Green v. Missouri (734 F. Supp. 2d 814, 2010)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

RODNEY W. SIPPEL, District Judge.

In a thirteen count complaint, Plaintiff Percy Green, II has sued more than twenty defendants for violations of his constitutional and statutory civil rights and the Missouri common law. All claims concern his arrest at a St. Louis City School Board meeting on November 18, 2003 and his subsequent prosecution. In three separate motions, the defendants have moved for summary judgment. In the first motion, Defendants Michael Quinn, JoAnn Freeman Morrow, Julius Hunter, Chris Goodson, and Francis Slay, as current or former members of the St. Louis Board of Police Commissioners, Secretary Paul Nocchiero, and Chief of Police Joseph Mokwa, as well as individual officers David Doetzel, Michael Regan, Andrew Griffin, Daniel Peek, John Podolak, and Brent Knox jointly moved for summary judgment. In the second motion, Defendants Charles McCrary, Kestner Miller, and the Special Administrative Board of the Transitional School District of the City of St. Louis jointly moved for summary judgment. And in the final motion, Defendants City of St. Louis, Francis Slay, as Mayor of the City of St. Louis, and two prosecutors, David Miller and John Bouhasin, jointly moved for summary judgment. For the reasons stated below, I will grant summary judgment on some claims and deny judgment on others.

1. Background

Plaintiff Percy Green is a well-known civil rights activist in St. Louis. Green’s long history of civil rights activism is discussed in the landmark employment discrimination case, McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). Three decades after Green’s civil rights activities reached the Supreme Court, Green became concerned about the actions taken by a new slate of candidates who were elected to the St. Louis School Board in the Spring of 2003. After being officially sworn in, the new School Board’s actions caused an outpouring of anger in the district and swelled the number of people attending School Board meetings. Green was one of the people who began attending School Board meetings, and his arrest at the November 18, 2003 School Board meeting gave rise to this lawsuit.

Green filed his initial complaint on November 17, 2006. Over the course of the last three and a half years, Green has amended his complaint four times. In its final iteration, Green seeks damages for his personal injuries, loss of employment and economic opportunities, personal embarrassment, damage to his reputation, litigation costs, and his sense of personal distress regarding “movement losses.” In this case, the “movement loss” at issue is not Green’s seizure at the School Board meeting or the loss of his freedom to move. Rather, Green asserts that he was damaged because the success of “the movement” was of great personal importance to him. He claims he is entitled to damages for the failure of “the movement” because after his arrest, attendance at meetings “dropped off.”

Before discussing the claims Green has made and the evidence the parties have submitted in support of and in opposition to summary judgment, it is necessary to explain the difficulty the defendants and the Court have encountered in their attempts to understand what, exactly, Green’s claims and legal arguments are. Green is represented by counsel, and I have asked Green for clarification. Green’s memoranda and responses frequently lack clarity and generally do not assist me in understanding his claims or arguments. It appears Green has made the following claims.

In Count I, Green sues Charles McCrary and Kestner Miller (“School Security Officers”) and David Doetzel, Michael Regan, Andrew Griffin, Daniel Peek, John Podolak, Brent Knox, Craig Hebrank, Daniel Sweeney, and Byron Willis (“Defendant Police Officers”), for violation of Green’s First, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights in their individual capacities. It is not clear whether Green asserts this count against the Special Administrative Board of the Transitional School District of the City of St. Louis (“SAB”) and the Police Department through its Chief of Police Joseph Mokwa, its Secretary Paul Nocchiero, and Board Members Michael Quinn, JoAnn Freeman Morrow, Julius Hunter, Chris Goodson, and Francis Slay, in their capacities as current or former members of the St. Louis Board of Police Commissioners (“Police Board”).

In Count II, Green sues School Security Officers and Defendant Police Officers for violation of his statutory civil rights. Green alleges that School Security Officers and Defendant Police Officers engaged in intentional wrongful conduct and violence toward him, and they had no lawful authority to arrest him or use force against him. Green also claims the actions were done with actual malice and with willful and wanton indifference to, and deliberate disregard, for Green’s constitutional rights. Green seeks exemplary and punitive damages.

In Count III, Green sues the Police Board for violations of Green’s constitutional rights. Green claims that the Police Department had a policy and practice to authorize, acquiesce to, and cover up the use of excessive force. Green further assets the Police Department had a policy and practice of authorizing its officers to verbally abuse detainees, and that these policies and practices caused Green to experience a constitutional deprivation. Green also claims the Police Department failed to adequately train, direct, supervise or control Defendant Police Officers concerning the use of excessive force and verbal abuse.

In Count IV, Green alleges that Defendant Police Officers, School Security Officers, and the Police Department conspired to violate his constitutional and statutory civil rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985 and the Equal Protection and Privileges and Immunities Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.

The Complaint does not contain any counts numbered V through VIII.

In Count IX, Green asserts a claim against the Police Department for respondeat superior liability for the intentional torts committed by Defendant Police Officers.

In Count X, Green asserts another claim against the Police Department, through the Police Board, for respondeat superior liability for the intentional torts of Defendant Police Officers, specifically the use of excessive force in the line of duty. Green claims that because the Police Department expressly authorized the use of excessive force, he is entitled to exemplary damages for the malicious conduct of Defendant Police Officers.

In Count XI, Green asserts a claim for negligence against Defendant Police Officers and School Security Officers. Green claims that Defendant Police Officers and School Security Officers were negligent when they used excessive force against him.

In Count XII, Green seeks exemplary and punitive damages from Defendant Police Officers and School Security Officers because their negligent violence was done with willful and wanton indifference to, and deliberate disregard for, human life and Green’s rights.

In Count XIII, Green seeks damages from the Police Department for the negligence of Defendant Police Officers through the doctrine of respondeat superior because Defendant Police Officers’ negligence was committed within the scope of their employment and was an approved custom and usage of, or was encouraged, or acquiesced to, by the Police Department.

