Kolley v. Adult Protective Services (786 F. Supp. 2d 1277, 2011)

OPINION AND ORDER REGARDING DEFENDANTS’ DISPOSITIVE MOTIONS

MARK A. GOLDSMITH, District Judge.

I. Introduction

This is a constitutional civil rights and state tort case related to the actions allegedly taken by Defendants in removing Plaintiff Jena Kolley from her home and placing her in Hazel House group home. Before the Court are six separate motions filed by Defendants requesting dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and/or judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), and/or summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

Plaintiffs are:

• Jena Kolley;

• Suzanne and Joseph Kolley (the divorced biological parents of plaintiff Jena Kolley);

• George Brown (Suzanne Kolley’s husband and Jena Kolley’s step-father); and

• William and Joseph Kolley, Jr. (Jena Kolley’s brothers).

Defendants are:

• the Michigan Department of Human Services (MDHS), Michigan Adult Protective Services (APS), and APS agent Marcie Fincher;

• the Macomb-Oakland Regional Center (MORC) and MORC agents Edward Kiefer, Lori Mathes, Susan Thomas, Lea Antella, and Susan Gipperich;

• Oakland County Sheriffs Detective John Neph;

• Hazel House group home, Hazel House manager Priscilla Murrell, and Hazel House employee Pat Holmes;

• Shirley Saltzman, Jena Kolley’s guardian ad litem; and

• Tricia Schuster, a forensic evaluator with Care House.

The following account is taken from the allegations of the complaint.

Jena Kolley is a developmentally disabled nineteen-year-old woman who has a rare genetic disorder, Oral Facial Digital Syndrome, characterized by physical defects of the mouth, tongue, teeth, jaw, face, head, eyes, nose, fingers, and toes. D.E. 1 at ¶ 16 (complaint). Due to her condition, Jena Kolley’s communication skills and social skills are significantly impaired. The complaint alleges that Jena Kolley’s communication skills are that of a child between the ages of five and seven; her social skills are that of a child between four and eight. Id. at ¶ 19. By way of illustration, “when given a verbal prompt, Jena Kolley will use a 2 word utterance 80% of the time.” Id. Jena Kolley does not communicate well with people with whom she is uncomfortable, is often misunderstood, and lacks the ability to correct the listener when she is misunderstood. The complaint alleges that, when faced with a question, Jena Kolley often simply answers “yes.” Id.

Jena Kolley attended Rochester Public Schools until October 2008, when she began attending “Wings,” a school for mentally disabled children. On November 12, 2008, Oakland County Sheriffs Department Detective John Neph informed Suzanne Kolley that Jena Kolley’s teacher at Wings reported that Jena Kolley told her on October 29, 2008 and November 6, 2008 that “mama hit me.” Id. at ¶ 23. According to the complaint, when Suzanne Kolley arrived at school with Jena Kolley on November 14, 2008,

Plaintiff Suzanne Kolley was approached by a school police liaison, [Jena Kolley’s teacher] Stephanie Nelson, ... Defendant Neph, [APS employee] Marcie Fincher, and an unknown APS employee who informed Plaintiff Suzanne Kolley that Plaintiff Jena Kolley would be questioned for a few hours[,] after which Jena could return home with her mother. This upset Plaintiff Jena Kolley, who began to cry and cling to her mother. At that point Plaintiff Suzanne Kolley showed the school social worker that Plaintiff Jena Kolley did not have any bruises on her back, yet these individuals persisted in taking the hysterically upset girl away from her mother to be questioned.

Present at this interview were Defendant Marcie Fincher, Assistant Oakland County Prosecutor Derek Meineeke, Defendant Edward [Kiefer], Defendant Lori Mathes, Defendant Susan Thomas, Defendant Neph, and Defendant [Tricia] Schuster.

Defendants subjected Plaintiff Jena Kolley to a variety of invasive and leading questions, despite the fact that Plaintiff Jena Kolley is not competent to make such statements.

As a result of these tactics, Defendants were able to take advantage of Plaintiff Jena Kolley’s disability and convince her to make allegations against her mother, Plaintiff Suzanne Kolley.

Id. at ¶¶ 24-27. Following the interview, Jena Kolley was permitted to return home with her mother. The complaint alleges that, based solely on the statements made by Jena Kolley at the interview, “Defendants” filed an ex parte petition to terminate Suzanne’s guardianship over Jena Kolley. Id. at ¶ 29. Joseph Kolley, Jena Kolley’s father, was allegedly not notified of the petition.

Later that same day, Detective Neph informed the Kolley family that Jena Kolley was going to be removed from the home. Within an hour, MORC agent Defendant Susan Gipperich appeared at Jena Kolley’s home with two Oakland County sheriffs deputies and removed Jena Kolley. Suzanne Kolley informed Gipperich of Jena Kolley’s strict dental and oral hygiene requirements. Id. at ¶ 32-33. From November 14 to November 18, the Kolley Family was allegedly not made aware of the location to which Jena Kolley had been taken. On November 18, 2008, they were notified that the Oakland County Probate Court had appointed a temporary guardian in place of Suzanne Kolley. Later, criminal charges were filed against Suzanne Kolley related to the abuse allegations by Defendants. Id. at ¶ 47.

On November 18, 2008, Jena Kolley was allegedly transported to St. John Providence Hospital in Southfield, Michigan, by Detective Neph and Hazel House’s Pat Holmes and subjected to an “anal and vaginal rape test.” Id. at ¶ 35. The complaint alleges that the exam occurred “without any allegations whatsoever of rape,” and that Jena Kolley was not competent to consent to the exam and Jena Kolley’s temporary guardian did not sign the form. According to the complaint, the hospital report showed no evidence of rape, abuse, or bruising. Id. at ¶ 35.

No one from the Kolley family was permitted to visit Jena Kolley at Hazel House from November 18, 2008 to December 26, 2008. During that time, Hazel House employees would cut short family members’ phone calls to Jena Kolley because after the calls, Jena Kolley would cry for hours to see her family and go home. On December 23, 2008, Joseph Kolley was allegedly appointed by the Probate Court as a co-guardian, with rights of visitation. Plaintiffs allege that, as Jena Kolley’s biological father, Joseph Kolley had. the right to be appointed full guardian. Id. at ¶¶ 36, 39.

