Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM OPINION KOLLAR-KOTELLY, District Judge. “May the days flow sweetly with music to your ears and may your time be spent knowing that the love you have given me shall never become dull in the wind.” -Robert Holland, August 1983 letter to his wife This action arises from the most deadly state-sponsored terrorist attack against American citizens prior to September 11, 2001 — the October 23, 1983 Marine barracks bombing in Beirut, Lebanon, during which 241 American servicemen acting as part of a multinational U.N.authorized peacekeeping force were murdered in their sleep by a suicide bomber. Twenty-eight year-old Petty Officer Robert S. Holland, son of Charles and Rosemary Holland, brother of Patrick Holland, husband of Donna Marie Holland, and father of James Robert and Chad Phillip Holland (collectively, “Plaintiffs”), was one of these unfortunate victims, killed while serving his country and upholding the greater cause of regional peace and stability. Due to the nature and force of the explosion, the Holland family suffered through two more agonizing weeks of waiting until Robert Holland was conclusively identified as “killed in action.” The memory of this horror continues to this day for the Holland family, who — in order to obtain some form of compensation, however small, for their tragic loss — brought this action against the Islamic Republic of Iran (“Iran”); the Iranian Ministry of Information and Security (“MOIS”); the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (“IRGC”); Hezbollah, Muhsin Rafiq-Dust, former Commander-in-Chief of the IRGC; Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, former Speaker of the Majlis of Iran; Mohammad Rayshari, former Minister of the MOIS; and Ali Akbar Mohtashemi, former Interi- or Minister of Iran and former Iranian Ambassador to Syria (collectively, “Defendants”). On January 19, 2005, this Court conducted a bench trial to determine the liability of Defendants for this cowardly and inhumane act. Having reviewed the extensive evidence presented during trial by both lay and expert witnesses, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs Donna, James, and Chad Holland have established their right to obtain judicial relief against Defendants Iran, the MOIS, and the IRGC. The Court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law are set forth below. I: PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Finally provided a jurisdictional avenue with which to obtain redress for their loss when Congress altered the traditional parameters of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FISA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1604, through the 1996 enactment of Section 1605(a)(7) to the FISA, see Pub.L. No. 104-132, Title II, § 221(a), Apr. 24, 1996, 110 Stat. 1241 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7), and the so-called “Flatow Amendment,” see Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997, Pub.L. No. 104-208, Div. A, Title I, § 101(c)) [Title Y, § 589], 110 Stat. 3009-172 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1605 note), Plaintiffs filed a Complaint in the above-captioned action on September 13, 2001. Plaintiffs then served the required number of copies of the Notice of Suit, Complaint, and Summons along with their respective translations to Iran, the MOIS, and the IRGC, as required by 22 C.F.R. 93 and 28 U.S.C. § 1608(a)(3). After service was executed and these three defendants failed to respond within the required time period, Plaintiffs moved for a default judgment on December 9, 2002. The Court granted Plaintiffs’ Motion for Entry of Default against these three defendants on June 3, 2003. However, given Plaintiffs’ stated desire to amend their Complaint, the Court vacated the entry of default, permitted Plaintiffs to file their First Amended Complaint, and ordered that Plaintiffs reserve Defendants. After some problems with service, Plaintiffs successfully effectuated service pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1608(3) and § 1608(4) against Defendants Iran, the MOIS, and the IRGC in early 2004. Once again, these defendants failed to respond within the required time period. After Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Entry of Default and an Affidavit supporting that motion, the Clerk of this Court entered default against Iran, the MOIS, and the IRGC on March 16, 2004. This Court subsequently approved the entry of default on March 22, 2004. However, despite the entries of default, the Court is required to make a further inquiry prior to entering any judgment against defendants. Indeed, the FSIA mandates that “[n]o judgment by default shall be entered by a court of the United States or of a State against a foreign state ... unless the claimant establishes his claim or right to relief by evidence that is satisfactory to the Court.” 28 U.S.C. § 1608(e); see also Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F.Supp. 1, 6 (D.D.C.1998); Peterson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 264 F.Supp.2d 46, 48 (D.D.C.2003). “In evaluating the plaintiffs’ proof, the court may ‘accept as true the plaintiffs’ uncontroverted evidence.’ ” Campuzano v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 281 F.Supp.2d 258, 268 (D.D.C.2003) (quoting Elahi v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 124 F.Supp.2d 97, 100 (D.D.C.2000)). Plaintiffs’ evidence may take the form of sworn affidavits. Id. (citing Weinstein v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 184 F.Supp.2d 13, 19 (D.D.C.2002)). During this time period, the D.C. Circuit issued a decision in Cicippio-Puleo v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 353 F.3d 1024 (D.C.Cir.2004), holding that “neither 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7) nor the Flatow Amendment, nor the two considered in tandem, creates a private right of action against a foreign government,” id. at 1033. Given the obvious implications of the Ci-cippio-Puleo decision for this case, the Court issued an Order on March 31, 2004 inviting briefing from Plaintiffs regarding the issues raised by that decision and the continuing viability of their claims. In responding to the Court’s Order, Plaintiffs submitted a Memorandum of Law regarding the Cicippio-Puleo decision on April 9, 2004, and provided supplements including additional authority in support of their position on August 31, 2004, and September 13, 2004. A trial date in this action was then set for January 19, 2005, and — as directed — Plaintiffs submitted a Memorandum in Support of Their Causes of Action on January 5, 2005. At trial, Plaintiffs presented two expert witnesses: Dr. Bruce Tefft, an expert in counter-terrorism, and Dr. Jerome S. Paige, an expert on projected economic losses in cases of wrongful death. Plaintiffs also presented four lay witnesses in support of their claims: Donna Holland, Rosemary Holland, Charles Holland, and Pat Holland. Following the trial on January 19, 2005, given concerns raised by yet another recent FISA-related decision by the D.C. Circuit, Acree v. Republic of Iraq, 370 F.3d 41 (D.C.Cir.2004), which held that plaintiffs cannot state a right of action under the “generic common law” or merely “allude[ ] to the traditional torts ... in their generic form” but instead must “identify a particular cause of action arising out of a specific source of law,” id. at 58-59 (quotation omitted), this Court ordered that in addition to Plaintiffs planned section of [their post-trial] brief dealing with federal common law, Plaintiffs shall also include a discussion of (1) whether the