Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER HELLERSTEIN, District Judge. Plaintiff, Telecom International America, Ltd. (“TIA”), a reseller of long-distance “800” service, and defendant AT & T Corp. (“AT & T”), a telephone company which provides both telecommunications services and equipment, are parties to three contracts. Two of the agreements cover purchases and sales of telephone equipment manufactured and designed by AT & T, and the other covers the utilization by TIA of certain of AT & T’s long-distance telephone services. TIA claims in this lawsuit that the contracts are parts of an “overarching” agreement to provide “end-to-end” service that AT & T breached, and that AT & T is liable to TIA for damages flowing from this breach and for various unfair and otherwise illegal practices. AT & T denies liability, denies the existence of any such “overarching” agreement and counterclaims for sums due under its contract tariff filed with the Federal Communications Commission (the “FCC”). The damages respectively claimed are substantial: TIA seeks an aggregate total of at least $187 million, while AT & T seeks approximately $59 million. After eighteen months of extensive discovery, AT & T moved for summary judgment dismissing the bulk of TIA’s claims, and for partial summary judgment with respect to its four counterclaims. I grant AT & T’s motion in part, and deny it in part. STATEMENT OF FACTS In early 1994, TIA’s parent, Telecom International, Ltd. (“Telecom International”), undertook to provide a high quality, reliable long-distance telephone service to Japanese subscribers at lower rates than those available from other Japanese providers. The parent, Telecom International, was a reseller of telephone services and a dealer in telecommunications equipment to the Japanese market. Telecom International opened discussions with equipment manufacturers toward purchasing available and specially designed equipment to provide a “call-turnaround” application, to be marketed under the name “Diamond Net,” capable of linking two telephone calls: • a long-distance call over a toll-free line from Japan to a switching station in New York (the “inbound call”), with a linked call from New York to the number anywhere in the world dialed by the Japanese subscriber (the “outbound call”). (Affidavit of Eamon Joyce, dated Nov. 19, 1998 (“Joyce Aff.”), at ¶4 n. 1; AT & T’s Statement Pursuant to Local Civil Rule 56.1 (“AT & T 56.1”), at ¶¶ 5-8). Telecom International provided AT & T with projections estimating that Diamond Net would capture 15% of the Japanese long-distance market, sell over two million minutes per month of long-distance services and contract with over 2,000 customers during the first year of operations. (TIA’s Statement Pursuant to Local Civil Rule 56.1 (“TIA 56.1”), at ¶¶ 8, 21). AT & T negotiated to provide both the telecommunications services and the equipment that were needed for Diamond Net, representing that its equipment, combined with its international long-distance network services, could provide the efficiency of “end-to-end” service, linking and completing the envisioned calls in “less than a nanosecond.” (TIA 56.1, at ¶ 12). AT & T promised better service and benefits than competitors like Northern Tele-com, even though the equipment available from such other companies was also compatible with AT & T telecommunications services, and there was no technological reason forcing TIA to purchase both equipment and long-distance services from one company. (Affidavit of Jacques Richard, dated May 8, 1997 (“Richard May 8 Aff.”), at ¶ 6). Thus, AT & T represented in its effort to obtain TIA’s business: When Telecom International selects Me-gacom 800 International and Megacom Wats Services [the AT & T services to be utilized for the inbound call to New York, and the switched outbound call], you are selecting a solution that is “all AT & T” from design through delivery. AT & T Bell Laboratories designed these services and engineered its software. AT & T Network Systems, which won the 1992 Malcolm Baldridge Quality Award, manufactures the network’s components. The AT & T Business Network Sales Division installs and maintains Megacom 800 International and Megacom Wats to AT & T’s rigorous standards. (TIA 56.1, at ¶¶ 12-17). Furthermore, AT & T represented that its equipment had been utilized previously in conjunction with its network services in similar configurations as contemplated by TIA. (Id. at ¶ 3). AT & T recommended the network services and the use of customized equipment to be purchased: AT & T’s Megacom 800 service for the incoming call from Japan to the U.S.; -AT & T’s Megacom service for the outbound call; a customized G3r switch to bridge the calls; a Conversant Series 4.0 automated voice response system to couple the inbound to the outbound call; and a T-45 cable to connect the Me-gacom 800 and Megacom services to the switching equipment. (TIA 56.1, at ¶ 24). AT & T’s materials stated that the configuration could support call volumes of up to 1775 calls per busy hour with an average duration of 3.5 minutes. (TIA 56.1, at ¶ 7). AT & T recommended that Tapestry Computing Co. (“Tapestry”), a company comprised mostly- of former AT & T employees, design and write the software necessary to implement the application. (Id. at ¶ 25). At the time of contracting, AT & T did not provide a single long-distance tariffed service, which could carry both the inbound and outbound calls without requiring a switch to connect the calls. (Richard May 8 Aff., at ¶ 7). A separate service and corresponding tariff 'would have had to have been developed and filed. The Equipment Purchase/Service Agreement of May 1994 On May 3, 1994, AT & T and TIA (which by then had been incorporated by Telecom International) entered into a written equipment purchase and service agreement (the “Equipment Agreement”) providing for the sale by AT & T to TIA of approximately 150 items of equipment for an aggregate price of $527,916.17. The Equipment Agreement, a form contract used by AT & T for many years, provided the terms and conditions of the contractual relationship between AT & T and TIA with regard to these items of equipment. (Kelly Aff., at ¶ 10). The Equipment Agreement, however, did not incorporate the representations made by AT & T during the period of negotiations and in their proposals; indeed, it largely excluded them. In capital letters, the Equipment Agreement excluded any warranty of merchantability or fitness; Section 8 provided: A. Except as stated in Sections 6 and 7, AT & T, its subsidiaries and their affiliates, subcontractors and suppliers make no warranties, express or implied, and specifically disclaim any warranty of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose. (Equipment Agreement, at § 8(A)). Moreover, AT & T disclaimed any warranty of error-free operation, or that the equipment would meet TIA’s specific requirements. Section 8 thus continued: D. AT & T does not warrant uninterrupted or error free product operation or that the software functions will meet your requirements. Although AT & T has used reasonable efforts to minimize defects or errors in the software except as stated in Sections 6 and 7, you assume the risk of any damage or loss from the use of or inability to use the software. (Id. at § 8(D)). The single warranty provided by the Equipment Agreement was that the equipment sold by AT & T would perform in accordance with AT & T’s standard specifications. Thus, in