Full opinion text
OPINION AND ORDER BESOSA, District Judge. Introduction This is a civil action for wrongful death, personal injury and related torts pursuant to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (the “FSIA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1605A, arising from a terrorist machine-gun attack at Israel’s Lod Airport on May 30, 1972 (the “Lod Airport Attack”). American citizen Carmelo Calderon-Molina (“Carmelo”) was murdered in the Lod Airport Attack and American citizen Pablo Tirado-Ayala (“Pablo”) was injured in the attack. The plaintiffs are the family members and estates of Carmelo and Pablo. Plaintiffs allege that the Lod Airport Attack was carried out as a joint operation by the Japanese Red Army (“JRA”) and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (“PFLP”) terrorist organizations, with the material support of the named defendants, the Democratic People’s Republic of North Korea (“North Korea”) and North Korea’s Cabinet General Intelligence Bureau (“CGIB”) (“defendants”). Plaintiffs’ Complaint was filed on March 27, 2008. (Docket No. 1) As required by section 1608(a)-(b) of the FSIA, the Clerk initiated service of process on the defendants, which process included copies of the Complaint, summonses and a Notice of Suit, and Korean-language translations of those documents. (Docket No. 7) Service was effected on North Korea and CGIB on July 21, 2008, pursuant to the provisions of FSIA section 1608(a)-(b). (Docket No. 8) After the sixty-day period provided by section 1608 had passed without the defendants filing an answer or otherwise responding to this action, plaintiffs moved for entry of default against defendants pursuant to Rule 55(a). (Docket No. 8) On October 31, 2008, the Court entered default against defendants North Korea and CGIB. (Docket No. 9) Notwithstanding defendants’ default, the FSIA requires that a default judgment against a foreign state be entered only after a plaintiff “establishes his claim or right to relief by evidence that is satisfactory to the Court.” 28 U.S.C. § 1608(e). Thus, pursuant to section 1608(e), this Court cannot enter default judgment in this case unless it finds that the plaintiffs have shown “by evidence that is satisfactory to the Court” that the Court has jurisdiction and that the defendants are liable. See e.g. Holland v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 496 F.Supp.2d 1, 12 (D.D.C.2005) (“Every case brought against a foreign state raises two distinct and crucial legal questions. First, the Court must look to whether it has jurisdiction to hear the claim. In the context of claims implicating the parameters of the FSIA, this jurisdictional determination is guided by an inquiry into whether the case falls within one of the statutory exceptions to the sovereign immunity of a foreign state. Second, the Court must consider the actual liability of the defendant foreign sovereign.”) (citations omitted). At the same time, pursuant to section 1608(e) “the Court may accept as true the plaintiffs’ uncontroverted evidence.” Wachsman v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 603 F.Supp.2d 148, 155 (D.D.C.2009) (internal quotations omitted) (citing Elahi v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 124 F.Supp.2d 97, 100 (D.D.C.2000)). See also Botvin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 604 F.Supp.2d 22, 26 (D.D.C.2009) (same); Gates v. Syrian Arab Republic, 580 F.Supp.2d 53, 63 (D.D.C.2008) (same); Alejandre v. Republic of Cuba, 996 F.Supp. 1239, 1243 (S.D.Fla.1997) (same). The “satisfactory to the court” standard contained in 28 U.S.C. § 1608(e) is identical to the standard for entry of default judgments against the United States government in Rule 55(e). Compañía Interamericana Export-Import, SA. v. Compañía Dominicana de Aviación, 88 F.3d 948, 951 (1996). For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds that plaintiffs have clearly demonstrated both the Court’s jurisdiction and the defendants’ liability for their injuries “by evidence that is satisfactory to the Court.” 28 U.S.C. § 1608(e). Findings of Fact This Court conducted an evidentiary hearing on December 2, 2009 and December 3, 2009, at which plaintiffs presented evidence establishing, to section 1608(e)’s satisfaction, the following facts. On May 30,1972, American citizens Carmelo Calderon-Molina (“Carmelo”) and Pablo Tirado-Ayala (“Pablo”) arrived at Israel’s Lod Airport near Tel Aviv, as part of a large group of Puerto Rican pilgrims touring Israel and visiting the Christian religious sites in the Holy Land. For many of the participants on this church-organized trip, this was to be the experience of a lifetime, and one for which they had saved up money to finance for many years. Three members of the JRA, disguised as regular passengers, who had just disembarked at Lod Airport on a flight arriving from Italy, recovered their luggage from the baggage carousel. They then removed automatic weapons and grenades from their luggage and began shooting and throwing explosives indiscriminately into the crowd of innocent civilians which included Carmelo, Pablo and other passengers located in the terminal building. At the time of the Lod Airport Attack in 1972, there were no armed Israeli security personnel stationed inside Lod Airport, and therefore the JRA terrorists encountered no organized resistance. At some point during the Lod Airport Attack, however, two of the terrorists were felled by self-inflicted wounds (one from a ricocheting bullet and the other by a prematurely-detonated grenade), at which time the third terrorist raced outside of the terminal building with the intention of blowing up several aircraft located on the tarmac. (Exhibit No. 2, ¶ 24) This third terrorist, Kozo Okamoto (“Kozo”), was eventually neutralized by Claude Chanan Zeitoun (“Zeitoun”), a Lod airport employee who, though unarmed, chased down Kozo near the runway, knocked away his automatic rifle, and restrained him until the police arrived. (Exhibit No. 2, ¶¶ 12-18) When the slaughter ceased, 26 innocent persons had been murdered and over 80 persons had been wounded by the JRA terrorists. (Trial Transcript, Dec. 2, 2009, p. 27, In. 18 and 23) Seventeen of the murdered victims were Puerto Rican pilgrims. Carmelo was killed in the Lod Airport Attack; his last act before dying was to shield a pregnant woman with his body, absorbing bullets that otherwise would likely have killed her and her unborn child. Pablo was wounded in the Lod Airport Attack; for him and his family the attack became a watershed experience that negatively affected the quality of his life in significant ways, including severe psychological injuries which grievously disabled him and persisted for his entire life. (Trial Transcript, Dec. 3, 2009, p. 109, In. 18-25) During interrogations with Israeli authorities, Kozo admitted that his fellow attackers and he were members of the JRA and that the attack had been carried out in conjunction with the PFLP. The PFLP also publicly claimed responsibility for the attack; this claim was widely reported in the international press. Kozo was tried and convicted in an Israeli court for his involvement in the Lod Airport Attack. He received a life sentence. Kozo was released from jail in 1985 as part of a prisoner release, and is believed to be living in Lebanon. (Trial Transcript, Dec. 2, 2009, p. 116, In. 5 and p. 117, In. 12) Carmelo’s widow, Eladia Cardona-Rosario (“Eladia”) and his ten children (eight with Eladia and two from a prior marriage) have suffered greatly from the loss of