relevant probate statute governing the administration of decedent’s estate allows for the recovery of economic damages under a wrongful death action; and (2) whether the state in which each Plaintiff-claimant resides allows for the collection of damages under solatium for a person of their status in relation to the decedent. Holland v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Civ. No. 01-1924 (D.D.C. Jan. 19, 2005) (minute order requiring further briefing). Plaintiffs, pursuant to the Court’s Order, concluded the briefing in this matter with their Post-Trial Brief submitted on February 18, 2005. II: FINDINGS OF FACT After listening to the testimony in the case, reviewing the evidentiary record, personally observing the demeanor and credibility of the witnesses, and making all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom in accordance with the Federal Rules of Evidence, the Court sets forth the following findings of fact. A. Historical Background The Republic of Lebanon is a small, largely mountainous country of approximately 3,800,000 people situated at the eastern edge of the Mediterranean Sea, bordered by Syria on the east and north, and Israel on the south, with a narrow coastline on its west. While Lebanon is one of fifteen present-day countries that comprise what is considered to be “the Cradle of Humanity,” Lebanon did not become an independent nation until November 22, 1943, having completed the League of Nations mandate process begun after the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire in World War I. Unlike its regional neighbors, Lebanon did not participate militarily in the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli wars. During this time period, Lebanon was known as “the Switzerland of the Middle East,” with its gleaming capital, Beirut, labeled “the Paris of the Middle East” given its wide boulevards, French-style architecture, and modernity. Unfortunately, by the early 1970s, Lebanon had become increasingly destabilized due to the influx of Palestinian refugees; by 1973, approximately one out of every ten persons living in Lebanon was a Palestinian refugee, many of whom supported the efforts of the Palestine Liberation Organization (“PLO”) against Israel. From bases in southern Lebanon, some of these refugees engaged in guerilla warfare against Israel, leading to reprisals by Israel against these Palestinian strongholds beginning in 1968. In April 1975, full-scale civil war broke out in Lebanon, with the fault lines breaking largely according to religion. On one side were a number of mostly Marionite (i.e., Arab Christian) militias, while the other side was comprised of a coalition of largely Palestinian, Sunni, and Druze forces. With the war going poorly for the Marionites by early 1976, Syria sent 40,000 troops into the country to prevent them from being overrun. By 1978, however, many of the Maronites had become convinced that the Syrians were really occupying Lebanon for reasons of their own, and by September of that year, the two groups were openly feuding; despite this feud, Syrian forces remained in Lebanon, effectively dominating its government, until their final military withdrawal on April 26, 2005. The Lebanese civil war would not come to a complete end until the Arab League-sponsored Taif Agreement of 1989. The roughly fifteen-year-long civil war led to the deaths of approximately 20,000 Lebanese, with approximately the same number of Lebanese wounded. See Peterson, 264 F.Supp.2d at 49. B. The Arrival of the 2bth Marine Amphibious Unit In this post-1975 chaos and power vacuum, the PLO’s armed forces continued to use Lebanon as a base to attack Israel with rockets and artillery. As such, Israel again invaded Lebanon in 1982 with the objective of evicting the PLO, eventually occupying areas from the southern Lebanese border with Israel northward into areas of Beirut. On August 20, 1982, with the concurrence of the United Nations, a multinational peacekeeping coalition consisting of American, British, French, and Italian soldiers arrived in the Lebanese capital of Beirut. In May of 1983, the 24th Marine Amphibious Unit (“24th MAU”) joined this coalition. The rules of engagement issued to the servicemen of the 24th MAU made clear that they possessed neither combatant nor police powers. Rather, the rules of engagement ordered that the servicemen were not to carry weapons with live rounds in their chambers, and were not authorized to chamber • the rounds in their weapons unless (1) they were directly ordered to do so by a commissioned officer or (2) they found themselves in a situation requiring the immediate use of deadly force in self-defense. See Pl.’s Ex. 5 (December 20, 1983 Report of the DoD Commission on Beirut International Airport Terrorism Act, October 23, 1983); 1/19/05 Tr. at 15:1-17:13. As Dr. Tefft’s testimony in this case established, and other courts in similar cases have found, see Peterson, 264 F.Supp.2d at 50, the members of the 24th MAU, and the service members supporting the unit, were clearly non-combatants operating under peacetime rules of engagement. Having previously served his country in the Hospital Corps of the United States Navy from June 1973 to June 1977, Robert Holland chose to re-enlist with the United States Navy in March 1981 in order to support his growing family, which eventually included his wife, Donna Marie Holland, and two young sons — James Robert and Chad Phillip Holland. PL’s Ex. 11 (Enlisted Commissioning Program Application); 1/19/05 Tr. at 77:8-24, 78:24-79:8. After his re-enlistment with the United States Navy, Robert Holland went into the battalion aid station (“BAS”), and was involved in the maintenance of medical records in a manner consistent with the military’s code. 1/19/05 Tr. at 79:9-16. As part of this process, Robert Holland and his family moved from Illinois, where they had moved temporarily from Kentucky to accommodate Donna’s position in the Air Force, to Camp Lejeune in Jacksonville, North Carolina. 1/19/05 Tr. at 77:8-24. Because the United States Marine Corps is actually a division of the United States Navy and does not have its own medical staff, Robert Holland was stationed in Beirut, Lebanon, in May 1983 along with the 24th MAU as the corpsman in charge of medical records at the BAS headquarters division. 1/19/05 Tr. at 82:17-84:9; 87:12-22. Robert saw this position as a temporary one, as he had already applied for the Navy’s “Enlisted Commissioning Program” in January 1983. See PL’s Ex. 11 (Enlisted Commissioning Program Application); 1/19/05 Tr. at 79:20-81:1. C. The Iranian Government and the Formation of Hezbollah Following the 1979 revolution spearheaded by the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the nation of Iran was transformed into an Islamic theocracy. The new government promptly drafted a constitution, still in effect today, which boldly declares its commitment to spread the goals of the 1979 revolution to other nations. 1/19/05 Tr. at 24:1 — 26:4. Towards that end, the government of Iran spent approximately $50 to $150 million between 1983 and 1988 financing terrorist organizations in the Near East. Sensing a power vacuum in the destabilized, war-torn Lebanon, Iran had begun efforts to export the fundamentalist revolution to the area by early 1982 and had already sent roughly 1500 members of the IRGC to the Beka’a Valley in Lebanon — then an area outside of the control of the Lebanese government. 1/19/05 Tr. at 26:5-28:20. These members of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps sought to radicalize the Lebanese Shi’ite community by recruiting members of a faction (known as “Hezbollah”) within a larger group of moderate Lebanese Shi’ites (known as “Amal”). 