United States v. Dimora (836 F. Supp. 2d 534, 2011)

OPINION & ORDER

SARA LIOI, District Judge.

The Indictment charges the defendants, James C. Dimora and Michael D. Gabor, with RICO conspiracy, conspiracy to commit mail fraud and honest services mail fraud, Hobbs Act violations, and various other related crimes. (Doc. No. 444, Third Superseding Indictment.) The charges stem from an extensive three-year federal investigation into allegations of public corruption in Cuyahoga County, Ohio.

On September 1, 2011, defendants filed a series of pre-trial motions. A hearing on all of the pre-trial motions was held October 5, 2011. The Court has already issued several opinions and orders addressing many of these motions. This opinion addresses the remaining pre-trial motions, specifically: Dimora’s motion to suppress evidence seized from the search of his home and office (Doc. No. 422); Dimora’s motion for disclosure of grand jury transcripts and the identities of confidential informants (Doc. No. 417); the motions of Gabor and Dimora to suppress wiretaps (Doc. No. 423 and 424, respectively); and Dimora’s motion to suppress wiretaps based on a failure to minimize (Doc. No. 484).

I. Dimora’s Motion to Suppress Evidence Seized from His Home and Office (Doc. No. 422)

Defendant Dimora seeks to suppress all evidence seized during the July 2008 searches of his home and office owing to what he perceives as insufficiencies in the search warrants and the affidavit offered in support of those warrants. Specifically, Dimora insists that: (1) the affidavit lacked the requisite nexus between the places to be searched and the evidence to be seized; (2) the search warrants were overly broad; (3) the search warrants authorized the seizure of political speech; (4) the affidavit relied on wiretaps obtained in violation of Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Street Act of 1968; and (5) the warrants were not supported by probable cause. The government filed a response in opposition to Dimora’s motion (Doc. No. 478.) and Dimora subsequently filed a reply (Doc. No. 511). Dimora’s fourth contention will be addressed in the separate section of this opinion devoted exclusively to the defendants’ motions to suppress the wiretaps. The remaining contentions are addressed directly below.

On July 25, 2008, a warrant application was submitted for the search of Dimora’s office, as well as the work spaces of other individuals located within the Cuyahoga County Administration Building. (Doc. No. 422-1, Ex. A.) That same day (July 25, 2008), a second application was filed for the search of Dimora’s home. (Doc. No. 422-2, Ex. B.) Both applications were supported by a Master Affidavit, totaling more than 365 pages and including contributions from IRS Agent Kelly Fatula and FBI Special Agent Gregory Curtis. (Doc. No. 422-3 and 422-4, Ex. C.) The Master Affidavit included information derived from a review of bank records and pen registers, physical surveillance, the interception of telephonic communications, search and seizures of computer systems, consensual recordings, and interviews with confidential sources. Both contributing agents also drew from their personal experiences as federal officers in presenting the information to the neutral magistrate.

The Fourth Amendment mandates that there must be probable cause for any search and seizure. U.S. Const. amend. IV. “Probable cause has been defined as ‘reasonable grounds for belief, supported by less than prima facie proof but more than mere suspicion.’ ” United States v. Padro, 52 F.3d 120, 122-23 (6th Cir.1995) (quoting United States v. Bennett, 905 F.2d 931, 934 (6th Cir.1990)). “To demonstrate probable cause to justify the issuance of a search warrant, an affidavit must contain facts that indicate a fair probability that evidence of a crime will be located on the premises of the proposed search.” United States v. Frazier, 423 F.3d 526, 531 (6th Cir.2005) (internal quotations and citation omitted). “Probable cause is based on the totality of the circumstances; it is a ‘practical, non-technical conception that deals with the factual and practical considerations of everyday life.’ ” United States v. Abboud, 438 F.3d 554, 571 (6th Cir.2006) (quoting Frazier, 423 F.3d at 531); see United States v. Lazar, 604 F.3d 230, 241-42 (6th Cir.2010) (trial judge properly found probable cause in commonsense manner where affidavit was based on two-year involvement in case, personal visits to locations, review of bills, and extensive interviews).

A. Nexus with the Location Searched

Dimora first challenges the sufficiency of the affidavit supporting the warrants because it allegedly failed to establish the necessary nexus between the places searched and the items to be seized. “To justify a search, the circumstances must indicate why evidence of illegal activity will be found ‘in a particular place.’ There must, in other words, be a ‘nexus between the place to be searched and the evidence sought.’ ” United States v. Carpenter, 360 F.3d 591, 594 (6th Cir.2004) (quoting United States v. Van Shutters, 163 F.3d 331, 336-37 (6th Cir.1998)). See Frazier, 423 F.3d at 531 (internal quotation and citation omitted) (“To demonstrate probable cause to justify the issuance of a search warrant, an affidavit must contain facts that indicate a fair probability that evidence of a crime will be located on the premises of the proposed search.”) Dimora suggests that the Master Affidavit merely recites conversations between himself and others, but “provides no real implication that any physical or tangible evidence supporting the allegations made in the affidavit would actually exist at the places to be searched.” (Mot. at 6.)

1. The Office Search

With respect to his office, Dimora complains that the Master Affidavit “alleges only that Mr. Dimora’s office possesses a fax machine, Mr. Dimora uses the fax machine and that Mr. Dimora’s assistant was able to handle some business for him.” (Mot. at 7.) He notes that it also alleges that records of calls and meetings may be found at his office.

The government posits that the search warrant for the office instructed agents to seize personal and financial records, campaign records, records pertaining to County employees, and other records relating to County work. It insists that the fact that Dimora served as County Commissioner and had a County office assigned to him for use as County Commissioner is sufficient to establish probable cause that records of county business would be found there. Given the fact that the allegations of criminal activity set forth in the Master Affidavit focused on actions Dimora allegedly took in his position as a Cuyahoga County Commissioner, the Court agrees with the government. See Abboud, 438 F.3d at 572 (“One does not need Supreme Court precedent to support the simple fact that records of illegal business activity are usually kept at either a business location or at the defendant’s home.”); see, e.g., Lazar, 604 F.3d at 241 (warrant applications provided “a fair probability that evidence of health care fraud — -namely, the defendant’s patient files and records— would be found at the defendant treating physician’s offices”).

