Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER JAMES O. BROWNING, District Judge. THIS MATTER comes before the Court on the Defendant’s Motion' to Suppress and Supporting Brief, filed December 1, 2009 (Doc. 46). The Court held an evidentiary hearing on October 29, 2009. The primary issues are: (i) whether Defendant Joseph Martinez’ statements were attenuated from the taint of the Fourth-Amendment violation and were not a fruit of the poisonous tree; (ii) whether the evidence found within Martinez’ house would have inevitably been discovered notwithstanding the Fourth-Amendment violation; and (iii) whether the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies. The Court finds that the taint of the illegal search was not attenuated at the time that Martinez made his confession, that the police would not have inevitably discovered Martinez’s confession or the evidence from his home if not for the illegal search, and that the good-faith exception does not apply when law enforcers violate the constitution and then pass off the illegally acquired information to another officer to put into the search warrant that is eventually found invalid. The Court will thus grant Martinez’ motion to suppress. FACTUAL BACKGROUND Rule 12(d) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure requires the Court to state its essential findings on the record when deciding a motion that involves factual issues. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 12(d) (“When factual issues are involved in deciding a [pretrial] motion, the court must state its essential findings on the record.”). The findings of fact in this Memorandum Opinion and Order shall serve as the Court’s essential findings for purposes of rule 12(d). The Court makes these findings under the authority of rule 104(a) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which requires a judge to decide preliminary questions relating to the admissibility of evidence, including the legality of a search or seizure and the voluntariness of an individual’s confession or consent to search. See United States v. Merritt, 695 F.2d 1263, 1269-70 (10th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 916, 103 S.Ct. 1898, 77 L.Ed.2d 286 (1983). In deciding such preliminary questions, the other rules of evidence, except those with respect to privileges, do not bind the Court. See Fed.R.Evid. 104(a). Thus, the Court may consider hearsay in ruling on a motion to suppress. See United States v. Merritt, 695 F.2d at 1269-70. A. THE INITIAL SWEEP. 1. The Court incorporates by reference its factual findings in the Memorandum Opinion and Order which resolved Martinez’ first motion to suppress. See Memorandum Opinion and Order, 686 F.Supp.2d 1161, 1167-77 (D.N.M.2009); Transcript of Hearing at 4:3-24 (taken January 21, 2010)(Court, Rees, Bregman)(“Jan. 21 Tr.”)(stipulating to the testimony and exhibits proffered as evidence in the prior motion to suppress). 2. Sergeant Robert Lind (# 208) and Deputy Nathan Kmatz (# 252) were both with the Bernalillo County Sheriffs Office (“BCSO”). See Jan. 21 Tr. at 119:1-12 (Bregman, Hartsock). 3. According to the Computer Aided Dispatch (“CAD”) sheet and Lind’s and Kmatz’ testimony, Lind and Kmatz entered Martinez’ residence at 2:00 p.m. and exited at approximately 2:05 p.m. See Government Exhibit 2 (“CAD Sheet”) at 1 (dated September 9, 2009); Transcript of Hearing at 63:3-65:3 (taken October 29, 2009)(Rees, Lind)(“Oct. 29 Tr.”); Oct. 29 Tr. at 180:19-181:3 (Torrez, Kmatz). 4. Lind and Kmatz gained entry into Martinez’ house by opening an unlocked sliding glass door on the second-story balcony. See Oct. 29 Tr. at 58:3-13 (Rees, Lind); id. at 86:11-12 (Rees, Lind); Government Exhibit 16. 5. Lind and Kmatz secured Martinez’ residence, and, at approximately 2:26 p.m., asked for a detective to respond to the residence. See CAD Sheet at 1 (“... 14:26 208 [Lind] ... PER S10. CONTACT SVU AND HAVE THEM 21 @ CELL”). 6. Lind and Kmatz based their entry and search on what they believed were exigent circumstances. See Oct. 29 Tr. at 64:17-65:3 (Rees, Lind). B. DETECTIVES ARRIVE TO INVESTIGATE. 7. Detective Kyle Hartsock (# 201) is a BCSO employee. See Jan. 21 Tr. at 7:6-12 (Rees, Hartsock). 8. Since the October 29, 2009 hearing on Martinez’ first motion to suppress, Hartsock has changed assignment within the BCSO from working with the Special Victims Unit to working for the Regional Computer Forensics Lab, a task force run jointly with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and local law-enforcement agencies. See Jan. 21 Tr. at 7:6-18 (Hartsock). 9. Before Hartsock arrived, Lind told him by telephone about the entry into the house, the reasons for the entry, the contraband items that Lind and Kmatz had seen inside, and where they had seen those items. See Oct. 29 Tr. at 82:5-83:16 (Rees, Lind); id. at 212:17-213:12 (Rees, Hart-sock). 10. Hartsock arrived at the residence to take a physical description for purposes of a search-warrant application at approximately 3:42 p.m. See Jan. 21 Tr. at 12:8-11 (Rees, Hartsock); CAD Sheet at 1 (“15:42 Stat SO/201 [Hartsock] ... Location]: 10 DAIRY LN”). 11. When Hartsock arrived, he went up to the balcony of Martinez’ home, where the sliding glass door that Lind and Kmatz used to gain entry to Martinez’ house was still standing open. See Jan. 21 Tr. at 12:23-13:10 (Rees, Hartsock); id. at 134:8-23 (Court, Hartsock). 12. While on the balcony of Martinez’ home, Hartsock could smell marijuana while standing by the open sliding glass door. See Jan. 21 Tr. at 12:23-13:10 (Rees, Hartsock); id. at 134:24-135:2 (Court, Hartsock)(“THE COURT: And from that position of being outside the open door you could smell marijuana? THE WITNESS: I could smell marijuana standing right there.”). 13. From the smell of marijuana at the doorway, Hartsock could have, and would have, gone and acquired a search warrant to search Martinez’ house for illicit drugs and paraphernalia. See Jan. 21 Tr. at 13:2-14:10 (Rees, Hartsock). 14. If officers had searched the house looking for illicit drugs and drug paraphernalia, they would have found the photographs of child pornography during the search. See Jan. 21 Tr. at 15:8-16:17 (Rees, Hartsock); id. at 50:17-20 (Rees, Hartsock). C. THE ARRIVAL AND INVESTIGATION OF MARTINEZ’ TRUCK. 15. Hartsock and other officers later— but before any contact with Martinez-noticed a suspicious truck parked in a dead-end, separate cul-de-sac west of Martinez’ property. See Jan. 21 Tr. at 16:24-18:16 (Rees, Hartsock); id. at 145:19-147:4 (Torrez, Dudewicz). 16. The location of the truck was not near any houses and had an advantageous vantage point over the officers. See Jan. 21 Tr. at 21:4-14 (Hartsock); id. at 31:12-22 (Hartsock); id. at 123:5-24 (Rees, Hart-sock); id. at 238:24-239:7 (Rees, Gaitan). 17. The officers had not seen this truck upon their arrival, did not know to whom the truck belonged, and became concerned for them safety because of the truck’s location. See Jan. 21 Tr. at 19:19-20:5 (Rees, Hartsock)(Hartsock testifying that he did not know whom the driver of the truck was nor where the truck belonged); id. at 27:6-28:11 (Rees, Hartsock); id. at 66:11—22 (Bregman, Hartsock); id. at 145:19-147:4 (Torrez, Torres); id. at 166:11—167:17 (Torrez, Dudewicz); id. at 237:7-24 (Rees, Gaitan). 18. Hartsock believed that the truck was somehow connected to the Martinez’ residence. See Jan. 21 Tr. 66:8-67:21 (Bregman, Hartsock). 