In re Vioxx Products Liability Litigation (802 F. Supp. 2d 740, 2011)

ORDER & REASONS

ELDON E. FALLON, District Judge.

The Court has previously determined the value of the common benefit work in the Vioxx MDL and associated state litigations which produced the global settlement of November 9, 2007. In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 760 F.Supp.2d 640 (E.D.La.2010) (“October 19, 2010 Order and Reasons”). The value was fixed at 6.5% of the $4.85 billion settlement amount for a total of Three Hundred and Fifteen Million, Two Hundred and Fifty Thousand Dollars ($315,250,000.00). Now, the Court must allocate those common benefit attorneys’ fees among the attorneys who did the work which produced this settlement. This allocation is in addition to common benefit costs, which have already been distributed.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

To put this matter in perspective, a brief review of this litigation is appropriate.

A. Vioxx Litigation and Settlement

This multidistrict products liability litigation involves the prescription drug Vioxx, known generieally as Rofeeoxib. Merck, a New Jersey corporation, researched, designed, manufactured, marketed, and distributed Vioxx to relieve pain and inflammation resulting from osteoarthritis, rheumatoid arthritis, menstrual pain, and migraine headaches. On May 20, 1999, the Food and Drug Administration approved Vioxx for sale in the United States. Vioxx remained publicly available until September 20, 2004, when Merck withdrew it from the market after data from a clinical trial known as APPROVe indicated that the use of Vioxx increased the risk of cardiovascular thrombotic events such as myocardial infarction (heart attack) and ischemic stroke. Thereafter, thousands of individual lawsuits and numerous class actions were filed against Merck in state and federal courts throughout the country alleging various products liability, tort, fraud, and warranty claims. It is estimated that 105 million prescriptions for Vioxx were written in the United States between May 20, 1999 and September 30, 2004. Based on this estimate, it is thought that approximately 20 million patients have taken Vioxx in the United States.

California was the first state to institute a consolidated state court proceeding on October 30, 2002. New Jersey and Texas soon followed suit, on May 20, 2003 and September 6, 2005, respectively. On February 16, 2005, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (“MDL”) conferred MDL status on Vioxx lawsuits filed in various federal courts throughout the country and transferred all such cases to this Court to coordinate discovery and to consolidate pretrial matters pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407. See In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 360 F.Supp.2d 1352 (J.P.M.L. 2005). Even after the creation of this federal MDL, many cases remained pending in the various state courts, particularly the courts in California, New Jersey, and Texas. It is estimated that the census of the litigation totaled over 50,000 claims.

On March 18, 2005, this Court held the first status conference in the Vioxx MDL to discuss procedures for moving this matter forward. Shortly thereafter, the Court appointed steering committees of counsel to represent the parties. In addition, the Court announced at monthly meetings that any attorney who was not appointed but who wished to do common benefit work on behalf of Vioxx claimants could do so by joining a subcommittee. The Plaintiffs’ Steering Committee (“PSC”) was encouraged to establish subcommittees and include non-PSC members on these subcommittees.

Furthermore, to give transparency to this litigation, the Court created a web site accessible to all counsel and the public at large. All motions, Court orders, opinions, recent developments, a calendar of scheduled events, transcripts of hearings, and various other matters were posted on this web site. Throughout the litigation monthly status conferences were held in open court. Notice of the meetings were posted on the web site and were open to all. The Court established a call-in number for those unable to attend in person, and also posted transcripts of the conferences on its web site.

Discovery rapidly commenced. The common benefit attorneys were responsible for all aspects of pre-trial preparation, including document discovery, the taking of depositions, preparation of experts, motions practice, and to some extent, coordination of federal and state court proceedings. Over nine million documents were discovered and collated. Thousands of depositions were taken and at least 1,000 discovery motions were argued to the Court. After a reasonable period for discovery, the Court assisted the parties in selecting and preparing certain test cases for bellwether trials. Additionally, a number of similar trials were scheduled in state courts.

This Court conducted six Vioxx bellwether trials. The first of the bellwether trials took place in Houston, Texas, while this Court was displaced following Hurricane Katrina. The five subsequent bellwether trials took place in New Orleans, Louisiana. Only one of the trials resulted in a verdict for the plaintiff. Of the five remaining trials, one resulted in a hung jury and four resulted in verdicts for the defendant. During the same period that this Court was conducting six bellwether trials, approximately thirteen additional Vioxx-related cases were tried before juries in the state courts of Texas, New Jersey, California, Alabama, Illinois, and Florida.

After extensive discovery, after the bellwether trials were completed, and after a number of trials were completed in state courts, this Court and courts from Texas, New Jersey, and California met in New Orleans with a representative of the Board of Merck, their attorneys, and representatives of the PSC. The Judges suggested that it was an appropriate time to explore a global resolution of this litigation. Negotiating Plaintiffs’ Counsel (“the NPC”) were appointed to explore and engage in settlement discussions with Merck. Counsel for Merck and the NPC met together more than fifty times and held several hundred telephone conferences. Although the parties met and negotiated independently, they kept this Court and the coordinate state courts of Texas, New Jersey, and California informed of their progress in settlement discussions.

On November 9, 2007, Merck and the NPC formally announced that they had reached a Settlement Agreement. See Settlement Agreement, In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL 1657 (E.D.La. Nov. 9, 2007) (“Settlement Agreement” or “MSA”), available at http://www. broumgreer.com/vioxxsettlement. The private Settlement Agreement establishes a voluntary, opt-in pre-funded program for resolving pending or tolled state and federal Vioxx claims against Merck as of the date of the settlement, involving claims of heart attack (“MI”), ischemic stroke (“IS”), and sudden cardiac death (“SCD”), for an overall amount of $4.85 billion. Id. § “Recitals”. Merck retained a walk away right to terminate the Settlement Program and Agreement if fewer than 85% of eligible participants enrolled in the Program. See generally art. 11. The MSA was designed to provide a fair and efficient means to compensate claimants who could present objective evidence of Vioxx usage and an associated MI, IS, or SCD injury. Claimants enrolled in the Program by signing a release, which would be delivered to Merck once the claim was paid or the claimant had elected to pursue other avenues for the amicable resolution of their claims pursuant to the terms of the MSA. After enrolling, claimants or their primary attorneys gathered and submitted medical records to the Claims Administrator for processing and review, as set forth in the Agreement. The deadlines for submitting records were extended several times.