According to Dimora, the Master Affidavit only offers evidence that he used his office (and his home) for work, and separately offers evidence that he engaged in illegal activity. He argues that there is no connection such that it would be likely that evidence of criminal activity would be found at either location. The Master Affidavit, however, provided more information supporting the searches, and supplied the link to illegal activity. Specifically, it provided:

Multiple telephone calls evidence the fact that DIMORA regularly works from his home and typically travels to his office only on days that Cuyahoga County Commissioners’ meetings are scheduled. DIMORA regularly has employees from his office deliver a folder containing mail, scheduling, and “call sheets” to his home. After DIMORA reviews the items, those same employees pick up the folder and return the items to DIMORA’s office.

As mentioned above, DIMORA’s office paperwork is relevant to this investigation because it is evidence of the meetings, telephone calls, and faxes that DIMORA has had with individuals who have asked him to take official acts in exchange for something of value. Therefore, there is probable cause to believe that the work areas of the sources of that paperwork [including the work stations of other individuals identified therein] will contain documents relevant to the investigation.

(Curtis Master Aff. at 290-94.) This information clearly established that paperwork, along with records of calls, were flowing between Dimora’s home and office. Moreover, the Master Affidavit provides that the work Dimora performed at his office allegedly included unlawful activity that advanced the conspiracy. As such, the Master Affidavit allowed a neutral magistrate to conclude that there was a “fair probability” that information involving illegal activity would be found at Dimora’s office.

2. The Home Search

This same evidence supports a finding of a “fair probability” that evidence of criminal activity would be found in Dimora’s home. The Master Affidavit provides a substantial basis for finding that Dimora did most of his Cuyahoga County Commissioner work from home, only coming into the office on days of scheduled commissioner meetings, that he regularly had employees deliver mail, call sheets, and other office paperwork to his home, and that this paperwork is believed to contain information that individuals asked Dimora to take official action in exchange for things of value. In fact, the Master Affidavit offered specific examples of such activity, including an incident on February 18, 2008, wherein Dimora instructed an employee to fax bids related to the sale of a parcel to a contractor. It was apparent that the employee had originally sent the fax to Dimora’s home. The Master Affidavit further recounts information supporting a fair probability that Dimora received political information at home, and there was evidence that campaign contributions were among the “things of value” received by Dimora. (See Curtis Master Aff. at 290-92.) See United States v. Gardiner, 468 F.3d 445, 470-71 (6th Cir.2006) (evidence that the defendant was involved in the conspiracy, coupled with evidence that he maintained an office in his home with a hidden safe, was sufficient to establish probable cause for a search of his home). Based on the “totality of the circumstances,” and applying the “practical considerations of everyday life,” the Court finds that the Master Affidavit supplied the necessary nexus between the locations searched and the evidence sought. See Abboud, 438 F.3d at 571-72

B. Particularity

Defendant Dimora insists that the warrants are merely “general” in nature, and, thus, violate the particularity requirement. The Fourth Amendment requires a warrant to “particularly describe the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. “The purpose of this particularity requirement is to prevent the use of general warrants authorizing wide-ranging rummaging searches in violation of the Constitution’s proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures.” United States v. Logan, 250 F.3d 350, 365 (6th Cir.2001) (citing Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 480, 96 S.Ct. 2737, 49 L.Ed.2d 627 (1976)). “[T]he degree of specificity required is flexible and will vary depending on the crime involved and the types of items sought.” United States v. Henson, 848 F.2d 1374, 1383 (6th Cir.1988); see United States v. Campbell, 256 F.3d 381, 389 (6th Cir.2001). A determination as to particularity is “best resolved upon examination of the circumstances of the particular case.” Logan, 250 F.3d at 365. Further, a “description contained in a warrant is sufficiently particular if it is as specific as the circumstances and the nature of the alleged crime permit. In addition, once a category of documents has been adequately described in the warrant, in part by an illustrative list of items to be seized, the Fourth Amendment is not violated when officers executing the warrant exercise minimal judgment as to whether a particular document falls within the described category.” Id. (internal citation omitted).

Even broadly worded warrants allowing for the seizure of all business records have been upheld where the investigation has involved a “pervasive scheme to defraud.” United States v. Martinelli, 454 F.3d 1300, 1308 (11th Cir.2006) (quoting United States v. Sawyer, 799 F.2d 1494, 1508 (11th Cir.1986)); see United States v. Smith, 424 F.3d 992, 1006 (9th Cir.2005) (internal quotation omitted) (stating that “even an ‘extraordinarily broad’ warrant authorizing the seizure of essentially all business records may be justified when there is probable cause to believe that fraud permeated the entire business operation”); United States v. Travers, 233 F.3d 1327, 1330 (11th Cir.2000) (internal citation omitted) (noting that cases involving “complex financial fraud ... justify a more flexible reading of the fourth amendment particularity requirement”).

Dimora argues that the warrants were overly broad because they permitted the seizure of “any information that pertains, in any way whatsoever, to over 80 different entities and individuals.” (Mot. at 10.) Dimora’s description fails to take into account the detail provided in the supporting documents, as well as the broad scope of the investigation.

Attached to each warrant was a picture of the place to be searched, along with a written description of the location. Also attached to each warrant was a multi-page list of fairly detailed categories of documents and other items that could be seized. Most of the categories were further limited by dates, with many limited to no more than five years preceding the search, and some limited further still to only two years prior to the search. The warrants also incorporated the 365-page Master Affidavit that included sworn statements from the agents seeking the warrants.