In Count XIV, Green asserts that the Police Department was negligent in that it failed to provide adequate training, supervision and control of Defendant Police Officers, and that Green was injured as a result of that failure.

In Count XV, Green claims he is entitled to punitive and exemplary damages from the Police Department for its failure to adequately train and supervise Defendant Police Officers because the failure to do so constitutes willful and wanton indifference to, and a deliberate disregard for, human life and the rights of private citizens, including Green.

In Count XVI, Green asserts a claim of malicious abuse of process, false arrest, and false imprisonment against School Security Officers and Defendant Police Officers. Green claims School Security Officers and Defendant Police Officers used the criminal process against him in order to intimidate him and dissuade him from asserting his rights, to cover up their own wrongdoing, and to avoid civil and criminal liability for their own acts. Green also claims School Security Officers and Defendant Police Officers falsely arrested him and falsely imprisoned him or caused him to be imprisoned.

In Count XVII, Green sues City of St. Louis, Francis Slay, as Mayor of the City of St. Louis, and two prosecutors, David Miller and John Bouhasin (collectively “City Defendants”), for malicious prosecution in violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983 and 1985. Green claims David Miller, Bouhasin, Slay, and the City of St. Louis conspired to deprive him of his rights to free speech, free assembly, and equal protection under the United States Constitution by prosecuting him in retaliation for exercising his constitutional rights.

Green also repeatedly asserts that his Thirteenth Amendment rights were violated, but it is not clear under which count he brings his Thirteenth Amendment claim. Because it is a constitutional right, I will group it with his other constitutional claims in Count I.

What occurred at the November 18, 2003 School Board meeting prior to Green’s arrest

Green attended a meeting of the St. Louis School Board on November 18, 2003. At that time, Green was sixty-eight years old. The meeting was held in the auditorium at Carr Lane School. Green testified that the auditorium was nearly full and “an enormous number of people” were present. Among them were School Security Officers; both McCrary, the Director of Security for the St. Louis Public Schools, and Kestner Miller, a School Safety Officer, were inside the auditorium during the meeting. McCrary testified that due to recent acts of violence against board members at prior meetings, he was ordered to provide additional school security personnel and a contingent of St. Louis police officers at the November 18, 2003 meeting. Kestner Miller testified that his duties were to provide security and maintain order, and he received all instructions from his supervisor, McCrary. Several of Defendant Police Officers, namely Doetzel, Regan, Griffin, Podolak, and Knox, were stationed inside the building. Peek, another Defendant Police Officer, was stationed outside the Carr Lane School on the street.

McCrary was aware of Green’s prior civil rights activities and considered Green “a well known civil rights activist in the St. Louis area.” Before that night, Kestner Miller did not have personal knowledge of Green’s history as a civil rights activist. Doetzel, Regan, Griffin, Podolak, Knox, and Peek all testified that they were unaware of Green’s history of civil rights activity.

The November 18, 2003 meeting was contentious, and speakers were routinely interrupted by shouts from the audience. Green observed a lot of yelling. According to Green, the yelling was coming from “everywhere in the auditorium.” Green heard yelling from his right, his left, behind him, and in front of him.

There is a factual dispute concerning Green’s behavior at the meeting. Green states that he spoke during the public access time, but during other portions of the meeting, he did not make “any noise” louder than a conversational tone, and he did not “boo.” Byron Clemens, a St. Louis Public School teacher, testified that he paid “close attention” to Green during the meeting. Clemens noticed outbursts during the meeting, but none of them were centered near Green. Clemens also testified that at no time did Green, in a public way, say or do anything boisterous, contentious, disruptive, or inappropriate. R. William Purdy, a former teacher and administrator in the St. Louis Public Schools, testified that Green was seated about 10 to 15 feet in front of him and to the right. Purdy witnessed many others speak out of turn, yell, boo, or otherwise interfere with the meeting, but Green was not seated with the people behaving that way. Purdy testified that due to his proximity to Green at the meeting, he can state “with certainty” that Green spoke only during the public comment portion of the meeting and did not boo or disrupt the meeting in any manner.

For purposes of this motion, Defendant Police Officers and Police Board agree that Green was not boisterous or disruptive. Other defendants, namely the School Security Officers and SAB, deny that Green comported himself quietly and calmly during the meeting. McCrary claims that he heard Green repeatedly make loud disruptive outbursts, but he is unable to remember the specific words Green spoke. McCrary also testified that he heard the School Board President, Darnetta Clinkscale repeatedly ask Green to refrain from making disruptive outbursts and that he, himself, made a personal request that Green stop his outbursts while School Board members were conducting their discussions. McCrary also testified that he did not ask any police officers to arrest Green, and he did not enter an agreement with any police officers or “named defendants” to arrest or prosecute Green.

It appears that Kestner Miller did not see or hear Green make any loud outbursts. When asked to state what comments or statements Green made during the meeting, Kestner Miller did not mention any loud outbursts. Kestner Miller did, however, witness others telling Green to be quiet. For example, Kestner Miller testified that he witnessed Clinkscale repeatedly ask Green to refrain from making verbal disruptions. Kestner Miller also testified that he witnessed McCrary ask Green not to make any outbursts. Kestner Miller testified that he did not ask police officers to arrest Green, and he did not enter an agreement with any police officers or “named defendants” to arrest or prosecute Green.

