Full opinion text
OPINION AND ORDER BARZILAY , District Judge. I. Background...............................................................406 A. Procedural History.....................................................406 B. The Patents in Suit.....................................................407 1. The '877 Patent....................................................407 2. The '002 Patent....................................................408 C. Trading and Financial Markets..........................................409 II. Legal Standards...........................................................413 A. Summary Judgment....................................................413 B. Invalidity.............................................................414 III. Discussion.................................................................415 A. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Pertinent Art Resolved.......................416 B. Scope and Content of Prior Art..........................................416 1. Prior Art Patents...................................................417 2. Other Technologies.................................................418 3. The CME and CBOE Systems.......................................420 C. Differences Between the Claims and the Prior Art .........................422 1. The '877 Patent....................................................422 a. Independent Claim 1............................................422 i. The Transmitting Steps.................'....................422 ii. The Calculating Step........................................424 iii. The Displaying Step........................................425 iv. The Selecting Step .........................................427 b. Dependent Claims 2-19..........................................429 i. Dependent Claims 2,16, and 17 ..............................430 ii. All Other Dependent Claims.................................432 2. The'002 Patent....................................................436 a. Independent Claim 1............................................436 i. The Sequence Code Limitation...............................437 ii. The Volley Code Limitation..................................438 iii. The Many-to-one Relationship Limitation......................439 iv. The Data Structure Limitation...............................439 b. Independent Claim 8............................................441 e. Dependent Claims 2 and 9.......................................442 d. Dependent Claims 3-5 and Claims 10-12...........................442 e. Dependent Claims 6 and 13......................................443 f. Dependent Claim 7 .............................................444 D. Secondary Considerations...............................................444 IV. Conclusion................................................................446 Before the court are four motions — one by Plaintiff Papyrus Technology Corp. (“Papyrus”) and three by Defendant New York Stock Exchange, Inc. (“NYSE”)— concerning U.S. Patent No. 5,774,877 (issued June 30, 1998) (“the '877 Patent”) and U.S. Patent No. 5,797,002 (issued Aug. 18, 1998) (“the '002 Patent”). Papyrus moves for summary judgment of infringement by NYSE of the '002 Patent. In turn, NYSE moves for summary judgment of non-infringement of the '877 and '002 Patents. Also before the court are NYSE’s motions for summary judgment that all asserted claims of the '877 Patent and the '002 Patent are obvious and therefore invalid. To hold a patent claim invalid, the evidence must be clear and convincing. After analysis of the voluminous record in this case, the court believes that there is clear, convincing, and uncontroverted evidence that every claim in the patents at issue was either explicitly identified in the appropriate prior art or would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill. The asserted claims are therefore invalid. The court’s reasoning follows. I. Background A. Procedural History Papyrus first filed suit against NYSE in January 2004, alleging infringement of four patents — the '877 Patent, the '002 Patent, U.S. Patent No. 5,915,245 (issued June 22, 1999) (“the '245 Patent”), and U.S. Patent No. 6,539,362 B2 (issued Mar. 25, 2003) (“the '362 Patent”). In March 2004, NYSE denied Papyrus’s allegations and counterclaimed for a judgment of invalidity, non-infringement, and unenforceability of the '877, '002, '245, and '362 Patents, as well as for a declaration that there had been no breach of contract. Papyrus filed a supplemental complaint in September 2004 alleging infringement of U.S. Patent No. 6,768,981 (issued July 27, 2004) (“the '981 Patent”). Following the conclusion of fact discovery in January 2005 and expert discovery in March 2005, the parties stipulated to the dismissal with prejudice of all claims relating to the '245 and '362 patents. See Stipulation and Order of Dismissal, Papyrus Tech. Corp. v. N.Y. Stock Exch. Inc., No. 04 CV 00625 (S.D.N.Y. May 11, 2005) (No. 68). In response to NYSE’s January 2005 request for a Markman hearing, the court ordered the parties to brief the claim-construction issues, which they completed in May 2005. Following the Markman hearing, the court issued a memorandum and order in September 2008, in which it construed fifteen disputed terms and phrases from the claims of the '877, '002, and '981 Patents. See Papyrus Tech. Corp. v. New York Stock Exch., Inc., 581 F.Supp.2d 502 (S.D.N.Y.2008) (‘Papyrus III”). Four months later, as a result of the claim-construction rulings, Papyrus stipulated to a judgment of non-infringement with regard to the '981 Patent. See Stipulation and Order, Papyrus Tech. Corp. v. N.Y. Stock Exch. Inc., No. 04 CV 00625 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 3, 2008) (No. 127). On January 15, 2009, Papyrus moved for summary judgment of infringement of the'002 Patent. NYSE concurrently moved for summary judgment, asserting that claims 1-11 and claims 14-19 of the '877 Patent are invalid. In addition to its other supporting documentation, Papyrus filed the Declaration of Lee A. Hollaar (the “Hollaar Declaration”) as a supplemental report pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(e). Although NYSE contested the admissibility of the report, the court ultimately admitted the Declaration into the record on March 17, 2009. See Papyrus Technology Corp. v. New York Stock Exchange, LLC, 257 F.R.D. 39 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“Papyrus IV”). After resolving the admissibility issue, the court issued a revised scheduling order on April 6, 2009 for summary judgment briefing. The court now turns to the substantive issues in the parties’ respective summary judgment motions. B. The Patents in Suit 1. The'877 Patent The '877 Patent was filed on September 20, 1994, and issued on June 23, 1998. Generally, the '877 Patent teaches “[a] method of managing the activities of one or more floor brokers situated on the floor of an exchange” which uses “a programmed computer to compare a relative number of instructions having a pending status that have been delegated to the floor brokers and find the floor broker having comparatively few pending instructions.” ' 877 Patent, Abstract. More specifically, Claim 1 recites that the patent is: 1. A method for managing one or more floor brokers situated on the floor of an exchange, comprising the steps of: providing each floor broker with a two-way communications device; transmitting an instruction from a programmed computer operated by an operator to the two-way communications device provided to a floor broker, the instruction being selected from the group consisting of quotations requests, quotations, orders, partial executions, and executions; transmitting from each two-way com- munication device to the programmed computer current-status information concerning any transmitting instructions; calculating at the programmed computer a remaining quantity of unfilled orders to fill using current-status information transmitted to the programmed computer; automatically and simultaneously dis- playing at the programmed computer in real time the current status information of at least a portion of the delegated instructions received from each two-way communication device; and selecting a floor broker to whom a further instruction is to be transmitted. '877 Patent col. 3211. 