Full opinion text
DECISION and ORDER THOMAS J. McAVOY, Senior District Judge. Plaintiffs commenced the instant action against Defendants claiming that they conspired amongst themselves to keep down the wages of registered nurses in the Albany area. Presently before the Court are: (1) Defendants’ Joint Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony of Orley Ashenfelter [Docket No. 355/358]; (2) Defendants’ Joint Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony of Gregory Vistnes [Docket No. 344/356]; (3) Defendants’ Joint Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket No. 345]; and (4) Plaintiffs’ Motion to Exclude Portions of Expert Testimony of Robert Willig [Docket No. 342/343]. I. BACKGROUND Plaintiffs allege that during the class period, June 20, 2002 to June 20, 2006, Defendants entered into at least two restraints of trade in violation of the Sherman Act. Count I alleges that Defendants engaged in a continuing conspiracy in restraint of trade to depress the compensation of RNs employed at hospitals in the Albany area. See Docket No. 1. Count II alleges that Defendants have engaged in a continuing agreement to regularly exchange detailed and non-public information about compensation being paid or to be paid to their RN employees, which not only facilitated the enforcement of the wage suppression conspiracy but unreasonably restrained competition on RN compensation in its own right. Id. In a Decision and Order dated July 28, 2008, the Court certified a class of registered nurses with respect to two issues: “whether there has been a violation of antitrust law and whether there has been injury to the class that the Sherman Act was designed to prevent.” Fleischman v. Albany Medical Center, 2008 WL 2945993, at *7 (N.D.N.Y. July 28, 2008). Following merits discovery, Plaintiffs moved the Court to amend the prior certification order to additionally certify the issues of impact and damages as to a narrower class of registered nurses. The Court denied Plaintiffs’ motion. All Defendants have settled with Plaintiffs except Albany Medical Center and Ellis Hospital. Presently before the Court are: (1) Defendants’ Joint Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony of Orley Ashenfelter; (2) Defendants’ Joint Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony of Gregory Vistnes; (3) Defendants’ Joint Motion for Summary Judgment; and (4) Plaintiffs’ Motion to Exclude Portions of Expert Testimony of Robert Willig. The facts as pertinent to each motion are set forth as follows. a. Defendants Ellis and Albany Medical Center’s Joint Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony of Orley Ashenfelter Defendants move to exclude Orley Ashenfelter, who will testify concerning anti-competitive effect, injury-in-fact, and damages. Ashenfelter “currently serves as the Joseph Douglas Green Professor of Economics at Princeton, where he specializes in labor economics, and was recently elected to serve as President of the American Economic Association.” See Plaintiffs’ Opposition Memo, at 3. He has previously served “as the director of the Office of Evaluation of the U.S. Department of Labor and had testified for the Federal Trade Commission in a variety of antitrust matters.” Id. at 4. Ashenfelter opines “the fees that Defendants paid for agency nurses, when appropriately adjusted, are equal to or less than competitive staff nurse wages because in a competitive market employees are paid what they are worth.” Plaintiffs’ Opposition Memo, at 5. Ashenfelter selects agency nurses as a benchmark because they are used as a substitute for staff nurses in the workplace and their wages are not set by the Defendant hospitals. Ashenfelter first determined the rates paid to agency nurses by Defendants during the class period. He then estimated separate competitive wages by hospital and year and for specialty and non-specialty jobs, shift differentials and on-call status because agency nurse wage rates were separately set for each of these variables. Next, these rates were adjusted so as to account for the flexibility offered by agency nurses and the additional costs incurred to employ staff nurses such as payroll taxes, workers compensation, human resources costs, and recruitment costs. Ashenfelter then compared this agency nurse wage benchmark to actual earnings of staff nurses, as reflected in payroll records. The analysis purports to take into account straight-time, overtime, shift differentials, on-call status, bonuses, and tuition. Ashenfelter concluded that Plaintiffs and most other staff nurses should have, on average, earned 21% more than they were actually paid. Ashenfelter also opines that in a competitive market more RNs would have been employed. Ashenfelter’s report explains that underutilization is an anticompetitive effect of the conspiracy to depress RN wages. Defendants challenge the reliability of Ashenfelter’s methodology arguing that it is inadmissible under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), and should be excluded from consideration both on summary judgment and at trial. Specifically, Defendants argue that Ashenfelter’s methodology should be excluded because: (1) it is based on an assumption that contradicts his claims of anticompetitive effect, impact, and damages; (2) the “but for wages” do not vary by the experience of the nurse; (3) it is premised on the idea that Defendants made extensive long term use of agency nurses; (4) the “but for wages” are not credible; (5) the rate of employment of nurses in the Albany area is no different from the rate in New York state as a whole; (6) Ashenfelter did not assess whether there was a conspiracy or whether the anticompetitive effects resulted from a conspiracy or some other cause; (7) it applies only to the smaller subclass that the Court rejected; and (8) it is not rehable to prove impact and damages for the two named plaintiffs. Plaintiffs maintain that Defendants’ criticisms are unfounded or go to the weight of the evidence, rather than its admissibility. Specifically, Plaintiffs respond that Ashenfelter’s methodology is reliable and admissible because: (1) he employed widely acceptable and reliable methods; (2) he properly relied on widely accepted economic principles and peer reviewed materials; (3) his benchmark comparisons reliably show impact and measure damages; (4) Defendants challenge results and not methodology; (5) agency bill rates allow reasonable estimation of competitive staff nurse wages; and (6) the validity of Ashenfelter’s benchmark does not depend on whether the use of agency nurses was excessive. b. Defendants Ellis and Albany Medical Center’s Joint Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony of Gregory Vistnes Defendants also move to exclude Gregory Vistnes, who will testify that Defendants conspired to suppress nurse compensation or agreed to exchange confidential information for the purpose, or with the effect, of doing so. “Dr. Vistnes is a Vice President at Charles River Associates, an international economics and business consulting firm.” See Plaintiffs’ Opposition Memo, at 1. He has also “served as Deputy Director for Antitrust in the Federal Trade Commission’s Bureau of Economics” and “held several positions in the Economic Analysis Group of the U.S. Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division, including Assistant Chief of the Economic Regulatory Section.” Id. at 1-2. Although Defendants seek to exclude all of the expert testimony of Vistnes, Defendants specifically dispute the reliability of two opinions; his facilitation opinion and his softened competition opinion. Vistnes’ “facilitation opinion” asserts that “Defendants’ information sharing made it easier [for Defendants] to form and maintain a wage-fixing agreement.” See Plaintiffs’ Opposition Memo, at 6. Specifically, it concludes “that direct, regular exchanges of detailed compensation information made it easier for Defendants to coordinate on nurse compensation.” Id. Plaintiffs contend that this opinion is based “on a thorough understanding of the economics literature on information exchange, ... and a full examination of the discovery record regarding Defendants’ 60+ information exchanges.” Id. at 9. Vistnes’ “softened competition opinion” asserts that “the information exchanges in this case ... reduced Defendants’ incentive to compete.” See Plaintiffs’ Opposition Memo, at 10. According to Vistnes, a softening of competition “means that competition is reduced, such that Defendants would raise nurse wages less often and in smaller amounts, causing them to hire less often and in smaller numbers.” Id. at 13. The theory purports to contemplate and allow for disparities in pay and employment levels across hospitals. It contends that softening reduces the hospitals’ incentive to raise wages to gain a competitive advantage even if “rivals do not on all occasions immediately or exactly match that hospital’s wage increase.” Id. It theorizes that the incentive to increase wages may decrease because a hospital anticipates that the other hospitals will match the increased wages. This opinion “is based on a careful study of the details of those exchanges and the principles found in the economics literature regarding the competitive effect of information exchanges.” See Plaintiffs’ Opposition Memo, at 14-15. Defendants argue that Vistnes’ opinions are neither reliable nor relevant. Specifically, Defendants argue that Vistnes’ facilitation argument is unreliable because: (1) his methodology is not related to the facts of the case; (2) his opinion is connected to the facts of the case only through ipse dixits; and (3) his reliance on the analysis and opinions of Ashenfelter, does not pro^ vide a reliable foundation for his conclusion. See Defendants’ Memo, at 7-13. Defendants argue that Vistnes’ softened competition opinion is unreliable because: (1) the opinion is contradicted by the facts; and (2) he failed to link Defendants’ information exchanges and any harmful effect on competition. See Defendants’ Memo, at 13-20. Plaintiffs responds that Vistnes is a highly qualified expert and his opinions are admissible. Alternatively, Plaintiffs argue that because Defendants challenge only two of Vistnes’ numerous opinions, the unchallenged opinions should be admitted even if the Court finds the challenged opinions inadmissible. c. Defendants’ Joint Motion for Summary Judgment Defendants Ellis Hospital (“Ellis”) and Albany Medical Center (“AMC”) have also filed a joint motion for summary judgment arguing that Plaintiffs “have no evidence of any agreement by Defendants to fix registered nurse compensation, no evidence of parallel wage movements, and no evidence to support Plaintiffs’ claim that Defendants’ conduct harmed competition or injured the Plaintiffs.” See Defendants’ Memo, at 1. Following extensive merits discovery, the following facts are undisputed. Albany Medical Center (AMC) is the largest Defendant. Although there is no formal policy preventing AMC from altering the timing or procedure for setting compensation, RN compensation has traditionally been set in the following way: (1) “AMC establishes the amount of money available to compensate all AMC employees ... during its annual budget process;” (2) “[i]n approximately August of each year, AMC’s human resources department prepares a compensation proposal for the President’s Council, a group comprised of AMC’s President and CEO and its executive and senior vice presidents;” (3) “AMC’s annual compensation proposal addresses all aspects of AMC’s compensation for all employees;” (4) “AMC’s annual compensation proposal reflects the human resources department’s best estimate as to what AMC should budget for compensation for all AMC employees in the coming year”; (5) “AMC’s President’s Council may request additional information and make recommendations, which may result in modifications to the initial proposal, typically in September;” (6) “AMC’s President’s Cabinet can request additional modifications to the proposal as it shapes an annual budget;” (7) “[i]n October or November of each year, AMC’s President’s Cabinet meets with AMC’s CEO to discuss the final budget document to be presented to the Board of Directors;” (8) “[t]he final budget is submitted to the Finance Committee and then to the full Board of Directors for approval in early December of each year;” and (9) “AMC approves the market adjustments and merit increases in December, and they are effective in May of the following year.” See Plaintiffs’ Response to Defendants’ Statement of Undisputed Facts at 3-10. Ellis hospital is the only Defendant whose nurses are unionized and whose nurse wages are established, at least as to the bargaining unit, through a collective bargaining process with the New York State Nurses Association (N.Y.SNA). See Plaintiffs’ Response to Defendants’ Statement of Undisputed Facts at 21. When Ellis prepares to negotiate a new collective bargaining agreement, its bargaining objectives and proposals are determined, at least in part, by human resources (HR), the finance department, nursing management, legal counsel, the CEO, and the COO. Id. at 24. The NYSNA and Ellis negotiate until they reach an agreement. Id. at 24-25. Northeast Health (Northeast) operates two hospitals, Samaritan Hospital in Troy and Albany Memorial Hospital in Albany. Id. at 33. Although there is no formal policy preventing Northeast from altering the timing or procedure for setting nurses compensation, it has traditionally been set as part of an annual budget process in the following way: (1) “[i]In August of each year, each department submits a budget request, which includes a compensation component, to the finance department;” (2) “[i]n September and early October, department administrators and the finance and human resources departments refine the budget requests;” (3) “[i]n mid-October, Northeast’s executive vice presidents consider the budget recommendations and decide on the need for a market adjustment;” (4) “[i]n mid-October, Northeast’s human resources committee of the board reviews the budget recommendations;” and (5) “Northeast’s finance committee of the board reviews and makes a final recommendation on the overall budget to the board of directors, and the board approved the budget in late November or early December.” Id. at 33-36. Seton Health System (Seton) is a member of Ascension Health, the nation’s largest not-for-profit health care system and is the smallest Defendant. Id. at 41. “Each year as part of the budget planning process, Seton budgets a certain amount of funds for possible market adjustments.” Id. at 43. “Seton’s budget process changed midway through the class period-in 2002 and 2003, Seton’s fiscal year began January 1, and it