their loving spouse and father. Pablo and his family have suffered from his psychological injuries and chronic deep depression caused by the Lod Airport Attack and Pablo’s consequent failure to be able to resume his prior, functioning lifestyle, including his inability to maintain employment. The plaintiffs have established defendants’ liability for the Lod Airport Attack primarily through the testimony of three expert witnesses: Professor Barry Rubin (“Prof. Rubin”), Professor Bruce Bechtol (“Prof. Bechtol”), and Professor Rohan Gunaratna (“Prof. Gunaratna”). Two eyewitnesses to the Lod Airport Attack, Ze’ev Sarig and Claude Chanan Zeitoun, presented affidavit testimony (Exhibit Nos. 1 and 2); Mr. Sarig also testified before the Court at trial. (Trial Transcript, Dec. 2, 2009, pp. 9-34) Each of the expert witnesses and two fact witnesses also submitted affidavit testimony as exhibits to plaintiffs’ Pretrial Memorandum that was submitted prior to the trial. (Docket No. 23) (See also Exhibit Nos. 1, 2, 4, 6, and 8) Professors Rubin, Bechtol, and Gunaratna offered documentary evidence, including government reports, publications, and other information, in addition to their affidavit testimony and oral testimony at trial. Although some of plaintiffs’ evidence is cumulative, given the level of detail and insight the witnesses provided regarding the support by defendants to PFLP and JRA terrorism generally, and the Lod Airport Attack specifically, the Court will quote at length from them expert testimony. A. Testimony of Professor Barry Rubin Plaintiffs presented affidavit and trial testimony by Prof. Rubin, the director and a member of the faculty of the Global Research in International Affairs Center (GLORIA) at the Interdisciplinary University (IDC), in Herzliya, Israel. Prof. Rubin is also a senior fellow at the IDC’s International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism. He holds a doctorate degree from Georgetown University, a master’s degree from Rutgers University, and a bachelor’s degree from Richmond College. Prof. Rubin’s affidavit and trial testimony were based upon his academic studies, research, teaching and publishing over the course of his many years as a director of IDC, a senior fellow at a counter-terrorism institute, and a lecturer at numerous academic institutions. During the course of his professional career and academic research, Prof. Rubin has obtained information from interviews with political leaders and captured terrorists, reviews of documents, periodicals, credible news reports, government publications, and scholarly works, as well as from his own discussions with colleagues, observations and experiences living in the Middle East. (Exhibit Nos. 5 and 6) Prof. Rubin, in his affidavit testimony, explained that at the time leading up to the Lod Airport Attack and thereafter, North Korea was a communist revolutionary regime whose goal was to help create additional communist states which would in turn provide North Korea with strategic and economic support. North Korea sought to accomplish these goals by fostering political unrest and instability in non-communist nations by supporting domestic groups that were striving to overthrow their governments violently. Accordingly, North Korea consistently demonstrated three qualities in particular which qualified it as an active state sponsor of terrorism: (i) its extremist militancy (as compared to other communist nations at that time such as the Soviet Union and People’s Republic of China); (ii) its relative recklessness, as measured by its systematic willingness to shun international law and norms of behavior; and (iii) its desire to carve out an independent role for itself in promoting revolution and developing clients in the Middle East. (Exhibit No. 3, p. 6, ¶ 17) North Korea’s main aspirations were to (a) help create additional communist states which would provide it with strategic and economic support, (b) discredit the United States (primarily by showing that the United States was ostensibly unable to protect its allies), and (c) destroy countries friendly to the United States. (Id. at ¶ 18) The defendants determined that actively supporting terrorist groups to act as their proxies was an effective means of achieving these goals, and specifically that “Israel fell into that [the above] category both as a direct target and as a symbolic target.” (Id.) During the early 1970’s, North Korea waged a battle against its South Korean rival for diplomatic and trade relations with the Arabic-speaking states. The ability to strike against Israel would, North Korean policymakers believed, greatly increase North Korea’s popularity and attractiveness as an ally within the Arab world. (Exhibit No. 3, p. 6, ¶ 19) Prof. Rubin explained in his affidavit testimony that North Korea was “willing to work with those who no one else would work with, to provide weapons for those who no one else would provide weapons for; and that not only applied to countries, it even applied to terrorist groups.” (Trial Transcript, Dec. 2, 2009, p. 55, In. 9-15) One of North Korea’s key interests at that time was to be a global revolutionary player, and, as Prof. Rubin set forth in his affidavit testimony, North Korea believed that goal would be facilitated by North Korea establishing an effective terrorist network. As Prof. Rubin explained: “At the time of which we’re speaking, the 1970’s, was a high point in the history of international terrorism. To be a revolutionary player, you had to have terrorist assets. And North Korea was in a weak position because it was a smaller and weaker state than the Soviet Union and China. So for them to get terrorist assets, they could not go, so to speak, with the A-team, the first league. They had to find groups that others were not willing to sponsor, and then use them to project North Korean power by carrying out spectacular terrorist acts which would show the world that North Korea was important, was revolutionary, it was worth courting, and also supported Arab causes, particularly in the Palestinian cause. So there was a perfect fit between the three groups. Each of them needed the others, and each of them — the alliance for each of them lacked alternatives other than an alliance among the three parties.” (Trial Transcript, Dec. 2, 2009, In. 2-18) Given North Korea’s ideology and aims, it is thus not surprising that North Korea concluded that using terrorist groups as proxies could effectively magnify its influence in the Middle East. As a practical matter, North Korea was well-positioned to extend material support to terrorist groups; it carried with it the benefits and the resources of a nation-state sponsor, including financial assistance, military training, operational cover and safe harbor. It was not long before North Korea set up and operated terrorist training camps (a large proportion of which were Palestinian) in which over the years thousands of terrorists were trained. (Trial Transcript, Dec. 2, 2009, In. 15) These training camps provided comprehensive instruction on weapons use, bomb-making, kidnapping, assassination, propaganda, and guerrilla warfare. (Exhibit No. 6, ¶ 34) North Korea also supplied Palestinian terrorist groups with a wide variety of armaments. The PFLP, a Palestinian terrorist organization with a communist ideology, was an ideal match for the North Korean regime, given that, as explained above, North Korea was already seeking to spread its own communist revolutionary aspirations via proxies throughout the Middle East. In fact, North Korea was an