LG Display Co. v. AU Optronics Corp. (686 F. Supp. 2d 429, 2010)

United States District Court for the District of Delaware 2010-02-16

Citations

Full opinion text

OPINION

FARNAN, District Judge.

These proceedings involve three related patent infringement cases involving 23 patents. In the first-filed action, LG Display Co., Ltd. (“LGD”) alleges infringement of nine asserted patents (collectively, the “LGD Patents”) against AU Optronics Corporation (“AUO”) and Chi Mei Optoelectronics Corporation (“CMO”). AUO and CMO have also brought separate actions against LGD and LG Display America, Inc. (“LGD America”) alleging infringement of eight patents asserted by AUO and six patents asserted by CMO.

Proceedings with respect to CMO have been stayed. The Court required the parties to reduce the number of patents and claims asserted to a total of four patents and seven claims per side. As a result, LGD identified the following patents and claims for trial against AUO: U.S. Patent No. 5,019,002 (claim 8); U.S. Patent No. 5,825,449 (claims 10 and 11); U.S. Patent No. 6,815,321 (claims 7, 17 and 19) and U.S. Patent No. 7,218,374 (claim 9). AUO identified the following four patents and claims for trial against LGD and LGD America: U.S. Patent No. 6,778,160 (claims 1 and 3); U.S. Patent No. 6,689,629 (claims 7 and 16); U.S. Patent No. 7,125,-157 (claim 1) and U.S. Patent No. 7,090,506 (claims 7 and 17).

A bench trial was held on the claims brought by the parties and was bifurcated into two phases. The first phase of trial was held from June 2-8, 2009, and addressed AUO’s infringement claims against LGD. The second phase of trial was held from June 16-22, 2009, and addressed LGD’s infringement claims against AUO.

The claims and counterclaims for infringement and declaratory judgment in this case arise under the patent laws of the United States, Title 35, United States Code. Accordingly, the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1338(a), and 2201(a). Personal jurisdiction over the parties exists pursuant to 10 Del. C. § 3104, the Delaware long-arm statute. D.I. 1170 at 12. Likewise, venue in this district is appropriate under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391(b), (c) and (d) and 1400. Neither jurisdiction nor venue is contested by the parties.

This Memorandum Opinion constitutes the Court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law on the claims brought by the parties.

BACKGROUND

I. The Parties

LGD, formerly named LG Phillips LCD Co., Ltd., is a Korean corporation with a place of business in Korea. D.I. 1170 at Exh. 1, Stipulated Fact No. 1. LGD America is a California corporation with a place of business in San Jose, California. Id., Stipulated Fact No. 2. LGD and LGD America are collectively referred to as “LGD.” Id., Stipulated Fact No. 3.

AU Optronics Corporation (“AUO”) is a Taiwanese corporation with a place of business located in Taiwan. Id., Stipulated Fact No. 5. AU Optronics Corporation of America (“AUO America”) is a California corporation with a place of business located in Santa Clara, California. Id. at Stipulated Fact No. 6. AUO Corp. and AUO America are collectively referred to as “AUO.”

II. The Patents And The Technology Generally

The asserted patents relate to liquid crystal display (“LCD”) products or methods of producing and assembling such products. Id., Stipulated Fact No. 13. An LCD is a flat panel display device that is used to generate images in a variety of products, including such devices as computer monitors, television screens, notebook computers and mobile phones. Id., Stipulated Fact No. 14.

DISCUSSION

I. Claim Construction

A. The Legal Principles of Claim Construction

Claim construction is a question of law. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 977-78 (Fed.Cir. 1995), aff'd, 517 U.S. 370, 388-90, 116 S.Ct. 1384, 134 L.Ed.2d 577 (1996). When construing the claims of a patent, a court considers the literal language of the claim, the patent specification and the prosecution history. Marlcman, 52 F.3d at 979. Of these sources, the specification is “always highly relevant to the claim construction analysis. Usually it is dispositive; it is the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.” Phillips v. AWH Corporation, 415 F.3d 1303, 1312-17 (Fed.Cir. 2005) (citing Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed.Cir. 1996)). However, “[e]ven when the specification describes only a single embodiment, the claims of the patent will not be read restrictively unless the patentee has demonstrated a clear intention to limit the claim scope using ‘words or expressions of manifest exclusion or restriction.’ ” Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 358 F.3d 898, 906 (Fed.Cir.2004) (quoting Teleflex, Inc. v. Picosa N. Am. Corp., 299 F.3d 1313, 1327 (Fed.Cir.2002)).

A court may consider extrinsic evidence, including expert and inventor testimony, dictionaries, and learned treatises, in order to assist it in understanding the underlying technology, the meaning of terms to one skilled in the art and how the invention works. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1318-19; Marlcman, 52 F.3d at 979-80. However, extrinsic evidence is considered less reliable and less useful in claim construction than the patent and its prosecution history. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1318-19 (discussing “flaws” inherent in extrinsic evidence and noting that extrinsic evidence “is unlikely to result in a reliable interpretation of a patent claim scope unless considered in the context of intrinsic evidence”).

In addition to these fundamental claim construction principles, a court should also interpret the language in a claim by applying the ordinary and accustomed meaning of the words in the claim. Envirotech Corp. v. Al George, Inc., 730 F.2d 753, 759 (Fed.Cir.1984). If the patent inventor clearly supplies a different meaning, however, then the claim should be interpreted according to the meaning supplied by the inventor. Markman, 52 F.3d at 980 (noting that patentee is free to be his own lexicographer, but emphasizing that any special definitions given to words must be clearly set forth in patent). If possible, claims should be construed to uphold validity. In re Yamamoto, 740 F.2d 1569, 1571 (Fed.Cir.1984).

B. AUO’s Patents

The parties dispute a number of claim terms from the asserted patents. The Court has selected for construction those terms that appear most pertinent to the disputes and trial positions argued by the parties in the post-trial briefing.

1.U.S. Patent No. 6,778,160 (the “ '160 patent”)

AUO asserts claims 1 and 3 of the '160 patent. Claim 3 is a dependent claim that stems from claim 2. Accordingly, the relevant claims of the '160 patent are provided below, in full:

1. A liquid crystal display, comprising: an input logic for inputting a video signal from a host; a storage for storing the previous brightness level of the video signal input through said input logic; a determinator for determining an output brightness level based on the previous brightness level stored in said storage and the next brightness level of the next video signal input to said input logic so as to make a time integration quantity of a brightness change substantially equal to an ideal quantity of light in a stationary state with respect to the next brightness level; and a driver for driving an image displaying liquid crystal cell based on said output brightness level determined by said determination logic.

