Representative David Rivera. II. THE PARTIES The Plaintiffs are travel agencies and charter companies providing services to individuals traveling to Cuba or who wish to send humanitarian aid or family remittances to Cuba. The Plaintiffs are licensed by the federal government to provide these travel related services to Cuba. Some of the Plaintiffs act as travel agents and sell tickets for flights to Cuba to individuals wishing to travel there, or send packages and humanitarian aid to families of Cuban Americans. Some of the Plaintiffs charter aircraft to fly individuals to Cuba. The charterers, called charter service providers, work with the travel agencies (referred to as “Travel Service Providers” or “TSP’s” under federal regulations), or are themselves travel agencies, to provide lawful passage between Cuba and the United States. The Plaintiffs’ customers live in Florida and in other States and travel here before boarding flights to Cuba. All of the Plaintiff companies are owned by Cuban-Americans. The Defendant, CHARLES H. BRONSON, is sued by the Plaintiffs in his official capacity as the Commissioner of the Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, a government entity established under Florida law. Mr. Bronson, as Commissioner, is charged with enforcement and implementation of the Travel Act, including the Amendments to the Travel Act. III. JURISDICTION The Plaintiffs bring this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to redress their claimed deprivation of rights, privileges, and immunities secured by the Constitution and the laws of the United States and under the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Plaintiffs sufficiently allege jurisdiction by claiming that the state law violates the First, Fifth, Eight Amendments and the Equal Protection and Due-Process guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and the Supremacy and Foreign Commerce Clauses. I have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3) and 28 U.S.C. § 1331. TV. FACTUAL BACKGROUND A. Amendments to the Florida Sellers of Travel Act. The amended Travel Act, inter alia: a. Requires sellers of travel to Cuba to post $100,000 or $250,000 bonds, but requires companies engaged in travel to “non-terrorist designated states” to post only a $25,000 bond even if the business that provides travel related services to Cuba has a better consumer record (F.S. § 559.929(l)(b),(c)). b. Allows the state to use the bond funds to investigate any seller of travel related services to Cuba but does not allow the state to do the same for sellers of travel related services to other countries (F.S. § 559.929(2)(b)). c. Gives priority on the bond funds to the state over consumers when the travel is Cuba-related but does not do the same for bonds posted by travel agencies not providing Cuba-related travel services (F.S. § 559.929(2)(a)-(c)). d. Denies a seller of travel to Cuba a waiver or a reduction in their bonds in the future, despite having a good consumer record, while allowing sellers of travel to other countries to have their bond reduced or waived. (F.S. § 559.929(5)). e. Bars sellers of travel services, including those selling travel to Cuba, from posting a letter of credit (which is allowed by federal law), in lieu of a bond. (F.S. § 559.929). f. Makes any violation of “any state or federal law” restricting or prohibiting commerce with a designated “terrorist state”, as well as violations of “this part”... “which violation directly or indirectly pertains to an offer to sell, at wholesale or retail, prearranged travel, tourist related services or tour-guide services for individuals or groups directly to any terrorist state and which originate in Florida ...” (F.S.559.937(2)), a third degree felony. In contrast, sellers of travel to countries other than Cuba are subject only to misdemean- or charges for the same violations of the Travel Act. g. Requires sellers of travel related services to Cuba to disclose all companies with whom each such company does business, related to any “business or commerce” with Cuba. (F.S. § 559.9285(3)(c)). h. In addition, the information Plaintiffs are required to disclose, all or much of which would normally be considered protected or confidential, proprietary customer information by the state, is expressly not to be protected as trade secret or proprietary/confidential information by the Defendant under the Travel Act. (F.S. § 559.9285(3)(e)). i. Imposes substantially higher administrative fines for any violation of state or federal law by a seller of travel to Cuba than on sellers of travel to other countries (F.S. § 559.9355). j. Imposes substantially higher registration fees on sellers of travel related services to Cuba than on sellers of travel to other countries (F.S. § 559.928(2)(a)). Most of the new Travel Act requirements apply not to travel’ agencies doing business in Florida or all travel related businesses, but only to businesses providing such services to individuals traveling to, or sending humanitarian aid to, families in certain designated “terrorist states,” especially the Republic of Cuba. The preponderance of the evidence establishes that direct travel from Florida to any other federally designated terrorist state other than Cuba (i.e. Sudan, Syria, Iran, North Korea) is de minimis or nonexistent. Affidavit of Maria Teresa Aral at ¶ 5. The law was aimed principally, if not solely, to travel to Cuba and not to the other terrorist states. As candidly acknowledged by Representative Rivera, although the Amendments would affect travel agencies that do business with terrorist governments, “[l]n a practical sense here in Florida, the only direct flights that occur between any airport in Florida and a terrorist nations is from Miami International to Havana.” Plaintiffs’ Ex. B at 7 of DE 76. Prior to the imposition of the Travel Act, there were no hearings in the state legislature, and no legislative history indicating that travelers to Cuba (or any other federally designated state) had faced any problems or were disproportionately harmed by Plaintiff travel agencies or charterers or their colleagues. To the contrary, many of the charterers and travel agencies doing business related to Cuba have been in business without incident for a substantial period of time, and had such excellent records that the State of Florida has previously waived the obligation that they post even a small bond and would continue to waive the bond requirement if these companies cease activities related in any manner to Cuba. Aral Aff. ¶ 6(b); see also Affidavits of Mario Romero at ¶ 9, and Jesus Rodriguez at ¶ 9. No record evidence was offered suggesting that there was any problem with travel service providers to Cuba from Florida that warranted legislative intrusion to protect the consumer public. B. Effect of the Travel Act Amendments On the Plaintiffs Many of the Plaintiffs are small family owned businesses with limited capital whose primary source of revenue is providing