The Master Affidavit, in turn, included details relating to at least 60 fraudulent schemes in which Dimora and other co-conspirators were alleged to have been involved, the dates of the schemes, the names of other individuals or entities allegedly involved, and information indicating that the items sought were related to these schemes. (See Resp. at 9-15 (setting forth the citations in the Master Affidavit to the various schemes).) Further, the accompanying Master Affidavit provided an evidentiary basis for each scheme, see Logan, 250 F.3d at 365 (warrant sufficient where alleged items sought related to a fraudulent scheme, and the scheme was set forth in the warrant and accompanying affidavit), and it is clear that the categories of things to be searched were narrowly tailored to recover documents and other items that would amount to evidence of the fraud laid out in the accompanying Master Affidavit. See, e.g., United States v. Poulsen, No. CR2-06-129, 2008 WL 271661, at *5 (S.D.Ohio Jan. 30, 2008), aff'd, 655 F.3d 492 (6th Cir.2011) (warrant calling for the seizure of “any and all records or information ... relating to ... accounts receivables, sellers of account receivables; investors; note holders; banking records; wire transfer records; and reports to investors, noteholders or indenture trustees” was not beyond the scope of the purported fraudulent schemes). There is no doubt that the search warrants were broad. However, given the fact that federal agents were investigating extensive and far-reaching public corruption, involving multiple public officials and private business executives and companies, the details in the warrants and supporting documents were sufficiently specific as the “ ‘circumstances and the nature of the activity under investigation would permit.’ ” United States v. Ables, 167 F.3d 1021, 1033 (6th Cir.1999) (quoting United States v. Henson, 848 F.2d 1374, 1383 (6th Cir.1988)); see, e.g., United States v. Frost, 125 F.3d 346, 388 (6th Cir.1997) (stating that the search warrant “appropriately authorized the extensive seizure of paper and computer documents in this complicated mail fraud case”).

Dimora also argues that the warrants were overly broad because they sought documents reflecting his “awareness” of the County’s policies on hiring, promotion, outside employment, lobbying, and ethics. Likewise, he argues that the fact that the warrants sought all documents reflecting his “awareness” of any “Sunshine laws” was overly broad. With respect to both of these categories of documents, Dimora suggests that the language did not allow law enforcement officials to “reasonably ascertain” or “identify” the things to be seized. (Mot. at 9.) However, in Logan, the Sixth Circuit upheld a similar search warrant where its apparently general nature was due to the fact that agents were investigating a complex and far-reaching fraud. Logan, 250 F.3d at 365. Viewing the sufficiency of the warrants from the specific circumstances surrounding the multiple and complex alleged fraudulent schemes under investigation, the categories of items identified in the warrants were sufficiently particular to allow the agents to recover relevant documents with only minimal judgment. Id.; see United States v. Blair, 214 F.3d 690, 697 (6th Cir.2000); United States v. Word, 806 F.2d 658, 661 (6th Cir.1986). Accordingly, there is no basis for invalidating the search warrants here on grounds that they lacked the necessary particularity.

Of course, even if the Court found that portions of the warrants were overly broad, the remedy would not necessarily be suppression of all evidence derived from the searches. Instead, the proper remedy would be to “sever the overbroad portions of the warrant from those portions that are sufficiently particular.” United States v. Ford, 184 F.3d 566, 578 (6th Cir.1999) (citing United States v. Blakeney, 942 F.2d 1001, 1027 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1008, 112 S.Ct. 646, 116 L.Ed.2d 663 (1991); see United States v. Hanna, 661 F.3d 271, 287-89 (6th Cir.2011)). Dimora has failed to identify which documents were seized as a result of any over-breadth in the warrants. As such, even if this Court were to find over-breadth, Dimora has failed in his burden of identifying what documents would be properly suppressed. See, e.g., Abboud, 438 F.3d at 576 (proper to suppress only documents beyond the relevant time period); Blakeney, 942 F.2d at 1027 (“jewelry seized pursuant to the overbroad portion of the search warrant was not introduced into evidence”); United States v. Greene, 250 F.3d 471, 477 (6th Cir.2001) (severance of over-broad clause in warrant did not “impugn the validity of the three firearms which are the basis for Green’s conviction” and were properly seized pursuant to the warrant).

C. Probable Cause

Defendant Dimora suggests that there is a lack of probable cause because the Master Affidavit merely strings together conversations involving Dimora and others, with no evidence to support the conclusions reached by the affiant. He also complains that the warrants gratuitously include “salacious” facts and draw improper inferences from Dimora’s innocent receipt of dinners and invitations to family and friends’ barbecues.

The Master Affidavit incorporates sworn statements from IRS Special Agent Fatula and FBI Special Agent Curtis. S.A. Fatula details her review of the financial and other bank records of various co-conspirators, and demonstrates that many of the public officials undér investigation, including Dimora, appeared to be living beyond their means. (Fatula Master Aff. at 1 — 48.) S.A. Curtis’s affidavit begins with his representation that there is probable cause to believe that Dimora and other co-conspirators had committed certain crimes, including Hobbs Act violations, 18 U.S.C. § 1951; obstruction, 18 U.S.C. § 1512; bank fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1344; and other related crimes.

Before identifying with particularity the places to be searched, the Curtis Affidavit describes the scope of the investigation and the use of various investigatory techniques. His affidavit explains that a focus of the investigation had been Dimora’s and Frank Russo’s “obtaining or being offered things of value from local contractors and individuals seeking to do business with Cuyahoga County.” (Curtis Master Aff. at 21.) It also details the use of confidential sources, the nature and length of the relationship between the affiant and the source, the reliability of the source, and each source’s connection to the alleged public corruption fraud under investigation.

The next section of the Curtis Master Affidavit lays out the numerous schemes in which Dimora and his co-conspirators are alleged to have participated. For all of the approximately 60 schemes, the affiant provides identifies the participants in each scheme and the participants’ alleged roles, along with a detailed account of the evidence that supports the affiant’s conclusion that the scheme involved criminal activity. Included in these recitations are word-for-word accounts of intercepted communications, as well as information from confidential sources and various forms of surveillance.

For example, the very first scheme identified involved a trip to Las Vegas by Dimora, Gabor, Kevin Kelley, Steve Pumper, Frank Russo, and others. It was alleged that the trip was funded by Ferris Kleem, who owned Blaze Construction and was a part owner of Phoenix Cement, and that Kleem financed the trip in exchange for influence from Dimora on the awarding of County projects. In support of this scheme, the Master Affidavit details phone conversations between Dimora and others wherein Dimora expressed his understanding that Kleem would pay for the trip and various expenses incurred during the trip. Phone conversations also supported a finding that Kleem covered the expenses in the hopes of receiving favorable consideration from Dimora on certain public works contracts. (Curtis Master Aff. at 31-37.)