19. The truck’s windows were not tinted, and the interior of the truck is visible from the outside, if one can get up high enough. See Jan. 21 Tr. at 90:10-24 (Bregman, Hartsock). 20. To ensure their safety, and not knowing who, if anyone, was in the vehicle, Hartsock and other officers approached the truck in a crouch and opened the door with guns drawn, based on what they believed were exigent circumstances and on officer safety concerns, concerned that someone was inside who could do them harm. See Jan. 21 Tr. at 27:2-30:8 (Rees, Hartsock); id. at 31:20-22 (Hartsoek)(“So absolutely my gun is drawn and Detective Gaitan’s gun is drawn as we approached the car.”); id. at 36:5-14 (Hartsock); id. at 125:8-126:9 (Rees, Hartsock); id. at 237:25-238:23 (Rees, Gaitan). 21. The officers did not obtain a search warrant before opening the door of the truck and looking inside. See Jan. 21 Tr. at 69:9-11 (Bregman, Hartsock). 22. The officers, approaching in a crouch, did not attempt to look in the window before opening the truck’s door to look inside. See Jan. 21 Tr. at 90:25-91:24, 92:16-93:8 (Bregman, Hartsock). 23. The officers did not request radio silence — a so-called “10-3” — when approaching the truck as Lind and Kmatz did before sweeping Martinez’ house. Jan. 21 Tr. at 87:9-16 (Bregman, Hartsock); CAD Sheet at 1. 24. The officers did not perceive approaching the truck to be as dangerous as doing a sweep of the house, and there were fewer officer-safety concerns justifying entry into the truck than there were justifying entry into the house. See Jan. 21 Tr. at 87:17-18, 89:2-90:9 (Bregman, Hartsock)(Hartsock admitting that he did not perceive approaching the truck to be as dangerous as doing a sweep of the house and that there were fewer officer-safety concerns justifying entry into the truck than there were justifying entry into the house). 25. The officers did not contact dispatch to report their investigation of the truck. See Jan. 21 Tr. at 87:20-88:3 (Bregman, Hartsock); CAD Sheet at 1. 26. Officers are aware of a high number of officer-involved shootings in the East Mountains area of Albuquerque, New Mexico. See Jan. 21 Tr. at 30:17-31:12 (Hartsock). 27. Hartsock believes that there were officer-safety concerns on every police call in which he has been involved. See Jan. 21 Tr. at 72:24-25 (Hartsock). 28. Hartsock assumed there was someone inside the truck because: (i) the truck seemed to arrive after the officers; (ii) the officers did not see the driver anywhere else nearby; and (iii) Hartsock always assumes that there is someone inside a vehicle until he is able to disprove that fact. See Jan. 21 Tr. at 135:3-136:5, 138:9-139:3 (Court, Hartsock). See also Jan. 21. Tr. at 239:16-241:1 (Rees, Gaitan). 29. Hartsock did not believe someone was in the vehicle; he assumed that there was someone in it. See Jan. 21 Tr. at 135:8-136:5 (Court, Hartsock). 30. As the officers approached the pick-up truck, because of its height and size, they could not determine whether anyone was inside. See Jan. 21 Tr. at 31:23-32:6 (Rees, Hartsock); id. at 239:14-21 (Rees, Gaitan). 31. Upon opening the door to the vehicle, Hartsock and other officers immediately smelled marijuana inside the truck. See Jan. 21 Tr. 39:1-13 (Rees, Hartsock); id. at 240:7-241:4 (Rees, Gaitan)(“Q: What, if anything, did you notice upon opening that door? A: The strong odor of marijuana.”). 32. Based on the fact of him smelling marijuana inside the truck, Hartsock would have applied for, and would have acquired, a warrant to search the truck. See Jan. 21 Tr. at 41:3-19 (Rees, Hart-sock). 33. The officers ran the truck’s license plate in an attempt to identify the driver. See Tr. at 35:7-36:1 (Rees, Hartsock); id. 39:16-40:12 (Hartsock); id. at 241:16-22 (Rees, Gaitan). 34. The vehicle was registered to a company called AccuStripe. See 4/14/2009 Police Report at 3 (“Defendant Exhibit A”). 35. Shores (# 339) was assigned to watch the truck at approximately 4:17 p.m. See Jan. 21 Tr. at 122:3-8 (Bregman, Hart-sock). 36. Inside the truck, upon later execution of a search warrant, officers found drug paraphernalia and a quantity of marijuana. See Jan. 21 Tr. at 42:24-44:17 (Rees, Hartsock); Government Exhibits 83-86. 37. Based upon Hartsock’s training and experience, he believed that he could also have sought a warrant to search for drugs and drug paraphernalia at the driver’s residence. See Jan. 21 Tr. at 44:20-46:18 (Rees, Hartsock). 38. It is unlikely that Hartsock would have taken the steps to search Martinez’ residence based solely on discovering marijuana and drug paraphernalia in Martinez’ vehicle. See Jan. 21 Tr. at 130:13-131:4 (Bregman, Hartsock). 39. Before the officers had contact with Martinez, Hartsock left to draft a search warrant for the house at approximately 4:17 p.m. See Jan. 21 Tr. at 242:1-15 (Rees, Gaitan); CAD Sheet at 1. D. THE BCSO OFFICERS ENCOUNTER MARTINEZ NEAR HIS TRUCK. 40. Shores (#339), assigned to park his patrol vehicle behind the truck, encountered the driver when he returned to the truck at approximately 4:34 p.m. See Jan. 21 Tr. at 147:5-22 (Torrez, Torres); CAD Sheet at 1 (“16:33 MALE GREY SHIRT/ JEANS ... 16:34 339 [Shores] ... CUL DE SAC TO WEST OF 10 DAIRY .. 41. The driver of the truck was identified as Martinez. See Jan. 21 Tr. at 147:5-148:16 (Torrez, Torres). 42. Martinez indicated that he was associated with the truck and the house. See Tr. at 169:2-171:5 (Torrez, Dudewicz). 43. Detective Amy Dudewicz (# 178) has worked for the BC SO for the past eight years and has worked for the Special Victim’s Unit of the BCSO since April of 2006. See Jan. 21 Tr. at 157:13-23 (Torrez, Dudewicz); id. at 162:5 (Dudewicz). 44. Dudewicz told Martinez that his house had generated a 911 call, that BC SO officers had responded to the call, that the officers had found an unlocked door on the second-floor balcony, and that they had entered his house to confirm that nobody inside was in need of immediate assistance. See Jan. 21 Tr. at 170:11-25 (Dudewicz); id. at 221:18-222:19 (Court, Dudewicz). 45. Dudewicz told Martinez that detectives were called out because the officers, while inside his house, found some items about which they were concerned. She also told him that “this was currently an active investigation.” Jan. 21 Tr. at 170:22-25 (Dudewicz). See id. at 221:18-222:19 (Court, Dudewicz) (“THE WITNESS: I’d explained to Mr. Martinez ... [t]hey found some items that they needed to further investigate and that’s why detectives had been called out.... I didn’t elaborate on that.”). 46. Knowing that he had drugs and child pornography in his home, Martinez was more likely than not concerned about what Dudewicz was insinuating when she told him that officers found items about which they were concerned inside his house. E. OFFICER DUDEWICZ TRANSPORTS MARTINEZ DOWNTOWN. 47. Before transporting Martinez, Dudewicz asked Martinez if he would be willing to go to the main station for an interview. See Jan. 21 Tr. at 148:1-12 (Torrez, Torres); id. at 170:10-171:5 (Torrez, Dudewicz). 48. Martinez agreed. See Jan. 21 Tr. at 148:1-12 (Torrez, Torres); id. at 171:1-5 (Torrez, Dudewicz). 49. If Martinez had asked to go inside his house before being transported to the main station in downtown Albuquerque, New Mexico, his request would have been refused. See Jan. 21 Tr. at 183:23-184:3 (Torrez, Dudewicz). 