Each claimant’s records were assessed pursuant to three “Gates”: Injury, Duration, and Proximity, which required the claimant to provide evidence of a qualifying MI, IS, or SCD injury; receipt of 30 Vioxx pills within a 60 day period prior to the injury; and use of those pills at a time close to the injury. There were multiple layers of review for eligibility, including initial review by the Claims Administrator, an opportunity to submit additional records, review by a Gates Committee consisting of counsel for claimants and counsel for Merck, and a further opportunity for Merck to include the claim in the Program. If after that process a claim did not pass one of the Gates, the claimant could appeal to the Court-appointed Special Master for a final and binding review, or alternatively get off of the Settlement tracks and resume their lawsuit by filing a Future Evidence Stipulation and proceeding to trial. Claimants who qualified for the program were assigned points based on objective risk factors and the nature and extent of their injury, and were entitled to similar review of those calculations. Thus, the Settlement Program included an exit opportunity and multiple layers of review to ensure that claims received ample process.

The Settlement Agreement expressly contemplates that this Court will oversee various aspects of the administration of settlement proceedings, including appointing a Fee Allocation Committee (“FAC”), allocating a percentage of the settlement proceeds to a Common Benefit Fund, approving a cost assessment, and modifying any provisions of the Settlement Agreement that are otherwise unenforceable. This is consistent with the inherent duty of an MDL transferee court. Accordingly, this Court has exercised its inherent authority over the MDL proceedings, see Manual for Complex Litigation (Fourth) §§ 10.224, 14.215-16, 14.231-.216 (2004), in coordination with its express authority under the terms of the Settlement Agreement to ensure that the settlement proceedings move forward in a uniform and efficient manner.

On July 17, 2008, Merck formally announced that it was satisfied that the thresholds necessary to trigger funding of the Vioxx Settlement Program would be met. See Minute Enti% July 17, 2008, Ree. Doc. 15362 (July 17, 2008). Merck further advised that it intended to waive its walk-away privileges and that it would commence funding the Vioxx Settlement Program by depositing an initial sum of $500 million into the settlement fund, clearing the way for distribution of interim payments to eligible claimants. Id. Eventually some 99.9% of all eligible claimants enrolled in the program.

The Settlement Program proceeded at a very rapid rate and Merck made additional payments in order to ensure that the claimants would receive funds in a timely fashion. Final payments to heart attack claimants were completed prior to October 14, 2009, final payments to stroke claimants were completed by June 14, 2010, and final extraordinary injury payments (i.e., payments to those who incurred or sustained extraordinary losses) were completed by June 29, 2010. Thus, in only 31 months, the parties to this MDL case were able to reach a global settlement and distribute Four Billion, Three Hundred and Fifty-three Million, One Hundred Fifty-two Thousand and Sixty-four Dollars ($4,353,152,064) to 32,886 claimants, out of a pool of 49,893 eligible and enrolled claimants. This efficiency is unprecedented in mass tort settlements of this size. It was due in large part to the ability, industry, and professionalism of the attorneys for both sides, the plan administrators, the lien administrators, the pro se curator, and the special masters.

B. Procedures for Performing and Documenting Common Benefit Work

1) Pre-Settlement Procedures

As previously mentioned, from the very beginning of this MDL, and before the Settlement Agreement was contemplated or announced, steps were taken to create a fair and open environment for all interested attorneys to perform work for the common benefit of the Vioxx plaintiffs and to create a transparent factual record for an eventual application for common benefit fees.

Thirteen members, including Plaintiffs’ Liaison Counsel (“PLC”), were appointed to the PSC. Pretrial Order No. 6 (Apr. 8, 2005). Appointment of a supervising Plaintiffs’ Steering Committee is necessary to create centralized leadership and control of litigation of this magnitude. But the Court, the plaintiffs, and the justice system in general also have an interest in broadening the range of attorney participation in MDL cases, lest the work be confined to a specialized bar of MDL attorneys which would result in exclusivity, unfairness, and discrimination, and inure to the disadvantage of litigants and their attorneys. Therefore, as mentioned above, the Court authorized and encouraged the PSC to “organiz[e] subcommittees comprised of plaintiffs’ attorneys not on the PSC and assign[] them tasks consistent with the duties of the PSC.” Pretrial Order 6 (Apr. 8, 2005). All interested attorneys, including those in the state court litigations, were encouraged to coordinate with the PSC and to do work for the common benefit. Over one hundred firms or attorneys availed themselves of the opportunity to perform common benefit work.

To receive and vet records of the time spent and expenses incurred by attorneys performing common benefit work, the Court appointed a CPA, Phillip Garrett. Id. Those doing common benefit work and incurring common benefit expenses were ordered to report their hours and expenses contemporaneously to the Court-appointed CPA for review and reporting to the Court. Time and Expense Guidelines were established to govern “all activities performed and expenses incurred by counsel that relate to matters common to all claimants in MDL 1657.” Id. at 4.

Early in the litigation, the Court entered Pretrial Order No. 19, which established a Plaintiffs’ Litigation Expense Fund to compensate and reimburse attorneys for services performed and expenses incurred for the common benefit. Pursuant to this Order, any case that was settled, compromised, dismissed, or otherwise reduced to judgment for monetary relief, with or without trial, was subject to an assessment. In order to avail themselves of the benefit of the initial work of the common benefit attorneys, individual plaintiffs’ counsel could, for a limited time, enter into a contract that was to dictate the assessment amount. The “Full Participation Option,” which was one such option, established an assessment of 2% of the recovery for fees and 1% of the recovery for costs. See Pretrial Order No. 19 (Aug. 4, 2005). Counsel were able to select the “Full Participation Option” within 90 days of the entry of Pretrial Order 19. Following that period, counsel could accept a “Traditional Assessment Option” providing for 6% assessment of recoveries in MDL cases and 4% assessment of recoveries in state court cases.

As mentioned above, the case then proceeded through a period of extensive discovery, pretrial motions, Daubert hearings, six MDL bellwether trials, and over a dozen trials in state court. After several years, the settlement occurred.