Section 6, AT & T warranted that: ... on the Delivery or In-Service Date, whichever is applicable, and during the warranty period, the equipment and associated operating system software (basic software acquired with the equipment that enables it to function) will operate in accordance with AT & T’s standard specifications. (Id. at § 6). The warranty period was to last one year and AT & T agreed to provide maintenance service at no additional cost for the warranty period; TIA could receive post-warranty period maintenance at additional cost. ' (Id. at §§ 6, 9). The Equipment Agreement also limited the remedies available to TIA as well as the extent of liability to which AT & T could be held. In particular, the terms of the Equipment Agreement asserted that: ... AT & T shall not be liable for incidental, indirect, special or consequential damages, or for lost profits, savings or revenues of any kind, including but not limited to charges for common carrier telecommunication services or facilities accessed through or connected to products, whether or not AT & T has been advised of the possibility of such damages. (Id. at § 17(C)). This clause, like the others detailed above, was also in all capital letters. In addition, the Equipment Agreement contained an integration clause, which in capital letters, stated: H. This is the entire agreement between the parties with respect to the products and services provided hereunder and supersedes all prior agreements, proposals, communications between the parties and understandings, whether written or oral. (Id. at § 22(H)). The Equipment Agreement was to be “construed in accordance with and governed by the local laws of the state of New Jersey.” (Id. at § 22(G)). In light of the fact that TIA did not have a large technical or support operation, and sought to outsource the maintenance and storage responsibilities for the equipment, it did not want to have primary responsibility over storage and maintenance of the equipment. (Joyce Aff., at ¶ 9). Consequently, much of the equipment purchased by TIA was housed at Telehouse, a facility in Staten Island, which was owned in part by AT & T. (Joyce Aff., at ¶ 25; Affidavit of Jacques Richard, dated March 4, 1996 (“Richard March 4 Aff.”), at ¶ 4). Tele-house was specifically designed to house, maintain and keep secure computer and telecommunications equipment, and was the central base of operations for Diamond Net’s equipment. (TIA 56.1, at ¶ 10). TIA sought financing for the purchase price of the equipment, and third-party plaintiff AT & T Credit Corporation (“AT & T Credit”), recommended by AT & T, agreed to provide such financing, secured by a lease of the equipment purchased by TIA. In connection with the lease, TIA and AT & T Credit executed a Master Equipment Lease Agreement (MELA) providing secured financing for the $527,916.17 purchase price. The MELA provided for monthly payments by TIA to AT & T Credit over a term of thirty-six months, and also included acceleration provisions for default. The Contract Tariff Order and the Terms of the Filed Contract Tariff The telecommunications services purchased by TIA were also made the subject of a specific contract. Pursuant to a contract tariff order (the “CTO”) executed by the parties, TIA ordered and AT & T agreed to provide the “inbound” Megacom 800 and the “outbound” Megacom telecommunications services, both to be governed by specific tariffs incorporated by reference in the CTO. The CTO was a simple one-page agreement comprised of twelve paragraphs. Similar to the Equipment Agreement, the CTO disclaimed almost all warranties. Thus, Paragraph Five of the CTO provided, in bold-faced capital letters: Except for any warranties expressly made in the [contract tariff] or the applicable tariffs, AT & T excludes all warranties, express or implied, including but not limited to any implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose. AT & T’s liability to customer is subject to the limitations stated in the [contract tariff] and applicable tariffs. (CTO, at ¶ 5). The CTO also contained an integration clause, superseding the prior negotiations between the parties, and providing that only the terms of the CTO and the filed tariffs were binding. Consequently, the CTO constituted the: [ejntire agreement between the parties with respect to the services to be provided hereunder. This agreement supersedes all prior agreements, proposals, representations, statements, or understandings, whether written or oral, eon-cerning such services or the rights and obligations relating thereto. (Id. at ¶ 11). The CTO also contemplated the possibility of a business downturn that could reduce the volume of network services that TIA might require. Thus, Paragraph 10 of the CTO (the “Business Downturn Clause”) provided that the parties would cooperate to negotiate a suitable alternative. In the event of a business downturn beyond [TIAj’s control, a corporate divestiture, or a network optimization using other AT & T services, that reduces the volume of network services required by [TIA] with the result that [TIA] will be unable to meet its revenue and/or volume commitments under this Agreement (notwithstanding [TIA]’s best efforts to avoid such a shortfall), AT & T and [TIA] will cooperate in efforts to develop a mutually agreeable alternative to this Agreement that will satisfy the concerns of both parties and comply with all applicable legal and regulatory requirements. By way of example and not limitation, such alternative may include changes in rates, nonrecurring charges, revenue and/or volume commitments, discounts, the multi-year service period and other provisions. Subject to all applicable legal and regulatory requirements, including the requirements of the FCC and the Communications Act of 1934, AT & T will prepare and file any tariff revisions necessary to implement such mutually agreeable alternative .... (CTO, at ¶ 10). In order to invoke the clause, TIA was to provide AT & T with “written notice of the conditions it believes will require the application of’ the Business Downturn Clause. (Id). In addition, the clause could not be triggered unless and until AT & T filed a new tariff with the FCC. The clause also provided that it did “not constitute a waiver of any charges, including shortfall charges, incurred by [TIA] prior to the time the parties mutually agree to amend or replace this Agreement.” (Id.). The parties never did “develop a mutually agreeable alternative;” no new tariff was filed by AT & T; and the CTO and CT 1192 remained in effect without modification, and therein remained the only applicable tariff governing the relationship between TIA and AT & T. On May 18, 1994, pursuant to the CTO, AT & T filed a contract tariff, Contract Tariff No. 1192 (“CT 1192”), which provided a rate structure that was steeply discounted from AT & T’s standard tariff rates for Domestic and International Me-gacom Service (the “Megacom Services”) and Domestic and International Megacom 800 Service (the “Megacom 800 Services”). (AT & T 56.1, at ¶ 37). In return for the steep discount, TIA promised to purchase a large minimum annual volume of service (the “Minimum Volume Commitments”): 2,800,000 minutes of “inbound” Megacom 800 Service and 4,400,000 of “outbound” Megacom Service for year one, and 5,600,-000 minutes and 8,800,000 minutes, respectively, for years two and three. TIA agreed to pay AT & T shortfall charges of $.090 per minute for each minute it fell short of the