Full opinion text
ORDER DAVID C. GODBEY, District Judge. This Order addresses Defendants the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee, Inc. (“DSCC”), and the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee, Inc.’s (“DCCC”), (collectively, the “Democratic Committees”) motion to dismiss [19], and Defendants the National Republican Congressional Committee (“NRCC”), the National Republican Senatorial Committee (“NRSC”), and the Republican National Committee’s (“RNC”) (collectively, the “Republican Committees” and, together with the Democratic Committees, the “Political Committees”) motion to dismiss [16] and motion for summary judgment [91], as well as the Receiver’s motion for summary judgment [36], For the reasons that follow, the Court denies the Political Committees’ motions to dismiss, denies the Republican Committees’ motion for summary judgment, and grants the Receiver’s motion for summary judgment. I. Origins of the Receiver’s Fraudulent Transfer Claims This dispute presents another episode related to the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (the “SEC”) ongoing securities fraud action against R. Allen Stanford, his associates, and various entities under Stanford’s control (the “Stanford Defendants”). As part of that litigation, this Court “assume[d] exclusive jurisdiction and t[ook] possession of the” “Receivership Assets” and “Receivership Records” (collectively, the “Receivership Estate”). See Second Am. Order Appointing Receiver, July 19, 2010 [1130] (the “Receivership Order”), in SEC v. Stanford Int’l Bank, Ltd., Civil Action No. 3:09-CV-0298-N (N.D.Tex. filed Feb. 17, 2009). The Court appointed Ralph S. Janvey to serve as Receiver of the Receivership Estate and vested him with “the full power of an equity receiver under common law as well as such powers as are enumerated” in the Receivership Order. Id. at 3. Among these enumerated powers, the Court “authorized [the Receiver] to immediately take and have complete and exclusive control, possession, and custody of the Receivership Estate and to any assets traceable to assets owned by the Receivership Estate.” Id. at 4. Additionally, the Court “specifically directed and authorized [the Receiver] to ... [c]olleet, marshal, and take custody, control, and possession of all the funds, accounts, mail, and other assets of, or in the possession or under the control of, the Receivership Estate, or assets traceable to assets owned or controlled by the Receivership Estate, wherever situated,” id., and to file in this Court “such actions or proceedings to impose a constructive trust, obtain possession, and/or recover judgment with respect to persons or entities who received assets or records traceable to the Receivership Estate.” Id. at 5. Pursuant to those powers, the Receiver filed this fraudulent transfer suit to recover approximately $1.6 million in contributions made by R. Allen Stanford, James Davis, and the Stanford Financial Group Company (“SFGC”) to the Political Committees over a period of about eight years. The parties agree that the Stanford Defendants allocated their contributions as follows: $950,500 to the DSCC; $200,000 to the DCCC; $238,500 to the NRCC; $83,345 to the NRSC; and $128,500 to the RNC. See, e.g., Compl. at 7[1]. Nothing suggests that the Political Committees acted in bad faith. But, according to the Receiver, the Political Committees nonetheless must disgorge an amount equal to the contributions because they received Ponzi scheme proceeds without providing consideration of reasonably equivalent value in exchange. The Receiver now moves for summary judgment. The Political Committees raise two primary objections to the Receiver’s claims. First, the Political Committees argue that the Receiver untimely filed this action. Because Texas courts treat the time-bar provisions of the Texas Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (“TUFTA”), Tex. Bus. & Com.Code § 24.001, et seq., as a statute of repose rather than a statute of limitations, the Political Committees contend that the Receiver cannot rely on equitable tolling doctrines to establish that he timely brought suit. Second, the Political Committees argue that federal campaign finance laws preempt the Receiver’s claims. See Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (“FECA”), Pub. L. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 431, et seq.); Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (“BCRA”), Pub. L. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (2002) (codified in scattered sections of FECA), abrogated in part by Citizens United v. FEC, — U.S. -, 130 S.Ct. 876, 175 L.Ed.2d 753 (2010), and by FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 127 S.Ct. 2652, 168 L.Ed.2d 329 (2007). The Republican Committees move for summary judgment on these two defenses, which the Court analyzes in turn before addressing the Receiver’s motion for summary judgment. II. SUMMARY Judgment Standard Courts “shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.CivP. 56(a); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). In making this determination, courts must view all evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655, 82 S.Ct. 993, 8 L.Ed.2d 176 (1962). Courts, however, need not sift through the record in search of triable issues. Adams v. Travelers Indem. Co. of Conn., 465 F.3d 156, 164 (5th Cir.2006). The moving party bears the initial burden of informing the court of the basis for its belief that there is no genuine issue for trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Once the movant has made this showing, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to establish that there is a genuine issue of material fact such that a reasonable jury might return a verdict in its favor. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). Moreover, “[c]onclusory allegations, speculation, and unsubstantiated assertions” will not suffice to satisfy the nonmovant’s burden. Douglass v. United Seros. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1429 (5th Cir.1996) (en banc). Indeed, factual controversies are resolved in favor of the nonmoving party “ ‘only when an actual controversy exists, that is, when both parties have submitted evidence of contradictory facts.’ ” Olabisiomotosho v. City of Houston, 185 F.3d 521, 525 (5th Cir.1999) (quoting McCollum Highlands, Ltd. v. Washington Capital Dus, Inc., 66 F.3d 89, 92 (5th Cir.1995)). III. Texas Fraudulent Transfer Law Does Not “Extinguish” This Action The Court first addresses the Political Committees’ argument that TUFTA’s limitations provision “extinguished” the Receiver’s cause of action prior to filing. In general, TUFTA operates to void certain fraudulent “transfers,” which the statute defines in relevant part as “every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with an asset or an interest in an asset, and includes payment of money.” Tex. Bus. & Com.Code § 24.002(12). TUF-TA considers several types of transfers to be fraudulent. See id. §§ 24.005(a) (three types); 24.006 (two types). Despite some ambiguity in the Receiver’s complaint, the parties agree that this dispute concerns only one type of fraudulent transfer. See, e.g., Democratic Committees’ Mot. to Dismiss Br. at 5 n. 2 [19-1], The Receiver brings his claim under section 24.005(a)(1), which provides that a transfer “is fraudulent as to a creditor, whether the creditor’s claim arose before or within a reasonable time after