2) Post-Settlement Procedures

When consummated, the Settlement Agreement modified the landscape regarding common benefit attorneys’ fees for those interested in participating in the settlement. The Settlement Agreement provides for a common benefit fee assessment to create a common benefit fund, to “be administered by the Honorable Eldon E. Fallon,” and to be awarded “upon due consideration by him in consultation with the Honorable Victoria G. Chaney, the Honorable Carol E. Higbee, and the Honorable Randy Wilson, and in accordance with established Fifth Circuit precedent.” Id. § 9.2.3. Additionally, the Settlement Agreement states that this contractual common benefit fee assessment supersedes the assessments provided for in Pretrial Order No. 19. Id. (“The maximum 8% attorneys’ fee assessment shall supersede the assessment provided to MDL common benefit attorneys pursuant to Pretrial Order No. 19.”). Those who were not interested in participating in the settlement could proceed with their case and avail themselves of the common benefit work for the original assessment set forth in PTO 19.

The Settlement Agreement also addressed procedures regarding how the common benefit fund would be distributed, to which all parties to the Agreement consented. The Settlement Agreement called for appointment by the Court of a committee of plaintiffs’ attorneys to recommend an allocation of common benefit fees:

The Honorable Eldon E. Fallon will be asked to appoint a committee of eight plaintiffs’ counsel which shall include all members of the [Negotiating Plaintiffs’ Committee] and two additional plaintiffs’ attorneys to be responsible for recommending ... the allocation of awards of attorneys’ fees from the Settlement Fee and Cost Account. In making its recommendation, the “Allocation Committee” is to review the contemporaneous time records, or properly reconstructed time records and expense reports of all plaintiffs’ counsel that request compensation for common benefit work, as audited by the CPA firm of Wegmann Dazet. The Allocation Committee shall take into consideration the common benefit work of counsel in the MDL, and the work of counsel in the state litigations in Texas, California and New Jersey. The Allocation Committee shall be guided by these objective measures of common benefit counsel’s contributions, in addition to their subjective understanding of the relative contributions of counsel towards generating the Settlement Fund in accordance with established fee jurisprudence and subject to the approval of the Honorable Eldon E. Fallon in consultation with the Honorable Victoria G. Chaney, the Honorable Carol E. Higbee, and the Honorable Randy Wilson.

Id. at § 9.2.4. The Settlement also stated that the Court “provide appropriate notices governing the procedure by which [the Court] shall determine common benefit attorneys’ fees ... including Common Benefit Attorneys’ joint submission of papers by the PLC requesting compensation for their common benefit work.... [The Court] shall insure that there is ample opportunity for objections and comments to the application and a notice of hearing regarding the same.” Id. at § 9.2.5.

The provisions of the Settlement Agreement correspond to the Court’s inherent authority to award common benefit attorneys’ fees out of a limited fund created by the work of those attorneys, see October 19, 2010 Order and Reasons, 760 F.Supp.2d at 647-49, and the Court’s inherent authority to appoint a committee of plaintiffs’ attorneys to recommend an allocation of common benefit fees, see In re High Sulfur Content Gasoline Products Liability Litigation, 517 F.3d 220, 227 (5th Cir.2008) (“High Sulfur I ”).

The Court exercised its inherent authority as well as its express authority under the MSA by appointing nine members to a Fee Allocation Committee (“FAC”). See Pre-Trial Order No. 32 (Nov. 20, 2007). The FAC appointees were heavily involved in the MDL and in the associated state-court litigations and had firsthand knowledge of the nature and extent of the common benefit work which was done and who did it. The Court appointed to the FAC some attorneys who were not on the PSC; thus, the FAC was comprised of both “insiders” and “outsiders” to the MDL leadership, who could bring a wide perspective to assessing all work done for the common benefit both in the MDL and in state court. The makeup of the FAC was intended to provide a broad range of experience and opinions to ensure that an eventual recommended allocation would not over- or under-emphasize the contribution of any attorney in any venue with respect to any aspect of the litigation.

The FAC was charged first with obtaining supporting evidence from every attorney or firm who had performed common benefit work and sought an award of common benefit attorneys’ fees. On September 15, 2008, the Court issued Pre-Trial Order 6D, setting forth procedures and guidelines for the FAC to follow in preparing an eventual recommended allocation. Pursuant to PTO 6D, “any attorney wishing to have their time considered for an allocation of any common benefit award” was directed to submit a three-page written affidavit to the FAC articulating their contribution, with emphasis on factors including “substantial contribution to the outcome of the litigation,” quality of work, “consistency quantum, duration, and intensity of ... commitment to the litigation,” “level of partner participation,” committee membership and leadership positions, the “jurisdiction in which non-MDL common benefit work occurred,” “[a]ctivities surrounding trials of individual Vioxx claimants, including bellwether trials and non-MDL trials that impacted proceedings on a common benefit level,” participation in ongoing work for the common benefit, involvement in Vioxx litigation prior to withdrawal of Vioxx from the market or the MDL, contribution to funding of the litigation, commitment to the litigation after adverse verdicts, and any other relevant factors. Over one hundred firms or attorneys submitted common benefit time and costs to the Court-appointed CPA. The FAC received almost twenty-four hundred pages of affidavits and supporting documentation, all of which were entered into the record of this proceeding.

Also pursuant to PTO 6D, the FAC conducted in-person, on-the-record meetings at which all interested common benefit submitters were invited to “appear and present the reasons, grounds and explanations for their entitlement to common benefit fees and reimbursement of expenses.” The FAC conducted hearings in the epicenters of Vioxx litigation in Atlantic City, New Jersey; New Orleans, Louisiana; Houston, Texas; and Los Angeles, California. Over forty-five firms out of the more than one hundred firms or attorneys that applied for common benefit fees availed themselves of this opportunity, and the hearings produced over eighteen hundred pages of transcripts from the common benefit fee applicants.