1/19/05 Tr. at 39:12-40:1. Through the encouragement of Iran and its agents, Hezbollah split from Amal and — once it was established as a separate entity — the government of Iran framed the primary objective of Hezbollah: to engage in terrorist activities in furtherance of the transformation of Lebanon into an Islamic theocracy modeled after Iran. 1/19/05 Tr. at 32:3-14; PL’s Ex. 10 (Magnus Ranstorp, Hizbollah’s Command Leadership: Its Structure, Decision-Making and Relationship with Iranian Clergy and Institutions, in Terrorism And Political Violence, Vol. 6, No. 3 (Autumn 1994)). Given the testimony provided in this case, and consistent with the findings of other courts on this matter, see Peterson, 264 F.Supp.2d at 53, it is evident that the formation and emergence of Hezbollah as a major terrorist organization was due to the government of Iran. According to Dr. Tefft, almost since its founding, the Iranian government has provided Hezbollah with roughly $100 million per annum in financing, and has also provided it with arms, training, and strategic planning in its operations against the United States and Israel. 1/19/05 Tr. at 28:14-20. The primary agency through which the Iranian government established and exercised operational control over Hezbollah was through the MOIS. The MOIS had formerly served as the secret police of the Shah of Iran prior to his overthrow in 1979; after the 1979 revolution, the new regime allowed the MOIS to continue its operations as the intelligence organization of the new government. The. engagement with and promotion of Hezbollah marked a profound shift for the MOIS which, until 1983, had focused on the assassination of former Iranian government officials under the Shah and other Iranian dissidents living in Europe; from 1983 forward, Iran and the MOIS would look to employ international terrorism against non-Iranians. 1/10/05 Tr. at 37:11-38:7. Based on the evidence presented at trial, the Court concludes that the MOIS was a vital conduit for Iran’s provision of funds to Hezbollah, providing explosives to Hezbollah, and — at all times relevant to these proceedings — exercising near-complete operational control over Hezbollah. See, e.g., PL’s Ex. 6 (Major David E. Smith USMC, The Training of Terrorist Organizations (1995)); PL’s Ex. 10 (Mag-mis Ranstorp, Hizbollah’s Command Leadership: Its Structure, Decision-Making and Relationship with Iranian Clergy and Institutions, in Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 6, No. 3 (Autumn 1994)). Importantly; the connection between Iran, the MOIS, and the IRGC, on one hand, and Hezbollah, on the other hand, in the operation culminating in the October 23, 1983 attack on the United States Marine barracks in Beirut, Lebanon, has been conclusively established by Plaintiffs. During the months immediately preceding the October attack, there was a great deal of communication between the Iranian ambassador to Syria, Ali Akbar Mohtashemi, and various Iranian officials connected with the MOIS such as Sheik Ol-Islam-Zadi, who closely monitored the whole progress of the operation, frequently met with the heads of Hezbollah, and traveled between Damascus and Tehran. 1/19/05 Tr. at 32:15-33:5, 57:10-59:13. Indeed, on September 26, 1983, MOIS sent a message to Ambassador Mohtashemi, directing that he contact Hussein Musawi, the leader of the terrorist group Islamic Amal, and to instruct him to have his group investigate attacks against the multinational coalition in Lebanon, and “to take a spectacular action against the United States Marines” in order to force the United States to withdraw militarily from the region. 1/19/05 Tr. at 33:6-34:14, 57:10-59:13; see also Peterson, 264 F.Siipp.2d at 54-56. While it is unclear whether Mohtashemi contacted Musawi, he did contact the leader of the Lebanese headquarters of the IRGC (known as “Kanani”) and instructed him to investigate and plan a bombing of the United States Marine barracks in Beirut. This order led to a meeting in Baalbek, Lebanon, during which Kanani, Sheik So-bhi Tufaili, Sheik Abbas Musawi, and Sheik Hassan Nasrallah — the leaders of Hezbollah — formed the plan to carry out simultaneous attacks against the American and French barracks in Lebanon. Id. In addition to conceiving and ordering that Hezbollah undertake simultaneous attacks, on the American and French forces stationed in Beirut, Iran provided substantial support for the operation in other ways. First, because the explosives that were to be used in the operation were covered by end-use requirements that mandated only government-to-government sales, the government of Iran actually purchased the explosive materials used in the operation from the government of Bulgaria and then provided the explosives to Hezbollah. 1/19/05 Tr. at 53:15-54:9. Second, the Iranian government, MOIS, and the IRGC provided complete financial support for the operation, going so far as to use the Iranian embassy in Damascus to cash various checks to provide funding for Hezbollah. 1/19/05 Tr. at 54:10-23. Indeed, even at its inception during the 1982-83 period, Hezbollah was provided $50 million or more by Iran; as Dr. Tefft noted, “economically Hezbollah would not have existed or been able to be formed without the Iranian financial support.” 1/19/2005 Tr. at 55:13-16. Third, Iran provided Hezbollah with virtually all of its operational training, as the members of Hezbollah were highly inexperienced and required training by the IRGC and other Iranian agencies in various terrorist camps located in Lebanon’s Beka’a Valley, Syria, and outside of Tehran. 1/19/05 Tr. at 56:10-57:9. More specifically, the MOIS was directly involved in the preparations for the attack, conducting the -relevant surveillance and intelligence, coordinating with Syrian officials for safe passage for the trucks and materials used in the attacks, and paving the way for the operation through a variety of liaising activity. 1/19/05 Tr. at 61:24-62:6. The IRGC was the primary mover behind the attack itself, acting as the authorizing agent for the Iranian government in Tehran in addition to recruiting the individuals involved, training the suicide bombers, preparing the explosives, and installing the explosives in the trucks in camps located in the Beka’a Valley. 1/19/05 Tr. at 62:7-22. D. The October 23, 1983 Bombing Following the meeting in Baalbek, Lebanon, a 19-ton Mercedes Benz cargo truck, manufactured under license in Iran, was flown from Tehran to Damascus and then driven to the Beka’a Valley. 1/19/05 Tr. at 20:5-13. It was then disguised so that it would resemble the water delivery truck that routinely arrived at the Beirut International Airport, located near the U.S. Marine barracks, and modified to transport an explosive device. Another truck was acquired in Beirut by Hezbollah, brought to the Beka’a Valley, painted red, and outfitted with explosives for a planned simultaneous attack on the French barracks in Beirut. 1/19/05 Tr. at 20:1-4, 2L18-22. On the morning of October 23, 1983, members of Hezbollah ambushed the real delivery truck before it arrived at the U.S. Marine barracks. Hezbollah then placed an observer on the hill near the barracks to the operation, and the fake water delivery truck then set out for the barracks, driven by Ismalal Ascari, an Iranian. 1/19/05 Tr. at 21:2-22:1; Peterson, 264 F.Supp.2d at 56. At approximately 6:25 a.m. Beirut time, the truck drove passed the Marine barracks, circling in the large parking lot behind the barracks while increasing its speed. The truck then crashed through a concertina wire barrier and a wall of sandbags, entering the barracks. 