important enough sponsor of the PFLP that, in September 1970, the notorious PFLP terrorist leader George Habash (“Habash”) himself visited Pyongyang, the capital of North Korea, personally to seek an increase in material support for his organization and to discuss possible collaboration with the JRA in future terror attacks. (Trial Transcript, Dec. 2, 2009, p. 56, In. 10 and Exhibit No. 6, ¶ 34) Although the Palestine Liberation Organization’s (“PLO”) main branch, al-Fatah, received support from countries like China, the Soviet Union and Arab states, the PLO’s poorer cousin, the PFLP, was forced to seek sponsorship from less prominent and wealthy “second — and third-tier” countries such as North Korea. Habash’s visit was much feted in the state-controlled North Korean media. (Exhibit No. 36, ¶ 6) Prof. Rubin explained that this visit and North Korean media reports demonstrated North Korea’s increasing influence in promoting terrorist groups at this time, because the North Korea media was strictly controlled by its government and reflected its policies. As explained by Prof. Rubin, “[s]ince every action is an official action approved by the intelligence, military and the high leadership of North Korea, then we know that these are official actions.” (Trial Transcript, Dec. 2, 2009, p. 65, In. 7-10) It is especially telling that the North Koreans warmly welcomed Habash even though the PFLP already had been involved in attacks on Israeli targets, including the bombing a few months prior of a Swiss Air plane headed to Israel, killing 47 passengers. (Exhibit No. 3, ¶ 34) Moreover, during Habash’s visit to North Korea, several PFLP operatives hijacked four western passenger planes, took three of the airliners to Jordan and blew them up. Prof. Rubin stated that “for Habash to leave the scene [i.e., the Middle East] at a time when they [his PFLP terrorists] were involved in the most important crisis in terrorist activity that they had ever been involved in is an indication of the importance of his [Habash’s] going all the way to North Korea to pay a visit.” (Trial Transcript, Dec. 2, 2009, p. 60, In. 17-22) During the Pyongyang visit, Habash met with the JRA leadership, including Kozo’s brother Takashi Okamoto (“Takashi”). Takashi had, two years earlier, hijacked a Japanese airliner to North Korea. (Trial Transcript, Dec. 2, 2009, p. 61, In. 11-20) The visit between Habash and the fugitive JRA leaders hiding in North Korea, who were secluded from the general population and heavily guarded, could not have taken place without the direct assistance and authorization of defendant CGIB. Furthermore, Prof. Rubin states that there were very close links between North Korea and PFLP, and that North Korea actively courted PFLP, its operatives even traveling to Lebanon to visit a major PFLP training camp. (Trial Transcript, Dec. 2, 2009, p. 51, In. 21-25) The JRA was founded as a radical communist group in 1969. Its first major operation was the March 1970 hijacking of a Japanese airplane to North Korea, which was carried out by nine of its members. (Exhibit No. 3, p. 11, ¶ 34) Importantly, from its very start, the JRA was largely dependent on North Korea to finance its operations, training, general logistics (including use of North Korea as a safe haven) and collaboration with other terrorist groups. (Exhibit No. 6, ¶ 37) Prof. Rubin testified that “[i]t would have been impossible for them [the JRA hijackers] to land it [the hijacked Japanese airliner] or been there [in North Korea] for one hour without North Korean government making an explicit decision that this was in their interest and this is something they wanted to promote that they would trust those people to act as their agents.” (Trial Transcript, Dec. 2, 2009, p. 58, In. 25-p. 59, In. 4) Indeed, without the approval of the communist leadership and the CGIB, which directed every aspect of government policy, no actions in North Korea could be carried out. The JRA numbered only roughly 40 members, and, in contrast to most other terrorist groups, its survival was completely dependent on continued North Korean sponsorship. (Id.) It had no other important state sponsors of its terrorist activities. Similarly, one of the most important assets North Korea possessed was its link to the JRA, over which it had exclusive patronage. (Exhibit No. 6, ¶ 38) Among the best things North Korea was able to offer the PFLP was its intimate links to the JRA. The JRA, in turn, functioned as an effective intermediary through which Pyongyang’s connections with the PFLP could be disguised. (Id.) Following the introduction of JRA terrorist leaders to Habash and other leaders of the PFLP, the two terrorist groups maintained contacts and even trained together in Beirut. With the prospects so poor for starting a revolution in Japan, the JRA found the state of the Palestinian struggle far more advanced and an attractive means of providing the JRA with the opportunity for attaining a profile as a viable revolutionary group on the international stage. (Exhibit No. 6, ¶ 19) The JRA could no longer function in Japan, however, because much of its leadership had either been arrested, killed, or had relocated to North Korea. Thus North Korea played a vital role in the JRA’s development; it was the location from which contacts with Japan were maintained and new cadre recruited. (Exhibit No. 6, ¶ 39) North Korea and CGIB became the primary patrons of the JRA and greatly influenced its direction and policies. In fact, at the time of the Lod Airport Attack, North Korea was the only state sponsoring the JRA. (Trial Transcript, Dec. 2, 2009, p. 64, In. 2) And the JRA, in turn, was mindful of the sensitivities of its sponsor. Prof. Rubin testified that the JRA deliberately did not want to select operatives who had resided at some time in North Korea to participate in the Lod Airport Attack because North Korea wished to have a certain level of deniability. (Trial Transcript, Dec. 2, 2009, p. 68, In. 6-14) During his visit to North Korea in September 1970, Habash recruited JRA members to carry out attacks for the PFLP. (Exhibit No. 6, ¶ 44) Accompanied by North Korean officials, Habash visited the JRA hijackers, and himself requested that the JRA provide operatives to perpetuate the Lod Airport Attack. (Id.) Importantly, the Lod Airport Attack could not have been executed without the JRA, because PFLP operatives themselves, of Middle Eastern origin, would have been sure to arouse the suspicion and scrutiny of Israeli security. It was also vital for the operation that all PFLP-JRA contacts come about through North Korean channels, and were under its auspices. While preparing for the attack, the JRA members were trained either in North Korea or, in the case of Kozo, were sent through earlier training with the PFLP arranged by North Korean intelligence assets. (Exhibit No. 6, ¶ 46) According to Prof. Rubin, the Lod Airport Attack constituted the consummation of a tripartite relationship between North Korea, the JRA, and the PFLP. (Exhibit No. 6, ¶ 53) North Korea provided both terrorist groups with material support, resources, training, weapons, and refuge. North Korea financed, armed and trained the groups that perpetrated the Lod Airport Attack, while providing sanctuary to the leadership of the JRA. The seeds of the Lod Airport Attack were sown in 1970, when Habash visited North Korea and met with both the North Korean intelligence agencies and the JRA leadership. (Exhibit No. 6, ¶ 44) And from 1970-1972 defendants consistently harbored JRA terrorists, trained