travel related services to customers who wish to legally travel or mail remittances to family there. See, e.g., Romero Aff. ¶ 9; Rodriguez Aff. ¶ 9; see also Aff. ¶¶ 6, 2(c). Although they are licensed by the federal government, many of these businesses will not be able to afford to comply with the excessive state bonding requirements and will be forced to close their doors. Romero Aff. ¶ 12; Rodriguez Aff. ¶ 11. Similarly, the charter service providers will be substantially affected by the Travel Act Amendments. Many businesses will be financially harmed by the loss of travel agencies that provide the client base of passengers to Cuba for whom the Plaintiff charter companies arrange flight transportation. Without the travel agencies, the charterers will face organizational, financial, and structural problems that will last months or years. Aral Aff. ¶ 6(c). They will also face the difficult choice of ending their businesses or continuing in business where they will be subject to felonies and potentially excessive fines for what may be minor errors of federal law (such as taking excess baggage) that would normally result, at worst, in a cautionary call or letter from federal authorities. Plaintiffs will also be forced to disclose proprietary information to their competitors and the public under the Travel Act or suffer felony charges and severe administrative fines. F.S. § 559.9285(3)(c). Forcing them to disgorge proprietary information will harm their businesses by requiring them to disclose all persons and entities they do business with as well as passengers who travel to Cuba. Aral Aff. ¶ 6(d). C. Federal Laws and Regulations Affecting Travel to Cuba and Other Designated Countries Plaintiffs refer to several federal provisions that relate to the United State’s relationship with Cuba and other designated countries. With regard to Cuba, several laws at issue include the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 (“CDA”); the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996; the United States Embargo of Cuba, enacted pursuant to the Trading With the Enemy Act (“TWEA”) ; and the Cuban Assets Control Regulations (“CACR”). In addition, several statutes and related regulations concern the other designated countries, including the TWEA; the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (“IEEPA”); the Iran and Ly-bia Sanctions Act and certain regulations relating to travel to the designated countries. 1. Federal Laws and Regulations Relating to Cuba Federal law already thoroughly regulates the field of air travel and travel by these Plaintiffs to Cuba. Federal law places restrictions on when travel can occur [31 C.F.R. § 515.560, 515.561], how often it may occur [31 C.F.R. § 515.561], who may arrange travel to Cuba [31 C.F.R. § 515.420, 515.415, 515.572], who may travel to Cuba [31 C.F.R. § 515.560, 515.561, 515.562, 515.563, 515.564, 515.565, 515.566, 515.567], how transportation arrangements are to be made [14 C.F.R. Part 380], the amount and need for a bond and other protections for Plaintiffs’ customers [14 C.F.R. Part 380], The federal government has decided that travel to Cuba, albeit with certain restrictions, should be allowed. Plaintiffs each operate pursuant to licenses provided to them by the United States Department of Treasury. Virtually every aspect of Plaintiffs’ operations is monitored and regulated by the federal government. Plaintiffs each operate under a statutory and regulatory web including the Trading with the Enemy Act (50 USC § 5) and regulations promulgated and enforced by the United States Treasury Department, Office of Foreign Assets Control, (31 C.F.R. § 515.101 et seq.), as well as the Airline Deregulation Act (“ADA”) and regulations implemented and enforced by the United States Department of Transportation (“DOT”), 49 USC § 40101, et seq.; 14 CFR Part 380 et seq.; and the Department of Homeland Security. See, e.g., 8 CFR § 234.2; 19 CFR § 122.153. (a) Treasury Department, Office of Foreign Assets Control Regulation and Oversight Plaintiffs are authorized to operate as providers of travel related services to Cuba pursuant to laws administered by the federal government, including by the Treasury Department, Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”). The terms of the licenses and/or authorizations provided by OFAC to Plaintiffs are determined by OFAC and are expressly controlled by the United States government’s foreign policy goals. “Consistent with the foreign policy objectives of the United States, OFAC may make changes to your authorization by requiring new procedures or prohibiting certain transactions that were previously authorized.” Circular, 2006, “Travel, Carrier and Remittance Forwarding Service Provider Program”, Office of Foreign Assets Control (March 2006), at 6, attached as Plaintiffs’ Exhibit “C” to their Motion for Preliminary Injunction (referred to as “Exhibits “C””). OFAC guidelines provide: The broad restrictions in the Cuban Assets Control Regulations (“CACR”) in dealing with property in which Cuba or Cuban nationals have an interest are critical components of the United States foreign policy towards Cuba. On the one hand the purpose of the Regulations is to limit hard currency earnings by the Cuban government and deny benefits to the Cuban economy from unauthorized remittances, commercial transactions, and tourism. On the other hand, the Regulations support the policy objective of promoting a peaceful transition to democracy and civil society in Cuba. Licensing policy and enforcement actions, including penalties are essential components to achieving those objectives.” Service Provider Guidelines-Circular 2006, supra at 3, Appendix 1 (emphasis added), attached to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction as Exhibit “C”. The OFAC Service Provider enforcement guidelines go on to provide that: “OFAC’s licensing process for the provision of travel, carrier and remittance forwarding services aims at establishing a regulated “Service Provider” (“SP”) Community that assures that travel-related transactions and remittance forwarding are fully consistent with policy objectives and regulatory controls. OFAC predicates the granting of SP authorizations upon an expectation that the SP will continually maintain the standard of service that is consistent with foreign policy goals within the context of an ongoing relationship between OFAC and the SP’s. OFAC Licensing and enforcement policy is premised on the existence of a cooperative relationship between OFAC and the SP’s. Administrative actions, including licensing, provisional authorizations, oversight and review, suspension and/or revocation of authorization, monetary penalties and referral of certain cases to the Department of Justice for criminal prosecution are intended to further foreign policy goats. These SP Enforcement Guidelines are intended to provide OFAC with the procedural framework of general applicability to promote consistency in enforcement