established the budget the summer before; in 2004, Seton changed its fiscal year to begin July 1, and it reviewed employee compensation twice, in the summer of 2003 and in January 2004; and from 2005 forward, Seton’s fiscal year began July 1, and its budget process began in January.” Id. 43-44. Establishing RN compensation involves the human resources department, department directors, and nursing administrators as well as other executives. Id. at 44. The budget committee must approve all market adjustment proposals. Id. at 46. St. Peter’s Hospital (St. Peter’s) has been recognized twice as one of the top 100 hospitals in the nation. Id. at 56. Although there is no formal policy preventing St. Peters from altering the timing or procedure for making market adjustments, they have traditionally been set in the following way: (1) “St. Peter’s sets its budget for market adjustments in September or October and makes market adjustments in the spring;” (2) “[djuring the annual budget process, St. Peter’s sets aside a pool of money to use for market adjustments and divides the pool among those job titles where an adjustment is required;” (3) “St. Peter’s human resources department makes a recommendation to the director and vice president of human resources regarding the amount St. Peter’s should budget for market adjustments;” (4) “[t]he director and vice president of human resources then make a recommendation to the finance committee, which determines the amount of money to be given for the market adjustment.” Id. at 57-60. It is also undisputed that from 2003 through 2006 Defendants engaged in information exchanges regarding the compensation they paid to RNs. See Plaintiffs’ Opposition Memo, at 3 n. 6 (Plaintiffs point to 60 documented instances but contend that based on the many surveys produced in discovery there were many more undocumented information exchanges conducted by telephone or in person. Furthermore, incomplete e-mail trails evidence that custodians deleted e-mails.) The parties dispute the purpose and scope that these exchanges played and the role they played in setting nurses wages. The record shows that the hospitals extensively shared information through group communications, e-mails, telephone calls, and in person conversations with the other defendants. See e.g. Plaintiffs’ Response to Defendants’ Statement of Undisputed Facts at paragraphs 8, 18, 21, 23, 25, 49, 71, 72, 97, 103, 106, 130, 137; see also Ex. 23 (in March 2005, John Barnett of Ellis shares Ellis’ current and future new graduate rate with Cathy Halakan of AMC) (a June 2005 e-mail from Sandra Castilla of AMC to Louise Franz of Ellis asking for and obtaining updated information on Ellis’ wage and compensation practices including RN new hire and per diem rates) (in May 2004 Louise Franz of AMC sent an internal e-mail reporting that she receiving information from St. Peter’s about St. Peter’s current wage structure and its plan to move to a different model in June). These communications also included one-to-one email communications and one-to-one verbal discussions. Id.; see e.g. Ex. 25 (Louise Franz of AMC asked Kathleen Occhiogrosso for Seton for Seton’s new RN rate and also provides AMC’s new rate). Defendant collected the information on compensation and benefits gathered from other hospitals and complied reports and surveys which were shared with other defendant hospitals. Id. Additionally, “if a request for compensation information was sent out to a group of hospital HR representatives via e-mail, some of them simply replied to the entire group ... to share their hospitals current compensation information with the other hospitals.” Id. There are also evidence of information sharing regarding merit and recruitment bonuses, tuition assistance, merit pay, health insurance co-payments, length of workweek, and loan forgiveness programs. Id.; see e.g. Ex. 25 (Erin Baker of St. Peter’s provides Sandra Castilla of AMC with RN new hire, RN per diem rates, and merit increase information after Castilla stated that she needed updated information for AMC’s 2006 Compensation and Benefits Budget). Plaintiffs’ argument is as follows. See Plaintiffs’ Opposition Memo, at 1-2. During the class period, Defendants faced a serious nursing shortage. A nursing shortage should have led to intense competition for nurses. Instead, Defendants avoided competing by regularly sharing their most sensitive information about their nurse pay structure. Defendants would not have shared this information if their competitors used the information competitively to identify low paying hospitals and outbid them to attract more and better qualified nurses. Plaintiffs, therefore, maintain that the practice continued only because it was accompanied by an agreement and recognition that the exchanged information would not be used as a strategic asset to compete for nurses, but rather to coordinate on wages and ensure that any incentive to compete was eliminated. Defendants respond as follows. The process for setting compensation was based on a review of published survey data and internal analysis of compensation and employee needs. During the class period, nurse compensation was steadily increased and as a result, employment levels also increased. Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment because Plaintiffs: (1) cannot show an agreement to fix nurse pay; (2) cannot establish that Defendants’ exchange of compensation information unreasonably restrained competition; (3) have no evidence of harm to competition or injury; and (4) cannot show a causal link between Defendants’ information exchange and either the alleged anticompetitive effects or their alleged injury. Plaintiffs oppose Defendants’ motion arguing that: (1) no formal agreement is required and there is extensive evidence for circumstantial proof of a per se claim; (2) they have produced evidence of an actual adverse effect on competition resulting from the information exchanges; and (3) their expert Ashenfelter has presented a legally appropriate benchmark analysis. d. Plaintiffs’ Motion to Exclude Portions of Expert Testimony of Robert Willig Plaintiffs also move to exclude portions of the expert testimony of Robert Willig. They argue that “Willig should be limited to testifying as to matters where his expert knowledge can assist the jury in understanding the evidence” and the Court should prohibit Willig from offering any opinion concerning: (1) “[wjhether the fact discovery record in this case is probative or not of the alleged conspiracy; and (2) “[t]he information the Defendants did or did not consider in making their compensation decisions, and the effect or lack of effect particular information had on such decisions.” See Plaintiffs’ Memo, at 6-7. Defendants oppose this motion. They maintain that Willig’s testimony satisfies the requirements of admissibility under Rule 702 of the Fed. R. Evidence and, thus, should not be excluded. See Defendants’ Opposition Memo, at 1. II. STANDARD OF REVIEW a. Admissibility of an Expert Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which governs the admissibility of expert and other scientific or technical expert testimony, provides as follows: If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case. The Supreme Court interpreted the District Court’s function under Rule 702 in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993). The Second Circuit reiterated this function in Amorgianos v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 303 F.3d 256, 265 (2d Cir.2002) stating: [t]he Supreme Court has made clear that the district court has a “gatekeeping” function under Rule 702' — -it is charged with “the task of ensuring that an expert’s testimony both rests on a reliable foundation and is relevant to the task at hand.” Id. at 597, 113 S.Ct. 2786; accord Campbell [v. Metropolitan Property and Cas. Ins. Co.], 239 F.3d [179] at 184 [(2d Cir.2001)]; Federal Judicial Center, Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence 11 (2d ed. 2000). In fulfilling this gatekeeping role, the trial court should look to the standards of Rule 401 in analyzing whether proffered expert testimony is relevant, i.e., whether it “ ‘ha[s] any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.’ ” Campbell, 239 F.3d at 184 (quoting Fed. R.Evid. 401) (alteration in original). Next, the district court must determine “whether the proffered testimony has a sufficiently ‘reliable foundation’ to permit it to be considered.” Id. (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597, 113 S.Ct. 2786). In this inquiry, the district court should consider the indicia of reliability identified in Rule 702, namely, (1) that the testimony is grounded on sufficient facts or data; (2) that the testimony “is the product of reliable principles and methods”; and (3) that “the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.” Fed. R.Evid. 702. In short, the district court must “make certain that an expert, whether basing testimony upon professional studies or personal experience, employs in the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant field.” Kumho Tire [Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael], 526 U.S. [137] at 152, 119 S.Ct. 1167 [143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999)]. District courts consider various factors in determining reliability: (1) “whether a theory or technique can be (and has been) tested;” (2) “whether the theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and publication;” (3) a technique’s “known or potential rate of error,” and “the existence and maintenance of standards controlling the technique’s operation;” and (4) whether a particular technique or theory has gained “general acceptance” in the relevant scientific community. See Amorgianos, 303 F.3d at 266. “These factors do not constitute a ... definitive checklist or test, [r]ather, ‘[t]he inquiry envisioned by Rule 702 is ... a flexible one, ... and the gatekeeping inquiry must be tied to the facts of a particular case.’ ” Amorgianos, 303 F.3d at 266 (citing Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 150, 119 S.Ct. 1167); see also Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593, 113 S.Ct. 2786. “In undertaking this flexible inquiry, the district court must focus on the principles and methodology employed by the expert, without regard to the conclusions the expert has reached or the district court’s belief as to the correctness of those conclusions.” Amorgianos, 303 F.3d at 266; see Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595, 113 S.Ct. 2786. That being said, “conclusions and methodology are not entirely distinct from one another” and “[a] court may conclude that there is simply too great an analytical gap between the data and the opinion proffered.” Amorgianos, 303 F.3d at 266 (quoting General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146, 118 S.Ct. 512, 139 L.Ed.2d 508 (1997)); see Heller v. Shaw Indus., Inc., 167 F.3d 146, 153 (3d Cir.1999) (“[A] district court must examine the expert’s conclusions in order to determine whether they could reliably follow from the facts known to the expert and the methodology used.”). “Once the district court has deemed the evidence sufficiently reliable so as to be admissible, it is “bound to consider the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff’ when deciding motions for summary judgment or judgment as a matter of law.” In re Joint Eastern & Southern Dist., Asbestos Litigation, 52 F.3d 1124, 1135 (2d Cir.1995). b. Summary Judgment Summary judgment, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.P. 56(c), is warranted if “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of showing, through the production of admissible evidence, that no genuine issue of material fact exists. Major League Baseball Properties, Inc. v. Salvino, 542 F.3d 290, 309 (2d Cir.2008). Only after the moving party has met this burden is the non-moving party required to produce evidence demonstrating that genuine issues of material fact exist. Salahuddin v. Goord, 467 F.3d 263, 272-73 (2d Cir.2006). The nonmoving party must do more than “rest upon the mere allegations ... of the [plaintiffs] pleading” or “simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585-86, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); see also Fed. R. Civ.P. 56(e) (“When a motion for summary judgment is made [by a defendant] and supported as provided in this rule, the [plaintiff] may not rest upon the mere allegations ... of the [plaintiffs] pleading ____”). Rather, “[a] dispute regarding a material fact is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Ross v. McGinnis, 00-CV0275, 2004 WL 1125177, at *8 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2004) [internal quotations omitted] [emphasis added]. It must be apparent that no rational finder of fact could find in favor of the non-moving party for a Court to grant a motion for summary judgment. Gallo v. Prudential Residential Servs., 22 F.3d 1219, 1223-24 (2d Cir.1994); Graham v. Lewinski, 848 F.2d 342, 344 (2d Cir.1988). In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, the Court must resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences against the moving party. Schwapp v. Town of Avon, 118 F.3d 106, 110 (2d Cir.1997) [citation omitted]; Thompson v. Gjivoje, 896 F.2d 716, 720 (2d Cir.1990) [citation omitted]. III. DISCUSSION a. Defendants’ Ellis and Albany Medical Center’s Joint Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony of Orley Ashenfelter Plaintiffs employed Orley Ashenfelter to use “standard economic tools to study whether staff nurses in this action suffered impact and damages as a result of Defendants’ alleged conspiracy.” See Plaintiffs’ Opposition Memo, at 4. Ashenfelter compared actual wages paid to staff nurses by the Defendant hospitals during the alleged conspiracy with wages that would be paid “but-for” the alleged conspiracy. Ashenfelter computed the “but-for” wages of staff nurses by using bill rates for agency nurses as a benchmark with which to compare staff nurse wages during the same period. He maintains that agency nurses “are an appropriate benchmark because: (1) agency nurses, as literal substitutes for staff nurses, perform the work that would otherwise be done by a staff nurse;” and (2) their bill rates, set by a national market, would not have been affected by the alleged conspiracy. Plaintiffs’ Opposition Memo, at 2. Ashenfelter determined that “Plaintiffs, and most other staff nurses, had indeed suffered injury as a result of Defendants’ alleged collusive wage suppression.” Id. at 2-3. He concluded “that, on average, staff nurses had earned $28.11 per hour during the class period, but that in a competitive market, they would have earned an average of at least $35.74 per hour.” Id. at 7. Defendants argue that Ashenfelter’s testimony should be excluded because it is unreliable as a matter of law. They do not challenge Ashenfelter’s qualifications or the relevance of his testimony. Defendants instead challenge the reliability of his opinions, arguing that: (1) his benchmark theory is based on assumptions and is disconnected from the facts; (2) he failed to address whether a conspiracy existed and whether that conspiracy caused the wage suppression; and (3) his utilization theory does not take into consideration New York state specific conditions. The Court will address these arguments seriatim. 