There is also a factual dispute about what happened when School Security Officers approached Green. Green testified that the first “unusual” thing was that Kestner Miller approached him and told him he would have to leave. Green states that he responded, “Have to leave? Why am I asked — Why am I being asked to leave? I have every right to be at this meeting as anyone else. I’m a taxpayer. And so, therefore, I’m not leaving.” Green testified that he believed Kestner Miller leaned down and said, “I’m asking you to leave again.” Green states that he refused again and then noticed Kestner Miller’s supervisor, McCrary, standing 35 to 50 feet away near a column to Kestner Miller’s right. Green said Kestner Miller looked toward McCrary. Green then witnessed McCrary gesture with his left hand for someone in the back of the room to come forward, but Green could not see to whom McCrary signaled. Before McCrary made the gesture, Green had not seen any police officers that night, and no one had mentioned anything about the officers to him. After McCrary signaled, a police officer approached Green and ordered him to leave. Green testified that when he asked the officer why he was being asked to leave, the officer told him “they don’t want you here.” Green said that he responded that he had a right to be at the meeting, the officer reiterated his request that Green leave the meeting, and Green was arrested shortly thereafter.

McCrary testified that he and Kestner Miller approached Green together to ask him to leave the auditorium. After Green refused, McCrary says he summoned the St. Louis City police officers and asked them for assistance in requesting Green leave the auditorium. According to Kestner Miller, when he approached Green and asked Green to refrain from making loud outbursts, Green responded, “you are full of bullshit.” Kestner Miller states that St. Louis City police officers then asked Green to leave the auditorium.

The police report is consistent with Kestner Miller’s testimony and supports portions of McCrary’s testimony, but contradicts other portions. The report states that McCrary and Kestner Miller confronted Green on two occasions and asked him to refrain from any loud outbursts. According to the police report, McCrary did not ask the officers for assistance in requesting that Green leave the auditorium. Instead, the report states that after McCrary asked Green to leave, McCrary summoned officers Podolak and Doetzel and requested that Green be arrested for peace disturbance.

Other witnesses also testified about what happened in the moments before School Security Officers approached Green. Purdy testified that after he saw Clinkscale signal to McCrary, a security officer approached Green and ordered him to leave. Purdy then observed McCrary signal to someone at the back of the room. Clemens testified that as Green sat in his seat quietly and doing nothing, Clinkscale signaled to McCrary, who nodded in agreement. Clemens saw another school security officer, who he later learned was Kestner Miller, approach Green. Clemens testified that Kestner Miller motioned to McCrary who beckoned two uniformed police officers.

What the police officers knew at the time they arrested Green

Five of Defendant Police Officers participated in Green’s arrest at the School Board meeting: Regan, Doetzel, Griffin, Podolak, and Knox. Officer Peek testified that he was not present at the School Board meeting, and was instead stationed outside the building. Peek did not participate in removing Green from the meeting, and his only involvement in the incident was conveying Green to the Justice Center for booking after Green was brought to the police cruiser by the other officers. Peek testified that he did not come to an agreement with any other person concerning Green’s constitutional rights and that his actions in driving Green to the Justice Center were not motivated by Green’s race or civil rights activities. Peek claims his sole motivation was his assignment to convey any arrested person to the Justice Center.

Officers Regan, Doetzel, Griffin, Podolak, and Knox submitted nearly identical affidavits concerning their actions and knowledge before they arrested Green. They each testified that they were detailed to the School Board meeting due to recent disturbances at the meetings and were stationed outside the auditorium until summoned by McCrary, who advised the officers that Green “was disrupting the meeting by making loud oral outbursts and requested assistance in requesting Plaintiff to leave the auditorium.” In their answers to Green’s second set of interrogatories, Regan, Doetzel, Griffin, Podolak, and Knox each testified that they “ha[d] no specific recollection of any specific words being spoken by [Green] prior to his arrest.” Regan, Doetzel, Griffin, Podolak, and Knox also testified that they had no knowledge of Green’s conduct “other than the information provided by Mr. McCrary,” and their actions in helping to arrest Green were not motivated by Green’s race or civil rights activities, and were solely motivated by the information provided by McCrary. They each testified that they did not come to an agreement with any other officer or any person concerning Green’s constitutional rights. The only difference among the affidavits was that Regan’s affidavit noted that McCrary is African American.

Green disputes that Regan, Doetzel, Knox, Griffin, and Podolak were outside the auditorium. Green testified that he saw McCrary signal to the back of the auditorium, but he did not see the group at the back of the auditorium. Clemens testified that he saw McCrary signal to the back of the room where police officers were standing. Purdy also testified that he saw McCrary signal to someone at the back of the room and then a uniformed officer immediately approached. Although there appears to be a factual dispute over whether the officers were stationed outside the auditorium or at the back, this dispute is not material because there is no evidence that the officers witnessed any of Green’s conduct during the meeting.

Facts relating to Green’s “resistance” to arrest and the amount of force used in arresting Green

Green testified that after he was told he was under arrest, an officer grabbed his arm. The officers had to use their own strength to handcuff Green because he went limp. The officers pulled Green to the floor and placed him on his stomach. His face never impacted the ground in any significant manner. Green said that when the officers placed him face down on the floor, it was painful, but he did not scream out. Green also testified that the officers began to pull and drag him out of the auditorium, and he was dragged approximately 30 to 50 feet out a side door to a police cruiser.

Purdy testified that a uniformed police officer yanked Green “violently” by his arm and out of his seat and “threw” Green on the floor. Clemens testified that, without warning, an officer “violently grabbed” Green by the arm and yanked him on to the floor. Another officer then helped to “violently” roll Green onto the floor. According to Clemens, the officers, joined by several other uniformed officers, “dragged” Green out the door.

Kestner Miller stated that Green held on to the side of his seat when the police officers asked him to leave. McCrary stated that Green “fell to the floor in what is known as ‘Passive Resistance Mode’ and placed his body in an outstretched rigid form, which caused the officers to have to carry him out of the auditorium.” Clemens testified that “Green put up absolutely no resistance and there was no resistance in his hands to being handcuffed.” Clemens explained that as officers “dragged” Green out, “Green was limp and did not kick or thrust his body or arms in any manner to resist or attack the police officers.” Purdy testified that “Green made no action of resistance of any type.” Green testified that he “just went limp” because he did not want the officers to claim that he had hit them or kicked them. None of the police officers testified that Green resisted them in any manner.