50. The CAD Sheet lists Martinez as being “in custody” before being transported to the main station. Jan. 21 Tr. at 101:2-25 (Bregman, Hartsock); id. at 171:25-172:15 (Torrez, Dudewicz) (“And then there’s another comment [in the CAD Sheet] that says 178 which is my man number will 21 201 [Hartsock] and advise him, which means basically I was willing to give him a phone call and let him know that we had the homeowner currently in custody.”); id. at 231:1-10 (Court, Dudewicz); CAD Sheet at 1 (“... 16:36 208 [Lind] ... CONTACT 201 [Hartsock] ... HAVE HOMEOWNER IN CUSTODY ...”). 51. Dudewicz and Detective Doreen Torres transported Martinez to the John Price Law Enforcement Center in Albuquerque, New Mexico for an interview with Hartsock at approximately 5:08 p.m. See Jan. 21 Tr. at 149:13-150:25 (Torrez, Torres); CAD Sheet at 2 (“17:08 SO/178 [Dudewicz] ... Location]: MAIN 1X12.... 17:08 Disposition CHANGED ... 17:09 178 [Dudewicz] ENR[OUTE TO] MAIN 1X12 SM 1173.9....”). 52. The CAD Sheet states that Martinez rode as a passenger (code “12”) in Dudewicz’ vehicle. He sat in the front seat, free of handcuffs, while in route to the main station. Jan. 21 Tr. at 149:13-151:10 (Torrez, Torres); id. at 173:2-24 (Torrez, Dudewicz); CAD Sheet at 2. 53. After Martinez was placed in Dudewicz’ vehicle and was being transported downtown, he asked Dudewicz how he would get home. Dudewicz responded that they “would make arrangements for him to get back, if that was necessary.” Jan. 21 Tr. at 174:3-9 (Torrez, Dudewicz). 54. Martinez arrived at the main station at approximately 5:36 p.m. for an interview. See CAD Sheet at 2 (“17:36 Stat SO/178 [Dudewicz] ... Location]: Main 1X12”). 55. Martinez was held alone in the interrogation room for approximately thirty minutes before Hartsoek arrived to talk with him. See Jan. 21 Tr. at 108:19-109:11 (Bregman, Hartsoek). F. MARTINEZ’ INTERVIEW WITH HARTSOCK. 56. Hartsoek first saw Martinez in the interrogation room at the main BCSO station, at which point Hartsoek considered Martinez to be in custody and not free to leave. See Jan. 21 Tr. at 107:17-108:2, 108:13:18 (Bregman, Hartsock)(“Q: You ... nowhere in this Miranda on Exhibit 3 do you advise him that he is free to leave if he doesn’t want to talk to you? A: Correct. Q: And as you said that’s because he wasn’t, right? A: He was not free to leave.”). 57. Hartsoek, Gaitan and Dudewicz, at various times, participated in this interview, but Hartsoek asked the majority of relevant questions. See Government Exhibit 87 (“Video Interview”) at 18:07:30-19:33:30. 58. At the beginning of the interview, Martinez indicated that he did not know that officers had entered his house or why he was at the police station. See Video Interview at 18:13:00-18:14:00; Government Exhibit 88 (“Interview Tr.”) at 8:24-11:4. 59. Hartsoek advised Martinez of his Miranda rights before Martinez made any statements. See Jan. 21 Tr. at 53:3-14 (Rees, Hartsoek); Video Interview at 18:10:00-18:13:00; Interview Tr. at 4:21-5:16; Government Exhibit 3. 60. At approximately 6:18 p.m., after being advised of his Miranda rights, Martinez indicated that he did not want an attorney and was willing to speak with Hartsoek. See Jan. 21 Tr. at 53:3-14 (Rees, Hartsoek); Video Interview at 18:10:00-18:16:00; Interview Tr. at 4:21-6:16; Government Exhibit 3. 61. Martinez indicated, before his interview, through his signature, that he understood his Miranda rights and agreed to waive them. See Government Exhibit 3. 62. During the interview, which began at approximately 6:00 p.m., Hartsoek informed Martinez only that the officers were investigating potential drug trafficking and made no mention of pornography or child pornography until 6:25 p.m. See Video Interview at 18:25:00-18:30:00; Interview Tr. at 4:8-13 (“Q: Okay. Check it out. Kind of lean in here with me a little bit. Right now the crime that we’re investigating is trafficking of a controlled substance, narcotics. Okay?”). 63. Hartsock informed Martinez that officers entered his apartment and saw marijuana. See Interview Tr. at 10:16— 11:5. 64. Once he had been transported to the BCSO main station, had been left in a windowless room for approximately thirty minutes, was told that the officers were investigating drug trafficking, was read his Miranda rights, and was told that officers had entered his home and seen drugs, a reasonable person in Martinez’ position would have felt he was not free to leave or disengage from the police-citizen encounter. 65. After being told that officers had already seen drugs in his house, Martinez admitted that he had the drugs in his house for personal use, and that the officers would find approximately two ounces of marijuana and a small amount of cocaine. See Interview Tr. at 10:16-11:14 (“Q:.... I mean, there was a — from what they’re saying, a decent amount of marijuana inside the house. I mean, is this all — A: Yeah. Yeah, personal, personal.”); id. at 13:6-11 (“Q: How much would you— how much marijuana would you say is in the house, like your best guess? A: Maybe an ounce or two. I think there is a couple of bags — ”); id. at 14:3-15:10. 66. Even after Hartsock told Martinez that officers had entered Martinez’ house and seen marijuana inside, Martinez resisted confessing to using any other kinds of narcotics in his house until Hartsock told him that the officers had also seen a substance that they believed to be cocaine. See Interview Tr. at 13:25-14:16. 67. Before Martinez admitted anything regarding pornography, Hartsock told Martinez that officers had found lots of pornography lying around Martinez’ house and suggested that it might include child pornography. See Interview Tr. at 22:10-23:11 (“Another thing [the searching officer] noted is that a fairly, you know, in kind of plain view, amount of pornography laying out.... Some of it with, you know, suggestive younger aged males.”). 68. Hartsock then asked Martinez if he had ever engaged in sex with minors. See Interview Tr. at 24:13-25:10. 69. After about fifteen minutes of further questioning, Martinez first admitted to having one or two Polaroid pictures of himself engaging in sex acts with a person that was “[p]robably 17 or 18” years old. Video Interview at 18:30:00-18:46:00; Interview Tr. at 42:6-22. 70. Hartsock then told Martinez that the officers were going to get a search warrant, and that therefore Martinez should tell him if there was any child pornography inside the house because the officers would find it if it was there, implying that Martinez’ punishment would be less severe if he confessed. See Interview Tr. at 43:24-44:20. 71. Martinez stated the he also had dozens of pornographic videotapes and as many as four that involved him having oral sex with a sixteen-year-old male approximately twenty years ago. See Interview Tr. at 22:10-28:25; id. at 42:6-52:11. 72. Martinez confessed to having child pornography in his house only after being told that BCSO was going to search his home and would find any if it were present. See Interview Tr. at 22:10-28:25; id. at 43:24-44:20; id. at 42:6-52:11. 73. Martinez provided a false name for the sixteen-year-old male. See Tr. at 58:25-59:17 (Rees, Hartsock); Interview Tr. at 51:17-53:22 (Martinez)(telling the officers that the name of the juvenile in both movies is Eric). 74. After his confession, Martinez said to Hartsock: “You can look at every tape.” Interview Tr. at 59:14-15. 75. Hartsock used information that he received from Lind’s and Kmatz’ illegal search to pressure Martinez to confess details that Martinez otherwise would not have disclosed. G. HARTSOCK OBTAINS A SEARCH WARRANT FOR MARTINEZ’ HOUSE. 