On December 26, 2008, Joseph Kolley visited Jena Kolley at Hazel House. He was állegedly the first family member permitted to visit Jena Kolley since she had been removed from the family home on November 14, 2008. Joseph Kolley observed that Jena Kolley “had lost weight and appeared disheveled and dirty”; that Jena Kolley’s finger and toe nails were long and untrimmed; that “Hazel House employees had allowed the hair to grow out on her face and legs”; and that her dental hygiene needs were not being met. Id. at ¶ 40. Joseph Kolley complained about his daughter’s condition to Hazel House employees and repeated Jena Kolley’s dental hygiene requirements.

On January 28, 2009, the probate court held a hearing related to Joseph Kolley’s petition to receive full custody of Jena Kolley. According to the complaint, “[b]e-fore and at this hearing, [Hazel House] Defendant Pri[sc]illa Mu[r]rell, Defendant Marcie Fincher, [guardian ad litem] Defendant Saltzman, and the MORC Defendants conspired and subsequently offered false testimony that on the December 26, 2008 [Hazel House] visit ... Plaintiff Joseph Kolley made sexual connotations towards [Jena Kolley] and requested that Hazel House give [Jena Kolley] a ‘bikini wax’ or otherwise shave her pubic hair.” Id. at ¶ 43.

Also according to the complaint, after the hearing, William Kolley asked “how do you people sleep at night,” causing Murrell to tell Jena Kolley “something to the effect of, ‘if you don’t stop crying you will never see your family again.’ ” Id. at ¶ 44. Plaintiffs allege that Joseph and William Kolley were denied access to Hazel House on January 28, 2009, which caused Jena Kolley to begin crying for them.

On January 29, 2009, the probate court granted an emergency motion to terminate the Kolley family’s visitation rights. Plaintiffs allege that the motion was “based on the outlandish allegation that on January 28, [2009] William Kolley and Joseph Kolley threatened MORC and Hazel House employees at Oakland County Circuit Court and again at Hazel House.” Id. at ¶ 46. Plaintiffs allege that, after the termination of Joseph Kolley’s rights, no one from the Kolley family was permitted to visit or call Jena Kolley.

On March 11, 2009, Plaintiffs filed suit in federal district court, raising the same claims they raise in the instant suit (along with a medical malpractice claim). On October 16, 2009, United States District Judge George Caram Steeh dismissed the case without prejudice on Younger abstention grounds, due to then-pending state court proceedings involving Jena Kolley in Oakland County Probate Court and against Suzanne Kolley in Oakland County Circuit Court. See Kolley v. Adult Protection Servs., No. 09-CV-10919, 2009 WL 3388374 (E.D.Mich. Oct. 16, 2009).

On May 12, 2010, Plaintiffs filed the present suit. The complaint alleges that the state court matters “have since been resolved in favor of the family, and Plaintiff Jena Kolley has been returned to her family.” D.E. 1 at ¶ 50. With regard to the criminal charges against Suzanne Kolley, the complaint states that the charges “were subsequently dismissed upon a finding that the charges lacked evidence and lacked probable cause.” Id. at ¶47. It also alleges that Jena Kolley experiences “continuing trauma and hallucinations” as a result of the above events, and has been diagnosed with post traumatic stress disorder. Id. at ¶ 51.

The complaint alleges that Defendants committed the following federal constitutional violations:

• Count I: violation of Plaintiffs’ First Amendment right to family association by removing Jena Kolley from her home (against all Defendants);

• Count II: violation of Plaintiffs’ right not to be deprived of their parental liberty interests without procedural and substantive due process of law (against Defendants MDHS, APS, Fincher, the MORC Defendants, and Detective Neph);

• Count III: challenge to the Social Welfare Act of Michigan, Mich. Comp. Laws § 400.111 eb seq., as unconstitutionally overbroad and void for vagueness (against MDHS and APS); and

• Count IV: violation of Plaintiffs’ right to be free from discrimination based upon their Arab-American ethnicity (against all Defendants).

In addition, the complaint alleges the following state-law claims:

• Count V: gross negligence for breaching duties established by the MDHS Adult Service Manual, Michigan statute, and common law (against APS and Fincher);

• Count VI: negligence (against the MORC Defendants);

• Count VII: battery related to Jena Kolley’s rape examination (against Detective Neph and Defendant Holmes);

• Count VIII: defamation related to the statements to the probate court implying Joseph Kolley had sexual contact with his daughter Jena Kolley (against Defendants Murrell, Saltzman, and a yet-to-be-identified Hazel House employee);

• Count IX: false imprisonment for removing Jena Kolley from her home (against all Defendants);

• Count X: abuse of process for failing to notify Joseph Kolley of the ex parte guardianship petition and related to the testimony given against the Kolleys in court (against Defendants MDHS, APS, Fincher, the MORC Defendants, Detective Neph, the Hazel House Defendants, and Saltzman); and

• Count XI: intentional infliction of emotional distress (against all Defendants).

Plaintiffs seek a court order declaring portions of the Social Welfare Act of Michigan, Mich. Comp. Laws § 400.111 et seq., unconstitutional and $15 million in compensatory and exemplary damages.

Currently pending are the following six motions filed by Defendants:

• motion to dismiss (or alternatively for summary judgment) by MORC and Edward Kiefer, Lori Mathes, Susan Thomas, Lea Antella, and Susan Gipperich (D.E. 16);

• motion to dismiss by Defendant Shirley Saltzman (D.E. 20);

• motion for judgment on the pleadings (or alternatively, for summary judgment) by Defendant Tricia Schuster (D.E. 27);

• motion to dismiss by Defendant John Neph (D.E. 31);

• motion for judgment on the pleadings (or alternatively for summary judgment) by Defendants Hazel House, Priscilla Murrell, and Pat Holmes (D.E. 33); and

• motion to dismiss (or alternatively for summary judgment) by Defendants MDHS and Marcie Fincher (D.E. 34).

These motions have been fully briefed. On February 10, 2011, the Court held a motion hearing.

III. Discussion

This portion of the Court’s Opinion is divided into four parts. In part A, the Court sets out the standard of review. In part B, the Court addresses the threshold issues of jurisdiction and collateral estoppel. In part C, the Court addresses defects in the complaint. In part D, the Court addresses other defenses.

