Full opinion text
ORDER JOSEPH N. LAPLANTE, District Judge. This case presents a question currently pending before three different federal courts of appeal: whether state-law tort claims alleging the defective labeling of generic drugs are preempted by federal law. See Morris v. Wyeth, Inc., No. 09-5509 (6th Cir. Apr. 27, 2009); Demahy v. Wyeth, Inc., No. 08-31204 (5th Cir. Dec. 16, 2008); Mensing v. Wyeth, Inc., No. 08-3850 (8th Cir. Dec. 10, 2008). The defendants, Mutual Pharmaceutical Company, Inc. and United Research Laboratories, Inc., move for judgment on the pleadings, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c), on claims by the plaintiffs, Karen L. and Gregory S. Bartlett, alleging that Karen suffered serious injuries from Sulindac, a generic drug manufactured by the defendants. The defendants argue that all of the plaintiffs’ state-law causes of action are pre-empted by Title I of the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, part of the Hatch-Waxman Amendments to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”). This court has subject-matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) (diversity). After considering the parties’ extensive briefing and oral argument, the court denies the defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings. The Bartletts’ claims do not present an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress in the HatchWaxman Amendments, nor does complying with the state law underlying those claims make it impossible to comply with the Hatch-Waxman Amendments or any other federal law identified by the defendants. The Supreme Court’s recent decision on the pre-emptive effect of federal drug regulation on state tort law. in Wyeth v. Levine, — U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 1187, 173 L.Ed.2d 51 (2009), makes that result clear. Accordingly, the Bartletts’ claims are not pre-empted. 1. Applicable legal standard Federal “preemption is an affirmative defense on which [the] defendant bears the burden of proof.” Cambridge Literary Props., Ltd. v. W. Goebel Porzellanfabrik G.m.b.H. & Co. KG., 510 F.3d 77, 102 (1st Cir.2007), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 58, 172 L.Ed.2d 25 (2008); see also Wyeth, 129 S.Ct. at 1193 (characterizing a manufacturer’s argument that federal drug law pre-empted the plaintiffs claims as a defense). While an affirmative defense can support a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings, it can do so “only where it is (1) definitively ascertainable from the complaint and other sources of information that are reviewable at [the pleadings] stage, and (2) [these] facts establish the affirmative defense with certitude.” Citibank Global Mkts., Inc. v. Rodriguez Santana, 573 F.3d 17, 23 (1st Cir. 2009). II. Background A. The Bartletts’ allegations For purposes of the defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings, the court accepts the following allegations of the Bartletts’ complaint as true. See Gray v. Evercore Restructuring L.L.C., 544 F.3d 320, 324 (1st Cir.2008). In December 2004, Karen Bartlett’s physician prescribed her Sulindac, a non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drug manufactured by the defendants, for pain in her right shoulder. Within weeks of filling the prescription, she went to a local emergency room complaining of “pimple like bumps, spots or blisters on her face, a fever, eye irritation,” and other symptoms. She was soon diagnosed with Stevens-Johnson syndrome progressing to toxic epidermal necrolysis, a serious and potentially fatal condition characterized by large areas of lesions on and necrosis of the skin and mucous membranes. See Dorland’s Illustrated Medical Dictionary 1872 (31st ed.2007). She spent approximately three months in the hospital recovering, including two months in a medically induced coma, and emerged with permanent injuries. Sulindac is the generic version of a drug originally approved by the FDA in 1978; the generic version at issue here was approved in 1991. The Bartletts allege that, following this approval, the defendants “had an ongoing duty to conduct post-marketing safety surveillance for any reports of serious adverse events associated with Sulindac including any such report in the medical literature” and that, had they done so, they would have uncovered information compelling them “to warn physicians about the dangers” of the drug, including associations with Stevens-Johnson syndrome and toxic epidermal necrolysis. The Bartletts’ complaint asserts seven counts: • strict product liability — failure to warn (count 1); • strict product liability — defective in design or manufacture (count 2); • fraud, in the sense that the defendants “made misrepresentations of material facts ... and omitted and/or concealed material facts” about the risks of Sulindac (count 3); • breach of implied warranty that Sulindac was “of merchantable quality and safe and fit for [its intended] use” (count 4); • breach of express warranty that Sulindac “was safe and well accepted by patients and was safe for long-term use” (count 5); • negligence in failing “to use reasonable care in designing, testing, labeling, marketing, supplying, distribution [sic] and selling” Sulindac (count 6); • gross negligence based on the same omissions (count 7). B. The statutory and regulatory scheme 1. Overview of the FDA approval process The FDCA prohibits the “introduction into interstate commerce [of] any new drug, unless an approval of an application filed pursuant to subsection (b) or (j) of this section is effective with respect to such drug.” 21 U.S.C. § 355(a). As discussed in detail below, those two subsections provide two different procedures for obtaining the requisite approval from the Secretary of Health and Human Services to distribute a new drug. The Secretary oversees the Food and Drug Agency in carrying out these procedures. See id. § 393(b)(2)(A). Subsection (b) authorizes a new drug application (“NDA”) containing certain specified data, e.g., “full reports of investigations which have been made to show whether or not such drug is safe for use and whether such drug is effective for use,” “a full list of the articles used as components of such drug,” and “specimens of the labeling proposed to be used for such drug.” Id. § 355(b)(1). The Secretary shall approve such an application absent specified grounds for denial. See id. § 355(c)(1)(A). These grounds include, e.g., that the required investigations “do not include adequate tests ... to show whether or not such drug is safe for use under the conditions prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the proposed labeling thereof,” that “results of such tests show that such drug is unsafe for use under such conditions,” and that “based on a fair evaluation of all material facts, such labeling is unsafe or misleading in any particular.” Id. § 355(d). Subsection (j), the Hatch-Waxman Amendments, sets forth a process under which “[a]ny person may file with the Secretary [of HHS] an abbreviated application for the approval of a new drug.” Id. § 355(j)(l) (emphasis added). Rather than the data required of a full-blown NDA by subsection (b), an abbreviated application (“ANDA”) must show that “the conditions of use prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the labeling have been previously approved for ... a listed drug,” id. §§ 355(j)(2)(A)(i) (internal quotation marks and parentheses omitted), and that each of a number of specified characteristics of the new drug is “the same as that of the listed drug.” Id. §§ 355(j)(2)(A)(ii)-(v). These