terrorists, provided terrorists with financial support, and otherwise provided material support to JRA and PFLP activities and operations (Exhibit No. 6, ¶ 54). North Korea thus constituted the nexus of a relationship that resulted in the heinous murder and maiming of innocents at Lod Airport. The Lod Airport Attack was the logical consequence of North Korean foreign policy and its aspirations to export communist ideology and revolution throughout the West, and was viewed by North Korea (as well as by the JRA and PFLP) as a model operation and an important victory. (Exhibit No. 6, ¶ 53) Prof. Rubin also testified at trial that the JRA and the PFLP could not have successfully perpetrated the Lod Airport Attack without North Korean support. He stated at trial that “Any terrorist attack depends on involvement of large groups of people. You need the recruitment, you need the training, you need the army, you need the provision of false documents which are credible, and ... I think it’s safe to say that the PFLP did not have the capability to produce such false documents. That the only people who could have produced it for them were the North Koreans, who had a lot of experience in this area. So there’s a whole large cast of characters that stand behind an operation in which three people are firing guns.” (Trial Transcript, Dec. 2, 2009, pp. 73-74) Prof. Rubin further emphasized in his testimony that the Lod Airport Attack was “a very complex operation” in which terrorists had to infiltrate a “critically defended public facility in Israel, which is a country with strong defense and intelligence capabilities,” and that North Korea’s direct involvement was critical in enabling the JRA and PFLP to plan the Lod Airport Attack and for JRA terrorists to perpetrate the Lod Airport Attack. (Trial Transcript, Dec. 2, 2009, pp. 74-75) Prof. Rubin explained: “So to do this, you have to create credible back stories; that is, cover stories for the people involved, you have to cover the tracks, you have to have them in places where foreign intelligence cannot penetrate, to using secure lines of communication that cannot be read. The PFLP is not a country; it’s not a government. Its capabilities are limited. So to — this is why terrorist groups need state sponsors. Even in some cases, the most important of them, especially at that period of time when these things were more difficult, because if you’re going to have a serious operation, there’s simply a lot of things that a terrorist group cannot handle on its own. So that’s why they — they need to find help from a government with unlimited money, with advanced printing presses, with top quality communications that can’t be broken. I mean, if the PFLP needs to send a telegram — if they need to send a communication, they need to have somebody help them because American codebreaking is very good. So how do you get around that? So this is why you need a state sponsor.” (Trial Transcript, Dec. 2, 2009, pp. 74-75) In summary, the analysis reflected in Prof. Rubin’s testimony demonstrates to the Court’s satisfaction that the JRA could not have infiltrated Lod Airport nor otherwise perpetrated the Lod Airport Attack without the material logistical, financial, training and ideological support and resources provided by defendants. North Korea used the JRA and the PFLP as proxies to do its bidding, in that way allowing North Korea to avoid having to take responsibility for the massacre. B. Testimony of Professor Bruce Bechtol Plaintiffs presented both affidavit and trial testimony by Bruce Bechtol, Professor of International Relations at the Marine Corps Command and Staff College. Prof. Bechtol also has served as an Assistant Professor of National Security Studies at the Air Command and Staff College, an adjunct Visiting Professor at the Korea University Graduate School of International Studies and an adjunct Professor of Diplomacy at Norwich University. He received a Ph.D. in National Security Studies from the Union Institute, a master’s degree in international affairs from the Catholic University and a bachelor’s degree from Excelsior College. (Exhibit No. 3) Prof. Bechtol has extensive experience in military affairs, having served on active duty for 20 years in the United States Marine Corps at various locations in the western Pacific and East Asia. From 1997 until 2003, he was an Intelligence Officer at the Defense Intelligence Agency, and also served as the Senior Analyst for Northeast Asia in the Intelligence Directorate (J2) on the Joint Staff in the Pentagon. Prof. Bechtol has been published in 19 peer review journals and also authored a comprehensive study of North Korea, Red Rogue: The Persistent Challenge of North Korea (Potomac Books 2007), and has edited or been a contributing editor to several other books on North Korea. More recently, Prof. Bechtol authored another book about North Korea, whose publication is forthcoming, entitled Defiant Failed State: The North Korean Threat to International Security. (Exhibit No. 3) Rather than reiterate many of the findings presented by Prof. Rubin set forth above, the Court will focus on trial and affidavit testimony presented by Prof. Bechtol which further highlights defendants’ role in the attack. Prof. Bechtol stated in his affidavit testimony that the JRA, almost from its inception, maintained client relationship with the CGIB. (Exhibit No. 4, ¶ 17) North Korean agents passed instructions to their JRA cadres and provided them with various material resources, including training and various weapons. Some JRA members sought and were provided refuge in North Korea itself, where they were supported by the North Korean government. (Exhibit No. 4, ¶ 18) Prof. Bechtol stated that Habash’s official visit to North Korea in September 1970 constituted a watershed event in the tri-partite relationship between defendants, the PFLP and the JRA. He explained that the chain of evidence connecting the North Korean government to the PFLP (and ultimately the JRA as well) is further cemented by evidence that during his stay in North Korea, Habash was able to procure both weapons and funding from defendants. (Trial Transcript, Dec. 2, 2009, p. 95, In. 3) The reasons behind North Korea’s interest in promoting a terrorist attack against Israel were described in Prof. Bechtol’s affidavit testimony. Prof. Bechtol outlined various reasons for North Korea’s active support of state and non-state terrorists who, like North Korea, were hostile to the United States and its allies. As explained by Prof. Bechtol, North Korea has always regarded the United States as its primary enemy and its main threat to national survival. (Exhibit No. 3, ¶ 19) Israel is one of Washington’s key allies and its most important democratic buffer in the Middle East. Thus, supporting terrorist groups from other nations targeting Israeli citizens and Jews was an important strategy employed by North Korea to keep Washington’s focus on these terrorist groups and not on North Korea. (Exhibit No. 3, ¶ 19) As a matter of its official policy, North Korea provided material support, training, resources, weapons and safe haven to the JRA and PFLP during the period relevant to this case. Defendants ran roughly 30 terrorist training camps from 1968-1988 within North Korea’s borders; those camps specialized in terrorist and guerilla warfare training. These training camps serviced in excess of 10,000 terrorists, including members of the JRA and the PFLP, and provided various courses lasting anywhere from three to 18 months. (Exhibit No. 4, fn. 12) (Trial Transcript, Dec. 