1/19/05 Tr. at 22:1-17. Due to the limitations imposed by the standing rules of engagement, the seconds it took for the Marine sentries to load and chamber their rifles cost them the opportunity to engage the smiling suicide bomber behind the wheel of the truck. See Pl.’s Ex. 2 (Gunnery Sgt. Keith A. Milks, Marines in Beirut III: Disaster, Withdrawal, and Legacy, Marine Corps News (Oct. 18, 2003)). When the truck reached the center of the barracks, the bomb in the truck detonated. The resulting explosion was the largest non-nuclear explosion that had ever been detonated on the face of the earth. 1/19/05 Tr. at 22:1-17. Due the bomb’s use of “bulk form” pentaerythritol tetranitrate, the force of the explosion was equal to between 15,000 to 21,000 pounds of TNT: the explosion created a crater in the earth nearly nine feet deep, shredded trees located 370 feet away, shattered all of the windows at the traffic control tower of the Beirut International Airport over half a mile away, and reduced the four-story Marine barracks to rubble as the concrete building collapsed on itself. Id.; PL’s Ex. 2 (Gunnery Sgt. Keith A. Milks, Marines in Beirut III: Disaster, Withdrawal, and Legacy, Marine Corps News (Oct. 18, 2003)); Peterson, 264 F.Supp.2d at 56-57. As the result of the Marine barracks explosion, 220 Marines, 18 Sailors, and 3 soldiers were killed, and more than 100 others were wounded. As the court concluded in Peterson, 264 F.Supp.2d at 58. and as supported by the testimony offered by Dr. Tefft, see 1/19/05 Tr. at 22:18-23:20, the Court finds it beyond question that Hezbollah and its agents received massive material and technical support from the Iranian government. Indeed, the sophistication demonstrated in the placement of an explosive charge in the center of the Marine barracks building, the configuration of the bomb for maximum impact, and the devastating effect of the detonation of the charge indicates that it is highly unlikely that this attack could have resulted in such loss of life without the assistance of regular military forces, such as those of Iran. Petty Officer Robert Holland was one of the servicemen killed instantly in the blast. See Pl.’s Ex. 15 (Holland Record of Identification Processing). His family learned of the bombing through phone calls early that morning made by friends watching the events on television, 1/19/05 Tr. at 88:12-89:24, 128:25-129:7. However, given the nature of the explosion, the Holland family was forced to wait nearly two weeks until Robert was conclusively identified — a period filled with nerve-racking calls from Donna in Camp Lejeune to Robert’s parents in Kentucky as the family searched for any information regarding Robert. As Donna Holland described it, That was probably the worst two weeks of my life. You know, but you don’t know. You don’t want to admit it. There’s no — I would never wish that on my worst enemy. That is the most horrific two weeks that any family member [ ] can go through, not knowing anything specific about what their future holds, and having those two boys [i.e., James and Chad]. 1/19/05 Tr. at 95:21-96:2. Robert’s body was finally identified by a childhood injury that he had in his elbow. 1/19/05 Tr. at 129:10-21. As his father Charles Holland described the funeral, it was a large crowd, and it was cold and it was rainy, and ... we had some high-ranking officers from the military, and it was a typical military funeral, and to this day I can — I still hear them playing Taps. I can hear that all the time.... [Life] has never been the same. Never. 1/19/05 Tr. at 140:5-10,145:19-22. Robert’s death had a profound emotional and substantive impact on the Holland family. According to his brother Patrick, Robert’s parents — Charles and Rosemary Holland — “died a little bit” after his passing. 1/19/05 Tr. at 153:12-14. Donna, who never remarried, became a twenty-three year old widow, forced to raise a three year-old (James) and a one year-old son (Chad) with limited resources. As Donna noted, “it was my responsibility, I felt, that I make sure they turn out to be good people, and well rounded. But I didn’t have the tools or the interests to encourage those things that they were interested in. And Bob did.” Id. at 112:2-7. The record is replete with testimony regarding Donna Holland’s struggle to support two young sons, including discussions of their behavioral problems caused — in part — by the lack of a father figure, their need for medications and counseling since they were five or six years old, the fact that their growth and development was stunted by the loss of the one person who could have brought out their artistic abilities and strengths in writing, and their struggles to define themselves and overcome life-long depression while growing up without the love of their father. See 1/19/05 Tr. at 103:20-114:11,143:15-145:22. Moreover, Robert’s premature death at the hands of terrorists also had a significant effect on the finances of the Holland family, depriving his wife and children of between $1,019 and $1,241 million dollars of present value income. See Pl.’s Ex. 22 (Economic Loss Data submitted by Dr. Jerome S. Paige); 1/19/05 Tr. at 167:5-171:11. As Robert’s mother Rosemary Holland concluded when thinking of her twenty-eight year old son murdered by the efforts of Iran-sponsored terrorism, “we just miss him very much.” 1/19/05 Tr. at 133:7-9. Ill: LEGAL DISCUSSION Every case brought against a foreign state raises two distinct and crucial legal questions. See Cicippio-Puleo, 353 F.3d at 1029-30; Price v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 389 F.3d 192, 199 (D.C.Cir.2004); Dammarell v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Civ. No. 01-2224(JDB), 2005 WL 756090, at *5 (D.D.C. Mar.29, 2005) (Bates, J.) (“Dammarell II ”). First, the Court must look to whether it has jurisdiction to hear the claim. In the context of claims implicating the parameters of the FSIA, this jurisdictional determination is guided by an inquiry into whether the case falls within one of the statutory exceptions to the sovereign immunity of a foreign state. See Kilburn v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 376 F.3d 1123, 1126-27 (D.C.Cir.2004); Simpson v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 326 F.3d 230, 232 (D.C.Cir.2003); Dammarell II, 2005 WL 756090, at *5. Second, the Court must consider the actual liability of the defendant foreign sovereign. In the context of the FSIA, this inquiry requires that the Court assess what — if any — causes of action the plaintiffs may bring against the defendants, and whether the foreign state is liable on any of those claims. See Kilbum, 376 F.3d at 1133-36; Cicippio-Puleo, 353 F.3d at 1029-30; Dammarell II, 2005 WL 756090, at *5. It is this second question that has been profoundly impacted by the D.C. Circuit’s post -Cicippio-Puleo line of cases that call into question many of the key assumptions of many previous FSIA-related decisions. Compare Cicippio-Puleo, 353 F.3d at 1027 with Dammarell v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 281 F.Supp.2d 105, 194 (D.D.C.2003) (“Dammarell I”); Cronin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 238 F.Supp.2d 222, 231 (D.D.C.2002); Regier v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 281 F.Supp.2d 87, 98-99 (D.D.C.2003); Kilburn v. Republic of Iran, 277 F.Supp.2d 24, 36-41 (D.D.C.2003). Given the bifurcated nature of the relevant inquiry, the Court shall address each question in turn. A. Jurisdiction The FSIA establishes the broad rule that “foreign states,” including “a political subdivision of