characteristics include the drug’s active ingredient, route of administration, dosage form, strength, and labeling. See id. A “listed drug” is a “drug which has been approved for safety and effectiveness under subsection (c) of this section,” id. § 355(j)(7)(A)(i)(I), which, as just discussed, governs the approval of applications submitted under subsection (b). The Secretary must approve an ANDA absent certain specified grounds, e.g., “information submitted with the application is insufficient to show that each of the proposed conditions of use have been previously approved for the listed drug,” id. § 355(j)(4)(B), or “information submitted in the application is insufficient to show that the labeling proposed for the drug is the same as the labeling approved for the listed drug,” id. § 355(j)(4)(G). The Hatch-Waxman Amendments, then, authorize the approval of a new drug without demanding the information that would otherwise be required in an application under subsection (b), i.e., the reports of safety and effectiveness investigations and the like, provided the same drug has been previously approved for the same conditions under that more rigorous process. As one committee report on the Amendments noted, their “focus ... is to provide the Food and Drug Administration with sufficient information to assure that the generic drug is the same as the listed drug that has previously been determined to be safe and effective.” H.R.Rep. No. 98-857, pt. 1, at 21 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2654 (footnote and parenthetical omitted). The term “generic drug,” in this context, refers to a “listed drug” not covered by a patent, whether because that patent has expired or otherwise. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii). 2. ANDA procedures before HatchWaxman As this committee report also noted, the FDA had, at that point, already been approving ANDAs for generic drugs, but only insofar as such a drug was “the same as [a] pioneer [i.e., non-generic] drug” approved prior to 1962. H.R.Rep. No. 98-857, pt. 1, at 16, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2649; see also Abbreviated New Drug Applications, 48 Fed.Reg. 2751, 2755 (Jan. 21, 1983) (later codified at 21 C.F.R. § 314.2 (1984)). This temporal limitation had its origins in the Drug Amendments of 1962, which “required that all drugs, both generic and pioneer, ... be approved as safe and effective [by the FDA] prior to marketing”; before those amendments, the FDA had approved drugs on the basis of safety alone. H.R.Rep. No. 98-857, pt. 1, at 16, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2649; see also Drug Amendments of 1962 §§ 102(d) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355(d)). To carry out the mandate of the Drug Amendments, the FDA “created the drug efficacy study (DESI) to determine if all pre-1962 [approved] drugs were effective.” H.R.Rep. No. 98-857, pt. 1, at 16, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2649. The FDA later concluded that the reports generated in that study, together with other available data, “constituted a body of information sufficient, in the case of most DESI drugs determined to be effective, to conclude that the same drug product produced by another manufacturer would also be safe and effective if properly manufactured and used under the same conditions.” Abbreviated Drug Applications, 43 Fed.Reg. 39126, 39127 (proposed Sept. 1, 1978). Thus, the FDA promulgated a rule allowing an ANDA for a particular new drug upon a finding that such an approach was “sufficient.” Abbreviated Applications, 35 Fed.Reg. 6574, 6575 (Apr. 24, 1970) (later codified at 21 C.F.R. § 130.4 (1971)). This rule required, in relevant part, that an ANDA contain “[l]abeling that is in accord with the labeling conditions described in the finding.” Id. (later codified at 21 C.F.R. § 130.4(f)(2) (1971)). After receiving ANDAs for new drugs varying from ones approved through the DESI program in ways that “pose[d] significant questions of safety or effectiveness,” however, the FDA proposed a new rule limiting the ANDA process. 43 Fed. Reg. at 39127. This rule, promulgated in 1983, permitted an ANDA only upon a finding that a drug product “covered by [DESI] may be approved for marketing without the submission of additional evidence of preclinical and clinical studies to show safety and effectiveness.” 48 Fed. Reg. at 2755 (parenthetical omitted) (later codified at 21 C.F.R. § 314.2(a) (1984)). The new rule also provided that such a finding, i.e., “that an [ANDA] is suitable for a drug product[,] applies only to a product that is the same in active ingredient, dosage form and strength, route of administration, and conditions of use as the drug product that was the subject of the finding.” Id. (later codified at 21 C.F.R. § 314.2(b)(2)). This amendment did not alter the requirement that an ANDA contain “[l]abeling that is in accord with the labeling conditions described in the finding that an [ANDA] is sufficient.” Id. at 2756 (later codified at 21 C.F.R. § 314.2(f)(2)). At the time it proposed this rule, the FDA announced its “inten[t] to extend the ANDA concept at a later time to post-1962 drug products by publishing criteria for making a determination about these drugs,” noting that the rationale for the ANDA concept covered drugs approved before 1962 only — since only they had been subjected to the rigors of the DESI process. 43 Fed.Reg. at 39128. The FDA never did act on its own to make the ANDA process available for drugs approved after 1962, H.R.Rep. No. 98-857, pt. 1, at 16, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2649, so Congress acted through the Hatch-Wax-man Amendments, “generally extending] the procedures used to approve generic copies of pre-62 drugs to post-62 drugs,” id., at 14,1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2647. Doing so, the committee report recognized, would allow the FDA to approve such drugs without requiring human clinical trials, “retesting” which the FDA saw as “unnecessary and wasteful” — as well as “unethical” — “because the drug has already been determined to be safe and effective.” Id. at 16, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2649. The committee report also noted that the “approximately 150 drugs approved after 1962 that [were] off patent and for which there [was] no generic equivalent” at that time “could be approved in generic form if there was [an ANDA] procedure,” resulting in significant cost savings. Id. at 17, 1984 U.S.S.C.A.N. at 2650. 