Full opinion text
ORDER WM. TERRELL HODGES, District Judge. This case is before the Court for consideration of a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 by a Florida inmate, James Aren Duckett, who has been sentenced to death. The Respondent has filed a Response in opposition (Doc. 18). The issues have been fully briefed and the case is ready for decision. No evidentiary hearing is necessary because the record is fully developed and the claims of the Petition raise issues of law, not issues of fact. See Breedlove v. Moore, 279 F.3d 952, 959 (11th Cir.2002). Upon a review of the entire record and the Parties written submissions, the Court finds that all of Duckett’s claims lack merit. The Petition will be denied in its entirety. Facts and Procedural History The facts of the case are stated at length in the Florida Supreme Court’s opinion denying the Petitioner’s direct appeal. See Duckett v. State, 568 So.2d 891 (Fla. 1990) (“Duckett F’). Duckett, a police officer for the City of Mascotte, was the only officer on patrol from 7:00 p.m., May 11, 1987, to 7:00 a.m., May 12, 1987. Between 10:00 and 10:30 p.m. on May 11, Teresa McAbee, an eleven-year-old girl, walked a short distance from her home to a convenience store to purchase a pencil. Teresa left the store with a sixteen-year-old Mexican boy, who was doing laundry next door. The boy testified that they walked over to the convenience store’s dumpster and talked for about twenty minutes before Duckett approached them. A clerk at the convenience store testified that Duckett entered the store and asked her the girl’s name and age, at which time she advised him that Teresa was between ten and thirteen years old. After indicating that he was going to check on her, Duckett exited the store and walked toward the dumpster, where he located the ■ two children. Duckett testified that he conversed with the children and subsequently, acting in his capacity as a police officer, instructed Teresa to return home. The sixteen-year-old boy testified that, after speaking with Duckett, he went to the laundromat to wait for his uncle, who arrived soon thereafter; that Duckett and Teresa were standing near the patrol car; and that Duckett asked the uncle the nephew’s age. Subsequently, Duckett suggested that the uncle talk to his nephew while he spoke to Teresa. According to the uncle and the boy, Duckett placed Teresa in the passenger’s side of his patrol car and shut the door before proceeding to the driver’s side. The uncle also testified that he never saw Teresa touch the hood of Duckett’s car. At approximately 11:00 p.m., Teresa’s mother walked to the convenience store, searching for her daughter. Upon arrival, she was told by the store’s clerk that Duckett may have taken her daughter to the police station. The mother then left the store and spent about an hour with her sister driving around Mascotte in search of Teresa. During this time, the mother did not see a police car. She next went to the Mascotte police station and, finding no one there, she drove a short distance to the Groveland police station. There, she told an officer that she wanted to report her daughter as missing. The officer told her that he would contact a Mascotte officer to meet her at the Mascotte police station. Teresa’s mother returned to the Mascotte police station and waited for fifteen to twenty minutes before Duckett arrived. After arriving, Duckett told her that he had spoken with Teresa at the store; that she had been in his police car; and that he had directed her to return home. Before returning home, the mother also filed a missing person report with Duckett. Subsequently, Duckett went to the mother’s residence to get a picture of her daughter, called the police chief to inform him of the missing person report, and advised the police chief that he had made a flyer and did not need any help in the matter. Duckett then returned to the convenience store with a flyer but told the clerk not to post it since it was not a good picture. Although he told the clerk that he would return with a better one, he never did. Duckett did bring flyers to two other convenience stores. The clerk at one of these stores testified that, while the police usually drove by every forty-five minutes to an hour, Duckett came by at 9:30 p.m. but failed to return until he brought the flyer later that evening. A tape of Duckett’s radio calls indicated none between 10:50 p.m. and 12:10 a.m. At 1:15 a.m., Duckett went to the uncle’s house to question his nephew about Teresa, and Duckett returned to the mother’s home around 3:00 a.m. Later that morning, a man saw what he believed to be a body in a lake and went to find the police chief, who determined that it was Teresa’s body. The lake is less than one mile from the convenience store where Teresa was last seen. A medical examiner testified that the perpetrator had sexually assaulted the victim while she was alive, strangled her, and then drowned her, causing her death. Prior to this incident, the victim had not engaged in any sexual activity. Blood was found on her underpants but not in or about Duckett’s patrol car. Semen was discovered on her jeans. A technician for the sheriffs department examined the tire tracks at the murder scene and indicated that they were very unusual. While leaving the crime scene, he observed that the tracks of a Mascotte police car appeared to be similar. He stopped his vehicle, examined the tracks, and determined that they were consistent with the tracks at the crime scene. An expert at trial corroborated this evaluation. The tracks were made by Goodyear Eagle mud and snow tires, which are designed for northern driving. While the local tire center had not sold any of those particular tires during its nine years of existence, it had received two sets by mistake and placed them on the two Mascotte police cars. Evidence revealed that the vehicle which left the impressions had driven through a mudhole. However, no evidence was presented that Duckett cleaned his vehicle, and no debris from the scene was found in or on his vehicle. Evidence was also presented that Duckett was neat and clean later that night, as if he had just come on duty. Both Duckett’s and Teresa’s fingerprints were discovered on the hood of Duckett’s patrol car. Duckett’s prints were commingled with the victim’s, whose prints indicated that she had been sitting backwards on the hood and had scooted up the car. A pubic hair was found in the victim’s underpants. While other experts could not reach a conclusion by comparing that hair with Duckett’s pubic hair, Michael Malone, an FBI special agent who had been qualified as an expert in hairs and fibers in forty-two states, examined the hair sample, concluding that there was a high degree of probability that the pubic hair found in her underpants was Duckett’s pubic hair. Malone also testified that the pubic hair did not match the hairs of the sixteen-year-old boy, the uncle, or the others who were in contact with the victim that evening. On June 15, 1987, before his arrest, Duckett gave a statement in which he denied driving his vehicle to the lake that evening. He further stated that the victim had not been on the hood of his patrol car and that he had stopped at the Jiffy store for coffee after the girl went home. The state presented testimony of three young women who allegedly had sexual encounters with Duckett. Prior to the introduction of this testimony, the trial judge instructed the jury that the