Green also submitted a video of the arrest that was shot by local St. Louis television station NewsChannel 5. The video clip shows an officer and Green conversing and Green calmly waving his hand back and forth as if to say, “no.” The officer then grabbed Green’s left arm and began to pull Green from the chair. Another officer placed his hand on Green’s back to assist in pulling Green from the chair. The video also shows that Green did not actively resist. There is no indication of any violence on the video.

Green testified that after he was out of the view of the auditorium, an officer tightened his handcuffs. Once Green reached the cruiser, Green stepped into the rear and sat on one of the benches. Peek then drove Green to the Justice Center for booking. During the ride to the Justice Center, which lasted about 5 or 10 minutes, Green sat alone in the rear of the van. As he rode to the Justice Center, Green experienced 6 or 7 abrupt stops, but the stops did not cause him to fall or hit the inside of the cruiser. Green testified that the abrupt stops caused the handcuffs to tighten. Green could not see the road, and it was impossible for him to know why the driver was stopping.

The only physical injuries Green claims to have suffered are injuries to his wrists caused by the handcuffs. Green testified that his circulation was cut off and did not return for a couple of months. The handcuffs left a mark which ultimately receded, and Green never sought medical treatment for his alleged wrist injuries. Green also testified that he currently has no problems with his hands or wrists attributable to Defendant Police Officers’ conduct.

Facts concerning the prosecution of Green

David Miller was the Attorney Manager in the City Counselor’s Office assigned to the Municipal Courts. John Bouhasin was an Assistant City Counselor primarily assigned as a prosecutor in Municipal Court from November 2003 to December 31, 2005. Francis Slay was the Mayor of the City of St. Louis during all of 2003 to 2006.

After Green was arrested for peace disturbance, David Miller charged Green with peace disturbance and resisting arrest. David Miller testified that he based his decision to prosecute Green on information he was told by a police officer: that Green was disturbing a Board of Education meeting by “screaming, yelling, jumping up and down on tables,” and he believed that amounted to peace disturbance. Bouhasin testified that the charges were improperly dismissed from a “call docket” on June 17, 2005.

Bouhasin testified that he decided to refile the charges against Green because there were witnesses that wished to testify and prosecute Green, and in Bouhasin’s opinion, there were sufficient facts to pursue the charges. Green’s attorney, Robert Reinhold, testified that when he asked David Miller about why the charges were refiled, David Miller answered, “The may- or wants us to refile them, and we do what the mayor wants.” David Miller testified that the exchange between Reinhold and him did not occur. David Miller acknowledged that refiling charges was rare, and during his thirty years in the City Counselor’s officer he had probably refiled charges less than fifteen times. Slay denies having personally communicated with David Miller or Bouhasin regarding Green’s prosecution. Slay also denies requesting that David Miller or Bouhasin refile the charges against Green after they had been dismissed.

II. Legal Standard

In considering whether to grant summary judgment, a district court examines the “pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(2). Summary judgment is appropriate if the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, demonstrates that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Lynn v. Deaconess Medical Center, 160 F.3d 484, 486 (8th Cir.1998). When a genuine issue of material fact exists, summary judgment should not be granted.

The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial responsibility of informing the court of the basis of its motion and identifying those portions of the affidavits, pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file which it believes demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). When such a motion is made and supported by the movant, the nonmoving party may not rest on his pleadings but must produce sufficient evidence to support the existence of the essential elements of his case on which he bears the burden of proof. Id. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548. In resisting a properly supported motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party has an affirmative burden to designate specific facts creating a triable controversy. Crossley v. Georgian-Pacific Corp., 355 F.3d 1112, 1113 (8th Cir.2004).

III. Discussion

Before analyzing the individual bases for summary judgment that the various parties have raised, I will address Green’s Fifth, Eighth and Thirteenth Amendment claims brought against all parties, and any claim he brings under 42 U.S.C. § 1982.

Both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution contain Due Process Clauses. The Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause limits the actions of the federal government, and a plaintiff may sue for violations under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971). The Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause applies to state action, and a plaintiff may sue for violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In this case, all defendants were state or municipal officials, and none were federal officials. Because the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause applies only to federal action, and no defendants are federal actors, I will grant judgment on Green’s Fifth Amendment claims as to all defendants.

I will also grant judgment to all defendants on Green’s Eighth Amendment claims. The Supreme Court has made explicit “that all claims that law enforcement officers have used excessive force— deadly or not — in the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other ‘seizure’ of a free citizen should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its ‘reasonableness’ standard.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989) (emphasis in original). After a conviction, “the Eighth Amendment ... serves as the primary source of substantive protection to convicted prisoners in cases ... where the deliberate use of force is challenged as excessive and unjustified.” Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 327, 106 S.Ct. 1078, 89 L.Ed.2d 251 (1986) (emphasis added). Green was not convicted of any of the charges arising from his November 18, 2003 arrest. The parties do not dispute that the only force used against Green was during his arrest and transportation to the police station. As a result, all defendants are entitled to judgment on Green’s Eighth Amendment claims.

Green also alleges that the defendants have deprived him of his Thirteenth Amendment rights. Section one of the Thirteenth Amendment provides, “Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.” While primarily directed at the enslavement of Blacks in the southern states, the Thirteenth Amendment applies to all compulsory servitude. The Amendment extends beyond slavery and applies to cases where involuntary service is compelled by the use or threatened use of physical or legal coercion. United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 948, 108 S.Ct. 2751, 101 L.Ed.2d 788 (1988). In this case, there is no evidence that Green was compelled to labor for defendants or that defendants intended to force Green, through physical or legal coercion, to serve them. As a result, I will grant judgment to all defendants on Green’s claims under the Thirteenth Amendment. Additionally, to the extent that Green assert claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1982, I will grant judgment to all defendants because there is no evidence that Green was denied the right “to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property.”