3. ANDA procedures after Hatch-Wax-man The FDA later proposed amending its regulations to implement the ANDA procedure set forth in the Hatch-Waxman Amendments. See Abbreviated New Drug Application Regulations, 54 Fed.Reg. 28872 (proposed July 10, 1989). In relevant part, the FDA proposed “to add a new requirement with respect to the submission of labeling as part of an ANDA” to effect Hatch-Waxman’s rule that an ANDA “show that the proposed labeling for its drug product is the same as that of the reference listed drug.” Id. at 28884 (emphasis added). The FDA then promulgated rules specifying that an ANDA must include “[a] statement that the applicant’s proposed labeling is the same as the labeling of the reference listed drug except for” enumerated differences not relevant here. Abbreviated New Drug Application Regulations, 57 Fed.Reg. 17950, 17985-86 (Apr. 28, 1992) (later codified at 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.94(a)(8)(iii)-(iv) (1993)). These rules also stated that the FDA would deny an ANDA if it was “insufficient to show that the labeling proposed for the drug is the same as the labeling approved for the listed drug,” id. at 17992 (later codified at 21 C.F.R. § 314.127(a)(7) (1993)), and that the FDA “may” begin proceedings to withdraw its approval of an ANDA if it found “[t]hat the labeling for the drug product that is the subject of the [ANDA] is no longer consistent with that for the listed drug,” id. at 17993-94 (later codified at 21 C.F.R. § 314.150(b)(10) (1993)) (emphasis added), both with exceptions not relevant here. During the notiee-and-comment period on these rules, the FDA received feedback that “the labeling provisions should be revised to permit ANDA applicants to deviate from the labeling for the reference listed drug to add contraindications, warnings, precautions, adverse reactions, and other safety-related information.” Id. at 17961. The FDA noted that it “disagree[d].... [T]he ANDA’s product labeling must be the same as the listed drug’s product labeling because the listed drug product is the basis for ANDA approval.” Id. But the FDA also noted that Consistent labeling will assure physicians, health professionals, and consumers that a generic drug is as safe and effective as its brand-name counterpart. If an ANDA applicant believes new safety information should be added to a product’s labeling, it should contact FDA, and FDA will determine whether the labeling for the generic and listed drugs should be revised. After approval of an ANDA if ANDA holder believes that new safety information should be added, it should provide adequate supporting information to FDA, and FDA will determine whether the labeling for the generic and listed drugs should be revised. Id. (emphasis added). Further, in response to a comment that “FDA should create a mechanism to compel ANDA holders to revise their labeling to conform to the listed drug product once the ANDA is approved,” the FDA observed that 21 U.S.C. § 355(e)(2) authorizes the withdrawal of approval of an application if ‘there is a lack of substantial evidence that the drug will have the effect it purports or is represented to have under the conditions of use prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the labeling thereof.’ This provision applies to both ANDA and NDA drug products. Because an ANDA must have labeling that is the same as the reference listed drug under [21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(v) ], FDA believes that a generic drug product approved on the basis of studies conducted on the listed drug and whose labeling is inconsistent with the listed drug’s labeling might not be considered safe and effective for use under the conditions prescribed, suggested, or recommended in the listed drug’s labeling. FDA, therefore, has revised § 311.150 to permit the agency to withdraw approval of the ANDA if the applicant fails to maintain labeling in compliance with the requirements of the Act. Id. at 17968 (emphases added). In explaining this revision, the FDA noted its agreement with comments that it “should create a new provision authorizing the agency to withdraw an [ANDA] if the [ANDA] holder failed to modify its labeling to match labeling changes in the reference listed drug.” Id. at 17970. Thus, the FDA explained, “§ 314.150(b)(10) states that the ANDA applicant’s failure to maintain drug labeling that is consistent with that of the listed drug may be grounds for withdrawing approval of the [ANDA].” Id. (emphasis added). 4. Revisions to drug labeling Revisions to drug labeling are covered under another FDA regulation, 21 C.F.R. § 314.70, “Supplements and other changes to an approved application.” Under this rule, before making “[c]hanges in labeling,” id. § 314.70(b)(2)(v)(A), the applicant must submit, and the FDA must approve, a “supplement” describing the change, id. §§ 314.70(a)(1)®, (b)(1). The rule has exceptions, however, see id. § 314.70(b)(2)(v)(A), one of which is for “[c]hanges in the labeling ... [t]o add or strengthen a contraindication, warning, precaution, or adverse reaction,” id. § 314.70(e)(6)(iii)(A). In such a case, “the holder of an approved application may commence distribution of the drug product involved upon receipt by the agency of a supplement for the change,” rather than waiting for the FDA to approve it. Id. § 314.70(c)(6)(iii). This is known as a “changes being effected” or “CBE” supplement. Id. § 314.70(c)(3). As with other changes in labeling, the FDA may ultimately disapprove a change made through the CBE process, in which case “it may order the manufacturer to cease distribution of the drug product(s) made with the ... change.” Id. § 314.70(c)(7). This version of the rule was promulgated in 2004, following the passage of Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997 (“FDAMA”). Supplements and Other Changes to an Approved Application, 69 Fed.Reg. 18728, 18764-65 (Apr. 8, 2004). The Modernization Act provided that, “[w]ith respect to a drug for which there is in effect an approved application under section 355 ..., a change from the manufacturing process approved pursuant to such an application ... may be made, and the drug as made with the change may be distributed.” 21 U.S.C. § 356a(a). The Act authorized the Secretary to “designate a category of ... changes for the purpose of providing that ... the holder involved may commence distribution of the drug involved upon the receipt by the Secretary of a supplemental application for the change,” rather than wait for approval. Id. § 356a(d)(3)(B)(ii). So, by opening the CBE process to labeling changes that added or strengthened warnings and the like under 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c)(6)(iii)(A), the Secretary created “a category of changes” that could be implemented upon receipt of a supplemental application effecting them. In substance, however, a rule like § 314.70(c)(6)(iii)(A) had been in effect since 1965, when the Secretary promulgated a rule that, if a supplemental application proposed “additional warning, contraindication, side-effect, [or] precaution information” to package labeling, that change “should be placed in effect at the earliest possible time.” Supplemental New-Drug Applications. 30 Fed.Reg. 911, 993 (Jan. 30, 1965) (later codified at 21 C.F.R. § 130.9(d)(1) (1965)). To effect this goal, the FDA announced in the rule a policy “to take no action against a drug or applicant solely because changes of [this] kind ... are placed in effect by the applicant prior to his receipt of a written notice of approval.” Id. at 994 (later codified at 21 C.F.R. § 130.9(e)). Despite some renumbering, see 39 Fed. Reg. 11680, 117123 (Mar. 29, 1974) (recodifying § 130.9 as § 314.8), the relevant substance of this rule remained the same until 1985, when the rule took its current form. See New Drug and Antibiotic Regulations, 50 Fed.Reg. 7452, 7498-99 (Feb. 22, 1985) (later codified at 21 C.F.R. § 314.70 (1985)). Though the Hatch-Waxman Amendments had already become law at that point, the FDA had yet to promulgate the regulations implementing them; when the agency did so, however, the only change it made to the rule on supplemental applications, § 314.70, was to add a paragraph directing that “[t]he applicant shall comply with the patent information requirements under section 505(c)(2) of the act.” Abbreviated New Drug Applications, 57 Fed.Reg. at 17983 (codified at 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(f)). But later, in a 2008 proposal to amend 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c) “to reaffirm that a CBE supplement is appropriate to amend the labeling for an approved product only to reflect