1. Whether the Methodology Used by Prof. Ashenfelter in Forming his Benchmark Theory is Reliable The methodology used by Ashenfelter to determine that agency nurse bill rates and staff nurse wages should be comparable is based on the widely accepted economic concept of marginal revenue product (MRP). MRP is the “value that an employee creates for his or her employer.” The concept promulgates that an employer will not “incur costs to employ a staff nurse or hire an agency nurse that, in total, exceed a nurses’ [MRP].” In other words, according to economic theory, Ashenfelter opines that because agency nurses “are interchangeable with staff nurses, working instead of, and alongside, staff nurses at the exact same hospitals performing the exact same tasks on the same day” the two types of nurses are worth the same to the hospitals. Ashenfelter explains that agency nurse bill rates and staff nurse wages differ because agency bill rates “pay for all the costs of employing an agency nurse, not just her wages, and include an amount to compensate the agency nurse for scheduling flexibility.” Staff nurse wages are usually lower than agency nurse bill rates because they do not include this flexibility premium and fail to account for fringe benefits and other costs of employing a full time employee. Ashenfelter’s methodology purports to adjust the competitive agency bill rate to account for these variables. He opines that the “but-for” wages of staff nurses will equal the MRP of the agency nurse minus the value of the flexibility. Conversely, the competitive wage of a staff nurses equals the MRP of the staff nurse minus the “non-earning costs of employing that nurse.” From these economic computations, Ashenfelter opines that he is able to determine the extent to which Defendants’ alleged conspiracy affected the wages of staff nurses during the class period. The validity of the economic concept MRP is not challenged by the Defendants. Ashenfelter based his methodology on this accepted economic principle. His methodology took into consideration the flexibility premiums offered by agency nurses, staff nurse fringe benefits, and the costs of employing full time staff nurses and he took the necessary logical steps from agency bill rates to estimate the competitive wage of individual staff nurses. Similarly, Defendants do not challenge the data used by Ashenfelter to compute the “but-for” wages. The but-for wages are computed using wage and pay-roll data and differences in pay grade depending on on-call status and specialty placements at each of the Defendant hospitals during each year of the class period. The underlying data applied to the methodology to compute “but-for” wages is undisputed. Defendants argue that Prof. Ashenfelter’s methodology is unreliable because: (1) it assumes that agency nurse rates are set in a national market; (2) it does not account for differences in experience; (3) it is based on the assumption that Defendants made extensive long term use of Agency nurses; (4) the but-for wages created by his methodology are not credible; (5) the but-for wages barely change over the class period; (6) the methodology can only be applied to a subset of the nurses; and (7) the methodology cannot prove impact and damages for the two named plaintiffs. a. Agency Nurse Wages are Set in a National Market Defendants argue that Ashenfelter has “no basis to believe that there is any connection between the adjusted bill rates for agency nurses and the competitive wages of staff nurses.” Defendants’ Memo, at 7-8. Defendants contend that wages for the two groups must be set in the same market for agency nurses to be properly used as a benchmark. They argue that because (1) Ashenfelter’s methodology assumes that wages for agency nurses are set in a national market; and (2) Ashenfelter has stated that the Defendant hospitals would have little influence over the national market for staff nurse wages, he in effect acknowledges either that there is no link between agency nurse’s and staff nurse’s wages or that Defendants have no power to suppress wages. Plaintiffs argue that the MRP theory does not require that staff nurse wages be set in the same market as agency nurse bill rates because “what matters is that the bill rate is equal to or less than the marginal revenue product of an agency nurse.” See Plaintiffs’ Opposition Memo, at 14. They further claim that after proper adjustments, his methodology computes the actual competitive wage of the staff nurse based on the staff nurses’ economic worth to the hospital. The fact that Defendants dispute Ashenfelter’s methodology does not render the methodology unreliable. Experts are entitled to differing opinions as to the validity of the methodology, so long as the challenged methodology is grounded in reliable scientific principles and facts. See McCullock v. H.B. Fuller Co., 61 F.3d 1038, 1044 (2d Cir.1995), (“[disputes as to ... faults in [expert’s] use of [particular scientific analysis] as a methodology ... go to the weight, not the admissibility, of his testimony.”). Because the Court has already concluded that Ashenfelter’s methodology is based on a well accepted economic principle and uses undisputed data, exclusion is not warranted. b. Methodology does not take into account Experience Defendants argue that work experience is not accounted for in Ashenfelter’s methodology because agency nurse bill rates do not vary by experience and, therefore, “but-for” wages do not vary. They allege this overcompensates starting nurses and under compensates the most experienced nurses, rendering the methodology unreliable. See Defendants Memo, at 11-12. Plaintiffs respond that “Ashenfelter took into account all available data, which allowed him to account for differences in competitive wages based on job type, hospital, year, shift differential, and on-call status.” Plaintiffs’ Memo, at 17. “The benchmark does not account for experience because the data [is] not available.” Id. They maintain that the available data allows for a “conservative estimate of impact and damages based on a customized and highly comparable benchmark methodology.” Id. “Damages in antitrust cases ‘are rarely susceptible to the kind of concrete, detailed proof of injury which is available in other contexts.’ ” Litton Systems, Inc. v. American Tel. and Tel. Co., 700 F.2d 785, 828 (2d Cir.1983) (quoting Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 123, 89 S.Ct. 1562, 23 L.Ed.2d 129 (1969)). In Litton Systems, Inc., 700 F.2d at 823-24, the Second Circuit determined that “where there is a basis on which a jury can reasonably infer significant antitrust injury, [the court] should be very hesitant before determining that damages cannot be awarded.” In Litton Systems, Inc., 700 F.2d at 823-24, the Second Circuit upheld the consideration of expert testimony which was based on assumptions about the size of the market and a company’s share in that market. The court found that the estimates were based upon analysis of the industry data and a review of other studies and that the projections made were conservative. Id. “An antitrust plaintiff must provide only sufficient evidence to support a ‘just and reasonable estimate’ of damages.” U.S. Football League v. National Football League, 842 F.2d 1335, 1378 (2d Cir.1988) (quoting Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 264, 66 S.Ct. 574, 90 L.Ed. 652 (1946)); see also Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 563, 51 S.Ct. 248, 75 L.Ed. 544 (1931) (proof of antitrust damages sufficient “if the evidence show[s] the extent of the damages as a matter of just and reasonable inference, although the result be only approximate.”). A benchmark need not be perfect to allow for this reasonable estimate of damages. See McDonough v. Toys R Us, Inc., 638 F.Supp.2d 461, 491 (E.D.Pa.2009) (“His proposed benchmarks are not perfect, but they will give a reasonable estimate of damages.” (internal citations omitted)). Here, only the named Plaintiffs are pursuing damage claims and both named Plaintiffs are experienced nurses. Therefore, the critique that Ashenfelter’s methodology may overcompensate inexperienced nurses is irrelevant. Ashenfelter’s methodology is reliable for reasonably estimating the damages for the two named plaintiffs based on a variety of variables specific to those Plaintiffs. c. No Evidence of Extensive Agency Use Defendants next argue that “although Prof. Ashenfelter’s [methodology] is premised on the idea that the Defendants made extensive long term use of agency nurses, he admits that he cannot distinguish between appropriate long term agency use and inappropriate agency use” and therefore his opinions are unreliable. Defendants’ Memo, at 13. Plaintiffs respond that Ashenfelter’s methodology is not premised on the fact that Defendants made extensive use of agency nurses. They contend that excessive agency use is merely additional evidence of wage suppression. Therefore, whether agency usage is considered excessive has no effect on the reliability of Ashenfelter’s benchmark analysis. Furthermore, Plaintiffs argue that Defendants’ business documents provide evidence that support the conclusion that agency use was excessive. d. The But-For Wages are not Credible Defendants also argue that Ashenfelter’s methodology should be excluded as unreliable because the but-for wages are not credible and barely change over time. The Supreme Court in Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595, 113 S.Ct. 2786, stated that “the district court must focus on the principles and methodology employed by the expert, without regard to the conclusions the expert has reached or the district court’s belief as to the correctness of those conclusions.” The district court however must still “examine the expert’s conclusions in order to determine whether they could reliably follow from the facts known to the expert and the methodology used.” Heller v. Shaw Indus., Inc., 167 F.3d 146, 153 (3d Cir.1999); See Joiner, 522 U.S. at 146, 118 S.Ct. 512 (“[C]onclusions and methodology are not entirely distinct from one another ... [N]othing in either Daubert or the Federal Rules of Evidence requires a district court to admit opinion evidence that is connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the expert. A court may conclude that there is simply too great an analytical gap between the data and the opinion proffered.”). As previously stated, Ashenfelter’s methodology is based on sound economic principles and applies undisputed facts. Defendants will have the opportunity to cross-examine Ashenfelter at trial as to the credibility of his results and the jury will be able to assign the appropriate weight to the expert’s opinions. The methodology requires a step-by-step application of undisputed pay roll information into a methodology which this Court finds to be reliable. There is no analytical gap between this application and the results found by Ashenfelter. 2. Whether Ashenfelter’s Opinions are Unreliable because he did not Study Whether a Conspiracy Existed and Whether the Conspiracy Caused the Wage Suppression Next, Defendants argue that Ashenfelter’s opinions are unreliable because he “simply assumed, upon direction from plaintiffs counsel, that the defendants unlawfully conspired either to exchange nurse wage information or suppress nurse wages” and never investigated whether that assumption had merit. Defendants’ Memo, at 20. They contend that “[t]he Court should not feel comfortable allowing Professor Ashenfelter to offer opinions on anticompetitive effect, impact, and damages flowing from the conspiracy when he did not even investigate whether the conspiracy even existed, or whether, even assuming it did exist, it was the cause of the effects he claims to have found.” Id. at 20-21. Ashenfelter’s opinions focus exclusively on the issues of whether staff nurses suffered impact and damages and he offers no opinions as to liability. Plaintiffs admit that “[f]or the purposes of his report, Prof. Ashenfelter was asked to assume that Defendants conspired to suppress wages and exchanged wage-related information.” Plaintiffs’ Memo, at 4 n. 2. Ashenfelter does not rely on the assumption of liability in determining whether the staff nurses’ wages were depressed. Ashenfelter’s methodology focused on undisputed data and facts and was based on well accepted economic theory. The fact that he did not address whether a conspiracy existed or whether a conspiracy caused the wage suppression does not render his opinions, as to impact and damages, unreliable. 3. Whether Ashenfelter’s Underutilization Opinions are Unreliable Ashenfelter also studied underutilization in Albany hospitals. Plaintiffs describe underutilization as an “anticompetitive effect of Defendants’ conspiracy” and offer it as evidence of Defendants’ market power. To determine whether underutilization was present at Defendant Hospitals, Ashenfelter applied a formula for measuring utilization developed by Kevin Grumbach and others and published in a peer reviewed journal. When applying this formula: Prof. Ashenfelter gathered data on the number of full-time nurses, the average number of inpatient beds filled per day, the volume of outpatient services, and the complexity of services provided. He found nurse utilization in Albany to be a full 14% lower than in other cities nationwide. Notably, this estimate is conservative because the utilization measure for Albany includes hospitals that did and did not participate in the conspiracy to suppress wages. Plaintiffs’ Memo, at 7-8. Professor Ashenfelter’s methodology to determine whether Albany nurses were underutilized compared Albany-area utilization of nurses to average nurse utilization in the country as a whole. Defendants argue that Ashenfelter’s nurse utilization analysis is unreliable because it does not take into account state specific factors that affect utilization from one state to another, such as budgetary or funding issues and laws and regulations. Defendant’s expert “re-ran [the utilization] analysis using cities in New York state as a