United States v. Johnson (713 F. Supp. 2d 595, 2010)

ORDER AND REASONS

HELEN G. BERRIGAN, District Judge.

This capital matter comes before the Court on motion for new trial and supplemental motion for new trial filed by the defendant, John Johnson (“Johnson”). Oral argument was held on March 23, 2010. Having considered the record, the memoranda and argument of counsel and the law, the Court affirms the convictions but grants a new penalty phase hearing for the reasons set forth below.

In May 2009, the defendant was convicted of three counts of a Second Superseding Indictment pertaining to his role in a 2004 attempted bank robbery and death of a bank security officer, Orleans Parish Criminal Deputy Sheriff Sidney Zaffuto. The jury imposed the death penalty on the two capital counts, Count Two and Count Three, making the same eligibility phase findings as to each count, and also making the same selection phase findings as to non-statutory aggravating factors and mitigating factors.

Trial errors and the resulting fairness of the trial are evaluated “against the record as a whole” on a motion for new trial. United States v. Wall, 389 F.3d 457, 466 (5th Cir.2004). Johnson’s guilt as to all three counts was essentially conceded, although issues concerning his intent were disputed by the defense. His willingness to plead guilty to a life sentence from the inception of the prosecution was also stipulated. The entire attempted robbery and murder were captured on surveillance film introduced into evidence. During the aborted robbery, defendant Johnson and co-defendant Joseph Smith (“Smith”) were shot by another bank security guard, Orleans Parish Deputy Andrew Jenkins. All three defendants were captured shortly after fleeing the bank. Many of the underlying facts were stipulated. Rec. Doc. 1240. The guilt phase verdict was returned in a little over one hour. Rec. Doc. 1219.

The attempted robbery and murder at the bank occurred over a very short period of time, shocking in its brevity. The surveillance photos and testimony are gripping and the crimes traumatized all unfortunate enough to have been in that bank at that time. The surveillance and testimony establishes that Smith entered first, co-defendant Herbert Jones (“Jones”) entered next and Johnson was the last to enter, taking at most perhaps six steps into the bank and remaining near the front door. Smith rushed toward Deputy Zaffuto, who was standing at a check writing stand near the door, pointed his gun at him, disarmed him and slid the deputy’s service gun to Johnson. While this was happening, Jones quickly moved in the opposite direction toward the bank manager’s office. Deputy Jenkins, who had been in corner by the entrance to the bank, out of the sight of the defendants, testified that he ordered Smith to drop his gun and when Smith failed to do so, Jenkins shot him, and then likewise shot Johnson, hitting both in the leg area. Meanwhile, after Smith was shot, Deputy Zaffuto retrieved Smith’s gun and attempted to shoot several times at Johnson from behind the podium but the gun would not fire. Johnson shot back several times at Deputy Zaffuto and also at Deputy Jenkins. Moments thereafter, Smith scrambled across the floor to the entrance of the bank and both he and Johnson fled, to be arrested shortly thereafter.

The bullet fired by Johnson that killed Deputy Zaffuto is captured midair in the surveillance photos at a time when Zaffuto was trying to shoot Johnson with Smith’s inoperable gun, not knowing that the gun did not shoot. The fatal bullet first hit the grip of the gun in Zaffuto’s hand, then ricocheted into his chest, killing him. Johnson also shot Deputy Jenkins in the foot with Deputy Zaffuto’s service revolver just before crawling out of the building immediately before Smith. Johnson had what appears to be ample opportunity to leave the building immediately after Jones, which would have left Smith several yards away from the door and in Deputy Jenkins’ line of fire.

The eligibility phase of trial of the sentencing hearing was short in duration and the jury deliberated for less than an hour. Rec. Doc. 1221. The jury found the gateway factors that Johnson, who was nearly 57 years old at trial, was over eighteen years old at the time of the offense, and that he intentionally killed Sidney Zaffuto. 18 U.S.C. § 3591; Rec. Docs. 1221-1, 1221-2. It also found, as statutory aggravating factors that the defendant had been previously imprisoned for a crime that involved the use of a firearm against another person, that the defendant knowingly created a grave risk of death to more than one person in addition to the victim, and that he attempted to kill more than one person in a single criminal episode. 18 U.S.C. § 3592; Rec. Docs. 1221-1, 1221-2.

The unanimous jury verdicts from the selection phase of trial consisted of several findings. The jury concluded that the government had proven, beyond a reasonable doubt, the non-statutory aggravating factors that Johnson aided and abetted the taking of a hostage during the robbery, that the defendant had a substantial criminal history based on stipulated guilty pleas, and an additional unadjudicated attempted bank robbery in 2003. In addition, the jury unanimously found that the murder of Sidney Zaffuto created harmful emotional and financial distress on his family. Rec. Docs. 1238-1,1238-2.

At the same time, all the jurors found non-statutory mitigating factors that the defendant offered to plead guilty to a life sentence at the inception of the prosecution, that he was raised in poverty by his mother, that he lacked a positive male role model and father figure, that he was 57 years old, and that if he was not sentenced to death, he will be sentenced to a term of life imprisonment without the opportunity for release. Id. One juror found an additional non-statutory mitigating factor in that Johnson became addicted to heroin in his youth, struggled throughout his life to stop using drugs, being gainfully employed when he was off drugs but relapsing back to drugs and crime to support his addiction. Id. One juror also found that Johnson’s life had value in that he had been a good and loving son, brother, father and grandfather and that his family will suffer greatly if he is executed. Id. Some evidence was presented that Johnson had in fact shot heroin the morning of the crime, the crime occurring midday.

CAPITAL REVIEW UNDER RULE 33

Defendant Johnson has moved for a new trial based on eighteen claims in two motions. In order to frame his allegations, the Court begins with a restatement of some fundamental legal principles with respect to review of capital cases as well as the standards for a motion for new trial under Fed.R.Crim.P. 33.