the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred, if the debtor made the transfer or incurred the obligation ... with actual intent to hinder,. delay, or defraud any creditor of the debtor.” “In determining [a debtor’s] actual intent,” courts may consider, “among other faetors[,] ... whether ... the value of the consideration received by the debtor was reasonably equivalent to the value of the asset transferred or the amount of the obligation incurred” and if “the debtor was insolvent or became insolvent shortly after the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred.” Id. § 24.005(b)(8) & (b)(9). Notably, TUFTA considers a debtor to be insolvent “if the sum of the debtor’s debts is greater than all of the debtor’s assets at a fair valuation.” Id. § 24.003(a). As the Political' Committees point out, TUFTA does not preserve indefinitely a plaintiffs cause of action. TUFTA “extinguish[es]” claims brought under section 24.005(a)(1) unless filed “within four years after the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred or, if later, within one year after the transfer or obligation was or could reasonably have been discovered by the claimant.” Id. § 24.010(a)(1). Because the Receiver almost exclusively seeks the return of funds contributed to the Political Committees more than four years before his appointment, the parties agree that the Receiver timely filed suit only if he did so within the “discovery rule” in section 24.010(a)(l)’s second clause. Cadle Co. v. Wilson, 136 S.W.3d 345, 350 (Tex.App.Austin 2004, no pet.) (“It is clear from the text of the statute that the legislature has chosen to preserve application of the discovery rule to some extent within the provisions of TUFTA.”); Johnston v. Crook, 93 S.W.3d 263, 270 (Tex.App.Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. den.) (“[T]he [Texas] UFTA specifically acknowledges the availability of the discovery rule to cases of transfers made with actual intent to defraud.”). The Political Committees contend, for a variety of reasons stemming from TUF-TA’s alleged status as a statute of repose, that the Receiver did not timely file. First, the Political Committees posit that, because the Receiver stands in place of the Stanford Defendants, his claims were discovered the moment the Stanford Defendants made each contribution. Under this view, the Texas legislature’s intentional crafting of TUFTA as a statute of repose effectively exempts it from traditional equitable tolling doctrines that might otherwise salvage the Receiver’s claims. Thus, according to the Political Committees, the Stanford Defendants’ actual knowledge of their contributions’ fraudulent origins extinguished the Receiver’s claims well before his appointment. See, e.g., Republican Committees’ Mot. to Dismiss Br. at 6-7[17]; Democratic Committees’ Mot. to Dismiss Br. at 7-8. In the alternative, the Political Committees argue second that, even if TUFTA’s extinguishment provision operated as a statute of limitations that allowed equitable tolling, the Receiver should have filed his complaint no later than the first anniversary of his appointment, or February 16, 2010. See Order Appointing Receiver [10], in SEC v. Stanford Int’l Bank, Civil Action No. 3:09-CV-0298-N. This theory holds that the Receiver, in a singularity-like moment, inherited the Stanford Defendants’ actual knowledge of the contributions immediately upon his appointment. See, e.g., Republican Committees’ Mot. to Dismiss Br. at 7-9; Democratic Committees’ Mot. to Dismiss Br. at 8-9. Finally, the Political Committees assert that the Receiver, simply by exercising reasonable diligence, could have discovered the contributions in the three-day window between the date of his appointment and February 19, 2009, the date one year prior to the date he filed suit. See, e.g., Democratic Committees’ Mot. to Dismiss Br. at 9-11; Republican Committees’ Summ. J. Reply at 7[98]. The Court addresses each of these objections in turn. A. TUFTA’s Discovery Rule Applies to the Receiver’s Claims The Political Committees’ first two objections assume that only the Court’s use of equitable tolling, specifically the doctrine of adverse domination, may bring the Receiver’s claims within the ambit of TUFTA’s discovery rule. “Under the common law doctrine of adverse domination, the statute of limitations for an entity’s claim is tolled when the entity is controlled or dominated by individuals engaged in conduct that is harmful to the entity.” Warfield v. Carnie, 2007 WL 1112591, at *15 (N.D.Tex.2007) (Buchmeyer, J.) (citing, inter alia, FDIC v. Dawson, 4 F.3d 1303 (5th Cir.1993)). If TUFTA operates as a statute of repose, the argument goes, it renders unavailable adverse domination as a way to void the Stanford Defendants’ ab initio knowledge of the contributions’ fraudulent nature. The viability of the Receiver’s claims, however, does not hinge on equitable tolling. As an initial matter, the Political Committees overlook the possibility that adverse domination has relevance here beyond its potential deployment as an equitable tolling mechanism. The Court declines to venture an Erie guess on whether TUF-TA’s extinguishment provision operates as a statute of repose or limitations. Even if it is a statute of repose, the plain language of the subsection applicable to the Receiver’s claims preserves the discovery rule. And, when “the discovery rule is explicitly available by statute ... the [Texas Supreme] court’s [common law] ‘inherently undiscoverable’ analysis, which focuses on a plaintiffs exercise of reasonable diligence,” applies because it “is relevant to the statutory issue ... of when [the] transfer could reasonably have been discovered.” Cadle Company, 136 S.W.3d at 351 (citing Tex. Bus. & Com.Code § 24.010(a)(1)) (emphasis in original). Thus, R. Allen Stanford and his associates’ adverse domination of the numerous Stanford enterprises may serve as a conceptual factor in establishing the reasonableness of the Receiver’s delay in discovering the contributions; the Court is not constrained to use solely adverse domination as a tool to allow a claim to proceed when the Texas Legislature allegedly has provided to the contrary. More importantly, the Political Committees’ first two objections depend on a cramped — and recently rejected — interpretation of the Receiver’s authority to bring claims besides those available to the Stanford Defendants. The Fifth Circuit recently held in another asset recovery case that the Receiver may stand in the shoes of the Stanford Defendants and also represent defrauded creditors in their recovery efforts. See Janvey v. Alguire, 628 F.3d 164, 183 (5th Cir.2010) (noting that receivers are “legal hybrids” who “ ‘stand[ ] in the shoes of the person for whom [they] ha[ve] been appointed,’ ” serve as “ ‘instrument^] of the court ... acting also for the stockholders ... and creditors of the corporation,’ ” and “are imbued with rights and obligations analogous to the various actors required to effectively manage an estate in the absence of the ‘true’ owner” (quoting Armstrong v. McAlpin, 699 F.2d 79, 89 (2d Cir.1983); Drennen v. S. States Fire Ins. Co., 252 F. 776, 788 (5th Cir.1918))). Indeed, the Fifth Circuit explicitly held that the Receiver has standing to bring creditors’ TUFTA claims. Alguire, 628 F.3d at 184-85. The discovery rule’s application here thus turns on whether the facts giving rise to the Receiver’s claims were inherently undiscoverable to the