Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER JOSEPH F. BIANCO, District Judge. Defendant Dov Shellef (hereinafter “defendant” or “Shellef’) was convicted following a jury trial on all counts of an 86-count indictment, alleging: conspiracy to defraud the government, 18 U.S.C. § 371; filing a false tax return, 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1); wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1343; and money laundering, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(a)(1)(A)®, (a)(l)(A)(ii), (a)(1)(B)®. All of the charges relate to a scheme by defendant to avoid paying excise taxes on CFC-113, an industrial chemical. Before the Court is defendant’s motion for a judgment of acquittal under Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure or for a new trial under Rule 33. For the reasons set forth below, defendant’s Rule 29 motion is granted in part and denied in part. Specifically, the Court concludes that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction on the money laundering charged in Counts 46-50, 52-63, 65-68, 70-75, and 77-82 because the counts were duplicative of several wire fraud counts and the evidence was insufficient to show that those transactions involved the proceeds of earlier unlawful activity. The evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict on all of the other counts, and defendant’s motion, therefore, is denied in all other respects. Defendant’s motion for a new trial under Rule 33 is denied. As set forth in more detail below, CFC-113 is a highly regulated industrial chemical. The manufacturer of that chemical is required to pay excise taxes on sales of the material unless: (1) the material is sold for export, or (2) the material is recycled or “reclaimed.” In Count One of the Indictment, Shellef is charged with conspiring to defraud the United States with respect to the collection of excise taxes on CFC-113. There was evidence presented at trial that Shellef agreed with coconspirator William Rubenstein (hereinafter “Rubenstein”) to avoid paying excise taxes on CFC-113 that they had purchased from two manufacturing companies, Elf Atochem and Allied Signal. Although the material was purchased tax-free for export, Shellef and Rubenstein eventually worked together to sell the material domestically without telling the manufacturers or paying the excise taxes themselves. For the reasons set forth below, the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict of guilty on Count One. In Count Two of the Indictment, Shellef is charged with willfully filing a false tax return under 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1). There was evidence presented at trial that Shellef did not report as income on his company’s 1999 tax return any of the money received on the domestic sales of Allied Signal CFC-113. Although he provided his accountant with various records to aid in the preparation of the return, he did not disclose to his accountant any of this income, nor did he disclose to his accountant that he had certain bank accounts that held this income. Thus, the Court concludes that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict of guilty on Count Two. In Counts 3-45 of the Indictment, Shellef is charged with wire fraud in connection with his purchase of CFC-113 from Allied Signal. The contract between Shellef and Allied provided that Shellef was to export the material to a designated area. Because the material was sold for export, Allied Signal did not charge Shellef with the cost of any excise taxes. The contract provided, however, that if any unanticipated taxes became due, Allied Signal had the right to collect the amount of those taxes from Shellef. In November 1998, Shellef reaffirmed his obligation to export the material, even though he had already begun selling the material domestically and continued to do so. There was evidence presented at trial that Shellef never told Allied about the domestic sales and never paid the taxes himself. For the reasons set forth below, the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict of guilty on Counts 3-45. Finally, Shellef was charged with multiple counts of money laundering in Counts 46-86. However, the financial transactions charged as money laundering in Counts 46-50, 52-63, 65-68, 70-75, and 77-82 are also charged as wire fraud in earlier counts of the Indictment. Defendant argues that these alleged money laundering transactions did not, by definition, involve the proceeds of unlawful activity because those same transactions were alleged to generate the unlawful proceeds in the first place. For the reasons set forth below, the Court agrees with defendant and concludes that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction of defendant on these counts. The remaining money laundering charges, Counts 51, 64, 69, 76, and 83-86, involve placing the proceeds of earlier wire fraud into bank accounts, including foreign bank accounts, about which Shellef did not tell his accountant. Shellef did not report any of the money involved in these transactions in his company’s 1999 corporate tax return. Because there was sufficient evidence for the jury to rationally conclude that Shellef engaged in these transactions with the purpose of concealing the attributes of the funds involved and with the purpose of committing tax fraud, the Court denies defendant’s motion with respect to these counts. The Court also concludes that none of the alleged errors at trial, whether taken individually or collectively, warrant a new trial under Rule 33. I. Background A. The Trial Evidence Familiarity with the trial record is presumed. The Court summarizes the evidence relevant to the instant motion infra in connection with discussion of the specific counts of the Indictment. Because all of the counts relate to the collection of excise taxes on CFC-113, the Court briefly describes here the regulatory framework for that chemical. As the Second Circuit has explained: CFC-113 is a highly regulated, ozone depleting industrial solvent commonly used to remove grease from metal. Global regulation of CFC-113 began in earnest following the ratification of the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (the “Montreal Protocol”) in 1987.... Pursuant to the Montreal Protocol, Congress sharply limited American production of CFC-113 as part of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401 et seq. The Act implemented a phased ban ... of the “production and consumption” of the substance in the United States. See 42 U.S.C. § 7671c. Previously stockpiled CFC-113 could, however, still lawfully be used in the United States. As an incentive for discontinuance of such use, Congress imposed an excise tax on any CFC-113 “sold or used by the manufacturer ... thereof.” See 26 U.S.C. § 4681(a)(1) (imposing a tax on sales of ozone-depleting chemicals); 26 U.S.C. § 4682(a)(2) (including CFC-113 within the definition of ozone-depleting chemicals). United States v. Shellef, 507 F.3d 82, 89 (2d Cir.2007). There are two exceptions to the application of the excise tax that are relevant to this case. First, the excise tax does not apply to “sale[s] by the manufacturer or producer of [CFC-113] for export, or for resale by the purchaser to a second purchaser for export.” 