Full opinion text
OPINION BROWN, Chief Judge: This matter comes before the Court upon Plaintiffs’ motion for default judgment (Docket Entry No. 28, “Plaintiffs’ Motion”) and defendant Minmetals Inc.’s (“Minmetals”) motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ complaint (Docket Entry No. 27, “Defendant’s Motion”). For the reasons stated below, Plaintiffs’ Motion will be denied. Defendant’s Motion will be granted insofar that Plaintiffs’ complaint will be dismissed without prejudice, and Plaintiffs will be granted leave to amend their complaint. All residual motions will be dismissed as moot. TABLE OF CONTENTS I. Procedural Background ...................................................847 II. Motion for Default Judgment...............................................848 III. Challenges to Subject Matter Jurisdiction....................................850 IV. Plaintiffs’ Allegations......................................................851 A. Assertions as to Trade and Commerce..................................851 B. Anticompetitive Conduct..............................................852 C. Additional Elaborations...............................................853 V. Industry-Related Data....................................................854 VI. Pertinent Legal Regime...................................................857 A. The Sherman Act....................................................857 1. “Per Se” and “Rule of Reason” Analyses.............................857 2. Parallel Pricing...................................................859 B. The Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act .........................859 1. Legislative History...............................................859 2. Methodology of the FTAIA Analysis................................860 3. Direct, Substantial, and Reasonably Foreseeable Effect................862 4. Additional Considerations..........................................863 a. Comity......................................................863 b. “Mixed FTAIA” Scenario......................................864 VII. Discussion...............................................................866 A. Presumption as to Lack of Sovereign Action.............................866 B. As Drafted, Plaintiffs’ Complaint Is Barred by the FTAIA.................868 1. Trade and Commerce.............................................869 2. Plaintiffs Failed to Assert Facts Shoving a Link Between Defendants’ Alleged Illegal Actions and the United States Commerce.....................................................870 a. Cost-of-Production Arguments .................................871 b. Currency- and Sale-Price-Based Arguments.....................873 e. Economic Arguments .........................................875 3. The Complaint Indicates Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction...........876 C. As Drafted, Plaintiffs’ Complaint Fails to State a Sherman Act Claim.....877 D. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Default Judgment Will Be Denied...................880 VIII. Leave to Amend..........................................................880 A. Grant of Leave Is in the Interests of Justice.............................880 B. Future Litigation ....................................................881 IX. Conclusion........................ ......................................882 I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND At issue here is the extraterritorial scope of the Sherman Antitrust Act and its application to this case. The putative Plaintiffs’ class comprises certain United States consumers of magnesite products who allege that a number of Chinese entities and their trade association conspired to keep prices on certain magnesite products artificially inflated worldwide, including in the United States. On September 7, 2005, Plaintiffs Animal Science Products, Inc. and Resco Products, Inc. (“Animal Science” and “Resco,” collectively, “Plaintiffs”) filed a civil complaint naming the following seventeen entities as Defendants in this matter: China National Metals & Minerals Import & Export Corporation; China National Minerals Import & Export Corporation; Sinosteel Corporation; China Metallurgical Import & Export Corporation; Liaoning Jiayi Metals & Minerals Co. Ltd.; Haicheng Houying Co. Ltd.; Haicheng Huayu Group Import & Export Co. Ltd.; Minmetals; Xiyang Group; Xiyang Imoprt & Export Ltd. Co.; Xiyang Refractory Materials Ltd. Co.; Xi-yang Fireproof Material Co. Ltd.; Liaoning Foreign Trade General Co.; Liaoning Jinding Magnesite Group; Dalian Golden Sun Import & Export Co.; Haicheng Pailou Magnesite Ore Co. Ltd.; and Yingkou Huachen Co. Ltd. See Docket Entry No. 1. On October 17, 2005, an order extending Minmetals’ time to file a responsive pleading was issued by Judge Harold A. Ackerman; that time was re-extended by Judge Ackerman on November 7, 2005, and then re-extended once again by Magistrate Judge Mark Falk on December 15, 2005. See Docket Entries Nos. 3, 5 and 6. No responsive pleading followed and, on May 4, 2007, Magistrate Judge Esther Salas (to whom the case was reassigned from Judge Falk) issued another order granting Min-metals two extensions to file such a pleading. See Docket Entries Nos. 18 and 25. On December 14, 2007, Minmetals filed Defendant’s Motion. See Docket Entry No. 27. Plaintiffs’ filed their opposition on January 14, 2008, see Docket Entry No. 33, and Minmetals filed their reply on February 12, 2008. See Docket Entry No. 38. Meanwhile, during 2007, Plaintiffs filed numerous motions for entries of default, see, e.g., Docket Entries Nos. 16, 19 (hence, causing the Clerk to enter corresponding defaults); Plaintiffs followed those applications by filing Plaintiffs’ Motion on December 14, 2007. See Docket Entry No. 28. On February 5, 2008, certain Defendants filed their opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion, see Docket Entries Nos. 36 (supplemented by Docket Entry No. 41), together with Defendants motion to compel arbitration. See Docket Entry No. 37. On February 25, 2008, Plaintiffs filed their reply to Defendants’ opposition. See Docket Entry No. 42. Defendants’ sur-reply was filed on March 6, 2008. See Docket Entry No. 48 (supplemented by Docket Entry No. 50). Since then, extensive briefing of the arbitration issue has taken place. On September 15, 2008, the matter was reassigned to the undersigned. On October 6, 2008, this Couit held oral arguments as to the pending motions. II. MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT Default is governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55. See Fed. R.Civ.P. 55. “Pursuant to Rule 55(a), a plaintiff can request the clerk’s entry of default against a party ‘against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought that has failed to plead or otherwise defend [and] that fact is made to appear by affidavit or otherwise.’ ” Doug Brady, Inc. v. N.J. Bldg. Laborers Statewide Funds, 250 F.R.D. 171, 177 (D.N.J.2008), (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 55(a)). “Thereafter, the plaintiff may seek the Court’s entry of default judgment under either Rule 55(b).” Doug Brady, 250 F.R.D. at 177 (citing Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Starlight Ballroom Dance Club, Inc., 175 Fed.Appx. 519, 521, n. 1 (3d Cir.2006)). “The district court has the discretion to enter default judgment, although entry of default judgments is disfavored as decisions on the merits are preferred.” Super 8 Motels, Inc. v. Kumar, No. 06-5231, 2008 WL 878426, at *3, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28066, at *7 (D.N.J. April 1, 2008) (citing Hritz v. Woma Corp., 732 F.2d 1178, 1181 (3d Cir.1984)). In other words, district courts must remain mindful that, like dismissal with prejudice, default is a sanction of last resort, see Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 747 F.2d 863, 867-68 (3d Cir.1984) (“We reiterate what we have said on numerous occasions: that dismissals with prejudice or defaults are drastic sanctions”), and district courts must resolve all doubt in favor of proceeding on the merits. See Zawadski de Bueno v. Bueno Castro, 822 F.2d 416, 420 (3d Cir.1987). Moreover, “before imposing the extreme sanction of default, district courts must make explicit factual findings as to: (1) whether the party subject to default has a meritorious defense, (2) the prejudice suffered by the party seeking default, and (3) the culpability of the party subject to default.” Doug Brady, 250 F.R.D. at ”177 (quoting Emcasco Ins. Co. v. Sambrick, 834 F.2d 71, 74 (3d Cir.1987), stating “[W]e have further required the district court to make explicit findings concerning the factors it must consider in rendering judgment by default or dismissal, or in declining to reopen such judgment”). Hence, a litigant’s failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, e.g., an assertion of a claim over which the court lacks jurisdiction, prevents the presiding court from entering a default judgment, see Comcast Cable Communs. v. Dorris, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23156, at *5-6 (D.N.J. Feb. 8, 2005); Abney v. Alameida, 334 F.Supp.2d 1221 (S.D.Cal.2004); see also Quirindongo Pacheco v. Rolon Morales, 953 F.2d 15 (1st Cir.1992); Au Bon Pain Corp. v. Artect, Inc., 653 F.2d 61, 65 (2d Cir.1981); Danning v. Lavine, 572 F.2d 1386, 1388 (9th Cir.1978); Kelley v. Carr, 567 F.Supp. 831, 840 (W.D.Mich.1983); 10 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2688 at 447-48 (1983), since, under Rule 55(b)(2), the litigant is not entitled to a default judgment unless (s)he establishes that the essential elements of the pleaded claims are present and states factual allegations in support of these elements. See Comdyne I v. Corbin, 908 F.2d 1142, 1149 (3d Cir.1990); Fehlhaber v. Indian Trails, Inc., 425 F.2d 715, 717 (3d Cir.1970); D.B. v. Bloom, 896 F.Supp. 166, 170 n. 3 (D.N.J.1995). Finally, if default is entered against some defendants in a multi-defendant case, the preferred practice is for the court to withhold granting default judgment until the action is resolved on its merits against non-defaulting defendants: if plaintiff loses on merits, the complaint should then be dismissed against both defaulting and non-defaulting defendants. See Jefferson v. Briner, Inc., 461 F.Supp.2d 430 (E.D.Va.2006) (relying on Frow v. De La Vega, 82 U.S. 552, 15 Wall. 552, 21 L.Ed. 60 (1872)); see also Northland Ins. Co. v. Cailu Title Corp., 204 F.R.D. 327 (W.D.Mich.2000); Exquisite Form Industries, Inc. v. Exquisite Fabrics of London, 378 F.Supp. 403 (S.D.N.Y.1974); accord Thabault v. Chait, 541 F.3d 512, 531 (3d Cir.2008). It appears that the matter at hand presents this Court with the entire panoply of obstacles to default judgment, since it is a multi-defendant case where some Defendants defaulted but others did not, the validity of service of process is challenged by all Defendants, the sufficiency of Plaintiffs pleading is challenged by one of them, and the complaint is yet to pass muster for the purposes of this Court’s sua sponte dismissal power. This Court, therefore, while taking due notice of Defendants’ service-related challenges and the prudential considerations pertinent to the entry of default judgment against selected defendants in a multi-defendant suit, finds it prudent and in the interests of judicial economy (as well as in the interests of litigants, granted the current procedural posture of this matter) to limit this Court’s review to the issues of subject matter jurisdiction and sufficiency of Plaintiffs’ pleading: it is indeed axiomatic that, prior to entering default judgment, the Court must ensure that its has proper jurisdiction over the action, just as the Court must determine that Plaintiffs, at the very least, sufficiently stated their claim. See Quirindongo Pacheco, 953 F.2d 15; Au Bon Pain Corp., 653 F.2d 61; Danning, 572 F.2d 1386; Atlantic Recording Corp. v. Brennan, 534 F.Supp.2d 278 (D.Conn.2008); Calderon v. Burton, 457 F.Supp.2d 480 (S.D.N.Y.2006); Comcast Cable Communs., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23156; Abney, 334 F.Supp.2d 1221; Patray v. Northwest Publ., 931 F.Supp. 865 (S.D.Ga.1996); Kelley, 567 F.Supp. 831; see also 10 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2688 at 447-48 (1983). III. CHALLENGES TO SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION The failure of a party to address the issue of subject matter jurisdiction neither waives nor disposes of the issue. See Three Keys Ltd. v. SR Util. Holding Co., 540 F.3d 220, 226 (3d Cir.2008) (citing Bracken v. Matgouranis, 296 F.3d 160, 162 (3d Cir.2002)) (“[The] Court has a continuing obligation to sua sponte raise the issue of subject matter jurisdiction if it is in question”); Morel v. INS, 144 F.3d 248, 251 n. 3 (3d Cir.1998) (quoting Ins. Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702, 102 S.Ct. 2099, 72 L.Ed.2d 492 (1982), as to the observation that “[a] federal court ... will raise lack of subject-matter jurisdiction on its own motion.”) Deficiencies as to the “subject matter jurisdiction may be either ‘facial’ or ‘factual.’ ” Turicentro, S.A. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 303 F.3d 293, 300, n. 4 (2002). Assessing a factual deficiency, the court: (1) “must weigh the evidence relating to jurisdiction, with discretion to allow affidavits, documents, and even limited evidentiary hearings,” id. (citing Garcia v. Copenhaver, Bell & Assocs., 104 F.3d 1256, 1260-61 (11th Cir.1997); Ohio Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 922 F.2d 320, 325 (6th Cir.1990); Oaxaca v. Roscoe, 641 F.2d 386, 391 (5th Cir.1981)); and (2) “can look beyond the pleadings to decide factual matters relating to jurisdiction.” Id. (quoting Cestonaro v. United States, 211 F.3d 749, 752 (3d Cir.2000)). In contrast, “[fjaeial attacks contest the sufficiency of the pleadings, and the trial court must accept the complaint’s allegations as true.” Id. However, last year the Supreme Court elaborated on the requirements a pleading must meet to withstand a facial attack. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). In Twombly, the Court explained that the pleading must provide “enough factual matter” to suggest that the alleged event took place. See id. at 1965. While the Supreme Court left it to the district courts to determine, on a case-by-case basis, how much factual matter is “enough,” the Court unambiguously indicated that represented litigants cannot satisfy the pleading requirements by invoking the overly lenient regime of “pure notice” originated in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957), a case decided half a century ago. In fact, the Twombly Court explicitly disavowed the oft-quoted statement in Conley of “the accepted rule that a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief’ stating that the “no set of facts” language “has earned retirement” and “is best forgotten.” Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1968-69 (quoting Conley, 355 U.S. at 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99). Moreover, the Court, using a variety of phrases, indicated that more than an oblivious notice of a claim is needed to allege a violation. For example, the Court required “enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of [the alleged claim],” “facts that are suggestive enough to render [plaintiffs allegations] plausible,” “allegations plausibly suggesting (not merely consistent with) [plaintiffs allegations],” a “plain statement” with “enough heft” to show entitlement to relief, and “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 1969-74. Finally, the Court refused to entertain a plaintiffs far-fetched flights of fancy by unambiguously stating that the line “between the factually neutral and the factually suggestive ... must be crossed [by allegations made in plaintiffs pleadings] to enter the realm of plausible liability,” id. at 1966 n. 5, and stated that no “reassurances of plaintiffs’ counsel” that discovery would soon flesh out plaintiffs claim, which is currently pled so that it is “just shy of a plausible entitlement,” can prevent facial dismissal. Id. at 1967 and n. 6 (referring to id. at 1975 (Stevens, J., dissenting)). Thus, the plaintiffs complaint will survive facial dismissal only if it contains “enough [factual] heft” establishing the plaintiffs claims rather than plaintiffs conjecture, or self-serving interpretations of actual events, or mere “labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1965-69; accord Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 125 S.Ct. 1627, 161 L.Ed.2d 577 (2005); Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231-33 (3d Cir.2008). IV. PLAINTIFFS’ ALLEGATIONS A. Assertions as to Trade and Commerce Substantively, the Complaint opens with a section titled “Trade and Commerce.” See Compl. ¶¶ 37-44. The section provides no citations to Plaintiffs’ sources and reads as follows: Magnesium is the eighth most abundant element on earth and constitutes about two percent of the earth’s crust. Magnesite is the naturally occurring carbonate form of magnesium.... China is estimated to have 80 percent of global magnesium reserves. Magnesite is mined from magnesium deposits and delivered from the mine to a crushing plant where it is crushed in three stages. Depending on the grade of the crushed material, the crushed magnesite ... produce[s] different forms of magnesite. There are three principal forms of magnesite sold in U.S. commerce. Dead-burned magnesite (“DBM”) is produced by high temperature conversion of magnesite. DBM is used for the lining of metallurgical or refractory furnaces, used for the melting of steel, nonferrous metal and glass and the making of cement. Approximately 70 percent of the world’s production of magnesite [results in] DBM. Caustic-calcined magnesite (“CCM”) is produced by low temperature conversion. Approximately 22 percent of the world’s production of magnesite [results in] CCM. [The] third type of magnesite [is] electro-fused magnesite (“EFM”), [and it] is produced by fusing CCM at high temperatures in an electric arc furnace.... Approximately 8 percent of the world’s production of magnesite [results in] EFM. China accounts for 80 percent of worldwide EFM production. During the period described in this Complaint, [that is, from April 2000 to at least the date of Plaintiffs’ filing of the Complaint, September 7, 2005 (“Relevant Period”),] the international market for magnesite and magnesite products was dominated by [Defendants .... Defendant producers have lower costs than their western competitors and[,] as a result!,] also dominate the group of manufacturers worldwide who can produce magnesite and magnesite products at costs below other producers. Exporters from China also enjoy a competitive advantage relative to manufacturers in other nations because China has employed a fixed currency exchange rate which undervalues the Yuan, making Chinese exports of magnesite and magnesite products to the United States relatively less expensive compared to exports of magnesite and magnesite products from other nations. During the period of this Complaint, the conduct of defendants and their coconspirators has taken place in and affected the interstate and foreign trade and commerce of the United States. Over 650,000 metric tons of magnesite are imported into the United States each year and over sixty percent of that is imported from China. U.S. Import of magnesite and magnesite products from China [during an unspecified period of time] exceed[s or exceeded] $50 million per year. Id. B. Anticompetitive Conduct The next section of the Complaint, titled “Factual Background,” aims to state Plaintiffs’ facts as to Defendants’ alleged cartel-like activities. See ¶¶ 45-55. Plaintiffs’ sources as to these alleged facts are similarly not provided to the Court. According to the Complaint: (a) in April of 2000, “thirteen producers and exporters of magnesite in China [unidentified in the Complaint] established a cartel called the ‘Jiayuan Magnesite Export Group’ for the export of magnesite, and reached agreement of fixing unified export prices to avoid competitive price cutting”; (b) “[d]uring the same [time,] a second cartel [was] formed[,] called ‘Huaxia Magnesia Products Export Group’ ”; and (c) these “two eartel[s] ... represent more than 70 percent of the export volume of magnesite in China.” Id. ¶ 45. According to the Complaint, “[a]s a result of these cartel agreements, despite slumping demand [in markets unidentified in the Complaint, i.e., either world-wide or in any region of the world], the price of magnesite and magnesite products increased [in geographic consumption markets also unidentified in the Complaint] during 2000 by over 45 percent compared to 1999. The president of the Jiayuan Magnesite Export Group reported by mid-2001 that [his/her] cartel’s efforts had been successful and would generate an additional 50 million U.S. dollars [presumably, for his/her cartel].” Id. ¶ 46. The Complaint further asserts that [the two cartels joined into] a single cartel under the name of the “Chinese Magnesite Export Association” [ (“CMA”), which grew to encompass] 23 exporting companies, including [those out of the seventeen named Defendants that were Chinese exporting companies]. Since April 2000, the [CMA] has conducted [an unspecified number of] cartel meetings of [Defendants and other exporters. On March 22, 2003, at least 19 exporting companies, including [unspecified entities among Defendants, met in Shenyang, China [and] agreed to strengthen ... cooperation to reduce competition in exports of magnesite. The [CMA] agreed to establish itself under the name the “China Magnesite Forum” [] and established goals of restraining competition and establishing limits on export supply in order to maintain and increase prices.... After achieving [unspecified] price increases, the cartel has successfully stabilized the prices of magnesite and magnesite products in the United States and avoided major price cutting despite [unspecified] low levels of demand [in unspecified geographic consumption markets]. During the period of the charged combination and conspiracy, [Defendants ... have participated in [unspecified] meetings ... in China and elsewhere in which the prices, volume of sales, and markets for magnesite and magnesite products were ... agreed upon. Together, [Defendants and their coconspirators dominate the production and sale of magnesite in the world and the United States.... Although non-cartel members represent 30 to 40 percent of the U.S. market, the cartel has been successful because [unspecified] other producers have higher costs for magnesite