2. The liquid crystal display according to claim 1, wherein said determinator comprising a table for storing a brightness level determined by the characteristic of a liquid crystal cell according to a relation between the previous brightness level and the next brightness level, and determining the output brightness level by modifying said next brightness level based on the brightness level read from said table.

3. The liquid crystal display according to claim 2, wherein: said video signal input through said input logic comprises a plurality of color signals; and said table in said determinator is provided for each of said color signals.

The parties agree that one of ordinary skill in the art with respect to the '160 patent at the time of its filing is a person with at least a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering and several years experience working with liquid crystal displays, or the equivalent combined education and work experience. D.I. 1388 at ¶ 389; D.I. 1383 at ¶ 122.

a.a storage for storing the previous brightness level

The parties agree that the term “storage” refers to a “memory.” D.I. 1388 at ¶ 390; D.I. 1387 at 23. The parties dispute the meaning of “brightness level.” LGD contends that “brightness level” means a “gray scale value or luminance value” and proposes that the phrase “a storage for storing the previous brightness level” be defined as “memory that temporarily holds the brightness level of the video signal received from the host through input logic for the previous time increment.” Id. at ¶ 394. AUO contends that the term “brightness level means a level of intensity of light,” and therefore, the term “a storage for storing the previous brightness level” should be defined as “memory for storing a previous level of light intensity of a video signal input through input logic.” D.I. 376 at Exh. M-2.

After reviewing the claim language in light of the specification, the Court concludes that “brightness level” means a “level of intensity of light.” This construction is consistent with the specification which explains that brightness “should be considered in terms of the quantity of light.” AUO-5 ('160 patent) at col. 8, 11. 32-35. While it is true that the specification suggests that a “brightness level can be represented as a target brightness by a gray scale,” the Court does not read the specification to limit the representation of a video signal’s brightness level to “gray scale values.” Id. at col. 3,1. 67.

b.determinator for determining an output brightness level

AUO contends that this term means “logic, such as a circuitry, for determining an output brightness value”. D.I. 376 at Exh. M-3. LGD contends that this phrase should be defined as “circuit or logic” that determines the output brightness level by applying an offset to the next brightness level that is predetermined based on a difference in quantity of light between the actual and ideal response characteristics of the liquid crystal cell. D.I. 1388 at ¶ 395.

The parties are in agreement that this term refers to logic or circuitry. Their disagreement arises from LGD’s additional limitations which purport to limit the manner in which the determinator determines the output brightness. The Court has reviewed the claim language in light of the specification, and concludes that such additional limitations are not required. Accordingly, the Court adopts AUO’s proposed construction of the phrase “determinator for determining an output brightness level” as “logic, such as a circuitry, for determining an output brightness value.”

c.so as to make a time integration quantity of a brightness change substantially equal to an ideal quantity of light in a stationary state with respect to the next brightness level

1. substantially equal

AUO contends that the term “substantially equal” should be construed in accordance with its plain meaning such that “substantially equal” means “a level that is not completely the same but can be accepted as a substantially equal level.” LGD contends that the phrase “substantially equal” is indefinite, or in the alternative, should be construed as “a level which is not completely the same but can be accepted as a substantially equivalent level, and includes a level which is closer to an ideal quantity of light than [sic] no preventive measures are taken.” D.I. 1388 at 101.

The Court concludes that the term “substantially equal” is not indefinite and should be defined as AUO proposes. This construction is consistent with the plain meaning of the term and the specification, which explains that the “representation ‘substantially equal level’ refers to a level which is not completely the same but can be accepted as a substantially equivalent level.” '160 patent, col. 4, 11. 56-58; col. 9, 11. 19-23 (referring to Fig. 6 and the desire to obtain a “quantity of light (S”) ... which is approximately the same as the quantity of light (S) ... [from an LC with] ideal response characteristie[s] (S”.S)”; col. 8, 11. 45-47) (quantity of light is “almost the same as” that of an ideal LC). In the Court’s view, LGD’s construction, improperly imports limitations from the preferred embodiment into the claims.

2. time integration quantity of a brightness change/ideal quantity of light in a stationary state

AUO contends that the term “time integration quantity of a brightness change” means “a quantity of light equal to the actual brightness level output through a liquid crystal, summed over the rise and fall response time of the liquid crystal.” D.I. 376 at M-13. According to AUO, the plain meaning of “integration, in this context, is summing a change value (here, brightness level) over a period of time (here, the response time of the crystal).” Id. AUO also contends that the term “ideal quantity of light in a stationary state” refers to the “quantity of light emitted by a pixel during one time increment in which the pixel is in a nonchanging state.” Id.

LGD contends that these terms are indefinite. In the alternative, LGD appears to conflate the terms and offer a combined definition as follows: “quantity of light based on the actual response characteristic of the liquid crystal cell when the liquid crystal cell is provided with the next brightness level during the next time increment and the previous brightness level before and after the next time increment.” D.I. 376 at Exh. M-13.

After reviewing the claim language in light of the specification, the Court concludes that the terms are not indefinite and will adopt AUO’s proposed construction of these terms. The specification explains that the “[q]uantity of light can be considered as a time integration quantity of a brightness change.” '160 patent, col. 4, 11. 53-57. The specification further explains that “brightness of a pixel to the human eye ... should be considered in terms of the quantity of light, that is brightness change integrated with respect to time.” Id. col. 8, 11. 30-34. In the Court’s view, this supports AUO’s position that the “time integration quantity of a brightness change” is the quantity of light that is emitted due to the change in brightness. LGD’s proposed construction adds limitations that are not supported by the specification.

Likewise, the Court will adopt AUO’s proposed construction of the term “ideal quantity of light in a stationary state.” The specification teaches, by way of example, that an ideal quantity of light is that quantity of light output by an ideal LC over one time increment. Id., col. 4, 11. 42-47, Fig. 4. However, an ideal LC does not exist, id. at col. 8, 11. 63-65, and the specification’s example teaches that the ideal quantity of light from a conventional LC is that quantity of light emitted from the LC during one time increment when the brightness is constant, meaning the image is stationary. Id. col. 8, 11. 37-39 (when the particular pixel or LC is driven at a target brightness for an entire time increment, the pixel or LC may be described as being in a non-changing or “stationary state”). As with LGD’s previous construction, its proposed construction of “ideal quantity of light in a stationary state” adds limitations that are not supported by the specification.