testimony was for the limited purpose of showing motive, opportunity, plan, and identification. The first woman, a petite nineteen-year-old, testified that, in either January or February, 1987, she ran into Duckett while she was attempting to find her boyfriend. After indicating that he, too, was searching for her boyfriend, he drove her in his patrol car in search of her boyfriend. While in the car, Duckett placed his hand on her shoulder and attempted to kiss her. After she refused to kiss him, he desisted and she got out of the car. The second woman, a petite eighteen-year-old, stated that, on May 1, 1987, Duckett picked her up while she was walking along the highway. After Duckett drove her to a remote area in an orange grove, he parked the car, placed his hand on her breast, and attempted to kiss her. When she refused to kiss him, he desisted and drove her to where she requested. The third woman, a petite seventeen-year-old, testified that on two occasions, once in February or March, 1987, and again in April or May, 1987, she voluntarily met Duckett at a remote area while he was on patrol and performed oral sex on him. At trial, Duckett testified that, on the night of the murder, while running stationary radar near the convenience store, he noticed a girl talking to three Mexicans at a laundromat. After he saw the girl and one of the boys walk over to an ice machine, he went into the store to ask the clerk some questions about the girl. He then left the store, asked the children their ages, requested that they walk to his car, and questioned the boy further. At this time, the boy’s uncle arrived at the scene with some other men. Subsequently, Duckett placed the girl in his car while he spoke with the uncle about his nephew. After the boy’s uncle left with the other men, Duckett obtained more information from Teresa and told her to go home. He did not see her again after she got out of the car and walked in front of the store. Duckett also stated that he then returned to the station for a short period of time, went to one of the convenience stores for coffee, and went on patrol. He subsequently responded to a call by a Groveland police officer and returned to the station in Mascotte, where he met the girl’s mother. After visiting the uncle’s home to ask some questions concerning the girl, he drove to the mother’s home to get a picture. He then returned to city hall, called the police chief, and told him he was going to make a poster and contact all the stores. With regard to Teresa’s fingerprints on the hood of his car, he explained that it was possible that she sat on the hood when he was at the convenience store. Duckett denied any involvement with the three women. Duckett I, 568 So.2d at 891-94. Duckett was arrested and charged by indictment on October 27, 1987 with one count of first degree murder. On February 29, 1988, Duckett was charged by information with one count of attempt to commit sexual battery in violation of Fla. Stat. § 794.011(2). The charges were consolidated for trial by stipulation of both parties on April 4,1988. The case was tried on April 25, 1988 through May 10, 1988. The jury returned a verdict of guilty on all counts. The penalty phase began, and was completed, on the same day that the jury returned its guilty verdict. At the conclusion of the penalty phase, the jury recommended the death sentence for Duckett by a vote of eight to four. On June 30, 1988, Judge Jerry T. Lockett imposed a sentence of death with regard to the first degree murder count, and a sentence of life with a 25-year minimum mandatory on the sexual battery count, to run consecutively. In rendering the sentence of death, the trial judge found two aggravating factors: (1) that the murder was committed during the commission of or immediately after a sexual battery; and (2) that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel. The trial judge found the existence of one statutory mitigating factor — that Duckett had no significant history of prior criminal activity — and several nonstatutory mitigating factors— Duckett’s family background and education-and concluded that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances. The conviction and death sentence were affirmed on direct appeal on November 14, 1990, Duckett I, 568 So.2d 891, and the Court’s mandate was issued on December 17, 1990. A timely motion for post-conviction relief pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 was filed on May 1, 1992. Duckett filed an amended Rule 3.850 motion on November 14, 1994. Both motions raised a total of fourteen claims and various sub-claims. The trial court held evidentiary hearings on January 7-8, 1997, October 28-30, 1997, December 17, 1997, October 26-27, 1998, and February 19, 1999, and permitted the parties to file additional post-hearing briefs. The trial court denied Duckett relief as to all of his claims on August 13, 2001. Duckett filed a timely appeal to the Florida Supreme Court on May 31, 2002. On June 5, 2002, Duckett also filed a state petition for a writ of habeas corpus. During oral argument, counsel for both Duckett and the State explained that DNA testing might be possible on certain items of clothing previously introduced into evidence. The Florida Supreme Court took the unique approach of sua sponte remanding the case to the trial court to “determine whether clothing exists that can be tested for DNA.” On remand, the trial court determined that only one of the items could potentially produce any relevant evidence — a slide which contained a smear from a 1987 vaginal swab. After determining that the slide would not produce any meaningful results and the sample would be consumed by the testing, Duckett chose not to have the slide tested. The trial court denied Duckett’s attempt to have other, non-clothing items tested for DNA, on the grounds that such items were outside the Florida Supreme Court’s mandate relinquishing jurisdiction, and because such testing would amount to nothing more than a “fishing expedition.” Duckett’s motion for compliance with Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963) and Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995) was also denied. The Florida Supreme Court denied Duckett’s appeal of the trial court’s ruling on his Rule 3.850 motions and the remand proceedings, as well as his state petition for a writ of habeas corpus on October 6, 2005. Duckett v. State, 918 So.2d 224 (2005) (‘Duckett II”). A timely filed motion for rehearing was denied on December 22, 2005, and the United States Supreme Court denied Duckett’s petition for writ of certiorari on October 2, 2006. Duckett v. Florida, 549 U.S. 846, 127 S.Ct. 103, 166 L.Ed.2d 78 (2006). On January 8, 2007, Duckett filed the instant petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doe. I). The petition is 212 pages in length and presents 16 claims of constitutional violations, many of which contain numerous sub-parts. On June 13, 2007, the State filed its consolidated response to each of Petitioner’s claims (Doc. 18). Duckett moved to hold the proceedings in this Court in abeyance on May 5, 2008, in order to pursue a successive Rule 3.851 motion for postconviction relief (Doc. 22). The Court denied Duckett’s motion on May 23, 2008 (Doc. 24), and the Parties were permitted to file additional briefs on September 23, 2008 and November 12, 2008 (Docs. 32, 35). Duckett’s petition is therefore ripe for resolution, and the Court will address each of the Petitioner’s claims seriatim. Clisby v. Jones, 960 F.2d 925 (11th Cir.1992). Standard of Review Because Duckett filed his petition after April 24, 1996, this case is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 2254, as amended by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 792, 121 S.Ct. 1910, 150 L.Ed.2d 9 (2001); Henderson v. Campbell, 353 F.3d 880, 889-90 (11th Cir.2003). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) and (e), this Court’s review of the state court’s factual findings must be highly deferential. Such findings are presumed to be correct unless rebutted by clear and convincing evidence. Fugate v. Head, 261 F.3d 1206, 1215 (11th Cir.2001); § 2254(e)(1). Similarly, the state courts’ resolutions of issues of law— including constitutional issues — must be accepted unless they are found to be “contrary to” clearly established precedent of the Supreme Court of the United States or involve an “unreasonable application” of such precedent. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000); Robinson v. Moore, 300 F.3d 1320 (11th Cir.2002). Indeed, it is not enough that the federal courts believe that the state court was wrong; it must be demonstrated that the state court decision was “objectively unreasonable.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 409-10, 120 S.Ct. 1495. See also Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694, 122 S.Ct. 1843, 152 L.Ed.2d 914 (2002); Breedlove v. Moore, 279 F.3d 952, 961 (11th Cir.2002). Moreover, in order for a court to consider claims brought in a federal habeas petition they must first be fully exhausted in state court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1); Kelley v. Sec’y for Dept. of Corrections, 377 F.3d 1317, 1343 (11th Cir.2004). In order to be exhausted, a federal claim must be fairly presented to the state courts. Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275, 92 S.Ct. 509, 30 L.Ed.2d 438 (1971). A federal question raised in a federal habeas petition is not fairly presented to the state courts if the issue is only raised as a state law claim before the state courts. Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6-8, 103 S.Ct. 276, 74 L.Ed.2d 3 (1982). Thus, federal claims that have not been fairly presented are procedurally barred and cannot be adjudicated at the habeas stage; and a claim is “fairly presented” to a state court only when a “reasonable reader would understand each claim’s particular legal basis and specific factual foundation,” Kelley, 377 F.3d at 1344-45 (citing Picard, 404 U.S. at 277, 92 S.Ct. at 513). Similarly, claims that are not presented at all at the state court level, or that the state courts determine to have been either legally insufficient or procedurally barred, are also barred in this Court. See, e.g., Sims v. Singletary, 155 F.3d 1297 (11th Cir.1998); Bolender v. Singletary, 16 F.3d 1547 (11th Cir.1994); Lindsey v. Smith, 820 F.2d 1137 (11th Cir.1987). Teague v. Lane Retroactivity Analysis In addition to performing the analysis required by AEDPA, a federal court considering a habeas petition must also consider whether the petitioner’s claims are barred under the non-retroactivity rule set forth in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989). See also Horn v. Banks, 536 U.S. 266, 272, 122 S.Ct. 2147, 153 L.Ed.2d 301 (2002); Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U.S. 383, 389, 114 S.Ct. 948, 127 L.Ed.2d 236 (1994). “Under Teague a new rule of criminal procedure generally may not be applied in a federal habeas proceeding where the judgment in question became final before the rule was announced.” Schwab v. Crosby, 451 F.3d 1308, 1323 (11th Cir.2006). A state conviction becomes final “when the availability of direct appeal to the state courts has been exhausted and ... a timely filed petition [for a writ of certiorari] has been finally denied.” Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U.S. 383, 389, 114 S.Ct. 948, 127 L.Ed.2d 236 (1994). A case announces a new rule “when it breaks new ground or imposes a new obligation on the States or Federal Government,” but not if the result in that case is “dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant’s conviction became final.” Teague, 489 U.S. at 301, 109 S.Ct. 1060. Because Duckett did not file a petition for certiorari, his conviction became final on February 12,1991, when the 90-day period for filing his petition expired. Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406, 411, 124 S.Ct. 2504, 159 L.Ed.2d 494 (2004). Therefore, the law as it existed as of February 12, 1991 governs Duckett’s claims. The State contends that each of Duckett’s claims is barred under Teague because in order to rule in Duckett’s favor, the Court would have to create a new rule of law which would then have to be applied in a manner not dictated by controlling precedent at the time Duckett’s conviction became final. Duckett, as expected, argues that with the exception of Claim XVI, none of his claims are Teague-bwved. Unfortunately, in the more than 370 pages of briefing submitted to this Court, neither side has provided any analysis-other than to expound in excruciating detail on the Teague standard itself-explaining precisely how each claim is or is not barred under Teague. The Court will therefore undertake this task as necessary with respect to each claim. Standard for Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Most, if not all of Duckett’s 16 enumerated claims are a combination of alleged errors by the State courts and allegations of deficient performance by trial and appellate counsel. Therefore, the Court will be reviewing Duckett’s claims under the well-established two-part test for ineffective assistance of counsel set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). First, the petitioner must show that his counsel’s representation “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness ... considering all the circumstances.” Id. at 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Counsel’s errors must be “so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.” Id. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly deferential, and every effort should be made to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time. Id. at 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052. The petitioner must also overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy. Id. See also Devier v. Zant, 3 F.3d 1445, 1450 (11th Cir.1993) (“a court should be highly deferential to those choices ... that are arguably dictated by a reasonable trial strategy.”). Once the petitioner demonstrates that counsel’s behavior was objectively unreasonable, he must still prove that counsel’s particular errors “had an actual effect on the defense,” not merely that the errors had “some conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Stated differently, the petitioner must show actual prejudice; that there “is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. In determining this prejudice prong, the court must “consider the totality of the evidence before the judge or jury.” Id. at 695, 104 S.Ct. 2052. In addition, failure to raise non-meritorious issues is not considered ineffective assistance of counsel. Card v. Dugger, 911 F.2d 1494, 1520 (11th Cir.1990). The burden of establishing whether counsel was ineffective rests with the Petitioner, and it is a heavy one. As such, “the cases in which habeas petitioners can properly prevail