actions while allowing for the appropriate exercise of OFAC discretion, consistent with the Regulations. Service Provider Enforcement Guidelines — Circular 2006, supra at 3, Appendix 1 (emphasis added). Attached hereto as Exhibit “C” Thus, OFAC has promulgated a graduated and carefully balanced enforcement and compliance regime that provides it with maximum discretion and options required to enforce federal law to achieve U.S. foreign policy goals in the area of relations with Cuba. OFAC’s stated intent “is to work cooperatively in carrying out this function, using an informal procedure as much as possible.” Exhibit “C”, OFAC Service Provider Enforcement Guidelines — Circular 2006, at 4. For this reason, OFAC has a range of administrative actions available to it to ensure compliance by a licensed business. OFAC administrative procedures provide for OFAC inquiry and factfinding proceedings whereby a business is given advance notice when possible of OFAC’s “concerns and intended steps” and “the opportunity to comment when possible.” Exhibit C, at 4. The OFAC investigatory and enforcement regime is conservatively and carefully calibrated to allow the federal government maximum flexibility and discretion. Plaintiffs and businesses regulated by OFAC are given the opportunity to comment “in writing or verbally on the facts at issues, on the proper analysis of the situation, and on the appropriate conclusions to draw concerning apparently inconsistent conduct and OFAC will take those comments into consideration in its evaluation.” Id. at 5. OFAC also has available to it audits, additional background investigations, training, and if it finds enforcement is required, has a range of options to choose from, ranging from cautionary letters, warning letters, cease and desist orders, monetary penalties, suspension or revocation of a license, or criminal referral. Id. at 6-8. (b) United States Department of Transportation Oversight and Regulation Plaintiffs are also regulated by the United States Department of Transportation (“DOT”). Under DOT statutes and regulations, {see 14 C.F.R. § 380.34), Plaintiffs may not accept any payments, make any reservations or issue any tickets to passengers for any public charter flights until a prospectus is filed with and approved by DOT. As part of this process, each Plaintiff must obtain a surety bond, or a letter of credit securing payments of all passengers who are booked on the Plaintiffs’ flights. Id. The purpose of the bond is solely to protect the passengers and to guarantee that they will receive the transportation they booked or a refund if such transportation cannot be provided. Id. DOT regulations prohibit cancellation less than 10 days prior to departure and then only with special authorization from DOT. Id. Due to the foreign policy issues posed by the U.S./Cuba embargo, every prospectus for flights must be reviewed and cleared by the U.S. Department of State and OFAC before DOT approval of a flight. Moreover, as discussed below, Plaintiffs are “air carriers” under the Airline Deregulation Act (“ADA”), codified at 49 U.S.C. § 40101 et seq. The FAA expressly preempts the states from “enacting or enforcing any law, rule, regulation, standard, or other provision having the force and effect of law relating to rates, routes, or services of any air carrier ...” 49 U.S.C. § 41713. (c) Department of Homeland Security Oversight and Regulation The Department of Homeland Security, Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”), administers regulations limiting locations of travel to and from Cuba. Thus, travel to Cuba from the United States is limited to three locations, Miami, Florida; Queens, New York; and Los Angeles, California. 8 CFR § 234.2(a); 19 CFR § 122.153. 2. Federal Laws and Regulations Relating to Other Designated Countries The Travel Act Amendments apply on their face not only to Cuba, but also to those countries that the Federal government has designated as state sponsors of terrorism, namely, Iran, North Korea, Sudan and Syria (the “other designated countries”). There is no record that Plaintiffs are injured by the application of the Travel Act Amendments to these other designated countries. However, assuming arguen-do that they are making a facial challenge to the constitutionality of the Travel Act Amendments as a whole, the Federal scheme governing travel and other related transactions with respect to Iran, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria will be examined. Similar to the Federal laws and regulations that relate to Cuba, an extensive framework of Federal law and regulations exist with respect to the other designated countries, including the TWEA; the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (“IEEPA”); the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act; and the Export Administration Act. I already have noted that the OFAC has promulgated a graduated and carefully balanced enforcement and compliance regime to achieve U.S. foreign policy goals in the area of relations with Cuba. Similarly, OFAC has promulgated such a regime with respect to the other designated countries. Overall, the federal scheme that controls and restricts transactions related to countries that the federal government has designated as ‘terrorist states’ is comprehensive. Similar to the regulations concerning Cuba, federal law speaks specifically to the scope and extent of travel and other related restrictions with respect to the other designated countries, which reflect the careful consideration and implementation of our country’s foreign policy goals and objectives. Currently, OFAC regulations exempt travel and transactions incidental to travel to the other designated countries from the general restrictions imposed on financial transactions involving Iran, North Korea, Sudan and Syria. Title 31 C.F.R. § 560.210(d) of the Iranian Transactions Regulations, 31 U.S.C. § 538.212 of the Sudanese Sanctions Regulations and 31 C.F.R. § 542.206(c) of the Syrian Sanctions Regulations provide, in pertinent part, that “[t]he prohibitions contained in this part do not apply to transactions ordinarily incident to travel to or from any country, including importation of accompanied baggage for personal use, maintenance within any country including payment of living expenses and acquisition of goods or services for personal use, and arrangement or facilitation of such travel including nonscheduled air, sea, or land voyages. ” (Emphasis added). Further, 31 C.F.R. § 500.563(a) entitled “Transactions incident to travel to and within North Korea,” states “[a]ll transactions of persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction, including travel service providers, ordinarily incident to travel to, from, and within North Korea and to maintenance within North Korea are authorized. This authorization extends to transactions with North Korean carriers and those involving group tours, payment of living expenses, the acquisition of goods in North Korea