newly acquired information,” the FDA stated in a footnote that “CBE changes are not available for generic drugs approved under an [ANDA] under 21 U.S.C. [§ ] 355(j). To the contrary, a generic drug manufacturer is required to conform to the approved labeling for the listed drug.” Supplemental Applications Proposing Labeling Changes for Approved Drugs, Biologies, and Medical Devices, 73 Fed.Reg. 2848-01, 2849 n. 1. (proposed Jan. 16, 2008). The footnote cited 21 C.F.R. § 314.150(b)(10) — which provides, again, that the FDA may attempt to revoke its approval of an ANDA if its labeling is not “consistent with” that of the listed drug — as well as the FDA’s cornments on ANDA applicants’ labels, quoted above. The FDA did not, however, propose to amend any of its regulations to clarify that an ANDA holder could not avail itself of a CBE supplement. See id. Nor did its final version of the proposed rule contain any such provision. See Supplemental Applications Proposing Labeling Changes for Approved Drugs, Biologies, and Medical Devices, 73 Fed.Reg. 49603-01 (Aug. 22, 2008). And the footnote in the proposal did not acknowledge that, when the FDA promulgated its new rule on ANDA applications following Hatch-Waxman, it included a provision that “[t]he applicant shall comply with the requirements of §§ 314.70 and 314.71 regarding the submission of supplemental applications to an approved abbreviated application.” 57 Fed.Reg. at 17987 (codified at 21 C.F.R. § 314.97). 5. Generic manufacturers’ reporting obligations The ANDA regulations promulgated after Hatch-Waxman require that “each applicant having an [ANDA] ... shall comply with the requirements of § 314.80 regarding the reporting and recordkeeping of adverse drug experiences.” Id. at 17983 (codified as amended at 21 C.F.R. § 314.98(a)). Section 314.80 requires an applicant to report (A) “each adverse drug experience that is both serious and unexpected ... as soon as possible but in no case later than 15 calendar days of the initial receipt of the information by the applicant,” 21 C.F.R. § 314.80(c)(1)®, and (B) every other “adverse drug experience ... at quarterly intervals, for 3 years from the date of approval ... and then at annual intervals,” id. § 314.80(c)(2)(i). Furthermore, an applicant “shall also develop written procedures for the surveillance, receipt, evaluation, and reporting of post-marketing adverse drug experiences to FDA.” Id. § 314.80(b). Congress also addressed the ongoing responsibilities of generic drug manufacturers in the Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007. This law requires the Secretary to “promptly notify the responsible person” — defined as the holder of an application for a prescription drug approved under subsection (b), see 21 U.S.C. § 355(o )(2) — “or, if the same drug approved under subsection (b) of this section is not currently marketed, the holder of an approved application under subsection (j),” “if the Secretary becomes aware of new safety information that the Secretary believes should be included in the labeling of the drug.” 21 U.S.C. § 355(o)(4). The holder of the ANDA approval must, in response, either “submit a supplement proposing changes to the approved labeling to reflect the new safety information” or explain “why such a change is not warranted.” Id. §§ 355(o )(4)(B)(i),(ii). Paragraph (4) of subsection (o) also contains a “Rule of construction” that it “shall not be construed to affect the responsibility of ... the holder of the approved application under [21 U.S.C. § 355(j) ] to maintain its label in accordance with existing requirements, including subpart B of part 201 and section[ ] 314.70 ... of Title 21, Code of Federal Regulations (or any successor regulations).” Id. § 355(o )(4)(I). Subpart B of part 201 imposes labeling requirements on prescription drugs, including that “[t]he labeling shall be revised to include a warning as soon as there is reasonable evidence of a serious hazard with a drug; a causal relationship need not have been proved.” 21 C.F.R. § 201.80(e) (2008). II. Analysis The defendants argue that all of the Bartletts’ claims are pre-empted by the Hatch-Waxman Amendments to the FDCA or the ANDA regulations that followed it. “A fundamental tenet of our federalist system is that constitutionally enacted federal law is supreme to state law. See U.S. Const. Art. VI. cl. 2. As a result, federal law sometimes preempts state law either expressly or by implication.” N.H. Motor Transp. Ass’n v. Rowe, 448 F.3d 66, 74 (1st Cir.2006), aff'd, 552 U.S. 364, 128 S.Ct. 989, 169 L.Ed.2d 933 (2008). The defendants make no express preemption argument here; indeed, nothing in the Hatch-Waxman Amendments expressly preempts state law. Instead, the defendants argue for implicit preemption of the Bartletts’ state-law claims. “[FJederal law can preempt state law by implication in two ways,” as the court of appeals has explained: First, Congress may indicate an intent to occupy an entire field to the exclusion of state law. Second, even if Congress has not occupied the field, state law is nevertheless pre-empted to the extent it actually conflicts with federal law, that is, when compliance with both state and federal law is impossible, or when the state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress. Good v. Altria Group, Inc., 501 F.3d 29, 47 (1st Cir.2007) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted), aff'd,-U.S.-, 129 S.Ct. 538, 172 L.Ed.2d 398 (2008). The defendants also make no “field preemption argument,” relying solely on “conflict preemption” instead. The defendants invoke both kinds of conflict pre-emption, though: that complying with the state law underlying the Bartletts’ claims (1) would be impossible in light of, and (2) would frustrate the goals of, the Hatch-Waxman Amendments and the subsequent ANDA regulations. Specifically, the defendants argue that, having obtained FDA approval for their generic version of Sulindac under the ANDA procedure envisioned by Hatch-Waxman, they could not change Sulindac’s design, or the warnings included in the drug’s labeling, without running afoul of federal law (impossibility pre-emption). They further argue that, even if the FDA could approve such a change, it could come only after “substantial expense to obtain the scientific substantiation necessary to support [it],” frustrating Hatch-Waxman’s goal to “increase the availability of low-cost generic drugs” by opening the ANDA process to them (frustration-of-purpose pre-emption). As the Supreme Court reaffirmed in Wyeth, “ ‘the purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone in every pre-emption case.’ ” 129 S.Ct. at 1194 (quoting Med tronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485, 116 S.Ct. 2240, 135 L.Ed.2d 700 (1996) (further internal quotation marks omitted by the Court)). The Court also reaffirmed in Wyeth that “ ‘[i]n all preemption cases, and particularly in those in which Congress has legislated ... in a field which the States have traditionally occupied,’ we start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.’ ” Id. at 1194-95 (quoting Lohr, 518 U.S. at 485, 116 S.Ct. 2240) (further internal quotation marks omitted). Prior to the Court’s decision in Wyeth, the continued validity of this so-called “presumption against pre-emption” had been in some doubt, see, e.g., Rowe, 448 F.3d at 74 n. 10; for that reason, perhaps, the parties here have not even mentioned the presumption in their briefing. Wyeth, however, clarified not only that the presumption applies against claims of implied preemption, but that it applies in this case, given “the historic presence of state law” in the field of drug labeling. 