2. U.S. Patent No. 6,689,629 (the “'629 patent”)

AUO asserts claims 7 and 16 against LGD. Claim 7 is a dependent claim which depends upon claim 4. Claim 4, in turn depends upon claim 2, and claim 2, depends on claim 1.

Similarly, Claim 16 is a dependent claim which depends on claim 13. Claim 13 in turn depends on claim 11. Claim 11 depends on claim 10, and claim 10 depends on independent claim 9.

Accordingly, the relevant claims of the '629 patent are provided below in full:

1. An array substrate for display, comprising:

a layer of an insulating substrate, having an area;

a thin film transistor array formed on the insulating substrate; a plurality of wiring arranged on the insulating substrate, each wiring having a first end, the wiring in communication with at least one of the transistors in the thin film array;

connections pads, each connection pad contacting the first end of at most one of the plurality of wirings; pixel electrodes, and

dummy conductive patterns, the dummy patterns comprising at least about 30% of the area of the insulating substrate, the dummy conductive patterns situated between the connection pads and the pixel electrodes such that the dummy patterns are not in contact with any of the wiring.

2. The array substrate for display according to claim 1 wherein at least one of the wirings comprises at least an upper layer and a lower layer of conductive materials.

4. The array substrate for display according to claim 2 wherein the upper layer wiring material is selected from the group consisting of molybdenum, chromium, tantalum, titanium and alloys thereof.

7. The array substrate for display according to claim 4 wherein the upper layer wiring material is selected such that the upper layer wiring material does not become insoluble in an acid or alkaline etchant.

9. A method for forming an array substrate for display, comprising:

forming a layer of an insulating substrate, having an area;

forming a thin film transistor array formed on the insulating substrate, each wiring having a first end, the wiring in communication with at least on of the transistors in the thin film array;

forming connections pads, each connection pad contacting the first end of at most one of the plurality of wirings;

forming pixel electrodes, and

forming dummy conductive patterns, the dummy conductive patterns comprising at least about 30% of the area of the insulating substrate, the dummy patterns situated between the connection pads and the pixel electrodes such that the dummy patters are not in contact with any of the wiring.

10. The method for forming an array-substrate for display according to claim 9 wherein at least one of the wirings comprises at least an upper layer and a lower layer of conductive materials.

11. The method for forming an array substrate for display according to claim 10 wherein the lower layer wiring materials is selected from the group consisting of aluminum and aluminum alloys. 13. The method for forming an array substrate for display according to claim 11 wherein the upper layer wiring material is selected from the group consisting of molybdenum, chromium, tantalum, titanium and allays thereof.

16. The method for forming an array substrate for display according to claim 13 wherein the upper layer wiring material is selected such that the upper layer wiring material does not become insoluble in an acid or alkaline etchant.

The parties agree that one of ordinary skill in the art with respect to the '629 patent would be a person with at least a Bachelor’s degree in chemical or electrical engineering, chemistry, or physics with 2 or more years experience working with liquid crystal display fabrication processing, or the equivalent combined education and work experience. D.I. 1383 at ¶ 299; D.I. 1388 at ¶ 132; Tr. 118:3-16 (Silzars).

a. dummy conductive patterns

LGD contends that the term “dummy conductive patterns” means “portions of the layer that do not receive or convey voltages or signals.” D.I. 1388 at ¶ 133. Refining this construction further, LGD contends that this construction requires that the dummy patterns do not conduct or convey signals “at least during testing or operation of the display.” D.I. 1387 at 6. In this regard, LGD further contends that dummy patterns are structures that are put into the design of a product to aid in the manufacturing of the product, but do not have a function during the operation of the display. D.I. 1388 at ¶ 136-138. LGD contends that AUO has changed its position on the construction of this term, and that this change in position demonstrates that AUO’s currently proposed definition should not be accepted.

AUO contends that the term “dummy conductive patterns” refers to “one or more metal patterns in the specified region that are not in contact with any of the wiring.” D.I. 1384 at 24. AUO acknowledges that this construction is different than its previously proposed construction which was “a metal pattern that does not conduct signals or current used in the operation of the display.” Id. at 25. However, AUO contends that its previous construction was too restrictive. In this regard, AUO contends that the wiring recited in the claims connects the connection pads to the transistors in the TFT array. AUO contends that dummy patterns are not needed for the operation of the transistors of the TFT array, and therefore, they “are not in contact with any of the wiring” that is “in communication with at least one of the transistors in the TFT array.” Id., citing '629 patent, col. 8, 11. 14-19. However, AUO maintains that there is nothing in the intrinsic evidence that precludes the dummy conductive patterns from performing some function, such as conducting a voltage or signal used in the operation of a display, so long as they are not in contact with the TFT wiring. AUO points out that even under its prior construction, nothing required dummy conductive patterns to be unable to receive any voltages or signals, and that the dummy conductive patterns could still be connected to a ground or voltage supply. D.I. 1384 at 24-26.

As the Federal Circuit has recognized, the Court’s task in claim construction is not to decide which of the adversaries is correct, but to independently determine the meaning of disputed claims. Exxon Chem. Patents, Inc. v. Lubrizol Corp., 64 F.3d 1553, 1556 (Fed.Cir.1995). For this reason, the Court does not take AUO’s change in its claim construction position to be indicative of the merits of its current argument.

Reviewing the disputed term in light of the claim language and specification, the Court concludes that the term “dummy conductive patterns” is properly construed to mean “conductive patterns in the specified region that are not in contact with any of the wiring.” The claim terms expressly state that the dummy conductive patterns must comprise “at least about 30% of the area” and “are not in contact with any of the wiring.” '629 patent, col. 8, 11. 13-19, 57-63. The Court does not read the claims or the specification from precluding the dummy conductive patterns from performing some function, so long as that they are not in contact with the TFT wiring. Accordingly, the Court concludes that LGD’s claim construction and AUO’s prior claim construction were both too restrictive, and that “dummy conducive patterns” are “conductive patterns in the specified region that are not in contact with any of the wiring.”

b. area

LGD contends that the term “area” is indefinite because one of ordinary skill in the art would be unable to unambiguously discern the boundaries of the asserted claims. D.I. 1388 at ¶ 168-170. In this regard, LGD contends that there is no disclosure on how the 30% of the area should be calculated. Alternatively, LGD contends that the term “area” refers to “material deposited and patterned on a substrate, such as glass, that covers part of the array substrate surface.” Id. at ¶ 171.