25-47. 2. The '002 Patent The '002 Patent, which was filed on June 7, 1995 and issued on August 18, 1998, enables an operator to delegate instructions to floor brokers based on current-status information automatically displayed at the operator’s computer, and discloses a data structure for use in a two-way wireless system for processing trades. See '877 Patent, Abstract; '002 Patent, Abstract. Independent Claim 1 of the '002 Patent recites: 1. In a system for processing one or more executions against an order, a local computer-readable memory for storing data for access by an application program being executed on a two-way wireless system, comprising: a data structure stored in said local computer-readable memory, said data structure including information used by said application program and including: a plurality of data packets stored in said local computer-readable memory, each of said data packets containing said information and further containing a sequence code and a volley code, said sequence code associating a subset of said plurality of data packets together and said volley code defining a hierarchical relationship among said subset of data packets; an order data packet being one of said subset of data packets and having one hierarchical level; at least one execution data packet being another of said subset of data packets and having another hierarchical level, said at least one execution data packet having a many-to-one relationship with said order data packet, each of said at least one execution data packet being defined by a uniquely assigned execution sequence number, said execution sequence number being assigned by said application program. '002 Patent col. 33 11. 26-48. Furthermore, Claim 8 of the '002 Patent explains that the invention is: 8. A two-way wireless system for processing one or more executions against an order, comprising: a first computer running a first application program that generates sequence codes and volley codes, said volley codes being related to the stage of processing of the order, said first computer having a computer-readable memory for storing data; a second computer running a second application program that generates volley codes, said second computer having a computer-readable memory for storing data; a data structure stored in each of said computer-readable memories, said data structure including information which is accessible by each of said first and second application programs and including: a plurality of data packets stored in said computer-readable memories, each of said data packets containing information and further containing a sequence code and a volley code, said sequence code associating a subset of said plurality of data packets together and said volley code defining a hierarchical relationship among said subset of data packets; an order data packet being one of said subset of data packets and having one hierarchical level; at least one execution data packet being another of said subset of data packets and having another hierarchical level, said at least one execution data packet having a many-to-one relationship with said order data packet; and a wireless communications link between said first and second computers which is selectively established to enable transmission of said data packets therebetween. '002 Patent col. 3411. 9-39. C. Trading and Financial Markets Among the various types of financial markets in existence is the auction market, which is the focus of the '877 and '002 Patents. In a typical transaction, an investor places an order or quote request— an inquiry regarding the price and trading volume information for a particular instrument — with an off-the-floor trading desk. '877 Patent col. 11. 66 to col. 2 1. 4; col. 2 11. 17-19, 26-45. In turn, the trading desk conveys the order, either electronically or by telephone, to a booth clerk. Id. col. 2 11. 1-2. Having noted the parameters of the order, the booth clerk decides whether to delegate the order to a floor broker or whether to send it electronically to a specialist at a trading post. Id. col. 11. 30 to col. 2 1. 16. Once the floor broker or specialist has handled the delegated instruction, the booth clerk reports the execution or quote to the investor. Id. col. 1 11. 58-59. Traditionally, when a booth clerk decided to use a floor broker, the booth clerk transcribed instructions onto an order slip or quote request form and used a page or runner to carry instructions from the perimeter of the trading floor to the floor broker. Id. col. 2 11. 61-67. After a floor broker executed an order or quote request, the broker would note the information onto paper slips and give them to the page for conveyance to the booth clerk. Id. col. 2 1.66 to col. 3 1. 5. Use of paper records for orders and executions could be problematic, however, as the paper slips could be misplaced, or dropped and lost among the discarded slips on the trading floor. Id. col. 3 11. 20-27. In an effort to make the auction market more efficient and effective, financial exchanges began automating various aspects of the marketplace. Id. col. 3. 11. 40-54. Exchanges also incorporated technological innovations, where appropriate. For example, booth clerks used beeper technology to alert the floor broker that an order had been received, whereupon the floor broker would leave the trading floor and use a “yellow phone” to contact the booth clerk and receive instructions. The floor broker would then transcribe the instructions relayed by the booth clerk and return to the trading floor. Id. col. 4 11. 1-13. Later, cellular phone headsets were introduced to exchanges, allowing voice communications between the booth clerks and floor brokers. Id. col. 4 11. 26-27. Member firms and exchanges also began using electronic systems which would allow for the electronic routing of orders to a trading post for matching and reporting. Id. col. 1 II. 60-61. In 1989, as the result of an investigation into illegal trading practices at the Chicago Board of Trade (the “CBOT”) and at the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (the “CME”), the Federal Bureau of Investigation found instances of “dual trading and front-running whereby traders fill[ed] personal orders either simultaneously or ahead of their customers.” Ellis Booker, Handheld Auditing Eludes Chicago Commodity Traders, Computerworld, Sept. 12, 1994, at 1; Franks Deck Ex. 153 at 1. As a result of the investigation, Congress passed the Futures Trading Practices Act of 1992 (“FTPA” or the “Act”), which mandated enhancements to audit trail systems, and required that exchanges “provide a complete record of each trade that can be used for monitoring trading activity and enforcing customer protection and market integrity requirements.” Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Report to Congress on Futures Exchange, Nov. 1994, at 3 {“CFTC Report”); Yeh Deck Ex. 85 at 2-3. The FTPA also required that the exchanges make a good faith effort to satisfy the enhanced audit trail requirements by October 28, 1995. CFTC Report at 19, 23. Although the Act “[did] not specify electronic means as the required method of compliance with the standards of independence, unalterability and sequencing,” financial exchanges began utilizing two approaches — the “development of entirely new electronic audit trail systems, including handheld automated terminals and automated order routing systems,” and the electronic and non-electronic improvement of existing audit trail systems. Id. at 23-24. Even before the FTPA and the enhanced reporting requirements, financial exchanges engaged in the development of electronic, computer-based systems for use in trading. For example, the Chicago Board Options Exchange (“CBOE”) began using a program called Order Routing System (“ORS”) during the early 1980s. January Gaspar Decl. Ex. 18 (“Pfaffenbach Dep”) at 39-40. ORS ran on the CBOE’s mainframe computer, which consisted of a database that stored order and execution information. Def. '877 Statement of Material Facts ¶¶ 164-165 (“Def. '877 Facts”). By 1993, the CBOE’s system included three components: Compass, a communications system going out to the member firms, ORS, in which firms could input orders electronically and route them to the exchange, and the Booth Entered Routing System (“BERS”), which consisted of a terminal attached to ORS that provided a template for transcribing orders coming in via phone. Pfaffenbach Dep. at 38-40; January Gaspar Decl. Ex. 21 at CB 1101— 03. Once entered, ORS sent the order to a printer located on CBOE’s trading floor, generating a “print ticket,” which would be delivered to the floor broker. January Gaspar Decl. Ex. 21 at CB 1101; January Gaspar Decl. Ex. 19 at CB 0388; Franks Decl. Ex. 114 at 30. On May 25, 1994, CBOE’s Public Automated Routing System (“PAR”), also known as the Universal Agency Workstation (“UAW”), debuted in live trading on the floor of the CBOE. Def. '877 Facts ¶¶ 175, 191. PAR allowed for the electronic delivery of order information to floor brokers in the pit and for the electronic delivery of fill information from the pit back to ORS and to the order originator. Def. '877 Facts ¶ 176. In response to its 1988 objectives of (1) timely and accurate order flow and execution and (2) elimination of paper routing, the CME also developed its own electronic systems. Def. '877 Facts ¶¶ 154-156. As early as 1990, CME introduced its Trade Order Processing System (“TOPS”) for order entry and reporting and used it in live trading on the exchange floor. January Gaspar Decl. Ex. 5 (“Linker Dep.”) at 13; Franks Declaration Ex. Ill at CME 004039-40. In April 1992, the CME implemented the CME Universal Broker System (“CUBS”), which was a system for the electronic delivery of orders to a trader in the trading pit. CFTC Report at 48; Franks Decl. Ex. Ill at CME 004042. CUBS was comprised of three main elements, a CUBS booth station, a CUBS broker station, and a CME server. CFTC Report at 48. The CME implemented CUBS as a pilot program in April 1992 through the mid-1990s, id. at 49, eventually connecting the CUBS and TOPS systems via a hard-wired local area network. Linker Dep. at 18. Concurrent to these efforts, in August 1989 the CME also created a joint venture with CBOT to develop a wireless, handheld system called the Automated Data Input Terminal (“AUDIT”) that would record the time and details of each trade by a floor trader as it occurred. CFTC Report at 24; CME, The Chicago Mercantile Exchange’s Automated Systems, Dec. 1989, at 10; Franks Decl. Ex. Ill at CME 004044. During its development throughout the 1990s, AUDIT was never connected with any order entry or delivery system at CBOT or CME, and no orders were routed to AUDIT either by CBOT or CME. Franks Decl. Ex. 87 (“Huff Dep.”) at 122; May Gaspar Decl. Ex. 12 (“Taylor Dep.”) at 179; Franks Decl. Ex. 88 (“Schultz Dep.”) at 146; Franks Decl. Ex. 94 at NYSE 0068697. However, AUDIT handheld terminals were capable of transmitting trades from “locals” — traders making trades from their own accounts or accounts for which they have discretion, rather than executing customer orders— and sending them wirelessly to a base station. Franks Decl. Ex. 131 at CME 003564; CFTC Report App. D at 20-21; Taylor Dep. at 37, 94-95. In April 1994, the AUDIT committee informed the CFTC that the “October 1995 statutory deadline for implementation of AUDIT was optimistic and probably would not be met.” CFTC Report App. D at 13. Ultimately, the CBOT and the CME were unable to add order-handling features to the AUDIT handheld because the technology in existence at the time was not capable of sending and receiving information quickly enough to meet the real time demands of the exchanges. Linker Dep. at 222-223. II. Legal Standards A. Summary Judgment Summary judgment is appropriate when “the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). A fact is “material” if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law____” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). In that vein, “the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (emphases omitted). The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of making a prima facie showing that no genuine issues as to the material facts exist for trial. See id., at 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). However, the nonmovant may only defeat summary judgment by establishing, with the use of specific facts, that there is a genuine issue for trial. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Wright v. Coughlin, 132 F.3d 133, 137-38 (2d Cir. 1998). To do so, the party opposing summary judgment must present more than a “scintilla of evidence,” Delaware & Hudson Ry. Co. v. Consol. Rail Corp., 902 F.2d 174, 178 (2d Cir.1990) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505), and cannot rely on the allegations in the pleadings, conclusory statements, or on “mere assertions that affidavits supporting the motion are not credible.” Gottlieb v. County of Orange, 84 F.3d 511, 518 (2d Cir.1996) (citations omitted). In making its determination whether to grant summary judgment, “the court is to resolve all ambiguities and draw all permissible factual inferences in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought.” Patterson v. County of Oneida, N.Y., 375 F.3d 206, 219 (2d Cir.2004). B. Invalidity For an invention to be patentable, it must meet three requirements: utility, novelty, and nonobviousness. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103; see Aristocrat Techs. Australia PTY Ltd. v. Intern. Game Tech., 543 F.3d 657, 661 (Fed. Cir.2008). Once a patent issues, it is thereafter presumed valid. 35 U.S.C. § 282. To overcome this presumption of validity, “the party challenging a patent must prove facts supporting a determination of invalidity by clear and convincing evidence.” Schumer v. Lab. Computer Sys., Inc., 308 F.3d 1304, 1315 (Fed.Cir.2002) (citation omitted). For evidence to be clear and convincing, it must give the finder of fact “an abiding conviction that the truth of [the proponent’s] factual contentions [is] ‘highly probable.’ ” In re Omeprazole Patent Lit., 490 F.Supp.2d 381, 500 (S.D.N.Y.2007) (quoting Colorado v. New Mexico, 467 U.S. 310, 316, 104 S.Ct. 2433, 81 L.Ed.2d 247 (1984)). A patent claim may be held invalid if it is anticipated or made obvious by prior art. See e.g., Leggett & Platt, Inc. v. VUTEk, Inc., 537 F.3d 1349 (Fed.Cir.2008) (affirming the district court’s grant of summary judgment of invalidity based on a finding that the claimed patent was anticipated by prior art); Ritchie v. Vast Resources, Inc., 563 F.3d 1334 (Fed.Cir.2009) (finding that the patented invention was invalid for obviousness). A patent claim is invalid if it is anticipated by prior art that is “known or used by others in this country, or patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country, before the invention thereof by the applicant for patent” or “patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country or in public use or on sale in this country, more than one year prior to the date of the application for patent in the United States.” § 102(a)-(b). A patent may be invalid due to obviousness if “the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.” § 103(a). Whether a patent is obvious “is a question of law premised on underlying findings of fact.” Eolas Techs. Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 399 F.3d 1325, 1332 (Fed. Cir.2005) (citation omitted). Under § 103, the court considers factors such as (1) the scope and content of the prior art, (2) the differences between the prior art and the claims, and (3) the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406, 127 S.Ct. 1727, 167 L.Ed.2d 705 (2007) (“KSR”) (citing Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 17-18, 86 S.Ct. 684, 15 L.Ed.2d 545 (1966)). The court may also consider secondary considerations such as commercial success, long felt but unsolved needs, and the failure of others, so as “to give light to the circumstances surrounding the origin of the subject matter sought to be patented.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 406, 127 S.Ct. 1727 (citations omitted). Crucially, the relevant question “is not whether the combination was obvious to the patentee but whether the combination was obvious to a person with ordinary skill in the art.” Id. at 420, 127 S.Ct. 1727. A patent “composed of several elements is not proved obvious merely by demonstrating that each of its elements was, independently, known in the prior art.” Id at 418, 127 S.Ct. 1727. However, the mere “combination of familiar elements according to known methods is likely to be obvious when it does no more than yield predictable results.” Id. at 416, 127 S.Ct. 1727. It is widely understood that “[w]hen a work is available in one field of endeavor, design incentives and other market forces can prompt variations of it, either in the same field or a different one.” Id. at 417, 127 S.Ct. 1727. Where a person of ordinary skill can implement a predictable variation of a technique available in the same field of endeavor or a different one, § 103 will likely bar patentability of the variation. Id. However, in cases where the prior art “teaches away from combining certain known elements, discovery of a successful means of combining them is more likely to be nonobvious.” Id. at 416, 127 S.Ct. 1727 (citing United States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39, 51-52, 86 S.Ct. 708, 15 L.Ed.2d 572 (1966)). To determine whether there was an apparent reason to combine the known elements in the fashion claimed by the patent at issue, it may be necessary for a court to examine the “interrelated teachings of multiple patents; the effects of demands known to the design community or present in the marketplace; and the background knowledge possessed by a person having ordinary skill in the art____” Id. at 418, 127 S.Ct. 1727. In so doing, a factfinder “should be aware, of course, of the distortion caused by hindsight bias and must be cautious of arguments reliant upon ex post reasoning.” Id. at 421, 127 S.Ct. 1727. The Federal Circuit’s “teaching, suggestion, and motivation” (“TSM”) test “prevents hindsight and focuses on evidence before the time of invention ____” In re Translogic Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1260 (Fed.Cir.2007). “The TSM test, flexibly applied, [Jassures that the obviousness test proceeds on the basis of evidence — teachings, suggestions (a tellingly broad term), or motivations (an equally broad term) — that arise before the time of invention as the statute requires.” Ortho-McNeil Pharm., Inc. v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 520 F.3d 1358, 1365 (Fed.Cir.2008). The court “need not seek out precise teachings directed to the specific subject matter of the challenged claim,” but rather, “can take account of the inferences and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would employ.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 418, 127 S.Ct. 1727; see also Ortho-McNeil Pharm., Inc., 520 F.3d at 1365. III. Discussion In moving for summary judgment of invalidity, NYSE argues that claims in the '877 and '002 Patents are unpatentable due to obviousness, ie., that it then would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the 1993-95 time frame to combine and/or modify the prior art and create a technique or device similar to those taught in the patents at issue. Def. '877 Invalidity Br. 17-18; Def. '002 Invalidity Br. 14-15. Specifically, NYSE argues that the '877 Patent is obvious in view of the cited prior art, the CME and CBOE systems, and the prior art admitted in the '877 Patent’s background section. Def. '877 Invalidity Br. 18-27. NYSE also asserts that the primary evidence of obviousness is sufficient to outweigh any secondary considerations and that the presumption of validity is easily overcome. Def. '877 Invalidity Br. 27-30. With regard to the '002 Patent, NYSE contends that (1) the CME’s system constitutes prior art under § 102, (2) the evidence demonstrates the indisputability of the scope and content of the prior art as well as the differences between the claims and the prior art, (3) the secondary considerations further demonstrate the obviousness of the'002 Patent, and (4) the presumption of validity is easily overcome. Def. '002 Invalidity Br. 14-27. Papyrus opposes both of NYSE’s motions, arguing that material issues of fact preclude summary judgment. Regarding the '877 Patent, Papyrus contends that the CME and CBOE systems, as well as the prior art cited during prosecution does not render Claims 1, 2, 16, and 17 obvious. PL '877 Invalidity Resp. Br. 22-58. Papyrus also alleges that the secondary indicia of nonobviousness demonstrate the validity of the Claims. PL '877 Invalidity Resp. Br. 58-62. Addressing the '002 Patent, Papyrus asserts that the CME’s system, or a combination of the CME and CBOE systems, does not render the Claims obvious, and that the secondary indicia of nonobviousness demonstrate the validity of the Claims. PL '002 Invalidity Resp. Br. 8-60. A. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Pertinent Art Resolved When conducting the obviousness analysis, the court “should look to common sense and ‘take account of the inferences and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would employ.’ ” In re Omeprazole Patent Lit., 490 F.Supp.2d at 515-16 (quoting KSR, 550 U.S. at 418, 127 S.Ct. 1727). Accordingly, the court begins here by determining the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art. To determine ordinary skill, the court may consider the following factors: “(1) the educational level of the inventor; (2) type of problems encountered in the art; (3) prior art solutions to those problems; (4) rapidity with which innovations are made; (5) sophistication of the technology; and (6) educational level of active workers in the field.” Daiichi Sankyo Co., Ltd. v. Apotex, Inc., 501 F.3d 1254, 1256 (Fed.Cir. 2007) (citation omitted); Ruiz v. A.B. Chance Co., 234 F.3d 654, 666-67 (Fed.Cir. 2000). Further, the court presumes that the hypothetical person of ordinary skill in the art is aware of (1) all prior art in the same or analogous fields, and (2) “elements of prior art that were designed to solve problems other than those faced by the patent inventor .... ” In re Omeprazole Patent Lit, 490 F.Supp.2d at 516 (citing KSR, 550 U.S. at 420, 127 S.Ct. 1727). Although the patents at issue teach distinct methods and inventions, there is some undeniable overlap between the two patents. First, both patents involve the use of programmed computers and a two-way wireless communication system. Second, said network of computers is intended for use by floor brokers receiving orders and executing trades on the floor of a financial exchange. Third, the patents share identical background sections, nearly identical specifications, and much of the same prior art. In light of these considerations, the court need only establish a single definition for a person of ordinary skill for both patents: a person with (1) knowledge of negotiable instruments traded on auction markets, (2) a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or computer science, and (3) approximately one to two years of practical experience with computers and computer networks. Since the parties have no dispute here, the court adopts these criteria for a person of ordinary skill in the art for purposes of this case. B. Scope and Content of Prior Art The scope and content of prior art includes that art which is “reasonably pertinent to the particular problem with which the inventor was involved.” Ruiz, 234 F.3d at 664 (citation omitted). Crucially, prior art “ ‘encompasses not only the field of the inventor’s endeavor but also any analogous arts.’” Medinol Ltd. v. Guidant Corp., 412 F.Supp.2d 301, 313 n. 81 (S.D.N.Y.2005) (quoting In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1577-78 (Fed.Cir.1995)). “To ascertain the scope of the prior art, a court examines the field of the inventor’s endeavor, and the particular problem with which the inventor was involved, at the time the invention was made.” Monarch Knitting Mach. Corp. v. Sulzer Morat GmbH, 139 F.3d 877, 881 (Fed.Cir.1998) (internal citations and quotations omitted). Section 102 also guides the comb’s inquiry, indicating that prior art also includes “[ (1) ] printed publications or patents from anywhere in the world published or issued before the date of invention; [ (2) ] a United States patent application subsequently issued, and filed before the date of invention; and [ (3) ] another’s invention that was made in this country and not abandoned, suppressed, or concealed before the invention date of the invention in question.” Medinol Ltd., 412 F.Supp.2d at 313 (citing § 102). 1. Prior Art Patents As indicated by the text of the '877 and '002 Patents, the prior art includes forty-five unique prior art patents — forty-three domestic and two foreign. '877 Patent References Cited; '002 Patent References Cited; see Constant v. Advanced Micro-Devices, Inc., 848 F.2d 1560, 1570 (Fed. Cir.1988) (“A statement in a patent that something is in the prior art is binding on the applicant and patentee for determinations of anticipation and obviousness.”) (citation omitted). The court confines its discussion to the three patents most relevant here. First, U.S. Patent No. 5,297,-031 (issued Mar. 22, 1994) (“Gutterman”), which the specifications refer to by name. Gutterman teaches a broker workstation for managing orders in financial exchanges and a method comprised of “selectively displaying order information incoming to the workstation; accepting or rejecting orders corresponding to the incoming order information displayed; displaying accepted order information in a representation of a broker deck; and selectively displaying a total of orders at the market price.” Gutterman Abstract. Second, U.S. Patent No. 5,467,268 (issued Nov. 14,1995) (“Sisley”), which Papyrus and the patent examiner discussed throughout the prosecution history of the '877 Patent. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1317 (Fed.Cir.2005) (the prosecution history “includes the prior art cited during the examination of the patent” and demonstrates how the inventor and the PTO understood the meaning of the patent at the time of the proceedings). Sisley teaches “[a] system and method for assigning and scheduling resource requests to resource providers [that] use a modified ‘best-first’ search technique that combines optimization, artificial intelligence, and constraint-processing to arrive at near-optimal assignment and scheduling solutions.” Sisley Abstract. Further, the invention “improv[es] the timeliness and predictability of resource delivery, increase[s] dispatcher productivity ... by reducing travel time and generally improving utilization of active time, and enhance[s] flexibility by supporting a variety of organizational policy options to better serve diverse resource domains.” Sisley col. 3 11. 52-58. Third, U.S. Patent No. 5,003,473 (issued Aug. 6, 1991) (“Kramer”), which teaches a system where [a] central computer equipped with communications hardware and specially designed software receives transaction data from personal transaction stations operated by traders, sends back verification information to the traders, reconciles all trades, informs traders when an error occurs, generates complete records of all transactions, reports price and volume data to quote vendors, provides numerous reports which analyze trading activity to detect potential regulatory violations, creates a complete [real time] backup copy of all data, and provides intraday profit, loss, risk, and margin information to exchange and Futures Commission Merchant personnel. Kramer Abstract. Papyrus relies on this patent to argue the validity of the '002 Patent, contending that because (1) the Kramer patent discloses the same functionality as the CME’s hand held device (“AUDIT”), and (2) the patent examiner considered Kramer during the prosecution of the '002 Patent and deemed the claims allowable, the patent is valid over the CME’s prior art. PI. '002 Invalidity Resp. Br. 47. Although the prosecution contains no specific prior art patent references to Kramer by either the patent examiner or by Papyrus, the Kramer patent was part of the prior art cited in the application for the '002 Patent. 2. Other Technologies The prior art also includes those devices referred to in the background section of the patents, which details the problems with which the inventors were involved and the technology utilized in the field of the inventor’s endeavor. At the time of the claimed invention, financial exchanges faced problems such as complying with the legal requirement that orders must be handled in a timely manner, ensuring that instructions were accurately transcribed, and creating a clear audit trail of the orders and executions. '877 Patent col. 3 11. 