a foreign state or an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state,” 28 U.S.C. § 1603, are immune from suit in the courts of the United States. See 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (“Subject to existing international agreements to which the United States is a party at the time of enactment of this Act a foreign state shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States and of the States except as provided in sections 1605 to 1607 of this chapter.”). However, the FSIA also sets out certain exceptions to this general rule of immunity for limited categories of cases. See id. § 1605. The most recent of the exceptions in the statute was enacted in 1996 and revokes the sovereign immunity of a foreign state that sponsors acts of terrorism. See Pub.L. No. 104-132, § 221, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7)). Importantly, this latest exception— Section 1605(a)(7) — provides 'that a foreign state “shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the United States or of the States in any case” where money damages are sought against a foreign state for personal injury or death that was caused by an act of torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage taking, or the provision of material support or resources ... for such an act if such act or provision of material support is engaged in by an official, employee, or agent of such foreign state while acting within the scope of his or her office, employment, or agency. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7). This provision applies to a foreign state only if three other criteria in the statute are met as well: (1) the foreign state was designated as a state sponsor of terrorism at the time of the terrorist act or as a result of the act; (2) the foreign state was afforded a reasonable opportunity to arbitrate the claim if the act occurred within the foreign state against which the claim has been brought; and (3) either the claimant or the victim was a national of the United States at the time of the terrorist act. See id. § 1605(a)(7)(A), (B); Kilbum, 376 F.3d at 1127; Damma-rell II, 2005 WL 756090, at *5. Upon a review of the evidence presented at the bench trial in this action, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs have satisfied the jurisdictional requirements under Section 1605(a)(7) necessary to circumvent the traditional barrier of sovereign immunity. First, Iran was designated as a state sponsor of terrorism under Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979, 50 U.S.C. app. 2405(j), ■ and Section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 22 U.S.C. § 2371, in response to the April 18, 1983 bombing of the United States Embassy in Beirut, Lebanon, and the October 23, 1983 bombing of the United States Marine barracks in Beirut, Lebanon, and has remained on the State Department list of state sponsors of terrorism ever since. See 22 C.F.R. § 126.1(d); 31 C.F.R. § 596.201. Second, the bombing occurred within the borders of Lebanon, not Iran, rendering the “opportunity to arbitrate” requirement irrelevant in this case. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7)(B). Third, all of the Plaintiffs in this action are citizens of the United States, as was the victim, Robert Holland. Fourth, the murder of Robert Holland and .240 other American servicemen certainly qualifies as an “extrajudicial killing,” i.e., “a deliberate killing not authorized by previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording all judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized people,” see Pub.L. No. 102-256, § 3(a), 106 Stat. 73 (1992) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note) (incorporated by reference into 28 U.S.C. § 1605(e)). See, e.g., Peterson, 264 F.Supp.2d at 60-61 (finding that the October 23, 1983 bombing of the United States Marine barracks constituted an “extrajudicial killing”); Flatow, 999 F.Supp. at 18 (“[A] suicide bombing ... is an act of ‘extrajudicial killing’ within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7).”). Fifth, and finally, as the Court has concluded, see supra Section II(C)-(D), Iran, the MOIS, and the IRGC provided “material support or resources” for the killing within the meaning of Section 1605(a)(7) sufficient to constitute a proximate cause in the 1983 United States Marine barracks bombing and the death of Robert Holland. See Kilbum, 376 F.3d at 1126-31 (rejecting the argument that a plaintiff must show that the foreign state’s material support was the “but for” cause, and holding that a plaintiff need only establish proximate causation). Given that Plaintiffs have met the statutory prerequisites, the Court concludes that Section 1605(a)(7) removes the sovereign immunity of Iran, the MOIS, and the IRGC for their role in the barracks bombing. B. Liability Having concluded that Iran, the MOIS, and the IRGC are not immune from suit, the Court now must turn to an analysis of the causes-of-action that are permitted against a foreign state for its sponsorship of terrorism. As noted previously, see supra Section I, two recent decisions by the D.C. Circuit have altered the previous FSIA landscape. In Cicippio-Puleo, 353 F.3d at 1033, the court held that “neither 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7) nor the Flatow Amendment, nor the two considered in tandem, creates a private right of action against a foreign government.” Id. In Aeree, 370 F.3d at 58, the court emphasized that “generic common law cannot be the source of a federal cause of action” against a foreign state. Id. However, these decisions expressly leave open the question of whether a cause-of-action against a foreign nation might exist under “some other source of law, including state law.” Cicippio-Puleo, 353 F.3d at 1036; but see id. at 1033 (indicating that it “cannot be assumed” that there is any cause of action against a foreign state at all). As provided in Plaintiffs Memorandum of Law Responding to the Court’s Order Requesting Briefing on the Cicippio-Puleo Decision and Plaintiffs Memorandum of Law in Support of Their Causes of Action, Plaintiffs maintain that there are several causes-of-action available against foreign states consistent with the D.C. Circuit’s recent rulings. Plaintiffs propose that causes-of-action exist under state common and statutory law, federal common law, the law of foreign countries, the Torture Victims Protection Act, and even the Flatow Amendment (though the operation of Section 1606 of the FSIA). Importantly, between the submission of Plaintiffs filings and this Court’s present decision, another judge serving on the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, the Honorable John D. Bates, issued two decisions specifically addressing identical contentions made by plaintiffs seeking to recover for damages sustained in the April 18, 1983 car bombing of the United States Embassy in Beirut, Lebanon. See Dammarell II, 2005 WL 756090; Salazar v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 370 F.Supp.2d 105 (D.D.C.2005). A review of these persuasive decisions, and the authoritative Dammarell II decision in particular, indicates that the causes-of-action available against a foreign state are much narrower than claimed by Plaintiffs in this case. See also Price v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 384 F.Supp.2d 120, 132-33 (D.D.C. July 26, 2005) (upon remand from the D.C. Circuit, choosing to follow the twin holdings of Dammarell II and Salazar); Wyatt v. Syrian Arab Republic, 398 F.Supp.2d 131, 137-38 (D.D.C.2005) (joining in the FSIA analysis propounded in Dammarell II). Guided by the supple and convincing reasoning set out by Judge Bates in a more exhaustive manner in Dammarell II, 2005 WL 756090, at *7-*32, the Court shall review each potential source identified by Plaintiffs and examine the plausible resonance of each claim. 