In response, AUO contends that “area” should be construed according to its ordinary meaning as a “specified region.” D.I. 1384 at 23-24. Turning to the context of the claims more specifically, AUO contends that “area” refers to a region of the array substrate, specifically a region containing the dummy conductive patterns.

After reviewing the claim language in light of the specification, the Court concludes that the term “area” is not indefinite and should be construed according to its plain meaning as a “specified region.” In the Court’s view, this is consistent with the specification which explains that the substrate coverage “of the dummy conductive patterns themselves [is] 30% or more on an area of a specified surface.” '629 patent, col. 5, 11. 55-61. Similarly, the specification explains that “dummy conductive patterns are formed on an area of a specified region where the dummy conductive patterns are formed.” Id., col. 6, 11. 1-6. Thus, the Court concludes that an “area” is “a specified region,” more specifically, the region where dummy conductive patterns are located.

c. a plurality of wiring / each wiring

LGD contends that the term “each wiring” is indefinite, because it is unclear as to which wiring the term “each wiring” is referring from the plurality of wiring. LGD contends that “[t]o the extent the term ‘each wiring’ can be construed, the term ‘a plurality of wiring arranged on the insulating substrate’ should be construed to mean ‘portions of the layer that convey voltages or signals from the connection pads to the thin-film transistors in the pixel array.’ ” D.I. 1407 at ¶ 56.

AUO contends that the these terms should be construed in accordance with their plain meaning in the context of the claim element in which they are used. Thus, AUO contends that “a plurality of wiring arranged on the insulating substrate, each wiring having a first end, the wiring in communication with at least one of the transistors in the thin film array” means “each individual wiring in a plurality of wirings,” with the plurality of wirings being a plurality of electrical conductors. D.I. 1383 at ¶ 347. In this regard, AUO points out that the specification explains “this connection of ‘each wiring’ [by] describing ‘wirings such as scan lines and signal lines connected with’ the electrodes of the transistors.” D.I. 1383 at ¶ 344(cit-ing '629 patent, col. 1, 11. 17-19, col. 4, 11. 49-51, Fig. 2).

The Court concludes that the terms “each wiring” and “plurality of wiring” as recited in the claim element “a plurality of wiring arranged on the insulating substrate, each wiring having a first end, the wiring in communication with at least one of the transistors in the thin film array” are not indefinite. The Court further concludes that these terms should be construed according to their plain meaning in the context of the patent, such that a plurality of wiring is a plurality of electrical conductors and “each wiring” is “each individual wiring in a plurality of wiring.” '629 patent, col. 8,1. 6,11, col. 8,11. 54-55; Tr. 139:10-140:1 (Silzars).

d. the upper layer wiring material does not become insoluble in an acid or alkaline etchant

Although not identified in the parties’ claim construction charts, it is apparent from their briefing that disputes exist regarding the proper construction and/or application of this phrase. Specifically, AUO contends that the solubility issue in claim 7 and 16 must be evaluated in the context of a two layer structure-that is a wiring structure having a lower and upper layer of wiring. D.I. 1384 at 26-27.

LGD contends that AUO’s interpretation of this claim improperly imports into the claims limitations contained in the specification. In particular, LGD contends that claim 7 and 16 do not refer to the passivity problem described in the specification and contain no limitation that the insolubility of the upper layer is during the etching process. D.I. 1406 at 17-18.

After reviewing the claim language in light of the specification, the Court concludes that the limitation of claim 7 and 16 must be read in the context of a two layer structure. Fuji Photo Film Co., Ltd. v. International Trade Com’n, 386 F.3d 1095 (Fed.Cir.2004) (“Claims must be read in the context of the specification of which they are a part.”) This reading is consistent with claims 7 and 16 which are dependent upon claims 2 and 10. Claims 2 and 10 expressly contemplate two layer wiring, and therefore, the claim language makes it evident, that it is within the context of two-layer wiring that solubility must be evaluated. In the Court’s view, this is also consistent with the purpose of the invention which is to prevent the upper layer from becoming insoluble during etching of the two-layer wiring. Tr. 870:18-871:8, 872:9-13, 873:7-23 (Rubloff); Tr. 1388:20-1391:2 (Silzars). In this regard, the Court agrees with the testimony of Dr. Silzars that whether material would become insoluble if dropped by itself in a vat of etchant is irrelevant to the context of the claimed invention. Tr. 1388:20-24 (Silzars). Accordingly, the Court does not view its construction as importing limitations from the specification as LGD contends, but as an attempt to view the claim in its proper context.

3. U.S. Patent No. 7,125,157 (the “ '157 patent”)

AUO asserts independent claim 1 of the '157 patent. In full, claim 1 provides:

1. A backlight unit for a liquid crystal display, comprising: a frame; a first supporting portion, disposed on the frame; a second supporting portion, further disposed on the frame; and a film comprising a first constraining portion and a second constraining portion, positioned on the frame by the first supporting portion and the second supporting portion passing through the first constraining portion and the second constraining portion, respectively; when the frame is disposed in a first position, the first supporting portion partially contacts an inner wall of the first constraining portion for positioning the film, and the second supporting portion does not contact the second constraining portion; and when the frame is disposed in a second position, the second supporting portion partially contacts an inner wall of the second constraining portion for positioning the film and the first supporting portion does not contact the first constraining portion.

The parties agree that one of ordinary skill in the art with respect to the '157 patent at the time of its filing “would be a person with a bachelors degree in mechanical engineering or physics and several years of experience working with aspects of the backlight modules for liquid crystal displays or the equivalent combined education and work experience.” D.I. 1383 at ¶ 497; D.I. 1388 at ¶678; Tr. 207:24-208:12 (Silzars).

a.supporting portion

LGD contends that a “supporting portion” should be construed as a projection from the frame. D.I. 376 at Exh. Q-l. AUO contends that the “supporting portion” should not be limited to a projection, which may be defined to have a specified shape. Id.

The Court adopts AUO’s construction of “supporting portion” as “any structure protruding from the frame, (including but not limited to a cylinder or a cuboid) intended to support the optical film.” '157 patent, col. 2, 11. 61-62, col. 3, 11. 4-12, col. 4,11.17-24, Fig. 2A and 2B; col. 6,11. 4-8, 31-42 Fig. 3A and 3B; Fig. 3C, col. 7, 11. 39-45, Fig. 4A-4D.

b.constraining portion

AUO contends that a constraining portion is “any formation on or in the optical film (including but not limited to a hole or groove) intended to restrict the movement range of the film.” D.I. 376 at Exh. Q-2. LGD contends that this term should be defined as “a passage through the film that has a gap in the gravity acting direction after receiving a supporting portion.” Id.