on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel are few and far between.” Rogers v. Zant, 13 F.3d 384, 386 (11th Cir.1994). Claims for Relief Duckett asserts that his conviction and death sentence were obtained in violation of his Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. He further contends that he is innocent and that his conviction and continued incarceration are a miscarriage of justice. CLAIM I MR. DUCKETT WAS DENIED AN ADVERSARIAL TESTING WHEN CRITICAL, EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE WAS NOT PRESENTED TO THE JURY DURING THE GUILT PHASE OF MR. DUCKETT’S TRIAL. THE STATE EITHER FAILED TO DISCLOSE EVIDENCE WHICH WAS MATERIAL AND EXCULPATORY IN NATURE AND/OR PRESENTED MISLEADING AND FALSE TESTIMONY AND/OR DEFENSE COUNSEL UNREASONABLY FAILED TO DISCOVER AND PRESENT EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE. Duckett’s first claim for relief is actually six separate claims, many with multiple subparts, alleging a failure by the prosecutor to produce potentially exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963) and Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995), as well as ineffective assistance of Duckett’s trial counsel. The majority of these claims simply seek to retry the case. They were all raised during Duckett’s Rule 3.850 proceedings, and were all denied as either procedurally defaulted or on their merits. They are also due to be denied here. A. Testimony of Gwen Gurley and Subsequent Recantation Duckett’s first argument is that his due process rights were violated when one of the state’s witnesses, Grace Gwendolyn Gurley, gave allegedly false trial testimony, and his trial counsel failed to properly impeach her testimony. Ms. Gurley, who at the time was seventeen years old, testified that on the night of the murder, she walked to a convenience store with two other girls. Ms. Gurley saw a Mascotte police car and a uniformed police officer outside the store around 10:30 p.m. The officer spoke with Ms. Gurley and several other young persons, including the victim, and told them to all go home as it was past the City of Mascotte’s evening curfew. Ms. Gurley did not go home, instead she hid on a path just east of the store until she observed the officer leave the area. At that time, Ms. Gurley only saw one person in the police car — the officer himself. After the officer left the area, Ms. Gurley walked back over to the store to use the pay phone. From the location of the pay phone, Ms. Gurley observed a Mascotte police car parked next to the dumpster on the other side of the store with its headlights turned off. Ms. Gurley heard the police officer call the victim (who was also still at the store) over to the police car — and she recognized the officer’s voice as the same officer who had earlier told her to go home. Ms. Gurley saw the victim walk towards the car. Ms. Gurley then went back to her hiding place so that the officer would not see her, and heard a car door shut. She then saw the police car back up and drive away from the convenience store. As the car turned the corner, Ms. Gurley saw two people in the car — the driver and a smaller passenger. Ms. Gurley then identified Duckett as the police officer she saw on the night of the murder. She did not identify the victim as the passenger. Ms. Gurley also admitted that she had previously been convicted of three felonies for grand theft, and that at the time she first contacted the sheriffs office with information about the murder, she was incarcerated awaiting a hearing on a probation violation. Ms. Gurley also testified that she did not contact the sheriffs office until the day after Duckett’s indictment, when she realized that the victim was the same girl she observed with Duckett the night of the murder. She further testified that she did not receive any favorable treatment, was never promised any favorable treatment, and was never threatened by law enforcement in order to procure her testimony. On cross-examination, Duckett’s trial counsel repeatedly asked Ms. Gurley if she was testifying in order to obtain a more favorable resolution on her probation violation. Trial counsel also extensively questioned Ms. Gurley’s recollection of what she observed on the night in question, and attempted to find inconsistencies with her prior statements to the sheriffs office. Ms. Gurley consistently denied receiving any type of deal in exchange for her testimony. She did admit, however, that she had initially lied to the police about the identity of one the girls that had accompanied her to the convenience store and about the fact that the girl had gone home earlier in the night. Duckett now claims that during two post-trial interviews with his counsel and a private investigator, Ms. Gurley recanted her trial testimony, stating that she was not at the convenience store on the night of the murder, and that she was told by police what to say at trial. Ms. Gurley also allegedly told the private investigator that she received favorable treatment from the police in exchange for her testimony. Duckett contends that Ms. Gurley’s recantation establishes either that the state prosecutor knowingly and deliberately suborned false testimony from Ms. Gurley at trial which deprived Duckett of his due process rights, or that Ms. Gurley’s subsequent recantations constitute newly discovered evidence mandating a new trial. At the conclusion of a lengthy evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied this claim, holding that Ms. Gurley’s recantation was inconsistent, incredible, and unreliable, and that even without Ms. Gurley’s testimony at trial, Duckett would still have been found guilty (Ex. G-7, pp. 20-23). The Florida Supreme Court, relying solely on state law, affirmed, finding both that Ms. Gurley’s alleged recantation was not sufficient to warrant a new trial, and that there was sufficient additional circumstantial evidence so that a new trial would not have produced a different verdict. Duckett II, 918 So.2d at 232-34. After a careful review of the record and applicable federal precedent, the Court finds that the Florida Supreme Court’s decision was factually accurate and was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law. Duckett’s argument that Ms. Gurley repeatedly and consistently recanted her testimony, and that she was coerced by the state to perjure herself stretches the facts and evidence beyond any logical reading. At the Rule 3.850 evidentiary hearing, testimony was presented from various witnesses, including Duckett’s trial counsel, establishing that after the conclusion of Duckett’s trial, a private investigator affiliated with Duckett’s defense met with Ms. Gurley, and at that time, Ms. Gurley recanted her prior testimony. Ms. Gurley repeated her recantation at an August 3, 1989 interview with Duckett’s trial counsel and the investigator, and also stated that she had received favorable treatment from law enforcement in exchange for her testimony. However, two agents from the Florida Department of Law Enforcement subsequently interviewed Ms. Gurley, at which time she rescinded her recantation and adhered to her original trial testimony. Ms. Gurley was also called as a witness at the evidentiary hearing. She refused to answer any questions relating to the night of the murder, instead invoking her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Ms. Gurley did testify, however, that representatives from Duckett’s post-conviction counsel visited Ms. Gurley several times at her home and twice at her place of employment. Ms. Gurley stated that these representatives at times verbally harassed and badgered her, and on one occasion she called the State Attorney’s Office to inquire about filing a police report over an incident where the representatives yelled at Ms. Gurley and threw some papers at her. Ms. Gurley also testified that although the prosecutor mentioned to her that if she lied, she could be subject to a perjury prosecution, the prosecutor did not threaten, harass, pressure, or coerce Ms. Gurley in any way. The investigators who dealt with Ms. Gurley prior to Duckett’s trial also testified that they did not pressure or threaten Ms. Gurley to testify. Thus, at best, the state courts were faced with conflicting out of court statements by a witness who now refused to testify. 