1. The Collaboration Between Section 1606 and Various Federal Statutes Section 1606 of the FSIA provides, in relevant part: 28 U.S.C. § 1606. The Supreme Court has stated that this language means exactly what it says — for instance, where “state law provides a rule of liability governing private individuals, the FSIA requires the application of that rule to foreign states in like circumstances.” First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611, 622 n. 11, 103 S.Ct. 2591, 77 L.Ed.2d 46 (1983). As a consequence, a plaintiff should be able to bring a cause of action under state or common law, federal statutes (where Congress has not indicated otherwise), and even possibly the law of a foreign country in a Section 1605(a)(7) case, as long as the plaintiff would be able to bring such a claim against an individual in similar circumstances. See Dammarell II, 2005 WL 756090, at *11. However, Section 1606, much like the analogous section of its sister statute, the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), see 28 U.S.C. § 2674, is a mere pass-through to causes of action that would exist against private individuals; Section 1606 does not — by itself — create a cause of action against a foreign sovereign. Dammarell II, 2005 WL 756090, at * 12 (“For twenty years, courts have read section 1606 as a pass-through to existing causes of action.”); Roeder v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 195 F.Supp.2d 140, 174 (D.D.C.2002) (rejecting argument that plaintiffs “unambiguously have a cause of action against Iran by virtue of ... § 1606” because “the Supreme Court has made clear that this provision does not impact the substantive liability of a foreign government”) (citations omitted). As to any claim for relief with respect to which a foreign state is not entitled to immunity under section 1605 or 1607 of this chapter, the foreign state shall be liable in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances!!] In this case, Plaintiffs wish to enforce two federal statutes against Iran, the MOIS, and the IRGC through the pass-through mechanism provided by Section 1606:(1) the Flatow Amendment, 28 U.S.C. § 1605 note, and (2) the Torture Victims Protection Act (“TVPA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note. See Pl.’s Mem. of Law in Support of Their Causes of Action at 5-10. The Fla-tow Amendment, passed in the wake of-the changes implemented by Section 1605(a)(7), provides that: An official, employee, or agent of a foreign state designated as a state sponsor of terrorism ... while acting within the scope of his or her office, employment, or agency shall be liable to a United States national or the national’s legal representative for personal injury or death caused by acts of that official, employee, or agent for which the courts of the United States may maintain jurisdiction under section 1605(a)(7) ... for money damages which may include economic damages, solatium, pain and suffering, and punitive damages if the acts were among those described in section 1605(a)(7). 28 U.S.C. § 1605 note (emphasis added); see also Flatow, 999 F.Supp. at 28-34. The TVPA, passed in 1992, authorizes a federal statutory cause-of-action against certain individuals for acts of torture or extrajudicial killing. The statute provides: An individual who, under actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of any foreign nation— (1) subjects an individual to torture shall, in a civil action, be liable for damages to that individual; or (2) subjects an individual to extrajudicial killing shall, in a civil action, be liable to damages to the individual’s legal representative, or to any person who may be a claimant in an action for wrongful death. Pub.L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (reprinted at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note) (emphasis added). According to Plaintiffs, these “[t]wo federal statutes are applicable to foreign states under Section 1606’s prescription requiring them to be held liable in the same manner as individuals in like circumstances.” PL’s Mem. of Law in Support of Their Causes of Action at 5. Unlike the other federal statutes that have been applied to foreign states through the pass-through provided by Section 1606, see Southway v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 198 F.3d 1210, 1215 (10th Cir.1999) (applying the federal RICO statute through the FSIA after a lengthy examination of the statutes and an analysis of congressional intent); Mukaddam v. Permanent Mission of Saudi Arabia to the United Nations, 111 F.Supp.2d 457, 470 (S.D.N.Y.2000) (holding that Title VII applies to foreign states through Section 1606 only after a careful examination of text, structure, and purpose of Title VII), the Flatow Amendment and the TVPA are not statutes of general application. Rather, their very terms confine their scope to officials or agents of foreign states. As such, Plaintiffs’ assertion that these statutes, through the filter of Section 1606, can be expanded to apply to foreign states as well as foreign officials is far from established. Indeed, other judges on the United States District Court for the District of Columbia have reached wildly different conclusions on this point in recent post-Cicippio-Puleo decisions. Compare Dodge v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Civ. No. 03-252, 2004 WL 5353873, at *3-4 & n. 8 (D.D.C. Aug. 25, 2004) (Jackson, J.) (concluding that the Flatow Amendment and the TVPA, through Section 1606, create a cause-of-action against foreign states) with Dammarell II, 2005 WL 756090, at *28-*31 (Bates J.) (rejecting such an approach); Price, 384 F.Supp.2d at 132-33 (rejecting such an approach) (Lamberth, J.); Wyatt, 398 F.Supp.2d at 137-38 (rejecting such an approach) (Urbina, J.). Plaintiffs place a great deal of emphasis on the Judge Thomas Penfield Jackson’s decision in Dodge, see PL’s Mem. of Law in Support of Their Causes of Action at 10-11, which deals with this issue in a rather cursory manner. The Dodge court begins with the initial proposition that “[t]he D.C. Circuit’s recent ruling in Cicippio-Puleo ... does not undermine the ability of any victim of terrorism to bring an action under any potentially applicable law otherwise applicable to individuals. In particular, Cicippio-Puleo did not address § 1606, and therefore did not consider whether 28 U.S.C. § 1606 provides a basis for asserting federal statutory causes of action against foreign states.” Dodge, 2004 WL 5353873, at 4 n. 8 (emphasis in original). From this uncontroversial reading of Cicippio-Puleo, the Dodge court makes a significant logical leap to conclude that “[tjhese two statutes [the Flatow Amendment and the TVPA] provide a basis for plaintiffs’ recovery [against the Republic of Iran] under the facts as found,” id. at *4, while providing no analysis into the assumptions underlying its implicit expansion of the Flatow Amendment and the TVPA. Upon a review of Cicippio-Puleo, the plain text of the relevant statutes, and their legislative histories, the Court joins the Dammarell II, Price, and Wyatt courts in concluding that the Flatow Amendment and the TVPA cannot be read to create a private right of action against a foreign state through Section 1606. See Dammarell II, 2005 WL 756090, at *28-*31; Price, 384 F.Supp.2d at 132-33; Wyatt, 398 F.Supp.2d at 137-38. i. The Flatow Amendment As set out first by the court in Dammarell II, id. at *29-*30, four considerations weigh against expanding the cause-of-action created by the Flatow Amendment to foreign states through Section 1606. First, the plain text of the Flatow Amendment limits its reach to actions against an “official, employee, or agent of a foreign state.