Stanford Defendants’ creditors; when the Stanford Defendants obtained knowledge of the contributions is irrelevant. Cf. Cadle Company, 136 S.W.3d at 350 (“The discovery rule defers the accrual of a cause of action until the plaintiff knew or, through the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have known of the facts giving rise to the cause of action.”) (emphasis added) (citations omitted); Crook, 93 S.W.3d at 271-273 (rejecting TUFTA defendant’s attempt to overturn trial court’s denial of summary judgment because the defendant “did not conclusively establish when [the] Receiver knew or should have known about the allegedly fraudulent transfer” (citing Eckert v. Wendel, 120 Tex. 618, 40 S.W.2d 796, 797 (1931))) (emphasis added); Duran, 71 S.W.3d at 839 (“A creditor’s cause of action to set aside a fraudulent conveyance accrues when the creditor acquires knowledge of the fraud, or would have acquired such knowledge in the exercise of ordinary care.” (citing Eckert, 40 S.W.2d 796)) (emphasis added). Texas courts generally apply the discovery rule when “the alleged wrongful act and resulting injury were inherently undiscoverable at the time they occurred but may be objectively verified.” S.V. v. R.V., 933 S.W.2d 1, 6 (Tex.1996). “Requiring [both elements] assures that the policy underpinnings of statutes of limitations are met — balancing the possibility of stale or fraudulent claims against individual injustice.” Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai Inc., 918 S.W.2d 453, 457 (Tex.1996). Under Texas law, “[a]n injury is inherently undiscoverable if it is by nature the type of injury that is unlikely to be discovered within the prescribed limitations period despite due diligence.” Cadle Company, 136 S.W.3d at 351 (citing S.V., 933 S.W.2d at 7; Altai, 918 S.W.2d at 456). The Court has not found a succinct statement of the objective verifiability element, but it appears to block plaintiffs from avoiding statutes of limitation merely to present claims that, although undiscoverable during the limitations period, require resolution of “a swearing match between parties over facts and between experts over opinions.” S.V., 933 S.W.2d at 15. In general, plaintiffs satisfy the objective verifiability element when evidence of “the alleged injury [is] indisputable,” id. at 7, or established by “recognized expert opinion on a particular subject [that is] so near consensus that, in conjunction with objective evidence not based on the plaintiffs assertions,” the Court may presume the injury occurred. Id. at 15. Over time, the Supreme Court of Texas “has narrowed application of the discovery rule to a class of cases in which the injury was so concealed as to be effectively undetectable by the claimant without some type of expertise, or at least until the harm was already done.” Cadle Company, 136 S.W.3d at 351 (collecting cases). The facts underlying the Receiver’s claims were inherently undiscoverable to the Stanford Defendants’ creditors, and the creditors’ injuries are objectively verifiable. Even if the Stanford Defendants’ contributions were publicly disclosed, the possibility that the Stanford Defendants essentially funneled their creditors’ money to the Political Committees through an elaborate Ponzi scheme was not. The Stanford Defendants’ creditors would have had notice of that only after the Receiver’s appointment. And, although the Receiver brings claims based on contributions made approximately a decade ago, the Receiver presents his forensic accountant’s objectively verifiable — and uncontradicted — evidence showing that the Stanford Defendants operated a Ponzi scheme. The Political Committees admit receiving the contributions and provide no evidence that the Stanford Defendants’ contributions were derived from untainted funds. Under these circumstances, the Court holds that the fraudulent transfers and the creditors’ resulting injuries “were inherently undiscoverable at the time they occurred” and are backed by “objectively verified” information. S.V., 933 S.W.2d at 6. Accordingly, TUFTA’s discovery rule applies to the Receiver’s claims, and the Political Committees’ first two objections fail as a matter of law. B. The Receiver Filed Within the Discovery Rule Period as a Matter of Law “A defendant moving for summary judgment on the affirmative defense of limitations has the burden to establish that defense conclusively.” Cadle Company, 136 S.W.3d at 352 (citing KPMG Peat Marwick v. Harrison County Hous. Fin. Corp., 988 S.W.2d 746, 748 (Tex.1999)). To prevail, “the defendant must (1) conclusively prove when the cause of action accrued, and (2) negate the discovery rule, if it applies and has been pleaded or otherwise raised, by proving as a matter of law that there is no genuine issue of material fact about when the plaintiff discovered, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the nature of its injury.” Id. (citing KPMG, 988 S.W.2d at 748). “When a plaintiff knew or should have known of an injury is generally a question of fact.” Id. (citing Nat’l W. Life Ins. Co. v. Rowe, 86 S.W.3d 285, 298 (Tex. App.-Austin 2002, pet. den), rev’d on other grounds, 164 S.W.3d 389 (Tex.2005); Houston Endowment, Inc. v. Atl. Richfield Co., 972 S.W.2d 156, 160 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, no pet.)). But, “if reasonable minds could not differ about the conclusion to be drawn from the facts in the record, then the start of the limitations period may be determined as a matter of law.” Id. at 352 (citing, inter alia, Childs v. Haussecker, 974 S.W.2d 31, 44 (Tex.1998)). According to the Political Committees, the Receiver reasonably could have discovered the Stanford Defendants’ contributions before February 19, 2009. As evidence, they point primarily to the ostensibly vast resources at the Receiver’s disposal, publicly-available FEC records, and certain websites, news articles, and blogs discussing the Stanford Defendants’ many campaign and other political contributions. Under this view, the Receiver untimely filed his complaint outside of section 24.010(a)(l)’s one-year window because he did not sue until February 19, 2010. For summary judgment purposes, however, the Republican Committees fail to show conclusively when the Receiver’s cause of action accrued or when he reasonably should have discovered the contributions. The Receiver avers that he did not discover the contributions until February 20, 2009. See, e.g., Receiver’s Resp. to Mot. to Compel at 6[60]. The Political Committees have submitted no summary judgment evidence estabhshing that the Receiver actually discovered the contributions on February 16,17, 18, or 19. And, because the Receiver represents the Stanford Defendants’ creditors in this action, no basis exists for concluding that on his appointment the Receiver acceded to the Stanford Defendants’ knowledge that their contributions to the Political Committees were fraudulent. The Court thus considers only whether it was unreasonable for the Receiver to discover the Stanford Defendants’ contributions as late as February 20, 2009. The Court concludes that no reasonable minds could differ as to the timeliness of the Receiver’s discovery. It is simply unreasonable to expect the Receiver to have discovered the $1.6 million in contributions — out of a complex, long-lasting, intentionally-concealed, international scheme involving billions of dollars and myriad transactions — in less than four days. Under the