Finally, pursuant to PTO 6D and the MSA, the PLC moved on January 20, 2009 for a common benefit fee award of 8% of the $4.85 billion settlement amount. The PLC’s motion was posted on the Court’s website and on April 17, 2009, the Court invited any interested party to file a Notice of Objection on or before May 8, 2009. After receiving numerous objections, the Court concluded that it was appropriate to appoint a Liaison Counsel for the Common Benefit Fee Application Objectors (“Percentage-Fee Objectors”). Michael Stratton was selected by the Percentage-Fee Objectors for this role. See Pretrial Order No. 52 (Sept. 30, 2009). Thereafter, numerous status conferences were convened, discovery was taken, briefing was submitted, and arguments were heard. As a result of that process, the Objectors withdrew their objections and the PLC reduced its request to a common benefit fee award of 7.5%.

The PLC’s renewed motion was heard in open court. After the hearing, the motion was taken under submission and on October 19, 2010, the Court issued an Order and Reasons setting the amount of common benefit fees to be awarded and allocated between attorneys who did common benefit work in the MDL and coordinated state litigations. October 19, 2010 Order and Reasons, 760 F.Supp.2d 640. In fixing the common benefit fee, the Court analyzed the applicable law and concluded that a blended percentage approach to determining common benefit attorney’s fees was appropriate. Id. at 650-52. After a thorough review of the common benefit fee awards and set-asides in comparable MDLs and consideration of the Johnson factors as required by the Fifth Circuit, the Court determined that 6.5% of the settlement amount was appropriate compensation for the common benefit work done in this case. See id. at 652-58. Thus a common benefit award of 6.5% of the total settlement, or a sum of $315,250,000.00, was rendered. See id. at 658. The common benefit fee is to come from the attorneys’ fees of primary counsel and is not an additional fee borne by the litigants. Id. at 655.

To test the validity of this common benefit award, a rough lodestar cross-check was conducted. See id. at 658-62. Without delving extensively into individual time submissions, the Court used the submitted time in globo, to verify that a 6.5% award was not excessive or windfall compensation for the common benefit work actually done in the Vioxx litigation. The Court took the sum total of hours submitted to and vetted by Philip Garrett, the Court-appointed CPA, and multiplied those hours by the average of attorneys’ actual billing rates to generate a time-fee value of the common benefit work of approximately $249,546,751.20. See id. at 659-61. Comparing the two values (ie., $315,250,000.00 and $249,546,751.20), it is apparent that the 6.5% figure represented only a 1.2633 multiplier over the time-fee value of the common benefit work, a multiplier that was within the range supported by the legal literature and the case law. See id. at 661-62. Accordingly, the rough lodestar cross-check supported the percentage award fixed by the Court, consistent with percentage awards in other cases. But it bears repeating that the common benefit award of $315,250,000.00 was a percentage award supported by a lodestar value, and not generated in the first instance by the time-fee value. For the purpose of performing this cross-check, the Court did not closely scrutinize the hours involved or make any finding as to the amount of the common benefit fee to which anyone who submitted those hours would be entitled, and expressly stated that use of the aggregate of submitted hours did “not preclude the [FAC] or the Court from disallowing any particular submissions of common benefit time when allocating the common benefit fee award.” See id. at 660-61 & n. 22. Nor does it prohibit the Court from prioritizing certain common benefit work when dividing the fund among the applicants.

In the October 19, 2010 Order and Reasons, the Court also reiterated and elaborated on the procedure by which it would allocate that total award of common benefit fees. See id. at 662. Under this Order, the FAC would first prepare a suggested distribution in accordance with the Court’s announced guidelines and based on the affidavits and testimony gathered by the FAC as well as the FAC members’ personal experience with the litigation. If disputes regarding that suggested allocation arose, the Court would appoint a Special Master to take additional evidence, if necessary, and to evaluate the disputed recommendation. Thereafter, the Special Master would submit a second impartial report to the Court, and the Court would make the ultimate determination based on the FAC’s recommendation, the objections, the special master’s impartial report, and all the evidence proffered during those proceedings, as well as the Court’s own experience with the litigation.

Shortly after issuance of the October 19, 2010 Order and Reasons, the FAC informed the Court that it was preparing its proposed recommendation as to how the total amount should be allocated, pursuant to the Court’s Orders and guidance. The Court met with the FAC and suggested that it consider devising objective categories for types of work done for common benefit, based on the relative significance of that work in bringing about the ultimate successful resolution of this litigation. Even if all of the approved hours logged by the plaintiffs’ attorneys who performed common benefit work were helpful, clearly some of the work performed was more helpful and deserves greater compensation.

The FAC proposed a preliminary, “penciled-in” recommended allocation, based on its personal experience with the litigation, the record, and the Court’s guidelines. To arrive at this recommendation, the FAC developed its own objective criteria by-breaking down each common benefit fee applicant’s contribution to the work categories of Key Leadership Roles, Trials, Settlement, Law & Briefing, Settlement Implementation/PosL-Settlement Matters, Discovery/Science, Committee Leadership and Participation, Funding, and Case Management. The FAC assigned a maximum point value to each category based on its relative importance in the litigation and then assigned individual point values to attorneys for their work done in that category. These amounts were then totaled and adjusted pursuant to the Johnson factors for a “rough cut” on a preliminary evaluation. This method allowed the FAC to break down the applicants’ relative contributions in different areas of the litigation and to compare, for example, trial work to trial work and discovery work to discovery work.

PTO 6D required the FAC to “provide each participating attorney notice of the Committee’s Recommendation as it pertains to the participating attorney.” Pursuant to PTO 6D, each applicant had fourteen days to submit to the FAC a written objection to that preliminary recommendation before the FAC submitted its final proposed recommendation to the Court. The purpose of this notice and period for response was to elicit prompt feedback so that the FAC could consider and, if appropriate, revise its tentative allocation on the basis of that input before providing the final proposed recommendation to the Court. Some attorneys expressed misplaced concern that objecting or failing to object would have some preclusive effect on the amount that they might eventually receive. The Court explained on its website that “No attorney will be prohibited in any way from objecting to the Committee’s final recommendation on the basis of their response to notice of the preliminary allocation.”

The FAC received objections, considered them, and in many cases adjusted its penciled-in recommended allocation. Thus, the preliminary notice mandated by PTO 6D served its purpose. On January 20, 2011 the Court received the FAC’s final proposed recommendation and posted it on its website for both the attorneys and the public at large to see. The Court ordered any objections to any recommended allocation to be filed by February 4, 2011.