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1605 note. On its face, there is nothing to indicate the Congress intended — or even anticipated — that the statute would apply to foreign states and, given the traditional canon of statutory interpretation “expressio unius est exclusio altemos,” a court should be cautious in inferring such a significant expansion into'an otherwise-silent statute. Second, the legislative history of the Flatow Amendment does not contain “any indication that Congress intended to take the more provocative step of creating a private right of action against foreign governments themselves.” .Cicip-pio-Puleo, 353 F.3d at 1031. Importantly, the legislative history does not contain any evidence that Congress anticipated that the statute would encompass foreign states through the operation of one statute it had enacted only five months earlier — Section 1605(a)(7) — and another than it had created twenty years earlier — Section 1606. See Dammarell II, 2005 WL 756090, at *29. “Given the proximity in time between the enactment of the Flatow Amendment and section 1605(a)(7), one would expect some indication that Congress expected the Flatow Amendment to apply to foreign states, and the Court would require as much before writing that result into a silent federal statute.” Id. Third, in creating a cause-of-action against an “official, employee, or agent of a foreign state,” it appears as though the Flatow Amendment did not create a cause-of-action against a “private individual” within the meaning of Section 1606. See 28 U.S.C. § 1606 (“[T]he foreign- state shall be liable in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances.”) (emphasis added). As such, in contrast to RICO, Title VII, and other statutes that clearly expose a private individual to liability, and therefore may be read to act in conjunction with Section 1606, the Flatow Amendment is more specific and therefore more limited: it is aimed at public officials, not private individuals. While it may be the case that a “private individual” within the meaning of Section 1606 can also be considered an “agent” within the meaning of the Flatow Amendment, there is no reason to believe that Congress was aware of this potential for converting claims against private individuals into claims against states when it was enacting the Flatow Amendment. Due to the inherent nature of the Flatow Amendment, the Court concludes that it is “far from obvious that Congress would have understood that the small subset of Flatow Amendment cases that could involve a private party would lead to wholesale liability for .[foreign] states through section 1606.” Dammarell II, 2005 WL 756090, at *30. Fourth, and finally, while Cicippio-Puleo does not completely foreclose the possibility that a cause-of-action might exist under the Flatow Amendment other than of its own force or through Section 1605(a)(7), the D.C. Circuit specifically emphasized — after a careful examination of the text and legislative history of the Flatow Amendment and Section 1605(a)(7) — that neither of those statutes, “nor the two considered in tandem, creates a private- right of action against a foreign government.” Cicippio-Puleo, 353 F.3d at 1032. To circumvent the clear spirit of the D.C. Circuit’s language and allow a Flatow Amendment cause-of-action to proceed against foreign states through Section 1606 would produce a result that is clearly in tension with the general drift of recent D.C. Circuit caselaw. Given these problems, the Court joins the Dammarell II court in concluding that “the cause of action in the Flatow Amendment cannot be read to apply to foreign states through section 1606.” Dammarell II, 2005 WL 756090, at *30. ii. The TVPA As the Dammarell II court found, “[a] similar analysis disposes of the Torture Victims Protection Act.” Id. at *31. Two factors weigh against using Section 1606 to expand the reach of the TVPA. First, on its face, the TVPA authorizes a federal statutory cause-of-action against “[a]n individual” who subjects victims to torture or extrajudicial killing. See 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note. By limiting itself only to individuals, the plain language of the text guards against an expansion of the TVPA to foreign states. Second, the legislative history of the TVPA indicates that Congress was quite emphatic in its intent that the TVPA was not to apply to foreign states. The Senate Report directs that: The legislation uses the term “individual” to make crystal clear that foreign states or their entities cannot be sued under this bill under any circumstances: only individuals may be sued. Consequently, the TVPA is not meant to override the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) of 1976, which renders foreign governments immune from suits in U.S. courts, except in certain circumstances. S.Rep. No. 102-249, at 7 (1991). The House Report contains similar limiting language. See H.R.Rep. No. 102-367, at 2 (1992), U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.News 1992, pp. 84, 87 (“Only ‘individuals,’ not foreign states, can be sued under the [TVPA].”). These clear manifestations indicate Congress’ plain intent in enacting the TVPA to confíne liability for acts of torture and extrajudicial killing to individuals. In an effort to escape this compelling evidence of congressional intent, Plaintiff offer only the enactment of Section 1605(a)(7). See Pl.’s Mem. of Law in Support of Their Causes of Action at 6-7. The relevant question becomes whether Section 1605(a)(7) reflects a specific desire by Congress to reverse its earlier clearly expressed intent to create a cause-of-action for torture victims only against individuals. Upon an analysis, the Court joins the Dammarell II court in finding that to overcome the strong evidence of intent aimed at cabining the reach of the TVPA, “the Court would require something more than the textual gymnastics of reading a 1996 statute (section 1605(a)(7)) as operating through a 1976 statute (section 1606) to expand a 1992 cause of action (the TVPA) to [foreign] states.” Dammarell II, 2005 WL 756090, at *31. As such, the Court concludes that “Congress’s clearly expressed intent in 1992 should prevail over any speculative intent to the contrary in 1996.” Id. Plaintiffs, therefore, cannot use the Flatow Amendment or the TVPA as the starting point, funneled through Section 1606, for a cause-of-action against Iran, the MOIS, and the IRGC. Instead, Plaintiffs must look to other sources of law for a sustainable cause-of-action in this case. 2. Federal Common Law Plaintiffs next propose causes-of-action arising under federal “common law” as the basis for their claims against Iran, the MOIS, and the IRGC. See PL’s Mem. of Law in Support of Their Causes of Action at 11-18 (“In sum, federal common law provides a basis for a full award of damages for victims of state sponsored terrorism.”). Several pre-Cicippio-Puleo decisions by federal district courts concluded that federal common law should provide the substantive rule of decision for claims brought under Section 1605(a)(7) to the exclusion of state common law or statutory principles. See, e.g., Stethem v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 201 F.Supp.2d 78, 87 (D.D.C.2002) (“Consistent with its approach in previous FSIA cases involving claims