Minimum Volume Commitment for the Megacom Services, and $1.00 per minute for each minute it fell short of the Minimum Volume Commitment for the Megacom 800 Services (the “Shortfall Charges”). (CT 1192, at § 3.A.). CT 1192 incorporated by reference the terms and conditions for the generic tariffs corresponding to the Megacom Services, AT & T Tariff F.C.C. No. 1, and for the Megacom 800 Services, AT & T Tariff F.C.C. No. 2. (Id. at § 4). Moreover, CT 1192 also provided rate schedules detailing the discounted rates TIA would receive with regal'd to the Megacom and Megacom 800 Services. (Id. at §§ 4, 7). Furthermore, TIA also purchased another service from AT & T for Diamond Net: ACCUNET T1.5 Access Connections (the “T1.5 Service”); AT & T Tariff F.C.C. No. 9 set forth the contract price for the T1.5 Service. (Id. at § 4). As described by counsel, the T1.5 Service provided crucial local service connecting the inbound call from AT & T’s receiving switch to TIA’s switch housed in Staten Island, thus linking the inbound and outbound calls. (Tr. at pp. 8-10). The term of service for the T1.5 Service was also three years. Under the terms of CT 1192, TIA guaranteed AT & T minimum annual charges of $7,500,000 for the first year and $15,000,000 for the second and third years for these “inbound” and “outbound” services (the “Minimum Annual Charges”). (Id. at § 3.B.). All together, totaling the Minimum Volume Commitments and the Minimum Annual Charges, TIA made a commitment to purchase approximately $53,000,000.00 of volume from AT & T over the course of the three-year term. (Richard March 4 Aff., at ¶ 14). The CTO and CT 1192 also provided for the event of TIA’s discontinuation of services prior to the termination of the three-year term. TIA agreed that it could be assessed a termination charge, in the amount approximately of the entire shortfall from the Minimum Annual Charges if it discontinued service under CT 1192 pri- or to the expiration of the three-year term. (CT 1192, at § 6.E.). The Termination Charge for AT & T Megacom Services was to be 100% of the unsatisfied domestic Minimum Volume Commitment multiplied by $.090 per minute; and the Termination Charge for AT & T Megacom 800 Services was to be 100% of the unsatisfied international Minimum Volume Commitment multiplied by $1.00 per minute. (Id at § 6.E.). If, however, TIA replaced those tariffed services with other AT & T services applicable to “Contract Tariffs or another Contract Tariff of equal or greater term, volume and revenue commitment,” the Termination Charge imposed upon TIA was to be excused. (Id at § 6.F.). The terms of the various generic AT & T tariffs incorporated in CT 1192, AT & T Tariff Nos. 1, 2, and 9, all stated that payment for the services “is due upon presentation of the bill.” (AT & T 56.1, at ¶ 54). Finally, Paragraph Four of the CTO also made it clear that if any inconsistency arose between the terms of CT 1192, and the filed tariffs incorporated by reference therein, the terms of CT 1192 “shall prevail.” (CTO, at ¶ 4). Moreover, Paragraph Four also stated that if any inconsistency arose between the terms of CT 1192 and the filed tariffs incorporated by reference therein, on the one hand, and the CTO on the other, the terms of CT 1192 “shall prevail.” (Id). Thus, the parties agreed that the terms of CT 1192 would trump all other terms and conditions governing the network services aspect of the relationship between TIA and AT & T, including the terms of the CTO. Equipment Problems and Efforts to Remedy Same On June 16, 1994, the equipment and services comprising Diamond Net were activated. On September 23, 1994, TIA executed Commencement Certificates indicating that it had accepted the equipment provided by AT & T pursuant to the first Equipment Agreement. Almost immediately after activation, however, TIA experienced performance problems with the capability of the equipment it had purchased: calls did not reach their destination; the clarity of connections was distorted by echoes and noises; and incoming and outgoing lines could not be synchronized properly. (TIA 56.1, at ¶ 15). AT & T installed monitoring equipment intended to report outages automatically, and the reports thus generated indicated frequent equipment and service problems. (Id at ¶ 18). TIA advised AT & T frequently of the performance problems it experienced and complained that the equipment was inadequate for the Diamond Net application. (TIA 56.1, at ¶ 17). AT & T convened a high-level task force to analyze and remedy TIA’s complaints. Although the parties dispute its efforts and accomplishments, it appears that AT & T’s engineers recognized that “the network/hardware configuration” sold to TIA did not allow “an end-to-end AT & T solution,” that this presented a conflict with AT & T’s “marketing offer” to TIA, and that no solution was apparent. (Joyce Aff., at Ex. 37). In June 1995, one member of the AT & T task force wrote that in light of TIA’s $53 million commitment to AT & T, it was “not the time to tell” TIA the system was “permissive ... better to walk on egg-shells until we have an alternative?” (Id. at Ex. 22). As another member of the AT & T task force commented, “how far should we go toward fixing the unfixable.” (Id. at Ex. 20). AT & T recommended that TIA purchase additional equipment, including another Conversant, an ASAI link, more software, and another year of maintenance, and expressed its view that these measures would remedy Diamond Net’s performance problems. (TIA 56.1, at ¶¶ 23-27). Essentially, the theory behind the additional equipment was to provide a certain level of redundancy for back-up. (Affidavit of Douglas Lonergan, dated November 18, 1998, Ex. B). TIA agreed, and the parties entered into a second equipment purchase service agreement. The Equipment Purchase/Service Agreement of June 1995 On June 23, 1995, TIA executed the second Equipment Agreement providing for the purchase of the second Conversant, the ASAI link and other items of equipment. The terms of the Second Equipment Agreement were identical to the one executed in May 1994. (Kelly Aff., Ex. B). None of its provisions reflected on the frustrations that TIA had experienced or the view toward correction that AT & T had expressed. Indeed, as with the first Equipment Agreement, the terms disclaimed pre-contract promises and most warranties and representations. The single reflection of a possible problem was suggested by an amendment to the second Equipment Agreement providing that the equipment would be performance tested for “a period of ninety (90) days ... to determine compliance with the following standard:” The Product will consistently pass dialed numbers from your CONVERSANT to your DEFINITY G3R in one (1) second or less, provided the calls processed are limited to human voice calls, calls originating from a FAX machine or voice or FAX calls made via a speed dialing feature and no other applications than the Product are concurrently running on the CONVERSANT. (Id.). Furthermore, the Amendment provided that it was applicable only to the products included on the Second Equipment Agreement, (id.), and that by the ninetieth day, TIA would either accept the product and “AT & T [would] remedy any non-conformities in accordance with the warranty provisions of the PURCHASE [ ] AGREEMENT,” or TIA would notify AT & T in writing that it was rejecting the additional equipment. (Id.). AT & T delivered and installed the additional equipment and, after the 90-day period