26 U.S.C. § 4662(e)(1)(A). In order to qualify for the export exemption, parties must meet various procedural requirements, which are discussed in more detail infra. Typically, when a manufacturer sells CFC-113 to a purchaser who plans to sell the material domestically, the manufacturer pays the excise tax and passes that cost on to the purchaser. (1/11/10 Trial Transcript (hereinafter “Tr.”) 1579-80.) Second, the excise tax does not apply to CFC-113 that has been “diverted or recovered in the United States as part of a recycling process (and not as part of the original manufacturing or production process).” 26 U.S.C. § 4682(d)(1). The tax code does not define the phrase “recycling process.” The industry generally refers to CFC-113 that has been used and is then recycled as “reclaimed.” {See, e.g., 12/15/09 Tr. 104-05; 12/22/09 Tr. 884.) The industry generally refers to CFC-113 that has never been used as “virgin.” {See, e.g., 12/15/09 Tr. 102-04; 12/22/10 Tr. 868.) B. Procedural History Defendant was initially charged in a 91-count indictment on June 24, 2003. Following a jury trial in June-July 2005 before the Honorable Joanna Seybert, United States District Judge, defendant was convicted, along with co-defendant William Rubenstein, of all counts. Both Shellef and Rubenstein appealed their convictions. The Second Circuit held that certain tax charges against Shellef were improperly joined with the other charges against both defendants under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. See United States v. Shellef, 507 F.3d 82, 88 (2d Cir. 2007). The Second Circuit also held that the joinder of Shellef and Rubenstein as defendants was improper. See id. Familiarity with that decision is presumed. The case was remanded to the district court on March 5, 2008, and was reassigned to the Honorable Thomas C. Platt, Senior United States District Judge. On June 17, 2009, the case was reassigned to the undersigned. The Indictment was reduced to 86 counts to eliminate the portions of the Indictment rejected by the Second Circuit. {See Govt. Letter, Dec. 31, 2009, Dkt. 384.) The Court denied defendant’s motion to dismiss the Indictment. A five-week jury trial was held beginning on December 15, 2009 on the 86-count Indictment. The government introduced numerous documents as well as testimony from several witnesses. Pursuant to a plea agreement executed after the Second Circuit’s decision in this case, defendant’s coconspirator, William Ruben-stein, testified for the government during its case in chief. {See 12/22/09 Tr. 838-39; Govt. Ex. 3000.) At the close of the government’s case in chief on January 14, 2010, defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal on all counts pursuant to Rule 29. {See 1/14/10 Tr. 2109-16.) The Court reserved decision on the motion. On January 27, 2010, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on all counts. On April 2, 2010, defendant filed a renewed motion for a judgment of acquittal on all counts pursuant to Rule 29. In the alternative, defendant moved for a new trial under Rule 33. The government submitted its opposition on April 16, 2010. Defendant submitted a reply on April 26, 2010. Oral argument was held on May 26, 2010. The Court has fully considered the submissions of the parties. II. Legal Standard A. Rule 29 Pursuant to Rule 29(a), a district court shall enter a judgment of acquittal as to “any offense for which the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction.” Fed. R.Crim.P. 29(a). As the Second Circuit recently explained, “[f]or a defendant who challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction, our standard of review poses high obstacles. In reviewing such a challenge, we ‘must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, crediting every inference that could have been drawn in the government’s favor.’ ” United States v. Torres, 604 F.3d 58, 66 (2d Cir.2010) (quotation omitted); see also United States v. Lorenzo, 534 F.3d 153, 159 (2d Cir.2008); accord United States v. Pipola, 83 F.3d 556, 564 (2d Cir.1996) (citing Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80, 62 S.Ct. 457, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942)). The standard under Rule 29, as articulated by the United States Supreme Court, is “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) (emphasis in original); accord United States v. Finnerty, 533 F.3d 143, 148 (2d Cir.2008); Lorenzo, 534 F.3d at 159; United States v. Irving, 452 F.3d 110, 117 (2d Cir.2006); United States v. Temple, 447 F.3d 130, 136 (2d Cir.2006). In other words, “ ‘[a] court may enter a judgment of acquittal only if the evidence that the defendant committed the crime alleged is nonexistent or so meager that no reasonable jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” Temple, 447 F.3d at 136 (quoting United States v. Guadagna, 183 F.3d 122, 130 (2d Cir. 1999)). It is important to emphasize that, in evaluating the evidence under this standard, “courts must be careful to avoid usurping the role of the jury when confronted with a motion for acquittal.” United States v. Jackson, 335 F.3d 170, 180 (2d Cir.2003); see also United States v. Florez, 447 F.3d 145, 154-55 (2d Cir. 2006) (“In assessing sufficiency, we are obliged to view the evidence in its totality and in the light most favorable to the prosecution, mindful that the task of choosing among permissible competing inferences is for the jury, not a reviewing court.”); Guadagna, 183 F.3d at 130 (holding that court must bear in mind that Rule 29 “does not provide [it] with an opportunity to substitute its own determination of ... the weight of the evidence and the reasonable inferences to be drawn for that of the jury” (internal quotation marks omitted; alterations in original)). Therefore, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government means “drawing all inferences in the government’s favor and deferring to the jury’s assessments of the witnesses’ credibility.” United States v. Arena, 180 F.3d 380, 391 (2d Cir.1999) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord United States v. James, 239 F.3d 120, 124 (2d Cir.2000) (“[T]he credibility of witnesses is the province of the jury, and [a court] simply cannot replace the jury’s credibility determinations with [its] own.”). In examining the sufficiency of the evidence, the Court also should not analyze pieces of evidence in isolation, but rather must consider the evidence in its totality. See United States v. Rosenthal, 9 F.3d 1016, 1024 (2d Cir.1993); see also Guadagna, 183 F.3d at 130 (holding that sufficiency test must be applied “to the totality of the government’s case and not to each element, as each fact may gain color from others”). Finally, “[d]irect evidence is not required; ‘[i]n fact, the government is entitled to prove its case solely through circumstantial evidence, provided, of course, that the government still demonstrates each element of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” Lorenzo, 534 F.3d at 159 (quoting United States v. Rodriguez, 392 F.3d 539, 544 (2d Cir.2004)); see also Irving, 452 F.3d at 117 (“A jury may convict on circumstantial evidence alone.”); accord Jackson, 335 F.3d at 180; United States v. Martinez, 54 F.3d 1040, 1043 (2d Cir.1995). However, “if the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution gives equal or nearly equal circumstantial support to a theory of guilt and a theory of innocence, then a reasonable jury must necessarily entertain a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Glenn, 312 F.3d 58, 70 (2d Cir.2002) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord United States v. Cassese, 428 F.3d 92, 99 (2d Cir.2005). In short, “[wjhere a court concludes after a full analysis of the evidence in connection with a Rule 29 motion that ‘either of the two results, a reasonable doubt or no reasonable doubt, is fairly possible, [the court] must let the jury decide the matter.’ ” Temple, 447 F.3d at 137 (quoting United States v. Autuori, 212 F.3d 105, 114 (2d Cir.2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted; alteration in original). On the other hand, “ ‘in passing upon a motion for directed verdict of acquittal, ... if there is no evidence upon which a reasonable mind might fairly conclude guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the motion must be granted.’” Temple, 447 F.3d at 137 (quoting United States v. Taylor, 464 F.2d 240, 243 (2d Cir.1972)). B. Rule 33 Motion Pursuant to Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, “[u]pon the defendant’s motion, the court may vacate any judgment and grant a new trial if the interest of justice so requires.” Fed. R.Crim.P. 33(a). As the Second Circuit has explained, “[t]his rule ‘confers broad discretion upon a trial court to set aside a jury verdict and order a new trial to avert a perceived miscarriage of justice.’ ” United States v. Polouizzi, 564 F.3d 142, 159 (2d Cir.2009) (quoting United States v. Sanchez, 969 F.2d 1409, 1413 (2d Cir. 1992)); see also United States v. Cote, 544 F.3d 88, 101 (2d Cir.2008) (“[A] new trial is proper when a district court ‘is convinced that the jury has reached a seriously erroneous result or that the verdict is a miscarriage of justice.’ ” (quoting United States v. Landau, 155 F.3d 93, 104 (2d Cir.1998))). “The grant of a Rule 33 motion requires ‘a real concern that an innocent person may have been convicted.’ ” United States v. Parkes, 497 F.3d 220, 232 (2d Cir.2007) (quoting United States v. Ferguson, 246 F.3d 129, 134 (2d Cir.2001)). The Court should “exercise Rule 33 authority ‘sparingly’ and in ‘the most extraordinary circumstances.’ ” Cote, 544 F.3d at 101 (quoting Sanchez, 969 F.2d at 1414). “[A] motion for a new trial may be granted even if there is substantial evidence to support the jury’s verdict.” Landau, 155 F.3d at 104 (citation omitted). However, the Court “must defer to the jury’s resolution of the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses.” Sanchez, 969 F.2d at 1414 (quotation omitted). In determining whether to grant a new trial, the trial court “must examine the entire case, take into account all facts and circumstances, and make an objective evaluation.” United States v. Ferguson, 246 F.3d 129, 133-34 (2d Cir.2001). III. Discussion The Court considers the charged counts in turn below. A. Count One: Conspiracy to Defraud the United States In Count One of the Indictment, defendant Dov Shellef is charged with conspiring to defraud the United States under 18 U.S.C. § 371. Specifically, the Indictment alleges that Shellef engaged in a conspiracy with William Rubenstein to obstruct the collection of excise taxes on the sale of CFC-113. For the reasons set forth below, the Court concludes that the evidence was sufficient for the jury to rationally find defendant guilty of Count One of the Indictment. 1. Factual Background a. Elf Atochem Material In 1995, William Rubenstein purchased approximately 200,000 pounds of CFC-113 from a company called Elf Atochem. (12/11/09 Tr. 865-70.) Defendant Dov Shellef was a ten percent partner with Rubenstein in the deal. (Id. at 874-75.) Rubenstein and Shellef had done business before and had known each other since about 1980. (Id. at 851-52.) At the time of the purchase, Rubenstein intended to export the material, mostly to Israel, and told Elf Atochem that this was his intention. (Id. at 869.) Rubenstein did not believe that any excise tax would be paid on the material because he said he was going to export it. (Id. at 871-72.) Rubenstein told Shellef that, because he had filled out export forms for the material, no excise tax would be paid. (Id. at 876-77.) Rubenstein understood that the Elf Atochem CFC-113 had never been used before and, therefore, was “virgin” material. (Id. at 868.) Although it was virgin, the material had been mixed with some small percentage of alcohol during the manufacturing process. (Id. at 867.) In 1995, Shellef told Rubenstein that the alcohol could easily be removed by a water wash process. (Id. at 867.) Shellef also told Rubenstein that by removing the alcohol, the material would be considered “reclaimed” and, therefore, would be exempt from the excise tax. (Id. at 877.) Ruben-stein did not believe, based on his business experience, that such a process rendered the virgin CFC reclaimed (Id. at 879-84), but there is no evidence that he told Shellef about this belief. There was considerable evidence that the industry considered material “reclaimed” and tax-exempt only if various impurities had been removed from already-used CFC-113, which the Elf Atochem material was not. (See 12/15/09 Tr. 104-05; 12/21/09 Tr. 527-28, 578-80; 12/22/09 Tr. 879-84, 891-92; 1/7/10 Tr. 1429.) In about late 1996, Rubenstein stopped exporting Elf Atochem CFC-113 because there was no longer a demand for the product. (12/22/09 Tr. 898.) At the time, he had about 30,000 pounds of the material remaining, which he stored in his warehouse in Bayonne, New Jersey. (Id. at 898-900.) In the summer of 1997, Shellef told Rubenstein that he had some customers in California who would purchase the product. (Id. at 900; 12/23/09 Tr. 926-27.) Shellef knew that no excise tax had been paid on the Elf Atochem material. (12/22/09 Tr. 904.) Rubenstein was not “happy” about selling the material domestically because he had told Elf Atochem he was selling it for export, but he nevertheless wanted to “get rid of’ the material. (12/22/09 Tr. 900.) Therefore, Rubenstein agreed to sell the material to Shellefs company, Poly Systems USA, which, in turn, sold the material to Shellefs domestic customers. (Id. at 900-03.) Ruben-stein did not tell Elf Atochem that he was no longer exporting because he did not want to pay the excise tax. (Id. at 901-02.) Rubenstein and Shellef had conversations about the excise tax related to the Elf Atochem material; neither wanted to pay the tax and neither did pay it. (12/23/09 Tr. 992-93.) On multiple occasions, Shellef and Rubenstein worked together to sell Elf Atochem in the domestic market. (See generally 12/23/09 Tr. 939-85; see also id. at 990 (“[W]e had a joint venture on the Elf Atochem material. [Shellef] supervised the process being done, and we went into a joint venture in 1998 on Poly Systems USA.”).) Although the Elf Atochem CFC-113 had never been used, Shellef instructed Ruben-stein to label the material as “reclaimed.” (See, e.g., id. at Tr. 970, 983.) However, Shellef described the Elf Atochem material as virgin when attempting to sell it to one domestic customer. (1/7/10 Tr. 1431-32.) Rubenstein also labeled the material as “for export only.” Rubenstein testified that he did this “to sort of cover my own butt that the material was going domestically and I didn’t feel that the reclamation was tax exempt as I understood reclamation to be, and, therefore, I put for export only, should Elf Atochem ever ask to see whether I exported all the product that I bought from them.” (12/23/09 Tr. 938-39; see also 1/6/10 Tr. 1338 (“I didn’t want to get caught selling domestic Elf Atochem material by the IRS and have to pay excise tax on it.”).) When Rubenstein told Shellef that he was writing “for export only,” Shellef told Rubenstein to “put