1. Claim, That Prosecutor Presented False Testimony At Trial The Florida Supreme Court did not directly address Duckett’s claim that the prosecutor knowingly presented false testimony at his trial. Nevertheless, the denial of this claim based on other state law grounds is not contrary to applicable federal precedent. In order to succeed on a claim that a prosecutor knowingly suborned perjury, “the defendant must demonstrate that the prosecutor ‘knowingly used perjured testimony, or failed to correct what he subsequently learned was false testimony, and that the falsehood was material.’ ” United States v. Dickerson, 248 F.3d 1036, 1041 (11th Cir.2001) (quoting Tompkins v. Moore, 193 F.3d 1327, 1339 (11th Cir.1999) (internal citations omitted)). “It is axiomatic that only the knowing use of false testimony constitutes a due process violation.” See United States v. Lopez, 985 F.2d 520, 524 (11th Cir.1993). Duckett’s claim that law enforcement and/or the state prosecutor knowingly coached Ms. Gurley and encouraged her to falsely testify at his trial is based solely on Duckett’s own suppositions and accusations, and the inconsistent and unreliable testimony of Ms. Gurley. This is not enough to establish a due process violation. See Boyd v. Allen, 592 F.3d 1274, 1307-08 (11th Cir.2010). The fact that Ms. Gurley’s trial testimony was capable of impeachment by prior inconsistent statements or testimony of other witnesses does not amount to a showing of perjury, nor does it demonstrate that the prosecution knowingly presented false testimony to the jury. United States v. Michael, 17 F.3d 1383, 1385 (11th Cir.1994). 2. Newly Discovered Evidence Claim The Florida Supreme Court did address Duckett’s claim that Ms. Gurley’s post-trial recantation amounted to newly discovered evidence warranting a new trial, albeit on state law grounds alone. However, its ruling is not contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal precedent. The Supreme Court has held that “[cjlaims of actual innocence based on newly discovered evidence have never been held to state a ground for federal habeas relief absent an independent constitutional violation occurring in the underlying state criminal proceeding.” Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 400, 113 S.Ct. 853, 122 L.Ed.2d 203 (1993); Brownlee v. Haley, 306 F.3d 1043, 1065 (11th Cir.2002). It is not the Court’s role to make an independent determination of a petitioner’s guilt or innocence based on evidence that has emerged since trial. Brownlee, 306 F.3d at 1065. “This rule is grounded in the principle that federal habeas courts sit to ensure that individuals are not imprisoned in violation of the Constitution — not to correct errors of fact.” Herrera, 506 U.S. at 400,113 S.Ct. 853. In this case, it appears that Duckett’s underlying constitutional violation is a due process claim focusing on a knowing use of perjured testimony by the prosecution. Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972); Drake v. Francis, 727 F.2d 990 (11th Cir.1984). The Court again concludes that there is no evidence to support such a claim. Ms. Gurley refused to testify at the evidentiary hearing, and has given conflicting statements concerning the veracity of her trial testimony. Thus, the Florida Supreme Court was correct to find her post-trial statements unreliable and incredible. Furthermore, even if Duckett’s claim was cognizable for habeas relief, it would stili fail for lack of merit. “Recantation testimony is properly viewed with great suspicion. It upsets society’s interest in the finality of convictions, is very often unreliable and given for suspect motives, and most often serves merely to impeach cumulative evidence rather than to undermine confidence in the accuracy of the conviction.” Dobbert v. Wainwright, 468 U.S. 1231, 1233-34, 105 S.Ct. 34, 82 L.Ed.2d 925 (1984); accord United States v. Santiago, 837 F.2d 1545, 1550 (11th Cir.1988) (noting that “recantations are viewed with extreme suspicion by the courts”). In general, a witness’ recantation of trial testimony will justify a new trial only where the reviewing judge is satisfied that the recantation is true and that it will likely result a different verdict. See Dobbert, at 1234, 105 S.Ct. 34 (citing Brown v. State, 381 So.2d 690, 692-693 (Fla.1980)). The trial court and the Florida Supreme Court held that Ms. Gurley’s alleged recantation was not credible. Such factual findings are given great deference on habeas review, and the Court finds no reason to disagree with these findings. Even if her recantation was credible, it “would probably not produce a different result at a new trial.” United States v. Calles, 271 Fed.Appx. 931, 943 (11th Cir. 2008); see also McLaughlin v. Secretary, Dept. of Corrections, No. 8:07-CV-2223-T-30TBM, 2009 WL 3010818 at *4 (M.D.Fla. Sept. 16, 2009) (“To grant relief on the basis of newly discovered evidence, the evidence must be such that it would probably produce an acquittal.”) (citations omitted). Given her repeated assertion of her Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrimination, it is highly probable that Ms. Gurley would simply not testify at all at a new trial. And even without her testimony, there was more than enough circumstantial evidence — including testimony of other witnesses placing the victim in Duckett’s police car — to ensure Duckett’s conviction. The portion of Duckett’s claim relating to Ms. Gurley’s allegedly false testimony shall be denied. S. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Duckett also argues that there was a wealth of evidence — including testimony of other witnesses — which could have been used to impeach Ms. Gurley’s trial testimony, and/or show her propensity to lie. Duckett’s trial counsel, however, did not present such evidence, ostensibly because he did not do a thorough pre-trial investigation, or because the state withheld evidence. The Florida Supreme Court denied this claim on the grounds that Duckett failed to show both deficient performance and resulting prejudice. Duckett II, 918 So.2d at 234. This ruling is not contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law. As the Florida Supreme Court held, Duckett’s trial counsel did, in fact, attempt to impeach Ms. Gurley with her prior inconsistent statements and her prior felony convictions, (including the fact that she only served five and a half months on a two year sentence), and Duckett failed to establish how his trial counsel could reasonably have discovered other impeachment evidence. The Florida Supreme Court was also correct in its determination that Duckett did not establish any prejudice. As discussed above, even if Ms. Gurley’s testimony had been severely impeached or excluded entirely, other evidence in the record provided strong support for Duckett’s conviction. Thus, Duckett has not shown that but for his counsel’s failure to impeach Ms. Gurley further, Duckett would not have been convicted. See Brower v. Secretary for Dept. of Corrections, 137 Fed.Appx. 260, 266 (11th Cir. June 24, 2005). This portion of Duckett’s claim is Denied. B. Claims Concerning State’s Forensic Evidence Duckett next argues that his due process rights were violated when the trial court allowed several categories of forensic evidence at trial. 