15, 55-56, col. 4 11. 45-46. To meet these needs, at least in part, financial exchanges used technologies such as beepers, cellular phone headsets, and computer terminals (as disclosed by Gutterman). '877 Patent col. 4 11. 1-65. In addition, the exchanges sought to phase-out the job of the runner by introducing hand-held computers to the trading floors. '877 Patent col. 4 11. 66-67. The court is also aware of the existence of multi-player game technologies, which permit (1) two or more people to play the same computer game via a network, and (2) players’ screens to display information received from several other of the game’s participants simultaneously and in real time. Because this technology was not addressed during discovery or briefing for summary judgment, the court afforded the parties the opportunity to address the issue of whether multi-player game technologies constitute prior art for the '877 Patent. NYSE argues that the gaming technology is prior art either because there were patents published, or filed and subsequently published, before the date of invention. Specifically, NYSE points to two patents as examples of multi-player game technology. First, U.S. Patent No. 4,958,835 (issued, Sept. 25, 1990) (“Tashiro”) teaches a “game playing system comprising a plurality of independent game machines” that are playable in either a single-player game or in a mul[ti]-player game with the other game machines in the same game space by the reception and transmission of data between one player’s game machine and the other game machines through data transmission lines which connect said game machines together in a loop, each of said game machines comprising a communication interface for performing the reception and transmission of data between the one player’s game machine and the other game machines through said transmission lines .... Tashiro col. 2 11. 8-17. Second, NYSE cites to U.S. Patent No. 5,586,257 (“Pearlman”), which describes “an apparatus and method for linking multiple remote players of [real time] games” that utilizes a system comprised of various computers and a server coupled to the network. Pearlman Abstract; id. col. 4 11. 28-29. According to NYSE, Tashiro and Pearlman are examples of multi-player gaming technology which constitute prior art either because they share the same field of endeavor as the '877 Patent (networked computers and displays) or because they are analogous art. Def. Letter 1-2 (Aug. 7, 2009). In contrast, Papyrus contends that multi-player game technology is not prior art because (1) it is “directed to a wholly different field of endeavor, i.e., escapist entertainment where players compete with one another” rather than the handling of real-world financial transactions, it is not reasonably pertinent to the particular problems to be solved, and (3) the examiner did not discuss or allude to any reference concerning said technology. PL Letter 2 (Aug. 7, 2009). After considering the parties’ respective positions, the court finds that multi-player game technology is prior art. Prior art includes any patents published or issued before the date of the claimed invention and any United States patent application filed before the date of invention and subsequently issued. § 102(e)(2). NYSE has presented the court with two examples of patents which meet this criteria. However, prior art must either fall within the same field of endeavor as the claimed patent or be reasonably pertinent to the particular needs and problems with which the inventor was involved. Ruiz, 234 F.3d at 664; Medinol Ltd., 412 F.Supp.2d at 313. In this case, multiplayer game technology does not fall within the same field of endeavor as the '877 and '002 Patents, as the former allows multiple players to interact within the same computer game while the latter facilitate the timeliness and accuracy of financial trading. See '877 Patent Abstract. Nevertheless, the court finds that multiplayer gaming constitutes prior art because it is reasonably pertinent to the problem addressed by the inventor of the claimed patent. See In re Icon Health & Fitness, Inc., 496 F.3d 1374,1379 (Fed.Cir. 2007). The Federal Circuit has explained that a “reference is reasonably pertinent if, even though it may be in a different field from that of the inventor’s endeavor, it is one which, because of the matter with which it deals, logically would have commended itself to an inventor’s attention in considering his problem.” Id. at 1379-80. It is highly likely that a person of ordinary skill in the early 1990s would have known about the use of multi-player gaming technology and its ability to display information received from other users simultaneously and in real time. Further, it is also likely that a person of ordinary skill would have thought that said technology would be applicable to many computer interfaces including devices used for transmitting data on the floor of a financial exchange. Based on the above considerations, the court therefore finds that beepers, cellular phone headsets, computer terminals, and multi-player video games are prior art. 3. The CME and CBOE Systems Less clear is whether other inventions should be joined with the aforementioned prior art. Here, NYSE argues that the CME and CBOE systems belong to the prior art of the '877 and '002 Patents under either § 102(a) or § 102(b). Def. '877 Invalidity Br. 16; Def. '002 Invalidity Br. 14. More particularly, NYSE alleges that the CME and CBOE systems were “known or used by others” and “in public use” under § 102 because they were used publicly and commercially in live trading before September 1993 and September 1994, respectively. Def. '877 Invalidity Br. 16; Def. '002 Invalidity Br. 14. Papyrus challenges the prior art status of the CME systems, alleging that TOPS and CUBS are not prior art because they were not connected as of September 1994 and therefore did not allow an operator to select a broker based on the automatic, simultaneous, and real time display of current status information. PI. '877 Invalidity Resp. Br. 22-26. Under § 102 prior art must be either “known” or “used,” before the invention of the claimed patent, or be in public use one year prior to the date of the claimed patent. See Clock Spring, L.P. v. Wrapmaster, Inc., 560 F.3d 1317, 1325 (Fed.Cir.2009); Ormco Corp. v. Align Tech., Inc., 463 F.3d 1299, 1305 (Fed.Cir. 2006) (“Art that is not accessible to the public is generally not recognized as prior art.”); Minnesota Min. & Mfg. Co., 303 F.3d at 1301. In determining whether an invention was in public use, a court must consider factors such as policies underlying the public use bar, the removal of freely available inventions from the public domain which the public justifiably believes are freely available, the nature of the activity that occurred in public, public access to and knowledge of the public use, and whether observers were under a confidentiality obligation. Bernhardt, L.L.C. v. Collezione Europa USA, Inc., 386 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed.Cir.2004). In this case, the record makes clear that the public had access to the trading floors of the CME, the CBOT, and the CBOE. In August 1993, personnel, members, firm personnel, and members’ clerks were allowed