Additional schemes provided details as to (1) the other things of value that Dimora and Russo allegedly received in exchange for official action and (2) the conversations and other evidence that supported such allegations. These schemes establish probable cause to believe that Dimora had committed violations of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951. See United States v. Loftus, 992 F.2d 793, 796 (8th Cir.1993) (quoting McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257, 273, 111 S.Ct. 1807, 114 L.Ed.2d 307 (1991)) (“When a public official accepts money and ‘asserts that his official conduct will be controlled by the terms of the promise or undertaking,’ that official has received money ‘under color of official right within the meaning of the Hobbs Act.’ ”); United States v. Collins, 78 F.3d 1021, 1033-34 (6th Cir.1996) (same); see also United States v. Ostrander, 411 F.3d 684, 691 (6th Cir.2005) (to prove a Hobbs Act violation, the government must prove the interference with interstate commerce, in the course of a substantive criminal act).

The Curtis Master Affidavit also outlined and detailed evidence that supported a probable cause determination that Dimora had engaged in obstruction. See United States v. Collis, 128 F.3d 313, 318 (6th Cir.1997) (outlining the elements of obstruction). For example, the Master Affidavit offered evidence that, after Pumper was approached by the FBI in connection with allegations that he had bribed a City of Cleveland building inspector, Dimora instructed Pumper, Forlani, and others to create false invoices for work done on Dimora’s house in order to make it appear as though Dimora had paid for such work when in fact it was done in exchange for help securing County contracts. (Curtis Master Aff. at 93-125.)

There was substantial evidence in the Master Affidavit connecting Dimora to alleged fraud, obstruction, and Hobbs Act violations, and providing support for the search of his office and home. Dimora, however, selectively identifies a few instances where he believes that the Master Affidavit fails to make a direct connection between the conversations and the alleged criminal activity. While it is true that some schemes describe a quid pro quo without direct evidence of the connection, such a connection can be established by circumstantial evidence. See United States v. Bryant, 655 F.3d 232, 243-44 (3d Cir.2011) (in honest services fraud case, evidence of quid pro quo arrangement may be established with circumstantial evidence). For example, at the time that Dimora was allegedly using his office to secure County funding for Alternatives Agency, co-conspirator Kevin Kelley was depositing checks from Alternatives Agency totaling more than $75,000 into his checking account and thanking Alternatives Agency Director Brian Schuman for contributing to the Las Vegas trip that was attended by Dimora and others. (Curtis Master Aff. at 203-210.)

Likewise, the Hegedus Empire Tree scheme, highlighted by Dimora, was supported by more than amassed conversations and logical leaps. The Master Affidavit demonstrated that Hegedus solicited Dimora’s influence over a judicial proceeding involving Hegedus and one of its employees, as well as Dimora’s efforts to obtain public works contracts for the company in exchange for personal benefit. In the conversation, Dimora makes a clear reference to Hegedus’s willingness to contribute to events. (Id. at 276-79.) Further, while Dimora characterizes the Hegedus barbecue he attended as a “private barbecue hosted by a friend,” the government argues that the inference remains that it was a thing of value received by Dimora in exchange for him exercising his public duties. In his reply, Dimora challenges the affiant’s conclusions with respect to much of the evidence offered in support. He claims, without support, that the government should have eliminated all possible “innocent” inferences to be drawn from the evidence. But “the probable cause requirement does not require that every contrary hypothesis be excluded.” United States v. Alfano, 838 F.2d 158, 162 (6th Cir.1988), cert. denied, Palazzolo v. United States, 488 U.S. 821, 109 S.Ct. 64, 102 L.Ed.2d 42 (1988); see United States v. Poulsen, 655 F.3d 492, 504 (6th Cir.2011) (citing Alfano, 838 F.2d at 162) (“Certainty is not required, but rather a fair probability and something more than mere suspicion.”); United States v. Martin, 526 F.3d 926, 936 (6th Cir.2008) (“Probable cause is described as a fair probability — not an absolute certainty .... ”). These arguments actually go to Dimora’s theory of the defense that these were really innocent encounters. In the end it would be for the jury, as fact finder, to determine what reasonable inferences may be drawn from the evidence; at this stage, however, the conversations and other evidence offered in the Master Affidavit support a finding of a fair probability of illegal activity.

Not all schemes relied on inference and circumstantial evidence. Some schemes were far more specific. The Master Affidavit sets forth a scheme whereby Dimora allegedly used his influence with County Sheriff Gerald McFaul to obtain County employment for co-conspirator Jerry Skuhrovec in exchange for Skuhrovec holding a fundraiser for Anthony Russo and for another unspecified thing of value. According to the Master Affidavit, Dimora refused to hire McFaul’s grandson for a County position until McFaul hired Skuhrovec. The details of this quid pro quo scheme were laid out in a phone conversation between Dimora and Michael Forlani wherein Dimora told Forlani that Frank [Russo] told Jerry [Skuhrovec] “that he [Skuhrovec] wouldn’t get the job with McFaul if he didn’t get the money for Anthony [Russo].” (Curtis Master Aff. at 156.) Dimora later stated in a conversation with Skuhrovec, “We’re going to put his grandson on. I didn’t put him on deliberately until you got on. Cause if he don’t put you on, f — k his grandson. I ain’t putting him on. I got it in limbo. I got it held up.” (Id. at 157.) When Skuhrovec called Dimora to thank him for the job with McFaul, he said, “I’m going to have to bring food all summer [to Dimora’s pool parties].” Dimora replied, “More than food Jer, but I’ll explain that more when we’re not on the phone.” (Id. at 158.) These conversations clearly allow for a finding that political appointments were being made in exchange for things of value, and that Dimora was a part of the schemes.

In another scheme highlighted by Dimora, he complains that there were insufficient facts to set forth probable cause to believe that he had accepted things of value from Ken Fisher in exchange for assisting Fisher in obtaining County legal work and securing an appointment to a Cleveland Metroparks position for an unidentified individual. He notes that a reference to “go[ing] back” to a restaurant does not supply probable cause that Fisher had bought Dimora dinner in the past and would do so again. (See id. at 165.)