76. Using the information he collected from speaking with Lind and Kmatz, and from interviewing Martinez, Hartsock finished his warrant and supporting affidavit. See House Warrant and Affidavit (dated April 14, 2009)(United States Exhibit 4). 77. A Deputy District Attorney reviewed Hartsock’s search warrants before submission to a judge. See Tr. at 61:13-62:9 (Rees, Hartsock). 78. The Honorable Albert S. “Pat” Murdoch, Second Judicial District Judge, Division XIX, Bernalillo County, State of New Mexico, authorized search warrants. See Tr. at 62:10-19 (Rees, Hartsock); House Warrant and Affidavit at 1, 6; Truck Warrant and Affidavit at 1, 6 (dated April 21, 2009)(United States’ Exhibit 78). 79. The search warrants permitted seizures of drugs, drug paraphernalia, and videotapes and photographs containing child pornography from Martinez’ residence and the truck. See House Warrant and Affidavit at 2-3; Truck Warrant and Affidavit at 2-3. 80. Pursuant to the warrants, the officers seized mini-cassettes, VHS tapes, camcorders, Polaroid pictures, marijuana, pipes, and other drug paraphernalia from the residence, and marijuana and drug paraphernalia from the truck. See House Warrant and Affidavit at 7 (Return and Inventory from execution of the warrant). 81. Hartsock reviewed the evidence and discovered ten VHS videotapes, twelve 8mm videotapes, four mini DVDs, and twenty-nine Polaroid photographs depicting a minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct. See Transcript of Hearing at 24:7-34:8 (taken October 14, 2009)(Rees, Hartsock). 82. Hartsock later identified one of the photographed children and interviewed him regarding his sexual relationship with Martinez that occurred for eleven years. See Oct. 29 Tr. at 37:24-39:17 (Rees, Hart-sock). 83. None of the warrant affidavits that Hartsock swore out during his investigation of Martinez mentioned: (i) his officer-safety concerns regarding the mysterious truck; (ii) the officers’ approaching the truck with guns drawn; (iii) opening the door to the truck; or (iv) Hartsock smelling marijuana inside the truck. See Jan 21 Tr. at 70:12-86:2 (Bregman, Hartsock); Defendant Exhibit A-E; Government Exhibit 4, 78. 84. Hartsock made at least five warrant affidavits — one to search Martinez’ house, two to search AccuStripe, one to search Martinez’ truck, and one to arrest Martinez. See Defendant Exhibits A-E; Jan. 21 Tr. at 69:12-70:24 (Bregman, Hartsoek)(listing the four search warrant affidavits he had made). 85. The first warrant affidavit that Hartsock wrote was for the warrant to search Martinez’ house, dated April 14, 2009. See Government Exhibit 4; Defendant Exhibit E. 86. Hartsock made three of the four other affidavits after the initial affidavit to search Martinez’ house, as well as his April 29, 2009 police report, largely by cutting and pasting the contents of the first affidavit into the subsequent documents. See Defendant Exhibits A-E; Jan. 21 Tr. at 77:2-11 (Bregman, Hartsock)(“This is copied and pasted from my report.... ”). 87. Hartsock’s method of cutting and pasting from his affidavit for the warrant to search Martinez’ house caused the absence of any mention in Hartsock’s other warrant affidavits and police report of: (i) his officer-safety concerns regarding the truck; (ii) the officers’ approaching the truck with guns drawn; (iii) opening the door to the truck; and (iv) Hartsock smelling marijuana inside the truck were the result of Hartsock’s mistake and inadvertence. See Jan 21 Tr. at 70:12-86:2 (Bregman, Hartsock). 88. If Lind and Kmatz had not entered Martinez’ house when they responded to the static-only open-line 911 call at approximately 2:00 p.m. on April 14, 2009, it is more likely than not that they would have left the property before Martinez returned home at 4:30 p.m. that day. 89. If Lind and Kmatz had not entered Martinez’ house when they responded to the static-only open-line 911 call at approximately 2:00 p.m. on April 14, 2009, no BCSO officer would have seen the truck parked in the cul-de-sac west of Martinez’ property, and thus no BC SO officer would have investigated it and smelled marijuana inside it. 90. If Lind and Kmatz had not entered Martinez’ house when they responded to the static-only open-line 911 call at approximately 2:00 p.m. on April 14, 2009, no BCSO officer would have smelled marijuana inside Martinez’ truck, nor inside his house, and thus would have had no basis for procuring a search warrant to search the truck or the house. 91. If Lind and Kmatz had not entered Martinez’ house when they responded to the static-only open-line 911 call at approximately 2:00 p.m. on April 14, 2009, Hart-sock would not have been called out to 10 Dairy Lane and would not have otherwise sought out Martinez. See Jan. 21 Tr. at 106:7-107:14 (Bregman, Hartsock). PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND A federal Grand Jury indicted Martinez with two counts of Production of a Visual Depiction of a Minor Engaged in Sexually Explicit Conduct, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251(a) and 2256. See Indictment at 1-2, filed August 25, 2009 (Doc. I). On September 9, 2009, Martinez asked the Court to suppress all evidence seized in his home because the “protective sweep” that Lind and Kmatz performed, which formed part of the basis of a subsequent, warrant-authorized search of Martinez’ home, was an unconstitutional entry without probable cause. See Defendant’s Motion to Suppress, filed September 9, 2009 (Doc. 17). The Court agreed that the search was unconstitutional, but declined to suppress the evidence because the warrant affidavit, even with the information gleaned from the unlawful entry excised, still established probable cause. See Memorandum Opinion and Order, 686 F.Supp.2d at 1205-06 (“[E]xcluding the information obtained during that illegal entry, the warrant pursuant to which officers searched Martinez’ home was supported by probable cause. The Court therefore finds that suppression of the seized evidence is not warranted at this time.”). 1. The Briefs. Martinez now attacks the remainder of the basis for probable cause in the search warrant — a statement, made by Martinez to Hartsock, in which Martinez confesses to having child pornography in his house. See Motion at 1. Martinez again moves the Court to suppress all evidence seized inside his home, contending that his statement was fruit of the illegal search of his home and thus cannot provide probable cause for the warrant. See id. He argues that, but for the illegal entry and search, the officers would not have spoke to Martinez nor elicited his confession. See id. at 1, 5. The United States asks the Court to deny Martinez’ motion, and mounts a series of arguments why Martinez’ statement was not a fruit of the poisonous tree and why, even if the statement was illegally obtained, the evidence should nevertheless be admitted. See United States Response to Defendant’s Motion to Suppress (Doc. 46) at 1, filed December 15, 2009 (Doc. 52) (“Response”). First, the United States argues that, even if there is a “but-for” causal connection between Lind and Kmatz’ illegal entry, and the statement that Martinez made to Hartsock, any taint from the initial illegality has been attenuated by the passage of time and intervening facts and circumstances. Response at 6-11. The United States next asserts that the inevitable-discovery exception to the