Eighteen firms or attorneys objected. Because of the number of objectors, it was necessary to designate representatives for the Objectors and representatives of the FAC to coordinate discovery and briefing relevant to all fee objectors and applicants. Accordingly, the Court ordered the Objectors and the FAC to meet and confer separately and to select attorneys to serve as Lead and Liaison Counsel for each group. The Objectors and the FAC each unanimously selected Lead and Liaison Counsel who were appointed to those roles.

3) Proceedings Befóte the Special Master

As presaged by the October 19, 2010 Order and Reasons, given the nature and number of objections the Court appointed Patrick Juneau as Special Master pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 53 and assigned him a number of duties. (Rec. Doc. 62606). Special Master Juneau was authorized to “conduct interviews, review any relevant documents, oversee discovery, and then ... submit a written recommendation of the amount every common benefit fee applicant should receive.” Id. at 2-3. This was to serve as a second review conducted by someone who had no financial interest in the litigation.

The Special Master received extensive briefing from the Objectors and the FAC regarding the scope of discovery into the substantive basis of the FAC’s recommended allocation as well as their methodology. On March 31, 2011, Special Master Juneau ruled on those motions and issued a Report and Scheduling Order. (Rec. Doc. 62735). The Special Master noted the extensive discovery that had been made available to the Objectors, including extensive meetings with the Court-appointed CPA and access to submitted time records. The Special Master denied some additional discovery, permitted the Objectors to depose a representative of the FAC, and scheduled a week-long evidentiary hearing at which all Objectors would be entitled to testify before the Special Master and to question a FAC representative as well as the Court-appointed CPA. Objectors’ Counsel appealed the Special Master’s Report and Scheduling Order, and the Court affirmed the Special Master in all respects. (Rec. Doc. 62883).

On May 6, 2011, pursuant to the Special Master’s Report and Scheduling Order, Objectors took a nine-hour deposition of a representative of the FAC. Beginning on May 9, 2011, and continuing every day of that week through May 13, 2011, the Special Master presided over an evidentiary hearing. At the hearing, the Objectors testified and submitted evidence regarding their contribution to the common benefit in support of their requested allocation. The Objectors also had the opportunity to examine the Court-appointed CPA and a representative of the FAC. The FAC had the opportunity to cross-examine the Objectors. By the conclusion of the week-long hearing, a number of the Objectors had reached an accord with the FAC regarding the amount the FAC would recommend that they receive. Only four Objectors remained, and the Special Master concluded that no additional testimony or document production was necessary. The Special Master also provided all participants an opportunity to file post-hearing briefs, and he received briefs from the remaining Objectors, Lead Counsel for the Objectors, and the FAC.

On June 27, 2011, the Special Master filed his Report and Recommendations. (Rec. Doc. 63093). This Report and Recommendations considered the entire record, including the discovery and evidentiary hearing supervised by the Special Master, addressed the Objectors’ positions, and made a comprehensive recommendation as to how the common benefit fund should be divided between all applicants, Objectors and Non-objectors. The Court posted that Report and Recommendations on its website for all to see and invited a final round of comments and objections. The Court received objections from the four remaining Objectors, and a response from the FAC. The Court denied those objections in a previous Order and Reasons. (Rec. Doc. 63188).

To summarize, all attorneys seeking an award of common benefit fees have now had the opportunity to: submit time records to the Court-appointed CPA documenting their common benefit work; provide a written affidavit and supporting materials to the Court-appointed Fee Allocation committee articulating their common benefit contribution; testify on the record before the FAC regarding their common benefit contribution; comment on the FAC’s preliminary recommendation before it was presented to the Court; object to the FAC’s recommended allocation after it was presented to the Court; testify and produce evidence at a hearing before Special Master Juneau; depose and cross-examine a member of the FAC regarding that Committee’s reasoning and methodology in reaching its proposed recommendation; file a post-hearing brief arguing in support of their requested allocation; and respond to the Special Master’s report and recommendation. These proceedings were all recorded and the results posted on the Court’s web site. They have been transparent, have provided all common benefit fee applicants fair notice and ample opportunity to be heard, and have created a sufficient factual record for the Court to make an informed allocation of the common benefit fund. The Court has also kept the courts in Texas, New Jersey, and California advised of these developments and has periodically conferred with the Judges of these courts.

The Court now has before it the FAC’s original and amended recommended allocation of the common benefit fees, the Special Master’s independent Report and Recommendation, and the ample evidence and testimony produced throughout these proceedings. It is prepared to rule and allocate the common benefit fund. But before turning to the allocation it is appropriate to review the legal and factual authority of the Court to award common benefit fees and to discuss the method used in making this allocation.

11. LAW & ANALYSIS

A. Court’s Authority and Jurisdiction to Award Common Benefit Fees

First, it is worth reiterating the source of the Court’s authority to award and allocate the common benefit fund. Since the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court has recognized an equitable exception to the general rule that a prevailing litigant is not entitled to collect attorneys’ fees from the loser. This exception has become known as the common fund or common benefit doctrine and permits the creation of a common fund in order to pay reasonable attorneys’ fees for legal services beneficial to persons other than a particular client, thus spreading the cost of the litigation to all beneficiaries. See In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 594 F.3d 113, 128 (2d Cir.2010) (Kaplan, J., concurring). This equitable common fund doctrine was originally, and perhaps still is, most commonly applied to awards of attorneys’ fees in class actions. E.g., 4 Alba Conte & Herbert B. Newberg, Newberg on Class Actions § 13:76 (4th ed. 2002) (discussing common fund doctrine in context of class actions); Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(h).

But the common fund doctrine is not limited solely to class actions. See Sprague v. Ticonic National Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 59 S.Ct. 777, 83 L.Ed. 1184 (1939) (employing common benefit doctrine to award fees and costs to litigant whose success benefitted unrelated parties by establishing their legal rights); Alan Hirsh & Diane Sheeley, Fed. Judicial Ctr., Awarding Attorneys’ Fees and Managing Fee Litigation 51 (2nd ed. 2005) (“Although many common fund cases are class actions ... the common fund doctrine is not limited to class actions.”); Manual for Complex Litigation (Fourth) § 14.121 (2004). As class actions morph into multidistrict litigation, as is the modern trend, the common benefit concept has migrated into the latter area. The theoretical bases for the application of this concept to MDLs are the same as for class actions, namely equity and her blood brother, quantum meruit. However, there is a difference. In class actions the beneficiary of the common benefit is the claimant; in MDLs the beneficiary is the primary attorney.