whatever you want on it.” (12/23/09 Tr. 964-65.) Shellef knew that at least some of the customers to whom he sold the Elf Atochem material were not going to export the product. (Id. at 942-13, 958-59, 970-71.) b. Allied Signal Material In 1996, Shellef purchased about 700,000 pounds of CFC-113 from Allied Signal tax-free for export. (Govt. Ex. 227; 12/16/09 Tr. 206, 212, 224-25, 228, 238-39, 251, 265, 295, 311, 315-16, 329.) Rubenstein invested a small amount of money toward the initial payment by Shellef to Allied in 1996 (12/23/09 Tr. 1023); however, he was only involved in the shipping and warehousing. At first, Shellef sold the material for export in keeping with the terms of the contract. However, Shellef later learned that the government of Israel, his main customer, would no longer purchase CFC-113. (See, e.g., Govt. Ex. 261.) In 1998, Rubenstein and Shellef discussed the possibility of selling Allied Signal domestically: Q. Did you and the defendant ever have a discussion about selling the Allied Signal CFC-113 to customers in the United States? A. Yes. Q. Would you please describe that conversation? A. Well, he wanted to know if he started selling — taking orders, could I at least continue to warehouse the product for him, and process the orders for him. In other words, would I clean the drums, label them, ship them out. (12/23/09 Tr. 1082, 1083.) At some point prior to this conversation, the two had discussed that the Allied contract did not allow domestic sales of the material, and that domestic sales of the material would be subject to the excise tax. (Id. at 1083.) Rubenstein agreed to work with Shellef on the domestic sales of Allied Signal material in about mid-1998 but only “from a warehousing operation, to take it in, clean it up, label it, ship it out. But I didn’t want to get involved any further than that as far as — I would not — I was not involved in any profit as far as his domestic sales were concerned.” (Id. at 1083-84.) In September 1998, Shellef began selling Allied CFC-113 domestically, although he did not tell Allied that he was doing so. (See 12/16/09 Tr. 236, 250, 288, 294, 311; 12/21/09 Tr. 636, 702, 705, 709, 711, 713.) Allied, therefore, did not pay excise taxes on the material. (1/11/10 Tr. 1600, 1602.) Rubenstein also never told Allied Signal that it was being sold domestically, although Rubenstein did not know what Shellef told Allied. (12/23/09 Tr. 1170.) On multiple occasions, Shellef and Rubenstein worked together to sell Allied CFC in the domestic market. (12/23/09 Tr. 1115-27; 1/5/10 Tr. 1144-54.) Shellef used the Bayonne warehouse to store Allied CFC-113 and Rubenstein helped him with labeling and shipping. (12/23/09 Tr. 1043.) Shellef knew that the excise tax applied to the domestic sales, and never paid the tax. (Id. at 1025, 1083; 1/5/10 Tr. 1169-71; 1/11/10 Tr. 1606-15.) 2. Legal Standard Under 18 U.S.C. § 371, it is unlawful “[i]f two or more persons conspire ... to defraud the United States, or any agency thereof in any manner or for any purpose, and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy.” The elements of a conspiracy to defraud the government are: “(1) [that defendant] entered into an agreement (2) to obstruct a lawful function of the government (3) by deceitful or dishonest means and (4) at least one overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy.” Shellef, 507 F.3d at 104 (quoting United States v. Ballistrea, 101 F.3d 827, 832 (2d Cir.1996)); see also United States v. Stewart, 590 F.3d 93, 109 (2d Cir.2009). As the Second Circuit has explained, it is well established that the term “defraud” as used in section 371 “is interpreted much more broadly than when it is used in the mail and wire fraud statutes,” United States v. Rosengarten, 857 F.2d 76, 78 (2d Cir.1988), and that this provision “not only reaches schemes which deprive the government of money or property, but also is designed to protect the integrity of the United States and its agencies.” United States v. Nersesian, 824 F.2d 1294, 1313 (2d Cir. 1987). Thus, this section covers acts that “interfere with or obstruct one of [the United States’] lawful governmental functions by deceit, craft or trickery, or at least by means that are dishonest,” even if the Government is not “subject to property or pecuniary loss by the fraud.” Hammerschmidt v. United States, 265 U.S. 182, 188, 44 S.Ct. 511, 512 68 L.Ed. 968 (1924). Ballistrea, 101 F.3d at 831-32. “The essence of conspiracy is agreement. In order to convict a defendant of the crime of conspiracy, the government must show that two or more persons entered into a joint enterprise for an unlawful purpose, with awareness of its general nature and extent.” Torres, 604 F.3d at 65 (collecting cases); see also United States v. Snow, 462 F.3d 55, 68 (2d Cir.2006) (“To be guilty of conspiracy, there must be some evidence from which it can reasonably be inferred that the person charged with conspiracy knew of the existence of the scheme alleged in the indictment and knowingly joined and participated in it.”). “An individual defendant’s membership in a conspiracy may not be established simply by his presence at the scene of a crime, nor by the fact he knows that a crime is being committed.” United States v. Desimone, 119 F.3d 217, 223 (2d Cir.1997). However, “[t]he government’s proof of an agreement does not require evidence of a formal or express agreement; it is enough that the parties have a tacit understanding to carry out the prohibited conduct.” United States v. Nusraty, 867 F.2d 759, 763 (2d Cir.1989). “Evidence tending to show knowing participation in the conspiracy is also needed, i.e., facts sufficient to draw a logical and convincing connection between circumstantial evidence of an agreement, and the inference that an agreement was in fact made.” United States v. Jones, 393 F.3d 107, 111 (2d Cir.2004) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, the Second Circuit has noted that “[i]n cases of conspiracy, deference to the jury’s findings is especially important ... because a conspiracy by its very nature is a secretive operation, and it is a rare case where all aspects of a conspiracy can be laid bare in court with the precision of a surgeon’s scalpel.” United States v. Hawkins, 547 F.3d 66, 70 (2d Cir.2008) (quotation omitted). The government must also prove that defendant joined the agreement with the necessary criminal intent. See United States v. Villegas, 899 F.2d 1324, 1338 (2d Cir.1990) (“In order to prove a conspiracy, the government must present ‘some evidence from which it can reasonably be inferred that the person charged with conspiracy knew of the existence of the scheme alleged in the indictment and knowingly joined and participated in it.’ ” (quoting United States v. Sanchez Solis, 882 F.2d 693, 696 (2d Cir.1989))). “Both the existence of a conspiracy and a given defendant’s participation in it with the requisite knowledge and criminal intent may be established through circumstantial evidence.” Torres, 604 F.3d at 66 (internal quotation and alteration omitted). As the Second Circuit has explained: “A defendant’s knowing and willing participation in a conspiracy may be inferred from ... her presence at critical stages of the conspiracy that could not be explained by happenstance, or a lack of surprise when discussing the conspiracy with others.” It may also be established by “evidence that the defendant participated in conversations directly related to the substance of the conspiracy[,] possessed items important to the conspiracy,” or engaged in acts “exhibiting a consciousness of guilt, such as [making] false exculpatory statements.” In re Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in E. Africa, 552 F.3d 93, 113 (2d Cir.2008) (citations omitted). 