The United States Supreme Court has consistently held that under the Eighth Amendment “the qualitative difference of death from all other punishments requires a correspondingly greater degree of scrutiny of the capital sentencing determination.” Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 329, 105 S.Ct. 2633, 86 L.Ed.2d 231 (1985) (citation omitted); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 118, 102 S.Ct. 869, 71 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982)(O’C0NN0R, J., concurring) (“[T]his Court has gone to extraordinary measures to ensure that the prisoner sentenced to be executed is afforded process that will guarantee, as much as is humanly possible, that the sentence was not imposed out of whim, passion, prejudice, or mistake”); see also Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 45-46, 77 S.Ct. 1222, 1 L.Ed.2d 1148 (1957)(J. Frankfurter concurrenee)(“The taking of life is irrevocable. It is in capital eases especially that the balance of conflicting interests must be weighed most heavily in favor of the procedural safeguards of the Bill of Rights.”); Andres v. U.S., 333 U.S. 740, 752, 68 S.Ct. 880, 92 L.Ed. 1055 (1948)(“In death cases doubts such as those presented here [which involved a confusing jury instruction] should be resolved in favor of the accused.”).

In addition to demanding meticulous review of procedural safeguards in capital verdicts, the Supreme Court more recently has indicated that capital punishment in general should be a relatively rare occurrence. “It is an established principle that decency, in its essence, presumes respect for the individual and thus moderation or restraint in the application of capital punishment.” Kennedy v. Louisiana, — U.S. —, 128 S.Ct. 2641, 2658, 171 L.Ed.2d 525, modified on denial of reh’g on other grounds, — U.S. —, 129 S.Ct. 1, 171 L.Ed.2d 932 (2008). In capital jurisprudence, “[t]he tension between general rules and case-specific circumstances has produced results not all together satisfactory.” Id. at 2659. The Supreme Court’s response to capital case law, “which is still in search of a unifying principle, has been to insist upon confining the instances in which capital punishment may be imposed .... because ‘death as a punishment is unique in its severity and irrevocability.’ ” Id. at 2660, (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976)).

Against this backdrop, a motion for new trial in a capital case is governed by the same Rule 33 applicable in all criminal cases. In general, a district court may grant a new trial under Rule 33 “if the interest of justice so requires” whether based on newly discovered evidence or other grounds. Wall, 389 F.3d at 466. The motion is addressed to the discretion of the district court, “which should be exercised with caution, and the power to grant a new trial ... should be invoked only in exceptional cases.” United States v. Robertson, 110 F.3d 1113, 1120 n. 11 (5th Cir.1997). See also United States v. Scroggins, 379 F.3d 233, 239 (5th Cir.2004), vacated on other grounds, 543 U.S. 1112, 125 S.Ct. 1062, 160 L.Ed.2d 1049 (2005).

The Court has found that federal cases reviewing contemporary capital issues under Rule 33 are scarce, so non-capital jurisprudence has been sought for guidance. In general, the interest of justice standard under Rule 33 “requires the district court to balance the alleged errors against the record as a whole and evaluate the fairness of trial.” Wall, 389 F.3d at 466, quoting United States. v. McBride, 862 F.2d 1316, 1319 (8th Cir.1988). The grant of a new trial in the interest of justice may be based on the trial court’s evaluation of witnesses and weighing of evidence. Wall, 389 F.3d at 465-466, U.S. v. O’Keefe, 128 F.3d 885, 898 (5th Cir.1997). But the district court should not set aside the verdict “simply because [the court] feels some other result would be more reasonable.” United States v. Munoz, 150 F.3d 401, 413 (5th Cir.1998). Deference is given to the district court, however, because it actually observed the demeanor of witnesses and their impact on the jury. Wall, 389 F.3d at 465; O’Keefe, 128 F.3d at 893.

The trial court should not grant a motion for new trial “unless there would be a miscarriage of justice or the weight of evidence preponderates against the verdict.” Wall, 389 F.3d at 466, citing O’Keefe, 128 F.3d at 898. A new trial should be granted “only upon a demonstration of adverse effects on substantial rights of a defendant.” Wall, 389 F.3d at 466; Scroggins, 379 F.3d at 256; United States v. Cooks, 52 F.3d 101, 103 (5th Cir.1995); U.S. v. Rasco, 123 F.3d 222, 228 (5th Cir.1997).

The district court should consider the harmless and plain provisions of Rule 52, and deny a motion for new trial if substantial rights of the defendant were not affected by trial error. 3 Charles Alan Wright, Nancy J. King & Susan R. Klein, Federal Practice & Procedure: Criminal 3d § 551 (West 2004). “The requirement of Rule 51 that objections must have been made at the trial court level and the doctrines of harmless and plain error as stated in Rule 52 apply to Rule 33 motions.” Charles A. Moore, 8A Moore’s Federal Practice § 633.21[1], Generally, the harmless error rule is appropriate in evaluating motions for new trial; that rule presumes the existence of error. See, e.g., United States v. Logan, 861 F.2d 859, 864 (5th Cir.1988).

Other authority, however, stands for the proposition that the district court is not constrained by the plain error provisions of Rule 52, in light of its broad discretion on a motion for new trial, which may be granted under the “cumulative error doctrine.” United States v. Williams, 264 F.3d 561, 572 (5th Cir.2001). Munoz, 150 F.3d at 418. The Fifth Circuit has held, for example, that “[a] miscarriage of justice warranting a new trial in certain circumstances may occur even when there has been no specific legal error.” Scroggins, 379 F.3d at 239, 255. See also United States v. Sardesai, 125 F.3d 850 (4th Cir.1997); United States v. Aderoju, 2006 WL 2222368 *5, n. 5 (E.D.Va.2006); Unit ed States v. Jennings, 438 F.Supp.2d 637, 641 (E.D.Va.2006).

In general, the burden is on the defendant on a motion for new trial, “although the extent of that burden may vary depending on the ground on which the new trial is being sought.” Charles Alan Wright, Nancy J. King & Susan R. Klein, Federal Practice & Procedure: Criminal 3d § 551 (West 2004). When a court of appeals reviews a district court decision on a motion for new trial “to some extent it must begin with the error or grounds upon which the district court based its decision and then proceed to examine the court’s decision as measured against the relevant standard.” Wall, 389 F.3d at 466. “Otherwise, it would be impossible to give any meaning to the concept of ‘miscarriage of justice.’ ” Id. Also, more than just “the Judge’s feeling” that a miscarriage has occurred is required. Id.