circumstances, the Receiver reasonably might have taken longer. TUFTA requires only the exercise of reasonable diligence, not omniscience. The Political Committees’ limitations defenses thus fail as a matter of law. Accordingly, the Court declines to dismiss the Receiver’s claims or to grant summary judgment in favor of the Republican Committees on limitations grounds. IV. Feca Does Not Preempt The Receiver’s Claims The Republican Committees next move for summary judgment on the admittedly “novel” grounds that federal election laws preempt the Receiver’s state law fraudulent transfer claims. Republican Committees’ Summ. J. Reply Br. at 5. As the Republican Committees note, courts have not “squarely addressed” this argument. Id. Nonetheless, preemption caselaw and the relevant campaign finance statutes provide sufficient guidance to conclude that the Political Committees contentions fail as a matter of law. The Political Committees argue broadly that FECA, BCRA, and their associated regulations “expressly preempt state law and comprehensively address what contributions are illegal, how the national committees are to handle illegal contributions, and when and how nonfederal contributions received by national political committees were to be disgorged.” Republican Committees’ Summ. J. Br. at 3 [91-1]. According to the Political Committees, the Receiver’s TUFTA claims also “infringe on the domain set forth by Congress and the FEC” because, “even if [TUFTA’s] purpose is completely unrelated to elections ..., as applied, [it] encroach[es] on federal law” by effectively appending Ponzi scheme-derived contributions to FECA’s “comprehensive” — and therefore exclusive — “list of prohibited contributions.” Id. at 4. Combined with a “regulatory scheme [that also] instructs political committee treasurers on how to assess the legality of contributions ... and sets the conditions and timetable of each contribution refund,” federal law simply “leaves no room for additional ‘avoidance’ at the behest of state law plaintiffs.” Id. at 6. And, finally, because the Stanford Defendants’ made primarily “soft money” contributions, the Political Committees contend that honoring the Receiver’s request would “breach the long-standing principle of separating ‘soft money’ from ‘hard money’ ... at the core of the FECA” by requiring the disgorgement of a now-prohibited type of contribution for which Congress provided two “sole” means of disposal. Id. at 8 (emphasis removed). A. Preemption Principles Because “[a] fundamental principle of the Constitution is that Congress has the power to preempt state law,” Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372, 120 S.Ct. 2288, 147 L.Ed.2d 352 (2000) (citations omitted), discerning and effectuating “‘[t]he purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone’ of pre-emption analysis.” Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516, 112 S.Ct. 2608, 120 L.Ed.2d 407 (1992) (alteration in original) (quoting rule first articulated in Retail Clerks v. Schermerhom, 375 U.S. 96, 103, 84 S.Ct. 219, 11 L.Ed.2d 179 (1963)). To that end, courts look to “the language of the preemption statute and the statutory framework surrounding it” as well as “the structure and purpose of the statute as a whole, as revealed not only in the text, but through the reviewing court’s reasoned understanding of the way in which Congress intended the statute and its surrounding regulatory scheme to affect” interested parties. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 486, 116 S.Ct. 2240, 135 L.Ed.2d 700 (1996) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Federalism dictates, and courts “have long presumed[,] that Congress does not cavalierly pre-empt state-law causes of action.” Lohr, 518 U.S. at 485, 116 S.Ct. 2240; see also Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 129 S.Ct. 538, 543, 172 L.Ed.2d 398 (2008) (discussing presumption against preemption (citing, inter alia, Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230, 67 S.Ct. 1146, 91 L.Ed. 1447 (1947))); Karl Rove & Co. v. Thornburgh, 39 F.3d 1273, 1280 (5th Cir.1994) (noting that the presumption is “strong”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Explicit statutory or regulatory language provides the clearest expression of preemptive intent. See English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79, 110 S.Ct. 2270, 110 L.Ed.2d 65 (1990); Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. Lab., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713, 105 S.Ct. 2371, 85 L.Ed.2d 714 (1985) (acknowledging and citing authorities holding that “state laws can be pre-empted by federal regulations as well as by federal statutes”). But, federal law also may preempt state law impliedly “[w]hen Congress intends federal law to occupy the field” regulated by the statute or “to the extent” state law creates “any conflict with a federal statute.” Crosby, 530 U.S. at 372, 120 S.Ct. 2288 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Although not “rigidly distinct” conceptually, courts generally refer to these three broad categories as express, field, and conflict (or obstacle) preemption. English, 496 U.S. at 79 n. 5, 110 S.Ct. 2270. The Political Committees raise preemption arguments under all three varieties. B. The Court Narrowly Construes FECA’s Express Preemption Provision “When Congress has considered the issue of pre-emption and has included in the enacted legislation a provision explicitly addressing that issue, and when that provision provides a reliable indicium of congressional intent with respect to state authority, there is no need to infer congressional intent to pre-empt state laws from the substantive provisions of the legislation.” Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 517, 112 S.Ct. 2608 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “[W]hen the text of a pre-emption clause is susceptible of more than one plausible reading,” however, “courts ordinarily accept the reading that disfavors pre-emption.” Altria, 129 S.Ct. at 543 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Because express and field preemption often operate “no differently] in practice,” in many FECA cases “[t]he only real issue” for the court to determine “is the [preemption provision’s] effective reach.” Teper v. Miller, 82 F.3d 989, 994 n. 5 (11th Cir.1996). Here, the Court analyzes the Political Committees’ express and field preemption arguments separately- 1. FECA’s Plain Text Does Not Expressly Preempt the Receiver’s Claims. — FECA expressly “supersede^] and preempts] any provision of State law with respect to election to Federal office.” 