3. Application Defendant argues that the government failed to prove: (1) the existence of an agreement to obstruct a lawful function of the government and, relatedly, (2) that Shellef had the specific intent to join such a scheme. For the reasons set forth below, the Court rejects both arguments and concludes that, after considering the whole record and viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict of guilty on Count One of the Indictment. a. Agreement Defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence of an agreement with respect to either the Elf Atochem or Allied Signal CFC-113. The Court considers each theory in turn. i. Elf Atochem Material There was sufficient evidence for the jury to rationally conclude that Shellef agreed to obstruct the IRS’s collection of excise taxes on the Elf Atochem material. Defendant argues that there was no such agreement, pointing to testimony from Rubenstein that he did not have any specific conversations with Shellef about avoiding paying the excise tax on the Elf Atochem shipments. (See Def.’s Br. at 33-34 (citing Tr. 1338).) However, there was considerable circumstantial evidence that Shellef and Rubenstein had a tacit agreement to obstruct the collection of the tax. For instance, Shellef knew that Rubenstein had purchased the material for export and that the excise tax had not been paid. Shellef nevertheless offered to “get rid of’ the material domestically. (12/22/09 Tr. 899-900; 12/23/09 Tr. 992-93.) Defendant instructed Rubenstein to put “reclaimed” labels on the material, even though the material had never been used. As discussed above, there was overwhelming evidence that the removal of alcohol from otherwise virgin CFC was not considered “reclamation” so as to render the material tax-exempt. Shellef also knew that Ruben-stein was putting false export labels on the material (12/23/09 Tr. 964-65) and told Rubenstein to “put whatever you want on it.” Finally, Rubenstein testified that he: “aided and abetted with reference to CFC-113, storing it, et cetera, and knowing that excise tax was not paid on it.” (12/22/09 Tr. 840.) Thus, there was sufficient evidence of a tacit agreement to defraud the government. Defendant argues that, because Rubenstein had the ultimate tax liability on the Elf Atochem material, Shellef had nothing to gain from obstructing the IRS’s collection of excise taxes and, therefore, no reason to enter an agreement to do so. However, on a conspiracy charge, the government is not required to prove that each co-conspirator has a financial interest in the goals of the conspiracy. See United States v. Henry, 325 F.3d 93, 105 (2d Cir.2003) (“[E]vidence of a financial stake in the venture is not essential to show that the defendant intended to facilitate the unlawful objective of the conspiracy.” (quoting United States v. Isabel, 945 F.2d 1193, 1203 (1st Cir.1991))); United States v. Torres, 901 F.2d 205, 245 (2d Cir.1990) (holding that a charge of conspiracy does not require proof that each co-conspirator share a “personal financial interest in the outcome of the conspiracy”); United States v. Salerno, 868 F.2d 524, 532 (2d Cir.1989) (“Even if the evidence is not conclusive that Corallo and Santoro contemplated any direct or immediate remuneration for their help ..., that does not mean that Corallo and Santoro were not co-conspirators.” (collecting cases)). In short, the Court concludes that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to rationally find that defendant entered an agreement with Rubenstein to defraud the government in connection with the sale of Elf Atochem material. ii. Allied Signal Material There was also sufficient evidence for the jury to rationally find that Rubenstein and Shellef had a tacit agreement to obstruct the IRS’s collection of excise taxes on the Allied Signal material. For instance, both Rubenstein and Shellef knew that Shellef had purchased the material for export under the contract. (12/23/09 Tr. 1083.) They both knew that the excise tax applied on domestic sales and that no such tax had been paid. (Id. at 1025, 1083; 1/5/10 Tr. 1169-71; 1/11/10 Tr. 1606-15.) Shellef nevertheless sold the material domestically, and Rubenstein agreed to assist him with the sales. Defendant argues primarily that Ruben-stein had little knowledge of Shellef s dealings with Allied (see 1/6/10 Tr. 1215), and, therefore, there could not have been any agreement to defraud the government. The Court rejects this argument. As a threshold matter, Shellef is not charged in Count One of the Indictment with conspiring to defraud Allied Signal, but, rather, ■with conspiring to defraud the government. Therefore, the government was not required to prove on Count One that there was an agreement to deceive Allied Signal. Furthermore, it is well settled that a conspirator need not know all the details of the scheme for there to be an agreement. See United States v. Huezo, 546 F.3d 174, 180 (2d Cir.2008) (“The government need not show that the defendant knew all of the details of the conspiracy, ‘so long as he knew its general nature and extent.’ ” (quoting United States v. Rosa, 17 F.3d 1531, 1543 (2d Cir.1994))); United States v. Nusraty, 867 F.2d 759, 763 (2d Cir.1989). Defendant focuses specifically on Rubenstein’s testimony that he did not know whether Shellef had told Allied Signal that the material was being sold domestically. (See 12/23/09 Tr. 1170.) Defendant argues that, because any scheme to defraud the IRS would necessarily depend on deceiving Allied Signal about the destination of the material, there could be no conspiracy unless there was direct evidence that Rubenstein knew that Shellef was, in fact, deceiving Allied. The Second Circuit rejected a similar argument in United States v. Sanzo, 673 F.2d 64 (2d Cir.1982). The Sanzo Court explained: Sanzo next argues that there was insufficient evidence to demonstrate a conspiracy of income tax evasion because no direct evidence showed that Trainello knew Sanzo would not report the receipts of the cash or that Sanzo knew Trainello would claim tax deductions .... [However,] [t]here was sufficient circumstantial evidence from which the jury could find in this case that Trainello knew that Sanzo was unlikely to report as income large sums of laundered money, and that Sanzo equally knew that Trainello would have to assign on his books some legitimate purpose for the payments .... Id. at 69. Similarly, in this case, the jury could rationally find, based on the evidence discussed above, that Rubenstein and Shellef had a tacit understanding that they would sell the material domestically and that Shellef would not tell Allied about the domestic sales. Defendant also argues that there could be no shared goal of defrauding the IRS because Rubenstein performed only lawful services, ie., warehousing and shipping, and charged Shellef his normal rate. However, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, the jury could rationally conclude that Rubenstein’s seemingly legitimate warehousing and shipping services were done in furtherance of the unlawful objective of the scheme. See United States v. Yannotti, 541 F.3d 112, 122 (2d Cir.2008) (“It is well-settled that a conspirator need not be fully informed about his co-conspirators’ specific criminal acts provided that he agreed to participate in the broader criminal conspiracy and the acts evincing participation were not outside of the scope of the illegal agreement. ‘A conspiracy may exist even if a conspirator does not agree to commit or facilitate each and every part of the substantive offense. The partners in the criminal plan must agree to pursue the same criminal objective and may divide up the work, yet each is responsible for the acts of the other.’ ” (quoting Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 63-64, 118 S.Ct. 469, 139 L.Ed.2d 352 (1997))); United States v. Henry, 325 F.3d 93, 105 (2d Cir.2003) (“The mere fact that Panek participated with Henry in the suspicious transactions at issue suggests an agreement.”); United States v. Gaviria, 805 F.2d 1108, 1116 (2d Cir.1986) (“‘Seemingly innocent acts taken individually may indicate complicity when viewed collectively and with reference to the circumstances in general.’” (quoting United States v. Mariani, 725 F.2d 862, 865-66 (2d Cir. 1984))); see also United States v. Martino, 759 F.2d 998, 1004 (2d Cir.1985). In short, the Court concludes that the evidence was sufficient for the jury to rationally find that Shellef and Rubenstein agreed to obstruct the collection of excise taxes on the Allied Signal material. 4. Fraudulent Intent The government also had to prove that Shellef had the specific intent to obstruct the IRS’s collection of excise taxes. See Shellef, 507 F.3d at 104 (“All that is necessary is that the scheme had the object of making it more difficult for the IRS to carry out its lawful functions and that the scheme depend on ‘dishonest or deceitful means.’ ” (quoting Ballistrea, 101 F.3d at 831-32)). As set forth below, there was sufficient circumstantial evidence that defendant had the requisite criminal intent to join the conspiracy to defraud the government charged in Count One. a. Elf Atochem There was sufficient evidence that Shellef acted with specific intent to defraud the government with respect to the Elf Atochem material. Shellef and Rubenstein discussed the fact that no excise tax had been paid on the material and that they did not want to pay the tax. Although the material was purchased tax-free for export, Shellef and Rubenstein worked together to sell it domestically. Shellef also instructed Rubenstein to put “reclaimed” labels on the unused material. Defendant argues that Shellef believed in good faith that his water wash process, which removed alcohol from unused material, rendered the Elf Atochem material “reclaimed,” and, therefore, tax-exempt. However, there was sufficient circumstantial evidence for the jury to rationally conclude that Shellef did not, in fact, have a good faith belief that his water wash process rendered the material reclaimed. As discussed above, it was well settled in the industry that unused material was virgin and, thus, not tax-exempt. Furthermore, when Shellef attempted to sell some of the Elf Atochem material to a domestic company in May 1997, Shellef described the material as virgin. (See 1/7/10 Tr. 1431-32; Ex. 13333.) This evidence indicates that Shellef believed that the material, which had never been used, was virgin and, therefore, not reclaimed or recycled. The government also introduced evidence of other similar acts by Shellef, from which the jury could properly infer criminal intent in this case. Finally, defendant argues that Shellef did not intend to defraud the IRS because he had no motive to do so — Rubenstein was the one who owed the tax. However, the jury could have found specific intent based on the evidence discussed above, b. Allied Signal There was also sufficient evidence that Shellef specifically intended to join the charged conspiracy with respect to the Allied CFC-113. For instance, Shellef and Rubenstein discussed the fact that the Allied Signal contract required Shellef to export the material, that no excise taxes had been paid, and that excise taxes would apply to any domestic sales. Shellef nevertheless sold the material domestically without telling Allied, and, indeed, affirmatively represented to Allied that he would sell it for export. (See Govt. Ex. 291.) In 1999, Shellef told Rubenstein that he had never filled out an export registration certificate and that “Allied Signal had screwed up by not asking him.” (1/5/10 Tr. 1163.) Shellef told Rubenstein that he thought that Allied Signal “was going to come after him for excise tax.” (Id. at 1162-63.) Shellef also falsely told his customers on the Allied material that the excise tax had been paid or “taken care of.” (12/21/09 Tr. 532-33; 1/7/10 Tr. 1384.) Shellef indicated consciousness of guilt when federal agents searched the Bayonne warehouse on October 2, 2000, stating that the federal agents were not after Ruben-stein and that Shellef “thought that they were after stuff that he did.” (1/5/10 Tr. 1167.) The government also introduced evidence of other similar acts by Shellef that indicate fraudulent intent in this case. Specifically, Shellef worked with Rubenstein to defraud two other companies, 3M and Raychem, by purchasing products for a lower price under the pretense that he would export the products; Shellef then sold those products to domestic customers while keeping the profits. (See 12/23/09 Tr. 1003-20.) The fact that Shellef engaged in such conduct and had such discussions is circumstantial evidence of his intention to obstruct the IRS’s collection of the tax. See, e.g., United States v. Gurary, 860 F.2d 521, 525 (2d Cir.1988) (“[T]he conversation ... regarding the tax difficulties ... indicates defendants were well aware their scheme would prevent or impede the IRS from learning the source of the cash received .... ”); see also, e.g., United States v. Meneilly, 78 F.Supp.2d 95, 103-04 (E.D.N.Y.1999) (“[T]he mere fact that there is no direct evidence that [defendant] and one or more of his co-conspirators discussed the effect that their intended conduct would have on the IRS is not fatal to the prosecution’s case. The necessary proof of intent may be predicated upon a finding that [defendant] and another conspirator or conspirators had ‘at least a tacit or mutual understanding that the IRS would not be informed ... and the IRS’ functions would accordingly be impaired.’ ” (quoting United States v. Collins, 78 F.3d 1021, 1039 (6th Cir.1996))), aff'd, 28 Fed.Appx. 26 (2d Cir.2001). Defendant argues that Shellefs conversation about the tax implications of domestic sales of Allied CFC-113 indicates only that Shellef intended to get out of an oppressive contract with Allied and let Allied be stuck with the tax liability. However, based on all of the evidence discussed above, the jury could rationally find that, even if Shellef intended to get out of his contract with Allied, he also had the intention of defrauding the government. See United States v. Stewart, 590 F.3d 93, 110 (2d Cir.2009) (“Stewart insists that she acted with the intent, not to defraud the government, but to ‘zealously’ represent her client.... [E]ven if Stewart acted with an intent to represent her client zealously, a rational jury could nonetheless have concluded that Stewart simultaneously acted with an intent to defraud the government.”). In short, the Court concludes, based on a review of the whole record and viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to rationally find that defendant was guilty of conspiring to obstruct the IRS’s collection