The Court also finds helpful Judge Henry Friendly’s observations, dealing with a § 2255 motion to vacate sentence, regarding the balancing of the gravity of the trial error against its prejudicial effect:

The conclusion we draw from all this is that the standard of how serious the probable effect of an act or omission at a criminal trial must be in order to obtain the reversal or, where other requirements are met, the vacating of a sen- . tence, is in some degree a function of the gravity of the act or omission; the strictness of the application of the harmless error standard seems somewhat to vary, and its reciprocal, the required showing of prejudice, to vary inversely, with the degree to which the conduct of the trial has violated basic concepts of fair play. At one end of the range is the case where the defendant has simply, although excusably, not had the benefit of evidence that has later become available to him; there the Berry [v. State, 10 Ga. 511 (1851) ] test requires a showing that the new evidence ‘would probably produce a different verdict.’ At the other end of the range is the case of a defendant being obliged to plead to a capital charge without benefit of counsel; there the court ‘does not stop to inquire whether prejudice resulted.’ Hamilton v. State of Alabama [368 U.S. 52], 82 S.Ct. 157, 159 [7 L.Ed.2d 114] (1961).... Between these extremes lie the other cases we have reviewed-newly discovered evidence that a witness has recanted, or had lied (without knowledge by the prosecutor); ordinary errors in the admission or exclusion of evidence; violations of statutory commands; and infringements of other constitutional guarantees.

The reason why the showing of prejudice required to bring down the balance in favor of a new trial will vary from case to case is that the pans contain weights and counterweights other than the interest in a perfect trial. Sometimes only a small showing of prejudice, or none, is demanded because that interest is reinforced by the necessity that ‘The administration of justice must not only be above reproach, it must also the beyond the suspicion of reproach,’ People v. Savvides, supra [1 N.Y.2d 554, 154 N.Y.S.2d 885, 136 N.E.2d 853 (1956)] and by the teaching of experience that mere admonitions are insufficient to prevent repetition of abuse. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 650-653, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961). In other cases, where the conduct of the trial has been less censurable, or not censurable at all, a greater showing of prejudice is demanded, because the interest in obtaining an ideal trial, with the trier of the facts considering all admissible evidence that has ever become available, and nothing else, is not thus supplemented and may be outweighed by the interest in avoiding a retrial unlikely to have a different outcome — an interest especially weighty when, as is normally true on collateral attack, the second trial will come long after the first.

Kyle v. United States, 297 F.2d 507, 514-515 (2nd Cir.1961)(J. Friendly)(footnote omitted).

The Court concludes that prosecutorial error requires a new trial as to the selection phase in the interest of justice. Also, the Court takes the opportunity under Rule 33 for self-correction, and in so doing admits that the Court itself made errors in some of the trial rulings in the selection phase that have been challenged in these motions.

The Court will address the defendant’s eighteen claims in the two motions for new trial in an order other than that in which the defendant has presented them by dividing the claims into five categories, based on the Court’s findings. Category I are claims that challenge the underlying convictions, Category II are claims with no error or with waiver, Category III are claims with error that do not support a new trial individually, Category IV are claims with error that individually warrant a new trial, and Category V are errors in Category III and Category IV that cumulatively support a new trial in the interest of justice. The claims will be presented in this altered order of reverse significance.

CATEGORY I: CONVICTIONS: Claim XV and Supplemental Motion

Claim XV: Double Jeopardy

The defendant challenges the imposition of separate death verdicts on Count Two, which alleged violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) , 18 U.S.C. § 2113(e) and 18 U.S.C. § 2, and Count Three, which set forth a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1), 18 U.S.C. § 9240*) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. Rec. Docs. 157; 1219-3; 1238-1; 1238-2. The defendant argues that these two counts “aris[e] from the same offense” in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment.

Specifically, the defense claims that the factual allegations of the two capital counts are entirely duplicative for purposes of United States v. Agofsky, 458 F.3d 369 (5th Cir.2006), and that the special findings of the two counts are the same. In addition, the defense argues that the imposition of two penalties for a single violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) and 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d) is a double jeopardy violation according to Simpson v. United States, 435 U.S. 6, 16, 98 S.Ct. 909, 55 L.Ed.2d 70 (1978), that survived subsequent amendments to Section 924(c) in 1984.

The prosecution opposes this claim with the argument that Fifth Circuit jurisprudence recognizes Congress’s clear legislative intent that multiple convictions and punishments are allowed for a single criminal episode under the two sections at issue here, 18 U.S.C. § 924 and 18 U.S.C. § 2113. It relies on caselaw including United States v. Holloway, 905 F.2d 893, 895 (5th Cir.1990), United States v. Portillo, 18 F.3d 290, 291 (5th Cir.1994) and United States v. Singleton, 16 F.3d 1419, 1428 (5th Cir.1994).

The Court finds that the defense argument on this claim is unpersuasive. First, part of Congress’s intent in enacting the 1984 Comprehensive Crime Control Act and amendments to 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) was to overrule Simpson; the revised Section 924(c) “serve[s] as a cumulative punishment in addition to that provided for the underlying violent crime.” Holloway, 905 F.2d at 894. The revised section specifically provides for punishment thereunder “in addition to the punishment provided for such crime of violence ...” Also, none of the subject statutes contain the challenged “jurisdictional element” at issue in Agofsky, 458 F.3d at 372.

Instead, for double jeopardy purposes, the elements and relevant facts of the two crimes charged differ from each other for purposes of Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932). See United States v. Allen, 247 F.3d 741, 767 (8th Cir.2001), vacated on other grounds, 536 U.S. 953, 122 S.Ct. 2653, 153 L.Ed.2d 830 (2002). Where, as here, the alleged double jeopardy violation is not based on multiple trials for a single offense, but rather cumulative sentences imposed in a single trial, the Double Jeopardy Clause “does no more than prevent the sentencing court from prescribing greater punishment than the legislature intended.” Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 368, 103 S.Ct. 673, 74 L.Ed.2d 535 (1983). The Court finds that the legislative intent and sentencing language of the relevant statutes here is clear, and that no double jeopardy violation has occurred. See also United States v. Allen, 247 F.3d at 767 (Sections 2113(a) & (e) and Sections 924(c)(1) and (j)(l)); United States v. McCarty, 36 F.3d 1349, 1361 (5th Cir.1994)(Section 924(c)(1) and Sections 2113(a) and (d)). The Court finds this claim to lack merit, as the Court finds no error.