A. Applicable Standards

In evaluating a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6),

[cjourts “must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to plaintiff,” League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Bredesen, 500 F.3d 523, 527 (6th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted), “accept all wellpled factual allegations as true[,]” id., and determine whether the “complaint states a plausible claim for relief[,]” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1950, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). However, the plaintiff must provide the grounds for its entitlement to relief, Bovee v. Coopers & Lybrand C.P.A., 212, F.3d 356, 361 (6th Cir.2001), and that “requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). A plaintiff must “plead [] factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. A plaintiff falls short if she pleads facts “merely consistent with a defendant’s liability” or if the alleged facts do not “permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct ....” Id. at 1949, 1950.

Albrecht v. Treon, 617 F.3d 890, 893 (6th Cir.2010) (first bracket added, all others in original). Motions for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c) are analyzed under the same standards. Id.

With the exception of Defendant Saltzman’s and Defendant Neph’s motions to dismiss, Defendants’ motions to dismiss are alternatively submitted as motions for summary judgment. Significantly, all of Defendants’ motions (including the Saltzman and Neph motions) present the Court with evidentiary exhibits outside of the pleadings. In their responses to Defendants’ motions, Plaintiffs repeatedly argue that it would be inappropriate for this Court to rule on Defendants’ summary judgment arguments as Plaintiffs have not had an opportunity for discovery. See, e.g., D.E. 21 at 6; D.E. 23 at 8; D.E. 40 at 7; D.E. 42 at 15; D.E. 47 at 18.

Under the circumstances presented here, the Court agrees with Plaintiffs. It is a well established principle that “the plaintiff must receive ‘a full opportunity to conduct discovery’ to be able to successfully defeat a motion for summary judgment.” Short v. Oaks Corr. Facility, 129 Fed.Appx. 278, 281 (6th Cir.2005) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 257, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). Thus, “[a] grant of summary judgment is improper if the non-movant is given an insufficient opportunity for discovery.” White’s Landing Fisheries, Inc. v. Buchholzer, 29 F.3d 229, 231-32 (6th Cir.1994). Rule 56(d) provides a mechanism for plaintiffs to obtain sufficient discovery prior to consideration of a summary judgment motion. Short, 129 Fed.Appx. at 281. Although a non-movant who wishes to have additional discovery must ordinarily file a Rule 56(d) affidavit (or a motion for additional discovery) explaining its need for discovery, the Sixth Circuit has concluded that the failure to do so is not fatal where the party otherwise explains its need for discovery to the district court. Short, 129 Fed.Appx. at 282 n. 2; Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc. v. Am. Eagle Outfitters, 280 F.3d 619, 627-28 (6th Cir. 2002).

Although the parties are in possession of several documents related to the various state court proceedings, it appears the parties have not yet engaged in substantial discovery in this litigation. After Plaintiffs re-filed their complaint in the current case, and the case was subsequently reassigned to the undersigned Judge, the parties met with this Court for a scheduling conference on October 25, 2010. At that conference, Plaintiffs expressed their desire to pursue discovery; Defendants urged the Court to consider a round of dispositive motions before pursuing discovery.

Although the Court agreed to consider dispositive motions prior to the parties’ conducting discovery, the Court is mindful that it agreed to do so over Plaintiffs’ objection. Plaintiffs have, in the context of the specific summary judgment arguments against them, explained their need for discovery. See, e.g., D.E. 21 at 5-7, 10-14. Thus, at this stage in the proceedings, it would be premature for the Court to evaluate the incomplete body of evidence. Accordingly, in considering the current motions, the Court will exclude evidence outside of the pleadings, and will not consider arguments based on an alleged absence of disputed issues of fact.

B. Threshold Issues

1. Rooker-Feldman

Some Defendants argue that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this case under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. In particular, Defendants argue that because Jena Kolley was removed from her home pursuant to an order of the Oakland County Probate Court, this Court would have to make the determination that the state court order was erroneous for Plaintiffs to prevail in this action. According to Defendants, this Court lacks the subject matter jurisdiction to make such a ruling because it would amount to collateral attack on a state court order in federal court. D.E. 31 at 14-15 (Neph motion); D.E. 34 at 7-8 (MDHS & Fincher motion).

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine, named after the Supreme Court cases Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 44 S.Ct. 149, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923) and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983), establishes a limit on federal subject-matter jurisdiction. Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 4469.1 (2d ed. 2010). The doctrine “is based on the negative inference that, if appellate court review of ... state court judgments is vested in the Supreme Court, then it follows that such review may not be had in the lower federal courts.” Lawrence v. Welch, 531 F.3d 364, 368 (6th Cir.2008) (citing Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 283-84, 125 S.Ct. 1517, 161 L.Ed.2d 454 (2005)). Accordingly, the federal courts lack jurisdiction to hear “cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon, 544 U.S. at 284, 125 S.Ct. 1517. In determining whether to apply the doctrine, a Court must “distinguish!;] between plaintiffs who bring an impermissible attack on a state court judgment — situations in which Rooker-Feld man applies — and plaintiffs who assert independent claims before the district court — situations in which Rooker-Feldman does not apply.” Lawrence, 531 F.3d at 368 (citations omitted).

The Sixth Circuit has applied these principles in a pair of pertinent cases. In McCormick v. Braverman, 451 F.3d 382 (6th Cir.2006), the state courts had issued judgments concerning Mary and Edward McCormick’s divorce and the proper owner of a piece of disputed marital real property. See id. at 385-87. Mary McCormick’s daughter then filed suit in federal court alleging, inter alia, that the defendants had seized the property through fraud, false testimony, and malicious and reckless acts. Id. at 388. The federal district court concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The Sixth Circuit disagreed:

None of these claims assert an injury caused by the state court judgments; Plaintiff does not claim that the state court judgments themselves are unconstitutional or in violation of federal law. Instead, Plaintiff asserts independent claims that those state court judgments were procured by certain Defendants through fraud, misrepresentation, or other improper means[.]

Id. at 392. The court concluded that the pertinent question is “whether the source of the injury the plaintiff alleges ... is the state court decision.” McCormick, 451 F.3d at 393. Because the federal claims before the court “all assert[ed] injury from a source other than the state court judgments,” they were “independent claims outside the scope of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.” Id. at 394.