MDL courts have consistently cited the common fund doctrine as a basis for assessing common benefit fees in favor of attorneys who render legal services beneficial to all MDL plaintiffs. E.g., In re Genetically Modified Rice Litig., MDL No. 06-1811, 2010 WL 716190, at *4 (E.D.Mo. Feb. 24, 2010) (relying on common fund doctrine as an alternate basis to inherent managerial authority and concluding that “[b]oth sources of authority provide the same result”); In re Guidant Corp. Implantable Defibrillators Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 05-1708, 2008 WL 682174, at *4 (D.Minn. Mar. 7, 2008); accord In re Zyprexa, 594 F.3d at 128-30 (Kaplan, J., concurring).

In addition to judicial precedent the Court also finds authority to assess common benefit attorneys’ fees in its inherent managerial authority, particularly in light of the complex nature of this MDL. The Fifth Circuit has long recognized that a court’s power to consolidate and manage litigation necessarily implies a corollary authority to appoint lead or liaison counsel and to compensate them for their work. See In re Air Crash Disaster at Fl. Everglades on Dec. 29, 1972, 549 F.2d 1006 (1977) (“Everglades ”). In Ever glades, the JPML transferred all federal cases arising out of a passenger plane crash near Miami to the Southern District of Florida. Id. at 1008. The transferee court appointed a Plaintiffs’ Committee to coordinate discovery and pretrial matters, and then to conduct bellwether trials. Id. The court compensated the Committee through an assessment on the contingent fees of attorneys who represented MDL plaintiffs but were not on the Committee. Id. The non-Committee attorneys appealed and the Fifth Circuit upheld the district court’s authority to make that assessment. The Fifth Circuit explained that a district court has inherent authority “to bring management power to bear upon massive and complex litigation to prevent it from monopolizing the services of the court to the exclusion of other litigants.” Id. at 1012. Therefore, an MDL court “may designate one attorney or set of attorneys to handle pre-trial activity on aspects of the case where the interests of all co-parties coincide.” Id. at 1014. Naturally, this authority would be “illusory if it is dependent upon lead counsel’s performing the duties desired of them for no additional compensation.” Id. at 1016. Assessment of those fees against other retained lawyers who benefitted from the work done was permissible and appropriate. See id. at 1019-20.

Other courts have applied this inherent authority to compensate common benefit counsel in complex litigation. E.g., In re Diet Drugs, 582 F.3d 524, 546-47 (3rd Cir.2009); In re Genetically Modified Rice Litig., 2010 WL 716190, at *4 (“An MDL court’s authority to establish a trust and to order compensations to compensate leadership counsel derives from its ‘managerial’ power over the consolidated litigation, and, to some extent, from its inherent equitable power.”); In re Guidant, 2008 WL 682174, at *5; In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 467 F.Supp.2d 256, 265-66 (E.D.N.Y.2006); In re Linerboard Antitrust Litig., 292 F.Supp.2d 644, 653-56 (E.D.Pa.2003); see also Manual for Complex Litigation (Fourth) § 22.62 (2004); Restatement (Third) of Restitution § 30 Reporter’s Note b (Tentative Draft No. 3, 1994) (“In contrast to the standard view of class-action fees, which explains them as restitutionary, the leading accounts of fees to court-appointed counsel in consolidated litigation properly emphasize factors independent of restitution to justify the imposition of a liability by court order.”) (citing Everglades).

In addition to equity, quantum meruit, and inherent managerial authority, the Court derives express authority in this case from the very terms of the Settlement Agreement entered into by the parties and consented to by their primary attorneys. Section 9.2 of the Settlement Agreement governs common benefit fees and expressly authorizes this Court to determine common benefit attorneys’ fees, as explained in greater detail above. Settlement Agreement § 9.2.1 and 9.2.3 provide:

9.2.1. To ensure that ... common benefit attorneys ... are fairly compensated but that their fees are in conformance with reasonable rates, an assessment of common benefit attorneys’ fees will be imposed at no more than 8% of the gross amount recovered for every client that registers under the terms of the Settlement Agreement. Any sum paid as a common benefit fee shall be deducted from the total amount of counsel fees payable under individual plaintiffs’ counsel’s retainer agreement. The maximum 8% attorneys’ fee assessment shall supersede the assessment provided to MDL common benefit attorneys pursuant to Pretrial Order No. 19.

9.2.3 [T]he attorneys’ fees and common benefit expenses deducted by the Claims Administrator shall be deposited into an interest bearing escrow account (the “Settlement Fee and Cost Account”). The Settlement Fee and Cost Account shall be maintained at a financial institution. Funds within the Settlement Fee and Cost Account shall be administered by the Honorable Eldon E. Fallon and all awards therefrom will be subject to approval, upon due consideration by him in consultation with the Honorable Victoria G. Chaney, the Honorable Carol E. Higbee, and the Honorable Randy Wilson, and in accordance with established Fifth Circuit precedent. ...

Thus, all parties to the MSA expressly agreed to the creation of a common benefit fund to be administered by the Court.

B. Some Final Thoughts About the Process for Allocating Common Benefit Fees

Before determining the proper fee allocation in this case some general comments are in order.

First, the Court capped the total amount of attorneys’ fees for primary counsel at 32% of the $4.85 billion settlement which means that the primary counsel’s attorneys’ fees in this case are one billion, five hundred and fifty-two million dollars ($1,552,000,000). Out of that 32%, the Court has created a fund for common benefit counsel of 6.5% of the total settlement amount, or Three Hundred and Fifteen Million, Two Hundred and Fifty Thousand Dollars ($315,250,000.00). This amount has been escrowed and the remainder has been paid to primary counsel. Thus, primary counsel for individual claimants have already received over one billion dollars pursuant to contingent fee agreements. Many if not all of the common benefit fee applicants are also primary counsel in at least some if not many cases and thus have already received substantial compensation pursuant to contingent fee agreements with their own clients. For this reason, it is disconcerting and disappointing to receive such vexatious, vitriolic, and acerbic briefs from some of the attorneys who seek common benefit fees.