Supplemental Motion For New Trial And To Set Aside Count III Of The Indictment And Verdicts Based Upon Emerging Authority

The defendant argues in supplemental motion for new trial that the conviction in Count Three should be set aside because 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) “does not provide a separate count or criminal charge but rather designates an alternative minimum punishment for conduct otherwise criminalized.” Rec. Doc. 1448, p. 3. In so doing, the defendant acknowledges Fifth Circuit authority to the contrary, including United States v. Gould, 329 Fed.Appx. 569 (5th Cir.2009), cert. granted, — U.S. —, 130 S.Ct. 1283, — L.Ed.2d — (2010). The Court notes that the inclusion of the capital language in 18 U.S.C. § 924(j) bolsters the Fifth Circuit precedent on this issue by limiting its application to “[a] person who, in the course of a violation of section (c) ... ” If Section 924(c) was a penalty provision only, the prefatory clause in Section 924(j) would be illogical; instead, it depends on the establishment of a separate offense in Section 924(c). Waiting further direction from the United States Supreme Court on the issue, this claim is denied. The Court finds no error.

The remaining claims in these two motions pertain to the death penalty, not the finding of guilt. To the extent that it is necessary, however, the Court specifically finds no reason for a new trial on the underlying convictions of guilty on any of the three counts.

CATEGORY II: NO ERRORIWAIVER: Claims IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, XI, XII, XIV & XVI

Claim TV: The Government’s Repeated Suggestion That Mr. Johnson Should Be A Man And Admit His Role In The Offense, While Simultaneously Succeeding In Excluding Documentary Evidence That Mr. Johnson Expressed Remorse And Accepted Moral Responsibility Undermine The Validity Of The Sentence And Violates Due Process

This is the first claim made by the defense focused on the testimony of Robert Goodman (“Goodman”) and the allegation that Johnson committed murder in a 1974 botched restaurant robbery, for which there was no prosecution. This 1974 murder of Joseph Gennaro at Ruiz Restaurant in Jefferson Parish was included as a part of the non-statutory aggravating factor of “substantial criminal history.” In March 2009, the government gave notice of the anticipated testimony of Goodman, who allegedly had participated in the same 1974 event and whose DNA was found on evidence left near the scene in 1974.

Goodman testified during the selection phase of trial for the government and was the only eyewitness who asserted that Johnson in fact shot Joseph Gennaro. On cross-examination, Goodman stated that defendant Johnson did in fact shoot Gennaro, and that “if he was big enough a man, he would say the things his own self rather than me sitting here to say it for him.” Rec. Doc. 1252, p. 55. This remark was elicited by defense counsel, and while it was not entirely responsive to the question, it was not entirely unresponsive either. The defense argues that this was an improper comment on Johnson’s right not to testify, but the Court has been unable to find case law in which witness comment on a failure to testify constitutes error. Also, Goodman testified in the government’s case in the selection phase, before the defense had begun its selection phase case and at a time when it was unknown whether Johnson would testify or not. In fact, defense counsel had stated in opening remarks that Johnson would testify. Rec. Doc. 1272, pp. 83-84.

More problematic is the fact that in closing argument, after defendant Johnson had not in fact testified, both prosecutors referred to Goodman’s testimony.

And on cross-examination he [Goodman] called the defendant out, saying he should be a man and step up and tell people he shot the guy.

Rec. Doc. 1273, p. 16.

Again, a refusal to take responsibility for his actions, as Robert Goodman reminded him he should be doing.

Id. at p. 56.

A prosecutor is prohibited from commenting, directly or indirectly, on the failure of a defendant to testify. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 85 S.Ct. 1229, 14 L.Ed.2d 106 (1965); United States v. Wharton, 320 F.3d 526 (5th Cir.2003). Both of these remarks in closing arguments constituted a comment on Johnson’s failure to testify, and admit responsibility for the 1974 slaying. Nevertheless, as the government noted, no objection was lodged to either portions of the closing argument.

The Court concludes the comments did not affect any substantial right of the defendant for purposes of review under Rule 52(b). First of all, the comments were brief and in passing. Secondly, the Court instructed the jury at the close of the penalty phase, in connection with both the 1974 alleged murder and another unadjudicated attempted bank robbery, that the defendant had no obligation to prove his innocence and no inference could be drawn from his failure to testify. Rec. Doc. 1273, pp. 75-76. Finally, according to the selection phase verdicts on Count Two and Count Three, the jury did not unanimously conclude Johnson was in fact guilty of the 1974 slaying, so for at least one or more jurors, Johnson had nothing to confess. Rec. Docs. 1238-1,1238-2.

Defendant Johnson also argues that these impermissible comments were particularly prejudicial because the defense had been precluded by the Court from introducing a videotaped statement of Johnson, expressing his remorse and acceptance of responsibility. However, that video concerned the Zaffuto killing, not the 1974 slaying. The defense, on Johnson’s behalf, steadfastly denied his guilt in the 1974 slaying. Also, the defense inexplicably claims that the video was not hearsay because it was not being offered to establish the truth of his contents. It certainly was, as presumably the whole purpose of introducing it would have been to convince the jury that Johnson was sincerely remorseful for the Iberia Bank crimes and not just feigning regret. Finally, the prosecution and defense stipulated that as of January 2004, Johnson had been willing to plead guilty to a life sentence without the possibility of release. Rec. Doc. 1240, # 12. The defense did list as a mitigating factor Johnson’s willingness to plead guilty to a life sentence, which is what the video concerned, and all twelve jurors made that finding. Rec. Doc. 1238-1, 1238-2. See United States v. Fell, 531 F.3d 197, 220 (2nd Cir.2008).

The Court finds no error.

Claim V: The Failure Of The Government To Disclose Evidence That Impeached Shirley Zaffuto’s Claim Concerning Financial Harm Requires Reversal Of The Sentence

In this claim, defendant Johnson argued that the prosecution withheld significant information relevant to the financial aspect of the victim impact aggravating factor. For the reasons stated in its ruling denying discovery on this issue, the Court find no error. See Rec. Doc. 1476.

Claim VI: Misrepresentations Concerning the Communications Between the Government and Its Key Penalty Phase Witness Undermine Confidence in the Outcome

In this claim, defendant Johnson contends that the government provided false information regarding the number of times it met with Goodman, his lawyer or associates, and the nature of the discussions, that ultimately led up to his plea agreement and his testimony. For the reasons stated in denying discovery on this issue, the Court finds no error. See Rec. Doc. 1475.

Claim VII: The Prosecution Relied Upon Evidence Concerning The Impact Of The Offense On Bank Tellers, And Other Members Of The Community In Order To Secure A Death Sentence

In this claim, defendant Johnson contends that the bank teller testimony constituted victim impact evidence beyond what is permitted under 18 U.S.C. § 3593, because the tellers were not family members. The defense also challenges the government’s closing argument during the selection phase which referenced the bank employees as “people who tried to make our lives better, get us mortgages, get us car loans ...” Rec. Doc. 1273, pp. 54-55, and which also referenced the terror they experienced during the crimes. Id. at p. 8.