of warranty expired, TIA accepted the additional equipment. In January 1996, in connection with its acceptance, TIA executed another Commencement Certificate, identical to the earlier Commencement Certificate, documenting its unequivocal acceptance of the additional equipment. (Affidavit of George McLachlan, dated Jan. 9, 1999, Ex. C). Furthermore, TIA entered into another MELA with AT & T Credit to finance the purchase of the additional equipment. The adjusted purchase price of the equipment purchased pursuant to the second MELA totaled $452,000.84. Negotiations Concerning the Shortfall Charges and Invocation of the Business Downturn Clause During the summer of 1995, TIA recognized that it could not meet the Minimum Volume Commitments established for the first year of CT 1192. AT & T advised TIA that in order to invoke the Business Downturn Clause, certain measures needed to be implemented, including the transmittal of an “official” letter from TIA. (TIA 56.1, Ex. 28). But, no “official” letter from TIA to AT & T was ever transmitted; no amendment or agreement was made; and no new contract tariff was filed. Despite TIA’s intention to invoke the Business Downturn Clause and enter into negotiations with AT &. T in the manner provided by the CTO, an agreement was never reached. TIA’s Balance Due for the Network Services On December 23, 1996 and December 24, 1996, respectively, TIA gave notice to AT & T to terminate the Megacom 800 Services and the Megacom Services and soon thereafter disclaimed its payment obligations to AT & T Credit under the MELAs. (AT & T 56.1, at ¶¶ 51-52). By that time, TIA had incurred significant balances due to AT & T: $802,445.48 for the Megacom 800 Services; and $36,-915.19 for the T1.5 Services. AT & T alleges that these amounts are still outstanding presently. In addition, AT & T contends TIA owes AT & T the Shortfall Charges due under CT 1192: $21,659,-516.08 for the Megacom Shortfall Charges and $36,370,376.66 for the Megacom 800 Shortfall Charges. (AT & T 56.1, at ¶¶ 76-77). Thus, AT & T contends that TIA owes AT & T $58,869,253.36 pursuant to the tariff agreements. AT & T also contends that TIA owes it $47,727.07 in back post-warranty maintenance and termination bills for repair and maintenance services provided to TIA after the end of the one-year warranty period. TIA’s Lawsuit TIA filed suit against AT & T in early February 1996, almost eleven months prior to its termination notice to AT & T. TIA’s Second Amended Complaint alleges thirteen claims for relief, including fraudulent inducement, breach of contract and related contract and quasi-contract claims for relief, violations of the Federal Communications Act, and unfair competition under federal and state common law. TIA alleges that it entered into an “overarching” agreement with AT & T, pursuant to which AT & T agreed to design, implement and maintain Diamond Net as an “end-to-end” service. Moreover, TIA contends that AT & T breached numerous representations and warranties with respect to the performance of Diamond Net, and that AT & T fraudulently induced it to enter into the several constituent agreements: the Equipment Agreements, the CTO and contract tariff CT 1192. Thus, the Second Amended Complaint includes a claim for fraudulent inducement of contract and alleges breach of the “overarching” agreement, the two Equipment Agreements, the CTO and contract tariff CT 1192 (First and Second Claims for Relief, respectively). TIA’s Third Claim for Relief alleges that AT & T breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing, and its Fourth Claim for Relief alleges that AT & T breached certain express warranties with respect to the “overarching” agreement for “end-to-end” service. The Fifth Claim for Relief, based on a theory of “money had and received,” alleges that AT & T received substantial sums of money for the design, implementation and maintenance of Diamond Net and that it failed to provide a properly functioning system. TIA’s Sixth and Seventh Claims for relief seek damages and rescission of the agreements between the parties under theories of unilateral and mutual mistake, respectively. The Eighth Claim for Relief, based on promissory estoppel, claims that AT & T promised to design and implement Diamond Net and also promised not to enforce the Shortfall Charges, and that TIA relied to its detriment upon those promises. TIA’s Ninth Claim of Relief, asserting negligent misrepresentation and concealment, alleges that AT & T’s representations with respect to the performance of Diamond Net were made negligently and that AT & T purposely concealed the conclusions of the task force created by AT & T to investigate the performance problems with Diamond Net. In its Tenth, Eleventh and Twelfth Claims for Relief, TIA alleges that AT & T violated Sections 201-203 of the Communications Act. Specifically, TIA contends that AT & T violated Sections 201 and 202 by unjustly discriminating against TIA by providing it with less favorable charges and poorer service than those provided to non-reseller customers and to AT & T itself (Tenth Claim for Relief). Furthermore, TIA asserts that AT & T violated Sections 201-203 by unreasonably delaying and mishandling the provision of services to TIA, by providing TIA with untimely and inaccurate bills, by misusing TIA’s customer proprietary network information and by using TIA as a test “beta” enabling AT & T to design, improve and implement its own call-turnaround service for the Japanese Market (Eleventh Claim for Relief). TIA’s Twelfth Claim for Relief alleges that AT & T purposely withheld the conclusions of AT & T’s task force, convened specifically to study Diamond Net’s performance problems, that AT & T fraudulently induced it to purchase more equipment, pursuant to the second Equipment Agreement, and that AT & T’s actions with respect to TIA were “unjust and unreasonable,” and violated its “duty of non-discrimination” in violation of Sections 201 through 203 of the Communications Act (Twelfth Claim for Relief). Finally, TIA also alleges that AT & T’s conduct constitutes unfair competition under state and federal common law (Thirteenth Claim for Relief). In total, TIA seeks in excess of $187 million in damages, costs and attorneys’ fees in prosecuting this action, and any other relief the Court deems just and proper. AT & T denied the allegations in the Second Amended Complaint and asserted four counterclaims against TIA and its parent company, Telecom International, alleging: the balance due for Megacom 800 charges, in the amount of $802,445.43 (First Counterclaim); that TIA failed to reach the minimum volume commitments for both Megacom and Megacom 800 services, and, consequently, TIA owes AT & T Shortfall Charges in the amount of $58,-029,892.74 (Second Counterclaim); that TIA failed to pay monthly bills for its T1.5 Service usage during Diamond Net’s existence, in the amount of $36,915.19 (Third Counterclaim); and that TIA has failed to pay for post-warranty maintenance, in the amount of $47,727.07 (Fourth Counterclaim). In total, AT & T seeks damages in the amount of $58,916,980.43, plus pre- and post-judgment interest, costs and attorneys’ fees. AT & T Credit intervened and filed claims against TIA claiming the amount due under the terms of the two MELAs, totaling approximately $645,580.30 (minus $103,077.22 received by AT & T Credit as proceeds for the sale of the recovered equipment, for net damages of $542,-503.08.). On March 18, 1999, I