Second, there has been much discussion regarding the process by which this Court, or any court, should allocate attorneys’ fees. The Fifth Circuit’s opinion in In re High Sulfur is instructive in this respect. In High Sulfur, the Fifth Circuit reviewed an allocation of attorneys’ fees in a class action case. The takeaway from High Sulfur is that in allocating a fund of attorneys’ fees, the Court must conform to “traditional judicial standards of transparency, impartiality, procedural fairness, and ultimate judicial oversight.” 517 F.3d at 234. That requires creating a sufficient record, making sufficient factual findings, considering the time worked and the Johnson factors, providing an opportunity to be heard to all the applicants, and exercising independent judgment in allocating those fees rather than simply rubber-stamping a committee recommendation. The Court has been guided by these principles throughout this process.

Third, there has been much ink spilt in this case discussing the methodology by which common benefit attorneys’ fees should be calculated. As explained in the Court’s Order and Reasons of October 19, 2010, there is a growing trend in this country to use a blended approach to determine the appropriate common benefit fee in an MDL. Such an approach seeks an appropriate percentage through an analysis of similar cases, then modifies it upward or downward by a review of the Johnson factors and tests it through a lodestar cross-check. In this case, the Court applied this blended approach. See 760 F.Supp.2d at 652-62. The lodestar process played an important part in the analysis but the lodestar cross-check did not generate the common benefit award in the first instance; rather, it verified that the percentage fixed by the Court did not represent a windfall relative to the total hours worked.

Thus, on these facts, rigid application of a lodestar calculation to allocate fees is not the Court’s starting point. As the Court has explained before:

In a case of this kind, not all types of work are created equal. Hours spent taking depositions, participating in hearings, or trials, actively participating in developing the appropriate litigation strategies and tactics (through moot court presentations or similar practices), drafting briefs, actively participating in Court conferences, arguing motions, negotiating with opposing counsel to reach a settlement, and actively managing and organizing the administrative aspects of the case are some of the more significant types of work that a case of this sort requires and deserves the most recognition. This, of course, is not the only type of work that such a case requires. Documents must be reviewed, categorized, and analyzed; e-mails must be read and responded to; claimants must be kept advised; meetings must be attended and in general the litigation must be monitored. This work, while necessary and often time consuming does not deserve equal treatment when allotting fees.

Murphy Oil, 582 F.Supp.2d at 810-11. In short, there is a hierarchy of value for work that tends to have a greater impact on the litigation and generates more “common benefit.” Such work deserves greater compensation. This is not a unique concept. It is a common practice in the legal profession to bill certain work at a higher rate than other work. Mechanically calculating hours and allocating fees solely on that basis would incentivize padded hours and diminish the work that truly moved the litigation toward its conclusion. See id. A lodestar calculation is important in comparing the relative contribution of attorneys doing the same kind of work, and it is also an important check to ensure that the spread between compensation for attorneys doing more or less significant work is not grossly unfair, but it is not the end-all of allocating fees in an MDL case such as this.

It is not inconsistent, as some have suggested, to rely on lodestar as a cross-check but to reject it as the sole basis for allocation. The reason it is not inconsistent is because the objective is different. The objective of the lodestar method is to cross-check the accuracy of the percentage method to determine whether the totality of the hours spent and an amount assigned to it under the lodestar has a realistic relevance to the amount assigned as a common benefit fee. But when the focus is on the allocation of that fee the lodestar analysis is incomplete because it is necessary to drill down on the hours and prioritize them, consistent with the facts of each MDL. For those MDLs that are resolved without trials the priority may be different from this case. In this case there were nearly twenty trials: six in the MDL and the remainder in the various state courts. Those trials and the preparation involved therein played a substantial role in creating an environment in which settlement could be spawned, birthed, and nurtured. Therefore, in this case the attorneys who took up the cudgels and participated in those trials deserve an appropriate recognition for their efforts. To simply total the hours spent, apply an appropriate lodestar factor, and allocate the fee on that basis alone would not be appropriate in this case.

However, to uniformly recognize each trial counsel with the same common benefit fee would also be improper. The goal or objective of the proper allocation of the common benefit fee is not to pay counsel for his or her work at the trial stage of a particular case. That is the purpose of the contingent fee in that case. The purpose of the common benefit fee is to materially recognize counsel for the work which inured to the common benefit of the litigation as a whole. Thus, in allocating common benefit fees to trial counsel it is important to determine when the trial occurred, whether the work was shared with other counsel, whether the work was helpful in other eases or just in that one case. In this latter event, it does not mean that such counsel would not be entitled to some common benefit fee because there is a salutary rippling effect which a win or “hard fought case” has on other cases. But it also does not mean that such counsel may be entitled to the same common benefit fee as a colleague whose work was shared with other counsel and had a meaningful effect on subsequent trials.

Fourth, some comments on the role of a fee-allocating committee are also warranted. It is beyond dispute that a court may “appoint a committee of plaintiffs’ counsel to recommend how to divide up an aggregate fee award.” In re High Sulfur I, 517 F.3d at 227. The Court has previously used this mechanism with the hope that the committee could “achieve a unanimous agreement as to how the Common Benefit Fund should be allocated among counsel.” Murphy Oil, 582 F.Supp.2d at 801. If all counsel had an opportunity for informed arms-length discussion with an allocating committee, and the committee could recommend an allocation of a fixed pot of common benefit fees acceptable to all interested counsel, the Court would give weight to that mutual agreement. Unfortunately, unanimity is hard to achieve. Hence, the Court maintains the “responsibility to closely scrutinize the attorneys’ fee allocation, especially when the attorneys recommending the allocation have a financial interest in the resulting awards.” High Sulfu/r I, 517 F.3d at 227. To deal with this potential conflict a Special Master was appointed who had no financial interest in the awards. The Special Master was charged with conducting discovery and making his own recommendation.

In this case, the lengthy fee allocation procedure has provided an opportunity for common benefit fee applicants to review the FAC’s recommendation and the Special Master’s recommendation as they pertain to all applicants, and to comment on those recommendations. In some circumstances this dialogue between the FAC, the Special Master, and the applicants has resolved objections and produced consensus. Some might criticize any negotiation between the FAC or the Special Master and the applicants as “horse-trading” or “side deals.” The Court interprets this ongoing development of the FAC’s and the Special Master’s recommended allocations as an indication that the allocation process was working properly. The effectiveness of this process in this case is supported by the fact that only 4 out of the 108 common benefit fee applicants continue to maintain their objections.