Section 3593, the relevant section of the Federal Death Penalty Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3591-3599 (“FDPA”), concerns the character of the victim and the impact of his loss on family members. In many if not most instances, as was true here, none of the victim impact witnesses were present during the crime, hence the need for a specific statutory authority allowing their testimony and evidence.

The bank employees were witnesses to the actual crimes and their testimony was to establish the elements of the offenses. As the government correctly points out, one of the statutory aggravating factors alleged and found was that the defendant knowingly created a grave risk of harm to more than just the victim, Sidney Zaffuto. Rec. Docs. 1221-1, 1221-2. Likewise, a non-statutory aggravating factor was the taking of a hostage in the bank. Rec. Docs. 1238-1, 1238-2. The evidence elicited was probative of the crimes themselves, and the aggravating-factors.

The evidence was also relevant to the harm caused by the defendant and his blameworthiness. Consequently, it was proper for the prosecution to comment on that evidence in closing argument. With regard to the reference to mortgages and car loans, no prejudice can be gleaned from what is common knowledge of activities of bank employees.

The Court finds no error.

Claim VIII: The Prosecution’s Summation Improperly (And Unfairly) Injected “Future Dangerousness” Into The Penalty Phase Weighing Process

This claim involves whether the prosecution improperly and unexpectedly injected “future dangerousness” into the penalty proceedings, after abandoning it as a non-statutory aggravating factor earlier in the proceedings.

Defendant Johnson also claims that his counsel requested at the close of the penalty phase an additional mitigating factor that “no evidence” was presented to indicate Johnson would be a danger to prison staff or other inmates if sentenced to life imprisonment.

At issue are the following remarks made in the rebuttal summation by the government:

He was bad in 1974, and nothing you have heard over the past couple of weeks would make you not think he’s still cold and calloused today. John Johnson cannot and he will not ever be rehabilitated. Ladies and gentlemen, he just doesn’t have it in him.

Rec. Doc. 1273, p. 62.

He was given a second chance in 1974 when he escaped justice for the murder of Joe Gennaro. And what did he do with that second chance? Did he become a better man? Did he become a law-abiding man? No. He continued to use heroin. He continued to rob banks. He continued to intimidate decent people, hardworking citizens. And he decided to murder a deputy sheriff who was working a detail. That’s what he did with his second chance. Don’t give him a third chance.

Id.

The Court finds that the comment, in context, was a proper argument that Johnson had squandered prior opportunities to lead a law-abiding life and had failed to do so. The most reasonable interpretation of the summation was that Johnson did not deserve any more “breaks” in terms of the consequences for his continued criminal behavior. The comments also focused exclusively on the defendant’s behavior when not incarcerated, making no reference to his conduct, good or bad, while in custody.

The Court finds no error.

Claim XI: The Prejudicial Effect Of The Iberia Bank 911 Tape Far Outweighed Its Probative Value And Should Have Been Excluded

In Claim XI, the defendant reurges its pre-trial argument against the admission of the telephonic 911 tapes from Iberia Bank employee “J.O.” to police operator # 186 on January 8, 2004, during the robbery. The defense specifically claims that “[t]his tape was irrelevant to any disputed fact at trial and served only to further inflame the jury with the terror and emotion of the robbery/murder” which “contributed to a death verdict based upon, passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factor” for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 3595. Rec. Doc. 1337, p. 55.

The Court previously ruled that the first part of the tape was admissible, excluded the remaining part of the tape between J.O. and emergency medical personnel and denied the defense motion for further redaction. Rec. Docs. 376, 792. In the redacted taped recording introduced in the guilt phase of trial, the eyewitness J.O. provided information relative to the crime and events as they transpired and begged the operator not to hang up, to send the police and an ambulance, and repeated her fear that she was going to be killed. The Court specifically found that this part of the tape was relevant and that its probative value was not substantially outweighed by the danger or unfair prejudice for purposes of Fed.R.Evid. 403. For the record, the Court again acknowledges that this evidence was highly emotional and powerful, but still maintains that it did not create a danger of unfair prejudice that substantially outweighs its probative value. Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 117 S.Ct. 644, 136 L.Ed.2d 574 (1997); United States v. Powers, 168 F.3d 741 (5th Cir.1999); United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88 (2nd Cir.1998).

This claim is denied. The Court finds no error.

Claim XII: The Government Falsely Insinuated To The Jury That John Johnson Had Committed The Robbery And Battery Of Adel Zubhayer (sic)

In this claim, the challenges the government’s cross-examination of Adel Zughayer (“Zughayer”), who was called by the defense during the penalty selection phase to testify about a June 1, 2001, robbery in an effort to impeach the credibility of the deposition testimony of codefendant Jones. Specifically, Zughayer testified in response to the defense questions on direct that in March 2009, he identified photographs of Jones as the perpetrator of that crime. Jones testified “I don’t remember” when asked if he was the perpetrator at his video deposition played for the jury. Exh. P4A, p. 96.

On cross, however, Zughayer acknowledged that he was shown another photograph, which turned out to be of defendant Johnson, the day before his trial testimony and also identified him as the possible perpetrator.

Thereafter, the parties stipulated that Johnson was in federal custody on June 1, 2001. Rec. Doc. 1253, p. 89. The defense now argues that the government should not have suggested “that the photograph in No. 33 belonged to John Johnson.” Rec. Doc. 1337, p. 58. Although this testimony may have been confusing, the Court finds no error.

Claim XIV: The Government Did Not Establish Beyond A Reasonable Doubt That Death Was The Appropriate Punishment

In this claim, the defense challenges another ruling of the Court pertaining to the appropriate standard to be used by the jury in the penalty selection phase. The defense requested a charge that the death penalty should not be imposed unless a unanimous jury determined beyond a reasonable doubt that death was the appropriate punishment. The defendant argues that the failure to give this charge violates the rules set forth in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002) and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). Because the penalty predicate determinations are factual determinations, according to the defendant, unless they are found beyond a reasonable doubt, the maximum penalty is life imprisonment under Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004). The defendant candidly acknowledges Fifth Circuit case law to the contrary, including United States v. Fields, 483 F.3d 313 (5th Cir.2007), but maintains that without application of the enhanced burden of proof, the FDPA violates the Fifth, Sixth and Eighth Amendments.