benchmark and found no significant difference between Albany’s utilization rate and that of other New York cities.” Defendants’ Memo, at 19. Defendants do not attack the methodology Plaintiffs use to determine the utilization rate of nurses or the data used to determine Albany’s utilization rate. On the contrary, Defendants apply the same methodology and Albany-specific data when comparing the rate of utilization in Albany to a New York state benchmark. Defendants here challenge only Ashenfelter’s decision to compare utilization in Albany to a national benchmark, as opposed to a New York state benchmark. Differences in expert opinion as to which benchmark is more reliable does not render Ashenfelter’s opinions unreliable. Instead Defendants will have the opportunity to cross-examine Ashenfelter at trial as to the effects of state specific factors and the jury will be able to assign the appropriate weight to the expert’s opinions. Because the Defendants fail to challenge the methodology underlying the utilization theory, Ashenfelter’s opinion that hospitals in Albany have a lower nurse utilization rate than hospitals nationwide is admissible. Accordingly, Ashenfelter’s opinions regarding impact and damages are admissible. b. Defendants Ellis and Albany Medical Center’s Joint Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony of Gregory Vistnes Plaintiffs have offered Dr. Vistnes to testify in support of their claims that Defendants conspired to suppress nurse compensation or agreed to exchange confidential information for the purpose, or with the effect of, doing so. Vistnes opines that Defendants’ exchange of compensation information facilitated coordination among them and softened competition. Defendants argue that Dr. Vistnes’ opinions should be excluded because they are unreliable, unsupported, and contradicted by the facts and evidence produced during discovery. Although Defendants take issue only with the softened competition and facilitation opinions they contend that all of his opinions should be excluded. Because Defendants advance no arguments relating to the other opinions they are admissible. 1. Vistnes’ facilitation opinion Dr. Vistnes’ facilitation opinion asserts that “the scope of the information that Defendant Hospitals shared, the frequency with which they shared their information, and the nature of the information that they shared, significantly increase[d] Defendant Hospitals’ ability to establish and maintain an agreement to reduce competition for RNs.” Expert Report of Gregory S. Vistnes at 2. Plaintiffs contend that Vistnes’ opinion is based on “a thorough understanding of the economics literature on information exchange and a full examination of the discovery record regarding the exchanges.” Plaintiffs’ Opposition Memo, at 9. He explains that because information exchanges can both benefit and harm competition, expert testimony is necessary to help a jury understand the impact of the particular information exchanges in this case. Plaintiffs maintain that Vistnes’ testimony will explain why his “detailed review of the record led him to conclude that the information exchanges in this case in fact reduced incentives to compete.” Plaintiffs’ Opposition Memo, at 10. Defendants argue that this opinion should be excluded as unreliable and unsupported because: (1) the conclusions are related to the facts only through ipse dixit; and (2) Vistnes relied on the analysis and opinions of Plaintiffs other expert in coming up with his own opinion. See Defendants’ Memo, at 7,10 and 12. a. Whether the Conclusions are Related to the Facts Defendants contend that Vistnes’ conclusion-that information exchanges facilitated coordination of nurse compensation-is unreliable because Vistnes offered the opinion without understanding what role the information exchanges played in setting nurse compensation. Defendants allege Vistnes: (1) reached his conclusions without opining as to whether an agreement existed, what such an agreement would contain, and whether coordination actually occurred; (2) failed to distinguish between lawful and unlawful behavior; (3) “failed to examine the processes through which Defendants set their nurse compensation, and did not consider the reality of how, when, and why Defendants made their decisions regarding nurse compensation;” and (4) did not rely upon any data produced in discovery such as payroll or human resources data. See Defendants’ Memo, at 7-11. Therefore, Defendants argue that Vistnes “reached his opinions based upon an analysis that he conducted in a vacuum” and “jumped to his conclusions.” Defendants’ Memo, at 7-8. (1) Opinion does not Address: Whether an Agreement Existed, What it Contained, or Whether Coordination Occurred Plaintiffs argue that Vistnes is entitled to offer limited opinions and is not required to opine as to the ultimate issue in the case. They argue that Vistnes was not required to testify as to whether a conspiracy existed or whether coordination actually occurred for his opinions to be admissible. Vistnes’ testimony is offered only to opine that the nature, frequency and scope with which Defendants shared information would make it easier for Defendants to establish and maintain an agreement to reduce RN competition. As a general matter this type of opinion testimony may be helpful to the trier of fact. See City of Tuscaloosa v. Harcros Chemicals, Inc., 158 F.3d 548, 565 (11th Cir.1998) (“data and testimony need not prove the plaintiffs’ case by themselves; they must merely constitute one piece of the puzzle that the plaintiffs endeavor to assemble before the jury.”). In U.S. Information Systems, Inc. v. International Broth, of Electrical Workers Local Union Number 3, AFL-CIO, 313 F.Supp.2d 213, 240 (S.D.N.Y.2004), the Court explained that “an expert is permitted to testify that the ‘climate’ of a specific market was consistent with a conspiracy.” See In re Polypropylene Carpet Antitrust Litigation, 93 F.Supp.2d 1348, 1355 (N.D.Ga.2000) (denying in part defendants’ motion to exclude plaintiffs’ expert testimony because the expert’s proposed testimony “that the climate of the polypropylene market during the relevant time period was consistent with a finding that Defendants engaged in a conspiracy to fix prices” would be “helpful to the trier of fact.”). In U.S. Information Systems, Inc., 313 F.Supp.2d at 240, defendants claimed that the expert’s reports and testimony were impermissibly “replete with conclusions about the existence of a conspiracy based upon conclusions of law.” The court held that although the expert could not testify as to his legal conclusion: [h]e could ... point to factors that would tend to show anticompetitive conduct in a market. He could not indicate whether he believed those factors existed here, and what the economic significance of those factors would be. He could also explain how certain conduct could affect a market through the use of hypothetical statements ... [the expert] could hypothesize that if certain conduct did occur, economists would expect the market to react in a particular way. Id. In this case, Vistnes seeks to testify that the information exchanges, engaged in by the Defendant hospitals, made it easier for Defendants to form and maintain a wage agreement. This type of opinion maybe helpful to the jury and is admissible. (2) Opinion fails to Distinguish between Lawful and Unlawful