In the Court’s view, LGD’s construction improperly limits the constraining portion “to a passage through the film” and “a gap.” This is contrary to the specification which expressly contemplates that a constraining portion may be a “groove” which does not equate with a “gap.” '157 patent, col. 2, 11. 27-30, 63-65, col. 4, 11. 7-16.

c.first position / second position

With respect to the first and second orientations described in these terms, LGD argues that the first supporting portion or position must be located near an upper edge of the frame. LGD and AUO generally agree that the second position is determined by reference to the first position, but to the extent LGD’s construction of the second position depends from its upper frame requirement of the first position, AUO contends that LGD’s construction is incorrect. According to AUO, there is no upper edge location requirement and the first position is simply an initial position. D.I. 1383 at ¶¶ 513-516.

The Court agrees with AUO and concludes that no such upper edge limitation exists in the claim. In the Court’s view, adopting LGD’s proposal in this regard would improperly limit the claims to the preferred embodiments. Liebel-Flar sheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 358 F.3d 898, 906 (Fed.Cir.2004). Accordingly, the Court concludes that a first position means “an initial position of a liquid crystal display unit” and a “second position” means “the position determined by reference to the angle of rotation between the first and second position.”

d. does not contact

LGD contends that the phrase “does not contact” means “does not touch;” however, LGD further explains that this “requires that a supporting portion does not touch a constraining portion when in a non-supporting position, including when the film expands or contracts due to temperature variation.” D.I. 1388 at ¶ 681. AUO contends that this phrase should be construed according to its plain meaning and should not include any thermal expansion and contraction limitations. In this regard, AUO points out that such limitations are included in dependent claim 9, and therefore, the doctrine of claim differentiation should preclude claim 1 from being construed to include these additional limitations. D.I. 1384 at 40-41; D.I. 1440 at 17.

Claim differentiation “refers to the presumption that an independent claim should not be construed as requiring a limitation added by a dependent claim.” Curtiss-Wright Flow Control Corp. v. Velan, Inc., 438 F.3d 1374, 1380 (Fed.Cir.2006). However, claim construction posi tions based on claim differentiation are rebuttable, taking a secondary role if an alternate construction is dictated by the written description or prosecution history. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Dakocytomation Cal., Inc., 517 F.3d 1364, 1375 (Fed.Cir.2008).

After reviewing the claim language, specification and prosecution history, the Court concludes that the term “does not contact” should be construed as AUO proposes, according to its plain meaning without the additional temperature and thermal contraction and expansion limitations from claim 9 that inform LGD’s proposed claim construction. Claim 9 depends on claim 1 and adds the limitations that “when the frame is disposed in the second position, a first gap is formed between the first supporting portion and the first constraining portion, and the first gap is an allowance for film expansion or contraction due to temperature variation; when the frame is disposed in the first position, a second gap is formed between the second supporting portion and the second constraining portion, and the second gap is an allowance for film expansion or contraction due to temperature variation.” '157 patent, col. 9, 11. 16-20. During prosecution of the application for the '157 patent, the Examiner did not require the applicant to combine the elements of claims 1 and 9 into a single claim, and instead determined that claim 1 was separately patentable without any of the limitations of claim 9. AUO-10 at AUO-LGD 0001333, 0001452, 0001487-88; Tr. 1202:21-1203:6 (Smith-Gillespie). LGD points out that the embodiments of the '157 patent refer to thermal considerations, however limitations from the specification should not be read into claims. Claim 1 has no limitation relating to thermal expansion or contraction, and the Court is persuaded that, consistent with the doctrine of claim differentiation, claim 1 should not be read in a manner so as to incorporate the limitations of claim 9.

4. U.S. Patent No. 7,090,506 (the “'506 patent”)

AUO asserts claim 7 and 17 of the '506 patent. Claim 7 is a dependent claim that depends on independent claim 1. Claim 17 is also an independent claim. Accordingly, the relevant claims of the '506 patent provide, in full:

1. A signal transmission device, connecting a display module and a system, comprising: a first flexible printed circuit board, electrically connecting the display module and the system and a second flexible printed circuit board, electrically connecting the display module and the first flexible printed circuit board, wherein the first and second flexible printed circuit boards are joined by hot bar soldering.

7. The signal transmission device as claimed in claim 1, wherein the second flexible printed circuit board transmits a light source signal.

17. A signal transmission device, connecting an display module and a system, comprising: a first flexible printed circuit board, electrically connecting the display module and the system; and a second flexible printed circuit board, electrically connecting the display module and the first flexible printed circuit board, wherein the first flexible printed circuit board has a first alignment mark, and the second flexible printed circuit board has a second alignment mark overlapped with and aligned to the first alignment mark.

The parties agree that a person of ordinary skill in the art of the '506 patent is a person with a bachelors degree in mechanical engineering or physics and several years of experience working with aspects of liquid crystal display, or the equivalent combined education and work experience. D.I. 1383 at ¶ 571; Tr. 227:12-20 (Silzars).

a. the first and second flexible printed circuit boards are joined by hot bar soldering

LGD contends that this term describes a process by which the circuit boards are joined, and is thus, a process limitation. LGD contends that the term “the first and second flexible printed circuit boards are joined by hot bar soldering” means

both flexible printed circuit boards are connected to each other by a soldering process where the circuit boards are heated with a bar to melt the solder at multiple points simultaneously along each circuit board while pressure is applied to the connection.

D.I. 1388 at ¶ 541.

In response, AUO contends that this term is not a process limitation, but a structural limitation. In this regard, AUO contends that claim 1 does not include any of the typical product-by-process language and is a pure product claim defined solely by structural limitations. Thus, AUO contends that “joined by hot bar soldering” means “joined by solder material.” D.I. 1384 at 45. Alternatively, AUO contends that if this term is construed as a process limitation, it should be construed as

the first and second printed circuits made on flexible film are joined by a soldering process where the solder and flux are applied to the contact area and the contact area is heated with a bar to melt the solder.

D.I. 376 at Exh. 0-4. AUO contends that LGD’s construction is overly narrow, because hot bar soldering does not require “pressure” beyond that which is necessary to hold the two items being soldered together and does not require melting solder at “multiple” contact points.