Of course, if the Court were to consider this portion of the Master Affidavit in a vacuum, it might find that probable cause was lacking. The Court is required, however, to consider the entire affidavit and determine whether, under the totality of circumstances, there is probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed and that evidence of such crime will be discovered during a search of the premises in question. See United States v. Olson, 408 F.3d 366, 372 (7th Cir.2005) (affirming denial of motion to suppress; individual details were not sufficient for probable cause but together supported issuance of search warrant); United States v. Maddox, No. 2:09-CR-045, 2010 WL 3155896, at *2 (E.D.Tenn. Aug. 10, 2010) (quoting United States v. Landmesser, 553 F.2d 17, 20 (6th Cir.1977) (“Individual paragraphs should not be read ‘in isolation from the remainder of the affidavit.’ ”)). Given the substantial documentation of Dimora’s alleged practice of receiving free meals and other things of value from contractors and others seeking official action from him, a fair probability existed that Fisher had paid for a meal in the past and was planning to do so again.

Ultimately, Dimora’s attempts to pick apart conclusions drawn by the contributing agents as to certain schemes fall short of defeating a finding of probable cause. Even without consideration of these particular schemes, there was ample evidence supporting the validity of the warrants. See, e.g., United States v. Mastromatteo, 538 F.3d 535, 541 (6th Cir.2008) (probable cause still existed and a Franks hearing was not necessary, even without certain questionable portions of the supporting affidavit); United States v. Graham, 275 F.3d 490, 505 (6th Cir.2001) (even if omitted material had been included in the affidavit, probable cause would still have existed); United States v. Zimmer, 14 F.3d 286, 288 (6th Cir.1994), rev’d and remanded on other grounds, No. 94-2038, 1995 WL 462405 (6th Cir. Aug. 3, 1995) (probable cause to support search warrant, even if informant’s statements were taken out of the analysis).

On the whole, the Master Affidavit provided a sufficient basis for the neutral magistrate to conclude that there was probable cause to believe that Dimora and others had engaged in criminal activity and that evidence of such activity was likely to be found in Dimora’s office and home. For this reason alone, Dimora’s motion to suppress must be denied.

D. Good Faith

Even if probable cause were lacking, however, the searches would still be upheld under the good faith exception articulated in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3430, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984). Under this exception, the exclusionary rule will not apply to bar the admission of evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment where the officers had a “good-faith reliance on a search warrant that is subsequently held to be defective.” United States v. Weaver, 99 F.3d 1372, 1380 (6th Cir.1996). The “good-faith inquiry is confined to the objectively ascertainable question whether a reasonably well trained officer would have known that the search was illegal despite the magistrate’s authorization. In making this determination, all of the circumstances ... may be considered.” Leon, 468 U.S. at 922-23 n. 23, 104 S.Ct. 3405.

The good-faith defense will not apply, however, where: (1) the supporting affidavit contains information the affiant knew or should have known is false; (2) the issuing magistrate lacked neutrality and detachment; (3) the affidavit is devoid of information that would support a probable cause determination making any belief that probable cause exists completely unreasonable; or (4) the warrant is facially deficient. Leon, 468 U.S. at 923, 104 S.Ct. 3405; United States v. Helton, 314 F.3d 812, 824 (6th Cir.2003).

The government argues that, given the level of detail in the Master Affidavit, setting forth over 60 schemes, many of which contained “explicit exchanges of things of value for official acts,” and the details and specific terms of the categories of documents to be retrieved, the officers acted in good faith in executing the warrants. (Resp. at 54.) The Court agrees. It is clear from the Master Affidavit that the contributing agents took much care in laying out the over 60 schemes of fraud with specific details, which were substantiated by bank records, physical surveillance, intercepted telephone communications, searches and seizures of computer systems, pen registers, consensual recordings, and interviews with confidential sources. The Master Affidavit also sets forth Dimora’s involvement in the fraudulent schemes, including his alleged receipt of things of value in exchange for official action. Appended to the warrant applications, in turn, were several pages of detailed categories of documents and other items that were to be seized. Many of the categories were further limited by dates. Given the obvious effort exhibited by the applying agents to comply with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment, coupled with the fact that the applications were granted by a detached and neutral magistrate, the Court cannot find that a reasonably well trained officer would have known that such a search was illegal if, in fact, it had been illegal (and as stated previously, the Court finds that it was not). See, e.g., United States v. Stelten, 867 F.2d 446, 451 (8th Cir.1989) (good faith exception applied where agents “took much care in drafting the descriptions of the items to be seized”); United States v. Buck, 813 F.2d 588, 593 (2d Cir.1987) (good faith exception applied where officers provided details outlining the crimes and the evidence sought to a neutral magistrate).

Dimora challenges a finding of good faith, however, arguing that the absence of probable cause is so great as to render it unreasonable that any officer would have found probable cause, due to a lack of nexus between the items sought and the location to be searched. However, “[w]here a warrant is held invalid due to a simple error in the determination of probable cause, the evidence should be suppressed only if the supporting affidavit was ‘so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable.’ ” United States v. Savoca, 761 F.2d 292, 296 (6th Cir.1985) (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 923, 104 S.Ct. 3405) (emphasis in original). As set forth above, the agents offered detailed information as to Dimora’s use of his home and office and why evidence of suspected illegal activity would be found at these locations. Even if this information was technically insufficient to establish the necessary nexus, which this Court does not believe that it was, “the connection was not so remote as to trip on the ‘so lacking’ hurdle.” United States v. Schultz, 14 F.3d 1093, 1098 (6th Cir.1994) (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 923, 104 S.Ct. 3405) (finding the existence of good faith even though the affidavits failed to establish the necessary nexus); see Van Shutters, 163 F.3d at 338 (same). The Court thus finds that the searches were constitutionally valid for the additional reason that the officers executed the search warrants in good faith.

E. Political Speech

Defendant Dimora also complains that the warrants sought information, including campaign contributions, which could be categorized as protected by the First Amendment, and suggests that the directive to seize documents containing such information was based on mere “conclusions” that were not supported by “concrete evidence” that Dimora accepted campaign contributions in exchange for steering bond issuances and providing other official acts. (Mot. at 13.)

It is true that the seizure of protected speech requires an application of the Fourth Amendment with “scrupulous exactitude.” Frisby v. United States, 79 F.3d 29, 32 (6th Cir.1996) (quoting Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 564, 98 S.Ct. 1970, 56 L.Ed.2d 525 (1978)). It is also true, however, that “the fact that some of the seized property is expressive written material does not insulate it from government seizure where there is, as here, probable cause to believe that it was used to facilitate criminal activity.” Id. at 32. Moreover, the standard for probable cause is not “concrete evidence,” but rather is whether there is a “fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983). A court will find that the Fourth Amendment has been followed with “scrupulous exactitude” where “[pjroperly administered, the preconditions for a warrant — probable cause, specificity with respect to the place to be searched and the things to be seized, and overall reasonableness” — are met. See Zurcher, 436 U.S. at 565, 98 S.Ct. 1970.