In Pittman v. Cuyahoga County Dept. of Children and Family Servs., 241 Fed.Appx. 285 (6th Cir.2007) (unpublished), the Sixth Circuit applied McCormick’s principles to claims quite similar to those here. In that case, the plaintiff-father had lost custody of his daughter when the state courts granted legal custody to the girl’s great aunt and uncle. The plaintiff alleged that the county department of children and family services violated his rights to family association and due process. Id. at 286. He contended that defendants “acted wantonly, recklessly, in bad faith, and with a malicious purpose by falsely representing information to the juvenile court.” Id. at 287. The district court concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

Again, the Sixth Circuit rejected application of the Rooker-Feldman bar. The court concluded that the plaintiff was not challenging the state court custody order, but rather was challenging the defendant family services organization’s failure to make a recommendation in his favor. Id. at 288. The plaintiff did not seek to overturn the state court order, but rather sought a declaratory order that defendants’ bad acts violated the Fourteenth Amendment, along with damages. Under these circumstances, the court found that the source of the plaintiffs alleged injury was the defendants’ activity, not the state court judgment. Thus, the court concluded that the plaintiff was “asserting independent claims, which are not barred by Rooker-Feldman.” Id.

Applying these standards, the Court concludes that the source of injury upon which Plaintiffs base their claims is not the Oakland County Probate Court order removing Jena Kolley from the family home, nor the series of orders thereafter that did not immediately return Jena Kolley to the home. Rather, the alleged source of Plaintiffs’ injuries is the activity of Defendants themselves. Plaintiffs do not claim that the state court orders are unconstitutional or otherwise violate state or federal law. They allege that those

orders were obtained due to fraudulent or otherwise improper actions by Defendants. McCormick and Pittman instruct that such claims are “independent claims,” to which the Rooker-Feldman bar does not apply.

Accordingly, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply here to divest the Court of subject matter jurisdiction.

2. Collateral Estoppel

Defendants MDHS and Fincher advance a collateral estoppel argument, which the Court observes is less than clear. Defendants do not explain precisely which issues currently before the Court they contend are precluded by prior state court litigation, which specific claims those issues relate to, and, in some cases, which prior state court proceeding is the subject of each preclusive bar. Nevertheless, the Court proceeds using Defendants’ own description of their collateral estoppel claims as a starting point for its analysis.

Defendants argue that collateral estoppel bars “the core of’ Plaintiffs’ claims. D.E. 34 at 9-11. Defendants contend that the orders of the state courts, specifically the November 14, 2008 probate court order concluding that there were reasonable grounds to remove Jena Kolley from her home, along with subsequent “similar findings” by the probate court when it continued Jena Kolley’s foster care placement and made Joseph Kolley Jena Kolley’s co-guardian, resolved the issues of “reasonable cause, probable cause, custody, care and supervision of Jena.” D.E. 34 at 10. Defendants argue that thus “the issues relevant to [Plaintiffs’] federal claims were actually litigated and determined by the state court in the child protection proceedings.” Id. Defendants also posit that “another layer of estoppel” is established by the fact that Suzanne Kolley (prior to having the abuse charges against her dropped) was bound over for trial, demonstrating that the state court had determined there was probable cause for Suzanne Kolley’s abuse charges. Id. at 11. Plaintiffs respond that they are not challenging the rulings of either the state probate court or criminal court. D.E. 40 at 16 (Plaintiffs’ response to MDHS/Fincher motion). In their reply, MDHS and Fincher retreat from the broader argument made in their initial brief and clarify that they rely on the fact that “the state court concluded [that there existed] probable cause to believe Jena was the victim of abuse in her home.” D.E. 52 at 4. Correspondingly, they base their entitlement to collateral estoppel on the assertion that “[p]robable cause is a material fact to both the First Amendment and due process claims asserted here.” Id.

In the context of evaluating the preclusive effect of a state court decision, the Sixth Circuit has explained:

The Full Faith and Credit Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738, requires the federal courts to give state court judgments the same preclusive effect that the state would afford such judgments. Exxon Mobil, 125 S.Ct. at 1527 (quoting Parsons Steel, Inc. v. First Alabama Bank, 474 U.S. 518, 523, 106 S.Ct. 768, 88 L.Ed.2d 877 (1986)). Michigan has three requirements for collateral estoppel: “(1) ‘a question of fact essential to the judgment must have been actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment’; (2) ‘the same parties must have had a full [and fair] opportunity to litigate the issue’; and (3) ‘there must be mutuality of estoppel.’ ” Monat v. State Farm Ins. Co., 469 Mich. 679, 677 N.W.2d 843, 845-46 (2004).

McCormick, 451 F.3d at 397 (citation omitted). The third requirement does not apply where, as here, collateral estoppel is being used “defensively.” Gilbert v. Ferry, 413 F.3d 578, 581 (6th Cir.2005).

In McCormick, 451 F.3d at 398 & n. 14, the Sixth Circuit applied these principles to conclude that collateral estoppel barred the plaintiffs claims because a factual predicate of her claims was that she had an ownership interest in a particular property, yet the state courts had previously ruled that she had no interest in the property. The same analysis applies here. Accordingly, the key issue is whether the absence of probable cause is a material fact to Plaintiffs’ First Amendment and due process claims.

As a preliminary matter, Defendants do not argue why “probable cause” is material to Plaintiffs’ claims for family association and unity, denial of due process, discrimination, and abuse of process. They merely assert the point, without argument or citation to authority. This oversight might be excusable, should the claims in question have the absence of probable cause as a necessary element. However, the elements of Plaintiffs’ claims do not reference probable cause, leaving Defendants’ assertion without substantiation.

In addition, the use of the term “probable cause” in reference to the various state court determinations is imprecise and confusing. Although the state court decision to bind Suzanne Kolley over for trial on the abuse claims reflects a finding of probable cause, see People v. Orzame, 224 Mich.App. 551, 570 N.W.2d 118, 121 (1997), in their reply brief, Defendants relied instead on the probate court order removing Jena Kolley from the home and appointing a temporary guardian for her as the “probable cause” determination. See D.E. 52 at 4. This order (which does not use the terminology “probable cause”) reflects the judge’s finding that Jena Kolley “is an individual with a developmental disability and requires guardianship services.” D.E. 16-8 (11/14/08 probate court order removing Jena Kolley and appointing temporary guardian). However, it is not clear from the order why the court concluded that Jena Kolley required “guardianship services,” only that she did. This order, without more, certainly does not establish (as Defendants claim) that the state court concluded there was “probable cause to believe Jena was the victim of abuse in her home.”