I turn now to the individual motions for summary judgment filed by the various defendants.

A. Claims Green brings against Defendant Police Officers

1. Fourth Amendment Claims

Defendant Police Officers argue that Green’s Fourth Amendment Unlawful Arrest claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 fails as a matter of law because the officers had probable cause to arrest Green for peace disturbance and resisting arrest. They also argue that, even if they lacked probable cause to arrest Green, they are entitled to qualified immunity because they did not violate any clearly established constitutional right. Defendant Police Officers argue that Green’s Fourth Amendment Excessive Force claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 fails as a matter of law because the officers used reasonable force, and they are entitled to qualified immunity because right to be iree from the de minimis force applied to Green was not clearly established.

The doctrine of qualified immunity shields government officials “from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 129 S.Ct. 808, 815, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009). “Qualified immunity balances two important interests — the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably.” Id. Officials are not entitled to qualified immunity if “(1) the facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, demonstrate the deprivation of a constitutional right; and (2) the right was clearly established at the time of the deprivation.” Baribeau v. City of Minneapolis, 596 F.3d 465, 474 (8th Cir.2010). Under current Supreme Court precedent, I may exercise my “sound discretion” to decide “which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand.” Id.

a. Unlawful arrest

In Green’s case, I believe it is most beneficial to first address whether the facts establish that Green was arrested in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched.” U.S. Const, amend. IV. “[A] police officer may arrest without warrant one believed by the officer upon reasonable cause to have been guilty of a felony.” United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 417, 96 S.Ct. 820, 46 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976). Similarly, a warrant is not required when an officer witnesses a criminal offense. “If an officer has probable cause to believe that an individual has committed even a very minor criminal offense in his presence, he may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender.” Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001); Baribeau, 596 F.3d at 474; see also Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 128 S.Ct. 1598, 1607, 170 L.Ed.2d 559 (2008) (“[Wjarrantless arrests for crimes committed in the presence of an arresting officer are reasonable under the Constitution.... ”).

There is probable cause for an arrest when the facts and circumstances within the knowledge of the arresting officers and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient to warrant a prudent person in believing that the person arrested had committed or was committing an offense. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91, 85 S.Ct. 223, 13 L.Ed.2d 142 (1964). ‘Whether probable cause exists depends on the reasonable conclusion to be drawn from the facts known to the arresting officer at the time of arrest.” Baribeau, 596 F.3d at 474.

Probable cause is a “practical, nontechnical conception” and must be evaluated based on the totality of the circumstances. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231-232, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983). “The substance of all the definitions of probable cause is a reasonable ground for belief of guilt.” Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949). “A reasonable ground for belief means more than bare suspicion, but less than evidence which would justify condemnation or conviction.” Baribeau, 596 F.3d at 474. “Probable cause exists where the facts and circumstances within the officers’ knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been or is being committed.” Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 175-76, 69 S.Ct. 1302. In this case, each officer testified that he did not have any personal knowledge of the facts that would cause them to believe Green had committed an offense. Instead, they relied solely on information provided by McCrary. This requires me to analyze two separate issues: (1) whether the officers reasonably found the information McCrary provided them to be trustworthy and reliable; and (2) whether the information provided, if reliable, could establish probable cause that Green had committed a crime.

When analyzing the totality of the circumstances, “an informant’s veracity, reliability, and basis of knowledge are all relevant and important factors.” United States v. Palega, 556 F.3d 709, 714 (8th Cir.2009). “The core question in assessing probable cause based on information supplied by an informant is whether the information is reliable. Information may be sufficiently reliable to support a probable cause finding if the person providing the information has a track record of supplying reliable information, or if it is corroborated by independent evidence.” United States v. Williams, 10 F.3d 590, 593 (8th Cir.1993).

The Missouri Attorney General claims that Clay v. Conlee, 815 F.2d 1164 (8th Cir.1987), states that law enforcement officers are entitled to rely on information supplied by a witness to a crime, absent some indication that the information is not reasonably trustworthy or reliable. That is not a correct reading of Clay, however. The case states that law enforcement officers may rely on information supplied “by the victim of a crime, absent some indication that the information is not reasonably trustworthy or reliable.” Id.; see also United States v. McKinney, 328 F.3d 993, 994 (8th Cir.2003); Peterson v. City of Plymouth, 60 F.3d 469, 474-75 (8th Cir.1995). This is because information furnished by a victim is generally considered to be reliable, and the “skepticism and careful scrutiny usually found in cases involving informants ... is appropriately relaxed if the informant is an identified victim.” Clay, 815 F.2d at 1168 (citing Easton v. City of Boulder, 776 F.2d 1441, 1449 (10th Cir.1985)).

In this case, Defendant Police Officers did not receive any information from the victim of a crime, thereby making the Clay victim-identification bright-line rule inapplicable to Green’s situation. Instead, Doetzel, Regan, Griffin, Podolak, and Knox each indicated that their sole source of information about Green’s alleged outbursts was McCrary, who advised them in person that Green was disrupting the meeting. When determining whether information provided by an informant is reliable, more weight is given to information when officers meet face-to-face with an informant and judge him to be credible. United States v. Wallace, 550 F.3d 729, 734 (8th Cir.2008). Similarly, informants are considered more reliable and credible when they voluntarily contact law enforcement and provide their personal information. United States v. Bell, 480 F.3d 860, 863 (8th Cir.2007). In this ease, it is undisputed that McCrary met face-to-face with some of Defendant Police Officers and told them Green was making loud oral outbursts. The fact that McCrary contacted law enforcement in person and provided his personal information to the arresting officers suggests he should be considered a reliable and credible informant.