Here, the affidavit offered in support of the warrants established multiple schemes, the existence of which was supported by information from confidential sources and intercepted wiretaps involving Dimora and others, wherein Dimora was allegedly motivated in the performance of his official duties by the likely receipt of campaign contributions. (See Curtis Master Aff. at 22, 41, 156, 157, 158-61, 162-65, 189-91, 273-74, 276-78, 281-85.) The fact that some of the seized property was protected by the First Amendment does not insulate it from seizure where the other requirements of the Fourth Amendment — probable cause, particularity, and sufficient nexus — are met. See Frisby, 79 F.3d at 32.

Because the warrants and the supporting affidavit satisfy the Fourth Amendment’s requirements and because the warrants were executed in good faith, Dimora’s motion to suppress the evidence resulting from the search of his home and office is DENIED.

II. Dimora’s Motion for Disclosure of Grand Jury Transcripts and Identities of Confidential Informants (Doc. No. 417)

A. Grand Jury Transcripts

Defendant Dimora moves for the disclosure of all grand jury transcripts, as well as the identification of all confidential sources and government deals. He bases his request for grand jury transcripts on the following grounds: (1) extensive and ongoing use of the grand jury; (2) such information may contain “relevant and possibly exculpatory [Brady] evidence”; (3) the inability to identify any of the government’s confidential sources; and (4) extensive publicity. He makes further claims with respect to his request for the identities of confidential informants and any deals they may have been given, noting that without such information he will be unable to investigate whether such individuals have relevant or exculpatory evidence. According to Dimora, there is a “possibility that an informant may possess evidence relevant to Mr. Dimora’s innocence.” (Mot. at 7.) The government filed a response to Dimora’s motion (Doc. No. 481) and Dimora subsequently filed a reply (Doc. No. 502.)

A party seeking disclosure of grand jury material under Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure must demonstrate a particularized need. See Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211, 228, 99 S.Ct. 1667, 60 L.Ed.2d 156 (1979). To meet the particularized need standard, a party-must establish that: (1) the material sought is necessary to avoid a possible injustice in another judicial proceeding; (2) the need for disclosure outweighs the need for continued secrecy; and (3) the request is structured narrowly to cover only the material needed. See id. at 222, 99 S.Ct. 1667. The district court has considerable discretion in determining whether to require disclosure of grand jury proceedings. See id. at 223, 99 S.Ct. 1667; In re Antitrust Grand Jury, 805 F.2d 155, 161 (6th Cir.1986) (same).

Dimora offers nothing more than general representations that the transcripts may contain relevant and/or exculpatory evidence. This generalized request is insufficient to establish a particularized need for the transcripts. See, e.g., United States v. Miramontez, 995 F.2d 56, 59-60 (5th Cir.1993) (particularized need not shown because request was general and did not specify which portions of proceedings should be disclosed); United States v. Azad, 809 F.2d 291, 294-95 (6th Cir.1986) (particularized need not shown when request for wide-ranging search to bolster unsubstantiated claim of prosecutorial misconduct was based on prosecutor’s “offhand remarks”); cf. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 838 F.2d 304, 308 (8th Cir.1988) (particularized need existed because plaintiffs case significantly hampered without grand jury materials, documents sought generated independently of grand jury, grand jury long dissolved, and disclosure carefully limited).

Defendant Dimora’s request for grand jury transcripts is, therefore, DENIED.

B. Confidential Source Information

Dimora also seeks the identification of all confidential sources. He argues that “[b]oth the identity and information regarding any confidential informants is important to the defense because of the possibility that an informant may possess evidence relevant to Mr. Dimora’s innocence.” (Mot. at 7.) He further notes that his request also encompasses the government’s entire internal “Confidential Source file.” (Id.)

The government has a limited privilege to withhold the identity of a confidential informant. Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 59-62, 77 S.Ct. 623, 1 L.Ed.2d 639 (1957); United States v. Jenkins, 4 F.3d 1338, 1341 (6th Cir.1993); see United States v. Moore, 954 F.2d 379, 381 (6th Cir.1992). “The purpose of the privilege is the furtherance and protection of the public interest in effective law enforcement.” Roviaro, 353 U.S. at 59, 77 S.Ct. 623. It encourages persons to cooperate with the police in such a capacity. Id. The privilege is not, however, absolute. “Where disclosure of an informant’s identity is relevant and helpful to the defense of an accused, or is essential to a fair adjudication of the case, the privilege must give way.” United States v. Leslie, No. 4:02CR039, 2002 WL 32059743, at *3 (E.D.Tenn. Oct. 4, 2002) (citing Roviaro, 353 U.S. at 60-61, 77 S.Ct. 623) (omitting further citations); see United States v. Hammons, 411 Fed.Appx. 837, 843 (6th Cir.2011); Moore, 954 F.2d at 381 (quoting Roviaro, 353 U.S. at 62, 77 S.Ct. 623) (“The court must ‘balance the public interest in protecting the flow of information against the individual’s right to prepare his defense.’ ”).

The burden of establishing the need for disclosure of an informant’s identity is upon the party who seeks the disclosure. See Moore, 954 F.2d at 381; United States v. Sharp, 778 F.2d 1182, 1185 (6th Cir.1985). A mere request is not sufficient to establish need. United States v. Smith, 90 Fed.Appx. 120, 125 (6th Cir.2004) (quoting Sharp, 778 F.2d at 1187) (holding that the denial of a defense motion to compel disclosure of any informant’s identity was not an abuse of discretion where defendant made no showing as to how such disclosure would substantively assist the defense.) Speculation as to helpfulness also falls short of establishing need. See United States v. Williams, 898 F.2d 1400, 1402 (9th Cir.1990); Sharp, 778 F.2d at 1187 (quoting United States v. Gonzales, 606 F.2d 70, 75 (5th Cir.1979) (“Mere conjecture or supposition about the possible relevance of the informant’s testimony is insufficient to warrant disclosure.”)). Instead, a defendant must come forward with probative evidence supporting the need for disclosure. Sharp, 778 F.2d at 1187.