for personal use, and normal banking transactions involving currency drafts, charge, debit or credit cards, traveler’s checks, or other financial instruments negotiated incident to personal travel.” (Emphasis added). In the past, OF AC regulations have imposed severe limitations on travel and related transactions involving Iran and North Korea. For example, with respect to North Korea, prior to 1995, travel service providers, including travel agents, tour operators and carriers, could only book passage to North Korea aboard third-country carriers, 31 C.F.R. 500.563(d)(1) (1988), and no person subject to U.S. jurisdiction could arrange, promote, or facilitate group or individual tours or travel to North Korea, 31 C.F.R. 500.563(d)(2) (1988). Viewed in the context of the comprehensive restrictions on financial transactions with the designated states, these travel and related restrictions have been designed to implement the foreign policy goals of the United States. Finally, DOT regulations places restrictions on travel between the United States and Syria, Sudan, and North Korea. For example, air cargo operations between the United States and Sudan are not permitted, DOT Order 98-2-5 (Jan. 16, 1998) and Syrian carriers may not take off from or land in the territory of the United States, 14 C.F.R. Pt. 91, SFAR No. 104. On the other hand, DOT regulations specify that U.S. carriers flights may operate in North Korean airspace. 14 C.F.R. Pt. 91, SFAR No. 79. V DEFENDANTS MOTION TO DISMISS Defendant, Charles H. Bronson, as Commissioner of Agriculture, moves to dismiss because “the Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction and standing to sue and is prohibited from hearing this matter under the Eleventh Amendment and Article III of the United States Constitution.” [DE 23, page 1]. He contends that the State of Florida is the real party in interest and, therefore, the Eleventh Amendment prohibits citizens from the State of Florida from suing the State in Federal Court without the State’s permission (which has not been given here). He further claims that, under Section 559.935(l)(b), Florida Statutes, the Travel Act Amendments do not apply to the Charterer Plaintiffs (ABC Charters, Inc., Cuba Travel Services, Inc., Marazul Charters, Inc., Xael Charters, Inc., and Wilson, Charters, Inc.) and they, therefore, lack standing to sue. Based on the evidence of record to date, I disagree with these contentions and deny the motion. Initially, it is well-established that the federal courts have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 over a preemption claim seeking injunctive and declaratory relief. See, e.g., Verizon Md., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 641-43, 122 S.Ct. 1753, 152 L.Ed.2d 871 (2002); In Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff who seeks in-junctive relief from state regulation, on the ground that such regulation is pre-empted by a federal statute which, by virtue of the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, must prevail, thus presents a federal question which the federal courts have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 to resolve. 463 U.S. 85 at 96 n. 14, 103 S.Ct. 2890, 77 L.Ed.2d 490 (1983) Likewise, the Fifth Circuit and other circuits have affirmed this principle holding that when a plaintiff seeks injunctive relief based on a federal statute, federal question jurisdiction clearly exits based on Shaw. See Planned Parenthood of Houston and Se. Tex. v. Sanchez, 403 F.3d 324, 331 (5th Cir.2005) (citing Qwest Corp. v. Santa Fe, 380 F.3d 1258, 1264 n. 1 (10th Cir.2004)) (where preemption “is the basis for a federal claim in [plaintiffs] complaint in federal court, [Shaw and Verizon ] make clear that there is federal question jurisdiction in these circumstances”); Local Union No. 12004, United Steelworkers of Am. v. Massachusetts, 377 F.3d 64, 74 (1st Cir.2004) (“a claim of preemption ... does constitute a federal question under § 1331.”); Ill. Ass’n of Mortgage Brokers v. Office of Banks & Real Estate, 308 F.3d 762, 765 (7th Cir.2002) (finding that § 1331 provides jurisdiction over preemption claim); St. Thomas-St. John Hotel & Tourism Ass’n, Inc. v. Govt. of the United States Virgin Islands, 218 F.3d 232, 241 (3d Cir.2000) (same). With regard to the Defendant’s specific contentions, I, first, conclude that the Plaintiffs’ claims are not barred by the Eleventh Amendment because Plaintiffs seek to enjoin a state officer from enforcing a state law that purportedly conflicts with a federal law. The United States Supreme Court has unambiguously have held that federal courts have the duty and authority to enjoin officers and employees of a state who act prospectively, and not nominally, in violation of the United States Constitution or federal statutes. Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 161, 28 S.Ct. 441, 454, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908) (a federal court may enjoin the attorney general of a state, whose “general duty” is to enforce state law, from proceeding to enforce a state statute which violates the federal constitution); Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 289, 97 S.Ct. 2749, 2762, 53 L.Ed.2d 745 (1977) (affirming injunctive relief requiring state officials to “conform their conduct to requirements of federal law”); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 73, 116 S.Ct. 1114, 1132, 134 L.Ed.2d 252 (1996) (reaffirming that Ex Parte Young allows a suit for injunction against a state official to go forward, notwithstanding the Eleventh Amendment, to end a continuing federal violation); Verizon Md. v. Public Serv. Com’n of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 645, 122 S.Ct. 1753, 1760, 152 L.Ed.2d 871 (2002). The Verizon Court explained that in determining whether the doctrine of Ex Parte Young avoids an Eleventh Amendment bar to suit, a court need only conduct a “straightforward inquiry into whether [the] complaint alleges an ongoing violation of federal law and seeks relief properly characterized as prospective.” Id. at 645, 122 S.Ct. 1753. The Supreme Court found that plaintiffs’ claim “no doubt” fell under general federal question because “Verizon seeks relief from the Commission’s order ‘on the ground that such regulation is preempted by a federal statute which, by virtue of the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, must prevail,’ and its claim ‘thus presents a federal question which the federal courts have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 to resolve.’ ” Moreover, the Court held that Verizon’s prayer for in-junctive relief — that the state officials be restrained from enforcing an order in contravention of controlling federal law— clearly satisfied the “straightforward inquiry” requirement. Id. Likewise, the Eleventh Circuit has held that while state defendants sued in their official capacity for monetary damages under § 1983 are immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment, they are not immune from claims seeking prospective declaratory or injunctive relief. See Powell v. Barrett, 496 F.3d 1288, 1308 & n. 27 (11th Cir.2007) (the Eleventh Amendment does not prevent Plaintiffs from seeking prospective, injunctive relief against county sheriff); MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., 298 F.3d 1269, 1272 (11th Cir.2002); Fla. Ass’n of Rehab. Facilities v. Fla. Dep’t of Health and Rehabilitative Serv., 225 F.3d 1208, 1220 (11th Cir.2000) (applying doctrine of Ex Parte Young where plaintiffs’ suit was directed against state officials for prospective injunctive relief to halt continuing violations of federal Medicaid reimbursement standards). Here, the Plaintiffs’ suit against Defendant Bronson in his official capacity for prospective injunctive and declaratory relief meet the “straightforward inquiry” requirement under Verizon. There is no contention, nor must there be, that Congress expressly abrogated the state’s Eleventh Amendment immunity. It is enough that Plaintiffs follow well-established case law that authorizes suits in federal court for an injunction against a state official, notwithstanding the Eleventh Amendment, to end a continuing federal law violation. The allegations of the Complaint, coupled with the evidence at preliminary injunction, establish that there is immediate expectation an ongoing violation of federal law by a state official charged with its enforcement unless injunctive relief is granted. Second, Defendant Bronson’s argument, that the State of Florida is the “real party in interest” fails because the amended Florida Sellers of Travel Act expressly confers enforcement and implementation authority upon the Florida Department of Agriculture. This simply is not a case where the action is nominally against individual state officers, and, instead, the state is the real, substantial party in interest. Rather, in this case, the Department is the agency authorized to collect registration fees, enforce bonds and impose penalties for non-compliance of the law. At oral argument, the Defendant conceded this point. In his official capacity as Commissioner of the Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, Defendant Bronson has the authority to execute the powers, duties, and functions vested in the Department. Section 20.05(l)(a), Florida Statutes. Accordingly, he has the requisite connection with enforcement of the act to be a party in this suit. See Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. at 157, 28 S.Ct. 441 (“The fact that the state officer, by virtue of his office, has some connection with the enforcement of the act, is the important and material fact, and whether it arises out of the general law, or is specifically created by the act itself, is not material so long as it exists.”). See also Luckey v. Harris, 860 F.2d 1012, 1015-16 (11th Cir.1988) (“All that is required is that the official be responsible for the challenged action.”) Third, the record, including the exhibits to the Complaint and affidavits, establish, at this juncture, that the charterer service provider (“CSP”) Plaintiffs have standing to sue to the extent they are not just charter companies. Plaintiffs contend that CSPs, such as ABC Charters, remain subject to the amended Travel Act because it also is a licensed travel service provider (“TSP”), in that it sells tickets to passengers directly and takes reservations from travel agencies for flights to Cuba, Aral Aff., ¶ 12, and travel agencies must be licensed as Travel Service Providers. Plaintiffs represent that all Plaintiff CSPs in this action are also licensed by OFAC as TSPs and have all been required in the past to post a bond with the Florida Department of Agriculture. For all of these reasons, the Defendant’s motion to dismiss is denied. Accordingly, I now turn to the Motion for Preliminary Injunction. VI. STANDARD FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION A preliminary injunction is an “extraordinary and drastic remedy” that should be granted only if Plaintiffs clearly established their “burden of persuasion.” McDonald’s Corp. v. Robertson, 147 F.3d 1301, 1306 (11th Cir.1998). Plaintiffs must establish: (1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) that irreparable injury will be suffered unless the injunction issues; (3) that the threatened injury outweighs whatever damage the injunction may cause; and (4) that if issued, the injunction would not be adverse to the public interest. Charles H. Wesley Educ. Found., Inc. v. Cox, 408 F.3d 1349, 1354 (11th Cir.2005); United States v. Jefferson County, 720 F.2d 1511, 1519 (11th Cir. 1983); Miami Light Project v. Miami-Dade County, 97 F.Supp.2d 1174, 1178 (S.D.Fla.2000). Of these four requisites the first factor, establishing a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, is most important and the one discussed at length here. VII. APPLICATION OF THE STANDARD A. Plaintiffs Have Demonstrated a Likelihood of Success on the Merits In ruling on the Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction, I must examine whether the Travel Act Amendments are likely to be found illegal or unconstitutional under any of the Plaintiffs’ challenges. If I conclude that the Plaintiffs have met their burden on certain of their claims, I need not proceed to address their remaining claims at this time. Miami Light Project v. Miami-Dade County, 97 F.Supp.2d 1174, 1179 (S.D.Fla.2000) (finding a substantial likelihood of success based on foreign affairs provision, foreign commerce clause and supremacy clause and not reaching First Amendment and equal protection clause issues). Given that limitation, I conclude that the Travel Act Amendments will likely be found unconstitutional under the Foreign Affairs Provisions, the Supremacy Clause, the Foreign Commerce Clause and the Interstate Commerce Clause. Therefore, I do not reach the Plaintiffs’ remaining claims, although I am prepared to do so on preliminary injunction if later deemed necessary upon further appellate review. 1. The Foreign Affairs Power As recently well-analyzed in Faculty Senate of Florida International University v. Roberts, 574 F.Supp.2d 1331 (S.D.Fla.2008) (finding in favor of plaintiffs on their challenge to constitutionality of Florida’s Travel Act restricting state universities from spending both state and “nonstate” funds on activities related to travel to a “terrorist state”), “[t]he exercise of the federal executive authority means that state law must give way where ... there is evidence of clear conflict between the policies adopted by the two.” American Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 421, 123 S.Ct. 2374, 156 L.Ed.2d 376 (2003); see also Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 442, 88 S.Ct. 664, 19 L.Ed.2d 683 (1968) (Stewart, J. concurring) (citing Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 63, 61 S.Ct. 399, 85 L.Ed. 581 (1941) (stating that “[o]ur system of government is such that the interest of the cities, counties and states, no less than the interest of the people of the whole nation, imperatively requires that federal power in the field affecting foreign relations be left entirely free from local interference”)). For a state statute to encroach on the federal foreign affairs power, it must have more than “some incidental or indirect effect in foreign countries.” Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 434-35, 88 S.Ct. 664. The First Circuit has articulated a five factor test (the “Natsios Factors”) for determining when a statute’s effect on foreign countries is more than “incidental or indirect.” Natl. Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 53 (1st Cir.1999) (“Natsios”). Those five factors that a court must weigh are: (1) the design and intent of the law; (2) the amount of purchasing power the law affected; (3) the possibility of other states following the example; (4) the protests lodged by other foreign countries; and (5) the differences between the state and federal approaches. Id. (a) The Design And Intent Of The Law The Travel Act Amendments’ treatment of non-Cuban terrorist states stands in distinct contrast to the federal government’s treatment of Cuba. The federal government treats persons selling travel to all other terrorist states in the same manner as a person selling travel to a non-terrorist state. There are no regulations under the Iranian, Syrian, North Korean, or Sudanese transaction regulations that currently regulate the sellers of travel to those countries. The fact that the Travel Act Amendments primarily apply to Cuba (as compared to other “terrorist states” (where travel from Florida is de minimis or nonexistent) and the burdens and penalties imposed by the Amendments are structured to end or seriously hamper federally licensed travel from Florida to Cuba by those legally entitled to travel to that country, demonstrates that the “design and intent” of the law is more than just a state consumer protection decision (especially since on their face the benefit of the Amendments inure to the state and not the consumer), but also a political statement of condemnation on the designated countries, particularly the Republic of Cuba. See Faculty Senate of Florida International University, 574 F.Supp.2d at 1848 (finding that the fact the Act restricts the use of “non-state” funds, as well as state funds used to administer non-state funds, demonstrates the law is more than just a state spending decision, but a political statement); Miami Light Project, 97 F.Supp.2d at 1180 (stating that because the “stated purpose of [a county ordinance was] to protest and condemn Cuba’s totalitarian regime,” it was outside the scope of the county’s power); see also Tayyari v. N.M. State Univ., 495 F.Supp. 1365, 1879-80 (D.N.M.1980) (holding that a university regulation entitled the “Substitute Motion,” which denied admission or readmission Iranian students to New Mexico State University, was unconstitutional because the “true purpose in enacting the Substitute Motion was to make a political statement.”). Indeed, the Sponsor of the Travel Act Amendments is on record that the law was needed to stop Plaintiffs from “lining the pockets” of the Cuban government, that the legislation was justified because the companies like Plaintiffs are “partners with Fidel Castro and his communist regime,” that the Act is to prevent “his constituents’ tax money from underwriting Fidel Castro’s regime” (see Exhibits A and B to Plaintiffs Motion for Preliminary Injunction), and that “[a]ny travel to a terrorist country necessarily subsidizes that terrorist regime.” The fact that the Sponsor’s criticism of Cuba’s oppressive regime is well-founded is simply not the point. What is the point is that the Florida Legislature may not impose exorbitant financial requirements (unrelated to consumer protection needs) and excessive penalties, evidencing the “sanctioning” nature of the Travel Act Amendments, in a desire to preclude travel to Cuba (and other designated countries) without running afoul of the United States Constitution. (b) The Economic Impact of the Act Under the federal regulations, the Plaintiffs, as licensed travel agents, are the only agents allowed under federal law to transport people from the United States to Cuba. Interruption of the limited air transportation between Florida and Cuba will further exacerbate the limited visitation rights of Cuban-Americans who have family members remaining on the island. These visitation rights are already curtailed by federal regulations, which places restrictions on how often Cuban-Americans can visit their family members. Additionally, the evidence at the preliminary injunction hearing establishes that many of the Plaintiffs are small owned businesses with limited capital whose primary source of revenue is providing travel related services to customers who wish to legally travel or mail remittances to family there. Although they are licensed by the federal government, many of these businesses will not be able to afford to comply with the extraordinarily high bonding requirements and will be forced to close their doors. Nothing in the record supports that higher bond requirements protect the consumer. In fact, given the Amendment scheme, the consumer may be the last person to obtain the proceeds on a state bond under the Travel Act because the Amendments give priority on the bond funds to the state over consumers. F.S. Ch. 559.929(2)(a)-(c). Similarly, the preponderance of the evidence at the preliminary injunction hearing further establishes that the charter service providers will suffer substantial economic impact. Many businesses will be financially harmed by the loss of travel agencies that provide the client base of passengers to Cuba for whom the Plaintiff charterer companies arrange flight transportation. Without the travel agencies, the charterers will face organizational, financial, and structural problems that could last months or years. While the exact amount of money impacting the designated countries, primarily Cuba, is not totally quantified, the impact is more than “incidental or indirect” considering the nature and extent of legally travel to Cuba occurring through the Travel Providers and Charter Service Providers to date. See Springfield Rare Coin Galleries v. Johnson, 115 Ill.2d 221, 236, 104 Ill.Dec. 743, 750, 503 N.E.2d 300, 307 (Ill.1986) (holding that “regulations which amount to embargoes or boycotts are outside the realm of permissible State activity”). The ability of this Nation to choose between a range of policy options in developing its foreign relations with Cuba and the designated countries is impaired by the existence of the “sanction” that the Travel Act Amendments imposes on the designated countries. The federal government cannot be hampered or impaired from removing, or modifying the restrictions at issue to fit changing conditions. See id. Thus, the second factor also indicates that