Having determined that the officers acted reasonably in finding the information provided to them by McCrary was reliable, I must now determine whether that information established probable cause that Green had committed or was committing a crime. Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 175-76, 69 S.Ct. 1302. In this case, Defendant Police Officers argue they had probable cause to arrest Green for peace disturbance and resisting arrest. Although Defendant Police Officers initially did not assert that they had probable cause to arrest Green for any other violations, upon my request for additional briefing, Defendant Police Officers argued they had probable cause to arrest Green for trespass.

The ordinances of the City of St. Louis make peace disturbance a misdemeanor offense. Section 15.36.030 of the St. Louis Municipal Ordinances, provides:

Any person who shall disturb the peace of others by noisy, riotous or disorderly conduct, or by violent, tumultuous, offensive or obstreperous conduct or carriage, or by loud and unusual noises, or by seemly, profane, obscene, indecent, lewd or offensive language, calculated to provoke a breach of the peace, or by assaulting, striking or fighting another in any park, street, alley, highway, thoroughfare, public place or public resort within the City ... so that others in the vicinity are disturbed thereby, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.

Peace disturbance is also illegal under Missouri state law. Section 574.010 of the Missouri Revised Statutes provides:

1. A person commits the crime of peace disturbance if: (1) He unreasonably and knowingly disturbs or alarms another person or persons by (a) Loud noise; or (b) Offensive language addressed in a face-to-face manner to a specific individual and uttered under circumstances which are likely to produce an immediate violent response from a reasonable recipient; or (c) Threatening to commit a felonious act against any person under circumstances which are likely to cause a reasonable person to fear that such threat may be carried out; or (d) Fighting; or (e) Creating a noxious and offensive odor; (2) He is in a public place or on private property of another without consent and purposely causes inconvenience to another person or persons by unreasonably and physically obstructing: (a) Vehicular or pedestrian traffic; or (b) The free ingress or egress to or from a public or private place.

2. Peace disturbance is a class B misdemeanor upon the first conviction. Upon a second or subsequent conviction, peace disturbance is a class A misdemeanor. Upon a third of subsequent conviction, a person shall be sentenced to pay a fine of no less than one thousand dollars and no more than five thousand dollars.

The Missouri courts have long “held that statutes abridging speech are constitutional to the extent that they prohibit only that speech which is likely to incite others to immediate violence.” State v. Carpenter, 736 S.W.2d 406, 408 (Mo.1987). Thus, a statute or ordinance must be construed only to prevent “fighting words.” Id. The Missouri Supreme Court has cautioned that “offensive language can be statutorily prohibited only if it is personally abusive, addressed in a face-to-face manner to a specific individual and uttered under circumstances such that the words have a direct tendency to cause an immediate violent response by a reasonable recipient.” Id.

Under Missouri law, “any statute or ordinance providing for punishment for a breach of the peace is unconstitutionally broad and vague if by its terms a person could be punished for exercising his right to freedom of speech and assembly as protected by the First Amendment of the United States Constitution and guaranteed by the 14th Amendment.” City of Kansas City v. Thorpe, 499 S.W.2d 454, 457 (Mo.1973). An ordinance can only be upheld if it is “limited to punishment of acts or conduct inciting violence or intended to provoke others to violence.” City of St. Louis v. Tinker, 542 S.W.2d 512, 515 (Mo.1976). For nearly a century, the Missouri Supreme Court has held that a conviction for breach of the peace or peace disturbance for the use of “violent, tumultuous, offensive or obstreperous conduct or carriage, or by loud and unusual noises, or by unseemly, profane, obscene or offensive language” is invalid unless the conduct was found to be “calculated to provoke a breach of the peace.” City of St. Louis v. Slupsky, 254 Mo. 309, 162 S.W. 155, 157 (1913). Simply disturbing “the peace by noisy, riotous and disorderly conduct” cannot qualify as a peace disturbance in Missouri. Tinker, 542 S.W.2d at 520. To constitute a crime, the conduct must have been calculated to provoke a breach of the peace, meaning it must have been intended to or reasonably likely to incite others to violence. Id.; Slupsky, 162 S.W. at 157. As the Missouri Supreme Court explained in Tinker, “in Missouri it now is and always has been the law that ‘breach of the peace’ unless otherwise defined in the ordinance or statute using the term, refers only to acts or conduct inciting violence or intended to provoke others to violence.” 542 S.W.2d at 516. For this reason, peace disturbance statutes and ordinances, “insofar as verbal conduct is concerned [only proscribe] verbal conduct which tends to excite immediate violence.”

Loud speech, absent more, cannot constitute the crime of peace disturbance under Missouri law. In Tinker, a protester who screamed and yelled at police and security guards, “pigs,” or “stupid pigs,” could not be found guilty of a peace disturbance because the words were not intended to provoke others to violence. Id. at 513-520; see also State v. Bickings, 910 S.W.2d 370 (Mo.Ct.App.1995) (reversing conviction for peace disturbance because the evidence was only that the defendant “argued and yelled,” and there was no evidence regarding the type of language used); State v. Swoboda, 658 S.W.2d 24, 26 (Mo.1983) (reversing conviction for use of profane language and finding ordinance unconstitutional because it was not “personally abusive, addressed in a face-to-face manner to a specific individual and uttered under circumstances such that the words have a direct tendency to cause an immediate violent response by a reasonable recipient”).

It is therefore clear, that under Missouri law and the St. Louis ordinance, Defendant Police Officers had probable cause to arrest Green for peace disturbance based on his verbal conduct only if the “the facts and circumstances within the officers’ knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief’ that Green’s verbal conduct was calculated to provoke a breach of the peace or “intended to and was reasonably probable to incite others to violence.” Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 175-76, 69 S.Ct. 1302; Tinker, 542 S.W.2d at 520. The Missouri Supreme Court explained that the “conduct or language used by the speaker and its probable effect with respect to immediate violence must be viewed in the setting in which it occurs. The police officer who hears and sees the event take place must, of course, make some judgment as to whether the acts and conduct of the speaker, in the particular circumstances, is inciting violence or is intended to and reasonably probable that such acts and conduct will provoke others to violence.” Tinker, 542 S.W.2d at 516.