onto the CME’s trading floor. Def. '877 Facts ¶¶ 157-158. In addition, the general public could either view the trading floor from a visitor’s gallery or could access the trading floor itself as a guest of a CME member or a firm’s personnel. Def. '877 Facts ¶¶ 159, 161. Once on the floor, visitors could see the various electronic trading devices being used by traders and “were in plain view of anyone who wanted to look at them on the floor.” May Gaspar Deck Ex. 18 (“Knighton Dep.”) at 50-51. Indeed, “there were many people who were not traders who came across the floor at the time who could have seen [the electronic trading] instruments and could have looked at the[ ] screens.” Id. at 51. Moreover, if asked about the devices they were using, traders would demonstrate the use of the device. Id. at 51-52. Regardless of how the general public wished to view the CME trading floor, they were not asked to sign confidentiality agreements before being allowed into the visitors’ viewing gallery or onto the trading floor. Def. '877 Facts ¶ 160; Linker Dep. at 54. The CBOT and the CBOE had similar public access rules and procedures. For instance, CBOT members, clerks, and member firm personnel and staff had access to the trading floor in 1993 and could escort members of the general public— who were never asked to sign eonfidentiality agreements — onto the floor. Franks Deck Ex. 147 (“Panek Dep.”) at 61-62. At the CBOE, the public had nearly unrestricted access to the viewing gallery located one floor above the trading floor during the early 1990s. Def. '877 Facts ¶ 254; Pfaffenbach Dep. at 33. Additionally, members of the public could enter the trading floor if escorted by CBOE members or staff, and did not have to sign a confidentiality agreement in order to do so. Def. '877 Facts ¶ 259; Pfaffenbach Dep. at 35-36. In light of evidence that the general public had access to the trading floors of the CME, CBOT, and CBOE, could see their respective systems in use, and could even receive demonstrations of their use from the traders, the court holds that TOPS, CUBS, AUDIT, ORS, and PAR are prior art as defined under § 102. C. Differences Between the Claims and the Prior Art 1. The '877 Patent According to NYSE, a person of ordinary skill in 1993-95 would have found the subject matter of Claim 1 of the '877 Patent to be obvious combinations or modifications of the prior art. Def. '877 Invalidity Br. 17. In contrast, Papyrus contends that because the prior art does not perform or suggest the key aspects of Claim 1 in the '877 Patent — the transmitting, calculating, displaying, and selecting steps — the claimed invention is not obvious. PI. '877 Invalidity Resp. Br. 22-23, 27-42. a. Independent Claim 1 i. The Transmitting Steps The first two steps in Claim 1 of the '877 Patent address the transmission of instructions, explaining that the programmed computer sends instructions to the two-way device (first transmitting step) and that the two-way device transmits current-status information concerning the instructions back to the programmed computer (second transmitting step). '877 Patent col. 32 ll. 29-37. Though Papyrus raises various collateral arguments regarding the second transmission step, its primary contention is that the CME system was incapable of performing the second transmitting step because CUBS and TOPS were not connected until after the filing of the '877 Patent. PI. '877 Invalidity Resp. 27. In so arguing, Papyrus relies on the information contained in the CFTC Report, which states that (1) CUBS ran as a pilot between April 1992 and the November 1994 publication of the report, (2) CUBS and TOPS did not communicate with each other during the pilot, and (3) the two systems would be connected only during a then-future phase of testing. CFTC Report at 49-50. Further, Papyrus stresses that the CFTC distinguished the CUBS booth station, which was connected to the CUBS broker station, from TOPS, which was not. In turn, NYSE points to the deposition testimony of Mr. Brian Linker as evidence that CUBS and TOPS were connected in September 1993. When deposed, Mr. Linker repeatedly and explicitly stated that CUBS communicated with TOPS through the CME’s local area network (LAN) before September 1993. Linker Dep. at 15, 17-18. This LAN allegedly allowed the TOPS mainframe computer to send orders to a CUBS terminal in the pit and also allowed the CUBS terminal to send fill information to TOPS. Id. at 97-98, 143, 215-16, 251. Because the transmission of current status information from the two-way device to the programmed computer is a key element of Claim 1, the existence of conflicting record evidence from seemingly reliable sources would generally induce the court to declare this an issue of material fact that precludes summary judgment. The court need not make such a conclusion, however. It is not necessary that the CME systems be connected and capable of transmitting current status information; instead, the prior art need only suggest such practice to a person of ordinary skill. Here, the record demonstrates that the CBOE systems were connected and performed transmitting functions like those in Claim 1. As early as May 1994, a wired LAN connected the PAR workstations, PAR server, and ORS, each of which had its own display screen. Def. 877 Facts ¶¶ 175, 193, 195; Acampora Report ¶ 22. The PAR system allowed electronic delivery of order information to floor brokers in the pit as well as electronic delivery of fill information from the pit back to ORS and the order originator. Def. 877 Facts ¶¶ 176, 194, 201. Based on the two-way transmission of messages between ORS and PAR, the court finds that there is little difference between the '877 Patent and the OBOE prior art and that it would therefore have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill to incorporate this capability into a system for managing floor broker trading. ii. The Calculating Step The third step of Claim 1 is the calculating step, which states: “calculating at the programmed computer a remaining quantity of unfilled orders to fill using current-status information transmitted to the programmed computer .... ” '877 Patent col. 32 11. 38^0. The court construed the step as meaning “mathematically processing the current-status information to expressly determine a number of unfilled orders to be completed.” Papyrus III, 581 F.Supp.2d at 541. To differentiate the prior art from the '877 Patent, Papyrus again focuses on the CME systems, arguing that TOPS and CUBS do not show or suggest the calculating step. Papyrus cites no evidence to support its position, noting only that because orders were routed to the workstations according to the type of commodity or currency rather than broker workload, there would be no reason for the booth clerk to calculate the number of pending orders. PI. '877 Invalidity Resp. 28-30. For its part, NYSE admits that the CME system did not calculate the exact number of unfilled orders to be completed using current-status information transmitted from the floor broker’s computer to the booth computer. Def. '877 Invalidity Br. 20. Even assuming that TOPS and CUBS were not connected prior to September 1994, the record contains evidence demonstrating that TOPS had the capability of searching through order and fill information entered via a TOPS terminal. More specifically, the TOPS Open Order Display Screen allows a user to search open orders by account