and magnesite products [and] currency costs [and] cannot compete [against Defendants]. Furthermore, these other producers] have shown that they would follow price increases rather than undercut the [CMA’s] price levels.... [T]he collusive arrangements [adopted among Defendants keeps resulting in] prices [that Plaintiffs believe to be] above those of a competitive market.... [P]rices of magnesite in the animal feed industry [have] risen an overall 25 percent. Id. ¶¶ 47-54. C. Additional Elaborations Finally, Plaintiffs assert that: Plaintiffs did not discover and could not discover, through the exercise of reasonable diligence, the existence of the claims sued upon [until an unspecified date/event] because [Defendants ... actively, intentionally, and fraudulently concealed the existence of the combination and conspiracy from Plaintiffs ... through at least the time four years prior to the filing [by] (a) Meetings which were kept secret from U.S. customers in which the prices, sales volumes, and markets for magnesite and magnesite products were discussed and agreed; (b) Intentionally setting prices purportedly on a competitive basis when such prices were the result of collusion; (c) Instructing members of the conspiracy at the above-described meetings not to divulge the existence of the conspiracy to others not in the conspiracy; (d) Treating cartel agreements and meetings as confidential and proprietary information [and] enforcing] adherence to the agreed-upon price and supply agreements. Id. ¶ 59. Plaintiffs’ conclude their Complaint with allegations that “[t]he price of magnesite and magnesite products purchased by [Plaintiffs (and the [putative] classes) has been fixed [and] maintained [at] non-competitive levels,” id. ¶ 60, and seek: (a) injunctive relief preventing Defendants from continuing the alleged combination and conspiracy; (b) monetary relief in the amount of “three-fold their damages;” and (c) legal costs and attorney fees. See id. at 13-14. V. INDUSTRY-RELATED DATA The Court’s careful reading of the twenty-one page Complaint yielded a total of eleven allegations providing the Court with statistical or statistics-related data. Three of these statistical allegations do not bear on the subject of the Complaint since they relate to the global tendencies in magnesite production processes, ie.: (a) “70 percent of the world’s production of magnesite [results in] DBM”; (b) “22 percent of the world’s production of magnesite [results in] CCM”; and (c) “8 percent of the world’s production of magnesite [results in] EFM.” Compl. at 8. The remaining eight allegations relate to China’s position in — and export of — magnesite and to Defendants’ alleged cartel activities: (a) “China is estimated to have 80 percent of global magnesite reserves”; (b) “China accounts for 80 percent of worldwide EFM production”; (c) “Over 650,000 metric tons of magnesite are imported into the United States each year and over sixty percent of that is imported from China”; (d) “U.S. import of ... magnesite products from China exceeds $50 million per year”; (e) “[T]he price of ... magnesite products increased during 2000 by over 45 percent compared to 1999”; (f) “The president of the Jiayuan Magnesite Export Group reported ... that the cartel’s efforts ... would generate an additional 50 million U.S. dollars”; (g) “[N]on-cartel members represent 30 to 40 percent of the U.S. market”; and (h) “[P]riees of magnesite in the animal feed industry [had] risen an overall 25 percent.” See id. at 8-12. All above-quoted statistical data are presented by Plaintiffs without any reference to the sources of Plaintiffs’ information. While the Court, on its own, is aware of certain sources that contain figures (or even allegations) quite similar to those of Plaintiffs, see, e.g., Magnesium, Magnesite and Dolomite, A Strategic Global Business Report (Global Indus. Analysists, Inc. Mar. 2008), license purchase available at < <http://www.reportlinker.eom/p 087368/WorldMagnesium-Magnesite-and Dolomite-M>> (“Strategic Report”), such sources cannot serve as a basis for legal claim. For instance, the Strategic Report, a 425-page compilation, cannot operate as a factual basis for litigation since: (a) just as the Complaint, it fails to state its sources, hence allowing for presumption that the statements made therein are merely the authors’ reading of the mix of industry rumors and verifiable facts; and (b) it contains facially self-contradicting data. The foregoing, however, in no way suggests that a litigant cannot rely, for the facts asserted in the litigant’s pleadings, on a source containing statistical information bearing an imprimatur of reliability; and a litigant mounting a challenge related to international trade in magnesite is not in danger of facing paucity of sources. See, e.g., U.S. Geological Survey, Magnesium Compounds (U.S. Dept, of Interior), at <<http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/ commodity/magnesium/index. html#mcs>> (“Government Surveys”). The Government Surveys provide data relevant to Plaintiffs’ statistical allegations as to China’s magnesite resources and export practices. For instance, contrary to Plaintiffs assertion that “China is estimated to have 80 percent of global magnesite reserves,” the Government Surveys provide statistical data indicating that, out of the total of 3,600,000,000 tons of world magnesite reservés, China holds 860,000,000 tons (i.e., 23.8%), being closely followed by North Korea (750,000,000) and Russia (730,000,000). See < <http://minerals.usgs. gov/minerals/pubs/commodity/magnesium/ mgcommcs04.pdf>>. Furthermore, relevant to Plaintiffs’ other statistical statements, the Government Surveys indicate that: (1) with respect to the United States’ importation of magnesite products (ie., CCM, DBM and EFM, that is, the products subject to the Complaint, collectively, hereinafter, “Processed Magnesite”), China accounted, during the Relevant Period, for: (a) 67% to 76% of total importation (67% in 1999; 68% in 2000; 73% in 2001; 69% in 2002; 76% in 2003 and 2004; and 77% in 2005); (b) import quantity ranging from 493,000 metric tons to 637,000 metric tons (515,000 in 1999; 637,000 in 2000; 493,000 in 2001; 542,000 in 2002; 529,000 in 2003; 575,000 in 2004; and 630,000 in 2005); (c) gross profit per annum ranging from US$42,550,000 to US$90,290,-000 (42.55M in 1999; 43.35M in 2000; 45.63M in 2001; 50.42M in 2002; 59.35M in 2003; 82.3M in 2004; and 90.29M in 2005) and, thus, prices ranging from $68 per metric ton to $143 per metric ton ($82 in 1999; $68 in 2000; $92 in 2001; $93 in 2002; $112 in 2003; and $143 in 2004 and 2005); and (2) Chinese annual “total production” of magnesite ranged, during the Relevant Period, from 2,400,00 metric tons to 4,700,000 metric tons (2,400,000 in 1999; 2,450,000 in 2000; 3,580,000 in 2001; 4,560,000 in 2002; 4,600,000 in 2003; 4,650,000 in 2004; and 4,700,000 in 2005), i.e., the amount of Processed Magnesite exported by China to the United States varied from 11% to 26% of the total Chinese magnesite produced (21% in 1999; 26% in 2000; 13% in 2001; 11% in 2002 and 2003; and 12% in 2004 and 2005). See < <http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/ pubs/commodity/magnesium/401499. pdf> >; < <http://minerals.usgs.gov/ minerals/pubs/commodity/magnesium/ 401400.pdf> >; < <http://minerals.usgs. gov/ minerals/pubs/commodity/magnesium/mgcmyb2001.pdf> >; < <http:// minerals.usgs.gov/ minerals/pubs/commodity/magnesium/mgcomyb02r.pdf> >; <<http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/ pubs/commodity/magnesium/mgcommyb03.pdf> >; < <http://minerals.usgs. gov/minerals/pubs/ commodity/magnesium/mgcommyb04.pdf> >; and <<http:// minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/ commodity/magnesium/mgcommyb05.pdf> > (collectively, “Government Surveys-Citations”).' The Government Surveys also provide information detailing shifts in the United States importation of Processed Magnesite during the Relevant Period, e.g.: (a) “[In 2000,] U.S. production of [DBM] dropped by about 9% from that in 1999, mostly because of the closure of National Refractories and Minerals Corp.’s Moss Landing, CA [ (‘NRMC’) ]. U.S. imports of [DBM] in 2000 increased by 28% from those in 1999.... [T]he reasons for the significant increase in imports was to replace ... the domestically produced material ... lost when [NRMC] closed”; (b) “[In 2001, a] general economic downturn led to decreasing demand for [CCM], and as a result, production and imports declined by 20% ... from the 2000 levels. U.S. imports of [DBM] in 2001 declined significantly, with the imports from China, the main source country, declining by more than 100,000 metric tons”; (c) “[In 2002,] imports of [CCM] and [DBM] rose in 2002. U.S. imports of [DBM] in 2002 were about 9% higher than those in 2001.... Imports of [CCM] were 14% higher than those in 2001”; (d) “[In 2003,] imports of [DBM] fell by about 4% from those in 2002.... Imports of [CCM] ... were slightly higher than those in 2002”; (e) “[In 2004,] imports of [DBM] increased by about 10% from those in 2003.... Imports of [CCM] were about 5% higher than those in 2003”; (f) “[In 2005,] imports of [DBM] increased by about 14% .... Imports of [CCM] were about 3% less than those in 2004.” See id. (emphasis supplied). The Court, therefore, examines the content of Plaintiffs’ Complaint in light of availability of precise statistical and factual data with respect to the United States importation and Chinese exportation of Processed Magnesite. VI. PERTINENT LEGAL REGIME A. The Sherman Act Plaintiffs assert that Defendants violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act. See Compl. ¶ 1. The Sherman Act prohibits “[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations.” 15 U.S.C. § 1. “To establish a violation of Section 1, a plaintiff must prove: (1) concerted action by the defendants; (2) that produced anti-competitive effects within the relevant product and geographic markets; (3) that the concerted action [was] illegal; and (4) that [the plaintiff] was injured as a proximate result of the concerted action.” Gordon v. Lewistown Hosp., 423 F.3d 184, 207 (3d Cir.2005) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1092, 126 S.Ct. 1777, 164 L.Ed.2d 557 (2006). A related statute, the Clayton Act, provides a litigant with the right of private action to vindicate violations of the Sherman Act. Accord Compl. ¶ 3 (asserting that Plaintiffs bring the instant action pursuant to the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 4 and 16). 1. “Per Se” and “Rule of Reason” Analyses To determine whether a particular action unreasonably restrains trade, courts apply either the “per se ” analysis or the “rule of reason.” Under the per se rule, certain types of restraints are presumed to be unreasonable, hence enabling the court to avoid an elaborate economic effect inquiry. See, e.g., Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 723, 108 S.Ct. 1515, 99 L.Ed.2d 808 (1988) (“per se rules are appropriate only for ‘conduct that is manifestly anticompetitive’ ”) (quoting Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 50, 97 S.Ct. 2549, 53 L.Ed.2d 568 (1977)). If a restraint is per se illegal, further examination of the practice’s impact on the market is unnecessary for finding that it produced adverse, anti-competitive effects within relevant product and geographic markets. See Pace Elecs., Inc. v. Canon Computer Sys., Inc., 213 F.3d 118, 123 (3d Cir.2000) (“[the per se ] standard, which is based on considerations of ‘business certainty and litigation efficiency,’ allows a court to presume that ' certain limited classes of conduct have an anticompetitive effect without engaging in the type of involved, market-specific analysis ordinarily necessary to reach such a conclusion”). Per se liability is reserved for only those agreements that are “so plainly anticompetitive that no elaborate study of the industry is needed to establish their illegality.” Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 5, 126 S.Ct. 1276, 164 L.Ed.2d 1 (2006). Examples of agreements which implicate the per se rule include horizontal price-fixing arrangements, market allocation, group boycotts and some “tying” arrangements. See, e.g., Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. at 223, 60 S.Ct. 811 (declaring per se illegal any agreement “formed for the purpose and with the effect of raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the price of a commodity in interstate or foreign commerce”); Todd v. Exxon Corp., 275 F.3d 191, 198 (2d Cir.2001) (holding that “[t]raditional ‘hardcore’ price fixing remains per se unlawful”); United States v. Andreas, 216 F.3d 645, 667 (7th Cir.2000) (finding per se illegal a sales volume allocation agreement, an output restriction, that necessarily furthered a practice of price fixing). In contrast, the rule of reason, which is the “prevailing standard,” ordinarily requires the court to engage in a detailed analysis of the effect that the restraint had or is having on competition in a relevant market. See GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. at 49, 97 S.Ct. 2549 (holding that the rule of reason typically requires a detailed examination “in light of the competitive situation in the product market as a whole”); United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 672 (3d Cir.1993) (holding that the rule of reason “ordinarily requires a detailed inquiry into the market impact of a restraint”). Typical examples of the conduct subject to the rule of reason analysis are agreements to exchange pricing information, certain “tying” arrangements, vertical non-price restraints, customer rebates and discount programs, promotional allowances to dealers and cooperative advertising programs, exclusive distributorships, etc. See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 104 S.Ct. 1551, 80 L.Ed.2d 2 (1984); United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 441 n. 16, 98 S.Ct. 2864, 57 L.Ed.2d 854 (1978); United States v. Citizens & Southern National Bank, 422 U.S. 86, 113, 95 S.Ct. 2099, 45 L.Ed.2d 41 (1975); United States v. Loew’s Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 83 S.Ct. 97, 9 L.Ed.2d 11 (1962); Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6, 78 S.Ct. 514, 2 L.Ed.2d 545 (1958); see also ABA Sec. of Antitrust L., Antitrust Law Developments 50-78 (5th ed. 2002). However, the issue of whether the court should assess the allegedly illegal conduct under the per se rule or the rule of reason does not depend on the litigants’ positions as to which rule should apply, nor does it depend on the labels utilized in the complaint: only the plaintiffs factual assertions allow the court to utilize the curtailed per se analysis. See Expert Mason ry, Inc. v. Boone County, Kentucky, 440 F.3d 336, 344 (6th Cir.2006) (To determine if restraints are per se illegal, courts look to the circumstances, details, and logic of a restraint to see whether the experience of the market has been so clear, or necessarily will be, that a confident conclusion about the principal tendency of a restriction may be reached.); see also GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. at 58-59, 97 S.Ct. 2549 (observing that “departure from the rule-of-reason standard [in antitrust law] must be based upon demonstrable economic effect rather than ... upon formalistic line drawing”); see also Bus. Elec. Corp. v. Sharp Elec. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 724-726, 108 S.Ct. 1515, 99 L.Ed.2d 808 (1988) (reiterating twice the preference for considering substantial economic effect, rather than formalism). 2. Parallel Pricing As a matter of substantive antitrust law, it has long been established that defendants’ mere parallel conduct, even if it is consciously parallel, does not violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act. See, e.g., Theatre Enters., Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 541, 74 S.Ct. 257, 98 L.Ed. 273 (1954). Indeed, such conduct is commonplace and often efficient. Of course, parallel conduct can result from an agreement between competitors, and such an agreement could violate Section 1. But an allegation of agreement under Section 1 must rest on something more than allegations of parallel conduct, lest commonplace and efficient economic behavior provide a sufficient basis for costly litigation over largely groundless claims. Nor can a mere conclusory allegation of an agreement or conspiracy suffice to convert allegations of parallel conduct into an adequate allegation of a violation of Section 1. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 2006 WL 2482696, at *9, 2005 U.S. LEXIS Briefs 1126, at *9-10 (Brief for the United States, as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners). Consequently, the Supreme Court held that mere allegations that defendants engaged in certain parallel conduct unfavorable to competition, absent some factual context suggesting an illegal agreement to that effect, were insufficient to state a claim under Section 1 of the Sherman Act. See Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1964. Consequently, to duly assert a violation, allegations of parallel conduct must be placed in a factual context which raises a plausible suggestion of a preceding agreement rather than identical independent action, since a defendant’s business activity could be an entirely natural, unilateral reaction of the defendant to the business activities by defendant’s competitors. See Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1964 (“Because § 1 of the Sherman Act does not prohibit all unreasonable restraints of trade ... but only restraints effected by a contract, combination, or conspiracy, the crucial question is whether the challenged anticompetitive conduct stems from independent decision or from an agreement, tacit or express”). B. The Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act 1. Legislative History Known as “inelegantly phrased,” Carpet Group, 227 F.3d at 69, the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act (“FTAIA”) is an adjunct of antitrust jurisprudence: the statute rarely appears on the pages of case law and, even when it does so, it is often misconstrued. See Turicentro, S.A. v. Am,. Airlines, Inc., 303 F.3d 293, 299 (2002) (“Although [the FTAIA was] passed two decades ago, few federal courts have had occasion to apply [it]”); see also Makan Delrahim, Drawing the Boundaries of the Sherman Act: Recent Developments in the Application of the Antitrust Law to Foreign Conduct, 61 N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. Am. L. 415 (2005) (surveying the complexities of the statute revealed by FTAIA litigations). The Supreme Court first addressed the applicability of the Sherman Act to conduct abroad in American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 29 S.Ct. 511, 53 L.Ed. 826, in 1909, a time when the United States was less economically interconnected with much of the world than today. The American Banana Court relied on a tort principle (namely, the conflict-of-laws rule that the legality of an act “must be determined wholly by the law of the country where the act is done”) to conclude that wholly foreign conduct in a foreign country did not state a Sherman Act claim. See id. at 356, 29 S.Ct. 511. Sherman Act jurisprudence matured, however, and the certainty expressed in American Banana began to dissolve when cases came to the Court involving conduct not wholly foreign and with more obvious effects on United States commerce. See e.g., United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268, 47 S.Ct. 592, 71 L.Ed. 1042 (1927) (involving a conspiracy to monopolize Mexican sisal exports and American sisal sales). By 1945, the modern view crystallized in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America (“Alcoa”), 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir.1945), a case that seems contemporary because it involved a foreign company as a participant in a foreign cartel that affected United States prices. The Second Circuit, sitting as court of last resort and speaking through Judge Learned Hand, held that the Sherman Act reached conduct abroad that was intended to affect' — and did in fact have a significant effect on — United States commerce. See id,, at 444. Hence, the situs of the effects, as opposed to the conduct, therefore determined whether the court presented with a foreign conduct-based antitrust challenge had the necessary jurisdiction to entertain the challenge under the Sherman Act. Legislating on this background, Congress in 1982 enacted [the FTAIA] to clarify the application of United States antitrust laws to foreign conduct [in order to] promote [inter alia,] the “certainty in assessing the applicability of American antitrust law to international business transactions and proposed transactions.” Turicentro, 303 F.3d at 298-99 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 97-686 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2487, 2494); see also United Phosphorus, Ltd. v. Angus Chem. Co., 322 F.3d 942, 952 (7th Cir.2003) (“If FTAIA sets out an issue on the merits, resolution of the issue could be delayed until late in the case, [hence, creating] an effect on foreign markets ... while the case remained pending.... Treating the matter as one of subject matter jurisdiction reduces the potential for offending the economic policies of other nations. [The] FTAIA limits the power of the United States courts (and private plaintiffs) from nosing about where they do not belong. And the power of the courts is precisely what subject matter jurisdiction is about.”). 2. Methodology of the FTAIA Analysis The FTAIA sets forth a general rule that excludes from the scope of the Sherman Act all conduct involving “non-import” foreign commerce unless two conditions are met: (1) the alleged conduct has a “direct, substantial and reasonably foreseeable effect” on United States domestic commerce; and (2) the domestic anti-competitive effect “gives rise to” a claim under the Sherman Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 6a. Thus, the FTAIA poses the following three-prong inquiry. First, the FTAIA asks whether all defendants were “involve[d in] import trade or import commerce.” See Carpet Group, 227 F.3d at 69, 72. If all that defendants were doing was actually bringing goods or services into the United States, then the FTAIA (and the FTAIA’s requirement for “direct, substantial and reasonably foreseeable effect”) is not even triggered, ie., the claim squarely falls within the scope of the Sherman Act. See Turicentro, 303 F.3d at 302 (“[While the FTAIA] does not define the term ‘import,’ ... the term generally denotes a product (or perhaps a service) has been brought into the United States from abroad”) (citing Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary (1986); Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990)). However, if “[defendants did not directly bring items or services into the United States ..., they cannot be labeled ‘importers,’ [nor it could be said that defendants] have they engaged in ‘import trade or commerce.’ ” See id. (emphasis supplied). In other words, even if a certain importer purchased or otherwise obtained the defendants’ product in a foreign market (be it the defendants’ national market or any other market) and brought the defendants’ product into the United States, the fact that the product eventually found its way into the United States does not transform the defendant into an “importer” and, hence, an antitrust claim against the defendants must pass muster under the FTAIA before the Sherman Act claim can be entertained. See id. at 304 (The fact “[t]hat ‘some of the goods purchased in [a foreign market] may ultimately have been imported by individuals into the United States’ [is] immaterial to determining if defendants [are] involved in ‘import trade or import commerce’ [since the defendants’ own] actions did not directly increase or reduce imports into the United States”) (quoting Kruman v. Christie’s Int’l PLC, 284 F.3d 384, 395 (2d Cir.2002), emphasis supplied). Once it is determined that the defendants are not actual importers or that they were importing goods all over the world, the FTAIA is triggered. However, the FTAIA bar does not exclude every possible conduct by the defendants which are not directly importing into the United States from the reach of the Sherman Act. Rather, the second prong of the inquiry must be conducted, namely, whether the defendants’ alleged conduct “involv[e]d trade or commerce with foreign nation.” See 15 U.S.C. § 6a. Generally, “where [the defendants’] conduct ... is directed at the competitiveness of a foreign market, such conduct involves ‘foreign trade or commerce.’ ” See See Turiceutro, 303 F.3d at 302 (quoting Krunt.au, 284 F.3d at 395) (“When there is conduct directed at .reducing the competitiveness of a foreign market ... such conduct involves foreign trade or commerce, regardless of whether some of the conduct occurred in the United States”). Hence, if the foreign defendants are not involved in importation into any foreign market, ie., if they operate only within their own domestic market, the FTAIA bars antitrust suits against such defendants by removing subject matter jurisdiction of á United States court to entertain Sherman Act claims against such defendants, even if certain ripple effects of the defendants’ conduct reach the United States’ market. However, if the answer to the second prong is in affirmative, ie., if the foreign defendants are involved in importation into foreign markets (which may or may not include the United States), then the third prong of the inquiry comes into play. See 15 U.S.C. § 6a(2). Specifically, the court shall determine whether the foreign defendants’ export activities (ie., the defendants’ bringing of their goods or services into markets other than their own) caused “direct, substantial and reasonably foreseeable effect” on the United States’ market, i.e., either on our nations’ interstate commerce or on the importation into the United States. See id. Once this third prong is satisfied, the court establishes its subject matter jurisdiction to examine the sufficiency of plaintiffs claim pursuant to the Sherman Act. See id. at 301. 3. Direct, Substantial, and Reasonably Foreseeable Effect The courts agree that participation by American firms in the alleged conspiracy does not, by itself, establish an anticompetitive effect in the United States. See Kruman, 284 F.3d at 395. Similarly, mere intent of defendants to reduce competition in the United States is insufficient to meet the “direct effect” standard. See Dee-K Enters., Inc. v. Heveafil Sdn. Bhd., 299 F.3d 281, 292 (4th Cir.2002), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 969, 123 S.Ct. 2638, 156 L.Ed.2d 675 (2003). To establish “direct effect,” the plaintiff must show a cáusal link between the wrongful conduct and the anticompetitive effect suffered in the United States. See United States v. LSL Biotechnologies, 379 F.3d 672, 680 (9th Cir.2004) (“[A]n effect is ‘direct’ if it follows as an immediate consequence of defendant’s activity”); Info. Res. Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet Corp., 127 F.Supp.2d 411, 417 (S.D.N.Y.2000); Eurim-Pharm GmbH v. Pfizer Inc., 593 F.Supp. 1102, 1106-07 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (finding no jurisdiction under the FTAIA when “the link between the defendants’ conduct abroad and the price ... in the United States is far from apparent”); see also In re Monosodium Glutamate Antitrust Litig., 2005 WL 2810682 (D.Minn. Oct. 26, 2005) (to avoid the FTAIA bar, the plaintiff must show “proximate” causation, not just “but for” causation, between the alleged domestic effects of defendants conduct and the defendants’ alleged worldwide activities); Latino Quimica-Amtex S.A. v. Akzo Nobel Chemicals B.V., 2005 WL 2207017 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 8, 2005) (same); eMag Solutions LLC v. Toda Kogyo Corp., 2005 WL 1712084 (N.D.Cal. July 20, 2005) (same); accord Sniado v. Bank Austria AG, 378 F.3d 210 (2d Cir.2004) (declining subject matter jurisdiction where plaintiff asserted a worldwide exchange rate fixing-scheme but did not characterize the scheme as even a but — for cause of his injury). Thus, mere spillover effects within the United States caused by a conspiracy targeting foreign markets are not sufficiently “direct” to satisfy the FTAIA, see Eurim-Pharm GmbH, 593 F.Supp. at 1106, just as mere ripple effects felt in the United States as a result of anticompetitive conduct abroad are not sufficiently “substantial” to meet FTAIA requirements. See Turicentro, 303 F.3d at 304 (“[pllaintiffs’ allegations that] defendants’ conduct ... substantially reduced [plaintiffs’] business values, forcing at least one member of the putative class out of business [do not state] any ‘effect’ on United States commerce”); Dee-K Enters. Inc., 299 F.3d at 292. 4. Additional Considerations a. Comity In Hartford Fire, nineteen of the U.S. States and numerous U.S. private plaintiffs filed complaints alleging that the defendants, which consisted of four domestic primary insurers, domestic reinsurers, brokers and trade associations, as well as reinsurers based in London, United Kingdom, violated the Sherman Act by engaging in various conspiracies that forced certain other primary insurers to change the terms of their standard domestic insurance policies. After the actions were consolidated for litigation, the District Court for the Northern District of California granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss, primarily on the grounds of antitrust immunity, pursuant to the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015. See In re Insurance Antitrust Litigation, 723 F.Supp. 464 (N.D.Cal.1989). The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s conclusion with respect to the McCarran-Ferguson Act and, in addition, the court rejected the district court’s conclusion that the principle of international comity barred the court from exercising Sherman Act jurisdiction over the claims brought solely against the London reinsurers. See In re Insurance Antitrust Litig., 938 F.2d 919 (9th Cir.1991). Upon grant of certiorari, the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Cal., 509 U.S. 764, 113 S.Ct. 2891, 125 L.Ed.2d 612 (1993). Justice Souter, delivering the opinion of the Court, observed: The only substantial question in this litigation is whether “there is in fact a true conflict between domestic and foreign law.” Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States Dist. Court for Southern Dist. of Iowa, 482 U.S. 522, 555, 107 S.Ct. 2542, 96 L.Ed.2d 461 (1987). The London reinsurers contend that applying the [Sherman] Act to them conduct would conflict significantly with British law [governing their conduct], and the British Government, appearing before [the Supreme Court] as amicus curiae, concurs.... But this is not to state a conflict. “The fact that conduct is lawful in the state in which it took place will not, of itself, bar application of the United States antitrust laws,” even where the foreign state has a strong policy to permit or encourage such conduct.... No conflict exists, for these purposes, “where a person subject to regulation by two states can comply with the laws of both.” Restatement (Third) Foreign Relations Law § 408, Comment e. 25. Since the London reinsurers do not argue that British law requires them to act in some fashion prohibited by the law of the United States, ... or claim that their compliance with the laws of both countries is otheiwise impossible, we see no conflict with British law. See Restatement (Third) Foreign Relations Law § 403, Comment e, § 415, Comment j. We have no need in this litigation to address other considerations that might inform a decision to refrain from the exercise of jurisdiction on grounds of international comity. Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 798-99, 113 S.Ct. 2891 (citations to parties’ and amici briefs omitted). Consequently, the Hartford Fire Court concluded that comity did not prevent the district court from entertaining the plaintiffs claim under the specific set of facts presented by the case, but stressed that all inquiries implicating a sovereign’s actions, including inquiries examining the effect a sovereign’s actions might have on global operations of the entities under the sovereign’s domain, are necessarily fact specific. See id. at 797, 113 S.Ct. 2891 (discussing the totality of factors). b. “Mixed FTAIA” Scenario The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Dee-K Enters., 299 F.3d 281, built on the Supreme Court’s teaching in Hartford Fire. In Dee-K Enterprises, two United States companies that purchased rubber thread filed a putative antitrust class action alleging a price-fixing conspiracy led by Southeast Asian producers of the thread. The plaintiffs named, as defendants, nine Southeast Asian producers of rubber thread and some of their subsidiaries and distributors in the United States, and alleged that the plaintiffs: (a) paid “artificially high and non-competitive prices”; (b) “were deprived of free and open competition in the market”; and (c) “the competition among defendants ... was restrained” in the United States and throughout world. See id. at 284. [The plaintiff] introduced substantial evidence at trial of horizontal price fixing among the producers. This price fixing apparently originated at least in part in reaction to 1991 threats by the United States government to punish Southeast Asian rubber-thread producers for violating antitrust prohibitions.... In December 1991, responding to the dumping-accusations, officials of the Malaysian producers ... met with a Malaysian government official and agreed to fix [Malasian] rubber-thread prices throughout the world. Later joined by other rubber-thread producers from Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand, they continued to meet for several years, at conventions and in other settings, to discuss and implement these and other efforts to fix prices. They met regularly between 1992 and 1995 — in Kuala Lumpur, in Columbo, in Bali, and in Penang [but] never met in the United States.... From 1991 to 1996, United States prices for rubber thread ... generally rose, [and the plaintiff] attributes these increases to the price-fixing conspiracy. ... At the conclusion of [the] trial, the district court submitted a special verdict form to the jury [asking, inter alia, whether] “the conspiracy ha[d] a substantial effect in the United States” [and] the jury answered [this] question in the negative [causing the plaintiffs appeal]. Id. at 284-85. The Fourth Circuit did not disturb the jurors’ finding. The court conducted a two-prong inquiry, first agreeing with the district court’s conclusion that the plaintiffs’ allegations clearly implicated the FTAIA because the alleged price-fixing conspiracy constituted a “foreign conduct” in light of the plaintiffs’ assertion of “a largely foreign conspiracy with some domestic elements, aimed at a global market including, but certainly not limited to, a United States import market.” Id. at 286-93 (providing an extensive discussion of the FTAIA and refusing to read the language in Carpet Group, 227 F.3d at 75, and United States v. Nippon Paper Indus., 109 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir.1997), as contradicting the FTAIA’s legislative history, the position of the Department of Justice, the Supreme Court’s holding in Hartford Fire and the positions of all other circuit and district courts). The court stressed that, in determining whether the FTAIA applies, a court should consider whether the [defendants’] acts, targets, and effects ... are primarily foreign or pñmañly domestic. This inquiry will best accommodate the cases with mixed fact patterns, defying ready categorization as “foreign” or “domestic” conduct, which our increasingly global economy will undoubtedly produce. We cannot begin to foresee the scope or complexity of future transactions. To adopt simplistic rules ... might well yield unintended and unfortunate results.... We note that this approach echoes that of the Third Circuit in Carpet Group and finds support in several of the treatises. Id. at 294 (citing Carpet Group, 227 F.3d at 75; Wilbur L. Fugate, Foreign Commerce and the Antitrust Laws § 2.12 at 80-82 (5th ed. 1996); Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 415(2), and Montreal Trading Ltd. v. Amax, Inc., 661 F.2d 864, 869 (10th Cir.1981)) (emphasis supplied). Then, the court concluded that, even in a scenario where the plaintiffs actually proved horizontal price fixing, the allegations that “the agreements ... were all formed entirely outside the United States — in several other countries, [the] target of the conspiracy was a global market, [and the] links to the United States are mere drops in the sea of conduct that occurred ... around the world” fail to establish that the defendants’ activities caused the “direct, substantial and reasonably foreseeable effect” on the United States trade necessary to remove the FTAIA bar. Id. at 295-96; accord, Eurim-Pharm GmbH, 593 F.Supp. at 1106; accord Turicentro, 303 F.3d at 304. Thus, Dee-K Enterprises stands for the proposition that the FTAIA bars claims failing to establish not only a clear link between the defendants’ illegal conduct and the United States trade and commerce, but also that the United States trade was, at the very-least, “a” focus point of the defendants’ illegal conduct. Cf. Int'l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. OPEC, 649 F.2d 1354, 1359 (9th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163, 102 S.Ct. 1036, 71 L.Ed.2d 319 (1982) (finding no jurisdiction over claims against a worl