the Travel Act Amendments have more than an “incidental or indirect” impact on foreign affairs. (c) The Possibility of Other States Following the Example The third Natsios Factor, influence on other states, also militates against the Travel Act Amendments restriction on those who provide travel related services to Cuba and, as charterers, provide lawful passage between Cuba and the United States. In concluding that the third Nats-ios Factor weighed against the Burma Statute, the First Circuit stated that “the effects of the law [Burma Statute] may well be magnified should Massachusetts prove to be a bellwether for other states (and other governments!.])” Natsios, 181 F.3d at 53. Similarly, Judge Moreno concluded that “Miami-Dade County, like Massachusetts, may be a bellwether for other states.” Miami Light Project, 97 F.Supp.2d at 1180. Likewise, here, the effects of the Travel Act Amendments enacted by the Nation’s fourth largest state, which curtail the opportunity for lawful travel with the designated countries, if replicated by other states or local governments, including New York and California, would be magnified to a great degree that all permissible travel from Florida, New York and California to Cuba could effectively end. (d) The Differences Between The State And Federal Approaches Finally, Plaintiffs’ argument that the Travel Act Amendments mark a departure from foreign policy towards the designated countries is also persuasive. A discussion of the interplay between the Travel Act Amendments and federal statutes relating to the designated countries is addressed more fully below in the discussion of preemption. Based on the preponderance of the evidence at preliminary injunction, the Travel Act Amendments restrictions on federally licensed travel from Florida to Cuba, as well as the other designated countries, constitute more than an “incidental or indirect” effect on foreign affairs and therefore infringes the federal government’s foreign affairs power. 2. Preemption/Supremacy Clause The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution establishes federal law as the “supreme law of the land, and invalidates state laws that interfere with or are contrary to federal law.” Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F.Supp.2d 477, 518 (M.D.Pa.2007) (citing Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 9, 9 Wheat. 1, 6 L.Ed. 28 (1824)). This invalidation is termed federal preemption. Olde Discount Corp. v. Tupman, 1 F.3d 202 (3rd Cir.1993); Hazleton, supra at 517; U.S. Const., art. VI, cl. 2. The Plaintiffs argue that federal law preempts the Travel Act Amendments because these Amendments conflict with federal laws and other regulations concerning the United States’ relations with the designated countries. Additionally, the Plaintiffs contend that the Congress has “occupied the field” and “closed off this area to state regulations.” In furtherance of these arguments, the Plaintiffs rely on theories of “express preemption,” “conflict preemption,” and “field preemption.” See This That And Other Tobacco, Inc. v. Cobb County, 285 F.3d 1319, 1322-23 (11th Cir.2002) (explaining these latter two preemption theories, as well as express preemption). See also Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372 n. 6, 120 S.Ct. 2288, 147 L.Ed.2d 352 (2000) (noting that preemption theories are not “rigidly distinct”). As discussed at length in Faculty Senate of Florida international University, 574 F.Supp.2d at 1350-52, a fundamental principle arising from the Second Clause of Article VI of the Constitution is that Congress has the power to preempt state law. See Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372-73, 120 S.Ct. 2288, 147 L.Ed.2d 352 (2000) (citations omitted). Even without an express provision for preemption, state law must yield to a congressional act in at least two circumstances: (1) when Congress intends federal law to “occupy the field;” and (2) even if Congress has not occupied the field, state law is naturally preempted to the extent of any conflict with a federal statute. Id. Federal law preempts state law where it is impossible for a private party to comply simultaneously with both state and federal law, or when state law “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” Id. (citing Hines, 312 U.S. at 67, 61 S.Ct. 399). Defining what is a sufficient obstacle is a matter of judgment, to be informed by examining the federal statute as a whole and identifying its purpose and intended effects. Id. The Crosby Court stated specifically that “For when the question is whether a Federal act overrides a state law, the entire scheme of the statute must of course be considered and that which needs must be implied is of no less, force than that which is expressed. If the purpose of the act cannot otherwise be accomplished-if its operation within its chosen field else must be frustrated and its provisions be refused their natural effect-the state law must yield to the regulation of Congress within the sphere of its delegated power.” Id. at 373, 120 S.Ct. 2288 (citing Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501, 533, 32 S.Ct. 715, 56 L.Ed. 1182 (1912)). In this case, there is a strong likelihood that the Florida Sellers of Travel Act is both expressly and impliedly preempted by federal law. (a) Express Preemption The Airline Deregulation Act prohibits the state of Florida, or a political subdivision of the state, from enacting or enforcing any law, regulation or other provision “relating” to a price, a route, or a service of any air carrier authorized to provide interstate air transportation. 49 USC § 41713(b)(1). 49 USC § 41713(b)(1) provides in relevant part as follows: Except as provided in this subsection, a State, political subdivision of a State, or political authority of at least 2 States may not enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other provision having the force and effect of law related to a price, route, or service of an air carrier that may provide air transportation under this subpart. 49 USC § 41713(b)(1) (emphasis added). Plaintiffs are “air carriers” covered by this language. “Air Carrier” under the ADA is defined as “a citizen of the United States undertaking any means, directly or indirectly, to provide air transportation.” 