Rosado Figueroa v. Chrysler Corp. (79 F. Supp. 2d 20, 1999)

OPINION AND ORDER

DOMINGUEZ, District Judge.

Pending before the Court is Chrysler Corporation and Chrysler International Corporation’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ complaint under the Cobrado River doctrine of abstention and for failure to join all necessary parties under Federal Rule of Civil PROCEDURE 19 (Docket No. 5). For the reasons set forth herein, Defendants’ Motion is DENIED.

I.

Relevant Facts

This action involves Plaintiffs’ claim for damages suffered as a result of a motor vehicle accident which occurred on September 28, 1997, when the brakes on Plaintiffs’ 1996 Dodge Caravan allegedly failed. On September 28, 1998, Plaintiffs brought the present action against Defendants to seek liability for damages allegedly caused by a manufacturing defect in the Dodge Caravan’s breaking system. Plaintiffs invoked the Court’s diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Thereafter, on October 5, 1998, Plaintiffs commenced an action in Puerto Rico’s local courts against the dealer who sold them the Dodge Caravan, Alberic Colón Auto Sales, Inc., Triangle Dealer; and against Western Auto Supply Company. Defendants in the present case were not originally included as defendants in the state court case. Notwithstanding, on January 26, 1999, Alberic Colón Auto Sales, Inc. filed a Third-Party Complaint in the local action against Chrysler International Corporation, thus impleading Chrysler so that the manufacturer would respond directly to Plaintiffs in the local action. Chrysler was served with the federal complaint on February 4, 1999, and with the local complaint on February 24, 1999. Discovery proceedings have begun in the local action.

Defendants in this action seek dismissal of Plaintiffs’ complaint on two related grounds. Defendants argue that the Court should abstain to exercise its jurisdiction under principles of “wise judicial administration” and the factors set forth by Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 96 S.Ct. 1236, 47 L.Ed.2d 488 (1976) and Moses H. Cone v. Mercury Construction Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 103 S.Ct. 927, 74 L.Ed.2d 765 (1983). Defendants alternatively argue that the federal cause of action must be dismissed because necessary parties sued in the local action have not been included in the federal case, thus promoting piecemeal litigation and the unnecessary expenditures of litigating the same claim twice.

II.

Abstention

It is most true, that this court will not' take jurisdiction if it should not: but it is equally true, that it must take jurisdiction, it if should. The judiciary cannot, as the legislature may, avoid a measure, because it approaches the confínes of the Constitution. [¶]... ] With whatever doubts, with whatever difficulties, a case may be attended, we must decide it, if it be brought before us. We have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given. The one or the other would be treason to the Constitution.

Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 19 U.S. 264, 5 L.Ed. 257 (1821).

A. Standards for abstention

Federal courts “have a strict duty to exercise the jurisdiction that is conferred upon them by Congress.” Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 116 S.Ct. 1712, 135 L.Ed.2d 1 (1996). See also England v. Louisiana Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 415, 84 S.Ct. 461, 464-465, 11 L.Ed.2d 440 (1964); Rojas-Hernandez v. Puerto Rico Elec. Power Auth., 925 F.2d 492 (1st Cir.1991); Villa Marina Yacht Sales Inc. v. Hatteras Yachts, 915 F.2d 7 (1st Cir.1990); MMI Products Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 39 F.Supp.2d 135, 136-37 (D.P.R.1999) (quoting Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817, 96 S.Ct. 1236, 47 L.Ed.2d 483 (1976)). This duty, however, is not without exceptions. Indeed, the Supreme Court of the United States has long recognized that a federal court may decline to exercise its jurisdiction when it “is asked to employ its historic powers as a court of equity” and there are “exceptional” and “narrow” circumstances under which “denying a federal forum would clearly serve an important countervailing interest.” Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 714-731, 116 S.Ct. at 1720-1727. Accordingly, the Supreme Court has allowed federal courts to decline exercising their jurisdiction in cases at equity “where abstention is warranted by considerations of ‘proper constitutional adjudication,’ ‘regard for federal-state relations,’ or ‘wise judicial administration.’ ” Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 716, 116 S.Ct. at 1721, citing Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 813, 96 S.Ct. at 1244.

The Supreme Court, however, has been extremely restrictive in allowing federal courts to dismiss cases at law under principles of abstention. In fact, in Quackenbush the Supreme Court specifically limited its precedents in this area to cases in which federal courts are asked to provide some form of discretionary relief. And in Moses H. Cone the Court cautioned that “our task in such cases is not to find some substantial reason for the exercise of federal jurisdiction by the district court; rather, the task is to ascertain whether there exist ‘exceptional circumstances,’ ... justifying] the surrender of that jurisdiction.” 460 U.S. at 25-26, 103 S.Ct. at 941-942, as quoted in Rojas Hernandez, 925 F.2d at 497. Thus, as a general rule the Supreme Court has not allowed federal courts to dismiss actions for damages by invoking the doctrine of abstention.

Furthermore, the First Circuit Court of Appeals has advised that a distinction must be made “between the problems created by piecemeal adjudication and the mere duplication of proceedings.” Rojas-Hernandez, 925 F.2d at 496. Only where there is a “significant potential for prejudice from piecemeal litigation” should a federal court abstain from exercising its jurisdiction. Id. at p. 497. Judgement in one case may be res judicata in the other, thereby ensuring consistency. On the other hand, even if the cases are resolved inconsistently, inconsistent results would not result in further litigation nor would it produce results so harsh that surrendering jurisdiction would be justified. Id.

B. Application of Abstention Standards to Facts

Defendants argue that the case at bar should be dismissed pursuant to the principles set forth by Colorado River and Moses H. Cone v. Mercury, 460 U.S. 1, 103 S.Ct. 927, 74 L.Ed.2d 765 (1983). Defendants, however, have neglected to address the differences between a case seeking a discretionary remedy and a case seeking a remedy at law. This being a damages case, the remedy that the Court may issue is one provided by law. Consequently, the factors enumerated by Colorado River and Moses H. Cone are less forceful than the Quackenbush doctrine. Under Quacken-bush, as has been discussed supra, this case may only be dismissed if Plaintiffs’ claims involve vital state interests, complicated questions of state law, or a federal decision that disrupts state efforts to establish a coherent policy. As none of these situations is present, Plaintiffs claims cannot be dismissed pursuant to Quackenbush.

Further, this case does not present the customary situation where abstention is traditionally applied. Federal courts ordinarily abdicate federal jurisdiction over a particular controversy out of respect for a pending state proceeding begun before the federal action. This case, however, was instituted before the parallel state