In this case, Defendant Police Officers were stationed at the School Board meeting because there had recently been disturbances at meetings. Regan, Doetzel, Podolak, Griffin, and Knox were summoned by McCrary who told them that Green was “disrupting the meeting by making loud oral outbursts.” Their informant, McCrary, stated in his answers to Green’s interrogatories that Green’s “exact actions” were “making loud oral outbursts that were disrupting the Board of Education meeting.” Regan, Doetzel, Podolak, Griffin, and Knox stated under oath that they had “no specific recollection of any specific words being spoken by Plaintiff prior to his arrest.” McCrary, also stated under oath that he did not remember the “specific words” spoken by Green. In light of these facts, and taking all reasonable inferences in Green’s favor, the police officers believed Green’s loud oral outbursts were words.

While there is evidence that Green told Kestner Miller, “you are full of bullshit,” there is no evidence that this information was conveyed to Defendant Police Officers or that McCrary informed Defendant Police Officers that Green was speaking in a' way that might incite others to violence. Based on the evidence submitted, a reasonable officer would not be justified in believing Green’s verbal conduct was calculated to provoke a breach of the peace or “intended to and was reasonably probable to incite others to violence” as required by state law. See Tinker, 542 S.W.2d at 520.

Because Defendant Police Officers believed Green was simply “disrupting the meeting by making loud oral outbursts” through words, and they did not believe Green was using “fighting words,” there was no probable cause to believe Green’s conduct violated the peace disturbance statute or ordinance.

Defendant Police Officers also argue that they had probable cause to arrest Green for resisting arrest because, after Green was arrested, he resisted by going limp. This argument has no merit because it is undisputed that Green had already been arrested, and therefore seized under the Fourth Amendment, at the time Green went limp. It is therefore irrelevant whether they later developed probable cause to arrest him. Probable cause must exist at the time of the arrest. Baribeau, 596 F.3d at 474.

At my request, the parties briefed the issues of whether Green’s refusal to leave the auditorium was a criminal infraction, whether Defendant Police Officers had probable cause to arrest Green for an infraction other than peace disturbance, and, if there was probable cause to arrest Green for another infraction, whether Defendant Officers violated Green’s Fourth Amendment rights for arresting him for the incorrect infraction. Supreme Court “cases make it clear than an arresting officer’s state of mind (except for the facts that he knows) is irrelevant to the existence of probable cause.” Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 151, 125 S.Ct. 588, 160 L.Ed.2d 537 (2004); see also Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996). “That is to say, his subjective reason for making the arrest need not be the criminal offense as to which the known facts provide probable cause.” Devenpeck, 543 U.S. at 153, 125 S.Ct. 588.

In Devenpeck, law enforcement officers arrested Jerome Alford for violation of the Washington Privacy Act because he had been recording his conversations with the officers. Id. at 592. After arresting Alford, Devenpeck discussed a series of possible criminal offenses with prosecutors, including violation of the Privacy Act, impersonating a police officer, and making a false representation. Id. Devenpeck rejected the suggestion that he levy multiple charges against Alford because “the State Patrol does not, as a matter of policy, ‘stack charges’ against an arrestee.” Id. A divided panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the law enforcement officers “could not have had probable cause to arrest because they cited only the Privacy Act charge and tape recording officers conducting a traffic stop in Washington.” Id. at 593. The majority held that, because impersonating a law enforcement officer and obstructing a law enforcement officer were not “closely related” to the offense Devenpeck invoked when he arrested Alford, there was no probable cause to arrest Alford for those offenses. Id. The Supreme Court rejected that test, explaining that the relevant inquiry was whether the facts, when viewed objectively, support a finding of probable cause, not the officer’s subjective reason for making the arrest, and found the “rule that the offense establishing probable cause must be ‘closely related’ to, and based on the same conduct as, the offence identified by the arresting officer of the arrest” inconsistent with its precedent. Id. at 593-94. The Court remanded the case for consideration of whether the law enforcement officers lacked probable cause to arrest Alford for obstructing a law enforcement officer or for impersonating a law enforcement officer. Id. at 595.

In this ease, Defendant Police officers assert that although they did not arrest Green for trespass, there was probable cause to arrest Green for trespass under § 569.140 of the Missouri Revised Statutes for his refusal to leave the auditorium at Carr Lane School. Section 569.140.1 provides: “A person commits the crime of trespass in the first degree if he ... knowingly remains unlawfully in a building or inhabitable structure.... ” An individual’s refusal to leave a building after an authorized agent requests him to leave is sufficient to support the charge of trespassing. State v. Armstrong, 863 S.W.2d 374, 377 (Mo.Ct.App.1993). In Armstrong, security guards asked protesters to leave an abortion clinic. Id. at 376. After the protesters refused to leave, the guards summoned the police, who also asked the protesters to leave. Id. When the protesters refused, the police arrested them and removed them from the building. Id. The Missouri Court of Appeals concluded that, had the protesters been charged with remaining unlawfully in the building (as opposed to unlawfully entering the building), those facts would support the charge of trespass. Id. at 377.