2 U.S.C. § 453(a). As several courts have noted, section 453’s plain text supports more than one plausible reading. See, e.g., Weber v. Heaney, 995 F.2d 872, 875 (8th Cir.1993) (“We recognize that § 453 is subject to more than one reading, and the areas preempted may vary with different readings.” (citing Reeder v. Kansas City Bd. of Police Comm’rs, 733 F.2d 543, 545 (8th Cir.1984))). Given the background assumption against preemption of state law causes of action, the Court — in line with long-standing precedent — reads section 453 to allow the Receiver’s claims. Although section 453 contains expansive “any provision” language, it simultaneously limits FECA’s preemptive reach with the restrictive modifier “with respect to.” Unlike the phrase “relating to,” which the Supreme Court has found “synonymous with ‘having a connection with,’ ” Altria, 129 S.Ct. at 548 (quoting Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 384, 112 S.Ct. 2031, 119 L.Ed.2d 157 (1992)), “with respect to,” like the phrase “ ‘based on,’ ” “ ‘indicates a but-for causal relationship and thus a necessary logical condition’ ” generally incompatible with broad preemptive intent. Id. (quoting Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 63, 127 S.Ct. 2201, 167 L.Ed.2d 1045 (2007)). Narrowly construed, then, FECA preempts only those State laws that regulate directly, either facially or as applied, “election to Federal office.” A plain reading, however, must also take into account that FECA uses “election” and “Federal office” as terms of art. FECA defines “election” as (A) a general, special, primary, or runoff election; (B) a convention or caucus of a political party which has authority to nominate a candidate; (C) a primary election held for the selection of delegates to a national nominating convention of a political party; and (D) a primary election held for the expression of a preference for the nomination of individuals for election to the office of President. 2 U.S.C. § 431(1). FECA provides that “[t]he term ‘Federal office’ means the office of President or Vice President, or of Senator or Representative in, or Delegate or Resident Commissioner to, the Congress.” 2 U.S.C. § 431(3). FECA also contains specific definitions for the terms “contribution” and “expenditure” that limit their application to uses “made ... for the purpose of influencing any election for Federal office.” 2 U.S.C. §§ 431(8)(A) (“contribution”) & 431(9)(A) (“expenditure”). These definitions demonstrate that TUFTA simply has nothing to do with “election to Federal office.” The Political Committees concede, as they must, that TUFTA facially contains no provision that could be construed to touch on federal campaign finance or election law. See Republican Committees’ Summ. J. Reply at 1, 4-5 (noting that, as opposed to a “broad” facial challenge, the Political Committees object to TUFTA “as applied”). But even as applied, the Receiver’s claim implicates the covered elections and conventions only in the most tangential and immaterial way. The Court accepts that the Stanford Defendants contributed funds for election-related purposes, and presumably the Political Committees used the funds as such. The Receiver’s claims, however, do not implicate those uses or attempt to regulate contributions or expenditures as made for the purpose of influencing any election for Federal office. Forcing the Political Committees to disgorge funds that presumably will come from present-day monies they would rather spend on core campaign-related activities may have a connection to topical areas, such as campaign finance, regulated by FECA. “ ‘[B]ut that possibility does not change [the Receiver’s] case from one about [fraudulent transfer] into one about’ ” election to Federal office. Altria, 129 S.Ct. at 546 (quoting Good v. Altria Grp., Inc., 501 F.3d 29, 44 (1st Cir.2007)). As with the issue of candidates’ personal liability for state law contract claims, FECA says nothing concerning political parties and their affiliated campaign committees’ liability for a host of state statutory and common law causes of action, including fraudulent transfers. Cf. Karl Rove, 39 F.3d at 1280. Accordingly, the Court concludes that FECA does not expressly preempt the Receiver’s TUFTA claim. 2. FECA’s Implementing Regulations Do Not Expresslg Preempt the Receiver’s Claims. — An examination of the regulations related to FECA’s preemption provision demonstrates that FECA’s regulatory scheme, too, fails to evince an intent to preempt state law fraudulent transfer claims. The Political Committees contend that the “Effect on State law” regulations at 11 C.F.R. § 108.7 show that FECA’s “reach extends to the regulation of campaign financing for federal elective office through federal political committees.” Democratic Committees’ Mot. to Dismiss at 12. Section 108.7 includes FECA’s statutory express preemption provision verbatim in subsection (a) and, in subsections (b) and (c), supplemental preemption provisions elaborating on FECA’s preemptive reach. Section 108.7(b) provides that “Federal law supersedes State law concerning the (1) Organization and registration of political committees supporting Federal candidates; (2) Disclosure of receipts and expenditures by Federal candidates and political committees; and (3) Limitation on contributions and expenditures regarding Federal candidates and political committees.” Although the Political Committees do not make the point clearly, they appear to argue that as applied TUFTA works here as a preempted “[limitation on contributions and expenditures.” See, e.g., Republican Committees’ Mot. for Summ. J. at 3-4. The Court disagrees. The Receiver’s claims limit neither contributions or expenditures as those terms are used in section 108.7(b)(3). FECA’s regulations, like the statute itself, rely on terms of art that render incomplete plain-text readings that are uninformed by the statute or regulation’s intent in using a particular term. In relevant part, the regulations use “contribution” to refer to a “gift ... or deposit of money or anything of value made by any person for the purpose of influencing any election for Federal office,” 11 C.F.R. § 100.52(a), and “expenditure” to refer to any “purchase, payment, distribution, loan ..., advance, deposit, or gift of money or anything of value, made by any person for the purpose of influencing any election for Federal office.” 11 C.F.R. § 100.111(a). Neither FECA nor its regulations define the word “limitation,” but the first nontautological definition supplied by Black’s defines it as “a restriction.” Black’s Law DICTIONARY 947 (8th ed. 2004). Section 108.7(b)(3), therefore, preempts only state laws that place restrictions on those contributions and expenditures “made ... for the purpose of influencing any election for Federal office.” In this light, the Receiver’s claims fall outside of section 108.7(b)(3)’s scope. The Receiver deploys TUFTA here to compel the Political Committees to disgorge the value of contributions made by the Stanford Defendants — with others’ money— years ago, not to effect a restriction on any person’s ability to influence elections to federal office. Similarly, although disgorgement will entail a “payment” by the Political Committees, they will make it for the purpose of satisfying a money judgment rather than influencing election for federal office. As a matter of plain language, therefore, section 108.7(b)(3) imposes no bar to the Receiver’s TUFTA claims. The Political Committees’ section 108.7(b)(3) argument, moreover, reads the provision in isolation. Section 108.7(b)(3)’s reference to “[l]imitation[s] on contributions and expenditures” must be analyzed in light of Congress and the FEC’s use of that phrasing in other places. As the Court discusses in more detail below in analyzing FECA’s preemptive scope, the statute and its regulations expressly concern only certain types of “contribution and expenditure limitations and prohibitions.” 