2, 2009, p. 88, In. 9-14) Defendants were also directly involved in training terrorists in other places around the world, including in the Beka’a Valley. (Trial Transcript, Dec. 2, 2009, p. 88, In. 9-17) At the camps, North Korean military or intelligence service employees served as the principal trainers. (Trial Transcript, Dec. 2, 2009, p. 90, In. 5-17) By supporting and financing these terrorist groups, North Korea advanced what it perceived as its foreign policy goals and carried out commitments it had to its own economic and political patrons such as the USSR and China. The Lod Airport Attack was facilitated by the support, training and encouragement that North Korea provided to the PFLP and the JRA. C. Testimony of Professor Rohan Gunaratna Plaintiffs also presented both affidavit and trial testimony by Dr. Rohan Gunaratna, Professor of Security Studies at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies and Director of the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR) at the Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. Prof. Gunaratna has studied terrorist groups for over 25 years, focusing, in particular, on the phenomenon of Asian terror. He holds a doctorate in International Relations, University of St. Andrews in the United Kingdom (1996-1999), as well as a master’s degree in International Peace Studies from the University of Notre Dame. (Exhibit No. 7) Among other appointments, Prof. Gunaratna has been a member of the Advisory Board of the European Homeland Security Association since 2006 and a member of the Steering Committee, George Washington University, Homeland Security Policy Institute, since 2004. He is also the founder and member of the Board of Governors, Council for Asian Terrorism Research (CATR). (Exhibit No. 7) Rather than reiterate many of the findings already presented by Profs. Rubin and Bechtol above, the Court will focus on trial and affidavit testimony presented by Prof. Gunaratna which further highlights defendants’ role in the attack. Prof. Gunaratna stated in his affidavit testimony that the JRA faction in North Korea was heavily controlled by the North Korean government, and that in fact, JRA members acted as agents of that government. (Exhibit No. 8, ¶ 26) One of the methods that defendants used to control the JRA and other terrorist groups was consistently to provide them with a regular flow of material support and resources. In fact, when the nine members of the JRA hijacked the Japanese airplane to North Korea in 1970, the North Korean government “treated them [the JRA hijackers] like state guests.” (Trial Transcript, Dec. 2, 2009, p. 118, In. 18-23) The North Korean government lavished the JRA terrorists with celebrity status, and provided them with refuge in North Korea along with such luxuries as a Mercedes-Benz vehicle and servants to care for their needs. (Trial Transcript, Dec. 2, 2009, p. 119, In. 1-3) These nine JRA members later received ideological and military training from North Korea; many of them eventually officially became North Korean agents and engaged in operations directly on behalf of the North Korean government. (Trial Transcript, Dec. 2, 2009, p. 119, In. 4-9) In his affidavit testimony, Prof. Gunaratna specifically cited the research of Joseph S. Bermudez, another expert on North Korean affairs, and (citing Mr. Bermudez) explained that defendants in the mid-1970s maintained six to ten training facilities in North Korean territory and numerous overseas training and advisory missions. (Exhibit No. 8, ¶ 19) Long-term training courses held in North Korean facilities were located in the “vicinity of P’yongyang (Wonhung-ri), Yongbyon, Sangwon, Haeju, Namp’o, and Wonsun” and lasted between 12-24 months, and North Korea also sponsored three to six-month short-term training courses which were conducted overseas. (Id.) During the period between 1969 to 1974, the JRA and the PFLP were among the various terrorist groups trained in those facilities by defendants. (Id.) The training camps managed by North Korea primarily taught guerilla warfare and “terroristing,” or attacks on civilian infrastructure and personnel. (Trial Transcript, Dec. 2, 2009, p. 127, In. 5-16) As Prof. Gunaratna explained at trial, “... as part of the terrorist training, the North Korean government agents imparted training in assassinations, in bombings, in sabotage, in hijackings, in kidnappings, in hostage takings” so that North Korea would have proxies skilled in perpetrating terrorist acts to further its interests. (Id. at In. 5-19) North Korean instructors also traveled from North Korea to Lebanon to provide training to JRA members in the terrorist camps located in the Beka’a Valley. In addition to providing training, defendants provided JRA and PFLP members with weapons and financial and other assistance, including cover for operational matters. (Id.) Although North Korea generally attempted to conceal its sponsorship of the JRA and other terrorist groups, the evidence revealing such sponsorship is nevertheless well documented. To quote the United States State Department’s Patterns of Global Terrorism, “Japanese police believe that Yasuhiro Shibata, a JRA member arrested in Tokyo in May, was ‘run’ by North Korean intelligence agents.” (Exhibit No. 8, ¶ 20) Shibata was using the identity of a former North Korean resident of Japan who had immigrated to North Korea in 1972. (Id.) Japanese authorities did arrest a number of JRA members who traveled from North Korea to other countries and then re-entered Japan. Based on debriefings, the seizure of documents and intelligence of the Japanese police, North Korea actively provided forged, adapted and fraudulently obtained genuine identification and other Japanese government-issued documents to JRA members. (Trial Transcript, Dec. 2, 2009, p. 128, In. 17-25) North Korea had expertise in adapting photo substitution and name changes for such documents, and was able to produce high-quality forgeries. (Trial Transcript, Dec. 2, 2009, p. 129, In. 8-19) There were other significant benefits flowing to the JRA in having North Korea as a state sponsor of its terrorist activities. Because North Korea is a state, it has “natural cover and capacity to operate.” (Trial Transcript, Dec. 2, 2009, p. 124, In. 8-9) For example, Prof. Gunaratna testified that there was a JRA member who was operating in Thailand with the CGIB, regarding whom he stated “[t]hey [CGIB] were bringing in counterfeit U.S. dollars from North Korea, and they were putting that money back to the U.S. dollar system in Thailand. And the Japanese Red Army member was traveling inside a North Korean diplomatic vehicle, so the Japanese Red Army used the diplomatic pouches, the diplomatic immunities, and the diplomatic privileges of North Korea.” (Trial Transcript, Dec. 2, 2009, p. 124, In. 5-19) The history of the JRA, as traced from its creation until its demise, clearly demonstrates that North Korea’s state sponsorship was crucial for the JRA’s survival. Indeed, a desire for a patron state is common to all terrorist organizations. The United States State Department noted in an official publication that “[w]ithout state sponsors, terrorist groups would have much more difficulty obtaining the funds, weapons, materials, and secure areas they require to plan and conduct operations.” (Exhibit No. 8, ¶ 37) As such, North Korean state sponsorship of both the JRA and PFLP enabled both these terrorist groups to forge a partnership and facilitated their perpetration of terror attacks worldwide. Prof. Gunaratna also testified