“Courts must generally take care to avoid reading process limitations into an apparatus claim.... ” Baldwin Graphic Systems, Inc. v. Siebert, Inc., 512 F.3d 1338, 1344 (Fed.Cir.2008). “Even where terms are amenable to interpretation as a procedure of manufacture, apparent ‘process’ terms should be interpreted as structural limitations when used in an adjective non-process sense and define a physical characteristic of the apparatus.” R2 Medical Sys., Inc. v. Katecho, Inc., 931 F.Supp. 1397, 1425 n. 5 (N.D.Ill.1996) (citing 2 Donald S. Chisum, Patents § 8.05[5], at 8-96 (1994)); Biacore v. Thermo Bioanalysis Corp., 79 F.Supp.2d 422, 456 (D.Del. 1999) (“The mere use in a claim of structural or characterizing terms derived from processes or methods, however, does not prevent a claim from being considered a true product claim.”)

Considering the claim language in light of the specification and prosecution history, the Court concludes that the limitation “joined by hot bar soldering” does not amount to a process limitation, but instead describes the structural relationship between the first and second flexible printed circuit boards. Claim 1 of the '506 patent was distinguished over the prior art based on the limitation requiring that solder material join the two flexible printed circuit boards rather than a foldable flat cable. AUO-12 at AUO-LGD 1948. Thus, the Court views the soldering described in this claim as a structural limitation. Accordingly, the Court construes the phrase “first and second printed circuit boards are joined by hot bar soldering” to mean that the “first and second printed circuit boards are joined by solder material.”

b. alignment mark

During the claim construction proceedings in this case, neither party proposed a construction for the term “alignment mark.” However, it appears that post-trial the parties are now disputing the meaning of this term. According to LGD, a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand an “alignment mark” to “be a distinctive identifying feature that is provided solely for positioning of the flexible printed circuit boards during assembly.” D.I. 1388 at ¶ 544.

In response, AUO contends that alignment marks can have more than one purpose. For example, they can function for both positioning and bonding. Thus, AUO contends that LGD’s definition of alignment marks is too restrictive, and “alignment marks” should be more broadly defined as patterns used for accurate positioning and connection of flexible printed circuit boards. D.I. 1383 at ¶¶ 657-663; D.I. 1384 at 46, 50.

Reviewing this claim term in light of the specification of the '506 patent, the Court concludes that AUO’s more expansive definition is correct. The '506 patent discloses more than one type of alignment mark. For example, pad electrodes are disclosed on the first and second printed boards in Figure 3a. These pad electrodes serve as both alignment marks for positioning and as contact pads for bonding or electrically joining two flexible printed circuit boards. '506 patent, col. 2, 11. 26-38. Accordingly, the Court concludes that an alignment mark is a pattern used for accurate positioning and connection of flexible printed circuit boards.

II. Direct Infringement

A. Applicable Law

A patent is infringed when a person “without authority makes, uses or sells any patented invention, within the United States during the term of the patent....” 35 U.S.C. § 271(a). A patent owner may prove infringement under either of two theories: literal infringement or the doctrine of equivalents. Literal infringement occurs where each element of at least one claim of the patent is found in the alleged infringer’s product. Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 836 F.2d 1329, 1330 n. 1 (Fed.Cir.1987); Robert L. Harmon, Patents and the Federal Circuit 195 & n. 31 (3d ed.1994).

“The doctrine of equivalents allows the patentee to claim those insubstantial alterations that were not captured in drafting the original patent claim but which could be created through trivial changes.” Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 733, 122 S.Ct. 1831, 152 L.Ed.2d 944 (2002). “An element in the accused device is equivalent to a claim limitation if the only differences between the two are insubstantial.” Honeywell Int’l v. Hamilton Sundstrand Corp., 370 F.3d 1131, 1139 (Fed.Cir.2004). To prove infringement by the doctrine of equivalents, a patentee must provide “particularized testimony and linking argument” as to the “insubstantiality of the differences” between the claimed invention and the accused product, or with respect to the function/way/result test. See Texas Instruments Inc. v. Cypress Semiconductor Corp., 90 F.3d 1558, 1567 (Fed.Cir.1996). “[EJvidence and argument on the doctrine of equivalents cannot merely be subsumed in plaintiffs case of literal infringement.” Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Sealy Mattress Co., 873 F.2d 1422, 1425 (Fed.Cir.1989).

Infringement is a two step inquiry. Step one requires a court to construe the disputed terms of the patent at issue. Construction of the claims is a question of law subject to de novo review. See Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., 138 F.3d 1448, 1454 (Fed.Cir.1998). Step two requires the fact-finder to compare the accused products with the properly construed claims of the patent. This second step is a question of fact. See Bai v. L & L Wings, Inc., 160 F.3d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir.1998). The party asserting infringement under either the theory of literal infringement or the doctrine of equivalents has the burden of proof and must meet its burden by a preponderance of the evidence. SmithKline Diagnostics, Inc. v. Helena Lab. Corp., 859 F.2d 878, 889 (Fed. Cir.1988) (citations omitted).

B. Whether LGD Infringes claims 1 and S ofAUO’s '160 Patent

After comparing LGD’s accused products with claims 1 and 3 of the '160 patent, the Court concludes that AUO has established by a preponderance of the evidence that LGD literally infringes the '160 patent. In reaching this conclusion, the Court credits the testimony of Dr. Silzars.

Claim 1 Preamble: A liquid crystal display, comprising

LGD does not dispute that this element of the claims is present in the accused devices, and the Court finds that LGD’s accused display modules are liquid crystal displays. AUO-164 at 1/51; AUO-859.

Claim 1: an input logic for inputting a video signal from a host

Page 1 of the New Monde specification shows that the New Monde timing controller chip includes LVDS input logic for inputting a video signal from a host. AUO-165 at 1/51; Tr. 173:19-174:17 (Silzars). All of the timing controllers in the accused LGD modules receive an LVDS input through an input logic, the LVDS interface. AUO-1533; AUO-135 at 1/46; AUO-160 at 1/36; AUO 161 at 1/36; AUO 149 at 1/50; AUO 150 at 1/50; AUO-155 at 2/41; AUO 156 at 2/41; AUO-157 at 1/35; AUO-158 at 1/35; AUO-137 at 1/48; AUO-145 at 1/45; AUO-143 at 1/46; AUO-133 at 1/53; AUO-167 at 1/51; AUO-151 at 1/51; AUO-153 at 2/35; AUO-162 at 2/33; AUO-170 at 1/51; AUO-165 at 1/51; AUO-140 at 1/45; AUO-132 at 1/44; AUO-141 at 1/25; AUO-147 at 1/47; A AUO-159 at 2/41; AUO-138 at 1/48; AUO-146 at 1/45; AUO-144 at 1/46; AUO-134 at 1/53; AUO-168 at 1/51; AUO-152 at 1/51; AUO-154 at 2/35; AUO-169 at 1/51; AUO-164 at 1/51; AUO-139 at 1/45; AUO-131 at 1/44; AUO-166 at 2/39; AUO-142 at 1/25; 0-148 at 1/47.