The Court’s pre-trial rulings on this issue are based squarely on the Fifth Circuit jurisprudence set forth in Fields, 483 F.3d at 346 and United States v. Flores, 63 F.3d 1342, 1376 (5th Cir.1995). Rec. Docs. 773, p. 4, 1253, pp. 103-104. This claim must be denied and the Court finds no error.

Claim XVI: Count III Of The Indictment Does Not Present A Basis To Impose The Death Penalty

In this claim, the defense mistakenly assumes that the typographical error contained in Count III of the Second Superseding Indictment was not resolved pri- or to trial, and that the error “precludes the defense from adequately addressing the question whether Simpson or Gonzalez in Claim I applies.” Rec. Doc. 1337, p. 73. Prior to trial, counsel for the defendant adopted the proposed jury instructions and objections of the co-defendant Smith. Rec. Docs. 773, 727, 726. At a hearing regarding jury instructions held on February 27, 2008, with Johnson’s counsel present, the reference to “Section 924(i)(l)” in Count Three was discussed. It was agreed that the reference would remain as typed after counsel for the co-defendant Smith advised that, “[w]e care about the instruction of the charge, not the letter.” Rec. Docs. 916, p. 6, 744.

The Court finds that the defendant has waived objection as to this claim. In any event, there was no confusion as to the applicable section at any time during trial and the defendant suffered no prejudice. The Court finds that this claim has been waived and that there is no error.

CATEGORY III: INSUFFICIENT INDIVIDUAL ERROR: Claims III, XIII

Claim III: The Ovenuhelming Presence Of Uniformed Police Officers, Along With The Government’s Reliance In Closing Argument On A Nonr-Statutory — Never Been Noticed — Ground for Imposing The Death Penalty, Rendered The Death Penalty Sentence Fundamentally Unfair

In this claim, defendant Johnson contends that the prosecution (a) improperly emphasized Sidney Zaffuto’s status as a law enforcement officer to justify the death penalty; (b) that such status is not a statutory aggravating factor under federal law, nor had it been listed by the government as a non-statutory aggravating circumstance, and (c) that the presence of uniformed police officers during the trial prejudiced him.

Turning first to the second complaint, (b) that Zaffuto’s status as a deputy sheriff is not a statutory aggravating factor under federal law, nor had the government listed it as a non-statutory aggravator, the defense is correct on both points. However, the Court finds no prejudice. Defendant Johnson has been well aware since the outset of the case that the victim was a deputy sheriff acting in the course of his duties as a security guard. This was clearly part of the facts and circumstances of the offense, hence appropriate to be commented upon in argument. The Court also knows of no legal obstacle to the government citing Zaffuto’s status as a law enforcement officer as a non-statutory aggravator, had it chosen to do so. Arguably the defendant benefitted from not having that additional aggravator specifically listed on the verdict sheet and weighed against him.

Turning next to the third complaint, (c) defendant Johnson claims that the presence of law enforcement officers in uniform during portions of the trial prejudiced him. More specifically, Johnson complains that on May 19, 2009, during the testimony of Deputy Sheriff Andrew Jenkins, more than forty uniformed members of the Orleans Parish Criminal Sheriffs Office, including the Sheriff himself, were seated in several rows behind the prosecution side of the courtroom. A “significant” number remained during closing argument on the guilt phase and six to eight deputies, in uniform, were also present on the morning of May 20,2009, during the eligibility phase. Rec. Doc. 1272, p. 46. The defense did not object to their presence per se, but rather to the officers being in formal law enforcement uniform. Rec. Doc. 1215. This was considered unduly inflammatory and inappropriate, and the defense requested that any law enforcement officer who wished to appear, be instructed not to appear in uniform; that request was rejected by the Court. Rec. Doc. 1272, pp. 46-47. The Court at this time does acknowledge that several dozen law enforcement officers, in full uniform, did in fact occupy several rows in the audience during the testimony of Deputy Jenkins and at least some were there on other days, including during the closing arguments of the guilt phase.

In Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 106 S.Ct. 1340, 89 L.Ed.2d 525 (1986), the defendant complained that added security officers in the courtroom, specifically, four uniformed state troopers, prejudiced him. The Supreme Court found no prejudice since the presence of the four additional security officers would be, at best, ambiguous to a jury. Since jurors in general are not familiar with courtroom procedures, they may well not attach any significance to security, or at most assume officers are present to prevent any disruption, and not infer anything negative about the defendant. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court did acknowledge that a “roomful of uniformed and armed policemen” might pose a threat to the fair trial rights of a defendant, and likewise suggested that a better practice would have been to have the security officers not readily identifiable as law enforcement, citing several cases in which the courtroom security were in plain clothes. Id. at 570-571, 572, 106 S.Ct. 1340.

This case, of course, involved a murder victim who was a law enforcement officer and the deputy sheriffs present were not there to provide courtroom security. Indeed, it would be difficult for any juror to not recognize that the Orleans Parish deputies who were present, were there to show support for their colleague, Orleans Parish Deputy Jenkins, as well as pay tribute to their fallen colleague, Deputy Sidney Zaffuto. The Mississippi Supreme Court has specifically noted that “in capital murder cases where the victim was a member of law enforcement, the potential exists for a coercive atmosphere when uniformed law officers sit together in a group. Consequently, we discourage this practice.” Balfour v. State, 598 So.2d 731, 756 (Miss.1992)(emphasis original). As in Holbrook, the Mississippi Supreme Court suggested the “overbearing influence is easily diffused” if the court would require the police officers to attend in street clothes or else disperse the uniformed personnel throughout the courtroom. Id.

In Phillips v. State, 70 P.3d 1128 (Alaska Ct.App.2003), the defendant was charged with murdering a state trooper. Uniformed law enforcement officers attended the beginning days of the trial. The court refused defense counsel’s request that the officers be required to appear in street clothes. The judge, however, did subsequently order that no more than five uniformed officers could appear on any one trial day. The Alaska appellate court acknowledged that the “appearance of law enforcement officers en masse in the spectator gallery posed a threat that the jurors would feel implicit pressure to return a verdict favorable to law enforcement interests or sentiment.” Id. at 1137. See also Powell v. State, 897 S.W.2d 307 (Tex.Crim.App.1994).