granted summary judgment in favor of AT & T Credit on the basis that TIA’s acceptance of the equipment and the terms and conditions of the MELAs created an irrevocable obligation on the part of TIA to pay the full amount financed. Subsequently, by Amended Memorandum and Order, dated June 10, 1999, I certified that judgment as final pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In response to AT & T Credit’s lawsuit, TIA initiated a “fourth-party” action against AT & T for fraudulently inducing it to enter into the MELAs claiming that AT & T should pay any damage award to which AT & T Credit may be entitled. TIA’s Fourth-Party action is not involved in AT & T’s motion. After two oral arguments and several meetings with the parties, I now grant in part and deny in part AT & T’s motion for partial summary judgment. THE RELEVANT LAW AND ANALYSIS A. The Law Concerning Summary Judgment The standard for granting summary judgment is well established. The moving party bears the initial burden of “informing the district court of the basis for its motion” and identifying the matter that “it believes demonstrate[s] the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (“Celo-tex ”). Summary judgment may be granted if the pleadings and written discovery, together with the affidavits, show that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c) (1999); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548; Gallo v. Prudential Residential Servs. Ltd. Partnership, 22 F.3d 1219, 1223 (2d Cir.1994) (“Gallo”). The trial court’s task at the summary judgment motion stage is to discern if there are genuine issues of material fact to be tried, not to deciding them; its duty is “issue-finding,” it does not extend to “issue-resolution.” Gallo, 22 F.3d at 1224. In determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, a court must resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences against the moving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (“Matsushita”). If the moving party meets its burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to come forward with “specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(e) (1999). The nonmoving party must raise more than just a “metaphysical doubt” as to the material facts. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348. “If the evidence is merely colorable or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 250-51, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). If there is an absence of sufficient proof as to any essential element on which the opponent of summary judgment has the burden of proof, any factual dispute with respect to other elements becomes immaterial and cannot defeat the motion. Gottlieb v. Co. of Orange, 84 F.3d 511, 519 (2d Cir.1996) (“Gottlieb”). Speculative and conclusory allegations by the non-movant are insufficient to prevent a summary judgment motion from being granted. Allen v. Coughlin, 64 F.3d 77, 80 (2d Cir.1995) (“Allen”). I. TIA’S SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT At its core, this matter concerns the scope of the rights and obligations to which these parties contracted. Resolution of this issue provides the foundation upon which the other claims can be assessed. Thus, I will treat TIA’s allegations of breach of contract first. A. Breach of Contract and Breach of Express Warranty TIA’s Second Amended Complaint alleges that AT & T breached an “overarching” agreement pursuant to which AT & T would design, manufacture and implement Diamond Net as an “end-to-end” long-distance telephone service. (Second Amended Compl., at ¶¶ 197-214). According to TIA, this “overarching” agreement was implemented by a number of oral representations and three written agreements, namely the CTO and the two Equipment Agreements, and that AT & T breached these agreements as well. I hold that the parties’ rights and obligations are to be determined by examining the terms and conditions of the three written agreements executed, by AT & T and TIA, and the tariff filed by AT & T thereunder. I hold that no “overarching” agreement for “end-to-end” service existed between the parties, and that such an “overarching” agreement contradicts the unambiguous terms . of the three executed integrated agreements, and is specifically disclaimed by them. New Jersey law, the governing law stipulated by the written agreements, makes this clear. In New Jersey, as its Supreme Court has held, “no principle is more firmly imbedded in our law than that which declares that in the absence of fraud or illegality [ ], where a written agreement is complete on its face, oral testimony will not be permitted either to contradict it, or to supply terms with respect to which the writing is silent.” Schlossman’s, Inc. v. Radcliffe, 3 N.J. 430, 435, 70 A.2d 493 (1950) (“Schloss-man’s”). Where a writing purports to be complete on its face, the writing must be accepted as the full expression of the agreement of the parties; parol evidence is not allowed. Filmlife, Inc. v. Mal “Z” Ena, Inc., 251 N.J.Super. 570, 573, 598 A.2d 1234 (App.Div.1991) (“Filmlife”). Consequently, an oral warranty or representation made prior to or contemporaneously with the writing will not be admitted to add or vary a writing, nor will a warranty be implied therein, where the contract by its very terms is made the “ ‘entire agreement’, between the parties.” Schlossman’s, 3 N.J. at 435, 70 A.2d 493. The parol evidence rule in New Jersey is “unusually rigid,” as the Study Comment to Section 12A2-316 of the New Jersey Statutes observes, and “has been used on a number of occasions to prevent proof of warranties.” N.J. Stat. Ann. § 12A:2-316 cmt. 5 (1999); see also, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 12A:2-202 (1999) (New Jersey’s Parol Evidence Rule). Thus, contracts with unequivocal integration and merger clauses are accorded “conclusive effect in determining whether the contract is integrated.” Dow Chem. Co. v. Schaefer Salt & Chem. Co., No. 91-4027, 1992 WL 672289, at *9 (D.N.J. July 21, 1992); Silverstein v. Keane, 19 N.J. 1, 115 A.2d 1 (1955); Ross v. Orr, 3 N.J. 277, 69 A.2d 730 (1949) (“Ross”); see also, N.J. Stat. Ann. 12A:2-202 cmt. (1999). 1. The “Overarching” Agreement TIA seeks what the parol evidence rule prevents — to alter or modify the specific terms of complete, integrated agreements with evidence of alleged prior communications between the parties. Schlossman’s, 3 N.J. at 435, 70 A.2d 493; Filmlife, 251 N.J.Super. at 573, 598 A.2d 1234. New Jersey law precludes such a result. Where a written agreement provides that it is the entire agreement between the parties, evidence of oral representations will not be admitted to vary the terms of the written agreement or to create a new agreement between the parties. Schlossman’s, 3 N.J. at 435, 70 A.2d 493; Filmlife, 251 N.J.Super. at 573, 598 A.2d 1234. TIA contends that an “overarching” agreement can be inferred from representations made by AT & T personnel in pre-contract meetings, and in meetings seeking to remedy Diamond Net’s performance problems. But there is no mention of a commitment by AT & T to provide “end-to-end” service in any written agreement. Thus, the written agreements specifically provide that any such “prior agreements, proposals [and] communications” are superseded. This is the entire agreement between the parties with respect to the products to be provided hereunder and supersedes all prior agreements, proposals, communications, between the