Fifth, there is some criticism expressed that allocation of common benefit fees contains an element of subjectivity. It is this Court’s view that some subjectivity is unavoidable in allotting common benefit fees. In the fictional and perfect “best of all possible worlds” of Voltaire’s Candide, an appropriate allocation might be achieved by applying purely objective criteria such as the billing-rate-times-hours method described above. But in the real and imperfect world of litigation it is an accepted fact that not all work hours are entitled to the same compensation rate. The nature of the work, the skill and experience of the party doing the work, and the result achieved all factor into the appropriate allocation. How these factors are weighed injects an unavoidable amount of subjectivity in the analysis. The best that can be done to assure the validity of the analysis is to base the subjectivity quotient on sufficient facts and experience, and to invite input from those affected. This Court has attempted to do this through a tedious and long drawn-out process.

Finally, after reviewing the documents and transcripts compiled by the Fee Allocation Committee, the detailed report and recommendations of the Special Master, as well as the exhibits cited therein, consulting with the Honorable Victoria G. Chaney, the Honorable Carol E. Higbee, and the Honorable Randy Wilson, and drawing upon this Court’s experience in this case accumulated during the course of over five years in which there were six bellwether trials, hundreds of meetings, dozens of hearings, and nearly 1000 Court rulings, and consistent with applicable law, this Court makes the following allocation of common benefit fees.

C. Allocation of Fees

The Court will address each common benefit applicant in alphabetical order, setting out the amount of the allocation and the factual basis underlying the Court’s conclusion.

1) Alley, Clark, Greiwe & Fulmer

Alley, Clark, Greiwe & Fulmer were co-counsel in Kozic v. Merck & Co., a bellwether case which was tried in state court in Tampa, Florida. The case was filed prior to Vioxx being withdrawn from the market and was the last case tried before the announcement of the settlement program. Alley, Clark, Greiwe & Fulmer submitted common benefit hours in the amount of 1,611.25 hours, of which 1,204.75 were partner hours. Alley, Clark, Greiwe & Fulmer incurred $197,945.81 in common benefit costs and enrolled more than 100 cases in the settlement program.

The FAC recommended an award of $365,000. The firm has indicated its acceptance of that recommended amount. The Special Master recommended an award of $365,000.

Based on the firm’s common benefit contribution and considering the nature of the work done by Alley, Clark, Greiwe & Fulmer, including its trial work in the Kozic case, the firm is awarded common benefit fees in the amount of $500,000.

2) Alvarez Law Firm

The Alvarez Law Firm submitted 30 common benefit hours. All time was devoted to document review. An affidavit in support of the petition for common benefit fees was not received. A presentation on behalf of the firm was not made to the Fee Allocation Committee. The Alvarez Law Firm submitted $2,763.89 in common benefit costs. The FAC recommended an award of $15,000. The firm has indicated its acceptance of that recommended amount. The Special Master recommended an award of $15,000.

Based upon the common benefit contributions and considering the nature of the work done by the Alvarez Law Firm, the firm is awarded common benefit fees in the amount of $15,000.

3) Anapol, Schwartz, Weiss, Cohan, Feldman & Smalley, P.C.

Sol Weiss served as Co-Lead Counsel in the New Jersey Coordinated Litigation. Anapol Schwartz was involved in the prosecution of the Yioxx litigation well in advance of the drug’s withdrawal from the market and the firm’s involvement continued until the time of the settlement.

Anapol Schwartz submitted 8,430 common benefit hours, 1,777.25 key lawyer horn’s and 4,034.25 partner hours. Anapol Schwartz incurred $579,749.50 in common benefit expenses. Anapol Schwartz enrolled over 700 claimants in the settlement program. The FAC recommended an award of $3,400,000. The firm objected to that recommended amount and participated in the Special Master’s hearing. The Special Master recommended an award of $4,000,000. The firm has indicated it does not object to a recommendation of that amount.

Therefore, based upon the common benefit contributions and considering the nature of the work done by Anapol Schwartz, including their leadership role in the New Jersey Coordinated Litigation, the firm is awarded common benefit fees in the amount of $4,000,000.

4)Anastopoulo & Clore, LLC

Anastopoulo & Clore, LLC was lead counsel in Reck v. Merck & Co., which was set for trial in the Texas Consolidated Litigation. Consequently, members of the firm participated in extensive case-specific discovery and motion practice. Lawyers for Anastopoulo & Clore also assisted in the development of experts and participated in document review. Anastopoulo & Clore submitted common benefit hours in the amount of 607.75, of which 255.75 are partner hours. More than half of these hours were expended for case assessment, development and administration; 170 hours were expended on discovery. Anastopoulo & Clore incurred $80,373.47 in common benefit costs. The FAC recommended an award of $15,000. The firm has indicated its acceptance of that recommended amount. The Special Master recommended an award of $15,000.

Therefore, based upon the common benefit contributions and considering the nature of the work done by Anastopoulo & Clore, the firm is awarded common benefit fees in the amount of $15,000.00.

5) Andrews & Thornton

Anne Andrews and John Thornton were the primary point of contact for Dr. Douglas Zipes, an expert cardiologist who participated in several bellwether trials, including Barnett v. Merck & Co. Ms. Andrews and Mr. Thornton worked extensively with Dr. Zipes on the development of his Rule 26 report and assisted in Dr. Zipes’ preparation for deposition and trial testimony. Ms. Andrews and Mr. Thornton worked with Jeffrey Popma, an expert cardiologist who testified in the Barnett trial, as well as Dr. Paul Ridker, Dr. Mark Haigney, and Dr. Michael Shlipak, among others. In addition, they pioneered and participated in an extensive vetting process for cardiologists throughout the country for purposes of identifying experts. Andrews & Thornton submitted common benefit hours in the amount of 2,005 hours, of which 1,908.25 were partner hours. Andrews & Thornton incurred $388,500.11 in common benefit costs. The FAC recommended an award of $600,000. The firm has indicated its acceptance of that recomme