exclusionary rule applies to this case, and that Martinez’ confession would inevitably have been obtained, even if there had been no illegal entry. See Response at 12-15. Finally, the United States argues that the Court should apply the good-faith exception because the officers believed, in good faith, that the warrant they used to search Martinez’ house was based on probable cause, even if the Court finds that it was invalid. See Response at 15-17. Martinez replies to the United States’ arguments first by alleging that the record does not support the United States’ recitation of the facts. See Defendant’s Reply to Government’s Response to Defendant’s Second Motion to Suppress at 1-3, filed January 8, 2010 (Doc. 60)(“Reply”). He then argues that, if it were not for the illegal search of Martinez’ home, the BCSO officers would never have discovered the truck and so the truck cannot be an intervening circumstance breaking the chain of causation between the illegal search and Martinez’ confession. See Reply at 3. Next, he argues that Hartsock committed another constitutional violation when he opened the door to the pickup truck without a warrant. See id. at 4. Finally, Martinez argues that neither the good-faith exception nor the inevitable-discovery exception applies under the facts of this case. See id. at 4-6. 2. The January 2010 Suppression Hearing. At the hearing, after a brief opening statement by Mr. Bregman, Charlyn Rees, Assistant United States Attorney, and Mr. Bregman stipulated to admission of the testimony and exhibits proffered in the first motion to suppress. See Jan. 21 Tr. at 2:16-3:7, 4:3-24 (Court, Rees, Bregman). The United States then called its first witness: Hartsock. See Jan. 21 Tr. at 6:2-3 (Rees). Hartsock gave extensive factual testimony, recounting the details of his arrival on Martinez’ property, the arrival of the mysterious truck, and the subsequent interview of Martinez at the main BCSO station in Albuquerque, New Mexico. The United States’ next witness, Torres, testified about the arrival of Martinez’ truck, about encountering Martinez, and about transporting him to the station downtown. See id. at 143:6-155:18 (Torrez, Bregman, Torres). Dudewicz, the United States’ third witness, testified primarily about how she did not enter Martinez’ home until after the officers obtained a search warrant. See id. at 161:21-165:17 (Torrez, Dudewicz). She also testified about her encounter with Martinez and the circumstances involved in transporting him downtown. See id. at 166:11-175:9 (Torrez, Dudewicz). The United States’ last witness was Detective Adam Gaitan, who testified as to tactics that a SWAT team would use to approach a potentially dangerous vehicle. See id. at 234:20-235:19 (Rees, Gaitan). Gaitan admitted, however, that the approach of the truck was not a SWAT situation. See id. at 245:14-18 (Bregman, Gaitan). Gaitan also testified as to how the officers approached and opened Martinez’ truck, and whether those tactics were normal. After the testimony, the parties argued their respective positions. Eric Loman argued for Martinez, taking the position that a confession which is acquired as a result of a constitutional violation should be excluded unless the United States can show some intervening event that breaks the chain of causation. See id. at 251:9-17 (Loman). Mr. Loman argued that the Court should apply the factors outlined in Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975), and find that the taint of the constitutional violation had not become so attenuated that the evidence may be allowed. See Jan. 21 Tr. at 251:18-257:2 (Court, Loman). He also argued that the search of the truck, rather than being an intervening event justifying the interview of Martinez, was a separate constitutional violation, and thus the United States cannot rely upon that event to break the chain of causation between the evidence and the unconstitutional search of Martinez’ home. See id. at 257:3-267:4 (Court, Loman). Mr. Loman also argued against the United States’ inevitable-discovery and good-faith arguments. See Transcript of Hearing at 6:8-11:2 (taken January 22, 2010)(Court, Loman)(“Jan. 22 Tr.”); Jan. 22 Tr. at 11:3-13:1 (Court, Loman). Ms. Rees argued to the contrary, asserting that the Brown v. Illinois factors, primarily the lapse-of-time factor, weigh in favor of finding that the taint of the unlawful search had become attenuated. See Jan. 22 Tr. at 13:18-14:14 (Court, Rees). Ms. Rees also argued vigorously that Martinez was not in “custody” or “detained” when he was brought to the main BCSO station, and when Hartsock questioned him. Id. at 17:25-21:1 (Court, Rees). She argued that it doesn’t matter what Detective Hartsock thought, whether the defendant was free to go or not. It matters what a reasonable person in Mr. Martinez’s situation would believe. And I would submit to, Your Honor, that all of the circumstances of that day would lead a reasonable person to believe that they were not in custody. The fact that Miranda warnings were given does not create a custodial setting, the fact— there’s case law on point — the fact the questioning may have taken place in a coercive environment, such as a police station, doesn’t change it into a custodial setting. Id. at 19:17-20:2 (Rees). She also argued that the investigation of the truck was wholly independent of the investigation of Martinez’ house, and thus can act as an intervening event that breaks the causal chain between the illegal entry into Martinez’ house and Martinez’ interrogation. See Jan. 22 Tr. at 22:11-23:25 (Court, Rees). Ms. Rees then reminded the Court how dangerous a police officer’s job is, and how the officers’ protective sweep of the truck was made based on concerns for the officers’ safety, which they honestly believed to be in jeopardy. See id. at 24:21-26:5 (Court, Rees). She next argued that, even if Martinez was in custody when he was at the BCSO station, his confession could nevertheless be voluntary. See id. at 32:17-36:19 (Court, Rees). Finally, she reiterated many of her arguments in the context of the inevitable-discovery and good-faith exceptions to the exclusionary rule. See id. at 36:20-39:19 (Court, Rees). RELEVANT LAW REGARDING SEIZURE The Fourth Amendment protects a person’s right to be secure against unreasonable search and seizure: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. U.S. Const, amend. IV. “[T]he rights of privacy and personal security protected by the Fourth Amendment ‘are to be regarded as of the very essence of constitutional liberty; and ... the guaranty of them is as important and as imperative as ... the guaranties of the other fundamental rights of the individual citizen.’” Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 150, 67 S.Ct. 1098, 91 L.Ed. 1399 (1947), overruled in part by Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 768, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969) (quoting Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 304, 41 S.Ct. 261, 65 L.Ed. 647 (1921)). The Supreme Court has found “a person has been seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed he was not free to leave.” United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980). Where the individual could not or would not want to leave, even absent police presence, “the appropriate inquiry is whether a reasonable person would feel free to decline the officers’ requests or otherwise terminate the encounter.” Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 436, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991). LAW REGARDING THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE When evidence is obtained in violation of a person’s constitutional rights, the police will be prohibited from using that evidence in a criminal prosecution of that person. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347, 94 S.Ct. 613, 38 L.Ed.2d 561 (1974). For the exclusionary rule to apply, the defendant need show only, by a preponderance of the evidence, a constitutional violation, and a causal nexus between the violation and the evidence sought to be excluded. See United States v. Torres-Castro, 470 F.3d 992, 999 (10th Cir.2006). Once the defendant makes this showing, if the prosecutor still desires to proffer the challenged evidence, the burden shifts to the prosecution to establish that some exception to the exclusionary rule applies. See id. 1. Judicial Rationale of the Exclusionary Rule. The exclusionary rule introduces into the criminal justice system a tension between the court’s need to find the truth by using all relevant evidence and the societal desire to deter illegal police conduct by excluding otherwise probative evidence. An illegal search often results in reliable, probative, and otherwise-unobtainable evidence of an individual’s guilt. Sometimes the result of applying the exclusionary rule is that all evidence in a case is suppressed, even though the defendant’s guilt is almost certain, because the unconstitutional search taints all of the evidence. In such circumstances, the individual often cannot be convicted of the crime of which he is clearly guilty. The Supreme Court of the United States has found, however, that limiting the powers of law enforcers and the concomitant decrease in their effectiveness is a price that each citizen must pay for the Fourth Amendment’s protections. As Justice Stevens noted in his concurring and dissenting opinion in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3430, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984): “It is of course true that the exclusionary rule exerts a high price — the loss of probative evidence of guilt. But that price is one courts have often been required to pay to serve important social goals.” 468 U.S. at 979, 104 S.Ct. 3430 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting). See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 355, 103 S.Ct. 1855, 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983) (“The price of [law-enforcement] effectiveness, however, is intrusion on individual interests protected by the Fourth Amendment.”). [The exclusionary] rule is based upon very strict requirements designed to narrow the occasions upon which officers can make searches and seizures without judicial warrant. Unquestionably its application will now and then permit a guilty person to escape conviction because of hasty or ill-advised action on the part of enforcement officers. But the same may be said of the requirements of the Fourth Amendment.... The framers of the Fourth Amendment must have concluded that reasonably strict search and seizure requirements were not too costly a price to pay for protection against the dangers incident to invasion of private premises and papers by officers, some of whom might be overzealous and oppressive. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 67-68, 70 S.Ct. 430, 94 L.Ed. 653 (1950)(Black, J., dissenting), overruled in part by Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969). The Constitution of the United States and the case law interpreting it reveal that the government’s right to interfere in the lives of its citizens is highly circumscribed. For the present time, the Supreme Court has determined that the purpose of the exclusionary rule “is to deter — to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way — by removing the incentive to disregard it.” Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 80 S.Ct. 1437, 4 L.Ed.2d 1669 (1960). 2. Distinction between Finding of a Constitutional Violation and Applying of the Exclusionary Rule. “Whether the exclusionary sanction is appropriately imposed in a particular case, our decisions make clear, is an issue separate from the question whether the Fourth Amendment rights of the party seeking to invoke the rule were violated by police conduct.” United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. at 906, 104 S.Ct. 3405 (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 223, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983))(internal quotes omitted). “To trigger the exclusionary rule, police conduct must be sufficiently deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently culpable that such deterrence is worth the price paid by the justice system.” Herring v. United States, — U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 695, 702, 172 L.Ed.2d 496 (2009). Thus, “the exclusionary rule serves to deter deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent conduct, or in some circumstances recurring or systemic negligence,” but “when police mistakes are the result of negligence ..., rather than systemic error or reckless disregard of constitutional requirements,” suppression is not automatic, and “any marginal deterrence” from suppression is often insufficient. Id. at 702, 704. 3. Exclusionary Rule Prohibits Indirect Uses of Tainted Evidence. Nevertheless, if the police acquire evidence in the process of violating one’s constitutional rights, they are forbidden from using that evidence in a criminal prosecution against the individual, unless an exception to the exclusionary rule applies. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 347, 94 S.Ct. 613 (“Under this rule, evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment cannot be used in a criminal proceeding against the victim of the illegal search and seizure.”). The exclusionary rule demands exclusion of evidence that was obtained as a but-for result of the illegal search unless the evidence is so far removed from the constitutional violation that the “taint” of the violation no longer clings to it. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963)(“The exclusionary prohibition extends as well to the indirect as the direct products of such invasions.”). The essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain way is that not merely evidence so acquired shall not be used before the Court but that it shall not be used at all. Of course this does not mean that the facts thus obtained become sacred and inaccessible. If knowledge of them is gained from an independent source they may be proved like any others, but the knowledge gained by the Government’s own wrong cannot be used by it in the way proposed. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. at 485, 83 S.Ct. 407 (quoting Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392, 40 S.Ct. 182, 64 L.Ed. 319 (1920)). The Tenth Circuit has acknowledged the rule as follows: [A] defendant may .'.. suppress any ... evidence deemed to be “fruit of the poisonous tree,” (i.e., evidence discovered as a direct result of the unlawful activity)» by showing the requisite factual nexus between the illegality and the challenged evidence. Once the defendant meets this burden, the Government may still avoid suppression by proving that the contested evidence is not fruit of the poisonous tree. According to the Supreme Court, the overriding issue in “fruits” cases is whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint. United States v. Olivares-Rangel, 458 F.3d 1104, 1109 (10th Cir.2006)(internal citations omitted). Though the exclusionary rule is simply stated, courts have been trying to hash out its scope for many years. 