parties and understandings, whether written or oral. (Equipment Agreement, at § 22(H), see also, similar provision in CTO, at ¶ 11). New Jersey law, gives such integration and merger provisions conclusive effect. Ross, 3 N.J. at 277, 69 A.2d 730. The Equipment Agreements and the CTO also expressly disclaim any but standard warranties. Except for any warranties expressly made in the [CT 1192] or the applicable tariffs, AT & T excludes all warranties, express or implied, including but not limited to any implied warranties or merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose.... (CTO, at ¶ 5; see also, similar provision in Equipment Agreement, at § 8A). Specifically, warranties of “merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose” are disclaimed. (Equipment Agreement, at § 8(A)). TIA’s understanding of these disclaimers is presumed. Fleming Cos. Inc. v. Thriftway Medford Lakes, Inc., 913 F.Supp. 837, 843 (D.N.J.1995) (“Fleming Cos. Inc.”); Fivey v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 67 N.J.L. 627, 632, 52 A. 472 (E. & A.1902). Moreover, the agreements are bereft of any description of how the tar-iffed services would work together, nor are there any representations concerning the quality of transmission. TIA is presumed to have understood the absence of such terms. These contracts are written for business people. Officers and employees of companies must be able to read and understand the rights and obligations of the parties from the terms and conditions of complete, integrated contracts. See, e.g., Brinderson-Newberg Joint Venture v. Pacific Erectors, Inc., 971 F.2d 272, 281 (9th Cir. 1992) {“Brinderson”). The stability of contract obligations and the objective understanding and expectations of the parties cannot be undermined by judicial sympathy to one party or the other, or the unwillingness to apply that which is clearly written. Fleming Cos. Inc., 913 F.Supp. at 843. Here, the Equipment Agreements and the CTO are clear and nowhere do they obligate AT & T to provide “end-to-end” service or equipment fit for any represented function. TIA further argues that the executed agreements are ambiguous as to the full breadth of the rights and obligations of the parties and asks me to entertain parol evidence. Garden State Buildings, L.P. v. First Fidelity Bank, N.A., 305 N.J.Super. 510, 702 A.2d 1315 (App.Div.1997) (“Garden State Buildings”); Kronisch v. The Howard Savings Institution, 154 N.J.Super. 576, 382 A.2d 64, aff'd in part, rev’d in part, 161 N.J.Super. 592, 392 A.2d 178 (App.Div.1978) (“Kronisch”). TIA’s argument is without merit. An absence of terms does not create ambiguity. The Equipment Agreements are form contracts and the CTO is a one page agreement with twelve straightforward provisions. There are no ambiguities. TIA fails to identify any language in either the Equipment Agreements or the CTO which is susceptible to at least two fairly reasonable meanings. Garden State Buildings, 305 N.J.Super. at 525, 702 A.2d 1315. We do not have an “unartfully drawn [assignment] provision clearly ... subject to more than one interpretation,” see, Garden State Buildings, 305 N.J.Super. at 525, 702 A.2d 1315, or a reference to a conveyance “in trust” that was susceptible to multiple interpretations, see, Kronisch, 154 N.J.Super. at 586, 382 A.2d 64. Here, TIA has not pointed to, and cannot point to, any provision of the Equipment Agreements or the CTO which is ambiguous, and consequently, its claim for breach of an “overarching” agreement must fail. In sum, TIA’s Second and Fourth Claim for Relief alleging breach of an “overarching” agreement and express warranties are dismissed with prejudice because the integrated agreements executed by the parties are bereft of any provisions memorializing an agreement for “end-to-end” service; the parol evidence rule bars introduction of any evidence specifically contradicting the terms of those agreements. 2. Breach of AT & T’s Standard Specifications with Respect to the Equipment Agreements TIA’s Second Claim for Relief also alleges, as extended during oral argument and elaborated by supplemental submissions from the parties, that the equipment and software it purchased failed to perform in accordance with AT & T’s standard specifications, a warranty that is specifically provided by the written agreements. (Equipment Agreement, at § 6). I hold that these allegations give rise to triable issues of fact and, therefore, I deny AT & T’s motion for summary judgment with respect to the Second Claim for Relief. I also deny TIA’s request for further discovery. TIA’s telecommunications consultant identified numerous standard specifications that AT & T breached, proximately causing the equipment failures that allegedly compromised TIA’s ability to deliver satisfactory Diamond Net performance to its customers. (Supplemental Affidavit of Douglas Lonergan, dated May 5, 1999 (“Lonergan Supp. Aff.”), at ¶¶ 5-6). Specifically, TIA’s expert identified breaches of standard specifications relating to, among other items of equipment: a.Problems with the G3r Conversant, including failure on a trunk to trunk transfer, during which TIA’s G3r “does not always pass supervision.” (Lonergan Supp. Aff., at ¶ 35, Ex. 21). b. The G3r Conversant, when acting in “tandem” failed to consistently perform in accordance with the standard specifications listed for the De-finity Generic 3 Glossary Issue 2, March 1994. (Id. at ¶ 36, Ex. 23). c. The “Blind Transfer” function consistently failed: the function which dials the “third party number” starts the transfer and then “relinquishes the call to either a busy signal, no answer or whatever the condition may be.” (Id. at ¶ 42, Ex. 31). d. Problems with the remote maintenance on the Conversant which allowed a “technician or remote system administrator ... to log into the system through the Remote Maintenance board over analog T/R lines to observe or administer the platform.” (Id. at ¶ 43, Ex. 32). e. AT & T failed to provide sufficient memory for the Conversant, providing only 26 megabytes of RAM rather than the 32 megabytes recommended by the Conversant’s manual. (Id. at ¶ 41). In addition, TIA contends that AT & T failed to deliver standard specifications for a considerable number of items of equipment where alleged failures to perform also proximately caused TIA’s inability to provide satisfactory performance to its customers. Specifically, TIA asserts that it did not receive standard specifications for the Tapestry Comp. A and the ASAI Call Flow, two “items which were to drive TIA’s application,” and it did not receive standard specifications for the “Load Balancing/Call Allocator.” (Lonergan Supp. Aff., at ¶ 3 n. 1, ¶ 44). TIA contends that, in the absence of standard specifications for this equipment, it could reasonably have expected performance in accordance with AT & T’s representations, notwithstanding the disclaimers of warranty in the Equipment Agreements. AT & T counters TIA’s claims that many of the “standard specifications” identified by TIA and the “missing” standard specifications were for “customized application[s] designed especially for TIA,” not generic products. (AT & T Supplemental Memoranda, dated May 6, 1999, at p. 3). AT & T thus implies that no warranties governed the performance of these items of equipment, but that does not make sense in light of the explicit provision in the Equipment Agreement regarding the standard specifications. AT & T also takes issue with TIA’s claims