Regardless, even assuming that “probable cause” (or a more proper characterization of the state court’s finding) is material to Plaintiffs’ claims, the fact that Plaintiffs allege that false information was provided as the basis for the state court’s determinations means that collateral estoppel does not apply. In Molnar v. Care House, 574 F.Supp.2d 772 (E.D.Mich. 2008), the plaintiff-father brought a § 1983 action against various defendants related to their investigation of his daughter’s allegations of his criminal sexual misconduct. The defendants argued that Molnar was collaterally estopped from pursuing an unlawful arrest claim in federal court because the state court had ruled on the issue of probable cause. The Molnar court observed that the claim would not necessarily be precluded:

There are, however, occasions where a finding of probable cause in a state court preliminary hearing will not preclude a plaintiff from litigating a federal claim in federal court. When a plaintiff alleges a police officer acted in bad faith, provided false information, or misstated material facts in order to establish probable cause, collateral estoppel will not apply. Taylor v. City of Detroit, 368 F.Supp.2d 676 (E.D.Mich.2005) (collateral estoppel will not apply to finding of probable cause at preliminary examination if plaintiffs false arrest claim under § 1983 is based upon officer supplying false information); Buttino v. City of Hamtramck, 87 Fed.Appx. 499, 504 (6th Cir.2004) (action alleging bad faith by police officer challenges integrity of evidence rather than sufficiency of evidence); Darrah v. City of Oak Park, 255 F.3d 301, 311 [ (6th Cir.2001) ] (holding that the state court’s determination of probable cause at the preliminary hearing was not identical to the issue of whether Officer Bragg made materially false statements to the state judge that formed the basis of the probable cause determination[ ]).

Id. at 791.

Although Molnar applied this principle in the false arrest context, it makes sense to apply it in the instant case as well. As stated above, one of the prerequisites to applying collateral estoppel is that the party against whom the doctrine is asserted must have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue. If a defendant allegedly provided the state court with false information, it would undermine a plaintiffs “fair opportunity” to litigate the issue. The Sixth Circuit has implicitly acknowledged this principle outside of the false arrest context. In McCormick (as explained above), the court found plaintiffs claims precluded because the factual predicate of her claims was that she had an ownership interest in a particular property, yet the state courts had previously ruled that she had no interest in the property. In reaching its conclusion, however, the McCormick court took care to note that, despite the fact that the plaintiff had alleged fraud and misrepresentation by the defendants in some state court proceedings, the plaintiff had not alleged fraud or misrepresentation with respect to the state court proceeding in which the court decided the issue of ownership interest in the property. McCormick, 451 F.3d at 398 & n. 12. Accordingly, there was no reason to doubt that the plaintiff had had a “full and fair opportunity” to litigate the key issue in state court, and collateral estoppel was appropriate.

Here, in contrast to McCormick, Plaintiffs’ allegations of false testimony by Defendants permeate the relevant state court determinations. Plaintiffs allege that Jena Kolley was misled by Defendants into making (false) accusations against her mother. Plaintiffs also allege that several Defendants gave the probate court false testimony concerning Joseph Kolley. Accordingly, state court findings that were based upon those allegedly infirm facts will not preclude consideration of the claims now before the Court. For these reasons, the Court rejects Defendants’ collateral estoppel argument.

C. Defects in Complaint

1. Federal Claims

a. Right of Family Association and Right to Due Process

Several Defendants raised the issue whether Plaintiffs have properly alleged the deprivation of a constitutionally protected right with regard to Count I (violation of Plaintiffs’ First Amendment right to family association) and Count II (violation of Plaintiffs’ right to due process). The Court examines the complaint’s allegations on these counts for compliance with the requirements of Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007).

In order to analyze the complaint’s allegations in these counts, the Court first examines the relevant legal landscape. As the Sixth Circuit has explained, where the state removes a child from parental custody, the stage is set for the clash between the state’s “compelling” interest in protecting children from abuse and the qualified right to family association:

[T]he right to family integrity, while critically important, is neither absolute nor unqualified. Martinez v. Mafchir, 35 F.3d 1486, 1490 (10th Cir.1994). The right is limited by an equaling compelling governmental interest in the protection of children, particularly where the children need to be protected from their own parents. Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1462 (8th Cir.1987). Governmental entities have a “traditional and transcendent interest” in protecting children within their jurisdiction from abuse. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 855, 110 S.Ct. 3157, 111 L.Ed.2d 666 (1990); see also, New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 757, 102 S.Ct. 3348, 73 L.Ed.2d 1113 (1982) (stating that “the prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse of children constitutes a government objective of surpassing importance”). Thus, “although parents enjoy a constitutionally protected interest in their family integrity, this interest is counterbalanced by the compelling governmental interest in the protection of minor children, particularly in circumstances where the protection is necessary as against the parents themselves.” Wilkinson [v. Russell ], 182 F.3d [89] at 104 [ (2d Cir.1999) ].

Kottmyer v. Maas, 436 F.3d 684, 690 (6th Cir.2006). Further, in the context of a child being removed from parental custody by the state, the right to family integrity requires that the state act in a manner consistent with due process:

[C]ourts have concluded that a parent’s liberty interest in familial association is implicated where a child is removed from his or her parent’s care and custody. Thus, a state agent must provide sufficient due process before terminating parental rights, see Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982), or before removing a child from his or her parent’s custody, see Ram v. Rubin, 118 F.3d 1306, 1310 (9th Cir.1997) (stating that a parent cannot be summarily deprived of custody of his or her child without notice and a hearing, except when the child is in imminent danger). These courts rely on the proposition that the constitution guarantees “that parents will not be separated from their children without due process of law except in emergencies.” Mabe v. San Bernardino County, Department of Public Social Services, 237 F.3d 1101, 1107 (9th Cir.2001) (citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972)).

Id. at 690-91.

Turning to the allegations contained in the complaint, in Count I, Plaintiffs allege, in pertinent part:

Defendants did not have a sufficiently compelling interest to eject Plaintiff Jena Kolley from her home.... whatever interest the Defendants may have had could have been achieved through means significantly less restrictive of associational freedoms.

D.E. 1 at ¶55. In Count II, Plaintiffs allege, in pertinent part:

That Defendants! ] had a duty to Plaintiffs to provide sufficient due process before removing Plaintiff Jena Kolley from her parentfs’] care and custody. Defendants failed to provide a clear and effective procedure in ensuring that Plaintiff Suzanne Kolley’s and Plaintiff Joseph Kolley’s parental interest in their child was not unduly obstructed, including but not limited to, failing to notify biological father Plaintiff Joseph Kolley.