at trial that North Korean direct and indirect sponsorship of the JRA and its provisions of material support was paramount for the JRA’s survival, sustenance and operation globally. (Exhibit No. 8, ¶ 38) North Korea not only sponsored the JRA directly, but also sponsored the JRA’s operational partner PFLP as well. (Id.) Thus, all of the terrorist operations carried out by the JRA alone, and jointly with PFLP, during the period of North Korean sponsorship, including the Lod Airport Attack, are attributable to North Korea’s leadership and intelligence services. (Id.) In fact, North Korean leader Kim Il-Sung envisioned using the JRA as North Korea’s proxy well into the future — to keep the revolution continuing beyond the first generation. To this end, Kim Il-Sung instructed the JRA members living in North Korea to take Japanese wives so that their Japanese children could form the next generation of JRA fighters. (Trial Transcript, Dec. 2, 2009, p. 134, In. 17-19) The CGIB even worked with the JRA to lure Japanese women living in Europe to North Korea for the purpose of having these children, and its efforts were successful to a certain extent; roughly 17 of those children have in fact returned to live in Japan, presumably to continue the struggle. (Trial Transcript, Dec. 2, 2009, p. 134, In. 13-25) Prof. Gunaratna highlighted another important issue at trial' — namely that the JRA selection of Lod Airport as a target reflected the JRA’s primary goal of shocking people with extreme violence and high-impact attacks, what could be referred to as “spectacular or theatrical attacks.” (Trial Transcript, Dec. 2, 2009, p. 113, In. 11-25) The JRA firmly believed that theatrical attacks would most effectively spread its ideology, and facilitate its continuing recruitment efforts. In fact, the audaciousness of the Lod Airport Attack can only be truly understood in the context of 1972; until the attack on Lod Airport in the contemporary wave of terrorism, there had never been a “suicide” or “no-surrender” terrorist attack. (Trial Transcript, Dec. 2, 2009, p. 115, In. 18-25-p. 116, In. 1-2) Further, Prof. Gunaratna’s testimony highlighted a direct link between North Korea and the Lod Airport Attack. One of the “Nine Samurai” (see fn. 17 supra) was “Takashi”, Kozo’s brother. Takashi asked Kozo (who at that time was living in Japan) to travel to Lebanon to work with JRA members training there. Takashi’s message to Kozo was sent to Japan from North Korea after Habash’s visit to North Korea. In referring to this exchange, Prof. Gunaratna testified, “[t]his is very significant. It’s a direct link.” (Trial Transcript, Dec. 2, 2009, p. 130, In. 3-9) D. Documentary Evidence In addition to providing detailed and thorough expert testimony about the defendants and their provision of material support and resources to the PFLP and the JRA, the plaintiffs submitted additional documentary evidence to provide further background and' context concerning the Lod Airport Attack, as Exhibits 65 through 76 to their Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law: Exhibit No. 66: United States Department of State, Terrorist Attack at Lod Airport, May 30,1972. Exhibit No. 67: Peter Grose, “Four Minutes of Horror at the Airport,” The New York Times (June 4,1972). Exhibit No. 68: Moshe Brilliant, “Witnesses Reconstruct Account of a Three-Minute Nightmare,” The New York Times (June 1,1972) Exhibit No. 69: Sen. Jud. Comm. Sub-comm. To Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and other Internal Security Law, Terroristic Activity-International Terrorism, 94th Cong. (May 14,1975); p. 183. Exhibit No. 70: United States Library of Congress, Country Profile: North Korea, Ch. 4, Sec. “The Media,” available at http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/kptoc. html. Exhibit No. 71: The Pyongyang Times, “Speech by Comrade Kim II Sung at the Airfield,” (Oct. 6,1969). Exhibit No. 72: Eric Pace, “Lebanon is Said to Have Set Up Liaison Unit With Commandos,” The New York Times (Sept. 23,1972). Exhibit No. 73: The Pyongyang Times, “Militant Solidarity with Palestinian People’s Struggle,” (May 20,1972). Exhibit No. 74: Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., Te'iTorism: The North Korean Connection (New York, N.Y. Taylor & Francis New York Inc.1990) p. 102. (Previously referenced in Exhibit 8, fn. 12) Exhibit No. 75: Yoshihiro Kuriyama, Terrorism at Tel Aviv Airport and a ‘New Left’ Group in Japan, Asian Survey, Yol. 13, No. 3 (Mar.1973) Exhibit No. 76: 53 Fed.Reg. 3477-01 (Feb. 5, 1988), 1988 WL 276528. (Previously referenced in Plaintiffs’ Pretrial Memorandum, fn. 4) Exhibit No. 77: United States Dept, of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1988. (Previously referenced in Exhibit No. 8, fn. 18) Conclusions of Law The FSIA was enacted in 1976 and is the sole basis of jurisdiction over foreign states in the federal courts. See Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping, 488 U.S. 428, 434, 109 S.Ct. 683, 102 L.Ed.2d 818 (1989). The FSIA codifies the “restrictive theory” of sovereign immunity under which foreign states are generally immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the United States subject to specific exceptions. See Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 488-89, 103 S.Ct. 1962, 76 L.Ed.2d 81 (1983). As originally enacted, the exceptions to immunity under the FSIA included cases in which a foreign state had waived its immunity and those involving commercial activities of a foreign state with a nexus to United States. See Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 488, 103 S.Ct. 1962 (discussing main exceptions to immunity under the FSIA). In April 1996, however, Congress enacted a “terrorism exception” to immunity under the FSIA as part of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. Pub.L. No. 104-132, § 221(a)(1)(C), 110 Stat. 1214, 1241. That exception, which was codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7), lifted the sovereign immunity of designated foreign state sponsors of terrorism in civil actions brought by American citizens for terrorist attacks carried out by those foreign states or for which the foreign states had provided material support and resources. Later in 1996, Congress amended the FSIA (the “Flatow Amendment”) to create a cause of action for terrorism against officials, employees and agents of those foreign states. See Pub.L. 104-208, § 589, 110 (1996), 110 Stat. 3009-1, 3009-172 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1605 note). Federal courts initially construed section 1605(a)(7) and the Flatow Amendment, read in tandem, as creating a federal cause of action against the foreign state itself. See e.g. Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F.Supp. 1 (D.D.C.1998). The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit ultimately held, however, that neither section 1605(a)(7) nor the Flatow Amendment created a cause of action against the foreign state itself. See Cicippio-Puleo v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 353 F.3d 1024 (D.C.Cir.2004). Following Cicippio-Puleo, the federal courts began to apply non-federal tort remedies (usually under the law of the state in which the plaintiff or decedent was domiciled) to determine the liability of foreign states sued under section 1605(a)(7). This methodology resulted in judgments in which plaintiffs injured by the same terrorist attack received vastly different awards — including cases where some plaintiffs-victims were denied recovery entirely while others were awarded significant damages. See e.g. Peterson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 515 F.Supp.2d 25 (D.D.C.2007) (ordering that damage awards to family members of United States servicemen killed in 1983 attack on the United States Marine Corps barracks in Beirut be granted or denied on the basis of the widely disparate rules of recovery obtaining in each plaintiffs respective state of domicile). In order to remedy this problem (and other difficulties faced by section 1605(a)(7) plaintiffs), in 2008 Congress enacted section 1083 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, H.R. 4986. P.L. 110-181, January 28, 2008 (“NDAA”). Section 1083 of the NDAA replaced section 1605(a)(7) of the FSIA with a new provision, section 1605A. Section 1605A(c) creates a new federal cause of action for American citizens injured in terrorist attacks sponsored by designated foreign state sponsors of terrorism. 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(c). Thus, “§ 1605A(c) abrogates Cicippio-Puleo ... by creating a federal right of action against foreign states, for which punitive damages may be awarded.” Simon v. Iraq, 529 F.3d 1187, 1190 (D.C.Cir.2008), rev’d on other grounds, — U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 2183, 173 L.Ed.2d 1193 (2009). Indeed, section 1605A is “more advantageous to plaintiffs in several respects.” Id. For example, section 1083 of the NDAA amends section 1610 of the FSIA, which governs enforcement of judgments against foreign states. Section 1083 adds a new subsection, section 1610(g)(1), which significantly eases enforcement of judgments entered under section 1605A. See 28 U.S.C. § 1610(g)(1). Moreover, the NDAA includes provisions allowing plaintiffs to refile pending section 1605(a)(7) cases under section 1605A (provided certain conditions are met) and to be able to benefit from all the advantages of a section 1605A action. Section 1083(c)(3) provides in relevant part: Related actions — If an action arising out of an act or incident has been timely commenced under section 1605(a)(7) of title 28, United States Code ... any other action arising out of the same act or incident may be brought under section 1605A of title 28, United States Code, if the action is commenced not later than ... 60 days after ... the date of the enactment of this Act. 28 U.S.C. § 1083(c)(3). See, generally, In re Islamic Republic of Iran Terrorism Litigation, 659 F.Supp.2d 31 (D.D.C.2009) (discussing NDAA’s refiling provisions). The plaintiffs in this action originally brought suit against the defendants under section 1605(a)(7) in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. Calderon-Cardona v. Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Civil No. 06-744(RBW) (D.D.C.) (“D.C. Action”). Section 1605A was enacted during the pendency of the D.C. Action. Accordingly, in order to obtain the advantages provided by Congress under section 1605A, the plaintiffs dismissed the D.C. Action without prejudice (id. at Docket No. 14) and exercised their right under section 1083(c)(3) of the NDAA to file this action in this district under section 1605A. Section 1605A eliminates foreign sovereign immunity in cases “in which money damages are sought against a foreign state for personal injury or death that was caused by an act of ... extrajudicial killing ... or the provision of material support or resources for such an act if such act or provision of material support or resources is engaged in by an official, employee, or agent of such foreign state while acting within the scope of his or her office, employment, or agency.” 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(l). Here, plaintiffs have met the conditions set forth in section 1605A: First, this case is an action for money damages. Second, the Lod Airport Attack was clearly an act of extrajudicial killing within the meaning of section 1605A. The attack was an act of extrajudicial killing within the meaning of section 1605(A)(a)(l) because Carmelo and 27 other innocent persons were killed. Congress specifically permitted actions for “personal injury ... that was caused by an act of ... extrajudicial killing” 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(l) (emphasis added). Thus, section 1605A(a)(l) does not require that the injury to a plaintiff result from the actual “extrajudicial killing,” but rather from an “act of extrajudicial killing.” A deadly terrorist attack, taken as a whole, clearly constitutes an “act” of extrajudicial killing. See Campuzano v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 281 F.Supp.2d 258, 270 (D.D.C.2003) (finding that plaintiffs injured in suicide bombing were entitled to bring an action under section 1605(a)(7) because other persons were killed in the bombing). Third, at trial, plaintiffs clearly demonstrated that, through their officials, employees and agents, who were acting pursuant to defendants’ official policies and therefore within the scope of their office, employment and agency, the defendants provided material support and resources to the JRA, PFLP and their operatives, within the meaning section 1605A, for the specific purpose of carrying out acts of extrajudicial killing such as the Lod Airport Attack. Fourth, section 1605A(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) further provides that a claim under section 1605A shall be heard when the “action [is] filed under this section [1605A] by reason of section 1083(c)(3) of’ the NDAA and the defendant “was designated as a state sponsor of terrorism when the original action ... under section 1605(a)(7) ... was filed.” 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(2)(A)(i)(II). As discussed supra, plaintiffs filed this action pursuant to section 1083(c)(3) of the NDAA as related to their original D.C. Action. When the D.C. Action was filed, North Korea had already been officially designated as a state sponsor of terrorism. Thus, the condition that the foreign state defendant “was designated as a state sponsor of terrorism when the original action ... under section 1605(a)(7) ... was filed” is satisfied here. Finally, section 1605A(a)(2)(A)(ii)(I) requires that “the claimant or the victim was, at the time the act ... occurred ... a national of the United States.” Plaintiffs have provided evidence that both they and the victims (i.e. Carmelo and Pablo) were United States citizens at the time of the Lod Airport Attack. Accordingly, the conditions of section 1605A have been met, and the Court concludes that defendants are not immune from this action. Because defendants are not immune from this action and service of process has been effected, this Court possesses both subject-matter and personal jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) (Providing that the “district courts shall have original jurisdiction without regard to amount in controversy of any nonjury civil action against a foreign state ... with respect to which the foreign state is not entitled to immunity ... under sections 1605-1607 of this title”); Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300, 308 (2d Cir.1981) (Under the FSIA “subject matter jurisdiction plus service of process equals personal jurisdiction.”). Findings Regarding Liability Section 1605A(c) of the FSIA expressly creates a federal statutory cause of action for plaintiffs in an action brought under section 1605A. Because the elements of a claim under section 1605A(c) must also be established in order to waive the foreign state’s immunity and vest the court with subject-matter jurisdiction under