1. Allegations of Expert Shopping The first of many arguments concerning the hair analysis expert testimony involves the State’s alleged “expert shopping” to find the best expert. The record reflects that the State’s first expert, FDLE Agent Deborah Steger, could not make a match between Duckett’s hair and a pubic hair found on the victim’s body. As a result, the State sent hair samples to Lifecodes lab to attempt DNA testing. Lifecodes could not conduct DNA testing on the samples, and returned them to the prosecutor. The State then sent the hair samples to the FBI for analysis — a step which Duckett contends had never been taken in any prior investigations in Lake County and was contrary to FBI policy. FBI Agent Michael Malone eventually tested the hair samples, and concluded that Duckett’s hair matched that of the unknown pubic hair. Agent Malone testified to that effect at Duckett’s trial. The trial court denied this claim as proeedurally barred because it could and should have been raised on direct appeal (Ex. G-7, p. 23). The Florida Supreme Court affirmed on the same grounds. Duckett II, 918 So.2d at 234. As such, the claim is also barred here absent a showing of cause or prejudice. Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 504, 123 S.Ct. 1690, 155 L.Ed.2d 714 (2003); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729, 111 S.Ct. 2546,115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991). In his reply memorandum of law, Duckett claims that his appellate counsel was constitutionally ineffective, and that this deficient performance establishes the cause and prejudice necessary to overcome the procedural bar. See Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488-89, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986). The only evidence to support Duckett’s theory is the fact that Duckett’s appellate counsel (who was also his trial counsel) did not raise this issue on direct appeal, and that his appellate counsel withdrew from the case, but was subsequently reappointed approximately five weeks later. Duckett has presented no explanation as to how the State’s contact with two different hair analysis experts and subsequent use at trial of the expert whose results were favorable to the State’s case violates any federal or constitutional law; and, absent such a showing, there is no basis for the claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel in failing to make that argument. Moreover, even if Duckett had made that sort of legal argument, it would be defeated by the fact that Duckett’s trial counsel called the FDLE hair analyst to provide expert testimony on Duckett’s behalf. The FDLE analyst testified that she had also tested the hair samples, did not find sufficient similarities between Duckett’s hair and the pubic hair, and therefore was not able to reach the same conclusions as Agent Malone. The FDLE analyst also testified as to the State’s alleged expert shopping, and Duckett’s trial counsel made much of this fact during his closing arguments. (Ex. A-10, pp. 1919-20). Thus the evidence of the State’s “expert shopping” was before the jury, and the jury was free to determine the credibility of each expert. In sum, there does not appear to have been any cognizable issue to raise on appeal — i.e., there was no error made at Duckett’s trial on this point. The failure to raise a nonmeritorious issue on appeal, particularly in light of the absence of any supporting legal authority, cannot equate to constitutionally deficient performance or prejudice. As such, Duckett has not overcome the procedural bar, and this portion of Claim I is Denied. 2. Cham of Custody of Hair Samples Duckett next argues that because of the State’s “expert shopping” the chain of custody for the hair samples was destroyed, thereby depriving Duckett of due process. This claim focuses on Lifecodes’ (the DNA laboratory that the State contacted after FDLE Agent Steger) misplacement of several of Duckett’s own hair samples. Apparently two years after Duckett’s trial, Lifecodes transmitted a package to the Lake County Sheriffs Office with additional samples of Duckett’s hair which Life-codes had previously stated were consumed during attempted DNA testing. In actuality, the hair samples had been misplaced in Lifecodes’ evidence room. There is no allegation, and no evidence, that Life-codes or anyone else misplaced the ham found on the victim’s body-the “unknown” hair sample. Duckett argues that because Lifecodes misplaced some of Duckett’s hair samples — the “known” hair samples — the entire chain of custody over both the “known” and “unknown” ham samples was destroyed and therefore all hair analysis evidence was unreliable and inadmissible. Duckett raised this claim in his Rule 8.850 proceedings, but it does not appear that the trial court or the Florida Supreme Court specifically addressed it. Instead the state courts denied Duckett’s claims concerning the hair analysis expert testimony on other grounds. See 918 So.2d at 234-35. Regardless, the Court finds that this portion of Duckett’s claim is without merit and the Florida Supreme Court’s rejection of Duckett’s hair analysis claim on other grounds was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law. Duckett simply has not shown how a laboratory’s misplacement of Duckett’s own hair samples in any way rendered the hair analysis evidence unreliable and/or inadmissible. There is no evidence that the ham sample taken from the victim’s body (the key evidence needed for the hair analysis) was lost, misplaced, or compromised in any way. Duckett’s supposition on this point does not equate to a constitutional violation warranting habeas relief. S. Evidence of a Second Unknown Hair That Did Not Match Duckett Duckett next contends that evidence of a second unknown hair found on the victim which was not consistent with either the victim’s hair or Duckett’s hair was never introduced at trial, and that this potentially exculpatory evidence was crucial for Duckett’s defense. The trial court and the Florida Supreme Court denied this claim, holding that Duckett did not satisfy the requirements for establishing a claim under Brady. Duckett II, 918 So.2d at 234-35. The Florida Supreme Court found this claim to be conclusory and insufficiently pled because it failed to identify the alleged hair as Brady material and failed to argue the effect the evidence would have had at trial. 918 So.2d at 235. The Court agrees with the Florida Supreme Court. Duckett did not establish a Brady violation in his Rule 3.850 proceedings, and his habeas claim is similarly deficient. In four conclusory sentences, Duckett claims that there is a second unknown hair which was not consistent with Duckett’s hair, and that this “potentially exculpatory evidence” was never submitted to the jury. Duckett does not even suggest how the Florida Supreme Court’s decision that his claim was insufficiently pled was contrary to or an unreasonable application of applicable federal precedent. See Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82, 119 S.Ct. 1936, 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999); Gore v. Crosby, No. 3:03-cv-474-J-25, 2006 WL 4847609 at *21-22 (M.D.Fla. Jan. 31, 2006). This portion of Duckett’s claim is therefore Denied. 