11 C.F.R. §§ 110.1 — .20; see also 2 U.S.C. § 441a (“Limitations on contributions and expenditures”). Read in context, section 108.7(b)(3) expressly preempts only state laws that impose restrictions on contributions and expenditures, such as contribution caps, similar to those already provided for in FECA — not any generally applicable state law that might conceivably implicate contributions and expenditures. Cf. Karl Rove, 39 F.3d at 1280 (“Although [the defendant] attempts to stretch § 453 far enough to create a preemptive bar to applying state law to hold federal candidates personally liable, we cannot read FECA as extending that far.”). Accordingly, the Court concludes that neither FECA nor its implementing regulations expressly preempt the Receiver’s TUFTA claims. C. TUFTA Does Not Encroach on FECA’s Domain Although the presence of an express preemption provision “means that [courts] need not go beyond [the provision’s] language to determine whether Congress intended the [statute] to preempt at least some state law, [they] must nonetheless identify the domain expressly pre-empted by that language.” Lohr, 518 U.S. at 484, 116 S.Ct. 2240 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). In this case, that requires the Court to determine whether other indicia demonstrate that Congress intended FECA to have broader preemptive scope than that established in the Court’s express preemption analysis above. Such an “intent may be inferred from a ‘scheme of federal regulation ... so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it,’ or where an Act of Congress ‘touch[es] a field in which the federal interest is so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject.’” English, 496 U.S. at 79, 110 S.Ct. 2270 (quoting Rice, 331 U.S. at 230, 67 S.Ct. 1146 (1947)) (alterations in original). “ ‘Where ... the field which Congress is said to have pre-empted’ includes areas that have ‘been traditionally occupied by the States,’ ” however, “congressional intent to supersede state laws must be ‘clear and manifest.’ ” Id. (quoting Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525, 97 S.Ct. 1305, 51 L.Ed.2d 604 (1977)) (alterations in original). 1. FECA’s Legislative History Fails to Support the Political Committees’ Expansive Interpretation. — The Political Committees argue that FECA’s legislative history evinces Congress’s desire that the statute have broad preemptive “sweep.” Democratic Committees’ Mot. to Dismiss Br. at 13. “The House Committee drafting the preemption provision,” for example, allegedly “intended it ‘to preempt all state and local laws ... [and] to make certain that Federal Law is construed to occupy the field.’ ” Id. (quoting H.R.Rep. No. 93-1239, at 10 (1974) [hereinafter “1974 House Report”], reprinted in, FEC, Legislative History of Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974 644 (1977) [hereinafter “FECA 1974 Compilation”] ) (alterations in original). And, according to the Political Committees, “[t]he Senate Conference Report further ‘make[s] it clear that the Federal law occupies the field with respect to ... the sources of campaign funds used in Federal races.’ ” Id. (quoting S. Conf. Rep. No. 93-443 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5618, 5638). As further evidence, the Political Committees argue that the FEC “has broadly interpreted FECA’s preemption provision” in its enforcement actions. Id. (citing FEC Adv. Op. 1999-12, at 6 (June 25,1999)). “[A]gainst a background of dissatisfaction with [FECA as enacted in 1971],” Congress amended FECA in 1974 (1) To place limitations on campaign contributions and expenditures; (2) To facilitate the reporting and disclosure of the sources and disposition of campaign funds by centralizing campaign expenditure and contribution reporting; (3) To establish a Board of Supervisory Officers to oversee enforcement of and compliance with Federal campaign laws; and (4) To strengthen the law for public financing of Presidential general elections, and to authorize the use of the dollar checkoff fund for financing Presidential Nominating Conventions and campaigns for nomination to the office of President. 1974 House Report at 1-2; FECA 1974 Compilation at 635-36; see also Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 (1974) [hereinafter the “1974 Amendments”]. Among a plethora of other amendments, the House Committee version “contain[ed] two separate provisions relating to the preemption of State laws.” 1974 House Report at 10; FECA 1974 Compilation at 644. Referencing then-18 U.S.C. § 591, Congress crafted a preemption provision “relating to amendments to the criminal code” in title I of the bill “to make it clear that [FECA] [was] intended to be the sole source of criminal sanctions for offenses involving political activities in connection with Federal elections.” Id. The other proposed preemption provision, in title Ill’s “General Provisions,” contained future section 453, designed to “supersede and preempt any provision of State law with respect to election to Federal office.” Id. The congressional reports related to the 1974 Amendments show that Congress intended FECA to preempt a much narrower domain than the Political Committees claim. To take the most off-the-mark argument first, the Political Committees quote from the 1974 Conference Report, ostensibly showing that Congress intended to occupy “the field with respect to ... the sources of campaign funds used in Federal races.” Democratic Committees’ Mot. to Dismiss Br. at 13. But, that portion of the report actually concerns only the title I criminal code amendments. The 1974 Conference Report explicitly adopted House amendment section 104, which “provided that chapter 29 of title 18, United States Code, relating to elections and political activities, supersedes and preempts provisions of state law.” 1974 Conference Report at 69; FECA 1974 Compilation at 1013. That provision — in text omitted from the Political Committees’ quoting of the report in various briefs — established that FECA “occupies the field with respect to criminal sanctions relating to limitations on campaign expenditures, the sources of campaign funds used in Federal races, the conduct of Federal campaigns, and similar offenses.” Id. (emphasis added). The Political Committees’ arguments as to Congress’s intended scope for section 453 fare no better. The Political Committees correctly note that the relevant House committee intended “to make certain that [FECA] is construed to occupy the field.” 1974 House Report at 10; FECA 1974 Compilation at 644. But, it showed no signs of intending to effect a wide-ranging preemption of all state and local laws that might peripherally touch on an election. The House committee meant for FECA to preempt state law “with respect to elections to Federal office and ... [to] be the sole authority under which such elections will be regulated.” Id. The House committee focused specifically on state laws’ treatment of certain federal reports. Although FECA as originally enacted required candidates for federal office to file federal reports with appropriate state election officials, it only “encourage[d]” the state officials “to accept [the] Federal reports in satisfaction of State reporting requirements.” Id. The 1974 Amendments made acceptance of the federal reports mandatory. It was this provision that the committee explicitly intended to have preemptive effect. See id. (“[T]he provision relating to encouraging State officials to accept Federal reports to satisfy State reporting requirements is deleted. Under [FECA], Federal reporting requirements will be the only reporting requirements and copies of the Federal reports must be filed with appropriate State officials.”). The 1974 Conference Report bolsters this narrow reading of Congress’s intent. The Senate and the House bills included almost identical title III preemption provisions, which the Conference committee believed would have amended FECA “in essentially the same manner.” 