Here, Dimora offers nothing more than the “possibility” that such disclosure might lead to exculpatory evidence; this is insufficient to meet his burden. Further, the government has indicated that, to the extent such information triggers its discovery obligations under Giglio, Brady, and the Jenks Act, it will disclose the information in accordance with the rules of law enunciated under these authorities.

At the hearing on October 5, 2011, counsel for Dimora indicated that they were in possession of information that they believed called into question the integrity of a particular confidential source. Specifically, counsel indicated that they had engaged in conversations with counsel for the individual they believe to be the confidential source in question, and he shared with them his client’s belief that he did not say certain things that were allegedly attributed to him in the Master Affidavit. The Court granted Dimora leave to supplement his motion with evidence that would substantiate his counsel’s claims. His supplement (see Doc. No. 519, filed under seal) merely reiterates the suspicions his counsel shared with the Court at the hearing, but provides no substantiation (such as an affidavit) for these claims. These bare suspicions are insufficient to justify requiring the government to identify this, or any, confidential source. See, e.g., United States v. Makki No. 06-20324, 2007 WL 781821, at *3 (E.D.Mich. Mar. 13, 2007) (refusing to require the government to reveal the identity of confidential sources, noting that “[ujnsworn assertions of ... counsel will not suffice”).

Dimora has failed to meet his burden of demonstrating the need for such information. His motion to compel the government to reveal the identities of the confidential sources is, therefore, DENIED.

III. Motions to Suppress the Wiretaps (Doc. Nos. 423 and 424)

Both defendants seek the suppression of all the wiretap communications intercepted by the FBI in which they are parties, as well as the suppression of all information derived therefrom. The government has filed an “Omnibus Response” (Doc. No. 476) to the defendants’ motions to suppress the wiretaps and fruits of the wiretaps, and the defendants have, in turn, filed separate replies (Doc. Nos. 510 (Gabor) and 512 (Dimora)). Both defendants challenge the wiretaps on the basis of an absence of probable cause, a lack of necessity, and a failure to minimize. Defendant Dimora also challenges the intercepts on the grounds that they were not authorized by the proper agent, that they violated his First Amendment rights, and that there were a variety of deficiencies in the warrants themselves. Defendant Gabor requests a Franks hearing.

The first wiretap application was filed by the government on December 5, 2007, and the first order of authorization was also filed on December 5, 2007. This application was renewed for the first time on December 21, 2007. Additional applications for renewal followed. While each subsequent application included different factual details and identified new schemes as they were unearthed during the investigation, each of the applications mirrored the original application. The first order of authorization was also issued on December 5, 2007, and each of the subsequent orders likewise mirrored the order issued on December 5, 2007. The Court’s analysis therefore applies to all of the applications and orders.

Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520, allows an aggrieved person to move to suppress the contents of intercepted oral or wire communications, or evidence derived from such communications, obtained in violation of the statute. An aggrieved person may challenge the use of such evidence at trial on the grounds that:

(i)the communication was unlawfully intercepted;

(ii) the order of authorization or approval under which it was intercepted is insufficient on its face; or

(iii) the interception was not made in conformity with the order of authorization or approval.

18 U.S.C. § 2518(10)(a).

A. Probable Cause

Both the Fourth Amendment and Title III require a showing of probable cause before a wiretap authorization order may issue. Specifically, Title III requires a finding of probable cause as to three circumstances. The judge reviewing a wiretap application must determine, among other things, that

(a) there is probable cause for belief that an individual is committing, has committed, or is about to commit a particular offense enumerated in section 2516 of this chapter;

(b) there is probable cause for belief that particular communications concerning that offense will be obtained through such interception;

(d) except as provided in subsection (11) [exception inapplicable here], there is probable cause for belief that the facilities from which, or the place where, the wire, oral, or electronic communications are to be intercepted are being used, or are about to be used, in connection with the commission of such offense, or are leased to, listed in the name of, or commonly used by such person.

18 U.S.C. 2518(3)(a)-(d). The challenges to probable cause brought by Dimora and Gabor deal primarily with the probable cause requirements found in paragraphs (a) and (b).

In determining whether probable cause exists to issue a wiretap order, “[c]ertainty is not required, but rather a fair probability and something more than mere suspicion.” United States v. Poulsen, 655 F.3d 492, 504 (6th Cir.2011) (citing United States v. Alfano, 838 F.2d 158, 162 (6th Cir.1988)). “A succession of superficially innocent events can be sufficient for probable cause if ‘a prudent man could say to himself that an innocent course of conduct was substantially less likely than a criminal one.’ ” Id. (quoting Alfano, 838 F.2d at 162-63).

“[I]n evaluating the existence of probable cause, reviewing courts must give substantial deference to the [issuing judge’s] determination.” United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 967, 104 S.Ct. 3430, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citations omitted). “Thus, the fact that a later trial judge or reviewing court may feel that a different conclusion was appropriate does not require, nor even authorize, the suppression of evidence gained through” the issuance of the wiretap order in question. Alfano, 838 F.2d at 162. An issuing judge’s “determination on the question of probable cause will not be reversed if the record contains a ‘substantial basis for his probable cause findings.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Lambert, 771 F.2d 83, 93 (6th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1034, 106 S.Ct. 598, 88 L.Ed.2d 577 (1985)); see also United States v. Allen, 211 F.3d 970, 973 (6th Cir.2000) (citation omitted) (Regarding probable cause determinations, “an issuing magistrate’s discretion should only be reversed if it was arbitrarily exercised.”).