1. Credibility of Hair Analyst Michael Malone The next portion of Duckett’s claim focuses on FBI Agent Michael Malone. Duckett contends that Agent Malone was not a credible witness and therefore should not have been permitted to testify. The Florida Supreme Court addressed Agent Malone’s credibility both at Duckett’s direct appeal and his Rule 3.850 appeal. In both instances, the Florida Supreme Court found Duckett’s challenges meritless: Duckett also claims that the State’s witness FBI expert Michael Malone, was not credible. The circuit court concluded that “[t]he attack upon Agent Malone of the FBI is unfounded and without merit.” This conclusion is supported by the record. At the evidentiary hearing it was established that Malone had received proficiency tests in the examination of hair and fiber and had never failed. Furthermore, Malone had previously testified as an expert in the field of ham and fiber, and no court has refused to recognize him as an expert. On direct appeal, we discussed Malone’s credibility: “Duckett’s counsel extensively challenged Malone’s credibility during cross-examination of Malone and during the testimony of a Florida Department of Law Enforcement expert on hair analysis. It is not our responsibility to reweigh that evidence. The expert’s credibility was resolved by the jury.” Duckett, 568 So.2d at 895. Duckett II, 918 So.2d at 234. This decisions is not contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law. Duckett also has failed to submit clear and convincing evidence rebutting the Florida Supreme Court’s factual findings. See Fugate, 261 F.3d at 1215. Duckett also argues that any evidence concerning Malone’s credibility should have been disclosed by the prosecutor. There is one problem with Duckett’s claim — none of the evidence existed at the time of Duckett’s trial or his appeal. And, as discussed in more detail in Claim XIV below, it defies logic as to how the State could have willfully or inadvertently suppressed evidence concerning Malone’s credibility as an expert witness when such evidence did not yet exist While Duckett has cited to state law for the proposition that Brady applies to post-conviction proceedings, he has not submitted any federal or Supreme Court authority for such a proposition. Moreover, none of this evidence which attacks Malone’s credibility establishes in any way that Malone gave false or unreliable testimony in Duckett’s case. 5. Misleading Nature of Malone’s Testimony Duckett next argues that Malone’s trial testimony concerning how many different individual hairs he examined during his career, how he reached his conclusion comparing Duckett’s hair with the unknown pubic hair, as well as the fact that he has only had two cases in which he could not distinguish between hairs from different people was highly suspect and misleading. This claim is simply a recast of Duckett’s challenge to Malone’s credibility. And, as the Florida Supreme Court correctly stated, trial counsel extensively challenged Malone’s testimony on cross-examination, and placed the FDLE Agent on the stand to rebut Malone’s findings. Malone’s credibility as an expert witness and the veracity of his testimony was resolved by the jury. There are no grounds for habeas relief. 6. General Unreliability of Hair Evidence Duckett next claims that hair evidence is unreliable in general, and is not sufficient to sustain his conviction. Duckett also argues that his trial counsel was ineffective because he should have moved to exclude the hair evidence pretrial. The Florida Supreme Court denied this portion of Duckett’s claim as procedurally barred because it could have been raised on direct appeal. Duckett II, 918 So.2d at 234, n. 12. Duckett concedes that his counsel did not raise this issue on appeal, but argues that this failure constitutes itself ineffective assistance sufficient to overcome the procedural bar. Because this claim was procedurally barred in the state courts, it is also barred on habeas review. Massaro, 538 U.S. at 504, 123 S.Ct. 1690; Coleman, 501 U.S. at 729, 111 S.Ct. 2546. Moreover, the Court finds that unlike the cases cited by Duckett in his petition, his conviction did not rely solely on hair comparison evidence. Rather, there was ample other evidence sufficient to support his conviction. Accordingly, counsel’s failure to raise this issue on appeal, or to object to the introduction of such evidence at trial did not cause Duckett any prejudice, and therefore cannot equate to constitutionally ineffective assistance. Duckett also has not cited to any Supreme Court or other federal authority holding that hair comparison evidence in general is inadmissible and/or violates a defendant’s due process rights. This portion of Duckett’s claim is Denied. 7. Challenges to Florida Supreme Court’s Analysis of the Hair Evidence Duckett’s last portion of his challenge to the hair evidence is directed at the Florida Supreme Court itself. Duckett claims that the Florida Supreme Court did not in fact discuss Agent Malone’s credibility, and did not address the argument that Malone himself was a state agent and therefore had the obligation to disclose his own allegedly false testimony in other trials. It is enough, however, that Duckett’s claims were rejected; Duckett’s burden here is to demonstrate not merely that the Florida Supreme Court was wrong in some particular, but that its decision was contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal precedent. He has not done so. Duckett’s claims pertaining to the hair evidence and related expert testimony are Denied. 8. Tire Tracks Evidence Duckett next claims that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate the origin of the tire tracks at the crime scene, failing to present a forensic expert, and failing to impeach the State’s expert about the tire tracks. The Florida Supreme Court denied this claim on the grounds that “Duckett’s conclusory arguments on this issue are legally insufficient and fail to present a proper basis for relief.” 918 So.2d at 235. The Florida Supreme Court’s denial of this claim because it was insufficiently pled is a procedural rule which provides an independent and adequate state ground for denial. Therefore, this Court is barred from habeas review of this claim unless Duckett shows cause and prejudice to overcome this procedural bar. See Doorbal v. Dept. of Corrections, 572 F.3d 1222, 1228 (11th Cir.2009) (discussing Florida’s well-established procedural rule that vague and conclusory allegations on appeal are insufficient to warrant relief). Duckett has failed to allege cause and prejudice that would excuse the procedural bar to this claim, and he is therefore barred from raising it now. See Doorbal, 572 F.3d at 1229; Atwater v. Crosby, 451 F.3d 799, 810 (11th Cir.2006). Duckett also does not explain how the Florida Supreme Court’s ruling is contrary to or an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent. Indeed, Duckett does not cite to any federal authority whatsoever. As such, he has not demonstrated any entitlement to habeas relief on this portion of his claim. 