129 S.Ct. at 1194-95 & n. 3; see also id. at 1229 n. 14 (Alito, J., dissenting) (observing that it “remained an open question — before ['Wyeth] — -whether [the] presumption applied in conflict preemption cases”). Thus, this court must evaluate the defendants’ preemption arguments in light of the assumption “that ‘Congress does not cavalierly pre-empt state-law causes of action.’ ” Id. at 1195 n. 3 (quoting Lohr, 518 U.S. at 485, 116 S.Ct. 2240). The defendants’ arguments do not withstand that level of scrutiny. A. The plaintiffs’ non-failure-to-warn claims As an initial matter, the court notes that the defendants’ arguments are directed almost entirely at the failure-to-warn aspects of the Bartletts’ claims. In addition to those claims, however, the Bartletts also allege that the defendants defectively designed or manufactured Sulindac; that they breached their express and implied warranties that Sulindac was safe and fit for its intended use; and that they negligently failed to design or test Sulindac. The defendants suggest, without fully explaining, that the Hatch-Waxman Amendments still pre-empt these claims because they depend on state law mandating “a generic drug’s design to differ from that of the branded on which it is based,” which is not permitted under the Hatch-Waxman Amendments. Assuming, without deciding, that either the letter or spirit of the amendments would prevent the defendants from changing Sulindac’s design, that would not conflict with the state law underlying the Bartletts’ non-failure-to-warn claims. Those claims allege that the defendants violated state law by distributing a product that was defectively designed or manufactured, that was not fit for its intended use, and without using due care in designing or testing it. While one way to avoid violating state law in this way would be to redesign Sulindac to remove the alleged defect before distributing the drug (or otherwise to meet the standard of care), another way to do so would be to refrain from distributing it at all. The defendants have not offered an explanation of how state law requiring them to do so would conflict with Hatch-Wax-man or any other federal law. At the outset, then, the defendants’ motion must be denied as to the Bartletts’ claims for defective design or manufacture, breach of express or implied warranties, and negligence. See Kellogg v. Wyeth, 612 F.Supp.2d 421, 427-28 (D.Vt.2008) (ruling that negligence, strict products liability, and express and implied warranty claims were “not exclusively based on failure to add to or strengthen the warnings in FDA-approved labeling for” a generic drug and therefore not pre-empted); Masterson v. Apotex Corp., No. 07-61665, 2008 WL 3262690, at *5 (S.D.Fla. Aug. 7, 2008) (“compliance with a state law duty to warn would conflict with the federal statutory scheme ... [but] preemption does not extend to manufacturing defect claims that arise separate and apart from [that] claim.”). B. The plaintiffs’ failure-to-warn claims The defendants do argue, at length, that the Hatch-Waxman Amendments and their implementing regulations pre-empt the Bartletts’ claims insofar as they arise out of the defendants’ alleged failure to warn of Sulindac’s potential to cause severe adverse reactions. This argument rests on the premise that, because the FDA approved Sulindac under a process that required the drug’s labeling to be “the same as” that of its listed predecessor, they could not have changed the labeling— to add or strengthen a warning about such a reaction, or otherwise — without breaking, or at least standing in the way of, the federal law creating that process, the Hatch-Waxman Amendments. 1. Impossibility pre-emption To succeed with their impossibility preemption argument, the defendants must show “that it would have been impossible for [them] to comply with the state-law duty to modify [Sulindac’s] labeling without violating federal law,” Wyeth, 129 S.Ct. at 1193, i.e., that “ ‘compliance with both federal and state [law] is a physical impossibility.’ ” Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153, 102 S.Ct. 3014, 73 L.Ed.2d 664 (1982) (quoting Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43, 83 S.Ct. 1210, 10 L.Ed.2d 248 (1963)). As this standard suggests, “[impossibility pre-emption is a demanding defense,” Wyeth, 129 S.Ct. at 1193. The defendants have not satisfied those demands here. a. The Hatch-Waxman Amendments Again, the Hatch-Waxman Amendments require that an ANDA contain “information to show that the labeling proposed for the new drug is the same as the labeling approved for the listed drug,” 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(v), and direct the Secretary to approve an ANDA absent a finding that “information submitted in the application is insufficient” to make such a showing, id. § 355(j)(4)(G), both with exceptions not relevant here. There is no dispute here that, absent these exceptions, Hatch-Waxman thus prevents the approval of an ANDA for a generic drug with labeling that is not “the same as” that of the listed drug; the Bartletts acknowledge as much. But the Bartletts do not seek to hold the defendants liable under state law because they failed to submit an ANDA for their generic Sulindac with labeling that was “the same as” the labeling for the pioneer version. Rather, as noted in Part II.A, supra, the Bartletts allege that, after securing approval of the ANDA for generic Sulindac with the same labeling as its listed predecessor’s, the defendants failed to change the label to warn adequately of the risks of Stevens Johnson-Syndrome and toxic epidermal necrolysis, despite actual or constructive knowledge of these risks. Nothing in the text of 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(j)(2)(A)(v) or (4)(G), as just quoted, prohibited the defendants from doing so. The defendants point out that, likewise, “there is no provision in the FDCA permitting either a branded or generic manufacturer, following product approval, to change the product’s labeling” (emphasis added). But that point is both irrelevant (at least as to the impossibility pre-emption analysis) and incorrect. Impossibility pre-emption arises where federal and state law “impose directly conflicting duties,” e.g., “if the federal law said, ‘you must sell insurance,’ while the state law said, ‘you may not.’ ” Barnett Bank of Marion County, N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 31, 116 S.Ct. 1103, 134 L.Ed.2d 237 (1996). To fit their claimed predicament into this framework, the defendants would need to show a federal law saying “You may not change your label” to conflict with the state law underlying the Bartletts’ failure-to-warn claims, i.e., “You must change your label.” So the defendants’ assertion that the FDCA does not say one way or the other whether they can change their label is insufficient. It is also incorrect, because, as discussed in part II.B.4, supra, the FDAMA allows, “[w]ith respect to a drug for which there is in effect an approved application under section 355 ..., a change from the manufacturing process approved pursuant to such application.” 21 U.S.C. § 356a(a)(l). Both NDAs and ANDAs, of course, are approved under section 355. The FDAMA did restrict such changes: insofar as they qualify as “major manufacturing changes,” they must await the Secretary’s approval of a supplemental application. Id. § 356a(c)(l). But Congress did not classify labeling changes as “major manufacturing changes” per se, see id. § 356a(c)(2), and, as the CBE regulation demonstrates, neither has the FDA in exercising its authority to further define that term. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c)(6)(iii). Because 21 U.S.C. § 356a expressly authorizes a manufacturer’s changes to an application approved under § 355 of the Act — whether under subsection (b), as in the case of an NDA, or under subsection (j), as in the case of an ANDA — the defendants are incorrect that nothing in the Act permits a manufacturer to change its label post-approval. As another court has noted, while “Congress intended for ANDA applicants to submit identical labeling to the FDA when seeking ANDA approval, the statute is silent as to the manufacturer’s obligation after the ANDA is granted.” Stacel v. Teva Pharms., USA, 620 F.Supp.2d 899, 907 (N.D.Ill.2009) (citation omitted); but see Mensing v. Wyeth, Inc., 562 F.Supp.2d 1056, 1064 (D.Minn.2008) (not discussing FDAMA amendments, and holding that “under the federal statutory scheme, the labeling for generic drugs must always remain the ‘same as’ that of the name brand drug.”), appeal docketed, No. 08-3850 (8th Cir. Dec. 10, 2008); Masterson, 2008 WL 3262690, at *4-*5 (same); Colacicco v. Apotex, Inc., 432 F.Supp.2d 514, 537-38 (E.D.Pa.2006) (similar), aff'd on other grounds, 521 F.3d 253 (3d Cir. 2008), vacated, — U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 1578, 173 L.Ed.2d 672 (2009). Nothing in the “statutory scheme,” then, makes it impossible for a manufacturer to change the labeling of an ANDA-approved drug — or to comply with a state-law requirement that it do so. b. FDA labeling regulations The analysis of the defendants’ impossibility argument does not end there, because “state laws can be pre-empted by federal regulations as well as by federal statutes.” Hillsborough County, Fla. v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713, 105 S.Ct. 2371, 85 L.Ed.2d 714 (1985). At the outset, the court notes that some of the regulations on which the defendants rely, like the provisions of the Hatch-Wax-man Amendments which those regulations implement, do not purport to restrict changes to the label of a generic drug following its approval. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.94(a)(8), 314.127(a)(7) (quoted in Part II.B.3, supra). Instead, those rules expressly require the generic drug’s proposed label to be the same as that of the listed drug, and provide that an ANDA will be denied for failing to demonstrate that. See id. These regulations, then, do not prevent post-approval changes to the label of an ANDA-approved drug any more than the Hatch-Waxman Act does, as a number of courts have recognized. See Demahy v. Wyeth, Inc., 586 F.Supp.2d 642, 649-52 (E.D.La.2008), appeal docketed, No. 08-31204 (5th Cir. Dec. 16, 2008); Laisure-Radke v. Par Pharm., Inc., 2006 WL 901657, at *3-*5 (W.D.Wash. Mar. 29, 2006); Bell v. Lollar, 791 N.E.2d 849, 854 (Ind.Ct.App.2003); see also Barnhill v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., No. 06-282, 2007 WL 6947996, at *4, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44718, at *13 (S.D.Ala. Apr. 24, 2007) (reasoning that the comments to the regulations “address labeling requirements necessary for initial approval, not changes to labels for approved ANDA’s”) (footnote omitted); but see Morris v. Wyeth, Inc., 582 F.Supp.2d 861, 868 (W.D.Ky.2008), appeal docketed, No. 09-5509 (6th Cir. Apr. 27, 2009). This is not to say that generic drug manufacturers- — or any drug manufacturers, for that matter — have carte blanche to make whatever alterations they want to their labels. FDA regulations classify most “labeling changes” as “major changes,” see 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(b)(2)(v), meaning that § 356a prohibits a manufacturer from making them without the FDA’s prior approval, see 21 U.S.C. § 356a(c)(l). As the Supreme Court observed in Wyeth, “[generally speaking, a manufacturer may only change a drug label after the FDA approves a supplemental application.” 129 S.Ct. at 1196. But, as Wyeth also noted, the FDA does have a “regulation that permits a manufacturer to make certain changes to its label before receiving the agency’s approval” — namely, 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(e)(iii), establishing the “CBE” supplement process. Id. Under this process, as discussed in Part II.B.4, supra, “if a manufacturer is changing a label to ‘add or strengthen a contraindication, warning, precaution, or adverse reaction,’ ... it may make the labeling change upon filing its supplemental application with the FDA; it need not wait for FDA approval.” Id. (quoting 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c)(6)(iii)(A)). The Court in Wyeth relied on this regulation in rejecting a manufacturer’s argument that state-law failure-to-warn claims were “pre-empted because it is impossible for it to comply with both the state-law duties underlying those claims and its federal labeling duties.” Id. at 1196. The Court ruled that, once the risk of the adverse reaction experienced by the plaintiff had become “apparent,” triggering a state-law duty to warn of it, “the CBE regulation permitted [the manufacturer] to provide such a warning before receiving the FDA’s approval.” Id. at 1198. While the Court acknowledged that “the FDA retains authority to reject labeling changes made pursuant to the CBE regulation in its review of the manufacturer’s supplemental application,” the Court declined to “conclude that it was impossible for [the manufacturer] to comply with both federal and state requirements” without “clear evidence that the FDA would not have approved a change” to effect the warning at issue. Id. The defendants here have not presented any such evidence, i.e., that the FDA would not have approved a change to their labeling to Sulindac to strengthen the warning as allegedly required by state law. In a supplemental memorandum (Wyeth, again, was decided after the parties here had already fully briefed the motion for judgment on the pleadings), the defendants nevertheless maintain that the Court’s decision does not foreclose their pre-emption defense. They principally argue that, because Sulindac is a generic drug approved through an ANDA, its labeling cannot be changed through the CBE process, which applies only to NDA approved drugs; therefore, the defendants conclude, it would be impossible for them to comply with both the federal labeling scheme and the state law underlying the Bartletts’ failure-to-warn claims. This court rejects with both the premise and the conclusion of that argument. i. FDA regulations do not forbid adding or strengthening warnings to the labeling of an ANDA-approved drug through the CBE process a. The regulations and their commentary Just as nothing in the text of the HatchWaxman Amendments forbids a generic manufacturer from changing its drug’s label from the listed version’s post-approval, nothing in the text of the CBE regulation forbids a generic manufacturer from using the CBE process to do so. As discussed in Part II.B.4, supra, the CBE regulation represents the FDA’s use of its authority, under the FDAMA, to designate labeling changes that add or strengthen warnings and such as “manufacturing changes that are not major manufacturing changes,” 21 U.S.C. § 356a(d)(l), and that therefore can be made without prior FDA approval, see id. §§ 356a(d)(l)(B), (3)(B)(ii); the FDA-MA, again, does not restrict this process to NDA-approved drugs. The regulation itself also imposes no such restriction: “the holder of an approved application” — not just an approved new drug application under subsection (b) — “may commence distribution of the drug product involved upon receipt by the agency of a supplement for the change.” 