Claim 1: storage for storing the previous brightness level of the video signal input through said input logic

The Court finds that the accused devices meet this claim element. The frame memory is the “storage for storing.” The system block diagram of New Monde includes a “frame memory” identified as the “Frame Memory SDRAM” in the System Block Diagram and as a Field Store, in the Over Driving Scheme Diagram. Tr. 177:14-179:7 (Silzars); AUO-164/165 at 1/51 and 4/51. The frame memory stores the previous level of light intensity of the video signal input through the input logic. The frame memory temporarily holds the brightness level of the video signal received from the host through input logic for the previous time increment. Tr. 178:13-179:7 (Silzars); AUO-165 at 1. Each of the timing controller chips analyzed by Dr. Silzars is used in a system that includes a similar frame memory SDRAM, also called the Field Store in the Over Driving Scheme block diagram. AUO-1533; AUO-1553; AUO-135 at 1/46 and 4/46; AUO-136 at 1/46 and 4/46; AUO-160 at 1/36 and 3/36; AUO-161 at 1/36 and 3/36; AUO-149 at 150 and 4/50; AUO-150 at 1/50 and 4/50; AUO-155 at 2/41; AUO-156-2/41; AUO-157 at 3/35; AUO-158 at 3/35; AUO-159 at 2/41; AUO-137 at 1/48 and 4/48; AUO-138 at 1/48 and 4/48; AUO-145 at 1/45 and 4/45; AUO-146 at 1/45 and 4/45; AUO-143 at 1/46 and 4/46; AUO-144 at 1/46 and 4/46; AUO-133 at 3/53 and 4/53; AUO-134 at 3/53 and 4/53; AUO-167 at 1/51 and 4/51; AUO-168 at 1/51 and 4/51; AUO-151 at 1/51 and 4/51; AUO-152 at 4/51; AUO-153 at 2/35; AUO-154 at 2/35; AUO-162 at 2/33; AUO-169 at 1/51 and 4/51; AUO-170 at 1/51 and 4/51; AUO-164 at 1/51 and 4/51; AUO-165 at 1/51 and 4/51; AUO-139 at 1/45 and 4/45; AUO-140 at 1/45 and 4/45; AUO-131 at 3/44 and 4/44; AUO-132 at 3/44 and 4/44; AUO-166 at 2/39; AUO-141 at 2/25 and 4/25; AUO-142 at 2/25 and 4/25; AUO-147 at 1/47 and 4/47 and AUO-148 at 1/47 and 4/47.

LGD contends that the accused products do not meet this claim limitation, because the accused timing controllers store compressed data that represents a comparison of brightness levels to the average grayscale level of a block of liquid crystal cells. LGD contends that the compressed data is not actual previous brightness levels, nor can it be used to recreate actual previous brightness levels.

However, the Court finds that LGD’s contentions are not supported by the record. The compressed data is used to recreate actual brightness levels. This is supported by LGD’s presentation, AUO-1538 at page 9, which describes the decompressed data as the “reconstructed previous frame.” This is also supported by the testimony of LGD’s witness, Mr. Kim, who testified that decompression recovers “the original image or close to the original image” and that ideally the decompressed data is “identical” to the original data but there may be “some small,” “acceptable” changes. Tr. 78:5-22 (C.G.Kim); Tr. 179:22-181:22 (Silzars). While it is true that the decompressed data is not used to actually display the images, it is used to look up overdrive values, which in turn display the image. Thus, errors in the decompressed data would impact the quality of the displayed image. Tr. 1363:3-1364:9 (Silzars). In sum, the Court concludes that the timing controllers do store the actual previous brightness levels in compressed form, and therefore, the Court finds that the accused devices meet the “storage for storing the previous brightness level of the video signal input through said input logic” claim element.

Claim 1: a determinator for determining an output brightness level based on the previous brightness level stored in said storage and the next brightness level of the next video signal input to said input logic

The Court concludes that the accused devices meet this claim limitation, because LGD’s timing controller chips include a lookup table, which is the determinator for determining an output brightness level. The brightness level output by the lookup table is based on the previous brightness level, which was stored in the frame memory, and the next brightness level. In the example of the New Monde lookup table, the brightness level for the previous frame and the current frame ranges from 0 to 255. Tr. 172:14-173:9 (Silzars); AUO-165 at 26/51. The lookup table is used to compare the video information (i.e. the brightness level) in the previous frame to the brightness information in the current frame and apply a correction. Tr. 171:15-172:13 (Silzars); AUO-165 at 4/51. Each of the timing controllers analyzed by Dr. Silzars includes a similar lookup table.

LGD’s argument that this claim limitation is not met relates to its argument regarding the storage of previous brightness levels, which the Court has declined to accept. In addition, LGD argues that the timing controllers in the accused products do not use “offset” values as required by the limitation “a determinator for determining an output brightness level.” However, the claim terms do not include the term “offset,” and the Court is not persuaded that an “offset” should be read into the accused devices. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the accused devices satisfy this claim limitation.

Claim 1: so as to make a time integration quantity of a brightness change substantially equal to an ideal quantity of light in a stationary state with respect to the next brightness level

The Court concludes that the accused products meet the limitations of this claim element. The determinator must provide an output brightness level that achieves the claimed results: a time integration of a brightness change that is substantially equal to an ideal quantity of light. Dr. Silzars tested the accused products, measuring the brightness change and noting that the brightness change was within 20% of the ideal response. See e.g. AUO-1075; Tr. 193:17-195:8; 1370:23-1372:9 (Silzars).

LGD contends that Dr. Silzars’s test results are inaccurate for several reasons, including that Dr. Silzars’s calculations did not reflect the “total amount of light” that would be emitted from the liquid crystal cell. Based on the Court’s claim construction, however, the claims do not refer to the total amount of light that would be emitted by an ideal liquid crystal cell. Rather, the claims are directed to the amount of light that would be emitted due to the brightness change. Further, the Court credits Dr. Silzars’s test results, and concludes, based on his testimony, that a brightness change within 20% is substantially equal to an ideal quantity of light in a stationary state with respect to the next brightness level.