In light of the above, the Court recognizes that it erred and should have granted the defense motion and insisted that any appearances by law enforcement in the audience be in plain clothes. Furthermore, the Court should have anticipated that this might happen and issued such an order in advance, not after the fact when the potential unfair prejudice had already occurred. However, the en masse uniformed appearance occurred on only one day, during the guilt phase. In this case, guilt was in essence a forgone conclusion. No further significant police presence occurred thereafter. While the en masse appearance was inappropriate, it was not in and of itself sufficiently prejudicial to deprive Johnson of a fair trial. However, it is a part, albeit a small part, of the overall totality of circumstances justifying a new penalty hearing.

Defendant Johnson’s final complaint with regard to Sidney Zaffuto’s status as a law enforcement officer is whether the prosecution’s emphasis of that fact in questioning witnesses and in closing argument crossed the line into inciting unfair passion and prejudice against the defendant. The following passage is challenged from the government’s closing argument in the guilt phase: “Deputy Zaffuto awoke on the morning of ... January 8th, strapped on his sidearm, and he went to the bank to do what he did every day. Serve and protect the people of Orleans Parish. He dedicated his life to the people of that parish.” Rec. Doc. 1251, p. 101. During the questioning of the victim impact witnesses during the eligibility phase, the prosecutor emphasized the victim’s devotion to law enforcement with questions such as, “[i]s it fair to say he was a lawful (sic) officer 24 hours a day?” and “[d]id he enjoy his work?” Rec. Doc. 1274, at pp. 11-12. One of the victim impact witnesses, Terry Zaffuto, was the deceased’s brother and also a law enforcement officer, who testified to becoming a deputy at his brother’s behest. Id. at pp. 12-15. The prosecutor specifically asked Terry if, considering how his brother died, he thought him to be a hero. Terry’s response was that he considered him a hero not just that day but every day that he served to protect others. Id. at p. 18. Linda Kelly, the deceased’s sister, also testified. She read her eulogy from the funeral which stated in part:

My other brother, Terry, who is also a police lieutenant, said it the best, Sidney wasn’t just a hero the day those men took his life, he was like every other officer, a hero every day they walk out of the door to protect the public.

I am so enormously proud of my brother. After hearing Sheriff Foti say he viewed the films and Sidney was a hero who probably saved a lot of tellers’ lives that day, I couldn’t be prouder. And knowing him, there was no other way for him that day even if it meant giving his own life.

* * *

I salute my brother here today, the finest of officers and my hero, his loving sister, or as he called me “sis.”

Id. at p. 23.

Linda Kelly also read a letter to the editor she wrote which noted that “hundreds of officers” from many different police departments in the state came to the funeral, and that the funeral included “an Honor Guard, a 21-gun salute and bagpipes that played Amazing Grace.” Id. at p. 24. The letter continued:

He died that day to protect the tellers at the bank, something he always did, protect the public. So often we forget that these men risk their lives every single day when they walk out the door and they do it for a lot less money than it is worth. Without them, life would be chaotic and people would have to fear walking out their door every day.

Id. at p. 25.

Finally, the defendant challenges comments made during the closing argument in the selection phase of the sentencing hearing.

It means so much more because we all now know, if we didn’t before, what it means for an officer to lace up his boots, to put on a uniform and go protect us every day.

Rec. Doc. 1273, p. 5.

... the government thought that he [Captain Jenkins] was a hero, who, like Sidney Zaffuto, put a gun on every day, went into those banks, did these details to protect people, to protect the tellers, to protect the customers, to protect the loan officers, people who tried to make our lives better, get us mortgages, get us car loans, do those sorts of things. I thought he was a hero. I thought doing something like that, serving your community, made you a good person.

Id. at p. 54.

... .if you want to shed a tear, shed a tear for the City of New Orleans because we lost one of our best and we lost one of our bravest.

Id. at p. 56.

Finally, according to defendant Johnson, the closing argument ended with the prosecution asking for the death penalty because the victim was a police officer.

We are here because of the choices the defendant made. We are here because a brave man is dead. Remember the victim. His name was Sidney Zaffuto. We are here because the defendant killed a police officer.

Id. at p. 60.

When a career criminal kills a police officer, he deserves the death penalty.

Id. at p. 67.

Anything less than a sentence of death in this case is a failure of will and a wholly inadequate response to the senseless murder of a man who dedicated his life to protecting us.

Id.

Make no mistake about it. And if it must — and it must be, it must be imposed in this case because if not him, who? If not when — if not now, when? Because if killing a police officer after executing a restaurant owner is not enough, what is?

Id. at p. 69.

The Court finds that the testimony regarding Deputy Zaffuto’s career as a law enforcement officer was appropriate victim impact evidence. The Court also finds that the prosecutorial arguments based on his status were, by and large, proper. Deputy Zaffuto was in fact serving in a law enforcement capacity at the time of his death, doing precisely what his duties called for — protecting the bank from would be bank robbers like the defendant. In addition, defendant Johnson knew Deputy Zaffuto was a law enforcement officer at the time he was shooting at him. Furthermore, the prosecution had properly elicited evidence of Deputy Zaffuto’s long career as a police officer, his love of his job and the high esteem with which he was held by his colleagues.

The Court’s only reservation is those portions of the government’s rebuttal argument which improperly demanded that a death penalty be imposed, in part because Deputy Zaffuto was a law enforcement officer. Those concerns however are more appropriately addressed under Claim IX, where the defendant claims the prosecution’s penalty phase summation was designed to inflame the jurors’ emotions and passions.

Claim XIII: The Restriction of Mitigation And The Limitation On The Court’s Instructions Concerning Consideration Of Mitigation Undemined The Reliability Of The Proceeding

The crux of this claim is that the Court improperly merged several of defendant Johnson’s mitigating factors into one in globo factor. Specifically, the defense had requested the following as independent mitigating factors:

The Defendant was a good and loving son, brother, father and grandfather.

The Defendant’s family would suffer greatly if he were executed.

The Defendant’s life had value.

The Court combined the three into one mitigator that read: “His life had value in that he has been a good and loving son, brother, father and grandfather and his family will suffer greatly if he is executed.” Only one juror checked this as a mitigating factor. Rec. Doc. 1238-1, p. 5; 1238-2, p. 5.

The Court agrees that it erred in combining all three of these factors into one. Compelling evidence was introduced by Johnson’s family members indicating that his life did have value to them and they would in fact suffer greatly if he were to be executed. However, jurors could have also concluded that in light of his overall history, particularly his criminal history, that he , had not in fact been “a good and loving son, brother, father and grandfather.”