section 1605A, liability under section 1605A(c) will exist whenever the jurisdictional requirements of section 1605A are met. See Kilburn v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 699 F.Supp.2d 136, 155 (D.D.C.2010) (“[T]he § 1605A(c) cause of action is fulfilled by demonstrating that the foreign sovereign performed acts described in subsection (a)(1) of § 1605A, which addresses immunity and subject matter jurisdiction.... Although an analysis of a foreign sovereign’s potential immunity and liability should be conducted separately, the elements of immunity and liability under § 1605A(c) are essentially the same in that § 1605A(a)(l) must be fulfilled to demonstrate that a plaintiff has a cause of action.”). See also Gates v. Syrian Arab Republic, 580 F.Supp.2d 53 (D.D.C.2008) (same). Accordingly, because, as discussed supra, defendants’ immunity is waived under section 1605A due to their provision of material support and resources to the JRA and the PFLP, defendants are liable to plaintiffs under section 1605A(c). Compensatory Damages In actions brought under section 1605A, plaintiffs are entitled to “economic damages, solatium, pain, and suffering, and punitive damages.” § 1605A(c). On the matter of damages, the Court received live and affidavit testimony from each of the plaintiffs. Also, plaintiffs presented expert medical testimony in the form of affidavits and reports from of Alexandra Ramos-Duchateau, Ph.D, a clinical and forensic psychologist. Quantifying the multiple layers of harm which plaintiffs suffer is difficult. As guidance for determining the quantum of damages, the Court is aided by the dozens of civil terrorism decisions under the FSIA. In determining the appropriate amount of compensatory damages, the Court may look to prior decisions awarding damages for pain and suffering, and to those awarding damages for solatium. Haim v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 425 F.Supp.2d 56, 71 (D.D.C.2006)' (Lamberth, J.). “While intervening changes in law have ruled many cases’ reliance on federal common law improper, such findings need not disturb the accuracy of the analogy between solatium and intentional infliction of emotional distress.” Id. This Court has previously set out a general framework for compensatory awards for family members of victims who were killed as a result of terrorist activity consisting of $8 million to spouses of deceased victims, $5 million to parents and children of deceased victims, and $2.5 million to siblings of deceased victims. Acosta v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, 574 F.Supp.2d 15, 29 (D.D.C.2008). There is also clear guidance from prior FSIA eases on awards to victims, like Pablo, who were injured in terrorist attacks. Surviving victims of terrorist attacks are generally awarded between $7 and $15 million for their own pain and suffering. Campuzano, 281 F.Supp.2d 258 (D.D.C. 2003) (awards ranging from $7 to $15 million to victims for past and future pain and suffering, loss of prospective income, and past medical expenses), Blais v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 459 F.Supp.2d 40 (D.D.C.2006) ($20 million for pain and suffering and mental anguish), Peterson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 515 F.Supp.2d 25 (D.D.C.2007) (26 injured survivors of the 1983 Beirut attack were awarded between $1.5 million and $12 million for battery). Courts have also made significant awards to plaintiffs who endured the trauma and emotional impact of having a relative injured in a terrorist attack. Kirschenbaum v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 572 F.Supp.2d 200 (D.D.C.2008) ($2.5 million to each parent of injured United States citizen; parents suffered great emotional anxiety after hearing of the attack, endured the sight of their son with multiple open wounds, watched him suffer, and thereafter had to deal with the strain on their relationship with their son); Blais v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 459 F.Supp.2d 40 (D.D.C.2006) ($3.5 million for pain and suffering to each parent of United States serviceman severely injured in Saudi terrorist bombing); Campuzano, 281 F.Supp.2d 258 ($2.5 million to mother for loss of solatium and severe mental anguish from the physical and emotional changes to daughter); Peterson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 515 F.Supp.2d 25 (D.D.C.2007) ($2.5 million for pain and suffering to parents of United States servicemen injured in 1983 Beirut bombing). Since the Lod Airport Attack was committed, members of Carmelo’s family have suffered ongoing anguish and suffering by reason of Carmelo’s murder, and their concomitant loss of Carmelo’s society, guidance and company. Plaintiffs’ pain and suffering is obviously enormous, has been with them constantly since the day of the Lod Airport Attack and they will continue to experience the effects of the tragedy for the remainder of their lives. Likewise, Pablo and his family also experienced, and his heirs and estate will continue to experience, severe harm as the result of the Lod Airport Attack. A. Ruth Calderon-Cardona (individually) Ruth Calderon-Cardona (“Ruth”) is a citizen of the United States (Exhibit No. 36) and resides in Puerto Rico. (Trial Transcript, Dec. 3, 2009, pp. 6-7) From the time of her father’s death, Ruth has experienced emotional pain and suffering, loss of her father’s society, companionship, comfort, advice and counsel and has suffered severe mental anguish and extreme emotional distress. Ruth testified that her childhood was filled with happy memories of her father, Carmelo. She said that he was a “very good husband and father” and a member of the church choir (Trial Transcript, Dec. 3, 2009, p. 11, In. 9), and above all a “family man.” (Trial Transcript, Dec. 3, 2009, p. 30, In. 21) At night Carmelo would sit with Ruth and her siblings on the porch and he would teach them various songs and poems, and recite them repeatedly with patience until they were memorized (Trial Transcript, Dec. 3, 2009, p. 10, In. 16-19, and 24-25). Ruth remembers fondly that Carmelo would take her smaller siblings on his lap and would tell them all stories, sing songs, and recite poems, all of which she and her siblings still remember fondly. (Trial Transcript, Dec. 3, 2009, p. 30, In. 14-16) Ruth testified that her family would drive almost every week into the country to visit extended family, from both her father’s and mother’s sides of the family. The whole family would take these trips together. (Trial Transcript, Dec. 3, 2009, p. 14, In. 6-10) Carmelo had a close relationship with his wife’s immediate and extended family, and several cousins even lived for a time in Carmelo and Eladia’s home. (Trial Transcript, Dec. 3, 2009, p. 14, In. 19-25) Ruth stated that it was “his [Carmelo’s] dream” to visit the Holy Land, and that he was “very enthusiastic” about the trip. (Trial Transcript, Dec. 3, 2009, p. 19, In. 9-16) She last spoke with her father when he surprised her with a call from the airport in New York while en route to Israel; she remembers that this made her “very happy.” (Trial Transcript, Dec. 3, 2009, p. 20, In. 10-13) Due to the Lod Airport Attack, this, unfortunately, was to be the last time that Ruth spoke with her father. (Trial Transcript, Dec. 3, 2009, p. 21, In. 1) Ruth was at work when she received a call from her brother-in-law in Puerto Rico, and learned of the terrible news that her father had been brutally murdered. She fainted. (Trial Transcript, Dec. 3, 2009, p. 22, In. 24) Soon thereafter, R