Behavior Defendants contend that “Vistnes’ conclusions ... will not assist the jury to understand the evidence because his opinions are as consistent with lawful behavior as unlawful behavior.” Defendants’ Memo, at 9. Plaintiffs argue that Vistnes’ opinion is offered as evidence probative of a per-se unlawful wage fixing conspiracy and cannot be probative of lawful conduct. See Plaintiffs’ Opposition Memo, at 8. In Williamson Oil Co. v. Philip Morris U.S.A., 346 F.3d 1287, 1322 (11th Cir.2003), the court excluded some of the expert’s testimony because “he did not differentiate between legal and illegal pricing behavior.” The expert’s conclusion was “that plaintiffs participated in an illegal price fixing conspiracy, and he expressed this opinion ... by saying that the manufacturer’s participation in the MSA information sharing system created an inference of collusion.” Id. at 1323. The expert defined collusion to include conscious parallelism, which is legal behavior. Id. The court excluded the testimony as unhelpful to the jury because the expert did not differentiate between legal and illegal pricing behavior. Id. Here, Vistnes does not define wage fixing to include legal activities. Vistnes does not suggest that any legitimate wage surveys facilitated a wage fixing agreement. Although he recognizes that information exchanges can in some situations increase competition, he testifies and opines that the information exchanges in this case do no such thing. Accordingly, his opinion would be helpful to the jury. (3) Opinion not Related to the Facts of the Case because Vistnes failed to Examine Processes for Setting Nurse Compensation and did not Rely on Data Produced During Discovery Defendants contend that Vistnes’ opinions are unreliable because he failed to examine the process by which Defendant Hospitals set their nurse compensation and failed to rely on any data produced during discovery, such as payroll or human resource data. They argue that “Dr. Vistnes cannot reliably conclude that the information exchanges made it easier for Defendants to coordinate if Dr. Vistnes himself did not understand how Defendants set nurse compensation — and what role the information exchanges played in those decisions — in the first instance.” Defendants’ Reply Memo, at 4. Plaintiffs respond that “Vistnes does not analyze data to determine whether the data [is] consistent with the existence of a conspiracy” because he “does not opine on the existence of the conspiracy.” Plaintiffs’ Opposition Memo, at 7. They maintain that Vistnes’ opinion is supported by substantial economic literature and the record and does not require information on how compensation was set. “An expert’s testimony is admissible under Rule 702 as long as the processes or techniques that he used to formulate his opinions are reliable.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594-95, 113 S.Ct. 2786. In his report, Vistnes opines that: Information exchanges can facilitate coordination among rivals in two ways: they can provide a means by which rivals can monitor each other’s conduct and ensure compliance with agreements to restrict competition; and they can provide rivals with a means by which they can more readily reach agreement. He explains that “anticompetitive agreements among rivals are more likely to endure over time if firms have a means by which they can monitor each other’s conduct to ensure compliance with the terms of the agreement.” According to Vistnes, “[i]nformation exchanges provide a mechanism to conduct such monitoring” because: rivals could monitor whether there is any cheating on an agreement to restrict competition for employees by sharing information about the wages they offer, the size of employees’ annual salary increases, or the conditions under which employees qualify for overtime payments. The more readily that firms can use an information exchange to identify when a rival has cheated on an anticompetitive agreement, and which rival(s) cheated, the greater the risk that rivals can use the information exchange to monitor and enforce an anticompetitive agreement to restrict competition. Information exchanges that increase rivals’ ability to monitor each other’s conduct can also reduce the expected costs associated with punishment; these reduced costs can, in turn, facilitate coordination by increasing the profitability of sustaining an anticompetitive agreement. Additionally: Information exchanges that involve future terms of competition (e.g., prices or wages) can allow firms to communicate their plans for future prices or wages to their rivals and create a means by which rivals can communicate back how they will respond. Thus, information exchanges involving future or planned terms of competition can provide a means by which rivals can reach agreement. See Expert Report of Gregory S. Vistnes at 4. In forming this opinions, Vistnes relied on economic theories published in various economic journals. See e.g. Per Baltzar Overgaard and H. Peter Mollgaard, “Information Exchange, Market Transparency and Dynamic Oligopoly,” in Wayne Dale Collins (Ed.), Issues in Competition Law and Policy, American Bar Association (2008), at 1254; Michele Grillo, “Collusion and Facilitating Practices: A New Perspective in Antitrust Analysis,” European Journal of Law and Economics, (September 2002) Vol. 14, N.2, pp. 151-169; Edward J. Green and Robert H. Porter, “Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information,” Econometrica, Vol. 52, No 1 (January 1984). Armed with this background understanding, Vistnes then analyzed the communications between Defendant hospitals and determined, among other things, that: (1) “[a]ll Defendants shared information, and they did so frequently throughout the time period at issue”; (2) “Defendants shared information over a wide range of terms, thus allowing them to monitor a wide range of variables over which they might compete for RNs and expanding the scope of variables over which competition was softened;” (3) shared data without ensuring anonymity, thus allowing Defendants to monitor compliance; and (4) collected and shared information without the benefit or safeguards of a third party administrator. See Expert Report of Gregory S. Vistnes, Ph.D. at 7. Vistnes also opined from this analysis that he sees “no evidence suggesting that Defendant Hospitals’ sharing of information regarding the terms by which they were competing, and planned to compete in the future, for RNs yielded any pro-competitive benefits that might offset the competitive harm associated with that information sharing.” Id. at 8. Defendants do not take issue with the economic theories or the literature used by Vistnes as a basis for his opinions. Similarly, they do not take issue with the communications which Vistnes analyzed. Defendants do not dispute the validity of the communications or allege that Vistnes misunderstood the communications. Instead Defendants take issue with the fact that Vistnes failed to examine the process by which Plaintiff hospitals set their nurse compensation and, therefore, failed to test whether his economic theories applied in this case. Vistnes’ opinion is reliable pursuant to the standard articulated in Daubert, 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786 (1993) (In this inquiry, the district court should consider the indicia of reliability identified in Ru