number, originating station, order number (consisting of a terminal ID and sequence code), and commodity code, among other criteria. Def. '877 Facts ¶ 88; January Gaspar Decl. Ex. 9 at CME 005112; Linker Decl. at 143-145. Employing the same search criteria, the TOPS Order History Display Screen allowed a user to view orders and those instructions related to the orders, such as fills or order changes. Franks Decl. Ex. 119 (“TOPS User Reference Manual (1993)”) at CBOT 0327164-65; January Gaspar Decl. Ex. 9 at CME 005112. A user could conduct a search on either screen and determine the number of pending instructions falling within specific criteria. For example, a search by date would produce a list of all open orders, regardless of the terminal in which they were entered. A search conducted using the terminal ID portion of the order number would produce a list of those instructions entered at a particular workstation that were still pending. That TOPS could conduct these inquiries and produce information on the number of pending instructions complies closely with the court’s definition of “calculating.” The device need not actively calculate the number of pending instructions and produce a numeric indicator, but rather, need only provide the user with sufficient information to arrive at said calculation. Moreover, even if TOPS and CUBS were not connected, it would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill to assign terminal ID numbers to each CUBS workstation added to the system, and equally obvious to allow TOPS to conduct open order and order history searches based on CUBS terminal IDs so as to allow a system user to determine the number of pending instructions at a specific CUBS workstation. Regardless of the connectivity of TOPS and CUBS, the CBOE system was capable of calculating the number of unfilled orders. In addition to trading pit workstations, the CBOE system included the PAR server, which had its own touch-sensitive display screen. Def. '877 Facts ¶¶ 181-88, 193; Acampora Report ¶ 22. Among the screens shown by the PAR Server was the Workstation Control screen, which showed the number of active orders for each PAR workstation, as well as the CBOE-issued identity acronym of the floor broker logged into a particular workstation. Def. '877 Facts ¶¶ 181-189. Papyrus seeks to differentiate PAR from the method taught by the '877 Patent by noting that the control room staff, rather than booth clerks, used the Work Station Control screen, and by arguing that NYSE has provided no evidence to show exactly where in the system the calculation of active orders takes place. PI. '877 Facts ¶ 181; PI. '877 Invalidity Resp. Br. 37. The court does not find this information material to the issue of whether the CBOE system was in fact performing in a capacity similar to that required by the calculating step. Although the calculation and display of unfilled orders may have taken place in locations different than those in the '877 Patent, the evidence clearly demonstrates that PAR was in fact able to perform said calculations. Accordingly, the court finds that the calculating step is present in the CBOE prior art and strongly suggests a system which would allow member firm personnel to view the number of unfilled orders. iii. The Displaying Step The displaying step is the fourth step of Claim 1 and states: “automatically and simultaneously displaying at the programmed computer in real time the current status information of at least a portion of the delegated instructions received from each two-way communication device ....” '877 Patent col. 32 ll. 41-45. The court defines the displaying step as “the current status information for one instruction and some current-status information for another instruction that may be simultaneously displayed.” Papyrus III, 581 F.Supp.2d at 523. Both NYSE and Papyrus are in agreement that the programmed computer in the CME’s system (TOPS) did not automatically display updated status information. Def. '877 Invalidity Br. 20, 22; Pl. 877 Invalidity Resp. 31. NYSE contends that because the CUBS broker computers installed in 1993 were able to automatically display information from the booth, it would have been obvious to update TOPS mainframe computer and terminals— which had not been updated since the 1980s — in a similar manner. Def. 877 Invalidity Br. 22-23. In contrast, Papyrus argues that TOPS could not have displayed current status information because it was not connected to CUBS until after September 1994 and therefore could not receive such information. Pl. '877 Invalidity Resp. 30. As with the transmitting steps, the contested connectivity of TOPS and CUBS creates an issue of fact that would normally preclude summary judgment. If the CME system components were not connected, then a booth clerk would enter the status command (for some types of orders), whereupon a status request form would print on the floor of the exchange and be delivered to the broker handling the order via runner. Once the broker had filled out the status request, the runner would return the slip to the booth clerk, who would enter the information into the TOPS terminal. Linker Dep. at 139-40. If, however, TOPS and CUBS were connected, then the CUBS terminal which had received the routed instruction would return an in-work message to the TOPS originating station, which would then print out a status ticket. Id. at 251-255. In the alternative, a broker could enter a view command, causing TOPS to both display the status of the order on the screen and print out a status ticket. Id. The record evidence therefore does not allow the court to determine, at the summary judgment stage, whether TOPS did or did not automatically and simultaneously display the current status of delegated instructions. Regardless of the connectivity of the CME system, ORS and PAR both had the capability of displaying current status information. Using ORS, a clerk could use the order inquiry function available on the Individual Order Inquiry Screen to search for, and display, the order and fill information stored in the ORS database. Def. '877 Facts ¶¶ 165, 169, 173, 210-11; Pfaffenbach Dep. 47-48, 51-52, 81-82. The order inquiry function was not automatic, as a clerk had to input a specific search parameter to find the information related to a specific instruction. Def. '877 Facts ¶ 169; January Gaspar Decl. Ex. 21 at CB 1194. The court previously noted that an operator using the PAR server display could view the number of active orders assigned to, and accepted by, a clerk using a particular workstation. Def. '877 Facts ¶¶ 181-188. The system automatically updated the Workstation Control screen every thirty seconds or whenever the operator pressed a specific on-screen button. Def. '877 Facts ¶ 189. In light of these facts, the court finds that display of current status information by the CBOE system differed from the claimed patent in that it updated the display screen at thirty second intervals rather than in real time. Furthermore, the court finds little difference between the prior art multi-player gaming technology and the displaying step of the '877 Patent. As explained supra in Section 111(B)(2), the Tashiro and Pearl-man patents both present inventions which allow networked computers to transmit data among themselves, with each individual computer displaying some of the information received from several other players simultaneously and in real time. Th