1974 Conference Report at 100; FECA 1974 Compilation at 1044. The Conference committee ultimately adopted the House version. In doing so — and in line with the 1974 House Report — the Conference committee succinctly explained that FECA “occupies the field with respect to reporting and disclosure of political contributions to and expenditures by Federal candidates and political committees.” Id. at 100-01; 1044-45 (emphasis added). The 1974 Conference Report contains no other explanation of title Ill’s intended reach except to note that it did not preempt “State laws as to the manner of qualifying as a candidate, or the dates and places of elections.” Id. at 101; 1045. Read in context, the legislative history shows a much more restricted conception of FECA’s preemptive reach than that urged by the Political Committees. Because TUFTA’s disgorgement remedy is not a criminal sanction, the preemptive reach of FECA’s long-repealed title I preemption provision is irrelevant to this case. And, no one suggests that the Receiver’s claims touch on FECA’s reporting and disclosure requirements. Accordingly, the Political Committees’ proffered legislative history provides no grounds for construing section 453 expressly to preempt the Receiver’s TUFTA claims. 2. FECA and Its Regulations’ Structure Support the Court’s Narrow Construction of FECA’s Preemptive Domain. — The Political Committees ground their next preemption objection in FECA’s structure. “Specifically,” they contend that “[sjections 441a through 441f of FECA provide a comprehensive list of source restrictions on political contributions” in a manner that “makes plain Congress’s intent to occupy the domain defining illegal sources of political contributions.” Democratic Committees’ Mot. to Dismiss Br. at 14. Allowing the Receiver’s TUFTA claims would allegedly “supplement this list of illegal sources to include Ponzi scheme funds” as well as “compromise the certainty provided by FECA’s source restrictions.” Id. The Political Committees’ expressio uniTts-style argument, however, accords FECA and its regulations’ “[l]imitations on contributions and expenditures” an unsupportable exclusivity. 2 U.S.C. § 441a. A “proper expressio unius inference” as to a specific statutory provision’s exclusivity must consider the provision as “viewed in the context of the overall statutory scheme.” Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 583, 120 S.Ct. 1655, 146 L.Ed.2d 621 (2000). FECA’s contribution limitations “serve[ ] an interest in protecting ‘the integrity of our system of representative democracy’ ” by facilitating “[FECA’s] primary purpose — ‘to limit the actuality and appearance of corruption resulting from large individual financial contributions.’ ” McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 120, 124 S.Ct. 619, 157 L.Ed.2d 491 (2003) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26-27, 96 S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976)), overruled in part on other grounds, Citizens United, 130 S.Ct. 876. FECA accomplishes that in large part by making “[violations of [its contribution and expenditure provisions] ... subject to civil enforcement action by the [FEC], criminal prosecution by the United States Department of Justice, or both.” FEC Adv. Op. 1996-05 at 2 (Mar. 14, 1996). Viewed in that context, the relevant provisions in FECA sections 441a through 441k delineate the realm of unlawful contributions and expenditures for enforcement purposes — not to list all situations that might cause a candidate or political committee to pay out funds from its campaign coffers. The FEC has taken the view that, “[i]n general, debt claims and liabilities are subject to relevant State law, and the Committee’s ‘responsibility’ for satisfying the obligations [are] determined with reference to those laws.” FEC Adv. Op. 1975-102 at 1 (Jan. 29, 1976). To that end — and pursuant to “long held” FEC policy — candidates and political committees regulated by FECA routinely use funds originally obtained in the form of contributions to satisfy debts, judgments, and other liabilities. See, e.g., FEC Adv. Op. 1989-02 at 2 (Apr. 25, 1989) (“[FECA] and [FEC] regulations do not preclude the Committee’s paying the judgment rendered under State [contract] law, although this may require the Committee to use all or most of its cash on hand.”). Despite numerous amendments to FECA over its forty-year history, neither Congress nor the FEC has attempted to graft any of these potential uses of erstwhile campaign contributions onto the purportedly exclusive list of prohibited limitations on contributions and expenditures. Cf. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 155-56, 120 S.Ct. 1291, 146 L.Ed.2d 121 (2000) (inferring “effective ratification]” of agency position when Congress has enacted statutes “against [a] background of the [agency] repeatedly and consistently asserting” a particular policy interpretation); see also Young v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 476 U.S. 974, 983, 106 S.Ct. 2360, 90 L.Ed.2d 959 (1986) (“This failure to change the scheme under which the FDA operated is significant, for a congressional failure to revise or repeal the agency’s interpretation is persuasive evidence that the interpretation is the one intended by Congress.”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). This strongly suggests that, although FECA’s domain may reach a host of activities and laws with respect to election for federal office, its occupied field does not include political committees’ paying on obligations incurred pursuant to state law. Even as applied, TUFTA falls squarely within this nonpreempted zone of state laws. The Receiver seeks only a judgment making the Political Committees liable to the Stanford Defendants’ creditors under Texas fraudulent transfer law. Doing so in no way imposes a “dollar limit” on contributions or expenditures, a restriction on the “[publication and distribution of statements and solicitations,” or a regulation of “contributions or expenditures by national banks, corporations, ... labor organizations,” “government contractors,” “foreign nationals,” improperly identified persons, or “minors.” And, although a literal reading of FECA section 441i(a) at first glance appears to support the Political Committees’ position, it exclusively concerns — as its caption suggests — now-prohibited “soft money” funds, which the Court addresses in more detail below. See Shays v. FEC, 414 F.3d 76, 102 (D.C.Cir.2005) (quoting McConnell’s observation that section 441 i(a) serves as the “cornerstone” of BCRA’s efforts to eradicate “the so-called soft money system”) (540 U.S. at 133, 124 S.Ct. 619). The regulation promulgated by the FEC to provide clarity to section 453’s preempfive scope, moreover, delineates three “supersede^]” and six nonsuperseded areas of State law. 11 C.F.R. § 108.7. Although state law fraudulent transfer claims do not fall within any of the six nonsuperseded areas, enumerating both specifically preempted and nonpreempted areas of State law suggests an absence of exclusivity as to either category. Cf. Eskridge App’x B at 19 (noting that expressio unius is “[i]napplicable if context suggests [the] listing is not comprehensive”). FECA may preempt unenumerated types