Nevertheless, the Court concludes the error was not unduly prejudicial. The jury did in fact hear extensive testimony of the defendant’s value to the members of his family as well as others, and could have considered it on an individual basis regardless of how the mitigator was phrased on the verdict sheet. In the event of a new penalty phase hearing, this mitigator will be severed into two if requested by the defense.

Finally, defendant Johnson alleges that his own conduct during the trial should have been listed as a relevant mitigating factor. The Court takes judicial notice of the fact that defendant Johnson sat impassively throughout the trial and did not react to the testimony of either the prosecution or defense witnesses. The Court also notes that his demeanor, while certainly not disruptive, was otherwise ambiguous. His non-response to the highly emotional victim impact evidence, for example, could be construed as commendable stoicism or heartless indifference. Nevertheless, the defense has cited a number of cases which have allowed similar mitigators and in the event of a new penalty phase hearing, the Court will give it reconsideration.

CATEGORY IV: SUFFICIENT INDIVIDUAL ERROR: Claims I, II, IX, X

The Court finds four individual claims, each of which present error sufficiently serious to constitute a miscarriage of justice under Rule 33. All were committed by the prosecution during the critical selection phase of trial, and the Court finds that each caused prejudice to the defendant’s constitutional rights sufficiently serious to warrant a new sentencing hearing.

Rule 33 error is evaluated “against the record as a whole,” which includes the evidence presented in these proceedings relevant to the sentencing selection. Wall, 389 F.3d at 466. Part of the Court’s measurement as to the effect of error includes consideration of the mitigation evidence presented by the defendant, at this same selection of trial. The Court is well familiar with capital cases in general, and this case was unusual in the extent of positive mitigation testimony offered on Johnson’s behalf. Among the witnesses were Shalinda Johnson, the defendant’s daughter; Tobias Calvey, the defendant’s grandson; Andreca Johnson, the defendant’s granddaughter; two of his nieces, Misunique Byes, Calrika Johnson, and a nephew, Kareem Johnson. They all testified consistently that Johnson had been the only father figure in their lives, that he was actively involved with them throughout their lives, and encouraged them to stay in school, to value themselves as people, to avoid bad influences and negative peer pressure, and to stay clear of drugs and guns. They also testified to him helping them all financially and that even when in jail, he stayed in contact and continued to be supportive. Most of these family members were college educated or college bound. They indicated that Johnson would continue to be a positive part of them lives if he received a life sentence. The Court observed the demeanor of these witnesses and they were clearly sincere and genuine in their love for and gratitude to Johnson for the positive impact he had had on then* lives.

Claim I: The Erroneous Admission Of Impermissible “Victim Impact” Testimony Introduced Arbitrary Factors Into The Jury’s Sentencing Determination

Claim I and Claim II are closely related and the underlying facts simultaneously occurred during the selection phase. In Claim I, defendant Johnson argues that an Eighth Amendment violation occurred when Shirley Zaffuto, the widow of the victim, Sidney Zaffuto, read a statement before the jury in which she castigated the defendant and his co-defendants. The defense challenges the following passages in particular:

... three selfish, greedy criminals tried to take what others had earned through their hard work. You and your friends terrorized innocent bank employees and customers and killed my beloved Sidney when he and another officer tried to stop you.

My health has suffered, and I’m alone now because of the decision made by ■ you and your evil friends.

You are an evil man and your life is a disgrace.

Rec. Doc. 1274, pp. 35-36.

Mrs. Zaffuto sobbed as she read the letter, having to pause several times to try to compose herself and continue, then breaking down entirely once the letter was read.

Defendant Johnson also contends the error was compounded when in closing rebuttal argument, the prosecutor used the “evil” vocabulary supplied by the widow in its selection phase rebuttal argument.

People who do evil, people who are evil, deserve justice. Make no mistake. John Johnson is evil. Justice, justice can only be had in this case if the death penalty is imposed.

Rec. Doc. 1273, p. 68 (emphasis added).

The Eighth Amendment bans cruel and unusual punishment. With respect to capital cases, the Supreme Court has consistently held that the Amendment requires that any death sentence be structured to eliminate arbitrary death verdicts,

the penalty of death is different in kind from any other punishment imposed under our system of criminal justice. Because of the uniqueness of the death penalty, Furman held that it could not be imposed under sentencing procedures that created a substantial risk that it would be inflicted in an arbitrary and capricious manner.

Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976).

In Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 107 S.Ct. 2529, 96 L.Ed.2d 440 (1987), the Supreme Court considered the admissibility of two types of victim-related information in the penalty phase of a capital case. The first was descriptions of the personal characteristics of the victim and the emotional impact the loss had upon the family members. The second was the family members’ opinions of the defendant, and their characterization of the crime. The Court held both types of information to be irrelevant to the decision to be made by the jury, and unfairly prejudicial to the defense under the Eighth Amendment.

With respect to the second category of information, the family members’ opinions of the defendant and their characterization of the crime, the Supreme Court specifically held that:

... the formal presentation of this information ... can serve no other purpose than to inflame the jury and divert it from deciding the case on the relevant evidence concerning the crime and the defendant. As we have noted, any decision to impose the death sentence must “be, and appear to be, based on reason rather than caprice or emotion.” The admission of these emotionally charged opinions as to what conclusions the jury should draw from the evidence clearly is inconsistent with the reasoned decision making we require in capital cases.

482 U.S. at 508-509, 107 S.Ct. 2529, quoting Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358, 97 S.Ct. 1197, 51 L.Ed.2d 393 (1977). In South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 109 S.Ct. 2207, 104 L.Ed.2d 876 (1989), the Court held that prosecutorial comment on prohibited victim impact evidence was likewise improper.

In Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 115 L.Ed.2d 720 (1991), the Supreme Court reversed itself with regard to the first type of victim impact evidence describing the personal characteristics of the victim and the loss suffered by the victim’s family. The Supreme Court held that evidence of the harm caused by the murder is relevant to the blameworthiness of the defendant, and also to show the uniqueness of a victim as an individual human being. Significantly, though, no evidence regarding the family members’ views of the crime or the defendant were presented in Payne. The Court overruled Booth and Gathers only insofar as those decisions disallowed evidence or argument regarding the victim’s characteristics and the impact of the loss on the family. Id. at 830, n. 2, 111 S.Ct. 2597.

Subsequently to Payne, several federal cou