4. Relevant Exceptions to the Exclusionary Rule. The exclusionary rule has exceptions. If illegally obtained evidence is somehow purged of the taint of the unconstitutional conduct, it can be admitted. “The Government can establish that a particular item of evidence has been purged of the primary taint by demonstrating that the evidence would have been inevitably discovered, was discovered through independent means, or was so attenuated from the illegality as to dissipate the taint of the unlawful conduct.” United States v. Olivares-Rangel, 458 F.3d at 1109. See United States v. Torres-Castro, 470 F.3d at 999 (“[T]he government may avoid suppression by demonstrating that the evidence would have been inevitably discovered, that it was discovered by independent means, or that it was so attenuated from' the illegality as to dissipate any taint from the Fourth Amendment violation.”). a. Attenuation of the Taint. When determining whether evidence constitutes fruit of the poisonous tree subject to the exclusionary rule, a court must determine, based upon the unique facts of each case, “whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which the instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of the illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.” United States v. King, 990 F.2d 1552, 1563 (10th Cir.1993) (quoting Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. at 488, 83 S.Ct. 407). See United States v. Carson, 793 F.2d 1141, 1156-57 (10th Cir.1986)(“The issue is not whether the officers ‘would not have requested consent but for the first illegal search,’ but rather whether the officers exploited the fruits of their illegal activity in such a way, that Carson’s consent to the search was involuntary under the Fourth Amendment.”). In Brown v. Illinois, the Supreme Court listed three factors for courts to consider when analyzing fruits of the poisonous tree and determining whether the causal chain is sufficiently attenuated: (i) the time elapsed between the constitutional violation and the acquisition of evidence; (ii) the presence of intervening facts, and (iii) the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct. See 422 U.S. at 603-04, 95 S.Ct. 2254. See also United States v. Torres-Castro, 470 F.3d at 999 (“In considering whether evidence seized is so attenuated from the illegality as to dissipate any taint, we balance the ‘temporal proximity of the Fourth Amendment violation,’ any ‘intervening circumstances,’ and the- ‘purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct.’ ”)(quoting United States v. King, 990 F.2d at 1563-64). The Tenth Circuit has stated that “[t]he implication of the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Illinois is that in order for incriminating statements to be purged of the taint of an underlying Fourth Amendment violation, [the] defendant’s consent must meet the voluntariness standard of the Fourth Amendment.” United States v. Carson, 793 F.2d at 1151. Furthermore, “[i]f Government officials use the fruits of their illegal conduct to ‘cajole’ the consent [to search] an unwitting citizen, then the evidence [obtained in that search] is obtained by exploitation of the primary illegality and is not obtained by means sufficiently distinguishable from the illegality to be purged of the primary taint.” Id. at 1157. At least in the context of the officers’ motivation for requesting consent to search, “the inquiry turns on whether the evidence is obtained by means, although influenced by prior illegal police actions, which are different enough from the prior illegality to be ‘sufficiently distinguishable.’ ” Id. at 1149 (emphasis added). (i) The origin of the attenuation doctrine: Wong Sun v. United States. Wong Sun v. United States is often considered the origin of the attenuation doctrine. In it, police arrested a man named Horn Way, who was found in possession of heroin. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. at 473, 83 S.Ct. 407. When questioned, he told the officers that he bought the drugs from a man named “Blackie Toy,” proprietor of a laundry establishment. See id. The officers found a laundry — “Oye’s Laundry” — which they believed to be the one to which Horn Way referred. Id. at 473-74, 83 S.Ct. 407. An officer knocked on the laundry’s door at 6:00 a.m., two hours before it opened for business, and attempted to gain entry. See id. at 474, 83 S.Ct. 407. When the man who answered the door refused to let the officer in, the officer identified himself as a federal narcotics agent, which prompted the man to slam the door on the officer and begin running down the hall. See id. The officers broke open the door and followed the man to his living quarters in back of the laundry, apprehending and handcuffing him. See id. The man’s name was James Wah Toy, and the Supreme Court noted a lack of evidence in the record whether James Wah Toy was the “Blackie” of whom Horn Way spoke. See id. Toy told the officers he did not sell heroin to Horn Way, but that he knew someone named “Johnny” who sold heroin and described the house in which Johnny lived. See id. at 474-75, 83 S.Ct. 407. The officers entered the house that Toy described and found a man named Johnny Yee, who, after a brief discussion, surrendered himself and his stash of heroin to the officers. See id. at 475, 83 S.Ct. 407. Yee told the officers that he bought the drugs from Toy and another man — Wong Sun. See id. The officers went to Wong Sun’s house and knocked on the door. See id. Wong Sun’s wife told the officers that Wong Sun was sleeping in the back room, so the officers went into the back room and arrested him. See id. No narcotics were found in his home or on his person. See id. Wong Sun was brought up on drug-trafficking charges, arraigned, and released on his own recognizance. See id. Several days later, Wong Sun voluntarily returned to the police station to make a statement, in which he confessed to participating in heroin transactions. See id. at 490, 88 S.Ct. 407. Wong Sun sought to have the confession suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree. See id. The district court, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and the Supreme Court all declined to suppress the statement. See id. at 477, 490, 83 S.Ct. 407. The Supreme Court agreed with the Ninth Circuit that the arrest of Wong Sun was unlawful because it was not based on probable cause. See id. at 490, 83 S.Ct. 407. Logically, if Wong Sun had never been arrested, there is no reason to believe that he would have come to the police to confess his involvement in any crime. Thus the confession was a but-for result of the unlawful arrest. The Supreme Court held, however, that, because “Wong Sun had been released on his own recognizance after a lawful arraignment, and had voluntarily returned several days later to make the statement,” “the connection between the arrest and the statement had ‘become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint’” of the illegal arrest. 