LGD’s argument that this claim element is not met in the accused devices is premised on the notion that “substantially equal” should also represent an improvement in the context of the “ideal quality of light.” However, the Court has not included this additional language in its construction of the relevant terms, and therefore, the Court concludes that an improvement is not necessary to establish this claim element.

In sum, the Court finds that AUO has established by a preponderance of the evidence, that the accused LGD products meet the elements of claim 1 of the '160 patent. Accordingly, the Court concludes that LGD infringes claim 1 of the '160 patent.

Claim 2: The liquid crystal display according to claim 1, wherein said determinator comprising a table for storing a brightness level determined by the characteristic of a liquid crystal cell according to a relation between the previous brightness level and the next brightness level, and determining the output brightness level by modifying said next brightness level based on the brightness level read from said table.

The Court concludes that the limitations described in claim 2 are met in the accused devices. The determinator in LGD’s timing controller chips comprises a table for storing a brightness level. This table is the lookup table, which stores a brightness level. Tr. 204:11-16, 172:14-173:18 (Silzars); AUO-165 at 26/51. The lookup table stores brightness levels that vary according to the relation between the previous brightness level and the next brightness level. Id. The lookup table values are determined by the characteristics of the liquid crystal cell. They are determined by trial and error using measurements of the response of the liquid crystal cell. A person makes the measurements using a photodiode, which measures light, and an oscilloscope. Tr. 79:24-80:24 (C.G.Kim).

Claim 3: The liquid crystal display according to claim 2, wherein: said video signal input through said input logic comprises a plurality of color signals; and

The Court concludes that this claim element is met in the accused devices. The video signal input includes a plurality of color signals. In particular, the LVDS video signal includes three separate colors: red, green and blue. Tr. 204:17-205:4; 434:24-435:10 (Silzars); AUO-165 at 1/51. The LVDS receiver, which inputs the LVDS signal, converts the LVDS data stream back into 28 bits or RGB, that is red, green and blue data. AUO-165 at 3/51, 4/51.

Claim 3: said table in said determinator is provided for each of said color signals.

The Court concludes that this claim element is also met in the accused devices. The lookup table includes three separate lookup tables, one each for red, blue and green data. Specifically, there are three Arithmetic LUTs, or lookup tables, in the block diagram for the New Monde chip. The Arithmetic LUTs each output 8 bits of red, green and blue, respectively. Tr. 205:5-10 (Silzars); AUO-165 at 3/51,14/51; Tr. 958:12-23 (Eccles).

In sum, the Court concludes that AUO has established by a preponderance of the evidence, that the accused LGD products meet the elements of claim 3 of the '160 patent. The LGD LCD modules containing the New Monde controller chip include every element of claim 3 of the '160 patent. Further, the LGD modules containing the New Monde timing controller chip, which infringe claim 1 are representative of the accused products containing the timing controller chips identified in AUO-1553, the listing of timing controller chips analyzed for infringement. Tr. 169:6-23, 170:8-18 (Silzars). Each of these products therefore also infringes claim 3. Accordingly, the Court concludes that LGD infringes claim 3 of the '160 patent.

C. Whether LGD Infringes claims 7 and 16 ofAUO’s '629 Patent

1. AUO’s standing to assert the '629 patent

As a threshold matter, LGD contends that AUO lacks constitutional standing to assert the '629 patent against LGD, because AUO was not the owner of the '629 patent at the time this action was filed. LGD contends that the inventors of the '629 patent assigned their rights in the patent to IBM Japan, but IBM Japan never assigned its rights to International Business Machines Corporation (US) (“IBM USA”) before IBM USA assigned its rights to AUO in June 2005. Thus, LGD contends that the June 2005 assignment could not have included the '629 patent. In addition, LGD contends that AUO cannot cure this standing defect through the retroactive application of the Patent Assignment Form filed with the PTO in May 2007 (LGDTX 931), which purported to assign the rights in the '629 patent from the named inventors to IBM USA.

In response, AUO contends that the '629 patent issued naming IBM USA as the assignee on the face of the patent, and IBM USA received title to the '629 patent through a succession of assignment agreements. As a result, AUO contends that the June 2005 Patent Assignment Agreement, in which IBM USA transferred and assigned to AUO “all right, title and interest in and to” certain specified patents, including the '629 patent “along with any and all damages for infringement of any of the assigned patents before, on and after” June 30, 2005, “and the sole right to sue therefor under the assigned patents,” was sufficient to transfer title of the '629 patent from IBM USA to AUO.

In a patent case, as in all federal actions, a plaintiff must have standing to sue before a claim can be brought. Sicom Sys. v. Agilent Techs., Inc., 427 F.3d 971, 975 (Fed.Cir.2005). The burden to establish standing rests on the party bringing suit. Id.

The assignation on the face of a patent is “not a conclusive indication” of patent ownership. U.S. Philips Corp. v. Iwasaki Elec. Co., 505 F.3d 1371, 1375 (Fed.Cir.2007). Rather, the plaintiff must demonstrate that it is the owner/patentee, assignee, or grantee of the patent-in-suit. See 35 U.S.C. § 281; Morrow v. Microsoft Corp., 499 F.3d 1332, 1339 (Fed.Cir.2007); Fairchild Semiconductor Corp. v. Power Integrations, Inc., 630 F.Supp.2d 365, 370 (D.Del.2007).

On the record presented, the Court concludes that AUO has demonstrated by credible chain of title evidence that it is the assignee of the '629 patent. LGD contends that the inventors assigned their rights to the invention claimed in the '629 patent to IBM Japan in 2000, and there was no direct conveyance of rights between IBM Japan and IBM USA prior to IBM USA’s assignment to AUO. However, LGD’s argument ignores the assignment documents predating 2000. Specifically, IBM USA and IBM World Trade (“World Trade”) entered into an agreement dated January 1, 1963, in which IBM USA acquired any patents that World Trade had or thereafter acquired. AUO-302 at IBM 300004. Thereafter, IBM Japan and World Trade executed two agreements in which IBM Japan granted to World trade the right to all of IBM’s patent applications and patents in countries other than Japan. The first agreement dated June 25, 1981, amended a previous 1960 agreement and provided that IBM Japan grants “to World Trade and/or its