of equipment failure, arguing that there was only a “single incident of failure” concerning the remote maintenance functions, not the repeated failures as described by TIA, and that TIA is comparing the wrong kinds of memory with respect to the Conversant’s memory capacity. It is not the function of the court to weigh these conflicting claims. I find that genuine issues of triable fact exist. I cannot determine from the submissions of the parties whether the equipment and conforming software provided to TIA were specific to Diamond Net, separately or in configuration, or a collection of “off-the-shelf’ products. I believe, also, that each item of equipment sold by AT & T had to perform according to a standard; that the reasonable expectations of a promisee would look to the standard specifications as the definitions of the governing standards; and that, in the absence of standard specifications, the parties’ reasonable expectations should allow proofs of alternatives utilized by the parties, that is, their representations to one another. Finally, neither TIA’s assertions of breach, nor AT & T’s denial of breach, can be accepted. Proofs at a trial are required. In anticipation of this finding, I ordered that the Plaintiffs should submit their Expert Report with respect to the alleged breaches of standard specifications by Friday, August 6,1999, and that AT & T shall have an opportunity to submit their own expert report by Friday, September 3, 1999. I ordered trial to commence on Monday, October 11, 1999, with respect to this issue. B. TIA’s Other Contract-Related Claims for Relief TIA has also asserted a number of claims for relief which are variations of its breach of contract claims. As I discuss, these claims are attempts to evade the preclusive effect of unambiguous and integrated written agreements which specifically disclaim the terms TIA seeks to impose upon AT & T. I will treat each of these claims for relief in turn. 1. Promissory Estoppel and Money Had and Received TIA’s Fifth and Eighth Claims for Relief are based on the principles of “money had and received” and promissory es-toppel, respectively. In short, TIA claims that it paid AT & T large sums of money to design, implement and maintain Diamond Net, and that it received in return a system that did not function properly. TIA relied to its detriment upon AT & T’s promises of “end-to-end” service, and under principles of “equity and good conscience,” TIA alleges that AT & T should return all money paid to it by TIA, plus damages. AT & T, in response, argues that where there is a written enforceable agreement governing the relationship between the parties, a claim based in promissory estoppel, or “money had and received,” cannot be sustained. I agree. The New York State Court of Appeals has held repeatedly that the existence of a “valid and enforceable written contract governing a particular subject matter ordinarily precludes recovery in quasi contract for events arising out of the same subject matter.” Clark-Fitzpatrick, Inc. v. Long Island R.R. Co., 70 N.Y.2d 382, 388, 521 N.Y.S.2d 653, 516 N.E.2d 190 (1987) (“Clark-Fitzpatrick”); Blanchard v. Blanchard, 201 N.Y. 134, 138, 94 N.E. 630 (1911); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc., 723 F.Supp. 976, 993 (S.D.N.Y.1989) (“Faced with a comprehensive contract ... authorizing Federated’s conduct, the Plaintiffs cannot invoke promissory estoppel to avoid its enforcement”). Indeed, such remedies only apply “in the absence of an express agreement;” for the remedy is not “really a contract at all, but rather a legal obligation imposed in order to prevent a party’s unjust enrichment.” Clark-Fitzpatrick, 70 N.Y.2d at 388, 521 N.Y.2d 653, 516 N.E.2d 190. New Jersey law is the same. See, Ballard v. Schoenberg, 224 N.J.Super. 661, 666, 541 A.2d 258 (App.Div.) (“Promissory estoppel is ... not itself a cause of action ex contractu ...”), cert. denied, 113 N.J. 367, 550 A.2d 473 (1988). Here, the parties executed three valid and enforceable agreements defining explicitly the relationship between AT & T and TIA: the two Equipment Agreements, and the CTO, which incorporates the terms of CT 1192. The terms of those contracts exclude specifically the existence of an “overarching” agreement between the parties for “end-to-end” AT & T service, and it is not proper to create such an agreement based on the principles of promissory estoppel or “money had and received.” Callahan v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 56 Misc.2d 734, 737, 289 N.Y.S.2d 1005, 1009 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1968) (Estoppel “will not ... serve to extend the coverage afforded by American’s policy beyond what it contracted for”). The doctrines of promissory estoppel, money had and received and other such quasi contract remedies cannot defeat a properly drawn integration clause in a contract which specifically disclaims such representations and warranties. NCC Sunday Inserts, Inc. v. World Color Press, Inc., 759 F.Supp. 1004, 1012 n. 13 (S.D.N.Y.1991); see also, Levitt Homes Inc. v. Old Farm Homeowner’s Assoc., 111 Ill.App.3d 300, 315, 67 Ill.Dec. 155, 444 N.E.2d 194 (2d Dist.1982). Accordingly, TIA’s Fifth and Eighth Claims for Relief based on “money had and received” and promissory estoppel, are dismissed with prejudice. 2. Breach of the Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing TIA’s Third Claim for Relief alleges that AT & T breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing because of its failure to perform pursuant to its “contractual obligations.” (Second Amended Compl., at ¶¶ 225-231). Specifically, TIA asserts that AT & T breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing because they failed to perform the “overarching” agreement, misrepresented and concealed the true nature of AT & T’s ability to provide “end-to-end” service, and failed to implement the Business Downturn Clause. (Id. at ¶¶ 31-39; 228-29). AT & T argues that TIA attempts to impose upon AT & T a contractual obligation for “end-to-end” service conspicuously absent from the CTO, CT 1192 and the two Equipment Agreements. New Jersey common law and N.J.S.A. 12A:1-201(19) impose upon parties the obligation to exercise good faith in the performance of a contract for the sale of goods. Coast Cities Truck Sales, Inc. v. Navistar International Transportation Co., 912 F.Supp. 747, 776 (D.N.J.1995). The duty of good faith does not, however, alter the terms of a written agreement. Rudbart v. North Jersey District Water Supply Comm’n, 127 N.J. 344, 366, 605 A.2d 681, cert. denied, 506 U.S. 871, 113 S.Ct. 203, 121 L.Ed.2d 145 (1992) (“Rud-bart”). Since, the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing cannot be utilized to .alter or add to the terms of the various written agreements executed by the parties, TIA may not use the duty to imply the existence of an “overarching” agreement for “end-to-end” service. Rudbart, 127 N.J. at 366, 605 A.2d 681. TIA’s attempt to do so is an evasion of the obligations of contract, and cannot alter or nullify the explicit terms of the CTO and the Equipment Agreements. Consequently; AT & T is entitled to summary judgment dismissing TIA’s Third Claim for Relief with prejudice. 