9. Fingerprints Evidence Duckett next contends that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective because he failed to present a rebuttal expert to counteract the State’s fingerprint expert. Duckett further alleges that his trial counsel failed to introduce evidence that the hood of Duckett’s squad car would heat up in a very short period of time so that a person could not lean on the hood for any period of time without getting burned. The Florida Supreme Court denied this claim on the merits. Regarding the fingerprints, Duckett presents a conclusory claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present an expert to rebut the State’s fingerprint evidence at trial. This claim is legally insufficient. Furthermore, at the evidentiary hearing it was established that defense counsel obtained a fingerprint expert in preparation for trial and did not present an additional expert at trial because, in trial counsel’s words, “the report I got [from the expert] was not significantly helpful, as a matter of fact, not helpful at all to the Defense.” Trial counsel considered the possibility of presenting a rebuttal expert but made a strategic decision not to call the expert. See, e.g., Rutherford v. State, 727 So.2d 216, 223 (Fla.1998) (“Strategic decisions do not constitute ineffective assistance if alternative courses of action have been considered and rejected.”). 918 So.2d at 235. The Florida Supreme Court’s ruling was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal precedent. To the contrary, the Florida Supreme Court’s holding tracks applicable federal authority on ineffective assistance of counsel. See Waters v. Thomas, 46 F.3d 1506, 1512 (11th Cir.1995) (“Which witnesses, if any, to call, and when to call them, is the epitome of a strategic decision, and it is one that we will seldom, if ever, second guess.”); Solomon v. Kemp, 735 F.2d 395, 404 (11th Cir.1984) (“While attorneys may disagree as to how many or what particular witnesses to call, such is the stuff out of which trials are made.”). Accordingly, this portion of Duckett’s claim is Denied. 10. The Pencil Duckett also contends that his trial counsel was ineffective because he did not present any evidence concerning how a pencil at the crime scene was actually discovered. Duckett further argues that his counsel should have retained an expert to testify as to whether the pencil had been left outside at the crime scene on the night of the murder, or at some later date. The Florida Supreme Court denied this claim. Finally, regarding a pencil found at the crime scene, Duckett claims that trial counsel should have presented the circumstances surrounding its discovery, as well as expert testimony disputing the fact that the pencil had remained outside for ten days. N 13. This claim is legally insufficient because it fails to address the prejudice prong of Strickland. Duckett’s vague assertion that he was “denied an adversarial testing” is insufficient to present a valid claim for relief. N.13 Duckett alleges that after ten days of exposure the pencil should have been in a more deteriorated state. 918 So.2d at 235. A review of Duckett’s motion papers during his Rule 3.850 proceedings demonstrates that he did not, in fact, ever address the prejudice element of Strickland. See Exh. G-6, pp. 40-42. He also did not address it in his appellate briefs. See Exh. J, pp. 57-59. Therefore, Duckett did not fully and fairly present his claim to the state court, and such claims, including claims which the state courts determine are legally insufficient, are barred in this Court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1); Kelley v. Sec’y for Dept. Of Corrections, 377 F.3d 1317, 1343 (11th Cir.2004); Sims v. Singletary, 155 F.3d 1297 (11th Cir.1998); Bolender v. Singletary, 16 F.3d 1547 (11th Cir. 1994); Lindsey v. Smith, 820 F.2d 1137 (11th Cir.1987). Duckett’s lone sentence tagged onto the end of his habeas petition which states, in conclusory fashion, that the result of Duckett’s trial would have been different, does not change this result. This portion of Duckett’s claim is Denied. C. Admission of Williams Rule Testimony During the guilt/innocence phase of his trial, three young women testified for the State to establish that Duekett had a tendency to pick up young, petite women and make passes at them while he was in his patrol car at night, on duty, and in his uniform. The three incidents took place within six months of the victim’s death. Duckett challenged the admissibility of this evidence during his direct appeal, which the Florida Supreme Court denied. Duckett I, 568 So.2d at 895. Duckett also raised this issue in his Rule 3.850 proceedings, under the guise of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Specifically, Duckett contended that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective when he: (1) stipulated to the consolidation of Duckett’s charges of sexual battery and first degree murder (thereby allowing the Williams rule testimony to come in at trial as evidence for the sexual battery charge); and (2) failed to present evidence to impeach one of the young women — Linda Upshaw. Duckett reasserts his ineffective assistance of counsel claim verbatim here. The Florida Supreme Court rejected this claim, but only addressed Duckett’s consolidation argument. In claim 1(f), Duckett argues that trial counsel was ineffective for stipulating to consolidating the charges of sexual battery and first-degree murder because it paved the way for admission of the Williams rule testimony. We conclude that trial counsel was not ineffective for stipulating to consolidation. Charges arising out of the same occurrence such as those brought against Duckett are routinely consolidated. See Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.150(a) (“Two or more offenses that are triable in the same court may be charged in the same indictment or information in a separate count for each offense, where the offenses ... are based on the same act or transaction or on 2 or more connected acts or transactions.”); Mendyk v. State, 545 So.2d 846, 849 (Fla.1989) (approving consolidation of first-degree murder, kidnapping, and sexual battery charges because the crimes were committed in a continuous episode on a single victim); Clark v. State, 379 So.2d 97, 103 (Fla.1979) (approving consolidation of charges of murder, extortion, and kidnapping); Wright v. State, 739 So.2d 1230, 1233 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) (approving consolidation of charges of sexual battery and engaging in sexual activity with a person sixteen or seventeen years old where the “related offenses arose from and were based on the same act or transaction, which occurred in one location within a short period of time”). The sexual battery and murder of the victim in this case were committed by the same person on a single victim in a single episode. An objection would have been futile. 918 So.2d at 235-36. The Florida Supreme Court’s decision on the consolidation argument is not contrary to or an unreasonable application of applicable federal precedent. Trial counsel is not required to make meritless or futile objections. See United States v. Winfield, 960 F.2d 970, 974 (11th Cir. 1992); Card v. Dugger, 911 F.2d 1494, 1520 (11th Cir.1990); Lancaster v. Newsome, 880 F.2d 362, 375 (11th Cir.1989). The Florida Supreme Court’s failure to address the impeachment portion of this claim also does not warrant habeas relief. The impea