of state laws that encroach on its domain, and certain types of state laws may lie outside of that domain even if not specifically listed as such in section 108.7(c). Thus, the FEC’s failure specifically to list in section 108.7(c) those state laws that could permissibly impose liability on candidates and political committees does not imply that such laws are preempted. That conclusion comports with the FEC’s position concerning political committees’ paying debts, judgments, and other liabilities using contributed funds. And, it is also congruent with the background presumption against preemption of state law causes of action absent clear and manifest congressional intent to do so. Accordingly, FECA and its regulations support the Court’s narrow reading of FECA’s preemptive scope. Even if the Court were to credit the Political Committees’ contentions that FECA contains an exclusive list of illegal contributions and expenditures, no basis exists for concluding that the Receiver’s claims fall within the realm of prohibited activities, let alone attempt to contrive a wholly new type of forbidden campaign funding. At most the Receiver’s claim will result in a judgment payable by the Political Committees’ to the Stanford Defendants’ creditors, who are represented here by the Receiver. The FEC views similar state law judgments as falling outside FECA’s purview. And, FEC regulations specifically provide for the resolution of such “debts owed by candidates and political committees.” 11 C.F.R. §§ 116.1-.12. The Stanford Defendants’ contributions might have made the Political Committees’ liable under TUFTA. But, that (at best) tangential connection to election to federal office does not transform TUFTA as used here into a campaign finance regulation. 3. Caselaw Belies the Political Committees’ Position on FECA Preemption. — Although not necessary to establish the reach of FECA’s preempted domain, the Court notes that the little available caselaw directly relevant to the subject confirms its narrow reading. As the Second and Fifth Circuits have observed, “even with respect to election-related activities, courts have given section 453 a narrow preemptive effect in light of its legislative history.” Stern, 924 F.2d at 475 n. 3 (citing Reeder, 733 F.2d at 545-46 (“concluding that section 453 did not preempt a state law forbidding police officers from making political contributions to federal campaigns”)); Karl Rove, 39 F.3d at 1280 & n. 18. Reeder notably adopted — both for its persuasive power and assessment of the merits- — -a Supreme Court of Missouri opinion holding that Congress intended FECA “only to preempt the limited field of statutes imposing restrictions on candidates for federal office and their campaign committees.” Pollard v. Bd. of Police Comm’rs, 665 S.W.2d 333, 337 (Mo.1984) (en banc) (holding that FECA did not preempt Missouri law providing that “ ‘[n]o officer or employee in the service of [the Kansas City] police department shall directly or indirectly ... contribute ... any money or other valuable thing to any person on account of, or to be applied to, the promotion of any political party, political club, or any political purpose whatsoever’ ” (quoting Mo.Rev.Stat. § 84.830 (1978))). Subsequent caselaw has taken the same tack. Courts that have found FECA preemption have done so in the context of state laws directly touching on federal elections or campaign finance. Courts considering generally applicable, nonelection-related state laws, however, have sustained plaintiffs’ claims over preemption objections. And, at least two federal courts have ruled that FECA preemption does not present a cognizable federal question to justify the removal of state court suits premised on state law causes of action against candidates and political committees. The Court’s approach here comports with this general trend of narrowly construing section 453’s preemptive reach, especially outside of its application to state laws with a direct connection to election-related activity. D. TUFT A’s Application Poses No Obstacle to FECA’s Purposes and Objectives Although “[a]t best there is an inference that an express pre-emption clause forecloses implied pre-emption,” the Supreme Court has consistently “rejected] the more absolute argument that the presence of the express pre-emption provision entirely foreclosed the possibility of conflict pre-emption.” Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 872, 120 S.Ct. 1913, 146 L.Ed.2d 914 (2000) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (alterations in original) (emphasis removed). Conflict preemption principles apply whenever a state law, “ ‘under the circumstances of th[e] particular case ... stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress’ — whether that ‘obstacle’ goes by the name of ‘conflicting; contrary to; ... repugnance; difference; irreconcilability; inconsistency; violation; curtailment; ... interference’ or the like.” Id. at 873, 120 S.Ct. 1913 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67, 61 S.Ct. 399, 85 L.Ed. 581 (1941)) (alterations in original). “What is a sufficient obstacle is a matter of judgment, to be informed by examining the federal statute as a whole and identifying its purpose and intended effects.” Crosby, 530 U.S. at 373, 120 S.Ct. 2288. But, conflict preemption protects only “significant federal regulatory objective[s],” Williamson v. Mazda Motor of Am., Inc., — U.S.-, 131 S.Ct. 1131, 1136, 179 L.Ed.2d 75 (2011) (citing Geier, 529 U.S. at 886, 120 S.Ct. 1913), as evidenced by the regulation’s history and the relevant agency’s interpretive views. Id. at 1139. To avoid a “freewheeling, extratextual, and broad evaluation!]” of FECA’s purposes and objectives, Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 129 S.Ct. 1187, 1217, 173 L.Ed.2d 51 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring), the Court limits its analysis to only the specific alleged conflicts identified by the Political Committees. The Political Committees first assert that the Receiver’s claims implicate FEC regulations governing the handling and disposal of illegal contributions. Because the Court determined above that the Receiver’s claims do not depend on categorizing the Stanford Defendants’ contributions as illegal contributions under FECA, that objection fails. See, e.g., Republican Committees’ Summ. J. Br. at 5. Disgorgement made to satisfy a judgment rendered pursuant to state fraudulent transfer law has no connection to the Political Committees’ treasurers’ assessing, processing, and refunding of campaign contributions potentially violative of FECA. And, as suggested by both the presence of regulatory provisions governing the Political Committees’ handling of debts, see 11 C.F.R. §§ 116.1-.12, and the FEC’s position on paying state law judgments, disgorging funds need not exclusively concern illegal contributions. The Political Committees’ second conflict preemption objection concerns BCRA’s soft money prohibitions. The Court reads the Political Committees to make two distinct arguments in this vein. First, and most broadly, the Republican Committees contend that paying the Receiver would require the “use [of] recently contributed ‘hard money’ to refund [the Stanford Defendants’ largely] ‘soft money’ contributions!,] • • ■ • breach[ing] the longstanding principle of separating ‘soft money from ‘hard money’ ” at FECA’s “core.” Republican Committees’ Summ. J. Br. at 8. Second, becaus