That ... the Defendants!’] improper conduct further violated [Plaintiffs’] substantive due process right to familial integrity.”

D.E. 1 at ¶¶ 60-61 (complaint).

With regard to Count I, the complaint is defective in several respects. As a preliminary matter, Count I (violation of the First Amendment right to family association and unity) is not alleged as a § 1983 claim. Because § 1983 is the vehicle by which a plaintiff may impose liability for constitutional injuries committed by individuals acting under color of state law, Grammer v. John J. Kane Reg’l Ctrs.-Glen Hazel, 570 F.3d 520, 525 (3d Cir.2009), Plaintiffs have not stated a claim. To the extent that Plaintiffs do intend to allege a § 1983 claim in Count I, the Court construes the allegations to be a substantive due process claim. See Herndon v. Chapel Hill-Carrboro City Bd. of Educ., 89 F.3d 174, 177 (4th Cir.1996) (explaining that parents were alleging a substantive due process claim where they contended that the school district was required to demonstrate a compelling interest and that its actions were narrowly tailored to advance that interest in the manner least restrictive of the parents’ rights). However, the allegations fail to state a claim. To the extent Plaintiffs allege that there was no compelling interest in removing Jena Kolley from her home, such an allegation flies in the face of Kottmyer, which makes clear that in circumstances of suspected abuse, the parents’ right to family association is limited by the government’s “compelling” interest in the protection of the children. See Kottmyer, 436 F.3d at 690. Further, Plaintiffs’ allegations that less restrictive means could have been employed is merely a legal conclusion without any supporting facts — a violation of the pleading standard required under the federal rules. In re Sofamor Danek Group, Inc., 123 F.3d 394, 400 (6th Cir.1997). Accordingly, the allegations in Count I fail to state a claim for violation of the right to family association.

Turning to Count II, specifically the complaint’s procedural due process allegations, the Court finds them lacking. Apart from the single concrete allegation that Defendants “fail[ed] to notify biological father Plaintiff Joseph Kolley,” it is unclear precisely what other actions by Defendants allegedly violated Plaintiffs’ due process rights. In addition, Plaintiffs have not stated a procedural due process claim as to any individual Defendant. See Foote v. Spiegel, 118 F.3d 1416, 1423 (10th Cir.1997) (“Individual liability under § 1983 must be based on personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violation.”); Moorer v. Booker, No. 09-13725, 2010 WL 5090111 at *1 (E.D.Mich. Aug. 31, 2010) (“In order to state a claim for monetary damages under § 1983, Plaintiffs must allege some specific, personal wrongdoing on the part of each individual defendant.”). Even assuming some sort of procedural due process deficiency related to “notifying]” Joseph Kolley, it is not clear which of Defendants, if any, had any duty to notify Joseph Kolley of the petition or of Jena Kolley’s removal. Nor is it clear that any Defendants had a duty to obtaining the Kolleys’ participation in the initial hearing. The complaint does not allege that any particular Defendant did.

With regard to Count II’s substantive due process allegations, the Court again finds the pleading insufficient. The lone allegation referencing substantive due process — that “the Defendants!’] improper conduct further violated [Plaintiffs’] substantive due process right to familial integrity” — is conclusory. The allegation cites Defendants’ “improper conduct,” but does not specify what conduct of Defendants’ allegedly violated Plaintiffs’ substantive due process rights. Plaintiffs may have intended for the factual allegations contained in the “Factual Background” section of the complaint to lend additional substance to this claim. However, even if this were the case, it is not clear which factual allegations apply to which legal claims. This Court could only speculate as to which allegations apply to which claims. The necessity of such speculation, of course, itself indicates an insufficient complaint. See Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (“Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.”).

Further, even if the Court were to speculate as to which factual allegations pair with which legal claims — for example, that the assertion that “Defendants were able to take advantage of Plaintiff Jena Kolley’s disability and convince her to make allegations against her mother” (id. at ¶ 27) alleges a violation of Plaintiffs’ substantive due process — the allegations are woefully under-explained. It is not clear what type of “allegations” Jena Kolley allegedly made against her mother. The complaint leaves unclear whether Defendants allegedly “[took] advantage” of Jena Kolley’s disability only through the technique of “invasive and leading questions” referenced earlier in the complaint or whether Defendants allegedly used other tactics to take advantage of Jena Kolley’s deficits. Id. at ¶¶ 26-27. With regard to the allegation that “Defendants subjected Plaintiff Jena Kolley to a variety of invasive and leading questions,” id. at ¶ 26, it is unclear whether the complaint is asserting that each Defendant interviewed Jena Kolley. The significance of this over-broad and generalized pleading is that individual Defendants have insufficient notice of the legal claims they face and the actions they are alleged to have taken. See Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (defendants entitled to be given “fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests”) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)). In addition, this lack of clarity in Plaintiffs’ substantive due process allegations is particularly deficient, given the significant showing required for a substantive due process claim.

Accordingly, Plaintiffs have failed to sufficiently plead a violation of constitutional rights with regard to the family association and due process claims (Counts I and II of the complaint). The claims are dismissed without prejudice to Plaintiffs filing an amended complaint within 30 days of the date of entry of this Opinion.

b. Ethnic Discrimination

Count IV of the complaint brings a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim alleging discrimination against Plaintiffs based on their Arab-American ethnicity. The legal basis of this claim is not clear. The complaint does not explicitly mention any substantive federal law or constitutional provision. It does cite § 1983, but § 1983 on its own does not create substantive rights. Sample v. Bailey, 409 F.3d 689, 695 (6th Cir.2005) (§ 1983 “does not create any substantive rights but rather merely provides remedies for deprivations of rights established elsewhere”).

Construing the complaint generously, Plaintiffs appear to be bringing this claim against Defendants based on a Fourteenth Amendment equal protection theory. To show an equal protection violation, Plaintiffs must show that Defendants deliberately discriminated against them based on their ethnicity. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-40, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976). That is, Plaintiffs must show discriminatory intent on the part of Defendants; they must show that Defendants “selected a particular course of action at least in part ‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its [racial] effects.” Wilson v. Collins, 517 F.3d 421, 432 (6th Cir.2008) (quoting Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 360, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991)).

All Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ allegations in Count IV fail to state a claim. Several make the argument that the complaint fails to make sufficient allegations under the standard announced by the Supreme Court in Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949.

The Court agrees. Even construing the complaint generously, the allegations of race discrimination are so conclusory and insubstantial that they do not satisfy Iqbal’s requirements. As explained above, after Iqbal, courts considering a motion to dismiss “must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to plaintiff, accept all well-pled factual allegations as true, and determine whether the complaint states a plausible claim for relief.” Albrecht, 617 F.3d at 893 (citations and quotations omitted). The complaint here does not meet that standard because it alleges, in an entirely conclusory manner, that Defendants committed illegal discrimination. The complaint speaks in unacceptably general terms and offers no facts that would support a claim of discriminatory animus. D.E. 1 at ¶ 77 (“The above-described actions and allegations of Defendants were motivated by racial animus because Plaintiff Suzanna Kolley, Plaintiff Jena Kolley, Plaintiff William Kolley, and Plaintiff Joseph Kolley Jr., are ArabAmerieans.”) This is not enough. See Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”); Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (explaining that the Court now “requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action”).

Accordingly, the ethnic discrimination claim (Count IV of the complaint) is dismissed as to all Defendants. This dismissal is without prejudice to Plaintiffs filing an amended complaint within 30 days of the date of entry of this order.

2. State-Law Claims

Similarly, Plaintiffs fail to state a claim with regard to several state-law claims. For the reasons stated below, the Court will dismiss these claims without prejudice to Plaintiffs filing an amended complaint within 30 days of the date of entry of this Opinion.

a. Battery

The complaint alleges:

On November 18, 2008 Defendant Neph and Defendant Holmes intentionally and willfully escorted Plaintiff Jena Kolley to St. John Providence Hospital in Southfield, Michigan.

Defendant Neph and Defendant Holmes, intended to, and did so subject Plaintiff Jena Kolley to an anal and vaginal rape test.

The anal and vaginal rape test involved the harmful and offensive contact of Plaintiff Jena Kolley’s person.

Plaintiff Jena Kolley was not competent to consent to this contact, nor was consent provided by her guardian.

As a direct and proximate result of the harmful and offensive contact, Plaintiff Jena Kolley was made to suffer damages, including, but not limited to: pain, suffering, humiliation, embarrassment, and emotional distress.

Plaintiff Jena Kolley was taken by Defendant Neph and Pat Holmes to St. John Providence Hospital in Southfield, Michigan for an anal and vaginal rape test. As a ward of the state Plaintiff Jena Kolley was not competent to consent to this exam, nor did her appointed guardian sign the consent. Despite this misstep, Defendant Neph and Pat Holmes subjected Plaintiff Jena Kolley, a girl with the functional equivalency of a young child, to an extremely invasive, humiliating and degrading test without any allegations of rape whatsoever.

D.E. 1 at ¶ 92-97.

To prevail on a battery claim under Michigan law, Plaintiffs must demonstrate a “wilful and harmful or offensive touching of another person which results from an act intended to cause such a contact.” VanVorous v. Burmeister, 262 Mich.App. 467, 687 N.W.2d 132, 142 (2004). Plaintiffs’ allegations, shocking as they are, do not contend that any Defendants (the battery claim is made against Defendants Neph and Holmes) touched Jena Kolley, an element of the tort. Although Plaintiffs argue that a Defendant’s physical presence was not required to make out a battery claim, the authorities they cite do not pertain to the tort of battery. See D.E. 42 at 21 (making the argument as to Defendant Neph). Because no apposite authority has been offered to support Plaintiffs’ novel understanding, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim. Defendants Neph and Holmes (the only Defendants against whom the claim is alleged) are entitled to dismissal of Count VII, the battery count. As stated above, this dismissal is without prejudice.

b. False Imprisonment

As the Michigan Court of Appeals has observed, the “general concept of false imprisonment” is that it is an “unlawful restraint of an individual’s personal liberty.” Moore v. City of Detroit, 252 Mich.App. 384, 652 N.W.2d 688, 690 (2002). The elements of false imprisonment are “ ‘[1] an act committed with the intention of confining another, [2] the act directly or indirectly results in such confinement, and [3] the person confined is conscious of his confinement.’ ” Id. at 691 (quoting Adams v. Nat’l Bank of Detroit, 444 Mich. 329, 508 N.W.2d 464, 469 (1993)).

The complaint’s central false-imprisonment allegation is that Jena Kolley was restrained by Defendant Gipperich when Gipperich physically removed Jena Kolley from her home and placed her into a foster home. D.E. 1 at ¶ 107. The complaint also alleges that Oakland County sheriffs deputies accompanied Defendant Gipperich, providing a threat of force. Id. at ¶ 109. The complaint’s false-imprisonment allegations do not allege any specific acts by Defendants other than Gipperich. The only allegation that applies to the other Defendants is the statement that “[t]he other Defendants^] conduct [described elsewhere in the complaint] amounts to knowing and [willful] participation in the false imprisonment.” Considering the three-prong standard above, the allegations of the complaint do not suffice to state a claim as to most Defendants. The single broad allegation that could conceivably be understood to apply to the nonGipperich Defendants fails to allege the intent of each of those Defendants (and what act each committed with that intent), as required.

Accordingly, the false-imprisonment claim, Count IX, should be dismissed as to all Defendants on this basis, except as to Defendant Gipperich. As stated above, this dismissal is without prejudice,

c. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

The Michigan courts have explained the standard governing a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress:

The tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress has four elements: (1) extreme and outrageous conduct, (2) intent or recklessness, (3) causation, and (4) severe emotional distress. Roberts v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 422 Mich. 594, 602, 374 N.W.2d 905 (1985); Johnson v. Wayne Co., 213 Mich.App. 143, 161, 540 N.W.2d 66 (1995). Liability for such a claim has been found only where the conduct complained of has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency and to be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. Id. at 161, 540 N.W.2d 66.

Haverbush v. Powelson, 217 Mich.App. 228, 551 N.W.2d 206, 209 (1996). The “intent or recklessness” requirement refers to the intention of inflicting emotional distress, rather than merely intending the action that caused the distress. Id. at 210.