Regarding Title III probable cause determinations, a careful reading of § 2518(3) shows that provision contains no requirement that, in order for a valid wiretap order to issue, probable cause be demonstrated as to every individual who is either named as a possible interceptee or who is unnamed yet ultimately intercepted. Rather, the issuing judge need only determine that there is probable cause that “an individual is committing, has committed, or is about to commit a” qualifying offense. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(a) (emphasis added). Probable cause need not exist as to every individual named in the wiretap application and order. United States v. Martin, 599 F.2d 880, 885 (9th Cir.1979) (“Section 2518(3)(a) permits a judge to issue an authorization order upon a showing that probable cause exists with respect to an individual; it does not expressly require a similar showing with respect to each person named in the application.”); see also, e.g., United States v. Figueroa, 757 F.2d 466, 475 (2d Cir.1985) (quoting United States v. Tortorello, 480 F.2d 764, 775 (2d Cir.1973)) (‘“[T]he government need not establish probable cause as to all participants in a conversation. If probable cause has been shown as to one such participant, the statements of the other participants may be intercepted if pertinent to the investigation.’ ”); United States v. Domme, 753 F.2d 950, 954 n. 2 (11th Cir.1985) (citations omitted) (“A wiretap application need not provide probable cause of criminal activity for each person named in an application, or even every resident of the place where the wiretap is sought. What is required is sufficient information so that a judge could find probable cause to believe that the telephone in question is being used in an illegal operation.”) (citation omitted); United States v. Dorfman, 542 F.Supp. 345, 377-78 n. 30 (N.D.Ill.1982) (citation omitted), judgment aff'd sub nom. United States v. Williams, 737 F.2d 594 (7th Cir.1984) (“[T]he government need not demonstrate probable cause for every person named as an interceptee in the order, and ... suppression is not required merely because one person named as an interceptee was placed in the order without probable cause.”).

To require a showing of probable cause as to every potential interceptee named in the application and order would place the government in a most untenable position. The Supreme Court has held that “a wiretap application must name an individual if the Government has probable cause to believe that the individual is engaged in the criminal activity under investigation and expects to intercept the individual’s conversations over the target telephone.” United States v. Donovan, 429 U.S. 413, 428, 97 S.Ct. 658, 50 L.Ed.2d 652 (1977); see also United States v. Kahn, 415 U.S. 143, 155, 94 S.Ct. 977, 39 L.Ed.2d 225 (1974) (“Title III requires the naming of a person in the application or interception order only when the law enforcement authorities have probable cause to believe that that individual is ‘committing the offense’ for which the wiretap is sought.”). If the government were also required to exclude from its list of interceptees all individuals for whom it did not have probable cause, it would be left on a tightrope with no room for even the slightest error when making probable cause determinations. The smallest misstep in either direction would render it in violation of Title III or the Fourth Amendment. Failure to name an individual for whom there was probable cause would violate Donovan, and failure to exclude an individual for whom probable cause was lacking would also amount to a violation. See United States v. Rodriguez, 606 F.Supp. 1363, 1370 (D.Mass.1985) (“To require identification of persons for whom probable cause exists, yet punish for naming a person for whom it does not exist would be to force passage between Scylla and Charybdis.”); Martin, 599 F.2d at 885 (noting that such a requirement would create “an impossible burden of exactness” for the government). This task would be especially harrowing in investigations which — like the one underlying the case at bar — involve a very large number of alleged participants and potential participants.

Moreover, the naming in an application and order of individuals against whom the government has not demonstrated probable cause but whose conversations may nevertheless be intercepted often redounds to the benefit of those interceptees. Section 2518(8)(d) requires that after-the-fact notice of the interception (or lack thereof if the judge reviewing the application for wiretap denies the application) be issued to all those “named in the order or the application.” In light of these provisions, “over-inclusion of persons in [a] wiretap affidavit is not a cause for suppression but rather ‘furthers the policy of preventing unreasonable invasions of privacy’ by ensuring that persons will be given notice of the order and intercepted communications.” United States v. Ambrosio, 898 F.Supp. 177, 184 (S.D.N.Y.1995) (quoting and characterizing United States v. Milan-Colon, Nos. S2, S3 91CR.685(SWK), 1992 WL 236218 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 8, 1992)).

Additionally, § 2518(l)(e) requires the wiretap applicant to supply the reviewing judge with “a full and complete statement of the facts concerning all previous applications known to” the applicant where such applications involved an individual named in the current application. This provision allows the reviewing judge to examine the fruit — or lack thereof — of past wiretaps and thus make a more informed decision as to the propriety of the wiretap application in question. See Clifford Fishman & Anne McKenna, Wiretapping & Eavesdropping: Surveillance in the Internet Age § 8:33 (2010) (discussing the benefits — for both the named individual and the government — of including individuals in a wiretap application for whom probable cause is not established).

Analogy to a conventional search and seizure further demonstrates the soundness of the principle that probable cause as to every interceptee is not necessary. If probable cause exists to believe that documents relating to the execution of a crime are housed in a specified residence and a warrant is issued as to that residence and those documents, they may be seized even if they were written in whole or in part by an individual against whom the searching authority did not have probable cause to believe was personally involved in the crime. See generally Kahn, 415 U.S. at 155 n. 15, 94 S.Ct. 977 (analogizing wiretap orders to conventional search and seizure warrants in a related context).

1. Confidential Sources

Both defendants challenge the veracity or reliability and basis of knowledge of the confidential sources relied upon by the government to demonstrate probable cause in its wiretap applications. Defendant Dimora contends that the information obtained from the confidential sources “was from unreliable individuals looking to avoid their own legal problems, lacked any explicit or detailed information, was often second hand and was often easily contradicted with a simple public records check or investigation.” (Dimora Mot. at 12.)

It appears that Dimora’s challenges to veracity or reliability and basis of knowledge are limited to five of the ten confidential sources relied upon in the affidavit accompanying the government’s December 5th wiretap application. For these five confidential sources, Dimora brings three main types of concerns: (1) that the information provided by the confidential source constituted hearsay or rumor (e.g., id. at 16, 19); (2) that the confidential source erred on a factual detail (e.g., id. at 13, 14, 20, 33); and (3) that the confidential source is known to have himself been involved in bribery or other crime (e.g., Dimora Reply at 3, 6).

Defendant Gabor’s arguments are similar, though he raises challenges to nine of the ten confidential sources relied upon in the government’s December 5th application. Gabor asserts that, though the government is required to establish the veracity or reliability and basis of knowledge for all the confidential sources, it has instead merely alleged “in vague terms” that these factors are present for each confidential source and “provides no specific details for corroboration.” (Gabor Mot. at 8.) Where acts of specific corroboration are presented in the affidavit, Gabor contends that the facts corroborated consist only of information that is “generally known” or “common knowledge.” (Gabor Reply at 3, 4.) Gabor also raises seve