49 USC § 40102(a)(2). Travel agents, tour operations, shipping and charterers and the like are “indirect air carriers” covered by the ADA. 14 CFR § 380.2; Illinois Corporate Travel, Inc. v. American Airlines, Inc., 682 F.Supp. 378, 380 (N.D.Ill.1988) (preemption upheld because state law allowing travel agents to charge lower rates could “potentially cause the rates for airline tickets in Illinois to differ from those available in other states”); Arkin v. Trans Int’l, 568 F.Supp. 11, 13 (E.D.N.Y.1982) (finding that travel agents and tour operators are indirect air carriers); Monarch Travel Servs., Inc. v. Associated Cultural Clubs, Inc., 466 F.2d 552, 554 (9th Cir.1972) cert. denied, 410 U.S. 967, 93 S.Ct. 1444, 35 L.Ed.2d 701 (1973) (holding that organizations arranging charter flights operate very much like a carrier and should be treated as a carrier, regardless of the label it applies to its business); Ry. Express Agency v. C.A.B., 345 F.2d 445, 448 (D.C.Cir.1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879, 86 S.Ct. 162, 15 L.Ed.2d 120 (1965) (finding that one who holds out to the public that it will undertake to transport property by air is an indirect air carrier). ADA preemption generally encompasses three types of state laws. Those which: (1) specifically regulate airlines; (2) indirectly regulate rates, routes or services; and (3) have a significant effect on rates, routes or services, even though they are laws of general effect. Thus, a state law claim, whether by a private individual or government entity, will be preempted if it involves the enactment or enforcement of the state law. If the law has a connection with or relation to airline prices, routes or services even indirectly, it is preempted by the federal law. Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 388-89, 112 S.Ct. 2031, 119 L.Ed.2d 157 (1992). In Morales the Supreme Court noted that this preemption provision is broad and will be construed to preempt any state law or state enforcement action “having a connection with or reference to” airline rates, routes, or services. Morales, 504 U.S. at 388-89, 112 S.Ct. 2031 (airlines sued to enjoin state attorneys general from enforcing state deceptive practices law against airline advertising. Trial court entered a preliminary injunction on grounds of preemption by 49 U.S.C. § 41713, the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court affirmed, finding state guidelines regarding airline fair advertising were expressly preempted by Airline Deregulation Act.) The Supreme Court stated that the ordinary meaning of the term “relating to” in ADA preemption provision is “a broad one,” and the words “thus express a broad preemptive purpose.” The Court found that it was “clear as an economic matter that the [state regulations] would have a forbidden effect upon fares” and that compelled disclosures and advertising restrictions would have a significant impact on the airlines’ ability to market their product and upon the fares they charge. Id. at 388, 112 S.Ct. 2031. The Court also found that the express preemption provision of the federal statute “relating to” rates, routes or services “displaced all state laws that fall within its sphere, even including state laws that are consistent with [the federal laws] substantive requirements”. Id. at 387, 112 S.Ct. 2031. While the Travel Act Amendments directly affects Plaintiffs as “indirect” air carriers, for a state law to be preempted, those amendments need not directly regulate an air carrier. Regulation of other individuals or entities, if such regulation will have an effect on price, route or service of a direct or indirect air carrier, is preempted. Huntleigh Corp. v. La. State Bd. of Private Security Examiners, 906 F.Supp. 357, 362 (M.D.La.1995) (Louisiana law governing registration and training of private security officers performing pre-departure screening at airports affected “services” of air carriers and was therefore preempted by the express preemption provisions of the Airline Deregulation Act. Federal scheme essentially created uniform training standards and uniform minimum qualifications for employees or agents of airlines who perform pre-depar-ture screening and allowing states to prescribe such qualifications and training would have frustrated uniformity of training standards and employee qualifications, thus conflicting with federal scheme); see also, Branche v. Airtran Airways Inc., 342 F.3d 1248, 1254 (11th Cir.2003) (finding that so long as state law action has connection with airline prices, routes, or services, preemption of such law under Airline Deregulation Act is mandated regardless of whether the state law specifically addresses the airline industry); Marlow v. AMR Services Corp., 870 F.Supp. 295, 298 (D.Haw.1994) (State enforcement actions which have a connection with or reference to airline rates, routes or services are preempted by the Airline Deregulation Act. The laws do not have to actually prescribe rates, routes or service or be specifically addressed to the airline industry or be inconsistent with federal law); In Re American Airlines, Inc., Privacy Litigation, 370 F.Supp.2d 552, 561 (N.D.Tex.2005) (laws of general applicability may be preempted by Airline Deregulation Act and need not actually prescribe airline prices, routes, or services. Thus, preemption under ADA is not limited to claims bought directly against air carriers); American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 226, 115 S.Ct. 817, 130 L.Ed.2d 715 (1995) (Airline Deregulation Act preemption of state regulation does not turn on whether the matter is “essential” or “unessential”). The Supreme Court recently ruled that the preemption provision of the Federal Aviation Administration and Authorization Act (“FAAAA”), which states that “a State ... may not enact or enforce a law ... related to a price, route, or service of any motor carrier ... with respect to the transportation of property,” expressly preempted certain provisions of Maine’s Tobacco Delivery Law requiring licensed tobacco shippers (not carriers) to utilize a delivery service that verified the legal age of the buyer. Rowe v. N.H. Motor Transport Ass’n, — U.S. -, 128 S.Ct. 989, 995, 169 L.Ed.2d 933 (2008). The Court’s preemption analysis relied on the fact that FAAAA provision was copied from the preemption provision of the ADA. Following the Morales framework, the Court held that Maine’s law was preempted because it affected motor carrier service providers that made up a substantial portion of delivery services, and although it acted directly against shippers rather than carriers, it would have had an adverse impact on carriers by effectively requiring them to offer a system of services not otherwise provided or required by federal law. Id. In the instant case, the Travel Act Amendments are “related to” (and will certainly affect) the routes, prices or services Plaintiffs provide. Fewer services at a higher rate will be the inevitable (and intended) result of the Travel Act Amendments as the number of travel agencies shrink, because they cannot afford to post a $100,00.00 to $250,000.00 bond, or as their increased costs are passed on to their customers. Similarly, the number of charterers will become smaller as they lose their economic base supplied by travel agencies, they are forced to constantly replace their $100,000.00 or $250,000.00 bond used to pay the state’s investigative costs, or they simply do not wish to continue operating under a regime where the slightest error or dispute with a consumer will result in a felony prosecution and onerous administrative penalties and fines. See generally Aral Affidavit. The fact tha