Plaintiffs raise this claim against all Defendants. The complaint simply asserts that Defendants’ conduct described elsewhere in the complaint was the direct and proximate cause of extreme mental and emotional distress to “the Plaintiff,” presumably Jena Kolley. Without more specific allegations, the Court is at a loss to understand which of the actions specifically — and by which Defendants — form the basis of this tort in Plaintiffs’ view. The allegations concerning Jena Kolley allegedly being subjected to an unnecessary vaginal and anal examination might be the type of allegations that could meet the Haverbush standard. However, the complaint’s description of this event does not include any allegation about Defendants’ intent, as required by Haverbush. Accordingly the claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count XI) is dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim.

D. Other Defenses Pertaining to Individual Defendants/Groups of Defendants

Because the Court will allow Plaintiffs to re-plead their complaint, despite the claims above being insufficient under Iqbal and Twombly, it remains relevant whether certain individual Defendants (or groups of Defendants) are entitled to dismissal based on immunity or some other legal ground. The Court will next address such arguments and determine whether certain defenses require a dismissal with prejudice as to particular Defendants.

1. Defendant Saltzman

Defendant Shirley Saltzman, Jena Kolley’s guardian ad litem, claims that she is entitled to dismissal of the claims against her because, inter alia, as a guardian ad litem, she is entitled to absolute immunity for all federal and state-law claims. For the reasons set forth below, the Court agrees that Saltzman is immune and is entitled to dismissal of the claims against her with prejudice.

a. Absolute (Quasi-judicial) Immunity

Saltzman argues that, as a guardian ad litem, she is entitled to quasi-judicial immunity with regard to the § 1983 claims.

In Kurzawa v. Mueller, 732 F.2d 1456 (6th Cir.1984), the Sixth Circuit concluded that a guardian ad litem, as a person “integral” to “the judicial process,” was entitled to absolute immunity from the plaintiffs § 1983 claims. The court explained:

Baldwin[,] who functioned as guardian ad litem for Cass Kurzawa, must act in the best interests of the child he represents. Such a position clearly places him squarely within the judicial process to accomplish that goal. A guardian ad litem must also be able to function without the worry of possible later harassment and intimidation from dissatisfied parents. Consequently, a grant of absolute immunity would be appropriate. A failure to grant immunity would hamper the duties of a guardian ad litem in his role as advocate for the child in judicial proceedings.

Id. at 1458. Kurzawa is consistent with numerous other circuit court decisions, all standing for the proposition that guardians ad litem are entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity for performing job duties that are a part of the judicial process. See, e.g., Gardner v. Parson, 874 F.2d 131, 146 (3d Cir.1989) (“We would agree that a guardian should be absolutely immune when acting as an integral part[ ] of the judicial process”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Dornheim v. Sholes, 430 F.3d 919, 925 (8th Cir.2005) (same); Cok v. Cosentino, 876 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1989) (same); See Fleming v. Asbill, 42 F.3d 886, 889 (4th Cir.1994) (because all of guardian ad litem’s actions “occurred within the judicial process,” guardian ad litem entitled to absolute immunity).

Here, Saltzman was appointed guardian ad litem pursuant to the probate court’s order. Michigan law describes the guardian ad litem duties of informing the court of the guardian’s determinations with regard to the guardianship of an individual and drafting a report. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 700.5305(e). The allegations against Saltzman concern her court-ordered testimony and recommendations. Accordingly, the actions complained of were an integral part of the judicial process and Saltzman is entitled to absolute immunity. The § 1983 claims against her will be dismissed with prejudice.

b. Immunity under Michigan Law

Concerning Saltzman’s state-law immunity argument, under Michigan law, “[a] guardian ad litem is immune from civil liability for an injury to a person or damage to property if he or she is acting within the scope of his or her authority as guardian ad litem.” Mich. Comp. Laws § 691.1407(6). Defendants qualifying for immunity under this statute are entitled to Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal. See Thomas v. City of Detroit, 299 Fed.Appx. 473, 477-78 (6th Cir.2008) (upholding district court’s

grant of motion to dismiss based upon defendant’s claim of immunity under the Michigan governmental immunity statute).

Plaintiffs can be understood to be making two arguments in response: first, that governmental immunity is not available as a defense to an intentional tort, and second, that Saltzman was not acting within the scope of her authority as guardian ad litem. The Court rejects these arguments.

As to the first argument, it is the case that the provision of the Michigan immunity statute that applies to officers and employees of governmental agencies— Mich. Comp. Laws § 691.1407(2) — does not apply to intentional torts. See Odom v. Wayne Cty., 482 Mich. 459, 760 N.W.2d 217, 223-24 (2008). As the Michigan Supreme Court has explained, the statute makes clear its intent to limit its immunity to non-intentional torts in Mich. Comp. Laws § 691.1407(3), which states that “[s]ubseetion (2) does not alter the law of intentional torts as it existed before July 7, 1986.” See Odom, 760 N.W.2d at 223. However, a different provision of the statute — -Mich. Comp. Laws § 691.1407(6), applying in particular to guardians ad litem — applies to Saltzman. And no similar limiting language applies to the guardian ad litem provision. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 691.1407(6). Thus, there is no basis for concluding that guardian ad litem immunity does not apply to intentional torts. Further, the language of the provision that applies to judges, legislators, and high executive officials, Mich. Comp. Laws § 691.1407(5), is nearly identical to the guardian at litem provision. Compare Mich. Comp. Laws § 691.1407(5) and Mich. Comp. Laws § 691.1407(6). And the Michigan Court of Appeals has concluded that the immunity provided by Mich. Comp. Laws § 691.1407(5) does apply to intentional torts. Nicklas v. Koelling, Nos. 248870 & 248871, 2004 WL 2808904 at *1 (Mich.Ct.App.2004) (citing Armstrong v. Ypsilanti Charter Twp., 248 Mich.App. 573, 594, 640 N.W.2d 321, 333 (2001)).

As to Plaintiffs’ second argument — that Saltzman was not acting within the scope of her authority as guardian ad litem — the Court agrees with Saltzman that all of the acts alleged in the complaint were committed when she was acting within the scope of her authority as guardian ad litem. The complaint alleges that Saltzman defamed Plaintiff Joseph Kolley when at the January 28, 2009 probate hearing in Oakland County Circuit Court, she did the following:

• “falsely republished the defamatory statements [that Joseph Kolley had requested that the Hazel House employees give his daughter a “bikini wax” “or otherwise have her pubic hair shaved”] to the Court and further defamed Plaintiff Joseph Kolley by making statements and implications at the hearing that Plaintiff Joseph Kolley had