371 U.S. at 477, 490, 83 S.Ct. 407 (quoting Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. at 340, 60 S.Ct. 266). (ii) The Supreme Court breaks the doctrine of Wong Sun v. United States into a multi-factor analysis in Brown v. Illinois. Twelve years after the Supreme Court decided Wong Sun v. United States, the Court took the opportunity to clarify the meaning of the case and elaborate on the considerations that go into the attenuation analysis. In Brown v. Illinois, police officers investigating the murder of a man named Roger Corpus illegally entered defendant Richard Brown’s apartment and searched it. See 422 U.S. at 592, 95 S.Ct. 2254. When Brown came home at 7:45 p.m., the officers, lacking probable cause or a warrant, arrested him at gunpoint. See id. at 593-94, 95 S.Ct. 2254. The officers then transported him to the police station, placed him in an interrogation room, and left him alone for a several minutes. See id. at 594, 95 S.Ct. 2254. When the officers returned, they read Brown his Miranda rights and, after the officers made some statements indicating they might have evidence of Brown’s complicity in the murder, Brown waived his Miranda rights and made a statement confessing to his role in Corpus’ death. See 422 U.S. at 594-95, 95 S.Ct. 2254. Brown gave this first statement at about 8:45 p.m., an hour after his initial arrest. With Brown’s help, the officers eventually tracked down Jimmy Claggett, the man that Brown implicated as the actual shooter in Corpus’ murder. See id. at 595, 95 S.Ct. 2254. Shortly thereafter, Assistant State’s Attorney Crilly spoke with Brown, again giving Brown his Miranda warnings and telling Brown that the state was going to charge him with murder. See id. In response, Brown made another, similar statement. See 422 U.S. at 595-96, 95 S.Ct. 2254. The State of Illinois, by a Grand Jury, indicted both Brown and Claggett for Corpus’ murder. See id. at 596, 95 S.Ct. 2254. Brown sought to have the statements that he made suppressed as fruit of his illegal arrest and detention. See 422 U.S. at 596, 95 S.Ct. 2254. The state trial court denied the motion. See id. The Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed, holding that the arrest and detention were illegal, but that the issuance of Miranda warnings rendered the statements “sufficiently an act of free will to purge the primary taint of the unlawful invasion.” 422 U.S. at 597, 95 S.Ct. 2254 (quoting the Supreme Court of Illinois). The Supreme Court of the United States granted Brown’s request for a writ of certiorari and reversed. The Supreme Court held primarily that, because Miranda warnings do not adequately protect the interests that the Fourth Amendment is intended to safeguard, the waiver of Miranda rights does not, by itself, show that the resulting statement is “sufficiently an act of free will to purge the primary taint.” 422 U.S. at 600-03, 95 S.Ct. 2254. “It is entirely possible, of course ... that persons arrested illegally frequently may decide to confess, as an act of free will unaffected by the initial illegality,” the Supreme Court said, “[b]ut Miranda warnings, alone and per se, cannot always make the act sufficiently a product of free will to break, for Fourth Amendment purposes, the causal connection between the illegality and the confession.” 422 U.S. at 603, 95 S.Ct. 2254 (emphasis in original). Rather, “[t]he question of whether a confession is the product of free will under Wong Sun [v. United States ] must be answered on the facts of each case. No single fact is dispositive.” Id. The Supreme Court then discussed the factors that a court should consider when analyzing whether a confession is “sufficiently the product of free will” to say that the taint of the initial illegality has become attenuated. “The Miranda warnings are an important factor,” as are “the temporal proximity of the arrest and the confession, the presence of intervening circumstances, and, particularly, the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct.” Id. at 603-04, 95 S.Ct. 2254. It clarified, however, that “[t]he voluntariness of the statement is a threshold requirement[,][a]nd the burden of showing admissibility rests, of course, on the prosecution.” Id. at 604, 95 S.Ct. 2254. Ultimately, the Supreme Court in Brown v. Illinois found that the defendant’s statement was a fruit of the poisonous tree because “Brown’s first statement was separated from his illegally arrest by less than two hours, and there was no intervening event of significance whatsoever.” 422 U.S. at 604, 95 S.Ct. 2254. It reinforced this holding with the fact that “[t]he illegality here, ... had a quality of purposefulness.” Id. at 605, 95 S.Ct. 2254. (iii) United States v. Ceccolini. In United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 98 S.Ct. 1054, 55 L.Ed.2d 268 (1978), the Supreme Court found that the taint of an illegal search had become attenuated. Officer Ronald Biro was spending his break at Ceccolini’s place of business, the Sleepy Hollow Flower Shop, talking with Lois Hennessey, an employee. See id. at 269-70, 98 S.Ct. 1054. During the conversation, Biro noticed an envelope with money in it, picked up the envelope, and discovered that it also contained policy slips— evidence of illegal gambling. See 435 U.S. at 270, 98 S.Ct. 1054. Without letting Hennessey know that he had inspected the envelope, Biro asked her to whom the envelope belonged, to which she answered that it belonged to Ceccolini. See 435 U.S. at 270, 98 S.Ct. 1054. Biro later told another detective what he learned, and that detective told Lance Emory, an agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. See id. Four months later, Emory went to Hennessey’s home, telling her only that he knew she worked for Ceccolini, and asked her for “any information regarding [Ceccolini’s] activities that [Hennessey] had acquired in the shop.” Id. at 272, 98 S.Ct. 1054. Hennessey was willing to testify to Ceccolini’s involvement in gambling. Id. Because Ceccolini had testified that he had never had any such involvement, the United States indicted him for perjury. See id. The trial court, although initially finding Ceccolini guilty of the charged offense, set aside its finding of guilt after granting a motion to suppress Hennessey’s testimony as fruit of the poisonous tree. See id. at 272-73, 98 S.Ct. 1054. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed, see id. at 273, 98 S.Ct. 1054, but the Supreme Court reversed, finding that the taint of the illegality had become attenuated, see id. Emory would not have spoke to Hennessey if not for the information illegally obtained from the initial police officer’s “search” of a suspicious-looking envelope. The Supreme Court reiterated, however, that “[t]he issue cannot be decided on the basis of causation in the logical sense alone, but necessarily includes other elements as well.” 435 U.S. at 274, 98 S.Ct. 1054. The Supreme Court found that Hennessey’s testimony, though causally related to the illegal search, had become sufficiently attenuated because: (i) the free will that the witness exhibited made it more likely that she would eventually have come forth on her own, see id. at 276-77, 279, 98 S.Ct. 1054; (ii) the Supreme Court is less willing to exclude live-witness testimony than to exclude inanimate documents or objects, see id. at 277, 98 S.Ct. 1054; (iii) the slips were not used in questioning Hennessey, see 435 U.S. at 279, 98 S.Ct. 1054; (iv) “substantial periods of time elapsed between the time of the illegal search and the initial contact with the witness,” and “between [the contact with the witnes