As in Armstrong, here, a security officer approached Green and asked him to leave. While there is a dispute whether both Kestner Miller and McCrary or just Kestner Miller approached Green, it is undisputed that a security officer asked Green to leave and Green refused and thereby unlawfully remained in the building. It is also undisputed that Defendant Police Officers were aware of Green’s refusal to leave. They therefore had probable cause to arrest Green for trespass. Under current Supreme Court precedent, the facts that the police did not arrest Green for trespass and the prosecutors did not charge Green with trespass are not relevant to the Court’s probable cause analysis. See generally Devenpeck, 543 U.S. 146, 125 S.Ct. 588. Accordingly, I find that Regan, Doetzel, Podolak, Griffin, Peek, and Knox did not violate Green’s Fourth Amendment rights to be free from unreasonable seizures.

b. Excessive force

Defendant Police Officers argue that Green’s Fourth Amendment Excessive Force claim fails as a matter of law because the officers used reasonable force, and even if they used excessive force, they are entitled to qualified immunity because right to be free from the de minimis force applied to Green was not clearly established.

“All claims that law enforcement officers have used excessive force, whether deadly or not, in the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other seizure are analyzed under the Fourth Amendment’s objective reasonableness standard.” Nance v. Sammis, 586 F.3d 604, 609-10 (8th Cir.2009). “Not every push or shove violates the Fourth Amendment, but force is excessive when the officers’ actions are not objectively reasonable in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them.” Rohrbough v. Hall, 586 F.3d 582, 585 (8th Cir.2009). The inquiry, then, is “whether the officers’ actions are objectively reasonable in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation.” Nance, 586 F.3d at 610. “Objective reasonableness depends on the facts and circumstances of the case, including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Rohrbough, 586 F.3d at 586. “A court may also evaluate the extent of the suspect’s injuries.” Id. “Injury and force, however, are only imperfectly correlated, and it is the latter that ultimately counts.” Wilkins v. Gaddy, — U.S. -, 130 S.Ct. 1175, 1178, — L.Ed.2d-(2010).

The Eighth Circuit has stated that “a de minimis use of force or injury is insufficient to support a finding of a constitutional violation.” Crumley v. City of St. Paul, 324 F.3d 1003, 1007 (8th Cir.2003). The Supreme Court’s decision this year in Wilkins clarified that, at least in the context of Eighth Amendment excessive force claims, the “core judicial inquiry” has shifted “from the extent of the injury to the nature of the force.” Wilkins, 130 S.Ct. at 1179. The Court reasoned that a person who was gratuitously beaten should not “lose his ability to pursue an excessive force claim merely because he as the good fortune to escape without serious injury.” Id. at 1178-79. The Court reiterated that the extent of the injury suffered is still a factor that “may suggest whether the use of force could plausibly have been thought necessary in a particular situation.” Id. at 1178. This interpretation of Eighth Amendment excessive force claims is consistent with interpreting Crumley to mean that the proper inquiry is not whether Green’s injuries were serious or minor, but whether the amount of force used was reasonable. A de minimis use of force is insufficient to support a finding of a constitutional violation. Hunter v. Namanny, 219 F.3d 825, 831 (8th Cir.2000). The same is not necessarily true for de minim-is injuries. That does not mean the extent of a person’s injuries is irrelevant, however. The lack, or minor degree of an injury, remains relevant to determining the reasonableness of the force used. Greiner v. City of Champlin, 27 F.3d 1346, 1355 (8th Cir.1994). This is true because the less serious the injury, the more likely the amount of force used was reasonable.

In this case, Green claims the officers used excessive force when they handcuffed him and dragged him from the school auditorium. He claims that after he was removed from the auditorium, an officer tightened the handcuffs around his wrists before placing him in the police van to transport him to the Justice Center. Green also claims that Peek used excessive force while driving Green to the Justice Center by excessively stopping the vehicle abruptly, which hurt Green’s wrists. Green testified that his circulation was cutoff and did not return for several months, but he never sought medical attention.

Green’s excessive force claims can be broken into two categories: (1) the force used to remove him from his seat; handcuff him, and remove him from the auditorium; and (2) the force used to tighten the handcuffs after Green was removed from the auditorium and to convey him to the Justice Center.

i. Force used in auditorium

The force used to remove Green from the auditorium was reasonable. In Curd v. City Court of Judsonia, Arkansas, 141 F.3d 839, 841 (8th Cir.1998), the Eighth Circuit found that even if seizing an arrestee’s arm was unnecessary to effect an arrest, that limited amount of force was not objectively unreasonable. The parties agree that after a police officer told Green he was under arrest, he grabbed Green’s arm. Although Clemens testified that an officer “violently grabbed” Green by the arm and yanked him on to the floor, and another officer then helped to “violently” roll Green onto the floor, and Purdy testified Green was “violently” yanked by his arm and out of his seat and thrown on the floor, Green submitted a video that shows the same incident Clemens and Purdy describe. No party disputes that the video depicts what actually occurred. In the video, absolutely no violence was used against Green. The video shows an officer and Green conversing and Green calmly waving his hand back and forth as if to say, “no.” The officer then grabbed Green’s left arm and began to pull Green from the chair. Another officer placed his hand on Green’s back to assist in pulling Green from the chair. Green did not assist the officers in lifting himself from his seat, which forced the officers to use their own strength to pull him from his seat. Notwithstanding Clemens’ and Purdy’s characterizations of the incident as violent, no reasonable person could conclude that the amount of force the officers used in seizing Green’s arm and lowering him to the floor was excessive.

After Green was placed on his stomach on the floor, the officers pulled and dragged Green for approximately 30 to 50 feet out of the auditorium. Green testified it was painful, but not so painful that he screamed out. This lasted about half a minute. Green does not claim that the officers threw him or jostled him about as they dragged or carried him out of the auditorium. It is undisputed that Green refused to walk out and instead went limp so that the officers would be forced to use their own strength to remove Green. This de minimis use of force cannot support a finding that the officers used unreasonable force in removing Green from the auditorium. See Namanny, 219 F.3d at 831.

ii. Force used after Green was removed from the auditorium

Green also complains that an officer used excessive force by tightening the handcuffs around his wrists and that Peek used excessive force by driving in an abusive manner. As for Green’s claim that officers used ex