of excise taxes on both the Elf Atochem and Allied Signal CFC-113. Accordingly, defendant’s motion for acquittal and/or a new trial with respect to Count One of the Indictment is denied. B. Count Two: Filing a False Tax Return In Count Two of the Indictment, defendant is charged with filing a false tax return in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1). For the reasons set forth below, the Court concludes that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict. 1. Factual Background The 1999 corporate tax return for Poly Systems, Shellefs company, was prepared by Shellefs accountant, Stephen Kashinsky of Stein Kashinsky. Kashinsky did not do an independent audit of Shellefs records and, instead, asked for all of Shellefs records and relied only on the information provided to him by Shellef. (1/11/10 Tr. 1708-10.) Shellef did not disclose to Kashinsky the existence of, or provide him with any information regarding, two bank accounts held in the name of Poly Systems: (1) Account Number 149001604 at Commercial Bank of New York (see Govt. Ex. 113); and (2) Account Number 5324007151 at North Fork Bank (see Govt. Ex. 116). (1/12/10 Tr. 1738^13, 1748-52.) These accounts held a total of $782,781 (id. at 1752) — which represented the proceeds from Shellefs domestic sales of Allied Signal CFC-113. (Id. at 1738-43, 1748-52.) Indeed, in August 1999, Shellef specifically instructed All Discount Labs, one of his domestic customers, to send payment to the Commercial Bank of New York account. (See 1/14/10 Tr. 2057-58.) After receiving an extension of time (1/12/10 Tr. 1787, 1804), Kashinsky filed the 1999 Poly Systems corporate tax return, which was signed by Shellef on September 14, 2000, and which was received by the IRS on September 18, 2000. (Govt. Ex. 98.) The tax return stated that the total amount of sales for Poly Systems for the year 1999 was $986,224, which was based on the documents provided by Shellef to Kashinsky. (Govt. Ex. 98; 1/11/10 Tr. 1716; 1/12/10 Tr. 1751.) The income figures on the return did not include the $782,781 held in the Commercial Bank and North Fork Bank accounts discussed above because Shellef did not provide any information on those accounts to his accountant. (1/12/10 Tr. 1751-52; see also 1/13/10 Tr. 1883.) Shellef fired Kashinsky in September 2000. (1/11/10 Tr. 1703.) On October 2, 2000, federal authorities searched Shellefs home in Great Neck, New York and his warehouse office in Bayonne, New Jersey. (1/7/10 Tr. 1497-98.) On October 5, 2000, Shellef met with a new accountant, Michael Maddaloni, and told him that there were Poly Systems sales that were not included on the original return. (1/13/10 Tr. 1878-79.) In November 2000, Shellef filed an amended tax return, which reported gross sales of $1,746,925 (about $800,000 in additional income). (1/13/10 Tr. 1872-73; Govt. Ex. 99.) 2. Application Under 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1), [a]ny person who ... [w]illfully makes and subscribes any return, statement, or other document, which contains or is verified by a written declaration that it is made under the penalties of perjury, and which he does not believe to be true and correct as to every material matter ... shall be guilty of a felony .... 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1). Thus, the elements the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt are: (1) that the defendant made or caused to be made, a federal income tax return for the year in question which he verified to be true; (2) that the tax return was false as to a material matter; (3) that the defendant signed the return willfully and knowing it was false; (4) that the return contained a written declaration that it was made under the penalty of perjury. A false statement is ‘material’ when it has ‘the potential for hindering the IRS’s efforts to monitor and verify the tax liability’ of the corporation and the taxpayer. United States v. Pirro, 212 F.3d 86, 89 (2d Cir.2000); see also United States v. LaSpina, 299 F.3d 165, 179 (2d Cir.2002). Defendant argues that the government failed to prove that Shellef acted willfully and also failed to prove that the tax return was false as to a material matter. For the reasons set forth below, the Court rejects both arguments. a. Willfulness In a prosecution under § 7206(1) “ ‘[wjillfully’ means ‘an intentional violation of a known legal duty’; gross carelessness or negligence is not sufficient.” United States v. Dyer, 922 F.2d 105, 108 (2d Cir. 1990) (citations omitted); see also Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 200, 111 S.Ct. 604, 112 L.Ed.2d 617 (1991) (defining “wilfulness” as “ ‘a voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal duty’ ” (quoting United States v. Bishop, 412 U.S. 346, 360, 93 S.Ct. 2008, 36 L.Ed.2d 941 (1973))). “The willfulness of one accused of tax crimes may be proved by circumstantial evidence. As a practical matter, such evidence is likely to be the only type to support or rebut a good faith defense other than the word of the defendant himself.” United States v. Schiff, 801 F.2d 108, 111 (2d Cir.1986) (citations omitted); see also United States v. Klausner, 80 F.3d 55, 63 (2d Cir.1996) (“Willfulness may be inferred from circumstantial evidence.”). The Court concludes that the evidence was sufficient for the jury to rationally find that defendant acted willfully in filing a false tax return. The evidence showed that Shellef did not report $782,781 in income, which represented the proceeds of his domestic sales of Allied Signal CFC-113. As discussed above, Shellef knew that this material had been purchased tax-free for export, but nevertheless sold the material domestically, did not tell Allied he was doing so, and did not himself pay the excise tax. He did not disclose to his accountant or provide any information regarding the two accounts that held the $782,781 in question. Indeed, Shellef specifically asked one of his customers to place the money from his domestic sales in the Commercial Bank of New York account that he did not tell his accountant about. Thus, there was sufficient circumstantial evidence that defendant’s false statement of income in the 1999 tax return was willful. See United States v. Bok, 156 F.3d 157, 166 (2d Cir.1998) (“[Defendant’s] failure to file ... until told to do so by the IRS is indicative of an intent to evade the tax system. This is particularly true in light of [defendant’s] legal education, which included coursework in both corporate and personal taxation.” (discussing willfulness requirement of 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1))); see also United States v. Perez, 612 F.3d 879, 887 (7th Cir.2010) (“[Willfulness may be inferred from conduct such as ... concealment of assets or covering up sources of income .... ” (quotation omitted)); United States v. Olbres, 61 F.3d 967, 972 (1st Cir.1995) (“To make matters worse, the two source materials that most easily could have identified the unreported income — the invoice log and the passbook for the business savings account — were withheld from the defendant’s accountant .... While the defendants maintained other books and records from which the existence of these funds could perhaps be gleaned ..., it is readily evident that a jury plausibly could infer from these facts that the defendants clumsily attempted to conceal income from both their tax preparer and their government.”) (finding sufficient circumstantial evidence of willfulness in tax evasion