for personal injury or death resulting from state-sponsored terrorism, this Court will evaluate plaintiffs’ claims under federal common law.”); Wagner v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 172 F.Supp.2d 128, 134-35 (D.D.C.2001) (“Specifically,- in FSIA cases involving claims for personal injury or death resulting from state-sponsored terrorism, the application of federal common law will ensure the greatest level of predictability and uniformity.”); Jenco v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 154 F.Supp.2d 27, 33-37 (D.D.C.2001) (same); Sutherland v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 151 F.Supp.2d 27, 48-50 (D.D.C.2001) (same); Flatow, 999 F.Supp. at 14-15 (same). Despite these previous decisions, the Court joins with the Dammarell II court in concluding that “developments in the law during the past several years, and a careful consideration of the entire area of jurisprudence, now compel the Court to find thát federal common law should not serve as a rule of decision in the run of section' 1605(a)(7) cases.” Dammarell II, 2005 WL 756090, at *23; see also Price, 384 F.Supp.2d at 132-33. Upon a review, it is evident that multiple problems exist with an application or creation of federal common law in this context. See id. at *23-*28. First, the D.C. Circuit in Bettis v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 315 F.3d 325 (D.C.Cir.2003), sent a strong signal that Section 1606 is incompatible with the creation of a federal common law of tort. In Bettis, the court was presented with thé question of whether nieces and nephews of a kidnapped and tortured victim could obtain recovery for intentional infliction of emotional distress against Iran and the MOIS under the Fla-tow Amendment. See id. at 333 (assuming without deciding that a claim could be asserted against a foreign state under the Flatow Amendment, an argument that was later rejected in Cicippio-Puleo). In responding to the argument, first propounded by amicus curiae, that the court should look to federal common law to determine the scope of the emotional distress claim, the D.C. Circuit explained that the term “ ‘federal common law’ seems to us to be a misnomer.” Id. at 333. The court stressed' that “it is a mistake, we think, to label actions under the FSIA and Flatow Amendment for solatium damages as ‘federal common law1 cases, for these actions are based on statutory rights. Without the statute, the claims would not arise.” Id. (emphasis in original). More importantly, the D.C. Circuit went even further in its condemnation of the application of federal common law in the FSIA context, quoting Section 1606 and emphasizing that “we have no free-wheeling commission to construct common law as we see fit.” Id. at 337. As the court delineated: Of course, because these claims are based on a federal statute, their “extent and nature” are “federal questions.” Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 476, 99 S.Ct. 1831, 1836, 60 L.Ed.2d 404 (1979). But that does not, in this case, “authorize the federal courts to fashion a complete body of federal law.” Id. at 477, 99 S.Ct. at 1837. Rather, ... because the FSIA instructs that “the foreign state shall be liable in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances,” 28 U.S.C. § 1606, it in effect instructs federal judges to find the relevant law, not to make it. Id. at 338; see also Burks, 441 U.S. at 479-80, 99 S.Ct. 1831, 60 L.Ed.2d 404 (counseling against the creation of an entire body of federal law “out of whole cloth” in situations where it is not shown that state laws poses a “significant threat to [an] identifiable federal policy or interest”). Given the tenor and language of Bettis, the Court is quite reluctant to employ federal common law as the basis for a cause-of-action through the prism of Section 1606. Second, as the Dammarell II court described, Bettis is a mere reflection of “the modern rule that the federal common law should only be employed in the rarest of circumstances.” Dammarell II, 2005 WL 756090, at *24 (citing O’Melveny & Myers v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Co., 512 U.S. 79, 87, 89, 114 S.Ct. 2048, 129 L.Ed.2d 67 (1994) (noting that “cases in which judicial creation of a special federal rule would be justified” are “few and restricted” and “extraordinary” (quotation marks omitted)); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Maplewood Invs., 31 F.3d 1276, 1294 (4th Cir.1994) (“In light of O’Melveny, there is a heavy presumption in favor of application of a rule of decision in accordance with Virginia law as opposed to the creation of a federal rule of decision.”); Erwin Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction § 6. 1, at 350 (3d ed. 1999) (“There long has been a strong presumption against the federal courts fashioning common law to decide cases.”)). Importantly, a court should craft a federal common law rule only in cases where there are both (1) “significant federal interests” and (2) a “significant conflict between some federal policy or interest and the use of state law.” Boyle v. United Tech. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 506, 108 S.Ct. 2510, 101 L.Ed.2d 442 (1988). The principal rationale identified by Plaintiffs for the use of federal common law in Section 1605(a)(7) and other FSIA-related cases is that it promotes “predictability and uniformity” in a sensitive area of jurisprudence. See Pl.’s Mem. of Law in Support of Their Causes of Action at 14. Unfortunately, an interest in uniformity is the “most generic (and lightly invoked) of alleged federal interests,” O’Melveny, 512 U.S. at 88, 114 S.Ct. 2048, 129 L.Ed.2d 67, and — as the Supreme Court has stressed — if uniformity, facilitation of nationwide litigation, the elimination of state-by-state research, and the reduction of uncertainty “qualified as an identifiable federal interest, we would be awash in ‘federal common-law’ rules,” id.; see also United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc. 440 U.S. 715, 730, 99 S.Ct. 1448, 59 L.Ed.2d 711 (1979) (“generalized pleas for uniformity” not a basis for resort to federal common law). Due to these considerations, the goal of uniformity has frequently been rejected “as a basis for the fashioning of a federal common law rule in the specific context of mass disasters and even terrorist attacks overseas.” Dammarell II, 2005 WL 756090, at *25. For instance, the Supreme Court declined to read the pass-through Warsaw Convention as an “implicit authorization for national courts to create uniformity” in the case of injury or death during international air transportation, as the Court explained that the pass-through element of the Convention (similar to Section 1606) does not “empower us to develop some common-law rule — under cover of general admiralty law or otherwise — that will supersede the normal federal disposition.” Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., 516 U.S. 217, 231, 116 S.Ct. 629, 133 L.Ed.2d 596 (1996); see also Pescatore v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 97 F.3d 1, 6, 11 (2d Cir.1996) (holding that the federal concern “between the Warsaw Convention’s goal of uniformity and the unruliness of applying multiple state laws” is “insufficient to justify imposition of federal common law”); Piamba Cortes v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 177 F.3d 1272 (11th Cir.1999) (applying Florida law in Warsaw Convention case involving airplane crash in Colombia). Courts have also reached the same conclusion in the context of the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), holding that the presence of