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c)(6). “Determining a regulation’s meaning requires application of the same principles that imbue exercises in statutory construction.” Morales v. Sociedad Española de Auxilio Mutuo y Beneficencia, 524 F.3d 54, 57 (1st Cir.2008), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 898, 173 L.Ed.2d 107 (2009). These principles include, first and foremost, “the plain meaning rule, stating that if the language of a ... regulation has a plain and ordinary meaning, courts need look no further and should apply the regulation as it is written.” Textron, Inc. v. Comm’r, 336 F.3d 26, 31 (1st Cir.2003) (citing, inter alia, Comm’r v. Soliman, 506 U.S. 168, 174, 113 S.Ct. 701, 121 L.Ed.2d 634 (1993)). Because, as just discussed, nothing in the text of the CBE regulation declares its process for labeling changes off-limits to ANDA-approved drugs, it would seem “the interpretive odyssey is at an end,” Morales, 524 F.3d at 57; like other ANDA holders, the defendants could have availed themselves of the CBE process to add or strengthen the warnings on Sulindae’s labeling. To support their view that the CBE process is nevertheless unavailable to ANDA-approved drugs, the defendants rely on the FDA’s remark explaining its revision to § 314.70 following the HatchWaxman Amendments. That remark states, in its entirety, FDA received no comments on this provision, but has amended the provision to adopt references to statutory, rather than regulatory, provisions to explain what information should be provided. However, the agency wishes to remind ANDA applicants that, as noted in paragraph 4 above, the labeling for an ANDA product must, with few exceptions, correspond to that for the reference listed drug. 57 Fed.Reg. at 17955. But for the reference to “paragraph 4,” this remark might provide some arguable (if atextual) support for the defendants’ view: the remark, unlike others they cite, speaks of “the labeling for an ANDA product,” rather than the “labeling proposed” for it, and thus might be read to require the labeling to remain the same beyond the approval process. “Paragraph 4,” though, rejects a comment that the FDA “accept ANDA’s with warnings or precautions in addition to those on the reference listed drug’s label,” pointing out that “section 505(j)(2)(A)(v) and (j)(3)(G) of the act requires [sic] that the applicant’s proposed labeling be the same as that of the listed reference drug” with exceptions not relevant here. Id. at 17953. Those provisions, again, dictate the content of the drug’s labeling at the times the ANDA is submitted and approved, not afterwards. In light of the reference to “paragraph 4” — and, in turn, that paragraph’s references to 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)— the FDA’s comment to § 314.70 cannot be fairly read to extend the mandate that “the labeling proposed for the drug [be] the same as the labeling approved for the listed drug,” 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(4)(G), into the post-proposal, or post-approval, period. Moreover, the only change the FDA made to the existing version of § 314.70 through the post Hatch-Waxman ANDA regulations was to add a paragraph requiring the applicant to “comply with the patent information requirements under [21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(2) ].” Id. at 17983 (later codified at 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(e) (1993)). It is hard to believe that, in remarking upon this minor revision to the rule, the FDA was in fact expressing the view that the CBE procedures of § 314.70(c)(6)(iii)— which were not being changed, and were not mentioned anywhere in the remark— are off-limits to ANDA-approved drugs. Indeed, as discussed in Part II.B.4, supra, the FDA had been letting manufacturers make labeling changes to approved drugs that added or strengthened warnings and the like, without prior agency approval, for nearly 20 years prior to Hatch-Waxman, and for more than 27 years prior to the FDA’s post-Hatch-Wax-man ANDA rules. See 30 Fed.Reg. at 993-94. And, as discussed in Part II.B.2, supra, the FDA had been accepting ANDAs for much of that period. If, in spite of this history, the FDA had intended to place the CBE process for labeling changes off-limits to ANDA-approved drugs in the wake of Hatch-Waxman, the agency might have been expected to do so explicitly by amending § 314.70(c)(6)(iii) to that effect — rather than by making a comment, which might or might not be read that way, while amending the rule in a different way entirely. What the FDA actually did was in fact markedly to the contrary: it promulgated 21 C.F.R. § 314.97, entitled “Supplements and other changes to an approved abbreviated application.” 57 Fed.Reg. at 17987. The FDA enacted this provision as part of its overhaul of the ANDA rules following Hatch-Waxman, and received — and made — no comments on it. See id. at 17964. This rule, as mentioned in Part II.B.4, supra, provides: “The applicant shall comply with the requirements of §§ 314.70 and 314.71 regarding the submission of supplemental applications and other changes to an approved abbreviated application.” The “requirements of § 314.70” referred to by § 314.97 include, of course, the CBE provision. Had the FDA intended that, notwithstanding the clear language of § 314.97, the CBE provision was nevertheless inapplicable to drugs approved via ANDAs, one would have expected § 314.97 — or the CBE provision itself — to contain language to that effect or, at least, for the FDA to have clearly explained, in enacting those provisions, that a generic manufacturer could not use the CBE process to change its labels. But the FDA did none of these things. So the defendants are essentially asking this court to rewrite § 314.97 by tacking the words “except for § 314.70(c)(6)(iii)” onto the end. This court, like almost all of those to have considered the availability of the CBE procedure to ANDA-approved drugs in light of § 314.97, declines to do so. See Stacel, 620 F.Supp.2d at 907; Kellogg, 612 F.Supp.2d at 435-36; Demahy, 586 F.Supp.2d at 649-52; Laisure-Radke, 2006 WL 901657, at *3-*5; accord Foster v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 29 F.3d 165, 170 (4th Cir.1994) (citing § 314.97 in recognizing that manufacturers of generic drugs are “permitted to add or strengthen warnings and delete misleading statements on labels, even without prior FDA approval”); but see Morris v. Wyeth, Inc., 642 F.Supp.2d 677, 684-85 (W.D.Ky.2009); Mensing, 562 F.Supp.2d at 1064. Where the language of a regulation is clear, “the courts have no warrant to rewrite [it] in the guise of ‘interpretation.’ ” United States v. Charles George Trucking Co., 823 F.2d 685, 689 (1st Cir.1987). That principle is particularly apt in light of what Congress had to say when it recently spoke on the labeling duties of generic drug manufacturers in the Food and Drug Amendments Act of 2007, as discussed in Part II.B.5, supra. Not only does that act require an ANDA holder (provided the drug is no longer marketed by its NDA holder) to submit a supplemental application proposing labeling changes to reflect new safety information identified by the Secretary, or to explain why no change was warranted, 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(o )(4)(B), it also provides that § 355(o )(4) “shall not be construed to affect the responsibility of ... the holder of the approved application under [21 U.S.C. § 355©] to maintain its label in accordance with existing requirements, including subpart B of part 201 and section[] 314.70- ... of Title 21, Code of Federal Regulations (or any successor regulations).” Id. § 355(o )(4)(I). As also discussed in Part II.B.5, supra, Title 21, part 201, subpart B of the Code of Federal Regulations requires that “[t]he labeling shall be revised to include a warning as soon as there is reasonable evidence of a serious hazard with a drug,” 21 C.F.R. § 201.80(e), at least for prescription drugs not approved on an NDA, BLA, or efficacy supplement after June 30, 2001. See id. § 201.56(b). The surest way to revise a label to include a warning “as soon as there is reasonable evidence,” of course, is to make the revision through the CBE process. If, as the defendants posit, the portion of § 314.70 which opens the CBE process to labeling changes adding or strengthening warnings does not apply to generic manufacturers — if, in fact, §§ 201.80(e) and 314.70(c)(6)(iii) impose no “responsibility” on ANDA holder “to maintain its label”— then the court is left to wonder, without an explanation, why Congress would have thought it necessary to clarify that 21 U.S.C. § 355(o )(4) does not affect that responsibility. The courts “assume that Congress is aware of existing law when it passes legislation.” South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329, 351, 118 S.Ct. 789, 139 L.Ed.2d 773 (1998). Yet the defendants do not attempt to reconcile 21 U.S.C. § 355(o )(4) with their view that neither § 201.80(e) nor § 314.70(c)(6)(iii) applies to them. In this void, it is reasonable to read the statute as authorizing the FDA to notify an ANDA holder of necessary labeling changes to reflect new safety information, while making clear that an ANDA holder’s responsibility to make those changes on its own under 21 C.F.R. § 201.80(e), through the CBE process set forth in 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c)(6), remains. Indeed, as Wyeth observed of 21 U.S.C. § 355(o )(4), “when Congress granted the FDA this authority, it reaffirmed the manufacturer’s obligations and referred specifically to the CBE regulation, which both reflects the manufacturer’s ultimate responsibility for its label and provides a mechanism for adding safety information to the label prior to FDA approval.” 129 S.Ct. at 1198. The defendants also advance an argument that § 314.70(c)(6) applies only to drugs approved through the NDA process which depends not on § 314.70(c)(6) itself, but on a different provision of the ANDA regulations, 21 C.F.R. § 314.150(b)(10). That regulation, as noted in Part II.B.3, supra, states: FDA may notify the applicant, and, if appropriate, all other persons who manufacturer or distribute identical, related, or similar drug products, and for a new drug afford an opportunity for a hearing on a proposal to withdraw approval of the application or the [ANDA] under [21 U.S.C. § 355(e) ] and under the procedure set forth in [21 C.F.R. § 314.200], if the agency finds: (10) That the labeling for the drug product that is the subject of the [ANDA] is no longer consistent with that for the listed drug referred to in the [ANDA], except for differences approved in the ANDA.... 21 C.F.R. § 314.150(b) (emphasis added). The defendants argue that this rule forbade them from using the CBE process to change Sulindac’s label, because doing so would have resulted in an ANDA-approved drug with labeling that was “no longer consistent with that for the listed drug,” thus subjecting the ANDA to revocation. The court cannot read § 314.150 that way. Initially, unlike the admonition repeated throughout the Hatch-Waxman Amendments, and elsewhere in the ANDA regulations, that an ANDA must show “that the labeling proposed for the new drug is the same as the labeling approved for the listed drug,” see, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(v) (emphasis added), section 314.150(b)(10) of the regulations requires that the ANDA’s labeling be “consistent with that of the listed drug” (emphasis added). While “same” means “being one without addition, change, or continuance,” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 2007 (2002), the term “consistent,” in contrast, means “showing no significant change, unevenness, or contradiction.” Id. at 484. Where two provisions of the same rule “differ in that one provision uses a term, but the other provision, where it would be equally sensible to use that term if [the agency] desired it to apply,” uses a different term instead, “it is generally assumed that [the agency] acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate” wording. United States v. Councilman, 418 F.3d 67, 73-74 (1st Cir.2005). Here, as one court has noted, “the discrepancy between the manifold use of the phrase ‘same as’ in the FDA’s initial rulemaking on the pre-approval ANDA process is curious in comparison to the use of the phrase ‘consistent with’ in the regulation governing post- approval processes,” suggesting the terms are not equivalent. Demahy, 586 F.Supp.2d at 649. Labeling on an ANDAapproved drug that differs from that on the listed version only in having stronger or additional warnings is “consistent with,” if not “the same as,” that labeling, in that the generic’s warning, contraindication, side-effect, and precaution information completely overlaps the brand name’ s. Indeed, the FDA enacted § 314.150 in response to a comment that it “should create a new provision authorizing the agency to withdraw an [ANDA] if the [ANDA] holder failed to modify its labeling to match labeling changes in the reference listed drug.” 57 Fed.Reg. at 17970. The rule therefore “revised the rule accordingly” to “state[ ] that the ANDA applicant’s failure to maintain drug labeling that is consistent with that of the listed drug may be grounds for withdrawing approval of the [ANDA].” Id. And the FDA also invoked § 314.150 in response to another comment that “FDA should create a mechanism to compel ANDA regulations to revise their labeling to conform to the listed drug product once the ANDA is approved.” Id. at 17968. As these remarks suggest, then, “the purpose of [the] regulation was not to prevent a generic manufacturer from improving or strengthening its warnings. It was, instead, to ensure that the FDA could require a generic manufacturer to modify its labeling to match labeling changes in the reference listed drug.” Barnhill, 2007 WL 6947996, at *4, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44718, at *13. So, according to the FDA’s own explanation for § 314.150(b)(10), it was not intended to address the opposite situation — where the ANDA holder wants to make labeling changes that have yet to be made on the listed drug. If anything, the FDA’s remarks in promulgating its new ANDA rules after Hatch-Waxman suggest that the agency expected ANDA holders to do just that. In rejecting a comment that it allow “ANDA applicants to deviate from the labeling for the reference listed drug,” the FDA noted that, “[a]fter approval of an ANDA if an ANDA holder believes that new safety information should be added, it should provide adequate supporting information to FDA, and FDA will determine whether the labeling for the generic and listed drugs should be revised.” 57 Fed. Reg. at 17961 (emphasis added). While at least one court has taken this statement to “underscore the notion that the ANDA drug’s label must remain the same as that of the listed drug,” Mensing, 562 F.Supp.2d at 1062, this court sees it differently. As the emphasized language suggests, the statement draws the familiar distinction between t