3. Fraudulent Inducement and Negligent Misrepresentation In Claims for Relief One and Nine, TIA claims that AT & T fraudulently induced it to enter into the “contract for and implementation of Diamond Net,” and that AT & T made numerous “negligent misrepresentations:” specifically, concerning “end-to-end service/ONE BELL SYSTEM,” Minimum Volume Commitments and the enforcement of Shortfall Charges, and withholding the task force’s conclusions that the performance of Diamond Net could not be guaranteed. (Second Amended Compl., at ¶¶ 197-214, 265-71). Again, these allegations are but essentially repetitions of TIA’s breach of contract claims that I have already dismissed. In New York, “it is well settled that ‘mere allegations of breach of contract do not give rise to a claim for fraud or fraudulent inducement....’ ” Rolls-Royce Motor Cars, Inc. v. Schudroff, 929 F.Supp. 117, 123 (S.D.N.Y.1996) (‘Rolls-Royce’’); Deerfield Comrmmications Corp. v. Chesebrough-Ponds, Inc., 68 N.Y.2d 954, 956, 510 N.Y.S.2d 88, 89, 502 N.E.2d 1003 (1986) (“Deerfield”). Most courts who have analyzed this question have refused to permit fraud claims arising from contractual relationships unless: (1) the claims are premised on a “a separate duty outside the [contract]” or (2) the plaintiff seeks to recover “special damages proximately caused by the alleged false representations that are not recoverable under the contract measure of damages.” Best Western Int’l, Inc. v. CSI International Corp., No. 94 Civ. 360, 1994 WL 465905, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 1994); see also, Sudul v. Computer Outsourcing Servs., 868 F.Supp. 59, 62-63 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). Here, TIA’s allegations of damage from the fraud arise from the same allegations of their breach of contract claims: AT & T misrepresented their ability to provide “end-to-end” service to TIA; AT & T misrepresented whether they would enforce the Shortfall Charges; AT & T misrepresented that the system would function properly; and because of AT & T’s alleged misrepresentations Diamond Net failed to achieve the success envisioned by TIA. Indeed, TIA’s claims seek to enforce no more than the breached promises and obligations alleged in the breach of contract claims. Bell Sports, Inc. v. System Software Assocs., Inc., 45 F.Supp.2d 220, 227 (E.D.N.Y.1999). Consequently, since TIA’s fraudulent inducement and negligent misrepresentation claims are redundant of its breach of contract claims, those claims for relief must be dismissed. Rolls-Royce, 929 F.Supp. at 124. TIA’s reliance on Deerfield is unavailing. In Deerfield, the New York Court of Appeals held that the alleged fraudulent promise was independent of the buyer’s duties to abide by the terms of the sales contract executed by the parties. Deerfield, 68 N.Y.2d at 956, 510 N.Y.S.2d 88, 502 N.E.2d 1003. Here, TIA points to no collateral fraudulent promise which it claims AT & T made to induce it to enter into the various agreements. Indeed, the only alleged promises TIA points to are those specifically disclaimed by the Equipment Agreements and the CTO, and which would contradict the express terms of those agreements. To allow parol evidence to contradict those specific terms would create an exception to the parol evidence rule which would defeat its very purpose. See, e.g., Brinderson, 971 F.2d at 280-81. Moreover, TIA may not rest simply on its allegations in the Second Amended Complaint to survive summary judgment. TIA must come forward with facts. Gottlieb, 84 F.3d at 519; Allen, 64 F.3d at 80. TIA’s papers are bereft of any facts demonstrating that the damages they are alleged to have suffered from the fraudulent inducement were caused by anything different from the facts alleged to support its claim for breach of an “overarching” agreement. Domberger v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 961 F.Supp. 506, 542 (S.D.N.Y.1997); PI, Inc. v. Quality Prods., Inc., 907 F.Supp. 752, 761 (S.D.N.Y.1995). Nor has TIA identified any facts supporting the notion that AT & T never intended to honor its obligations and commitments when it entered into the CTO and the two Equipment Agreements. Deerfield, 68 N.Y.2d at 956, 510 N.Y.S.2d 88, 502 N.E.2d 1003; Sabo v. Delman, 3 N.Y.2d 155, 160, 164 N.Y.S.2d 714, 143 N.E.2d 906 (1957). TIA’s First and Ninth Claims for Relief alleging Fraudulent Inducement and Negligent Misrepresentation are dismissed with prejudice. 4. Mutual and Unilateral Mistake TIA further seeks to have the CTO and the Equipment Agreements rescinded based on the ground of mutual mistake: that both parties were operating under the mistaken impression that AT & T could provide “end-to-end” service (Seventh Claim for Relief). (Second Amended Compl., at ¶¶ 258-59). Alternatively, TIA contends it is entitled to damages based on unilateral mistake: AT & T made “mistaken representations” which were material to TIA’s decision to execute the various agreements (Sixth Claim for Relief). These claims suffer from the same infirmities as those mentioned above. a. Mutual Mistake A mutual mistake occurs when both parties are under substantially the same erroneous belief as to a “particular, essential fact.” Bonnco Petrol, Inc. v. Epstein, 115 N.J. 599, 608, 560 A.2d 655, 659 (1989); see also, Chimart Assocs. v. Paul, 66 N.Y.2d 570, 574-75, 498 N.Y.S.2d 344, 347-48, 489 N.E.2d 231 (1986); Farnsworth on Contracts, § 9.3 (2nd ed.1998). Again, the doctrine of mutual mistake does not relieve the parties of the legal consequences of their signed agreements because they claim not to have been aware of those consequences. The objective intentions of the parties is determined by that which is signed, not that which they wish they would have signed. In addition, TIA fails to elucidate any evidence demonstrating that AT & T maintained a belief that the contract it signed mistakenly provided something different than AT & T intended. Indeed, none of AT & T’s deposition witnesses or affiants have stated that AT & T misunderstood the terms of the agreements it executed, or that the Equipment Agreements and the CTO contained provisions for the “end-to-end” service that TIA wishes to insert in them. b. Unilateral Mistake With respect to unilateral mistake, courts in New Jersey have been loathe to rescind a contract based on unilateral mistake absent the existence of special circumstances. None of those circumstances are present here. The alleged mistakes are nothing more than representations that TIA claims AT & T made during the pre-contract negotiation stage. The signed contracts did not incorporate those representations, and were specifícally disclaimed by the contract. TIA may not introduce parol evidence of its supposed mistaken belief in an attempt to circumvent the preclusive effect of a properly drawn integration clause and an unambiguous agreement. Moreover, TIA cannot demonstrate that its reliance upon these alleged mistaken misrepresentations was reasonable, since it is charged with understanding and with knowing and accepting the terms of the contract it executed. Fivey v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 67 N.J.L. 627, 52 A. 472 (E. & A.1902). Since TIA does not raise a material genuine issue of material fact with respect to its Sixth and Seventh Claims for Relief alleging mutual and unilateral mistake, AT & T is entitled to judgment dismissing these claims with prejudice. C. TIA’s Claims for Relief Under the Communications Act TIA next asserts three claims for relief pursuant to the Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 151, et. seq. (1999). TIA’s Tenth Claim for Relief alleges that AT & T violated Sections 201 and 202 of the Communications Act because AT & T “unjustly and u