case). Defendant argues that the fact that he filed an amended tax return to include the previously omitted income is evidence of a lack of willfulness. As this Court instructed the jury (see 1/21/10 Tr. 2538), the fact that a defendant files an amended return may indicate a lack of willfulness. See Dyer, 922 F.2d at 108. However, although a jury could have found that the amended return indicated a lack of willfulness, the mere fact that Shellef filed an amended return does not by itself preclude a finding of willfulness by the jury. See, e.g., United States v. Tishberg, 854 F.2d 1070, 1073 (7th Cir.1988) (“[Defendant’s] subsequent conduct may demonstrate a good faith effort to correct his previous mistakes .... It does not, however, negate, the import of his previous action.”). Shellef did not tell either of his accountants about the two bank accounts or file an amended return until after the government searched his home and the Bayonne warehouse office on October 2, 2000. Thus, the circumstances surrounding the filing of the amended return provided a basis for the jury to rationally find that the amended return did not indicate a lack of willfulness in the filing of the original return. Defendant also argues that, because the two bank accounts in question were openly held in the name of Poly Systems, Inc. with the correct federal tax identification numbers (1/12/10 Tr. 1799-1801), there was insufficient evidence of willfulness. Specifically, defendant argues that the “open” nature of the accounts reveals a lack of intent to conceal the income and also that his accountant should have found the accounts and reported the income contained therein. In essence, defendant argues that he cannot be guilty of a crime based on the negligence of his accountant. However, given the evidence discussed above that Shellef did not provide information on the two accounts to his accountant, and the two accounts contained the income from the domestic sales of CFC, on which no excise tax had been paid, there was sufficient circumstantial evidence for the jury to conclude that Shellef acted willfully in filing a false tax return. b. Materiality Defendant argues that the misstated income resulted in an additional tax liability of only $4,000 (see Def.’s Br. at 46) and, therefore, the misstatement in the 1999 corporate tax return was immaterial as a matter of law. The Court rejects this argument for the reasons set forth below. “In general, a false statement is material if it has ‘a natural tendency to influence, or [is] capable of influencing, the decision of the decisionmaking body to which it was addressed.’ ” Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 16, 119 S.Ct. 1827, 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999) (quoting United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509, 115 S.Ct. 2310, 132 L.Ed.2d 444 (1995)); United States v. Mittelstaedt, 31 F.3d 1208, 1221 (2d Cir.1994) (holding that omitting information from tax return was material for purposes of § 7206(1) prosecution because it “ ‘had the potential for hindering the IRS’s efforts to monitor and verify [defendant’s] tax liability’ ” (quoting United States v. Greenberg, 735 F.2d 29, 32 (2d Cir.1984))); accord United States v. Klausner, 80 F.3d 55, 60 (2d Cir.1996) (“In order to establish a violation of § 7206(2), the government must prove that a tax return is false as to a material matter. In the present case, the itemized deductions on the income tax returns of [defendant’s] clients constituted material matters if they were essential to the accurate computation of the clients’ taxes.” (collecting cases)). In this ease, the fact that the additional tax liability may have been only $4,000 does not render the misstatement immaterial as a matter of law. See United States v. Citron, 783 F.2d 307, 313 (2d Cir.1986) (rejecting argument that material falsity for purposes of § 7206(1) is that which results in a substantial tax due); United States v. Greenberg, 735 F.2d 29, 31-32 (2d Cir.1984) (“[Defendant’s] argument that the misstatements were not material because they resulted in, at most, minimal underpayments of taxes ignores the potential of the misstatements for impeding the IRS’s performance of its responsibilities.”). The misstatement, which omitted Shellef s income from the domestic sales of CFC, clearly had the potential for impeding the IRS’s performance of its responsibilities regarding the collection of excise taxes on CFC-113. Thus, the Court rejects defendant’s argument that the misstatement of income was immaterial as a matter of law. In short, the Court concludes that the evidence was sufficient for the jury to rationally find defendant guilty of willfully filing a false tax return under Count Two of the Indictment. C. Counts 3-45: Wire Fraud Counts 3^15 of the Indictment charge Shellef with wire fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1343 in connection with his purchase of CFC-113 from Allied Signal. For the reasons set forth below, after having considered the whole record and viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, the Court concludes that the evidence was sufficient for the jury to rationally find defendant guilty of the wire fraud counts. 1. Factual Background As discussed above, Shellef agreed to purchase approximately 700,000 pounds of CFC-113 from Allied Signal pursuant to a January 1, 1996 Agreement (hereinafter “1996 Agreement”). (Govt. Ex. 227.) The first paragraph of the contract provided: Destination of Material: Buyer hereby represents and warrants that Material to be sold and purchased hereunder shall be for resale to entities within the following countries only (the “Territory”): Israel, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Egypt and Jordan. (Govt. Ex. 227, ¶ 1.) The agreement also provided: Any tax or other governmental charge upon the inventory, sale and/or shipment of the Material including any federal excise tax imposed on the sale of the Material ... which is not anticipated by Seller at the time of contract execution but hereafter becomes effective for or during the period hereof, shall be added to the price herein provided, and shall be invoiced to Buyer.... Seller agrees to pay any such tax or other governmental charge to the appropriate federal, state or municipal authority .... Buyer agrees to indemnify and hold Seller harmless from any liability for additional taxes, interest or penalties assessed by any federal, state or municipal authority and based upon a determination that the tax or governmental charge should have been paid by Seller prior to the time described above, but after execution of this Contract. (Govt. Ex. 227, ¶ ll.C.) In other words, if excise taxes became due on the material, Allied was entitled to collect the amount of the tax from Shellef. {See 12/16/09 Tr. 211-12.) In about 1996-97, Shellef became aware that he could no longer export CFC-113 to Israel and stopped doing so. {See 12/23/09 Tr. 1081; Govt. Ex. 261.) Beginning in 1997, Shellef stopped ordering the Allied material as required. {See Def.’s Br. at 23.) After some negotiations between the parties, the contract was amended in December 1997 (Govt. Ex. 252) and again in January 1998 (Govt. Ex. 272). Both of those amended contracts left unchanged the requirement that Shellef export the material to the specifically defined territory. However, in September 1998, Shellef began selling the Allied material domestically. {See, e.g., Govt. Exs. 443, 444, 449.) On September 11,